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NOTE.

The following selection of cases in the law of Damages has been

made primarily for use in connection with the lectures upon that

subject given in the Law Department of the University of Michigan.

The purpose has been partly to supply illustrations of the applica-

tion of principles referred to in the lectures, and partly to supplement

the lectures by rounding out the view of certain ﬁelds not otherwise

completely developed.

Arbitrary, but inexorable, considerations of size and price have

determined the scope of the selection; and, for reasons perhaps suf-

ﬁciently obvious, preference has been given, when possible, to cases

which have appeared in the National Reporter System. It is, how-

ever, due to the publishers to say that, with respect to both of the

considerations above mentioned, their attitude has been constantly

NOTE.

generous.

The cases, as a rule, are not annotated, and they have usually been

reproduced entire, although some parts of them may not be germane

to the subject of Damages. F. B. M.

UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN,

Ann Arbor, November 1, 1898.
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The following selt>ction of cases in the law of Damages has been
made primarily for use in connection with the lectures upon that
subject given in the Law Department of the University of Michigan.
The purpose has been partly to supply illustrations of the application of principles referred to in the lectures, and partly to supplement
the lectures by rounding out the view of certain ftelds not otherwise
completely developed.
Arbitrary, but inexorable, considerations of size and price have
determined the scope of the selection; and, for reasons perhaps suficiently obvious, preference has been given, when pqssible, to cases
which have appeared in the National Reporter System. It is, however, due to the publishers to say that, with respect to both of the
considerations above mentioned, their attitude has been constantly
generous.
The cases, as a role, are not annotated, and they have usually been
reproduced entire, although some parts of them may not be germane
to the subject of Damages.
F. B. M.
UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN,
.ADD Arbor, November 1, 1898.
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WEBB v. PORTLAND MANUF'G CO.
(Fed. Ca.a. No. 17,322; 3 Sumo~ 189.)

WEBB v. PORTLAND MANUF'G CO.

(Fed. Cas. No. 17,322: 3 Sumn. 189.)

U. 8. Circuit Court, D. Maine. May Term,

1838.

In equity. On bill for imuuctlon.

Bill in equity by Joshua Webb against

the Portland Manufacturing ‘Company to

restrain the diversion of water from plain-

tit'.[‘s mill. On the stream on which the mill

was situated were two dams, the distance

between which was about 40 or 50 rods, oc-

cupied by the mill-pond of the lower dam.

Plaintiff owned certain mills and mill privi-

leges on the lower dam. Defendants also

owned certain other mills and mill privileges

on the same dam. To supply water to one

of such mills, defendants made a canal from

the pond at a point immediately below the

upper dam. The water thus withdrawn by
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them for that purpose was about one-fourth

of the water to which defendants were en-

titled as mill-owners on the lower dam. and

was returned into the stream immediately

below that dam. A preliminary question,

suggested by the court,_ was argued on the bill

and answer.

U. S. Circuit Court, D. M&iue. M&T Term,

1838.
In equity. On bill for lnJucctlon.

Bill in equity by Joshua Webb against
the Portland Manufacturing ·company to
restrain the diversion of water trom plalntift''s mill. On the stream on which the mill
was situated were two dams, the distance
between whleh was about 40 or 50 rods, occupied by the mlll-pond of the lower dam.
PlalntUf owned rertain mills and mill privileges on the lower dam. Defendants also
owned certain other mills and mill privileges
on the same dam. To supply water to one
of such mills, defendants made a canal from
the pond at a point Immediately below the
upper dam. The water thus withdrawn by
them tor that purpose was about one-fourth
of the water to which defendants were entitled as mill-owners on the lower dam. nud
wns returned Into the stream Immediately
below that dam. A preliminary question.
suggested by the court,. was argued on the blll
and answer.

C. S. Davels, for plnlntllf. P. Mellen a.nd
)lr. Longfellow, for defendants.

C. S. Davels, for plaintiff. P. Mellen and

Mr. Longfellow, for defendants.

STORY. J. The question which has been

argued upon the suggestion of the court is of

vital importance in the cause, and, if de-

cided in favor of the plaintiff, it supersedes

many of the inquiries to which our attention

must otherwise be directed. It is on this ac-

count that we thought it proper to be argued

separately from the general merits of the

cause.

The argument for the defendants, then,

presents two distinct questions. The ﬁrst is

whether. to maintain the present suit, it is es-

sential for the plaintif f to establish any actual

d31n8§_'t3.v The second is whether, in point of

law, a mill-owner, having a right to a certain

portion of the water of a stream for the

use of his mill at a particular dam, has a

right to draw of! the same portion or any

less quantity of the water. at a considerable

distance above the dam. without the consent

of the owners of other mills on the same dam.

In connection with these questions, the point

will also incidentally arise whether it makes

any difference that such drawing of! of the

water above can be shown to be no sensible

injury to the other mill-owners on the lower

dam.

As to the ﬁrst question, I can very well

understand that no action lies in a case where

there is damnum absque injuria; that is,

where there is a damage done without any

wrong or violation of any right of the plain-

till. But I am not able to understand how

it can correctly be said, in a legal sense, that

an action will not lie, even in case of a

wrong or violation of a right, unless it is

I

followed by some perceptible damage. which

can be established as a matter of tact; in

other words, that injuria sine damno is not

STORY, J. The question which has been
argued upon the suggestion of the court Is of
¥ital Importance In the cause, and, If decidecl In favor of the plaintiff, It supersedes
many of the Inquiries to which our attention
must otherwise be directed. It ls on this account that we thought It proper to be argued
separately from the general merits of the
eause.
The argument tor the defendants, then,
presents two distinct questions. The first ts
whether. to maintain the present suit, It ls essentlal for the plaintiff' to establish any actual
damaj!e. The second ts whether, In point of
law, n m·lll-owner, having a right to a certain
portion of tbe water of a. stream for the
use of his mill at a particular dam, has a
rlgbt to draw otr the same portion or any
less quantity of the water, at a considerable
distance above the dam, without the consent
of the owners of other mills on the same dam.
In connection with these questions, the point
will also Incidentally arise whether It makes
any dift'erence that such drawing off of the
water above can be shown to be no sensible
Injury to the other mill-owners on the lower
dam.
As to the first question, I can very well
understand that no action lies In a case where
there Is damnum absque injurla; that ls,
where there is a damage done without any
wrong or violation of any right of the plaintur. But I am not able to understand how
It can correctly be said, In a legal sense, that
an action wlll not lie, even In case or a
wrong or violation or a right, unleSI! It Is

followed by some perceptible damage. whlcll
can be established as a matter ot fnct; In
other words, that lnjurla sine damno ls not
actionable. See Mayor of Lynn, etc., v.
Mayor of London, 4 Term R. 130, 141, 143,
144; Com. Dig. "Action on the Case," B 1,
2. On the contrary, from my enrllPst reading,
.I have considered it laid up among the very
elements of the common law that wherever
there Is a wrong there Is a remedy to redress
It; and that every Injury Imports damage In
the nature of It; and, If no other damage is
established, the party Injured Is entitle<l to
a verdict tor nominal damages., A fortiori
this doctrine applies where there Is not only
a violation of a right of the plaintiff, but the
I act ot the defendant, If continued, may be-·
! come the foundation, by lapse of time, or
I an adverse right In the defendant; for then
It assumes the character, not me1·ely of n
vlolutlon of a right tending to diminish its
value, but goes to the absolute destruction
and extinguishment of It. Under such circumstances, unless the party injured can protect his right from suc:h a violation by nn
action, It Is plain that it may be lost or destroyed, without any pOSlllble remedial r<'drese. In my judgment, the common law
countenances no suc:h lnconsif1tenc:y, not to
call It by a stronger name. Actual, perc:epti' ble damage Is not Indispensable as the foundatlon of an action. The law tolerates no
1 further Inquiry than whether there bas been
the violation of a right. lf so, the party 1n1 jured Is entitled to maintain bis action for
nominal damages, In vindication of his right.
It no other damages are flt and proper to
remunerate him. So long ago as the great
case of Ashby v. White, 2 Ld. Rnym. 938. 6
1 M:od. 45, Holt, 524, the objection was put
forth by some of the judges, and was answered by Lord Holt, with his usual ability
and clear learning; and his judgment was
supported by the house of lords, and that of
bis brethren overturned. By the f&vor of an
eminent judge, Lord Holfs opinion, apparentJy copied from bis own manuscript. has
been recently printed. In this Inst printed
opinion (page 14} Lord Holt says: "It Is tmpossible to 1.mnglne any such thing as lnjmla
sine damno. Every Injury Imports damage
In the nature of It." S. P. 2 Ld. Rnym. 933.
And be cites many cases In support of l..ii.-i
position. Among these ls Starling v. Turner.
2 Lev. 50. 2 Vent. 25, where the plaintiff
was a cnndi\l!tte for the office of brldge-1:;iaster of London bridge, and the lord mayor refused hrs demand of n poll, and It was determlned that the action was maintainable
for the refusal of the poll. Although it might
br..ve been that the plalntltr would not have
been elected, the action was nevertheless
maintainable; for the refusal W88 a vlolatlon of the plalntlft''s right to be a candidate.
So In the case cited, as from 23 Edw. III. 18,
tit. "Defense," (It ts a mistake In the MS.,
and should be 29 Edw. UL 18b: Fitz. Abr.
tit "Defense," pl. 5,) and 11 Hen. IV. 47,

I
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where the owner of a market, entitled to toll

upon all cattle sold within the market,

brought an action against the defendant for

hindering a person from going to the market

with the intent to sell a horse, it was, on the

like ground, held maintainable; for though

the horse might not have been sold, and no

toll would have become due, yet the hindering

the plaintiff from the possibility of having

toll was such an injury as did import such

damage, for which the plaintiff ought to re-

cover. So in Hunt v. Dowman, Cro. Jae.

478, 2 Rollo, 21, where the lessor brought an

action against the lessee for disturbing him

from entering into the house leased. in order

to view it, and to see whether any waste

was committed; and it was held that the

action well lay, though no waste was com-

mitted and no actual damage done. for the

lessor had a right so to enter, and the hinder-
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ing of him was an injury to that right, for

which he might maintain an action. So Her-

ring v. Finch, 2 Lev. 250. where it was held

that a person entitled to vote, who was re-

fused his vote at an election, might well

maintain an action therefor, although the can-

didate, for whom he might have voted, might

not have been chosen, and the voter could

not sustain any perceptible or actual damage

by such refusal of his vote. The law gives

the remedy in such case, for there is a clear

violation of the right. And this doctrine, as

to a violation of the right to vote, is now in-

controvertibly established; and yet it would

be impracticable to show any temporal or

actual damage thereby. See Harman v. Tap-

penden, 1 East, 555; Drewe v. Coulton, Id.

563, note; Kilham v. Ward, 2 Mass. 236;

Lincoin v. Hapgood. 11 Mass. 350; 2 Vin.

Abr. “Action, Case," note c, pl. 3. In the

case of Ashby v. White, as reported by Lord

Raymond, (2 Ld. Raym. 953,) Lord Holt

said: “If the plaintiff has a right, he must

of necessity have a means to vindicate and

maintain it, and a remedy, it he is injured

in the exercise or enjoyment of it; and. in-

deed, it is a vain thing to imagine a right

without a remedy; for want of right and

want of remedy are reciprocal." S. P. 6

Mod. 53.

The principles laid down by Lord Holt are

so strongly commended, not only by authori-

ty. but by the common sense and common

justice of mankind, that they seem absolutely,

in a judicial view, incontrovertible. And they

have been fully recognized in many other

cases. The note of Mr. Sergeant Williams to

Mellor v. Spateman. 1 Saund. 346a, note 2;

Weils v. Watling, 2 W. B1. 1233; and the case

of the Tunbridge Dippers, (Weller v. Baker.)

2 Wils. 414,—are direct to the purpose. I am

aware that some of the old cases inculcate a

different doctrine, and perhaps are not recon-

cllable with that of Lord Holt. There are

also some modern cases which at ﬁrst view

seem to the contrary. But they are dis-

tinguishable from that now in judgment; and,

it they were not, cgo assentior scaevoloc. The

case of Williams v. Morland, 2 Barn. & C. 9.

where the owner of a market, entitled to toll casa of Wlllfama v. Morland, 2 Barn. & C. 9.
upon all cattle sold within the market, 10, seems to have proceeded upon the ground •
brought an action against the defendant for that there was neither any damage nor any
hindering a person from going to the market Injury to the right of the plalnwr. Whether
with the Intent to sell a horee, It was, on the that case can he supported upon principle It
llke ground, held maintainable; for though Is not now necessary to say. Some of the
the horse might not have been sold,' and no dicta In It have been subsequently Impugned,
toll would have become due, yet the hindering and the general reasoning of the judges seems
the plalntur from the poseiblllty of having to admit that, if any right of the plalntur
toll was such an Injury as did import such bad been violated, the action would have
damage, for which the plalntu:r ought to re- lnln. The case of Jackson v. Peeked, 1 Maule
cover. So In Hunt v. Dowman, Cro. Jae. & S. 235, turned upon the supposed defects
478, 2 Rolle, 21, where the lessor brought an of the declaration, as applicable to a mere
action against the lessee for disturbing him reverslonary Interest, It not stating any act
from entering Into the house leased, ln order done to the prejudice of that reverslonary Into view It, and to see whether any waste terest. I do not stop to inquire whether
was committed; and It was held that the there was not an overnicety In the appllcaactlon well Jay, though no waste was com- tlon of the technical principles of pleading
mltted and no actual damage done, for the to that <:ase, although, notwithstanding the
lessor bad a right so to enter, and the hinder- elaborate opinion of Lord Ellenborough, one
lng of him was an Injury to that right, for might be Inclined to pause upon lt. The case
which be might maintain an action. So Her- of Young v. Spencer, 10 Barn. & C. 145, turnring v. Finch, 2 Lev. 250, where It was held ed. also upon the point whether any Injury
that a person entitled to vote, who was re- was done to a reversionary Interest. I confused hls vote at an election, might well fess myself better pleased with the ruling of
maintain an action therefor, although the can- the learned judge (Mr. Justice Bayley) at
dldate, for whom he might have voted, might the trial than with the decl!;ion of the com·t
not have been chosen, and the voter could ln gmntlng a new trial. But the court adnot sustain any perceptible or actual damage mltted that, If there was any Injury to the
by such refusal of his vote. The law gives reYerslonary right, the action would lie; and,
the remedy In such case. for there Is a clear although there might be no actual damage
violation of the right. And this doctrine, as pro'\'ed, yet, If anything done by the tenant
to a violation of the right to vote, ls now In- would destroy the evidence of title, the accontro'\'ertlbly established; and yet It would tlon was maintainable. A fortiori, the action
b~ Impracticable to show any temporal or
must have been held maintainable, If the
actual damage thereby. See Harman v. Tap- act done went to destroy the existing right,
penden, 1 East, 555; Drewe v. Coulton, Id. or to found an adverse right.
563, note; Kllbam v. Ward, 2 Mass. 236;
On the other hand, Marzett! v. Williams.
Lincoln v. Hapgood, 11 Mass. 350; 2 Vin. 1 Barn. & Adol. 415, goes the whole length
Abr. "Action, Case," note c, pl. 3. In the of Lord Holt's doctrln~; for there the plaincase of Ashby T. White, as reported by Lord tiff recovered, notwithstanding no actual
Raymond, (2 Ld. Rnym. 953,) Lord Holt damage was proved at the trial; and Mr.
said: "If the plaintiff has a right. he must Justice Taunton on that occasion cited
of necessity ha'\'e a means to vindicate and many authorities to show that where a
maintain it, and a remedy, if he ls Injured wrong Is done, by which the right of the
In the exercise or enjoyment of It; and, In- party may be Injured, It Is a good cause or
deed, It ls a vain thing to Imagine a right action, although no actual damage be suswlthout a. remedy; for want of right and talned. In Hobson v. Todd, 4 Term R. 71,.
want of remedy are reciprocal." S. P. 6 73, the court decided the case upon the very
Mod. 53.
dlsttnctlon,whlch ls most material to the
The principles laid down by Lord Holt are present case, that If a commoner might not
so strongly commended, not only by author!- maintain an action for an Injury, however
ty, but by the common sense and common small, to his right, a mere wrong-doer
justice of mankind, that they seem absolutely, might, by repeated torts, In the course of
In a judicial view, Incontrovertible. And they time establish evidence of a right of comhave been fully recognized in many other mon. The same principle was afterwards
cases. The note of Mr. Sergeant Williams to recognized by Mr. Jm1tlce Grose, In Pindar
l\fellor v. Spateman, 1 Saund. 3'16a, note 2; v. Wadsworth, 2 East, 162. But the case
Wells v. Watling, 2 W. Bl. 1233; and the case of Bower v. Hiil, 1 Bing. N. C. 5-19, fully
c>f the Tunbridi;:e Dippers, (Weller v. Baker.) sustains the doctrine for which I contend;
2 Wlls. 414,-are direct to the purpose. I am and, indeed, a stronger case of Its appllcaaware that some of the old cases Inculcate a tlon cannot well be imagined. There the
different doctrine, and perbnps are not recon- court held tbat a permanent ol1structlon to
cllable with that o! Lord Holt. There are a navigable drain of the plaintiff's, though
also some modern cases which at first view choked up with mud for 16 years, was aceeem to the contrary. But they are dls-1 tlonable, although the plaintiff received no .
tlngulsbable from thnt now In judgment; nod, Immediate damage thereby; for, If acqullf tlley were not, cg-o nssentlor screvoloo. The esced In for 20 years, It would become evl-
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dence of a renunciation and abandonment

of the right of way. The case of Blanchard

v. Baker, 8 Greenl. 253, 268, recognizes the

same doctrine in the most full and satisfac-

tory manner, and is directly in point; for

it was a case for diverting water from the

plaintiff's mill. 1 should be sorry to have

it supposed for a moment that Tyler v.

Wilkinson, 4 Mason, 397, Fed. Cas. No. 14,-

312, imported a different doctrine. On the

contrary, I have always considered it as

proceeding upon the same doctrine.

Upon the whole, without going further in-

to an examination of the authorities on this

subject, my judgment is that, whenever

there is a clear violation of a right, it is not

necessary in an action of this sort to show

actual damage; that every violation im-

ports damage; and, if no other he proved,

the plaintiff is entitled to a verdict for nom-
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inal damages; and a fortiori that this doc-

trine applies whenever the act done is of

such a nature as that by its repetition or

continuance it may become the foundation

or evidence of an adverse right. See, also,

Mason v. Hill, 3 Barn. & Adol. 304, 5 Barn.

& Adol. 1. But if the doctrine were other-

wise, and no action were maintainable at

law, without proof of actual damage, that

, would furnish no ground why a court of

equity should not interfere, and protect such

a right from violation and invasion; for, in

a great variety of cases, the very ground of

the interposition of a court of equity is that

the injury done is irremediabie at law, and

that the right can only be permanently pre-

served or perpetuated by the powers of a

court of equity. And one of the most ordi-

nary processes to accomplish this end is by

a writ of injunction, the nature and eﬂicacy

of which for such purpose I need not state,

as the elementary treatises fully expound

them. See Eden, Inj.; 2 Story, Eq. Jur. c.

23, §§ 86-959; Bolivar Manuf'g Co. v. Nepon-

set Manuf'g Co., 16 Pick. 241. If, then, the

diversion of water complained of in the

present case is a violation of the right of

the plaintiff, and may permanently injure

that right, and become, by lapse of time,

the foundation of an adverse right in the

defendants, I know of no more ﬁt cae for

the interposition of a court of equity, by

way of injunction, to restrain the defend-

ants from such an injurious act. If there

ho a remedy for the plaintiff at law for dam-

ages, still that remedy is inadequate to pre-

vent and redress the mischief. If there be

no such remedy at law, then, a fortiori, a

court of equity ought to give its aid to vindi-

cate and perpetuate the right of the plain-

tiff. A court of equity will not, indeed, en-

tertain a bill for an injunction in case of a

mere trespass fully remediable at law. But,

if it might occasion irreparable mischief or

permanent injury, or destroy a right, that

is the appropriate case for such a bill. See

2.Story, Eq. Jur. §§ 926-928. and the cases

there cited; Jerome v. Ross, 7 Johns. Ch.

315; Van Bergen v. Van Bergen, 3 Johns.

deoce Of & renunciation and abandonment
ot the right of way. The case of Blanchard
v. Baker, 8 Greenl. 233, 268, recognizes the
same doctrine In the most full and satls!actory manner, and ls directly in point; tor
It was a case for diverting water from the
plainwr's mill. I should be sorry to have
It supposed for a moment that Tyler v.
Wilkinson. 4 Mason, 397, Fed. Oas. No. 14,312, Imported a dltferent doctrine. On the
contrary, I have always considered It as
proceeding upon the same doctrine.
Upon the whole, without going further Into an examination of the authorities on this
subject, my judgment le that, whenever
there 18 a clear violation of a right, It ls not
nece688.ry in an action of this sort to show
actual damage; that every violation Imports damage;- and, If no other be proved,
} the plalntllr is entitled to a >erdlct for nominal damages; and a fortiori that this doctrine applies whenever the act done ls of
such a nature as that by Its repetition or
continuance It may become the foundatlo'.l
or evidence of an ad\•erse right. See, aleo,
Mason v. Hill, 3 Barn. & Adol. 304, 5 Barn.
& Adol. 1. But If the doctrine were othert wise, and no action were maintainable at
law, without proof of actual damage. that
would furnish no ground why a court of
equity should not Interfere, and protect such
1 a right from violation and Invasion; for, In
a great variety of cases, the very ground of
the lnterp08ltlon of a court of equity Is that
the Injury done ls Irremediable at law, and
that the right can only be permanently preserved or perpetuated by the powers of a
court of equity. And one of the moet ordl·
nary processes to accomplish this end ls by
a writ of injunction, the nature and etHcacy
of which for such purpose I need not state,
as the elementary treatises fully expound
them. See Eden, Inj.; 2 Story, Eq. Jur. c.
23, §§ 86-9:;9; Bolivar Manuf'g Co. v. Nep:>nset Manuf'g Co., 16 Pick. 241. If, then, the
diversion of water complained of In the
present case ls a violation of the rlg!tt of
the plalntlff, and may permanently Injure
that right, and become, by lapse of time,
the foundation of an adverse right ln the
defendants, I know of no more flt case for
the Interposition of 'a court of equity, by
way of lujunctlon, to restrain the defendants from such an Injurious act. It there
bo a remedy for the plalntUT at Ia w for damages, still that remedy Is Inadequate to prevent and redress the mischief. If thC're be
no such remedy at law, then, a fortiori, a
court of equity ought to glYe Its aid to vindicate and perpetuate the right of the plaln·
t11T. A court of equity wlll not, Indeed, entertain a blll for an Injunction In case of a
mere trespass fully remediable at law. But,
i! it might occasion irreparable mischief or
permanent Injury, or destroy a right, that
ls the appropriate case for such a bill. See
2. Story, Eq. Jur. t§ 926-928, and the cases
there cited; Jerome v. Ross, 7 Johns. Ch.

~

311:>; Van ]Jergen v. Van Bergen, 3 Johns.
Cb. 282; Turnpike Road v. Miller, 5 .Johns.
Ch. 101; Gardner v. Village of Newburgh, 2
Johns. Ch. 162.
Let us come, then, to the only remaining
question ln the cause, and that ls whether
any right of the plaintiff, as mill-owner on
the lower dam, Is or wlll be violated by the
diversion of the water by the canal of the
defendants. And here it does not seem to
me that, upon the present state of the law,
there ls any real ground for controversy, although there were formerly many vexed
questions, and much contrariety of opinion.
The true doctrine ls laid down ln Wright v.
Howard, 1 Sim. & S. 190, by Sir John Leach,
In regard to riparian proprietors, and his
opinion has since been deliberately adopt.~
by the king's bench. Mason v. Hill, 3 Barn.
& Adol. 3<H, 5 Barn. & Adol. 1. See, also,
Bealey v. Shaw, 6 East, 208. "Prima facle,"
says that learned judge, "the proprietor of
each bank of a stream ls the proprietor of
half the land covered by the stream; but
there ls no property In the water., Every
proprietor has an equal right to use the water which fiows In the stream; and consequently no proprietor can have the right to
use the water to the prejudice of any other
proprietor, without the consent of the other
proprietors who may be affected by his operations. No proprietor can either diminish
the quantity of water which would otherwise
descend to the proprietors below, nor throw
the water back upon the proprietors above.
Every proprietor, who claims a right either
to throw the water back above or to diminish
the quantity of water which ls to descend
below, must, In order to maintain his claim,
either prove an actual grant or license from
the proprietors affected by his operations, or
IBU.'it prove an uninterrupted enjoyment of
twenty years, which term of twenty years
ls now adopted upon a principle of general
convenience, as affording conclusive presumption of a grant." The ea.me doctrine was
fully recognized and acted upon In the case
of Tyler v. Wilkinson, 4 Mason, 397, 400402; and aleo In the case of Blanchard v.
Baker, 8 Greenl. 253, 26G. In the latter case
the learned judge (Mr. Justice Weston) who
delivered the opinion of the court, used the
following emphatic language: "The right to
the use of a stream ls Incident or appurtenant
to the land through which It passes. It ls an
ancient and well-established principle that it
cannot be lawfully diverted, unless lt "Is returned again to Its accustomed channel, before It passes the land of a proprietor below.
Running water ls not susceptible of an appropriation which will justify the diversion
or unreasonable detention of It. The proprietor of the water-course has a right to
avail Wmself of Its momentum as a power,
which may be turned to beneficial purposes."
The ('!ISe of Mason v. Hill, 5 Born. & Adol.
1, contains language of an exactly similar
Import, used by Lord Denmon In delivering
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the opinion of the court. See, also, Gardner

v. Village of Newburgh. 2 Johns. Ch. 162.

Mr. Chancellor Kent has also summoned up

the same doctrine, with his usual accuracy,

in the brief, but pregnant, text of his Com-

mentaries, (3 Kent, Com. [3d Ed.] lect. 42,

p. 430;) and I scarcely know where else it

can be found reduced to so elegant and sat-

ist'at-tor_v a formulary. In the old books

the doctrine is quaintly, though clearly, stat-

ed; for it is said that a water-course begins

ex jure nitturee, and, having taken a certain

course naturally, it cannot be [lawfully] di-

verted. Aqua currit, et debet currcre, ut cur- 1

rero solcbat.

Poph. 166.

The same principle applies to the owners

of mills on a stream. They have an un-

Shury v. Piggot, 3 Bulst. 339,
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doubted right to the ﬂow of the water as it

has been accustomed of right and naturally

to ﬂow to their respective mills. The pro-

prietor above has no right to divert or un-

reasonably to retard this natural ﬂow to

the mills below; and no proprietor below has

a right to retard or turn it back upon the

mills above to the prejudice of the right

of the proprietors thereof. This is clearly

established by the authorities already cited;

the only distinction between them being that

the right of a riparian proprietor arises by

mere operation of law as an incident to his

owner as an incident to his mill. Bealey v.

Shaw, 6 East, 208; Saunders v. Newman, 1

Barn. & Ald. 258; Mason v. Hill, 3 Barn. & '

Adol. 304, 5 Barn. & Adol. 1; Blanchard v.

Baker, 8 Greenl. 253, 268; and Tyler v. Wil-

kinson, 4 Mason, 397, 400-i.05,—are fully in

point. Mr. Chancellor Kent in his Commen-

taries relies on the same principles and fully

supports them by a large survey of the au-

thorities. 3 Kent Comm. (3d Ed.) lect. 52,

pp. 441-445.

Now, it this be the law on this subject,

upon what ground can the defendants insist

upon a diversion of the natural stream from

the plaintiffs mills, as it has been of right

accustomed to ﬂow thereto? First, it is said

that there is no perceptible damage done to

the plaintiff. That suggestion has been al-

ready in part answered. If it were true, it

could not authorize a diversion, because it ‘

impairs the right of the plaintiff to the full,

natural ﬂow of the stream, and may become

the foundation of an adverse right in the de-

fendants. In such a case actual damage is

not necessary to be established in proof. The

law presumes it. The act imports damage

to the right, it damage be necessary. Such

a case is wholly distinguishable from a mere

fugitive, temporary trespass, by diverting or

withdrawing the water a short period with-

out damage, and without any pretense of

right. In such a case, the wrong, it there he

no sensible damage, and it be transient in its

nature and character. as it does not touch

the right, may possibly (for I give no opin-

ion upon such a case) be without redress at
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the opinion of the cou~. See, also, 'Gardner
. v. Village of Newburgh, 2 Johns. Cb. 162.
·Mr. Chancellor Kent has also summoned up
the same doctrine, with his usual accuracy,
fn the brief, but pregnant, text of hie Commentarles, (3 Kent, Com. [3d Ed.] lect. 42,
p. 439;) and I scarcely know where else it
can be found reduced to eo elegant and satisfllctor:v a formulary. In the old boolrq
the doctrine ls quaintly, though clearly, stated; for It Is said that a water-course beglni,i
ex jure naturm, and, having taken a certain
course naturally, It cannot be [lawfully] diverted. Aqua currit, et debet currere, ut currere solebat. Shury v. Plggot, 3 Buist. 339,
Poph. 166.
The same principle applies to the owners
of mills on a stream. They have an un·doubted right to the tlow of the water as lt
has been accustomed of right and naturally
to flow to their respective mills. The proprletor above has no right to divert or unreasonably to retard this natural tlow to
the mills below; and no proprietor below has
a right to retard or turn lt back upon the
mllls above to the prejudice of the right
ot the proprietors thereof. This ls clearly
established by the authorities already cited;
the only distinction between them being that
the right of a riparian proprietor arises by
mere operation of law as an incident to his
ownership of the bank, and that of a mlllowner as an Incident to his mlll. Bealey v.
Shaw, 6 East, 208; Saunders v. Newman, 1
Barn. & A.Id. 258; Mason v. H111, 3 Barn. &
Ado!. 304, 5 Barn. & Adol. 1; Blanchard v.
Baker, 8 Greenl. 253, 268; and Tyler v. Wllklnson, 4 Mason, 397, 400-405,-are fully In
point. Mr. Chancellor Kent In his Commentarles relies on the same principles and fully
supports them by a large survey of the authorlties. 3 Kent Comm. (3d Ed.) lect. 62,
pp. 441-445.
Now, It this be the law on this subject,
upon what ground can the defendants insist
upon a diversion .of the natural stream from
the plalntllI's mllls, as It has been of right
accust(}med to tlow thereto? First, It ls said
that there la no perceptible damage done to
the plnlntilI. That suggestion has been already In part answered. It It were true, lt
could not authorize a diversion, because It
Impairs the right of the plalntllI to the full,
natural tlow of the stream, and may become
the foundation of an adverse right In the defendnnts. In such a case actual damage ls
not necessary to be established In proof. The
law presumes It. The act imports damage
to the right, If damage be necessary. Such
a case Is wholly dlstlngulshable from a mere
fugltlve, temporary trespass, by diverting or
withdrawing the water a short period without damage, and without any pretense of
right. In such a case, the wrong, if there be
no sensible damaare, and It be transient in Its
nature and character. as It does not touch
the right, may possibly (for I give no oplnIon upon such a case) be without redress at

law; and certainly It would found no grounri
for the lnte1'posltlon or a court of equity by
way of injunction.
But I confess myself wholly unable to comprehend how lt can be assumed, in a case
like the present, that there le not and cannot
be an actual damage to the right of the plalni tiff. What le that right? It Is the right of
having the water tlow In Its natural current
at all times of the year to the plaintiff's
mills. Now, the value of the mill privileges
must essentially depend, ·Dot merely upon the
vell>city of the stream, but upon the head of
water which Is permanently maintained. The
necessary result of lowering the head of water permanently would seem, therefore, to
I be a direct diminution ot the value of the
! privileges; and, it so, to that extent lt must
: be an actual damage. ·
! Again, It ls said that the defendants are
! mill-owners on the lower dam, and are en: titled, as such, to their proportion of the
; water of the stream In Its natural tlow. Certalnly they a.re. But where are they BO entitled to take and use lt? At the lower dam~
tor there is the place where their right attaches, and not at any place higher up the
stream. Suppose they are entitled to use
for their own mllls on the lower dam half
the water which descends to It, what ground
ls there to say that they have a right to draw
otr that half at the head of the mill-pond?
Suppose the head of water at the lower dam
j In ordinary times ls two feet high, Is it not
I obvious that, by withdrawing at the head:
of the pond one-half of the water, the wa·
ter at the dam must be proportionally Iow1 ered? It makes no difference that the dei tendants Insist upon drawing otr only oneI fourth of what they lnsi~t they are entitled
to; tor, pro tanto, It wlll operate In the same
manner; and, If they have a right to draw
! otr to the extent of one-fourth of their prlvI liege, they bave an equal right to draw otr
I to the full extent of It. The privilege attached to the mills of the plalntltr Is not the
. privilege of using halt, or any other proportlon merely, of the water In the stream, but
! of having the whole stream, undiminished
1 ln Its natural ftow, come to the lower dam
1
with Its full power, and there to use his
· full share of the water-power. The plalntUf
has a title, not to a halt or other proportion
of the water In the pond, but Is, lf one may
so say, entitled per my et per tout to his
proportion of the whole bulk of the stream,
undivided and Indivisible, except at the lower
dam. This doctrine, In my judgment, lrreslstlbly follows from the general principles
already stated; and, what alone would be declsive, lt has the express sanction of the supreme court of Maine In the case of Blanchard v. Baker, 8 Greenl. 253, 270. The court
there said, In reply to the suggestion that
the owners of the eastern shore had a right
to half the water, and a right to divert It to
that extent: "It has been seen that, If they
had been owners of both sides, they had nc>

I
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right to divert the water without again re-

turning it to its original channel, (before it

passed the lands of another proprietor.) Be-

sides, it was possible, in the nature of things,

that they could take it from their side only.

An equal portion from the plaintiff's side

must have been mingled with all that was

diverted."

A suggestion has also been made that the

defendants have fully indemniﬁed the plain-

tiff from any injury, and in truth have con-

ferred a beneﬁt on him, by securing the wa-

ter, by means of a raised dam, higher up

the stream, at Sebago pond, in a reservoir,

so as to be capable of affording a full supply

in the stream in the dryest seasons. To this

suggestion several answers may be given.

In the ﬁrst place, the plaintiff is no party to

the contract for raising the new dam, and has

no interest therein, and cannot, as a matter
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of right, insist upon its being kept up, or

upon any advantage to be derived therefrom.

In the next place, the plaintiff is not com-

pellable to exchange one right for another,

or to part with a present interest in favor of

the defendants at the mere election of the

latter. Even a supposed beneﬁt cannot be

forced upon him against his will; and, cer-

tainly, there is no pretense to say that, in

point of law, the defendants have any right

to substitute. for a present existing right of

the plaintifffs, any other which they may

deem to be an equivalent. The private prop-

erty of one man cannot be taken by another,

simply because he can substitute an equiva-

lent beneﬁt.

Having made these remarks ‘upon the points

raised in the argument, the subject, at least

so far as it is at present open for the con-

sideration of the court, appears to me to be

exhausted. Whether, consistently with this

opinion, it is practicable for the defendants

successfully to establish any substantial de-

fense to the bill, it is for the defendants, and

not for the court, to consider. I am author-

ized to say that the district judge concurs in

this opinion.

Decree accordingly.

right to divert the water without again returning lt to lts original channel, (before lt

·7

or to part with a present interest In favor of
the defendants at the mere election of the
passed the lands of another proprietor.) Be- latter. Even a supposed benefit cannot be
sides, lt waa possible, In the nature of things, forced upon him against his wlll; and, certhat they could take It from their side only. tainly, there Is no pretense to say that, in
An equal portion from the plaintltr's side point of law, the defendants have any right
must have been mingled with all that was to substitute, for a preient existing right of
diverted."
the plaintiff's, any ot'.11.er which they may
A euggestlon bas also been made that the deem to be an equivalent. The private propdefendants have fully Indemnified the plaln- erty of one man cannot be ta.ken by another,
Wf from any Injury, and In truth have con- simply because he can substitute an equ!rnferred a benefit on hlm, by securing the wa- lent benefit.
ter, by means of a raised dam, higher up
Having made these remarks upon the points
the stream, at Sebago pond, In a. reservoir, raised In the argument, the subject, at least
so as to be capable of affording a. full supply so far as it Is at present open for the conln the stream 1n the dryest seasons. To this sideration of the court, appears to me to be
suggestion several answers may be given. exhausted. Whether, consistently with this
In the first place, the plaintiff ls no party to opinion, it ls practicable for the defendants
the contra.ct tor raising the new dam, and has successfully to ·establish any substantial deno Interest therein, and cannot, as a matter fense to the blll, it Is for the defendants, and
of right, Insist upon its being kept up, or not tor the court, to consider. I am authorupon any advantage to be derived therefrom. ized to say that the district judge concurs 1n
In the next place, the plaintiff ls not com- this opinion.
pellable to exchange one right for another,
Decree accordingly.
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\/ PAUL v. SLASON et 91.

(22 Vt. 231.)

Supreme Court of Vermont. Rutland. Jan.

" Term, 1850.

Trespass for taking two cords of wood,

two baskets, two pitchforks, two horses.

one harness, and one wagon. Plea, the

general issue. with notice, that the defend-

ant Charles H. Slason attached the prop-

erty by virtue of a writ, which he was 16-

gally deputised to serve, in favor of one

Langdon against the plaintiff, and that the

other defendants aided him in so dofng, at

his request. Trial by jury, September

Term, 1848,—HALL, J., presiding. On trial

it appeared, that on the twenty sixth day

of September, 1844, the defendant Francis

Slason commenced a suit in the name of

Benjamin F. Langdon against the plaintiff,

and that the defendant Charles H. Sluson,
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who was legally deputized to serve the

writ. which was returnable to the county

court, attached the property in question,

except one pitchfork, and that the defend-

ant Pelkey assisted in removing the prop-

erty. It also appeared, that on the same

day Charles H. Slason and Pelkey made

use of the horse, wagon and harness, part

of the property attached, in removing grain

and other property, which was attached

at the same time, on the same writ, and

upon the same farm, and continued to use

them for this purpose through the day;

and that on the next day Charles H. Sla-

son was seen driving the same horse and

wagon, with the harness, in the highway

in the vicinity,—but upon what business

did not appear. It also appeared,that the

defendants took a pitchfork belonging to

the plaintiff, and used it during the day,on

which the attachment was made,in remov-

ing the grain &c. The defendants offered

in evidence the ﬁles and record of the su-

preme court, in the suit in favor of Lang-

don against the plaintiff, in which the prop-

erty in question was attached, for the pur-

pose of proving, that judgment was ren-

dered therein in favor of Langdon;—t0

which evidence the plaintiff objected; but

It was admitted by the court. The defend-

ants then offered in evidence an execution,

purporting to have been issued upon the

judgment in the supreme court above men-

tioned, dated February 21,1848 ;—to the ad-

mission of which the plaintiff objected, in-

sisting, that an exempliﬁed copy of the

judgment should be produced, before

the execution could be *given in evi. ‘233

dence, and that the execution, and the

issuing thereof, could be shown only by a

certiﬁed copy of the record of the judgment;

—bu€ the objection was overruled by the

COlll‘ .

The defendants then offered in evidence

the return of one Edgerton, as sheriff, upon

thesaid execution, to show that tbewagon

in question was sold thereon and the pro-

ceeds applied in payment of the debt. To

the admission of this evidence the plaintiff

(22 Vt. 231.)

Supreme Court of Vermont. Rutland. J'au.
· Term, 1850.

Trespass for ta.king two cords of wood,
two baskets, two pitchforks, two horses.
one harness, and ene wagon. Plea, the
general Issue, with notice, that the defendant Charles H. Slason attached the property by virtue of a writ, which he was legally deputised to serve, In favor of one
Langdon against the plaintiff, and that the
other defendants aided him In so doing, at
bis request. '!'rial by Jury, September
Term, 1848,-HALL, J., presiding. On trial
tt appeared, that on the twenty sixth day
of September, 1844, the defendunt Frallcis
Slason commenced a suit in the name of
Benjamin F. Langdon against the plaintiff,
and that the defendant Charles H. Slason,
who was legally deputized to serve the
writ. which was returnable to the county
court, attached the property in question,
except one pitchfork, and that the defendant Pelkey assisted in removing the property. It also appeared, that on the same
day Charles H. Sia.son and Pelkey made
use of the horse, wagon and harness, part
of the property attached, In removing grain
and other property, which was attached
at the same time, on the same writ, and
upon the same farm, and continued i:o use
them for this purpose through the day;
and that on the next day Charles H. Slason was seen driving the same horse and
wagon, with the harness, In the highway
In the vicinity,-but upon what business
did not appear. It also appeared, that the
defendants took a pitchfork belonging to
the plaintiff, and used ft during the day,on
which theattachmentwaR made, In removing the grain &c. The defendants offered
tn evidence the files and record of the supreme court, In the suit In favor of Langdon against the plaintiff, In which the prop.
erty In question was attached, for the purpose of proving, that judgment was rendered therein In favor of Langdon ;-to
which evidence the plaintiff objected; but
It was admitted by the court. 'l'he defendants then offered In evidence an execution,
purporting to have been Issued upon the
Judgment in the supreme court above mentioned, dated February 21, 1848 ;-to the admission of which the plaintiff objected, insisting, that an exemplified copy of the
judgment should be produced, before
the execution could be *given in evl- •233
dence, a.nd that the execution, and the
issuing thereof, could be shown only by a
certified copy of the record of the judgment;
-l>ut the objection was o>erruled by the
court.
The defendants then offered in evidence
the return of pne Edgerton, as sheriff, upon
theaa.ld execution, to show that thewagon
tn question was sold thereon and the proceeds applied in payment of the debt. To
the admission of this evidence the plaintiff
objected, upon the ground, that from the
return It appeared, that the property was
sold two days after the sheriff received the
execution for service, 8.s shown by his fndorsement upon ft. The counsel for the defendants then suggested, that there was a

mistake ln the return, in stating the day
of the sale, and moved the court, that the
sheriff have leave to amend hie return In
that particular. To this the plaintiff objected; but the court permitted the sheriff
to a.mend his return, so as to state the day
of sale to have been one month later than
stated originally in the return. The defendants then offered in evidence the return, as amended; to which the plaintiff
obJected,-but the objection was overruled
by the court. The defendants then offered
In e"°ldence the .return of the sheriff upon the
original writ In favor of Langdon against
the plaintiff, showing an appraisal or the
horse and some othe1· property attached,
and that the plaintiff had furnished security tothesheriff and received possession of
theproperty. It appeared, that the money
had not been paid on the security, and no
application of the property had ever been
made upon the execution by the sheriff, or
bv an:v other person. The defendants also
proved, thatoneMcCunA had executed a receipt to the sheriff fora.portion of the property atta£hed, and that the property, except the wagon which was sold upon the
execution, went into the possession of the
plaintiff. The plaintiff requested the court
to charge the jury,-1. That the defendants could not Justify the taking of the property In question under the writ In favor of
Langdon, if the property attached, or any
portion thereof, were put to use by the officer who had a.ttachf'd it. 2. That property attached must be considered as In the
custody of the law, and the attaching officer haa no authority to put it toulile; and
if, tn this case, they found, that, upon the
property being attached by Charles H. Slason, he put the horse, wagon and harness,
to use, and contfnuAd W use them,
during the greater part *of the day, *234
In removing the other property atta£hed, he rendered himself a trespasser ab
lnltio, and could not juf'ltlfy taking the
property, or any po.rt thereof, under the
attachment. 3. Thatiftheofficercouldjustlfy the taking of the property under the
atta£hment, if he so used any part of it, he
could not Justify the taking of the horse,
wagon and harness so used; but, as to the
property so used, the authority waB rendered void by the abuse. 4. That the use of
the horse, wagon and harness, on the next
day after the atta~hment, was unjustifiable, and rendered the officer a trespasser
a,p Jnltlo. 6. Tha.t the application of the
plaintiff to havo the property appraised,
under the statute, In order to regain the
possession of it, and giving security to the
sheriff, was not a waiver or the right of
action aga.lnst the defendant for the trespass; but that the plaintittwa.s entitled to
recover the amount thus secured by him.
6. '.rhat If a portion of the property were
delivered to the recefptor, the plaintiff was
entitled to recover Its value, unless it had
come to bis possession. 7. That If theJury
found, that the defendants took the plaintiff's pitchfork and used it during the day,
without right, he was entitled to recover
its value, unlPss It were returned,-and
that, If returned, he was entitled to recover nomlnal damages. 8. That the sale
of the wagon and the application of its
vroceeds upon the execution lo favor 01
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Langdon could have no enect upon the
amount of damages In this snit. But the
court charged the Jury, that, from the testimony, the attachment and disposition
of the property attached was aJuBtulcatton
for the defendants, unl888 they had been
gotlty of such an abuse of the property, aa
to make them trespe.88f>rs ab lnltlo;-that
whetherthedefendantewere trespassers nb
Jnltlo depended upon the character of the
use or the property by them, after the attachment ;-that the uee of the horse,
wagon and hamees, in removing and securing other property of the plaintiff, attached
the same day, on the same writ and on the
same farm with the horse, wagon and harness,-the use being for a part of the day
only,-would not necet4sarily be such an
abuse of the omcer'R authorlty,a.e to make
the defendants trespassers ab lnltlo; but
that If they found, either that euch use of
the property by the defendant waa wanton, and with a design to Injure the plalntift, or that the property was Injured by
It so aa materially to diminish Its value,
the defendants would be trespaRHere
•23;) ~o the original taking and be liable
lo this action ;-that whether the drl vlng or the horRe nod wagon by the officer,
the next day after the attachment, was an
abuse of hie authority depended upon the
purpose and buelneee, lor which they were
driven; that 1f the jury found, that the officer was using the horse and wagon for
other purposes than that of removing and
securing them In a convenient place for
keeping, under the attachment, the defendants would be liable; but If for such a purpose, they would not be liable. In regard\
to d~a.ges. the court Instructed the jury.
that, the property having either boon sold
and applied on the execution, orrdelh·ered
to the plalnttn on security furnished by
him, the plalntln would not lie entitled to
recover the full value of It; but that the
measure of damages would be the amount,
which the property had been diminished In
value by the defendants' abuse of It. In
regard to the pitchfork the court charged
the Jury, that If they believed, from the evidence, that the defendants took ancl carried
It away, they should give the plaintiff Its
' 'alue; that If it WWI used and left upon the
premises, eo that the defendant reeelved It
again, and lt was Injured by the nee, tht>
plaintiff would be entlijied to recover the
a.mount of the Injury; but that if they
found, that It WLU! merely need for a portion of a day In removing the plaintiff's
property, there attu.che<l, and was left
where It was found, so that the plalntift
1111d it again, and that It waR not Injured
by the use, they were not hound to give the
plaintiff damagps for such Ul~e. The Jury
returned a verdict for the defondants. Exceptions by plnintlff.
M. G. Ev:ll'ts and Tlirnll & S111/th. for
plain tin, cited Lamb v . Dny 8 Yt. 407: 3
8tark. Ev.1108; 1 Chit. Pl. lil; 5 nnc.Abr.
161; Strong v. Hobbs, 20 Vt. 18.'J; Hart v.
Hyde, 5 Vt. 328; Orvis v. Isle La Mutt, 12
Vt. 195; Fletcher v. Pratt, 4 Vt. 18:?; and
Brainard v. Burton, 5 Vt. 97.
E. Edgerton, fur defendants, cited 2
Greenl. Ev.§ 253; lb. 283, § 2i6, n. 5; 1 Stark.
Ev. 151, § 33; Mickle!! et al. v. Hn11kln, 11
Wend. 125; Lamb v. Day, 8 Vt. 4Ui.
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Langdon could have no effect upon the

amount of damages in this suit. But the

court charged the jury, that, from the tes-

timony, the attachment and disposition

of the property attached was ajustiﬁcation

for the defendants, unless they had been

guilty of such an abuse of the property, as

to make them trespassers ab 1nit10;—that

whether the defendants were trespassers n b

initio depended upon the character of the

use of the property by them, after the at-

tachment;—that the use of the horse,

wagon and harness,in removing and secur-

ing otherproperty of the plaintiff, attached

the same day, on the same writ and on the

same farm with the horse, wagon and bar-

ness,—the use being for a part of the day

only,—would not necessarily be such an

abuse of the ofﬁcer's authority,as to make

the defendants trespassers ab inftio; but
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that if they found, either that such use of

the property by the defendant was wan-

ton, and with a design to injure the plain-

tiff, or that the property was injured by

it so as materially to diminish its value,

the defendants would be trespassers

‘235 ‘in the original taking and be liable

in this action ;—that whether the dri v-

ing of the horse and wagon by the oﬂicer,

the next day after the attachment, was an

abuse of his authority depended upon the

purpose and business, for which they were

driven; that if the jury found, that the of-

ﬁcer was using the horse and wagon for

other purposes than that of removing and

securing them in a convenient place for

keeping, under the attachment, the defend-

ants would be liable; but if for such a pur-

pose, they would not be liable. In regard

to damages, the court instructed the jury.

that, the property having either been sold

and applied on the execution, or’deiivered

to the plaintiff on security furnished by

him, the plaintiff would not be entitled to

recover the full value of it; but that the

measure of damages would be the amount,

which the property had been diminished in

value by the defendants‘ abuse of it. In

regard to the pitchfork the court charged

the jury. that if they believed,from the evi-

dence, that the defendants took and carried

it away, they should give the plaintiff its

value; that if it was used and left upon the

premises, so that the defendant received it

again, and it was injured by the use, the

plaintiff would be entitbed to recover the

amount of the injury; but that if they

found, that it was merely used for a por-

tion of a day in removing the plaintiffs

property, there attached, and was left

where it was found, so that the plaintiff

had it again, and that it was not injured

by the use, they were not bound to give the

plaintiff damages for such use. The jury

returned a verdict for the defendants. Ex-

ceptions by plaintiff.

M. G. Evarts and Thrall & Smith. for

plaintiff, cited Lamb v. Day 8 Vt. 407: 3

Stark. Ev. 1108; 1 Chit. Pl. 171; 5 Bac. Abr.

•

9

"The opinion of the court was de- 4'238
livered by
·

•

POLAND, .J. ThP ftrst question, Rrhdng
In thle caae, ls In relation to the charge of
the county court to the Jury as to the uee
of the horse, wagon and harneee by the defendants, In removing the other property
of the plaintiff, which was attached at tht'
same time. The Jury were charged, that
If they were only used In removing the
other property, and were not Injured or
lessen6'l In value thereby, such use would
not make the defendants trespassers ab
lnltlo.

It was an early doctrine of the common
law, that when a party was gullty of an
abuse of authority given by the law, he became a trespasser ab lnitlo, and lost the
protection of the authority, )lnder which
he originally acted,-ae, If benets, taken
dama,.,re fensant, or dlstralned for rent,
were killed, or put to work, by the party
taking them. he might be sued in trespass
ae for an orlginnl wrongful taking. '!'hie
doctrine has fully obtained In this country, and wae acted upon by tWs court in
the case of Lamb v. lJay et al., 8 Vt. 407,
where It was held, that the defendants,
who had attached the plaintiff's mare(one
being creditor and the other officer) and
worked her for several weeks In running
a line of stages, without the plaintiff's con11ent, became tre11passers ab lnltio. The
doctrine hae, to our knowleclge, never been
extended to any caee, except where there
has been a dear, substantial violation of
the plaintiff's rights. and of such a character as to show a wanton disregard of
duty on the part of the defendants. Were
the acts of the dereu<lants, in uRlng the
horse, wagon and harnc11s under the clrcumstaneee and for the purpose mentioned
In this rn11e, such e.n abuse of the property
and of the authority under whlcli it was
taken,ae ought to deprive them or the benefit or its prut«tlon?
It was the duty or the officer to remov~
the property, In order to make his attachmeut tiffcctual, and the expense of such removal muRt be borne by the dehtor; a.ml
instead of the plaintiff being injured by ti•"
nRe of the property, he was really benefited
by It. The doctrine, for which the plaintiff contends, goes the extent of saying,
that any use of the property makes the officer a treepaseer;-eo that If an officer attach a horse and wagon, and use the horse
for the purpose of drawing away the
wagon from the possession of the debtor,
he becomes a tort fensor. We are wholly
unable to satisfy ourselves, tha.t the law
hae ever gone to so unrPasonable an
•237 extent, or *has ever been applied to
any case, except those where the
property has been Injured, or lrns been ui;ed
by the officer for his own heneflt, or for the
benefit of some one other than the debtor.
This was the rule laid down by the county
court, and we are fully satisfied of ite correctness.
2. 'l'he next question arises upon the
charge to the Jury In relation to the driving of the horse and wagon by the officer
on the next day after the nttnchment. The
cai;e states, that the officer wa11 seen driving the horse and wagon In the highway,

10
10
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but upon what business did not appear.

The jury were charged, that if they found,

that the ofﬁcer was using the horse at!d

wagon for other purposes, than that of re-

moving and securing them in a place for

conveniently keeping them,while under the

attachment, the defendants would be lia-

ble.—otherwise not.

The ofﬁcer, no doubt, had the right to

drive the horse and wagon for the purpose

suggested in the charge; but the plaintiff

claims, that the legal presumption should

be, in the absence of express proof as to

the object and purpose of driving the horse

and wagon, that it was for an unlawful

purpose. But in our opinion this would be

contrary to the ordinary rule of legal pre-

sumption in relation to all persons, and

especially persons acting under legal au-
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thority. Omnia przesumnntur rite acta is

a maxim, which is always applied to the

conduct of persons acting under the a uthcr-

ity of law. Although there was no direct

evidence as to the object and purpose of

driving the horse and wagon, the jury

might well infer the object from the time,

circumstances and direction of the driving;

and we think it was properly left to them

to determine. We think, it was upon the

plaintiff to show the act of the ofﬁcer to

be unlawful; andif he had it left to the jury

to decide, even without any evidence to

prove it, we do not see, that he has any

ground of complaint.

3. Another question is also raised upon

the charge to the jury in relation to the

use of the pitchfork by the defendants.

Under the charge thejury must have found,

that the pitchfork was used by the defend-

ants only in moving the plaintiffs proper-

ty, that it was left where they found it,

that the plaintiff received it again, and

that it was in no way or manner injured.

They were told by the court, that if they

found all these facts proved, they were not

obliged to give the plaintiff any damages

for the fork.

It is true, that, by the theory of the

'238 law, whenever an invasion of "a right

is established,though no actual dam-

age be shown, the law infers a damage to

the owner of the property and gives nom-

inaldamages. This goes upon the ground,

either that some damage is the probable ,

result of the defendant's act,orthat his act ‘

would have effect to injure the other's

right, and would be evidence in future in

favor of the wrong doer. This last applies

more particularly to unlawful entries upon

real property, and to disturbance of incor-

_NmIINAL AND SUBSTANTIAL DAMAGES.

out upon what business did not appear.
The jury were charged, that if they found,
that the officer was using the horse a1'd
wagon for other purposes, than that of removing and securing them in a place for
conveniently keeping them, while under the
attachment, the defendants would be llable.-otherwise not.
The officer, no doubt, had the right to
drive the horse and wagon for the purpose
suggested in the charge; but the plaintiff
claims, that the legal presumption should
be, tu the absence of express proof as to
the object and purpose of driving the horse
and wagon, that It was for an unlawful
purpose. But in our opinion this would be
contrary to the ordinary rule of legal presumption in relation to all persons, and
especially persons acting under legal authority. Omnia prresumnntur rite acta le
a maxim, which Is always applied to the
conduct of pereonsactlngundertheauthority of law. Although there was no direct
evidence as to the object and purpose of
driving the horse and wagon, the jury
might well infer the object from the time,
clreumstances and direction of the driving;
and we think it was properly left to them
to determine. Wa think, it wae upon the
plaintiff to ehow the a.ct of the officer to
beunlawful; and If he had it left to the jury
to decide, even without any evidence to
prove It, we do not see, that he has any
ground of complaint.
3. Another question le aleo raised upon
the charge to the jury in relation to the
use of the pifohfork by the defendants.
Under the charge the jury muet haTe found,
that the pitchfork was used by the defendants only in moving the plaintiff's property, that it was left where they found it,
that the plaintiff received it again, and
that it was In no way or manner injured.
They were told by the court, that if they
found all these facts proved, they were not
obliged to give the plaintiff any damages
for the fork.
It ie true, that, by the theory of the
*238 law, whenever an invasion of •a right
is established, though no actual damage be shown, the law iniers a damage to
the owner of the property and gives nominal damages. Thie goes upon the ground,
either that some damage Is the probable
result or the defendant's act, orthat his act
wou1d have effect to injure the other's
right, and would be evidence in future In
favor of the wrong doer. Thie la.st applies
more particularly to unlawful entries upon
real property, and to disturbance of incorporeal rights, when the unlawful act might
have an effect upon the right of the party
and be eYidence in favor of thewrong doer,
if hie right ever came in question. In these
cases an action may be supported, though
there be no actual damage done,-because
otherwise the party might lose his right.
So, too, whenever any one wantonly invades another's rights for the purpose of
Injury, au action will lie, though no actual
damage be done; the law presumes damage, on account of the unlawful Intent.
But it Is believed, that no case can be found,
where damages have been given for a trespass to personal proper t y, when no unlawful Intent, or disturbance of a right, or possession, is shown, and when not only all

probable, but all possible, damage is expressly disproved.
L The English courts have recently gon&
far towards breaking up the whole system of giving verdict.s, when no actual injury has been done, unless there be some
right in question, which~t a.a Important
to the plaintiff to establish. In the case of
Williams v. Mostyn, 4
W. 145, where
·case was brought for the voluntary escape
of one Langford, taken on mesne process,
and it was admitted, that the plaintiff had
euetained no actual damage, or delay, the
defendant having returned to the custody
of the plaintiff, a verdict was found for the
plaintiff for nominal damages. But, on
motion, the court directed a nonsuit to be
entered, saying that there had been no
damage in fact or in law. So In a eult
brought by the owner of a house against a
lessee, for opening a door without leave,
the premises not being in any way weakened, or Injured, by the opening, the court
refused to allow nominal damages, and remitted the case to the jury to say, whether
the plai11Uff'e reverelonary.interest had In
polut of fact been prejudiced. Younit v.
Spencer, 1ti B. & C. 145, [21 E. C. L. 70.] Mr.
Broome, In nls recent work on Legal Maxims, lays down the law in the following
labguage,-" Farther, there are some Injuries of so small and little consideration in
the law, tha.t no action will lie for them;
for instance, in respect to the payment *of tithes, the principle which •ZJi.may be extra~ted from the cases appears to be, that for smll.11 quantities or
corn, involuntarily left in the process of
ra.king, tithe shall not be payable, unless.
there be any particular fraud, or intention
to deprive the parson of hie full right."
If any farther authority ie deemed necessary, in support of the ruling of the county
court on thle point, we have only to refer
to that ancient and well established maxim,
t-de min/mis non curat Jex,-which seems
J>~uliarly applicable in this case, and would
alone ha,·e been ample authority upon this
part of the case; for we fully agree with
Mr. Sedgwick, that the law should hold
out uo Inducement to useless or vlndictiv&
litigation. Sedgwick on Dam. 62. This
disposes of all the questions raised upon
the charge.
4. The remaining questions in the case
arise upon the admiSHlon Of the original
files and record of the case Langdon v.
Paul. The plaintiff objected to the introduction of theorildnal record, and claimed,
that the judgment could only be proved by
an exemplified copy of the record. But we
think the objection not well founded . Il
the clerk of the supreme court were willing
to bring the original record Into court, w&
think it might well be used. He probably
could not be compelled to do so, and might
have required the party to procure a copy
of the same; but when the original record
le brought into court, we think It would
be very difficult to give any substantial
reason, wily It is not evidence of as blgb &
character, as a copy of the same record
would he. The practice of receiving origI' inal
recordH as evidence has been universal,
· rui we believe, in this state, and is often
much more convenient than to procur&
copies. l\ye et al. v. Kellam, 18 Vt. 594.

poreal rights, when theunlawful act might

have an effect upon the right of the party

and be evidence in favor of thewrong doer,

if his right ever came in question. In these

cases an action may be supported, though

there be no actual damage done,.—becanse

otherwise the party might lose his right.

So, too, whenever any one wantonly in-

•
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In relation to the amendment of the exe-

cution by the ofﬁcer, it is very clear, that

the county court had no power to permit

any such amendment; but we cannot per-

ceive, that the case was in any way affected

by it. If the ofﬁcer. who held the execu-

tion, was guilty of any irregularity in his

proceedings in the sale of the wagon upon

the execution, it could not have the effect

to make these defendants trespassers, who

took the property rightfully, and were in

no way responsible for the act of the sher-

iff, who had the execution.

We ﬁnd no error in the proceedings of the

county court, and their judgment is af-

ﬁrmed.

NOTE. In Fullam v. Stearns, 30 Vt. 454. the

question was whether a trespasser should be

held liable for the value of certain thongs or

strings, which were used to fasten together the
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ends of a leather belt, and which the trespasser

had unnecessarily cut. The trial court had in-

structed the jury that if they found the thongs to

be old, worn out, and nearly worthless, the de-

fendant would not be liable unless he cut them

wantonly. As to this, the supreme court, by

BENNETT, J., said:

“We have more difficulty in relation to the

manner in which the court put the case to the

jury relative to the bands or belts. The case

is not put to them upon the ground that it was

necessary to cut the thongs with which the

bands were laced or fastened together. It could

not have so been, for the case says the evidence

went to show that the could have been easily

taken out without cuttmg.

“With reference to the value of the thongs,

the case should have been put to the jury upon

the ground that they found just what the de-

fendants‘ testimony tended to prove, and noth-

ing more, and that wa ‘that the thongs were

considerably worn, and of small value.' The

court were not warranted, upon such evidence.

to put the case to the jury upon the hypothesis

that they should ﬁnd the thongs to be old, worn

out, and nearly worthless. The court should

have charged the jury as to what the law would

have been had the jury found the thongs to

have been ‘considerably. worn, and of small

value.‘ “'ould the court, upon such a ﬁndin .

apply the maxim, ‘De minimis non curat lex ?

“‘hile, on the one hand, we should be unwill-

ing to hold out inducements to useless and vin-

dictive litigation, we should, on the other, be

slow to violate and set aside well-settled prin-

ciples. To give a right of action, it has often

been said there must be both an injury and a

damage, and it has been as often said that ev-

ery violation of a right imgorts some damage,

and, if none other be prove . the law allows a

nominal damage. See Whittemore v. Cutter, 1

Gallison, 429. The maxim, ‘De minhais non

curat lex,' I apprehend, whenever it is applied

correctly to take away a right of recovery, has

reference to the injury, and not to the resulting

damage.

“If a person has a right to vote at an election,

and he is refused this right, he may have his

action, even though the person for whom he

Jn n-lation to the amendment of the execution by the officer, It le very clear, that
the coonty court hail no power to permit
&ny such amendment; but we cannot perceive, that the case was In any way affected
by it. If the officer. who held the execution, wa.e guilty of any Irregularity In hie
proceedings In the sale of the wagon upon
the execution, It could not have the eff1-ct
to make these defendanta trl'Spruuiere, who
took the property rightfully, and were In
no way J'Cl!ponelble for the act of the sller1n. who hatl the execution.
We find no error In the proceetllnirs of the
county court, and their jutlgmcnt 1B affirmed.
NOTE. In Fullam v. ·stenms, 30 Vt. 454. the
question was whether a tl't'spai;ser should be
held liable for the value of certain thougs or
strings, which were used to fasten together the
ends ot n lt•atlwr belt, and which the trei;paKKcr
had unnece1<><0.rily cut. The trial court h11d in·
structed the jury that if they found the thong>1 to
be old, woru out. and nenrly worthless, tht• <il•fendnnt would not be liable unless he cut th1•m
wantonly. As to this, the supreme court, uy
BE~:SETT, J., said:
""'e hnYe more difllculty in relation to the
manner in which the court put the c&11e to the
jury relatin to th(' bands or belts. The cnse
is not put to them upon the ground that it wai.
nect>llsary to cut the thongs with which th!'
bands were laced or fastened together. It could
not haYe so been, tor the case says the evideuce
went to Rhow that the1 could have been eu11ily
taken out without cutting.
"W'ith reference to the value ot the thongs,
the calM' should have been put to the jury upon
the ground that they found just what the defendants' testimony tendl'tl to prove. and nothing more, and that was 'thnt the thongs wpre
considerably worn, and of snmll value.' The
court were not warranted, upon such evide1H'e,
to put the case to the jury upon the bypotht·~is
that they should find the thon1ts to be old, worn
out, and nearly worthless. The court ehonld
have cbnrged the jury as to whnt the law would
have been had the jury found the thongs to
have been 'considerahly. worn, nod of small
value.' "'ould the court. npon such a findiuf..
11pply the ruuxim, 'De minimil! non curnt lex ?
"l\nlle, on the one hand. we should be unwill·
ing to hold out inducements to useless and vindictive litigation, we 1hould, on the other, be
slow to violate and set aside well-settled principles. To give a right of action, it has orten
been said there must be both an injury and a
dama~e. and it has been BB often said that ev·
ery v1olation of a right imports some damage,
and, if none other be proYed, the law allows u
nominal damage. See Whittemore v. Cutter, 1
GallU,On, 429. The maxim, 'De mlnimis 0011
curat Jex,' I apprehend, whenever it is av1>lied
correctly to take away a right of recovery, hue
ret.. rence to the injury, and not to the resulting
damage.
"If a person baa a right to vote at an election,
and he is rPfnsed this right, be may have his
action, even though the pe!'!'Oo tor whom be
pro1K>Bed to vote ~hould chance to be electt~I.
Ashb)· v. White, ;? Ld. Raym. 9:!8. So, it a
sheriff neglect to return an execution the cred·
itor may have his action tor nominal damage11,
although no damairr appeared to huve re~ulted
from the nei:lect. I·rnlder v. Bnrker, 18 Vt. 4:i-l.
In the c111<e ot Clifton v. Hoop('r, U Adol. & K
(N. 8.) 468, in an action for not executing n ea.
sa., the jury found the defPndant in dl'funlt,
but that the plaintiff bad sustained no d11m11i:e.
and still jud1tment was _given for the plaintiff
for nominnl damages. lLord Denman. in that
case. said 'that l\·here a clear right of a party
wn11 invaded, in conseque nce of another's bn•n<>h
of duty, lw mnst be entitled to an n<>tion oi:ni11Ht
that party for some amount. and that there wus
no authority to the contrary.' J

11

"In Ashby v. 'White, 2 Ld. Raym.938,it is snid
by Lord Holt 'that every Injury to a right imports n dama~e in the nature of it, though ther11
be no 8ecnmary loss.' See, also, Barker v.
Green, - Bing. 317. The case of Williams v.
:Mo11tyn.. 4 )lees. & W. 145, Is not in conflict
with Clifton v. Hooper. In thut case the di~
tinction hrt wf't'n mesne and final process is well
tnken. 111 the cusp of mesne process, no rii:ht
of the creditor is violated by an escape, u11IP>'-~
he is delayed in his suit thereby, or has sustained nctnal dnmage. The creditor, it is said
In that CllK(', simply had the right to hnve the
sheriff keep the prisoner ready to l>e removed at
any time the plnintiff might elect, by habeas
corpus, into the superior court, thrre to be chnrgt><l with a decloration, or to be declnred ng:1inst
ns in the <>ustody of the sheriff. The right of
the plnintiff was correlative to the dutv of the
11~eriff: and, unless the plaintiff was de°Iayed in
his suit by re11son ot the escape, no right of his
hnd been Yiolated; but, if delayed, though for
eYt>r so short n time. a right hnd been violntt·d,•
a111! he bas bi" nction. See, also, Cady v. Huntington, 1 N. H. 1as. So, in Young v. Spencer,
10 Barn. & C. 145, the action was by the per·
ROii l\·ho bad the reversionnry interest agninst a
1..~~""· and the court refused to allow nomi11al
damuges for a wrongful net ot the le>111ee, which
diol not injure the estate In reven<ion. I lere,
al>10, no right of the reYPrHioner was Yiolnted.
A legal rhd1t must be viul11ted. and a damage
en11uc; but nctunl. 11erceptible damages are not
lndiA(X'nsn hie, and they will be pre11uD1ed to follow. Embrey v. Owen, G Exch. 353, 372; Willinnu~ v. f~sling. 4 Bnrr, 486.
The maxim. 'De
minimis non curut lex,' has been applied to
clnims for tithe11. where the quantity was small,
and involuntarily left upon the ground in the
proce11s of raking; yet, if there is a fraud, or an
inh•ntion to deprive the per>«m ot his ri1tht, the
mnxim will not be apphed to cut off hii1 right
of recovery, though the quantity be 11mnll. and
In Glnnvill v. Stacey, 6 Rnrn. & C. r>-43, the
plaintiff had a judirment on his verdict for three
Rhillinirs. nod in At•neca Rond Co. v. Auhurn
Rnilroad Co., 5 Hill. 175, it . is said the maxim,
'De minimis,' etc., is never applied to a posith-e
and wrongful invasion of another'11 property;
and I apprehend it may at least be snfe to say
it should never In such CUI!<'!! be applied to cut
off a recovery, where the positive nod wrongful
act causes damages which can be fairly valued.
The damnge done to the plaintiff's property by
cutting hi!! thongs, which fnstened the bnnds
tog<>ther, though 'considerably worn, and of
small Yalne,' could l>e estimated, and we cannot say that he shall not recover them. In Pnul
v. Slason, 22 Vt. 2:m, the Jury were charged
thnt, if they found that it (the pitchfork) was
merely used for a portion ot a doy in removing
the plaintiff's property, there attnched, and was
left where it was found, so that the plaintiff had
it 11gnin, and that it was not injured by its use,
they were not bonud to give the plnintiff damuges tor such use. The supreme eourt, it is
true, aftirm(•d this ruling, nnd applied the mnxim, 'De minimis non curat lex,' to the cuse. It
may be remarked that in th11t case the pitchfork
wns used in removing the plnintiff's hny, which
had been attached, nod which wns to be removed at his expense; nnd it mny, in one sense,
be said that the fork wus used in the business
of the plaintiff, nod for his henefit. and the jury
must haYe found thnt the plaintiff had his fork
agnin, nnd that it had not btoen injured by the
offlcer in removing the hay. \Ve apprehend that
cuse does not warrant the charge of the court
in th<' case nt bar. Both the iujnry nnd the
damni:e were too insignificnnt to lie mndc the
ground of an action. ln<l<·<·<I. the jury musl
have found there was no actual dumai:e, and
the court would not imply a damage from such
a taking, though perhaps it might technically
have constituted a wrongful taking by the offi·
cer, though taken to be u11cd in removing the
plnintiff's hay, nnd for the expense ot which the
plaintiff was to be charged."
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WARTMAN v. SWINDELL.

(% Atl. 356, 5-1 N. J. Law, 589.)

Court of Errors and Appeals of New Jersey.

Nov. 14, 1892.

Error to circuit court, Camden county; be-

fore Justice Garrison.

Action by John W. Wartman against Wil-

liam H. Swindell for damages. Judgment

for defendant. Plaintiff appeals. Reversed.

(25 .Atl. 356, 54 N. J. Law, 589.)
Court of Errors and Appeals of New Jersey.
Nov. 14, 1892.
Error to circuit court, Camden county; before Justice Garrison.
Action by John W. Wartman against William H. Swindell for damages. Judgmfnt
for defendant. PlalntUr appeals. Reversell.
John W. Wartman, pro se. Scovel & Harrlis, for defendant ln error.

John W. Wartmau, pro se. Scovel & Har-

ris, for defendant in error.

VAN SYCKEL, J. In September, 1891, the

clerk of the plaintiff in error, who was plain-

tiff below, drove the horse and carriage of

, the plaintiff to the sheriff's oﬂice in Camden,

and there tied the horse to a post at the curb

line of the street.. While the clerk was in

the sheriff's ofﬁce, the lines, worth about

three dollars or four dollars, were taken from
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the horse by the defendant in error, and the

clerk was left without the means of driving

the horse. He therenpon demanded the lines

of the defendant, who refused to return them

to him. The clerk then went to the oﬂice of

the plaintiff, and informed him of the occur-

rence, and was instructed to return to the

courthouse, and again demand the lines of

the defendant. A second demand was made.

and the defendant refused to comply with it.

Therenpon the plaintiff brought suit against

the defendant for damages. On the trial of

the cause in the court below the plaintiﬂ,

after proving the facts above stated, rested

his case. On the cross-examination of the

plaintiff's clerk it appeared that the defend-

ant said to him that the plaintiff had taken

a small article from the defendant, and the

clerk, in reply to the question whether the

defendant did not take the lines by way of a

joke, said he “supposed perhaps he did it in

a joke, but he did not know what it was done

for when it was ﬁrst done." When the plain-

tif f had rested his case, the trial judge said:

“If the defendant will make a tender of these

lines now, I will dismiss this case upon the

ground de minimis non curat lex." The de-

fendant therenpon tendered the lines to the

plaintiff, and the court dismissed the jury

from the further consideration of it. This

disposition of the case is the error complained

of in this court. The trial judge acted upon

the idea that the conduct of the defendant

was intended as a joke, and that the matter

involved was too insigniﬁcant to claim the at-

tention of the court. . If the defendant relied

upon the fact that he removed the lines by

way of a joke. it was a question for the jury

to decide whether the parties had been per-

petrating practical jokesnpon each other in

such a way that the defendant had a right to

believe that the plainiif f would accept this

act as a joke. That question could not legal-

ly be taken from the jury, and settled by the

court; nor, in my judgment, was the maxim

de minimis non curat iex applicable to this

case. In Seneca Road Co. v. Auburn & R. R.

Co., 5 Hill, 175, Mr. Justice Cowen said this

maxim is never applied to the positive and

VAN SYCKEL, J. In September, 1891, the
-clerk of the plaintiff In error, who was plaintiff below, drove the horse and carriage of
• the plaintiff to the sheriff's oftlce ln Camden,
and there tied the horse to a post at the curb
llne of tht. street. . While the clerk was ln
the sheriff's oftlce, the llnes, worth about
three dollars or four dollars, were taken from
the horse by the defendant ln error, and the
clerk was left without the means of driving
the horse. He thereupon demanded the llnes
of the defendant, who refused to return them
to him. 'fhe clerk then went to the oftlce of
the plalntllf, and Informed hlm of the occurrence, and was lusti·ucted to return to the
-courthouse, and again demand the lines of
the defendant. A second demand was m11de.
and the defendant refused to comply with It.
Thereupon the plalntltr brought suit against
the defendant for damages. On the trial of
the cause In the court below the plalntltr,
after proving the facts above stated, rested
his c11se. On the cross-examination of the
plalntlft"s clerk It appeared that the defendant snld to him that the plaintiff had taken
a small artlclE,, from the defendant, and the
clerk, ln reply to the question whether the
defendant did not take the lln~s by way o! a
joke, said be "supposed perhaps he did It In

a joke, but he dld not know what It was done
for when It was first done." When the plalnmr had rested bis case, the trial judge said:
"It the defendant will make a tender of these
lines now, I will dismiss this case upon the
ground de mlnlmls non carat lex." The defendant thereupon tendered the lines to the
plaintlf'I'. and the court dismissed the jury
from the further consideration of It. This
disposition of the c11se ls the error complained
of in this court. The trial judge acted upon
the Idea that the conduct of the defendant
was Intended as a joke, nnd that the matter
lnYolYed wns too lnslgnllknnt to claim the attention of the court. . If the defendant relied
upon the fnct that he removed the lines by
way of a joke. it was a question for the jury
to decide whether the parties had been perpetrating pnictlcal jokes. upon each other In
such n w11y that the defendant had a right to
believe that the plalntilT would accept this
act as a joke. That question could not legally be taken from the jury, and settled by the
court; nor, In my judgment, was the maxim
de mlnlmis non curat lex applicable to th!~
c11se. In Seneca Road Co. v. Auburn & R. R.
Co., 5 Hill, 175, llr. Justice Cowen said this
maxim ls never applied to the positive and
wrongful Invasion of another's property. The
right to maintain an action for the value of
property, however small, of which the owner
is wrongfully deprived, Is never denied. A
trespass upon lands Is actionable, although
the damage to the owner Is Inappreciable.
The celebrated Six Carpenters' Case, reported
In 8 Coke, 432, Involved a trlftlng sum. But
11s the case In hand stood at the close of the
plulntllf's testimony, I nm not prl'pnred to
say that a verdict for substantial damages
would not hnve been justifiable. In my opinion, the trlnl court erred In dismissing this
case, and the judgment below should therefore be reversed.

NOMINAL .AND SUBSTANTrAL DAM.AGES.
NOMINAL AND SUBSTANTIAL DAMAGES.

13

DAYTON v. PARKE et all

(37 N. E. 642, 142 N. Y. 391.)

Court of Appeals of New York. June 5. 1894.

Appeal from supreme court, general term,

second department.

Action by William B. Dayton against Wil-

liam A. Parke and others to recover freight

and demurrage charges. From a judgment

of the general term (22 N. Y. Supp. 613) mod-

ifying a judgment for plaintiff, defendants

appeal. Modiﬁed.

DAYTON "'· P.~RKE et &1.1
(37 N. l!l. M2, 142 N. Y. 391.)
Court of A.ppeala of New York. June 15, 1894.
Appeal from supreme court, general term,
second department.
Action by Wllllam B. Dayton against William .A. Parke and others to recover freight
and demurrage chargea. From a. judgment
of the general term (22 N. Y. Supp. 613) mod·
Uying a judgment for plalnttJr, defendanta
appeal Modlded.
Edward M. Shepard, for appellants. Thoe.
J. Ritch, Jr., for respondent.

Edward M. Shepard, for appellants. Thos.

J. Ritch, Jr., for respondent.

PECKHAM, J. The trial court directed

a verdict for the amount of the plaintiff's

claim for freight, together with six cents

damages, for demurrage, and the judgment

was thus duly entered, with costs. Both

parties appealed, and the general term, upon
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plaintiffs appeal, modiﬁed the judgment by

increasing the amount allowed plaintiff for

demnrrage from 6 cents to $312, and it af-

ﬁrmed the judgment upon defendants' ap-

peal. The defendants have appealed here

from the judgment as so modilied, and also

from several orders relating to costs, and to

the amendment of the judgment as to the

amount that should be directed upon the

plaintiff's claim for freight. [The court then

held defendants liable for freight, but not for

demurrage. as such, under the terms of the

bill of lading.]

We come, then, to the question of liability

of defendants, as consignees and presumed

owners of the ties, for the payment of dam-

ages in the nature of demurrnge for an im-

proper detention of the vessel. On this

branch the plaintiff has wholly failed to

prove any damage whatever. Because the

defendants might have been liable to pay

those damages which the plaintif f might

have proved it he had sustained them is no

reason for allowing the plaintiff to recover

even a nominal sum by way of damages,

when no amount of damages whatever has

been proved. The plaintiff chose to plant

himself upon his alleged right to recover "de-

PECKH.All, J. The trial court directed
a verdict for the amount of the plalntltr's
<.'la.Im for freight, together with six cents
damages, for demurrage, and the judgment
was thus duly entered, with costs. Both
parties appealed, and the general term, upon
plalntltf's appeal, modified the judgment by
Increasing the amount allowed plalntltr tor
demurrage from 6 cents to $312, and It affirmed the judgment upon defendants' appeal The defendants ba'l"e appealed here
from the judgment as so modltled, and also
from several orders relating to costs, and to
the amendment of the judgment as to the
a.mount that should be directed upon the
plaintiff's claJm for freight. [The court then
held defendants liable tor freight, but not for
demurrnge, as such, under the terms of the
blll of lading.]
We come, then, to the question of liability
of defendants, as consignees and prt-sumed
owners or the ties, tor the payment of damages In the nature of demurrage tor an improper detention of the vessel. On this
branch the plalntltr has wholly tailed to
pro'l"e any damage whatever. Because the
dt>fendants might have been liable to pay
those damages which the plnlntllf might
have pl'Oved If be had sustained them Is no
reason for allowing the plalntltr to reco'l"er
eYen a nominal sum by way of damages,
when no amount of damages whaten!r has
been proYed. The plalotltr chose to plant
himself upon bis alleged right to recover "demurrage," tecbnlcally so calJed; and for that
purpose be refers to the bill of lading and
charter party as forming a contract on defendants' part to pay a certain sum dally

murrage," technically so called; and for that

purpose he refers to the bill of lading and

charter party as forming a contract on de-

fendants' part to pay a certain sum daily

t Portion of opinion omitted.

for each day's detention proved beyond the

number allowed in the charter party. This

claim, as we have seen, he cannot make

good, and there is no reason why he should

be permitted to recover even a small sum

unproved, especially when the effect might

be to saddle costs of the litigation, otherwise

payable by plaintiff, upon the shoulders of

the defendants. The plaintiff says he was

entitled to a recovery of six cents, if for no

other reason than to establish a principle.

I see no principle that is established by such

a judgment. In an action of trespass upon

real estate, where title comes in question,

it is easily understood_ that a verdict of six

cents may be of the greatest value to

1

Portion of opinion omitted.

lS

!or each day's detention proved beyond the
number allowed In the charter party. This
cla.lm, as we ba.ve seen, be cannot make
good, and there 1s no reason wby he should
be pennltted to recover even a small sum
unproved, especially when the effect might
be to saddle costs of the lltlgatlon, otherwise
payable by plaJntltr, upon the shoulder& of
the defendant& The plaJntlff says he was
entitled to a recovery of six cents, If for no
ot'1er reason than to establish a. principle.
I see no principle that la established by such
a judgment. In an action Of trespass upon
real estate, where title comes ln question,
1t Is easlly understood. that a verdict of six
cents may be of the greatest value to
plaintiff as establishing his title to the land,
so far at least as the defendant la concerned.
No such principle obtains or can obta.ln In
such an action as this. The cause of action
of plaintiff In tmch a. case consists of two
branches,-'-One to establish an unjust or unreasonable detention by defendant, and the
other to show the damages which plaintiff
sustains by reason of such detention. A
failure to prove either tact-unlawful detention or damage ensuing-ls a failure to prove
a cause of action; and a plalntllf, In tailing to prove any damage whatever, ls not
entitled to a judgment for nominal damages.
It Is not a case where the la.w will presume
damage. It Is a tact to be proved.
We think the best that can be done In this
case Is to reverse the judgment, and grant a
new trial, costs to abide the event, unless the
plaintiff shall consent to reduce the judgment by striking out any recovery whatever
for demurrai:e. In case such consent shall
be given, then judgment shall stand for the
reduced amount, subject to any further reduction, If any shall be allowed by the decision or the court upon defendants' application for costs by reason of the oft'er made by
them. No costs on this appeal are allowed
to either party In case the jmli:ment Is affirmed by consent of plaintiff as reduced, and
In that case the order denying motion to
modify verdict ls affirmed. The· order denying defendants' application tor taxation of
costs must, In event of atHrmance of the
juclgrueut by ronsent, be reversed, with leave
to defendants to renew such motion upon the
facts as now existing. Judgment will nccordln)lly be entered In accordance with this
opinion. All concur. Judgment accordingly.
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JONES v. KING.

(33 Wis. 422.)

June Term, 1873.

E. L.

NOMINAL AND SliBS'.l'ANTIAL DAMAGES.

.JONES v. KING.
(33 Wis. 422.)
Supreme Court of Wisconsin. June Term, 1873.
J. F. Mcllullen, for appellant. E. L.
Browne, for respondent.

Supreme Court of Wisconsin.

J. F. .\Ic\Iullen, for appellant.

Browne, for respondent.

LYON, J. This is an action for slander.

The complaint charges the speaking by the

defendant, to and concerning the plaintiff, of

certain slanderous words, imputing to the

latter the committing of divers criminal of-

fenses. The defendant, by his answer, denies

the speaking of some of the slanderous words

set out in the complaint, andadmits the

speaking of others of them, and alleges, by

way of mitigation, that the plaintif f provoked

him, by charging him with crime, and by ap-

plying to him grossly insulting epithets, to

utter the language complained of. The evi-
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dence shows that the parties casually met,

and engaged in a conversation, which at ﬁrst

was reasonably good-natured, but soon be-

came an angry verbal altercation. in which

vile epithets and charges of crime were freely

hurled by each at the other. It will serve

no useful purpose to state the testimony in

detail, or to inquire which of the parties was

most to blame. It is better for them both

that we forbear to spread upon this record the

particulars of their foolish and disgraceful

encounter. Some objections on behalf of the

plaintiff were made to the admission of tes-

timony, and overruled; but they relate main-

ly to unimportant matters, and are not men-

tioned in the brief of counsel for the plaintiff.

Considering that they are abandoned, no fur-

ther notice will be taken of them. No valid

exception was taken to the charge of the

court. and no objection is made in the argu-

ment to its correctness. It should also be

stated that considerable testimony was given

tending to impeach the character of the plain-

tiff. The jury returned a verdict for the de-

fendant, upon which, after a motion for a

new trial had been overruled, judgment was

rendered dismissing the complaint, with costs.

The plaintiff appeals, and his counsel claims

that there should have been a verdict for

nominal damages, at least, which, while it

would have only carried nominal costs for

the plaintiff, would have defeated the defend-

ant's rights to recover costs. The claim of the

learned counsel is doubtless correct. The

speaking of words by the defendant, to and

concerning the plaintiff, imputing to him a

criminal offense, as charged in the complaint,

is admitted by the answer. The plaintiff was

therefore entitled to a verdict for at Jeast

nominal damages, without introducing any

testimony, and without regard to the testi-

mony which was introduced on the trial; and

such verdict would have defeated the recov-

ery of costs by the defendant. It should be

observed that the circuit judge was not asked

to charge, and did not directly charge, the

jury' that the plaintif f was entitled to a ver-

dict for some damages. He did not say to

the jury (as he well might) that the answer

LYON, J. This Is an action for slander.
The complaint charges the speaking by the
defendant, to and concerning the plaintiff, ot
certain slanderous words, Imputing to the
latter the committing ot divers criminal offenses. The defendant, by his answer, denies
the speaking of some of the slanderous words
set out In the complaint, and · admits the
speaking of others of them, and alleges, by
way of mitigation, that the plalntl.!f provoked
him, by charging him with crime, and by applying to him grossly Insulting epithets, to
utter the language complained of. The evidence shows that the parties casually met,
and engaged In a conversation, which at first
was reasonably good-natured, but soon became an angry verbal altercation, in which
vile epithets and charges of crime were freely
hurled by each at tile other. It will serve
no useful purpose to state the testimony In
detail, or to Inquire which of the parties was
most to blame. It is better for them both
that we forbear to spread upon this record the
particulars of. their foolish and disgraceful
encounter. Some objections on behalf of the
plaintiff were made to the admission of testimony, and overruled; but they relate mainly to unimportant matters, and are not mentioned In the brief of counsel for the plaintiff.
Considering that they are abandoned, no turther notice will be taken of them. No valid
exception was taken to the charge of the
e1Jurt. and no objection 1s made In the argumt>nt to Its correctness. It should also be
stntl'd that considerable testimony was given
tending to Impeach the character of the plalntltr. The jury returned a verdict for the defendant, upon which, arter a motion for a
new trial had been overruled, judgment was
rendered dismissing the complaint, with costs.
The plaintiff appeals, and his counsel claims
that there should have been a verdict for
nominal damages, at least, which, whlle It
would have only carried nominal costs for
the plaintiff, would have d\~feated the defendant's rights to recover costs. The claim of the
learned counsel is doubtless correct. The
speaking of words by the defendant, to and
concerning the plaintiff, Imputing to him a
criminal offense, as charged In the complaint,
is admitted by the answer. The plaintiff was
therefore entitled to a verdict for at Jens!
nominal damages, without Introducing any
testimony, and without regard to the testimony which was Introduced on the trial; and
such verdict would have defeated the recovery of costs by the defendant. It should be
observed that the circuit judge was not asked
to charge, and did not directly charge, the
jury' that the plaintiff was entitled to a verdict for some damages. He did not say to

the jury (as he well might) that the answer
of the defendant admltll, and also that the undisputed testimony proved, that actionable
words were spoken by the defendant to and
concerning the plalntitr, as alleged In the
complaint. But the judge, In his charge,
more than once refers to the speaking of
such words, hypothetically. His language ls,
"If the words were spoken," and the like.
Hence the verdict Is not In disregard of the
Instructions of the court. It must also be
observed that evidence of express malice on
the part of the defendant seems to be entirely
wanting In the case. In view of this fact,
and of the uncontradlcted testimony on certain other points (which It ls unnecessary to
specify), we are perfectly well satisfied that
the plalntlff should have recovered no more
than nominal damages. Indeed, we do not
understand his counsel to claim that he Is entitled to anythlng beyond that. We have before us, tpen, an action for ·slander, In willch
the verdict was for the defendant, but should
have been for the plalntlff for nominal damages only, and In which It ls not claimed that
any rule of Jaw has been violated by the
court, In admitting or rejecting testimony, or
In the Instructions to the jury, or that the
jury have disregarded the Instructions of the
court, or have behaved Improperly. From
these data we are to determine whether the
plalntlff ls entitled to a new trial of his action.
In Laubenhelmer v. Mann, 19 Wis. 519, n
was held that a judgment of nonsuit, although erroneous, will not be reversed, If It
appear that the plaintiff Is only entitled to
nominal damages, If the case be one In which
the defendant would recover costs, notwithstanding there Is a judgment for nominal damages rendered against him. That was an action for a penalty, and was within the jurisdiction of a justice of the peace, Hence, had
the plaintiff recovered nominal damages, the
defendant would have been entltled to costs,
the same as upon a nonsuit. · In Mecklem v.
Blake, 22 Wis. 495, which was an action to
recover damages for alleged breaches of the
covenants of seisin and against lncumbrances
In a deed of land, the cou.-t followed the decision In Laubenhelmer v. Mann, and refused
to reverse a judgment dismissing the complaint, although It appeared thnt the plaintiff
was entitled to recover, but only to recover
nominal damages. The fact was entirely
overlooked that such damages, In that action,
would have entltled the plalntltr to costs.
Hence, In Eaton v. Lyman, 30 Wis. 42 (which
was also an action on the covenants contained In a conveyance of real estate), Mecklem v. Blake was overruled as to the point
we are considering; and, It appearing that the
plaintiff was entitled to nominal damages, we
reversed a judgment of nonsuit against them.
We are entirely satisfied with this decision,
and believe that It establishes the correct rule
In all actions sounding in contract to which
It ls applicable. But there Is a class of ac-
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tions denominated in the books “hard ac-

tions," to which a different rule has been

applied in numerous oases. Of these actions,

and of the rules relating to new trials which

are applicable to them, a learned author says:

“Hard actions strictly include only civil pro-

ceedings, involving in their nature some pe-

culiar hardship, arising from the odium at-

tached to the alleged offense, or the severity

of the punishment which the law inﬂicts on

the offender in the shape of damages. To

this belong most actions arising ex delicto.

Trespass, slander, libel, seduction, malicious

prosecution, criminal conversation, deceit,

gross negligence, actions upon the statute, or

qui tam actions, prosecuted by informers, and

penal actions, prosecuted by special public

bodies or the public at large, are ranged

under this head. But as they partake, less

or more, in their nature and effect, of prose-
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cutions for criminal offenses. the rules that

govern in granting or refusing new trials, and

the reason of those rules, are drawn from

criminal cases, rather than civil." 1 Grab. &

W. New Tr. p. 503, c. 14. it is scarcely nec-

essary to say that in criminal prosecutions,

after trial and verdict for the defendant, a

new trial is never granted. But the rule is

not as broad in the class of civil actions men-

tioned above; yet in those actions it is much

broader in favor of defendants than in other

civil actions. In the volume last above cited,

we ﬁnd the following statement: \“It is a

general rule, with but few exceptions, that in

penal, and what are denominated ‘hard ac-

tions,' the court wlll not set aside the verdict,

if for the defendant, although there may have

been a departure from strict law in the ﬁnd-

ing of the jury." Page 353. And, again, on

page 5%: “In hard actions, a new trial will

not be granted, especially if the verdict be for

the defendant, although against evidence, not

unless some rule of law be violated." The

author proves the correctness of the princi-

ples and rules thus laid down by him, by

references to large numbers of cases, both

English and American; and he satisfactorily

demonstrates that, in a case like the present

one, a new trial cannot be granted without

a violation of well-settled rules of law. Per-

haps as satisfactory a statement of the law

on this subject as can be found is contained

in Jarvis v. Hatheway, 3 Johns. 180. Judge

Spencer there says: “In penal actions, in ac-

tions for a libel and for defamation, and other

actions vindictive in their nature, unless some

rule of law be violated in the admission or

rejection of evidence, or in the exposition of

the law to the jury, or there has been tam-

pering with the jury, the court will not give

a second chance of success." Add to these

other conditions which exist in this case, to

wit, that, at the most, the piaintif! is only en-

titled to recover nominal damages, and that

the jury have not disregarded the instructions

of the court, and there can be no doubt what-

ever that the motion for a new trial was prop-

erly denied by the court below. Our conclu-

sion is that the judgment of the circuit court

tlons denominated In the books "hard actions,'' to which a different rule has been
applied In numerous oases. O! these actions,
and o! the rules relating to new trials which
are applicable to them, a learned author says:
"Hard actions strictly include only clvll proeeedJngs, involving In their nature some peculiar hardship. arising !rorn the odium attached to the alleged offense, or the severity
ot the punishment which the law Inflicts on
the offender In the shape o! damages. To
this belong most actions arising ex del!cto.
Trespass, slander, libel, seduction, malicious
prosecution, criminal conversation, deceit,
gross negligence, actions upon the statute, or
qui tam actions, prosecuted by Informers, and
penal actions, prosecuted by special public
bodies or the public at large, are ranged
under this head. But as they partake, less
or more, In their nature and effect, or proseeutlona tor criminal offenses. the rules that
govern In granting or refusing new trials. and
the reason or those rules, are drawn from
erimlnal cases, rather than civll." 1 Grab. &
W. New Tr. p. 503, c. 14. It Is scarcely necessary to say that In criminal prosecutions,
after trial and verdict tor the defendant, a
new trial Is never granted. But the rule ls
not as broad In the class ot civil actions mentioned above; yet in those netlons It Is much
broader In favor ot defendants than In other
civil actions. In the volume last above cited,
we find the following statement: \"It Is a
general rule, with but rew exceptions, that In
penal, and what are denominated 'hard ac-
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tions,' the court will not set aside the verdict,
if for the defendant, although there may have
been a departure from strict law In the finding ot the Jury." Page 353. And, again, on
page 523: "In hard actions, a new trial will
not be granted, especially If the verdict be for
the defendant, although against evidence, nor
unless some rule or law be violated." The
author proves the correctness of the principles and rules thus laid down by him, by
references to large numbers o:f cases, both
English and American; and he satisfactorily
demonstrates that, In a case like the present
one, a new trial cannot be granted without
a violation or well-settled rules of law. Perhaps as satlst'actory a statement of the law
on this subject as can be found Is contained
In Jarvis v. Hatheway, 3 Johns. 180. Judge
Spencer there says: "In penal actions, In actions for a libel and for deramatlon, and other
actions vindictive In their nature, unless some
rule or law be violated In the admission or
rejection of evidence, or In the exposition of
the law to the Jury, or there bas been tampering with the jury, the court will not give
a second chance or success." Add to these
other conditions which exist in this case, to
wit, that, at the most, the plaintiff Is only entitled to recover nominal damages, and that
the jury have not disregarded the instructions
of the court, and there can be no doubt whatever that the motion for a new trial was properly denied by the court below. Our conclusion Is that the judgment of the circuit court
must be affirmed. Judgment affirmed.
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SPOKANE TRUCK & DRAY CO. v. HOE-
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SPOKANE TRUCK & DRAY CO. v. HOEFER et UL
(25 Pac. 1072, 2 Wash. 45.)

FER et ux.

(25 Pac. 1072, 2 VVash. 45.)

Supreme Court of Washington. Feb. 5, 1891.

Appeal from superior court, Spokane coun-

ty.

Turner & Graves, for appellant.

Supreme Court of Washington. Feb. 5, 1891.
Appeal trom superior court, Spokane county.
Turner & Graves, for appellant. Jesse Arthur, for appellees.

thur, for appellees.

DUNBAR, J.
Jesse Ar-

DUNBAR, J. The plaintif f Mina Hoefer

had her arm broken, and was otherwise in-

jured, by the falling of a safe, which was

being hoisted by the defendant into a ﬁve-sto-

ry brick building, known as the “Eagle

Block," in the city of Spokane Fails. Plain-

tiff had been to the oﬂlce of her physician, in

the second story of said building, where she

was accustomed to go for treatment daily,

and while returning from such a visit on the

7th day of February, 1890, she passed down
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the stairway, and into the court or opening

under the hoisted safe just as it fell. The

said stairway started from the entrance of

said court or well on Stevens street, and land-

ed on the north end of the covered way on

the second ﬂoor of the rear building. Dr.

'll‘hiel‘s ofﬁce, where Mina Hoefer had been

just before she was injured, was in a room

on the second ﬂoor of the Stevens-Street

building, and was the ﬁrst room north of the

Stevens-Street entrance. There was one oth-

er and perhaps main entrance to the building

from Riverside avenue, and it is claimed by

the defendant that the court or well on that

side of the block was used for hoisting heavy

articles to the upper stories of the building,

and was not generally employed by the pub-

lie as an entrance to the upper stories of the

block; yet we think it fairly appears that

the stairway leading from Stevens street was

in common use, and that the plaintif f had a

right to use it in going to and from the oﬂice

of her physician. Suit was brought against

the defendant, alleging damages in the sum

of $5,000. The case was tried by a jury, and

a verdict rendered for plaintiffs for $2,500,

and a judgment rendered for the same, from

which judgment an appeal was taken to this

court.

The defendant assigns as error the follow-

ing instructions to the jury, given by the

court upon its own motion: “Furthermore,

gentlemen, the plaintiffs claim in this action

t , the defendant was not only guilty of neg-

l‘ ence. by reason of which the plaintiff was

damaged, but was guilty of gross negligence,

and, in case you ﬁnd they were guilty of gross

negligence, a different rule of damages ap-

plies to the case." “ ‘Gross negligence' means

a wanton and reckless disregard of the rights

of other persons taken into consideration with

th(‘ facts in the case; and, in case you ﬁnd

that it was, then, in addition to the actual

damages which you may ﬁnd for plaintiff,

you ‘may assess a sum which the law calls

‘exemplary damages.' That means a damage

to deter others from being wanton and reck-

less of the rights of others." Also the fol-

lowing instructions asked by plaintiffs: "If

The plaintiff Mina Hoefer

bad her arm broken, and was otherwise in-

jured, by the falling of a safe, which wu
being hoisted by the defendant Into a llve-story brick building, known as the "Eagle
Block," In the city of Spokane Falls. Plaintiff had been to the oftlce of her physician, in
the second story of said building, where she
was accustomed to go for treatment dally,
and while returning from such a visit on the
7th day of February, 189(), she passed down
the stairway, and Into the court or opening
under the hoisted safe just u It fell. The
said stairway started from the entrance of
said court or well on Stevens street, and landed on the north end of the covered way on
the second fioor of the rear building. Dr.
Thlel's oftlce, where Mina Hoefer had been
just before she was injured, was In a room
on the second ftoor of the Stevens-Street
building, and was the first room north of the
Stevl'ns-Street entrance. There was one other and perhaps main entrance to the building
from Riverside avenue, and It Is claimed by
the defendant that the court or well on that
side of the block was used for hoisting heavy
articles to the upper stories of the building,
1111d wns not geqerally employed by the public as an entrance to the upper stories of the
block; yet we think It fairly appears that
the stairway leading from Stevens street was
in common use, and that the plaintiff bad a
right to use It In going to and from the office
of her physician. Sult wu brought against
the defendant, alleging damages In the sum
of $5,000. The case was tried by a jury, and
a verdict rendered for plalntlfl's for $2,500,
and a judgment rendered for the same, from
which judgment an appeal was taken to this
court.
Tile !lefendant assigns as error the following ins trnctions to the jury, given by the
court upon Its own motion: "l•'urthermore,
gentlemen, thl' l)laintltl's claim In this action
the defendant was not only guilty of ueg!ilenee, by reason of which the plaintlfl' was
damaged, but was guilty of gross negligence,
and, in Pase you find they were guilty of gross
negligence, a different rule of damages applies to the cnse." " 'Gross negligence' means
n wanton ::uul reckless disre~ard of the rights
of other persons taken into consideration with
the fnl'ls In the rnse; and, In case you llnd
that It was, then, In addition to the actual
damages which you mny find for plaintiff,
you ·may assl'ss a sum which the law calls
•exemplary da mages.' That means a damage
to deter others from being wanton and reek-

tilt

let!S ot the rights of others." Also the following Instructions asked by plalntltrs: "It
the jury believe from all- the evidence that the
agent and employ~ of defendant, the Spokane Truck & Dray ComPflily, in placing the
beams and planks across tbe well-hole, ln
plalntlft'.s' petition mentioned as being In the
Eugle block, In the city of Spokane Falls, and
in any other way, In the construction and
preparation of the appliances, for hoisting the
sate up and through said well-hole, and, in
the hoisting ot the same, failed to use such
care as the nature of the employment, and
the situation -and circumstances surrounding
the same, required of a prudent person; having had experience, and skilled In such or
similar work, and that, by reason thereof,
said beam and planks, and other appliances,
In the attempt to hoist said sate, gave way or
were broken, and tell down tbrough 'sald ,vellbole, striking plalntitr Mina Hoefer, breaking
her arm, and otherwise Injuring her, they
should llnd for plalntltr, assessing the damage, It any, at such sum as they llnd she bas
sustained, not exceeding $5,000, the aniount
claimed In the complaint." "The jury Is Instructed that, It they llnd tor plaintiff under
the preceding instruction, In assessing the
damage they have a right to consider and allow for the loss of the personal serv-l ces of
plaintiff Mina Hoefer to her family; her mental suft'erlng and bodily pain; the extent· of
probable duration of the Injury; and the prospective loss of service occasioned theceby;· also the expense Incurred for medicine, nursing, etc., and such reasonable doctor bill as
plalntltrs were obligated to pay." "Should
the jury find for plaintiffs under Instruction
No. 1, and also find that defendant's agents
and employes, In constructing the appll8llces
for hoisting said safe, and In hoisting the
same, were guilty of gross negligence, that is,
exercised so little care as to evlnce a reckless
and willful Indifference to the safety of plaintiff )Ilna Hoefer, and all others using said entrance and stairway, then they may find for
plaintiffs exemplary damages; that ls, damages in money by way of punishment, in addition to the damages they may find under
Instruction No. 2, In no case exceeding In
all the amount of $5,000 claimed In the cornplalnt." The court refused to give the following Instruction asked by tbe defendant,
which refusal defendant also assigns as error: "If you find by the evidence that the
Injury occurred by defects in the wall, caused
by the elements, and such defects were not
discoven'<i by ordinary care, In the absence of
further negligenC'e on the pnl't of the defendant. the plaintiff t111mot recover." So
far 11s the instruction Is concerned that was
asked for by defendant and refused by the
court, we think it had already been substantially given by the court; and It was not necessary to repeat It In another form of words.
The court had already instrurted the jury
that "If It did not appear by a preponderance
of testimony that this Injury was occa.sioned
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- an actual insurer of the safety of the public,

. was “that the defendant was bound to usedl

by the negligence of the defendant, that it

was their duty to ﬁnd for the defendant."

Courts should not be called upon to particu-

iarize by referring to certain portions of the

testimony. It is a far safer rule to state the

law governing the case in general terms.

It is claimed by the defendant that the lan-

guage used by the court in the ﬁrst instruc-

tion asked by plaintiffs makes the defendant

and is therefore erroneous. The statement

such care as the nature of the employment

and the situation and circumstances surround-

ing the same required of a prudent person

having had experience, and skilled in such o1;)

similar work." “'e are unable to see how

this instruction could be materially modiﬁed.

Undoubtedly the “nature of the employment"

Generated for facpubupdates (University of Michigan) on 2014-06-12 19:20 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/mdp.35112105421491
Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd-google

must be taken into consideration. If it is

an employment which is likely to endanger

life or property, certainly a greater degree of

care would be required than an employment,

the careless performance of which would not

ordinarily result in injury to person or prop-

erty. It is plain that “the situation and cir-

cumstances surrounding the employment"

must be considered; for, applying the rule

to a case of this character, a person in hoist-

ing a heavy weight in an unfrequented place,

in no way connected with any thoroughfare

or passage-way, would not be held to the

same degree of care as he would be if the

work were being done in a public thorough-

fare, where people had a right to pass, and

were actually constantly passing. It certain-

ly cannot be gainsaid that "prudence" should

be one of the requisite qualiﬁcations of a

person engaged in such employment. Nor

must his qualiﬁcations stop here. when en-

gaged in a business which is liable to inju-

riously affect the public; for he might be an

ordinarily prudent man, and yet, if he had

no experience or skill in the particular work

in which he is engaged, disastrous results

would be liable to follow. Language which

is not technical must be construed by its or-

dinarily accepted meaning, and we do not

think that the language employed by the

court could be so construed as to make the

defendant an insurer; and we concur with

the counsel for the plaintiffs that it states

substantially the same doctrine as the quota-

tion from Shear. & R. .\'eg. it 47, by defend-

ant, where they deﬁne ordinary care to be

“the care usually bestowed upon the matter

in hand by persons accustomed to deal with

such matters, and having the prudence of

the general class of society to which the per-

son whose conduct is in question belongs_.j

We next pass to the instruction of the court

both upon its own motion and upon the mo-

tion of ‘the plaintiffs in relation to punitive

damages. This is a question which has en-

gaged the earnest attention of courts and au-

thors. A careful investigation of the discus-

sion of this subject by such noted authors as

Greenleaf, Sedgwick, and Parsons, and also

l1

by the negligence of the defendant, that lt other eminent text-writers, and by numerous
was their duty to find for the defendant." courts, shows a wonderful diversity of opinCourts should not be <'ailed upon to partlcu- ion on tbls Interesting subject. The weight
la rlze by referring to certain portions of the of authority, especially considering the older
testimony. It Is a far s11fer rule to state the cases, seE>ms to be In favor of the doctrine
of punltiYe damages, but the opposite ilo('trine
law goYernlug the case In general terms.
It Is claimed by the defendant that th(' lan- has received the support and ad\·oeacy of
guage usrd by the court In the first lnstme- many modern writPrs, and the judielnl sanction asked by plalntitrs makes the l1Pf1•1ul:111t tion of many modern courts; while other
com·ts h:1'"e frnnkly slated tbt>lr repugnance
. RD actnal insurer of the t'nfety of the public,
and Is therefore erront>ous. The state111ent i to tbe doetrlne, yet considered thernselves
was "that tbe 1lefrmlant wns hound to usil : llouml, by former dN•lsions In their rcspe<·th·e
such care as the nature of the employment I stutes, to still maintain It, 11ppeallng to tl,1e
and the sltuatlon and drl'llllll'tlllle•·s surround- legislature to relieYe them from what tlley
ing the snme l"l'tJllired of 11 pr11clN1t p1•rson bellcve to be a P•'rnlclous practice. In this
having had experlen('e. aml skilled iu tmd1 O'tj state It Is a new qupstfon, and the court ap-·
slmllnr work." 'Ye are unable to s.-e how proaches Its Im·pstlgutlon untrammeled IJy
this in.strudlon <'OU!ll he mntt•rinlly 111011itlcd. formE>r deelsions, tree to aeeept the rea;iouiug
t.:ndoubtedly the "nah1rr of the emvloyment" which mo8t strong!~· n1111<'al~ to Its jmlgmrnt;,,
must be taken Into 1·on,.:id1•rntiuu. If it Is and to atlopt the rule whll'h, in Its opinion.
an employment whkh h1 likPly to eml11nger will simplify jutllelul proct't'tlings, nnd lead to
life or property, certainly a greater rlPgrt-e of the h•ast embarrassing complka tlons in the
care would be required thnn an employment, administration of the law, um! the determinathe carl'less perfonn1111ee of whkh would not tion of rights thercundc1·. .\ml this desire1l
ordinarily result In injury to pPr8on or prop- ultimatum, we think, wlll hest he attained by
erty. It le plain that "the situation and clr- ac1011tlng the rule Iii.Id down IJy )fr. Gre('nleaf
<:umstaoces surrounding the employment" {\'olume 2, § 253) that ..dumagl'S ure gh·en u·s \
must be considt>red: tor, appl~· lng the rnle a co11111eni,;11tio11 or satlsful'!ion to the plainto a case of this character, a person In hoist- tltr for nu Injury actually sustained by him
ing a heavy weight In an unfrequented place, from the defendant. They shouhl be precisely
In no way connected with any thoroughfare t'Ol11111NHml'llte with the Injury, neither more
or pn~sa~e-way, would not be held to the nor less; and this whethpr It be to his PP.!::::'
same degree of Cflre as he would he It the son or his estate,"-although It Is s toutly
work were being done In a public thorough- maintained by eo eminent an author as.
fare, where people hnd a right to pass, nod Mr. Sedgwick tbnt this detlultlon Is toll limit- :
were actually constantly passing. It ce1·taln- ed, and that, "whereYer the el.-ments o! •
ly cannot be galmmhl that "prudence" should !rand, malice, gross nE>gllgence, or oppn'Sbe one of the requisite qualifications of a skm mingle In the controversy, the law, Inperson engaged In such employment. Nor stead of adhering to the system or even the
must his qualifications stop here, when en- lnnguage or compensation, adopts a wholly
gaged In a buslnesi'.! which Is liable to inju- different rule. It permits tbe jury to give
riously afTert the public; tor be might be an what It tenns 'punitive,' '·vlmlkth·<·,' or 'exordinarily prudent man, and yet, If he bad t>mplary' damngrs: In other worcli!, blends tono e.~perience or skill In t.IJe particular work gether the Interests of society a11tl of the agIn which he Is engnged, disastrous results grieved individual, and gives damages not
would be liable to follow. Language whleh only to recompense the sntr<'rer, but to punish
Is not technical must be construed by Its or- the offender." 1 Sedg. Dam. p. 38; Id. (7th
dinarily al'l'epted meaning, and we do not 1<.:U..) p. !l:I. It Se('ms to us that there are
think that the lnngunge employed by the many \"alitl objections to lnterjeetiug Into a.
court could be so construed as to make the purely ch·fl a('tion the elements of a criminal
defendant an Insurer; and we concur with trial, Intermingling Into a sort of a meclley ol."
the counsel for the plalntitTs thnt It stntrs )pgal jumble two distinct systems of judicial
substantially the same doctrine as the quota- procedure. 'Vhlle the defendant Is tried fol"
tion from l'lhear. & H. ~eg. 47, by defl'nd- a crime, and damages a warded on the theory
nut, where they dl'llne ortllnary care to be tlm t be has been proven guilty of a crimr,
"the ea re usually hf'stowt>d upon the ma ttl'r many of the time-honored rules governln"in hand by persons accustomed to deal with the trial of crl111inal actions. nnd or the right•
such matters, and ha,·ing the JH'Udence of ·that have bel'n secured to dt>fendants In crhuthe gPnE>ral f'l:i~s of so('lety to whlrh lhP per- lnal actions "from the time wlH'n•of the nw111son whose conduct Is in question bPlon~~
ory of man runneth not to the contrary;• an~
\Ve next pass to the Instruction of the court absolutely Ignored. Umle1· this procedure the
both upon Its own motion and upon the mo- doctrine of pi·esumptlon of Innocence, until
tion or .the plalntltrs In rel11tlon to punitive proYcu guilty beyond a reasonable doubt,
damages. This is a qnestlon which has en- finds no 101lgment in the charge of the court,
gaged the earnest attention ot courts and au- but ls supplanted by the rule In civil acthors. A careful Investigation of the discus- tions of a preporulPrance of testimony. The
sion of this subject by imeh noterl authors as fnllnry 1md unfairness of the posltlon Is made
Gret>nlear, Sedgwick, and Parsons, and also manifest wben It Is noted that a person can.
LAW DAM.2d Ed.-2
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be convicted of a crime, the penalty for

which is unlimited, save in the uncertain

judgment of the jury, and ﬁned to this unlim-

ited extent for the beneﬁt of an individual

who has already been fully compensated in

damages, on a smaller weight of testimony

than he can be in a criminal action proper,

brought for the beneﬁt or protection of the

state, where the amount of the ﬁne is ﬁxed

and limited by law; and, in addition to this,

he may be compelled to testify against him-

.self, and is denied the right to meet the wit-

nesses against him face to face under the

practice in civil actions of admitting deposi-

tions in evidence. Exclusive of punitive dam-

ages, the measure of damages as uniformly

adopted by the courts and recognized by the

law is exceedingly liberal towards the injured

party. There is nothing stinted in the rule
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of compensation. The party is fully compen-

sated for all the injury done his person or

his property, and for all losses which he may

sustain by reason of the injury, in addition to

recompen for physical pain, if any has been

inﬂicted. But it does not stop here; it en-

ters the domain of feeling, tenderly inqui'res

into his mental sufferings, and pays him for

any anguish of mind that he may have expe-

rienced. Indignities received, insults borne,

sense of shame or humiliation endured, lacer-

ation of feelings, disﬁguration, loss of reputa-

tion or social position, loss of honor, impair-

ment of credit, and every actual loss, and

some which frequently border on the imag-

inary, are paid f under the rule of compen-

satory damages. The plaintiff is made en-

tirely whole. T e bond has been paid in

full. Surely the public can have no interest

in exacting the pound of ﬂesh. Ordinarily

the administration of the laws is divided into

two distinct jurisdictions, the civil and the

criminal, each governed by rules of procedure,

and by rules governing the admission and

weight of testimony different and distinct

from the other. The province of the civil

court is, as its name indicates, to investigate

civil rights; there its jurisdiction ends, or

ought to end; while the province of the crim-

inal court is, as its name imports, to investi-

gate and punish crime and restrain its com-

mission. And it is to the criminal, and not

the civil, jurisdiction that society looks for its

protection against criminals. Yfhe object of\

punishment is not to deter the criminal from

again perpetrating the crime on the particu-

lar individual injured, but for the protection J

of society at large; and as the state is at the

expense of restraining and controlling its

-criminals, and as lines are imposed for the

double purpose of restraining the offender-,

and of reimbursing the state for its outlay in

protecting its citizens from criminals, we are

at a loss to know by \\"h2IL process of reason-

ing, either legal or ethical, the conclusion is

reached that a plaintiff in a civil action, un-

der a complaint which only asks for compen-

sation for injuries received, is allowed to ap-

propriate money which is supposed to be paid

COllPENSATORY AND EXEMPLARY DA:MA.GES.

be convicted or a crime, the penalty for
which is unlimited, save In the uncertain
judgment or the jury, and fined to this unllmlteil extent for the benefit or an Individual
who has already been fully compensated In
damages, on a smaller weight of testimony
than be can be In a criminal action proper,
brought for the benefit or protection of the
state, where the amount of the fine ls fixed
and limited by law; and, la addition to this,
he may be compelled to testify against him.self, and ls denlt!d the right to meet the witnesses against him face to race under the
practice In civil actions or admitting depositions In evidence. Exclusive of punitive damages, the measure of damages as uniformly
adopted by the courts and recognized by the
law Is exceedingly liberal towards the Injured
party. There Is nothing stinted In the rule
of compeusa tlon. The party Is fully compensated for all the Injury done bis person or
his property, and for all losses which he mny
sustain by reason of the Injury, In adtlltlon to
recompenn for physical pain, if any has l>een
Inflicted. But It does not stop here; It en•
ters the omaln of feeling, tenderly Inquires
Into his mental sufferings, and pays him for
any anguish of mind that be may have experienced. Imllgn.ltles received, Insults borne,
sense of shnme or hmnlllatlon endured, laceration of feelings, dlsfiguration, loss of reputation or social position, loss of honor, Impairment of credit, and every actual loss, and
some which frequently border on the imaginary, are paid fl under the rule of compensatory damages. The plaintiff Is made entlr!"ly whole. T e bond has been paid In
full. Surely the public can have no Interest
In exacting the pound of 1lesh. Ordinarily
the administration of the laws Is divided Into
two distinct jurisdictions, the civil and the
criminal, each gov.erned by rules of procedure,
and by rules goYernbag the admission and
wPight of testimony different and distinct
from the other. The province of the civil
court Is, as Its name lndicat!"s, to Investigate
civil rights; there Its jurisdiction ends, or
.ought to end; while the province of the criminal court Is, as Its name Imports, to lnvestiga te and punish crime and restrain Its commission. And It ls to the criminal. and not
the civil, jurisdietlon tllat society looks for Its
protection against criminals. S::he object of\
punishment Is not to deter the criminal from
again perpetrating the crime on the particular Individual Injured, but for the protection_.
-0f society at large; and as the state ls at the
expense or restraining and controlling Its
.criminals, and as fin!"s are Imposed for the
double pmpose of restraining the offender·,
a111l of rt!lmburl'ling the state for Its outlay In
protecting Its citizens from criminals, we are
at a loss to know by whaL process of reasoning, either legal or ethical, the conclusion ls
r<'nched that a plalntit'f In a civil act.Ion, under a complaint which only asks for compen·
sation for Injuries rec!"lv!"d, Is allowed to appropriate money which Is supposed to be paid

for the 'benefit or the state. It ls to be presumed that the state bas fully protected lta
own Interests, or as fully at least as they
could be protected by laws, when It provides
for the punishment of crime ID Its criminal
statutes, and fixes the fine at a sum which It
deems commensurate with the crime designated; hence, punitive damages cannot be
allowed on the theory that It Is for the benefit of society at large, but must logically be:
allowed on the theory that they are for the
sole benefit of the plalnti.tr who has alreadi.
been fully compensated, a theory which ti
repugnant to every sense of just.Ice.
Again, while jurors should be the judges
or the character and weight of testimony,
that judgment should be exercised under
some rule, and be amenable to some law, so
that an abuse of discretion could be ascertained and corrected; but, under the doctrine of punitive damages, where the whole
question ls left to the tlnguidcd judgment of
the jury, and where, under the very nature
of the doctrine, no measure of damages ean
be stated, and hence no limits compelled,
where there are no special findings provided
for, It would not be o!ten that a court would
be warranted In Interfering with a vertllct,
If Indeed It could do so at all, If the verdict
fell within the amount asked as compensatory damages. Take the case at bar for
Instance, and the court has no way of ascertaining whether the jury found that the
plalntlt'f had actnnlly been damaged to the
full 11D1ount of $2,500, or whether they found
her actual damages to be $il00, and assrssed
the other $2,000 by way of punishment. It
seems to us that a prnctlce which leads to so
much confusion and uncertainty In the administration of the law, and that Is always liable to lead to Injustice, the correction of
which ls impracticable, cannot be too e1wetlily eradicated from our system of jurlsvrudence. In this connection, we quote approvingly the language of the supreme court of
Indiana In Stewart v. Maddox, 6.'3 Ind. 51.
Says the court: "The doctrine of exemplaryl
or punitive damages rests upon a "\'"ery uncertain and unstable basis. It Is almost equl"\'"alent to giving the jury fhe power to make
the law of damages In each case; and in a
case wllere the defendant ls a commanding,
popular, Influential person, and the plaintiff
of an opposite character. and the local and
temporary excitement of the time happens
to be In favor of the defendant, the jury Is
apt to be reluctant In giving ev!"n pecuniary
comp!"nsatlon, without adding anything by
way of exemplary or punitive damages; while,
In 11 case in which the character of the parties and the circumstances are reversed, the
jury will be liable to push their powers to
an unwarranted and unconscionable extent,
dangerous to justice and the security of settled rights." Says the court In Murphy v.
Hobbs, 7 Colo. 541, 5 Pac. 119: "The reftectlng lawyer Is naturally curious to account
fo1· this 'her('sy· or 'deformity,' as It has been
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termed. Able and searching investigations

made by both jurists and writers disclose the

following facts concerning it, viz.: That it

was entirely unknown to the civil law; that

it never obtained a foothold in Scotland; that

it ﬁnds no real sanction in the writings of

Blackstone, Hammond, Comyns, or Ruther-

forth; that it was not recognized in the earlier

English cases; that the supreme courts of

New Hampshire, Massachusetts, Indiana.

Iowa, Nebraska, .\Iit-higan, and Georgia have

rejected it in whole or in part; that of late

other states have faiteringly retained it be-

cause committed so to do: that a few years

ago it was correctly said, ‘At last accounts

the court of queen's bench was still sitting

hopelessly involved in the meshes of what

Mr. Chief Justice Quain declared to be “ut-

terly inconsistent propositions;" ' and that the

rule is comparatively modern, resulting in all
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probability from a misconception of impas-

sioned language and inaccurate expressions

used by judges in some of the earlier English

cases." And in support of this theory the

Colorado court quotes Mr. Justice Foster in

-Fay v. Parker, 53 N. H. 342, who concludes

a discussion of the expression “smart mon-

ey" as used by Grotins and jurists contempo-

rary with that author, in the following

language: “It is interesting, as well as in-

structive, to observe that one hundred and

twenty years ago the term ‘smart money‘ was

employed in a manner entirely different from

the modern signiﬁcation which it has obtain-

ed, being then used as indicating compensa-

tion for smarts of the injured person, and not,

as now, money required by way of punish-

ment, and to make the wrong-doer smart."

Some courts have held that it was in viola-

tion of the constitutional guaranty “that no

person should be twice put in jeopardy for

the same offense,“ where the criminal code

provided a punishment for the same otfense,

and some have restricted or limited its abro-

gation to cases where the act charged to

have been committed was made punishable

by law; but, without expressing any opinion

on the constitutional question, ‘we believe that‘

the doctrine of punitive damages is unsound

in principle, and unfair and dangerous in

practice, and that the instruction of the court

on the subject of punitive damages was erroj

neous. With this view of the law it is not

necessary to examine the further objection

urged by defendant, “that this was not a

proper case for the application of the doc-

trine of punitive dmnages." The judgment

is reversed, and the case remanded for a new

trial.

ANDERS, C. J., and HOYT, SCOTT, and

STILES, JJ., concur.

termed. Able and searching Investigations
made by both jurists and writers disclose the
following factB concerning It, viz.: Thot It
was entirely unknown to the civil law; that
it never obtained a foothold In Scotland; that
tt finds no real sanction In the writings of
Blackstone, Hammond, Coruyns, or Ruther·
:forth; that It was not recognized In the earlier
English cases; that the supreme courts of
New Hampshire, :ll11888.chusetts, Indiana.
Iowa, Nebraska, l-1leblgan, and Georgia have
rejected It In whole or In part; that of late
<>ther states have falteringly retained It because committed so to do; that a few years
ago It was correctly said, 'At Inst accounts
the court of queen's bench was still sitting
hopelessly Involved In the meshes of what
Mr. Chief Justice Qll81n declared to be "utterly lncollidstent propositions;"' and that the
rule is comparatively modern, resulting In all
probability from a mlsconct>ptlon of Impassioned language and lnaccurute exprPs,.ions
used by judges In some of lhe earlier E,ngllsh
cases." And lo support of this theory the
Colorado court quotes .Mr. Justice Foster In
. Fay v. Parker, 53 N. H. 342, who concludes
a discussion of the expression "smart money" as used by Grotius nnll jurists contemporary with that author, In the following
Ian~'ltu~e: "It ls inH•n>11tlng, as well us ln:Structlve, to observe that one hundred and
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twenty years ago the term 'smart money' was
employed In a manner entirely dlt'!crent frow
the modern signification which It hns obtained, being then used as Indicating compeusntlon for smarts of the injured person, and not,
as now, money required by way of punishment, nnd to make the wrong-doer smart."
Some courts have held that It was In vlolatlon of the constitutional guaranty "that no
person should be twice put in jeopardy for
the snme otrense," where the criminal code
provided a punishment tor the same otl'.ensc,
and some have restricted or limited Its abrogation to cases where the net charged to
hnve been committed was made punishable
by law; but, without expressing any opinion
on the constitutional question, 'we believe thnt1
the doctrine of punitive damages ls unsound
ln principle, and unfair and dangerous In
practice, and that the Instruction or the court
on the subjl'ct of punitive damages was erro;/
neons. With this view of the law It Is not
necessary to examine the further objection
urged by defendant, "that this was not a
proper case tor the applicntlon of the doctrine of punitive damages." The judgment
Is reversed, and the case remanded for a new
trial.
ANlJEHS, C. J., and HOYT, SCOTT, and
STILES, JJ., l'Oncur.
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LUCAS v. MbIGAN CENT. R. CO.
(56 N. w. 1039 98 Mich. l.)
,
Supreme Court of Michigan. Dec. 4, 1893.

LUCAS v. MPCHIGAN CENT. R. CO.

(56 N. W. 1039, 98 Mich. 1.)

Supreme Court of Michigan. Dec. 4, 1893.

Error to circuit court, Wayne county; Cor-

nelins J. Reilly, Judge. Y

Action by Calvin Lucas against the Mich-

igan Central Railroad Company for damages

for wrongful ejection from defendant's train.

Judgment for plaintiff, and defendant brings

error. Reversed.

Error to circuit court, Wayne county; Cornellus J. Reilly, Judge.
·
Action by Calvin Lucas against the Michlgan Central Railroad Company for damages
for wrongful ejection from defendant's train.
Judgment for plaintilf, and defendant brings
error. Reversed.
Henry Russel, (Ashley Pond, of counsel,)
for appellant. Dickinson, Thurber & SteveWlon, · for nppellee.

Henry Russel, (Ashley Pond, of counsel.)

for appellant. Dickinson, Thurber & Stev-

enson,-for appellee.

l\lcGR.A'I'H, J. Plaintiff purchased an ex-

cursion ticket at Dexter, good to Detroit

and return, and rode to Detroit thereon. At

about 8 o'clock on the evening of the same

day he took the train at Detroit for Dexter,
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taking a seat in the smoking car. When a

few miles out of Detroit, the conductor took

up his ticket. When the train arrived at

Ypsilanti, plaintiff left the smoker, and took

a seat in a regular passenger car. After the

train left Ypsilanti, the conductor came to

plaintiff, and demanded his fare. Plaintiff

informed him that he had given him his

ticket in the other car. The conductor then

asked him for his check. Plaintiff replied

that he had not been given a check. The

conductor threatened to put him off, but did

not at that time, but told him that he would

have to pay his fare, or get off at Ann Ar-

bor. Plaintiff responded that he had sur-

rendered his ticket, and would not pay his

fare. After the train left Ann Arbor, the

conductor returned, and, plaintiff refusing

to‘pay his fare, the conductor called the

brakeman, and they together pulled plaintif

f

from his seat, took him through the car, and

put him oﬂ, about one mile west of Ann

Arbor and eight miles east of Dexter. Plain-

tiff testiﬁed that when his ticket was taken

up no check was given him; that when the

conductor came to him the second time, and

again just before he was put off, he told the

conductor that if he would go back with him

into the smoking car he would prove his as-

sertions by the man who sat with him, but

that the conductor told him that he had no

time to bother with him; that the conduc-

tor insisted that he (plaintiff) had gotten on

at Ypsilanti; that he was ejected from the

car by force at about 10 o'clock at night;

that the night was very dark; that he could

not even see the fences on either side of the

track, and that he was compelled to walk

home. It was not claimed on the trial that

plaintiff had not surrendered a ticket, but

the conductor insisted that he had given him

and all of the excursionists checks; that he

told plaintiff that if he would bring one

man that knew him, that said he came from

Detroit, it would be all right, but he would

not do that; that he used no force in eject-

ing him; and denied that plaintlff had re-

quested him to go into the smoking car for

McGRATH, J. Plalntltr purchased an excursion ticket at Dexter, good to Detroit
and return, and rode to Detroit thereon. At
about 8 o'clock on the evening of the ·same
day be took the train at Detroit for Dexter,
taking a seat in the smoking car. When a
few miles out of Detroit, the conductor took
up his ticket. When the train arrived at
:Ypsilanti, plaintiff left the smoker, and took
a seat In a regular passenger car. After the
train left Y1>silnntl, the conductor cnrne to
plaintltr, and demanded his fare. Plalntil!
Informed him that be had given him bis
~cket In the other car.
The conductor then
asked him for bis check. Plaint!!! replied
that he hnd not been given a check. The
conductor threatened to put him oft, but did
not at that time, but told him tlint he would
have to pay his fare, or get otr at Ann Arbor. Plnlntltr responded that he had surrendered bis tl~et, and would not pny his
fare. After the train left Ann Arbor, the
conductor returned, and, plalntitt refusing
to · pay his fare, the conductor called the
brakeman, and they together pulled plalntltr
trom his seat, took him through the car, and
put him oft', about one mile west of Ann
Arbor and eight miles enst of Dexter. Plaintltr testified that when his ticket was taken
up no check was given him; that when the
conductor came to him the second time, and
again just before be was put off, be told the
conductor that lt be would go back with him
into the smoking car he would pro\"e his assc1·t1ons by the man who sat with him, but
that the conductor told him that he bad no
time to bother with him; that the conduc·
tor lnsisteu that he (plaintiff) bad gotten on
nt Yrtsilnntl; thnt he was ejected from the
mr by force at about 10 o'clock at night;
that the night was very dark; tbnt be could
not even see the fences on either side of the
track, and thnt lie wns compelled to walk
home. It wns not claimed on the trial that
plaintitr bad not sur1·N1dered a ticket, but
the conductor insisted that he hnd given him
and aJl of the excursionists checks; that he
told plalntltr that it be would bring one
man that knew him, that said he came from
Dctl'Oit, It would be all right, but he would
not do thnt; thnt he used no force in ejecting llim; and denied that plalntllf had re-

quested him to go into the smoking car for
the purpose ot identlfl.catlon. One of plaintlJf's witnesses, who was In the smoker,
testified that the conductor gave plaintitr n<>
check when the tlcket was taken up. Allother witness, who was ln the car from
which plalntitr was ejected, testified that she
was an excursionist, as were others who.
were with her; that no checks were given
to her or the other excursionist with her,
and that she heard plaintltr say to the conductor that lf he would go Into the smoking
car with him (plaintiff) he could prove that
he got on at Detroit, and had given up his
ticket, and the conductor refused to go.
PlalntUr had a verdict for $1,200, and defendant appeals.
The alleged erl'Ors relate to the refusal ot
requests to charge, and to the Instructions
given on the question of damages. The defendant was entitled to have the jury Instructed as to the law applicable to its version of the case. After the sw·render ot
his ticket, plaintiff had left his seat In the
smoking car, and taken a sent ln another
car. If plaintltr received a check from the
conductor, and, when his fnre was demanded, did not produce the check, and, when requested, refused to go into the other car for
identification, be could not recover. The
check, If given, was given hlm for the very
purpose of Identification. It was notice to.
him that the conductor would rely upon Its
production, and not upon recollection. The
defendant was entitled to the instruction
that there WSS' no evidence of mnllclous intention on the part of the conductor; but,
under the circumstances of this case, lf the
jury believed the testimony introduced on
behalf of plnlntltt, the plalntur was entitled to recover, not only those damages~
which are ordinarily termed "nctunl dam·
ages," but for whatever Injury to his feelings or of Indignity, pain, and disgrace such
conduct would tend to prouuce In view of·
the time, place, and circumstances. Conduct may be so hasty and lll·tlmed, and sofar disregard proper precaution and the
rights of others, as to be reckless and oppressive, and the law regat·ds recklessnes.:1
and oppr<'sslon as aggravating tbc Injury.
Post Co. v. McArthur, 16 Mich. 4.33; Josselyn v. McAllister, 22 Mich. 310; Kreiter v...
Nicl1ols, 28 Mich. 4!l9; Elliott v. Herz, 2\t·
l\lich. 20'.!; Ii:ehrlg v. Peters, 41 Mich. 4iii,
2 N. w. 801; Ross v. LPg"gett, Gl ?iUcb. 445,
28 N. W. 69:>. If plaintiff's l<>gnl rights 'Were
vlolnted by the expulsion from the train, it
was for the jury to consider the Injury to hi~
feelings that such conduct would be likely to
produce, In view of bis consciousness thnt
be was without fault, and hnd a right to remnln upon the train to his destination. Rnilroad Co. v. Flagg, 43 Ill. 364; Carsten v.
Railroad Co., 4-! Minn. 4iH, 47 N. W. 49;
Hailrnad Co. v. IUce, 64 Md. C.3, 21 At!. 97;
Railroad Co. v. Holdridge, 118 Ind. 281, 20
N. E. 837. It was expressly held in Hall-
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road Co. v. Winter's Adm'r, 1&3 U. S. 60,

12 Sup. Ct. 356, that if plaintiff was right-

fully on the train as a passenger, he had the

right to refuse to be ejected from it, and

to make a suﬂicient resistance to being put

oﬂ.' to denote that he was being removed by

compulsion, and against his will; and the

fact that under such circumstances he was

put off the train was of itself a good cause

of action against the company. Defendant's

belief cannot be held to justify unreasonable

or reckless conduct. Welch v. Ware, 32

Mich. 77; Raynor v. Nims, 37 Mich. 34.

The court was in error, however, in in-

structing the jury that plaintiff was enti-

tled to exemplary damages in the absence

of any explanation as to what was meant

by that term. Post Co. v. McArthur, supra.

The court had already instructed the jury
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that plaintiff was entitled to recover as ac-

tual damages “for such pain and mortitica-

tion and disgrace as the act entailed," and

then informed the jury that if plaintiff made

a proposition to the conductor to step back

into the other car, and allow him to prove

that he got on at Detroit, and surrendered

his ticket, then he was entitled to recov-

er, in addition to his actual damages,

what the law calls “exemplary damages."

The jury were left free to add to the amount

which they found that plaintif f had suffered

from mortiﬁcation, pain, and disgrace a fur-

ther sum as a punishment. The aim of

law which gives redress for private wrongs

is compensation to the injured, rather than

the prevention of a recurrence of the wrong.

The law recognizes the fact that an injury

may be intensiﬁed by the malice or will-

fuiness or oppresslveness or recklessness of

the act, and simply allows damages com-

mensurate with the injury when these ele-

ments are present. The added injury in

consequence of their presence is not always

susceptible of proof, hence the matter is left

to the sound discretion of the jury. Courts,

however, should call attention to the ele-

ments that should be considered by juries in

this class of cases, and caution them from

acting upon improper theories. Jossclyn v.

McAllister, 22 Mich. 310; Scripps v. Reilly, 38

Mich. 10; Stiison v. Gibbs, 53 Mich. 280, 18

N. W. 815; Wilson v. Bowen, 64 Mich. 133,

31 N. W. 81. It is urged that the defendant

is not liable in exemplary damages for the

oppressive or reckless conduct of the con-

ductor, and Railroad Co. v. Prentice, 147

U. S. 101, 13 Sup. Ct. 261, is relied upon. In

that case the act was wholly without the

line or scope of the conductor's authority,

’and the court expressly recognize the rule

that, if any wantonness or mischief on the

part of an agent acting within the scope of

his employment causes additional injury to

the plaintiff in body or mind, the principal

is liable to make compensation for the whole

injury suffered, and a number of cases are

cited in support of the doctrine. Forlthe

errors mentioned, the judgment is reversed,
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l'OOd 00. T. Winter's Adm'r, HS u. 8. 60, the prevention ot a recurrence of the wrong.
32 Sup. Ct. 356, that If plaintiff wae right- The law recognizes the tact that an Injury
fully on the train ae a passenger, he hnd the may be Intensified by the malice or wmright to refuse to be eJected trom It, and tulness or oppressiveness or recklessness of
to make a sutftclent real.stance to being put the act, and simply allows damages com-ott to denote that be was being removed by mensurate with the Injury when these ele-compulsion, and against his will; and the ments are present. The added Injury In
:tact that under such ctrcumstnncea he was consequence of their presence Is not always
put ott the train was ot Itself a good cnnse susceptible of proof, hence the matter Is left
of action agalnet the company. Defendant's to the sound discretion of the jury. Courts,
bellet cannot be held to Justlty unreasonable however, should call attention to the eleor reckless conduct. Welch v. Ware, 82 ments thnt should be considered by juries In
this class of cases, and caution them trom
Mich. 77; Raynor v. Nims, 37 Mich. 3-i.
The court was In error, however, In ln- acting upon Improper theories. Josselyn v.
structlng the jury that plnlntitr was enti- McAllister, 22 Mich. 310; Scripps v. Reilly, 39
tled to exemplary damages In the absence Mich. 10; Stilson v. Gibbs, ::.3 Mich. 280, 18
ot any explanation as to what was meant N. W. 815; Wilson v. Bowen, 64 Mich. 133,
by that term. Post Co. v. Mc.Arthur, supra.. 31 N. W. 81. It Is urged that the defendant
Tbe court had already Instructed the jury 18 not liable In exemplary damages tor the
that plalntlfr was entitled to recover as ac- oppressive or reckless conduct ot the contual damages ''tor such pain and mortifica- ductor, and Railroad Co. v. Prentice, 1-17
tion and disgrace as the act entailed.'' and U. S. 101, 13 Sup. Ct. 261, ls relied upon. In
then Informed the jury that It plalntltr made that case the act was wholly without the
a proposition to the conductor to step back , llue or scope of the conductor's authority,
Into the other car, and allow him to prove and the court expressly recognize the rule
that he got on at Detroit, and surrendered that, If any wantonness or mischief on the
bis ticket, then be was entitled to recov· part of an agent acting within the scope of
er, In addition to his actual damages, bla employment causes addltlonal Injury to
what the law calla "exemplary damages." the plalntltf ln body or mind, the principal
The Jury were left tree to add to the amount la liable to make compensation for the whole
' which they found that plalntltr bad auttered Injury suttered, and a number or cases are
from mortl11.catlon, pain, and disgrace a fur- cited ln support of the doctrine. For. the
ther sum as a punishment. The aim of errors mentioned, the judgment-la reversed,
law which gives redress for private wrongs and a new trla1 ordered. 'nle other Justices
Jal compensation to the Injured, rather than concurred.
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CHELLIS v. CHAPMAN.t

COliPENSATORY AND EXEMPLARY DAMAGES.

CHELLIS~. CHAPMAN.1

(26 N. E. 308, 125 N. Y. 214.)

(26 N. E. 308. 125 N. Y. 214.)

Court of Appeals of New York. Jan. 13, 1891.
Court of Appeals of New York. Jan. 13, 1891.

Appeal from supreme court, general

term, fourth department.

Watson M. Rogers, for appellant. Han-

nibal Smith, for respondent.

GRAY, J. This plaintiff has recovered a

verdict for $8,000, as damages for the

breach by defendant of his promise to

marry her. The proofs abundantly justi-

ﬁed the jury in ﬁnding as they did. but the

defendant insists that the trial judge erred

in his rulings upon the evidence, and in

his charge. He does not raise any ques-

tion about the fact of his agreement to

marry the plaintiff. and, indeed, he could

not well do so, as it was established out

of his own mouth; but he thinks his case

was prejudiced by theadmission ofcertain
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evidence. and by the way in which the trial

judge submitted the question of the dam-

ages to the consideration of the jury, and

that he should. therefore, have a new trial.

The general term, in afﬂrming the ju'dg-

ment, have passed upon various points

raised by the appellant, and we might well

remit the case without further expression

of opinion; but some of the questions still

insisted upon seem to deserve further con-

sideration from us. Evidence ofthe defend-

ant‘s general reputation as to wealth, at

the time of the agreement ofmarriage, was

admitted against theobjection to its cor‘-

petency upon the subject of damages in

such an action. The exception to its ad-

mission presents an interesting question,

and one which may be deemed not alto-

gether free from difficulty. Such evidence,

on ﬁrst consideration, seems to conﬂict

with the general rule that in actions for

a breach of contract evidence as to the de-

iendant's wealth is inadmissible. The

plaintiff. in such actions. is entitled to re-

cover only those damages which she may

prove that she has suffered in consequence

of the defendant's failure to perform on

his part. The defendan t's solvency, or in-

solvency, has nothing to do with the is-

sue, and furnishes no measure for the com-

putation of damages. And this rule of ex-

Clusion as to such evidence has been also

applied to cases where damages are sought

to be recovered for seduction, or for crint-

inal conversation. James v. Biddington,

6 Car. & P. 589; Dain v. Wycoff,7 N. Y.

191. Boron Ar.nsnso.v, in James v. Bid-

dington, an action by a husband for crim-

inal conversation with his wife, assigned

as the reason for holding such evidence to

Appeal from supreme court, general
term, fourth department.
Wat.<mn M. Rogers, for appellant. Hanvi/Jal Swith, for re1;pondent.
GRAY, J. Thl11 plalntlfi ha11 recovered a.
vertlict fur $8,00U, as damages for the
br(•nch by defendant of his promise to
marry h£'r. '.rhe proofs abundantly justltictl the jury In finding as they did, but the
cfofeuclunt insi11ts tl111t tbe trial judge erred
tn his rulings noon the evidence, and in
bis charge. He does not raise any que11tlon about the fact or his agreement to
warry the plaintiff, and, lndee<l, he could
not well rlD so, as it was established out
of ht:i own mouth; hot be thinks bis case
was prejudiced by theudmisHion of certain
evidence, and by the way in which the trial
judge submitted the question of the damages to the cousldern tion of the jury, and
that he should, the1·efore, bn ve a new ti·ial.
The general term, In affirming the jntlgmcnt, have pasHed upon various points
raised by the appr!llan t, and we might well
remit the case without further expression
of opinion; but some of the questions still
Insisted upon seem to deserve fui:ther con111idera ti on from us. Evidence oft be defenden t's genera~ reputation M to wealth, at
the timP o! thengreementofmarrlnge, wae
edmltted against the objection to Its corpetency upon the subject of damages in
such an action. The exception to its admission presents an Interesting question,
and one which may be deemed not altogether free from cllfticol ty. :Such evirlence,
on first couelclerntlon, seems to conflict
with the general rule that in actions for
a breach of contract evidence as to the defendant's wealth Is ina.1lml11slble. Tlie
plain tiff. In each actions, le en ti tied to recover only those damages which she may
prove that she has suffered In cou11t•4uence
of the defl'nclant's failure to perform on
his part. The defendant's solveney, or Insolvency, has nothing to do with the Issue, and furnishes no weasu1·e for the computation or damages. And this rule of excluRion us to such evidence has been also
applied to caseswheredamagesaresought
to he recovered for seduction, or for criminal conversation. James v. Biddlnp;ton,
6 Car. & P. 589; Dain v. Wycoff, 7 N. Y.
191. Baron ALDERSON, Jn Jamee v. Illddington, an action by a husbnud for criminal conversation with hie wife, aBBigned
as the re1111on for boMing such e\·lcJPnce to
be Improper that "the plaintiff Is en ti tied
to as much damages as a jury think le a
compensation fur tbP. Injury he has 11uetained, and the a mount of .the defendant's
property Is not a question in the case."
Judge GARDI:rnR. In Dain v. Wycoff, an
action hy n father for the seduction of hie
daughter, reasoned, upon the exclusion of
proof of what dt•fendant was worth, that
the Jory should nut be allowed "to t.to
beyond the Issue between the parties lltiga ting, and, after indemnlfylnK the plain-

be improper that “the plaintiff is entitled

to as much damages as a jury think is a

compensation for the injury he has sus-

tained, and the amount ofthe deiendant‘s

property is not a question in the case."

Judge GARDINER, in Dnin v. Wyeofi, an

action by a father for the seduction of his

daughter, reasoned, upon the exclusion of

proof of what defendant was worth. that

lA.ffinning 7 N. Y. Supp. 78.

tiff for the fnJury sustained by Mm, proceed as conservators of the public morale
topunlsh thedefendant In a private action
for an offense against society." 'l.' be principle umlerlying tUe exclusion of this kincl
of evidence. In the latter clnss of rasf's, Is
that vlndictlveorpunitlvedumages would
be Improper, as the recovery In them
should be confined to what the jury may
deem to he n sufficient compensRtion for
the Injury 1mstnlned tiy the plaintiff. But
the pre;;ent action Is quite other in Its nature, and constltute!i' an exception to that
general rule upon the subject or damages
for violation ofcontractohllgatlons which
has been assented to by the Judges of the
courts in this country an<l in Englund. It
iR apparent that, in such an action as this,
thero can be no hard and f11st rule of damages, and that they must be left to the
discretion oftbe jury. or course, that discretion Is not so absolute us to be independent of a consideration of the evidence.
It ls one whtch ls to be exercised wlt11 regard to all the circumstances of the particular case, and, as It bas frequently been
said, where the VPr(1ict bas not been
Influenced by 1we)udice, paBBlon, or corruption, Ute verdict will not he disturbed
by the court. \'l'lw,t the amount of the
suitor's pecuniary means is a factor of some
importance in the ca@e of a demand of
mnrrlage cannot fairly be denlell. It le a
circumstance which very frequently must
ba \'e Its partlcularinfiuence upon the mind
of the woman in determining the question
of cousen t or refusal; and, as I think, tu
a proper case, very naturally and properly
so. TbP. ability of the man to support her
In comfort, and the station in life which
marriage with him holds forth, are matters which may be weighed in connection.
' with an agreement to m1ury.
"-- Ju the cnse at bar the plalnttn was 47
years of ege, and the defendant 74. Six
yea rs previously he baa sought ht:r acquaintance, unsolicited by her, allll with
mntrimonial views on hie part. He bad
'l'islted her more or less f~uently, and
had twice propm1ed marriage befor.e tht-ir
engagement in 1886. She was ~nd had
been supporting herself l:lB a teacher and
superintendent In city schools. He bed
ne\•er been married, and hacl llved in the
country as a former. He was possessed of
pecuniary means, considerable In amount
In the general estimation of hie neighbors,
and not lncom1lderable If we take hie own
estlmatP. Thou~b pretending to Rome
cultivation of mind, which, umong other
ways, if ~e may judge from this record,.
he seemed to dellgh t In displaying by a
versification of the homely though not very
Inspiring or romantic topics and events or
bis farm life and surrouudlngs, be yet was
seemingly lacking in those outward graces.
of the penmn which are not infrequently
deemed u sub1;tltute for more solM possessions. Nor does he seem to have hud recou ree to the ucl 'l'entltlons aids of the wardrobe to adorn his exterior person, and
tbereby to compensn te for personnl shortcomings. I think that the jury should b"
made awti.re of all theclrcumstanceewhlch
In this case, and In every such ca11e, might
be supposed to have presented themselves
to the mind of the plaintiff when a11ked t<>
chnnge her position by marriage. 01

CO::\IPE~SATORY
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these circumstances. the home offered,

which for its comforts and case would de-

pend upon the more or less ample pecuni-

ary means of the defendant, the freedom

from the personal exertions for daily sup-

port, the social position accompanying

the marriage, all these are facts which

have their proper bearing upon the ques-

tion of marriage. The wealth and the rep-

utation for wealth of a man are matters

which, as this world is constituted. often

aid in determining his social positiou.not-

withstandinghe may haveother and more

intelligible rights to it. and despite objec-

tionable characteristies or traits. Where,

therefore, the defendant has demanded an

engagement of marriage. it seems proper

enough that the jury should know what

possible reinforcement his suit may have

had, and what were the inducements
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offered by his social standing and sur-

roundings. In the case of James v. Bid-

dington, supra, Baron ALDERsON, while

holding it improper to give evidence of the

amount of defendant's property in an ac-

tion fur criminal conversation, said: " In

acase of breach of promise of marriage.

the amount of the defendant's property is

very material, as showing what would

have been the station of the plaintiff in

society if the defendant had not broken his

promise. " And see Berry v. Du Costa, L. R.

1 C. P. 331; Wood v. Hurd. 2 Bing. N. (7.

166. It has been so held in this court. and

in the courts of other states, to some of

whose decisions the respondent's brief has

directed our attention. Knlffen v. Mc-

Connell. 30 N. Y. 285: Lawrence v. Cooke,

56 Me. 187; Bennett v. Beam, 42 Mich. 3~16,

4 N. W. Rep. 8: Allen v. Baker, 86 N. C. 91.

In Mayne, Damages. (Wood's Ed. § 677,)

upon the strength of the English authori-

ties I have cited, the same rule is given.

I apprehend, however, that the difﬂculty,

in the question before us, of theevidence.is

not so much in adducing proof as to de-

fendant's pecuniary means. as inthe mode

of their proof. But assuming, as I think

we are bound to do under the authorities,

that the amount of defendant's property

is material in such an action.then evidence

of the reputation which he enjoys for

wealth is unobjectionable. Reputation is

the common knowledge of the community,

a_nd. if it is exaggerated or incorrect. the

defendant has the opportunity to correct

it, and of giving the exact facts upon the

trial. The admission of the evidence is

not to establish an ability to pay, but to

show the ocial standing which defend-

ant's means did, or might. command. In

Kniffen v. McConnell, 30 N. Y. 289, which

was an action for a breach of promise

of marriage. Judge lsonsumu, deliver-

ing the opinion of the court, held that “it

may be objectionable to particuiarize the

deiendaut's property. and such evidence

should be conﬁned to general reputation

as to the circumstances of the defendant.

AND EXEMPLARY DAMAGES.

these clreumstanres. the home ottered,
which for its comforts nnd ease would depend upon thP more or Jess ample pecuniary meane of tile defendant, tbe freedom
from the personal exertions for dally support, the social position accompanyh1K
the marriage, all these are fnctH which
have their proper bem·ing upcm the question or marriage. Tht> wealth and the reputa tlon for weulth of a man ore muttt·rs
which, as this world is constituted, oftC'n
aid In determining his Eloclal position, not·
withstanding he may have other and more
Intelligible ri11:bts to It, and despite objectionablt! characteristics or traits. Where,
therefore, the defendant has demanded an
engagement of marrluge, It sC'ems proper
enough thRt the jury ehoultl know what
1wssible reinforcement his suit may have
had, and what WPre the Inducements
ottered by his social standing nnrl snrroundings. In the cttse or Jumes v. Biddlnp,ton, sup1·a, Baron Ar.o~:RSO:"i, while
holding it Improper to give evldt:nce of the
amount of defendant'8 property In an action fur criminal conver1mtion, euid: "In
a cnRe of breach or 11romlse of rnurringe.
the amount of the dde111lant'e propPrtl· lit
l"ery material, as showing what would
have been the station or the plaintiff In
society if the defcn<l1rn t had not broken his
promise." And see Derry v. Du Costa, L. H.
1 C'. P. 331; Wood v. Hur1l, 2 Ding. N. C.
166. It has been en ht>ld In this court. and
in the courts of other stn tes, to some of
whose decisions the responcknt'R brief hns
clirectt>d our attention. Knlfft>n v. McConnell, RO N. Y. 285: Lawrence \'.Cooke,
56 Me. 187; Bennett v. Beam, 42 Mich. :HG,
4 N. W. Rep. 8: Allen v. Ba~r. NG N. C. 91.
In Mayne, Damages, (Wood'R Ed. § 6i7,)
upon the etrengtll of the English nu thorlties I ha\'"e clterl, the same rnle le given.
I apprehend, however, that the dllflculty,
In th" question before ns, of tbeevlclence, ls
not so much in addul.'lng proof as to defendant's pecuniary meune, as In the mode
of their proor. But assuming, as I think
we are bound to do under the authorities,
that the amount of defenrl1rnt's property
Is ma terlal in 1mch ti.n action, then evidence
of the reputation which he enjoys for
wealth is unobjectionable. Reputation Is
the common knowledge of the community,
apd, If It Is exaggeru ted or Incorrect, the
defendant hae the opportunity lo correct
It, and of giving the exact facts upon the
trial. The admission of the evlden<'e Is
not to establish an ability to pay, \Jut to
show the social stamllng which defendant's menus did, or might, command. In
Knl1feo v. McConnell, SO N. Y. 289, which
was an action for a breach of promise
of marriage, Judge l.sGRABAM, dellrer·
Ing the opinion of the court, held that "It
may be objectionable to particnlarize the
defendant's property, and such evidence
should be confined to general reputation
as to the circumstances or the defendant.
To that extent I think It admissible."
Tbe lf'amed judge does not reuson upon
tilt> rule, but I am not aware that this 1leclslon has ever been questioned, and I do
not tbluk tt well can he. ln Kerfoot v,
Marsden, 2 Fost. & F. 160, an action for
breach of promise of mnnlage, In 1860,
WILDE, B., rnlecJ: "You may oRk In a genc>ral way as to the defendant's property,
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but yon cannot go Into particular Items
as to bis property." I think wemnst conch1de upon authority, as well RB upon tho
renR011 of the thin~. that evl<.lence of the
reputu tion of the delendunt a1:1 to W<'aH ·,
IR n1lmis11lble In these cases. The belief
of the pluintiff must have been lufiueneed by the opinions or beliefs of the
members of the community In which the
defcn<lnnt rc>11ided. She could not he prt•sumed to hove perRonal cogniznnce or
a matter. whlrh le so pecnllarly one
within the Individual's exl'lusive knowledge, and what credence she ga,·e to ~en
erttl report was not without justilkntion.
8he had some right to rely upon it. The
action Is lntendell as an Indemnity for the
temporal loss which the plain tiff hue l!UKtnlned, and thnt embraces the mortification to t11e feellng11, the wounded pride,
and all the disnppuintmenrs from the fall·
ure of the ma rriuge, as well lo the losses
It hut1 orcaHioned as In the blow to the
affections.
The nppellnnt lnRlstR upon the error or
the trial jmlge in submitting to tile jury
the question of exemplary damages. But
we think, In such a case, that it Is the
pro'flnce of the jury to determine upon
the p1·oof of the facts and or the surround·
Ing circumstances what damages should
be awarded. If the conduct of the defendant i~vlolatlng his promise ls charactC'rlzed by a dlRrel(ard of the plalntlff'R fc>ellngs or reputation; if he has placed her,
or Induced her to pl11ce herMelf. In a fnl11t>
position, or to forego temporul achantnA'e><: If the breach of his promise le unjuetlftahle; if he spreadR upon the record
matters In defense of the action which aru
1:1ca11dalous, and tend to reflect discredit
upon the plaintiff, or stain her reput11tlon,-then tbt>se are all circumstances
which may be considered by the jury, and
may be avatled of by them to enhnnc.!!.,
the damages. Here the trial judge did·
not eny In his charge that this was a ca~
for the Infliction of punitive damages. He
Instructed the Jury, In substance, that
the plaintiff was entitled to damages
they should certainly give compensatory
dama~ea, and that, In the exerclRe of thetr
discretion based on theproofs anrl circumstances or the caRe, they might award J
exemplary or punitive damngee. Upi1n
this subject, of when such damages might
be awurcled, ho read at length from the
opinions of this court In Thorn v. Knftpp.
42 :;-.;, Y. 474, and Johmmn v. Jenkins, 24
N. Y. 252, for the purpm1e of showing the
rule to be applied. It le clear that he
lPft It to them to anive at a decision 11pon the propriety of ~i ving exemplury
darnageR from a considt>ration of the defendant's motives und <'Ollduct. Now,
there w11s e\·tctence In the case upon which
a Yerul<'t might well Include exemplar.v
damugeH. 'l'he weildlug day was ~reed
upon, thi:> m111al prPpnrations were made
by the plaintiff, and relatives and guests
were llldden to the ceremony. But the defenrlnnt did not appeur. He nlleged physical ailments in excuse of not fulfilling bis
marital engagement, but there was evidence that he wae evading It, and shamming mness. He admits that he bad no
fault to find with her. She bad resigned
her r,osition to marry him. He denies re-

in
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questing her to do so; but his attempt at

denial is weakened by his subsequent ad-

mission that he expected her to do it.

'l‘hen,in his pleading, he charges the plain-

tiff with having no affection for him. but

with entertaining a purpose to procure

money from him. on the pretense of his

promise to marry her, and his breach

thereof. These were elements in the case

which might properly enter into the de-

cision of the jury as to the amount of

damages.

The appellant alleges another error in

the charge. when the trial judge in-

structed theiury: “in ﬁxing the amount

(of damages] the plaintiff is entitled at

least to such damages as would place her

in as good pecuniary ‘condition as she

would have been if the contract had been

fulﬁlled." This was, of course, a careless
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use of language, but itcould not have prej-

udiced the defendant's case. It was very

plain from all the char;ze,in whatpreceded

as in what immediately followed the sen-

tence picked out for objection, that the

/trial judge intended to and did instruct his

jury that they should compensate the

plaintiff for what she had lost and was

deprived of by the failure of the marriage.

They might afﬁx to the marriage with

the deiendant that pecuniary value which,

in their judgment, upon all the circum-

stances of the case, it would have to the

plaintljﬂ The jury-could not reasonably

have understood thejudge otherwise. It

may often occur in a charge to the jury

that particular words or expressions used,

when taken by themselves, will be objec-

tionable or seem to be erroneous: but they

should not be considered independently of

contextual phrases. If, when read in con-

nection with the rest of the charge, the sense

of language used is made clear, and its

meaning explained, and the instruction is

not uncertain as to the subject-matter, the

result of the trial should not be disturbed

for mere inaccuracies or carelessness in

speech. There is no occasion for a further

discussion of any questions, and the judg-

ment and order appealed from should be

afﬁrmed, with costs. All concur, except

EARL and PECKHAM, JJ., who dissent, on

the ground that it was error to receive

proof of the defendant's wealth by repu-

tation.

J udgment aﬂirmed.
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questing her to do so; but bis attempt at deprived of by the fallure of tho marrlaire.
denial Is weakened by his subsequent ad- They might affix to the marriage with
mission that he expected her to do It. the deft>ndant that pecuniary value which,
Then, in his pleading, be charges t.he 11luln- In their Judgment, upon all the circumtlft with having no arrectlon for him, but stances of the ca11e, It would have to tho
with entertaining a purpose to procure plalntUIJ The Jury could not reasonably
money from him, on the pretense of his have understood the juclge otherwise. It
promise to marry her, and his breach may often occur In a charge to the Jury
thert!of. Tht>se were elements In the case that particular words or expressions used,
which might properly enter into the de- when tn.ken by thf'ln11elves, will be objeccision of the jury as to the amount of tionable or seem to be erroneous; hut tbe;r
should not be considered lnclependently or
dama2es.
The appellant alleges another error In contextual phrases. Ir, when reucl lo r.onthe charge, when tht> ti;aJ judge In- nectlun with the rest of tllt!chnrge, the sense
structed the Jury: "Iu fixing the an.ount of language used Is made clem', ancl Its
{of damnges] the plaintiff Is entitled at meanlnF: explained, and the Instruction Is
leust to such damages as would place her not uncertain as to the subjPct-mn tter, the
tn as good pecuniary ·condition as she result ot the trial should nut be disturbed
would have been If the contract had been . for mere lnttccuracles or carelessness In
fulfilled." This was, or course, a careless speech. There Is no occa11lon for a further
use of language, but ltcould not have prej- dlHcu11slon or any questions, ttnd the juclgudiced the defendant's case. It was very ment and order appealed from should be
plain from all the charire, In what preceded affirmed, with costs. All concur, except
as In what lmmelllately followed tbe sen- .KARL and PECKHAM, JJ., who dissent, on
'teoce t•lcked out for objection, that the the ground that it was error to receive
ffrial judJ(e lntt•ndcll to and did ln11truct his proof of the llefendant's wealth by repu.
tury that they slwold compensate the tatlon.
plalntlft for what she had lost and was
J udgmen t affirmed.
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{13 N. E. 239, 121 DI. 660.)
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MeINTYRE,' Adm'r,/v. SHOLTY, sum..

(13 N. E. 239, 121 m. 660.)

Supreme Court of Illinois. Sept. 27, 1887.

Error to appellate court, Third district; O.

T. Reeves, Judge.

Blades & Neville, for plaintiff in error.

Kerrick, Lucas & Spencer and Tipton & Bea-

Supreme Oourt of nllnois. Sept. 27, 1887.
Error to appellate court, Third district; O.
T. Reeves, Judge. •
Blades & Nevllle, for plaintllr ln error.
Kerrick, Lucas & Spencer and Tipton & Beaver, for defendant in error.

ver, for defendant in error.

I

MAGRUDER, J. This is an action of tres-

pass, brought by defendant in error against

piaintif f in error, in the circuit court of Mc-

Lean county, under the “Act requiring com-

pensation for causing death by wrongful act,

neglect, or default;'' being chapter 70 of the

Revised Statutes, entitled “lnjuries." Hurd,

Rev. St. 1885, p. 695. Jury was waived by

agreement, and the case was tried without a

jury before the judge oi.‘ the circuit court,
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who gave judgment for the plaintiff for

$2,500. This judgment has been aiiirmed by

the appellate court, and is brought before us

for review by writ of error to the latter court.

Hannah Sholty was the wife of Levi Sholty,

a farmer living in McLean county, near

Bloomington. About February 17, 1886, a

working-man upon Levi Sholty‘s farm dis-

covered a man in the barn, who, to all up-

pearances, had been concealing himself there

for some time. The person so concealed is

proven to have been defendant's intestate,

Benjamin D. Sholty, a brother of Levi Sholty.

Some eiiorts seem to have been made on

February 17th or 18th to get the otiicers of

the law in Bloomington to go out to the farm

and arrest Benjamin D. Sholty, called by the

witness David Sholty. This effort, however,

failed. Accordingly, Levi Sholty and his

hired man, and a number of his neighbors,

gathered at his house on the afternoon of

February 18, 1886, for the purpose of watch-

ing for the intruder, and getting: him out of

his hiding-place. The barn was 40 or 50-feet

wide, and from 80 to .100 feet long. It was

situated about 150 or 200 feet north-west

from the house. The granary was in the

western end of the barn, and, hence. in the

end that was furthest from the house. About

6 o'clock in the evening, David Sholty was

discovered in the granary by his brother Levi

and one McCoy, who were on watch just out-

side of the granary door. He shot at them

twice with a pistol, while they were trying to

prevent his escape, and to capture him. Oth-

ers who were waiting in the house came to

their assistance. A wpe was obtained, with

the intention ot tying him, if captured. Pres-

ently there was a cry of ﬁre, and the ﬂames

were seen to be breaking out at the eastern

end of the barn, being the end nearest to-

wards the house. At this time Mrs. Hannah

Sholty, plaintiffs intestate, went from the

- house towards the barn, and had advanced

about half of the distance between the two,

when David Sholty appeared in the door at

the eastern end of the barn, with a shotgun.

He was plainly visible in the light made by

the ﬁre that had broken out. He called upon

•
MAGRUDER,
J. Tbls Is an action of trespass, brought by defendant lo error against
plalntur ln error, In the circuit court or McLean county, under the "Act requiring compensation for causing dooth by wrongful act,
neglect, or default;'' being chapter 70 of the
Revised Statutes, entitled "Injuries." Burd,
Rev. St. 1885, p. 695. Jury was waived by
a~ment, and the l'llSe was tried without a
jury before the judge of the circuit court,
who gave judgment for the plalntllr for
$2,500. Tbls judgment has been affirmed by
the appelbte court, and ls brought before us
for review by writ of error to the latte1· court.
Hannah Sholty Wl18 the wife of Levi ~hoity,
a farmer llvlng lo :McLenn county, near
Bloomington. About February 17, 1886, a
work.lng-man upon Levi Sholty's rarm discovered a man lo the barn, who, to all appearances, had been concealing himself there
for some Ume. The person so concealed ls
proven to have been defendant's Intestate,
.Benjamin D. Sholty, a brother of Levi Sholty.
Some elrorts seem to have been made on
February 17th or 18th to get the officers of
the law lo Bloomington to go out to the farm
and arrest Benjamin D. Sholty, culled by the
witness David Sholty. This elrort, however,
falled. Accordingly, I..evl Sholty and bls
hired man, and a number of hls neighbors,
gathered at hls house on the afternoon of
February 18, 1886, for the purpose of watching for the intruder, and gettlngi him out of
hls hiding-place. The barn was 40 or 50°fect
wide, and from 80 to .100 feet long. It was
situated about 150 or 200 feet north-west
from the house. Tbe granary was In the
western end of the barn, and, hence, In the
end that was furthest from the house. About
6 o'clock in tbe evening, David Sholty was
discovered lo the granary by hls brother Levi
and one McCoy, who were on watch just outside of the granary door. He shot at them
twice with a pistol, while they were trying to
1,>reveot his escape, and to capture him. Others who were waiting ln the house came to
th'!lr ai;:slstance. A rope was obtained, with
the intention ot tying him, If captured. Pres·
ently there was a cry of fire, and the flames
were seen to be breaking out at the eastern
end of the barn, being the end nearest towards the house. At this time Mrs. Hannah
Sholty, plalntifr's intestate, went from the
house towards the barn, and had advanced
about half of the distance between the two,
when David Sholty appeared ln the door at

25

the eastern end of the barn, with a shot-gun.
He was plainly visible In the light made by
the fire that had broken out. He called upon
Mrs. Sholty and her daughter Mary, who wus
with her, to stop. They stopped, turned, and
had advanced a few feet on their way back
towards tlle house, when David Sholty fired
at them with the gun lo hls hand. Both
were shot. The daughter wa.s wounded in
the wrist, and the mother was kllled. This
action ls brought by her husband, as administrator of her estate, to recover damages for
her death, against the administrator of the
estate of David Shdlty, who is said to have
~rished In the tlames of the burning barn.
The defendant introduced no testimony, except that the examination of one witness was
begun, and abandoned, after a few preliminary questions, on account of the ruling of
the court as hereafter stated. The defense
propos<.>d to sbow l.Jy the witness on the stnnd,
and l.Jy others there present ln court, thnt defendnnt's intestate, Benjamin D. Sholty, was
insane nt the time Mrs. Sholty was kllled.
The court refused to receive evidence of his
insanity, nod exception was taken to the ruling. 'l'he question presented relates to the
llablllty of an insane person for lDJurles committed by hlm.
It ls well settled that, though a lunatic ls
not punishable crimlnally, he ls liable in a
clvll action for any tort he may commit.
However justly this doctrine may have been
originally subject to criticism, on the grounds
of reason and prlnclple, lt ls now too firmly
supported by the weight of authority to be
disturbed. It ls the outcome of the principle
that lo trespass the intent ls not conclusive.
Mr. Sedgwick, lo bis work on Damages,
(marg. page 456,) says that, on principle, a
lunatic should not be held Hable for hls to1·tl·
ous acts. Opposed to hls view, however, la
a majority of the ~clslons and text writers.
There certainly can be nothing wrong or unjust ln a verdict which merely gives compensation for the actual loss resulting from an
injury lotllcted by a lunatic. Be has properly no wlll. Hls acts lack the element of intent, or intention. Bence lt would seem to
follow that the only proper measure of damages ln an action against him for a wrong,
ls the mere compensation of the party injured. Punishment ls not the object of the
~w when persons unsound lo mind are the
wrong-doers. There ls, to be sure, an appearance of hardship in compelling one to respond
for that which he ls unable to avoid, for
want of the control of reason. But the question of llablllty ln these cases ls one of publlc policy. If an insane person ls not held
liable for his torts, those Interested in hls
estate, as relatives, or otherwise, might not
have a sufficient motive to so take care of
hlm as to deprive him of opportunities for lofilctlng injuries upon others. There ls more
Injustice in denying to the lDJured party the
recovery of damages for the wrong suffered
by him, than there ls ln calling upon the rein-
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tlves or friends of the lunatic to pay the ex-

pense of his conﬁnement, it he has an estate

ample enough for that purpose. The liability

of lunaties for their torts tends to secure a

more eﬂicient custody and guardianship of

their persons. Again, it parties can escape

the consequences of their injurious acts upon

the plea of lunacy, there will be a strong

temptation to simulate insanity, with a view

of masking the malice and revenge of an evil

heart. The views here expressed are sus-

tained by the following authorities: Cooley,

Torts, 99-103; 2 Sannd. Pl. & Ev. 318; Shear.

& R. Neg. § 57; Weaver v. Ward, Hob. 134;

Morse v. Crawford, 17 Vt. 499; Behrens v.

McKenzie, 23 Iowa, 333; Krom v. Schoon-

maker, 3 Barb. 647; also cases in note to said

case, in Ewell, Lead. Cas. 642. In the light

of the principles thus announced we ﬁnd no

error in the ruling of the circuit court upon
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this subject.

Plaintiff in error also contends that there

COMPENSATORY AND EXE:\IPLARY DAUA.GES.

tlves ar friends of the lunatic to pay the ex- and that be was a1·med, when she started to
pense of his confinement, If be has an estate go from the house towards the stable; and
ample enough for that purpose. The liability that by doing so, under the circumstances,
of lunatics for their torts tends to secure a she was guilty of a want of proper ca.re and
more etnclent custody and guardlanslllp of prudence, We forbear to express any opintheir persons. Again,. it parties can escape ion as to whether or not there could be any
the consequences of their injurious acts upon such thing as contributory negllgence in a
the plea of lunacy, there will be a strong case of this kind, and under sucll circumtemptation to simulate insanity, with a view stances as are herein disclosed. It ls suffi.of masking the malice and revenge of an evll cient to SliY that there ls a considerable
heart. The views here expressed are sus- amount of evidence in the case bearing upon
tah1ed by the following authorities: Cooley, this question. It It could be properly mised,
•rorts, 99-103;· 2 Saund. Pl. & Ev. 318; Shear. the facts necessary to do so were fully de& R. Neg. § 67; Weaver ·v. Ward, Hob. 13!; veloped in the testimony presented to the
Morse v. Crawford, 17 Vt. 499; Behrens "· court by the plalntllT below. Therefore,
McKenzie, 23 Iowa, 333; Krom v. Schoon- plaintiff In error should have submitted to the
maker, 3 Barb. 647; also cases In note to said trial court a proposition to be held as law
case, In Ewell, Lead. Cas. 642. In the light embodying bis theory of contributory negliof the principles thus announced we find no gence as applicable to the facts of the case,
error In the ruling of the circuit court 11pon In accordance with section 41 of the practice
this s11bject.
act. Hurd, Rev. St. 1885, p. 90!. He did
Plalutlfr In error also contends that there not do so, and hence the question ls not propshould have been no recovery In this case be- erly before us for · our consideration.
cause of alleged contributory negllgence on
The judgment of the appellate court ls afthe part of Mrs. Sholty. It ls claimed that firmed.
she knew of her brother-In-law's madness,
Judgment atnrmed.

should have been no recovery in this case be-

cause of alleged contributory negligence on

the part of Mrs. Sholty. It is claimed that

she knew of her brother-in-law's madness,

and that he was armed, when she started to

go from the house towards the stable; and

that by doing so, under the circumstances,

she was guilty of a want of proper care and

prudence. We forbear to express any opin-

ion as to whether or not there could be any

such thing as contributory negligence in a

case of this kind, and under such circum-

stances as are herein disclosed. It is suﬂi-

cient to say that there is a considerable

amount of evidence in the case bearing upon

this question. If it could be properly raised,

the facts necessary to do so were fully de-

veloped in the testimony presented to the

court by the plaintiff below. '.[‘hercfore,

plaintiff in error should have submitted to the

trial court a proposition to be held as law

embodying his theory of contributory negli-

gence as applicable to the facts of the case,

in accordance with section 41 of the practice

act. Hurd, Rev. St. 1885, p. 904. He did

not do so, and hence the question is not prop-

erly before us for our consideration.

The judgment of the appellate court is af-

ﬁrmed.

Judgment aﬂirmed.
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SHEIK v. HdBSON, Adm'r.

(19 N. W. 875, 64 Iowa. 146.)

Supreme Court of Iowa. June 11, 1884.

Appeal from circuit court, Clayton county.

Action for damages on account of slander-

ous words spoken of plaintif f by defendant's

intestate. There was a verdict and judg-

ment for plaintiff for $1,000. Plaintiii ap-

neals.

J. W. Rogers & Son, for appellant. Mur-

dork & Larkin, Ainsworth & Hobson, Noble &

Updegraff, and Cyrus Wellington, for appel-

SHEIK ""· HclBSON, Adm'r.
(19 N. W. 875, 6i Iowa, 146.)
Supreme Court of Iowa. June 11, 188i.
Appeal from circuit court, Clayton county.
Action for damages on account of slanderous words spaken of plaintiff by defendant's
Intestate. There was a verdict and judgment tor plaintur for $1,000. Plaintltr apoeals.
J. W. Rogers & Son, for nppellnnt. llurdork & Larkin, Ainsworth & Hobson, l\'oble &
Updegraff, and Cyrus Wellington, for nppdlee.

lee.

REED, J. The action was originally

brought against Henry Rush, but during its

pendency he died. and defendanL Hobson,

administrator of his estate, was substituted

as defendant. The alleged slanderous words

imputed to plaintiff a want of chastity. They

are alleged to have been spoken in the pres-
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ence of plaintiff's husband, and were to the

effect that Rush had had sexual intercourse

with plaintiff. ‘

At the trial plaintiff asked the court to give

the following instructions:

"(1) If you ﬁnd that the defendant, Henry

Rush, did publish in substance the words al-

leged in petition as the grounds of the action,

and that said publication was made mali-

ciously and wantonly, you are instructed that

you may give exemplary damages. (2) You

are instructed that if you ﬁnd from the evi-

dence that the slanderous words were pub-

lished, and that the same were dictated or

accompanied by malice, oppression, or gross

negligence, you can give exemplary damages

in your verdict." The court refused to give

these instructions, but told the jury that

“damages on account of maliciously speak-

ing the words, or, in other words, exemplary

dauaages,'are not to be given." Error is as-

signed by plaintiff on the giving of this in-

struction, and the refusal to give those asked.

The question raised by the assignment is

whether exemplary or punitory damages may

be awarded against the personal representa-

tive of a deceased wrong-doer. There is no

doubt but, at common law, the remedy for

injury such as plaintiff complains of deter-

mines upon the death of the wrong-doer. 1

Chit. Pl. 89. But under our statute (Code, §

2525) all causes of action survive, "and may

be brought, notwith:-"tanding the death of the

person entitled or liable to the same." Plain-

tiff's position is that, under this section, the

right is preserved to her to have damages of

this character assessed on account of the

wrongful and malicious act by which she has

suffered, notwithstanding the death of the

one who committed the act. But we think

the position is not sound. It cannot be said,

in any ease,—uniess the right is created by

statute,—that the person who suffers from

the wrongful or malicious acts of another,

has the right to have vindictive damages as-

sessed against the wrong-doer. Such dam-

ages are awarded as a punishment of the man-

who has wickedly or wantonly violated the

rights of another, rather than for the com-

REED, J. The action was orlglnnlly
brought against Henry Rush, but during its
pendency he died, and defendant, Hobson,
administrator of his estate, was substituted
as defendant. The alleged slanderous words
Imputed to plaintiff a want of chastity. 'l'hey
are alleged to have been spaken In the presence of plaintiff's husband, and were to the
etrect that Rush had had sexual Intercourse
with plalntift'.
At the trial plaintiff asked the court to glve
the following Instructions:
"'(l} It you find that the defendant, Henry
Rush, did publish in substance the words alleged In petition as the grounds of the action,
and that said publication was made maliciously and wantonly, you are instructed that
you may give exemplary damages. (2} You
are instructed that If you ftnd from the evidence that the slanderous words were published, and that the same were dictated or
accompanled by malice, oppression, or gross
negligence, you can give exemplary damages
In your verdict." The court refused to give
these Instructions, but told the jury that
"damages on account of maliciously speaking the words, or, In other words, exemplary
damages,· are not to be given." Error le assigned by plaintiff on the giving of this Instruction, and the refusal to give those asked.
The question raised by the assignment le
whether exemplary or punltory damages may
be awarded against the personal representative of a deceased wrong-doer. There Is no
doubt but, at common law, the remedy tor
Injury such as plalntlll complains of determines upon the death of the wrong-doer. 1
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Chit. Pl. 89. But under our statute (Code, §
2525) all causes of action survive, "and may
be brought, notwithstanding the death ot tile
person entitled or liable to the same." Plaintitr"s position Is that, under this section, th~
right ls preserved to her to have damages of
this character assessed on account of the
wrongful and malicious act by which she has
suffered, notwithstanding the death of the
one who committed the act. Bnt we tllink
the position Is not sound. It cannot be said,
In any case,-unless the right Is created by
stntute,-that the person who sutrers from
the wrongful or malicious nets of another,
has the right to ba.ve vindictive damages assessed against the wrong-doer. Such clamnges are awarded as n punishment of the man
who has wickedly or wantonly violated the
rights of another, rather than fo1· the compensation of the one who suffers from his
wrongful net. It Is true, tl1ey are awarded
to the one who has beeu made to Ruffer, but
not as a matter of right; for, while he le entitled, under the law, to such sum as will
fully compensate him for the Injury sustained, the question whether punitory damages
shall be assessed, and the amount of the assessment, ls left to the dhscretion of the jury.
Plaintiff had a right of action, on account ot'
the slanderous words spoken by Rush, for
such sum as would compensate her for the
Injury. This was her en.use of action, and
this Is what was preserved to her by the statute at his death. But she bad no personal Interest In the question of his punishment. So
far as he was concerned, the punltory power
ot the law ceased when be dlell. To allow exemplary damages now, would be to punish
his legal and personal representatives for his
wrongful acts; but the civil law never lnftlcts vicarious punishment. Our holding as
to the object of assessing exemplary damages
In any case Is abundantly sustained by the
authorities, both In this state and elsewhere.
We content ourselves, however, with citing
the following cases In this state: Hendrickson v. Kingsbury, 21 Iowa, 3i9; Garland v.
Wholeham, 26 Iowa, 185; Ward v. Ward, 41
Iowa, 686.
We think, therefore, that the holding of the
circuit court le correct, and the judgment Is
affirmed.
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LAKE SHORE & M. S. RY. CO. v. PRENTICE.
.

COMPENSATORY AND EXEMPLARY DAMAGES.

(13 Sup. Ct. 261, 147 U. S. 101.]

\i

LAKE SHORE & M. S. RY. CO. v. PREN-

TICE. '

(13 Sup. Ct. 261, 147 U. S. 101.]

-Supreme Court of the United States. Jan. 3,
1893.

No. 58.

Supreme Court of the United States. Jan. 8,

1893.

No. 58.

in error to the circuit court of the United

‘States for the northern district of Illinois.

Action by Chalmer M. C. Prentice against

the Lake Shore & Michigan Southern Rail-

way Company to recover damages for unlaw-

ful arrest of plaintiff, while a passenger, by

the conductor of one of the company's trains.

Verdict and judgment for plaintiff. Defend-

ant brings error. Reversed.

Statement by Mr. Justice GRAY:

This was an action of trespass on the case,

brought October 19, 1886, in the circuit court
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of the United States for the northern district

of illinois, by Prentice, a citizen of Ohio,

against the Lake Shore & Michigan Southern

Railway Company, a corporation of Illinois,

to recover damages for the wrongful acts of

the defendant's servants.

The declaration alleged, and the evidence

introduced at the trial tended to prove, the

following facts: The plaintiff was a physi-

cian. The defendant was engaged in operat-

ing a railroad, and conducting the business

of a common carrier of passengers and

freight, through Ohio, Indiana, Illinois, and

other states. On October 12, 1886, the plain-

tiff, his wife, and a number of other persons

were passengers, holding excursion tickets,

on a regular passenger train of the defend-

ant's railroad. from Norwalk, in Ohio, to

Chicago, in Illinois. During the journey the

plaintiff purchased of several passengers

their return tickets, which had nothing on

them to show that they were not transfera-

ble. The conductor of the train, learning

this, and knowing that the plaintiff had been

guilty of no offense for which he was liable

to arrest, telegraphed for a police oﬂicer, an

employe of the defendant, who boarded the

train as it approached Chicago. The con-,

ductor therenpon, in a loud and angry voice,

pointed out the plaintiff to the ofﬁcer, and

ordered his arrest; and the oﬂicer, by direc-

tion of the conductor, and without any war-

rant or authority of law, seized the plaintiff,

and rudely searched him for weapons, in the

presence of the other passengers, hurried him

into another car, and there sat down by him

as a watch, and refused to tell him the cause

of his arrest, or to let him speak to his wife.

While 1.he plaintiff was being removed into

the other car, the conductor, for the purpose

of disgracing and humiliating him with his fel-

low passengers, openly declared that he was

under arrest, and sneeringly said to the plain-

tiff's wife, “Where's your doctor now?" On

arrival at Chicago, the conductor refused to

let the plaintiff assist his wife with her par-

cels in leaving the train, or to give her the

check for their trunk; and, in the presence

i

Jn error to the circuit court of the United
States for the northern district of Illinois.
Action by Chalmer M. C. Prentice agnlnst
the Lake Sllore & Michigan Southern Railway Company to recover damages for unlawful ane.;;t of plnlntilf, while a passenger, by
the conductor of one of the company's trains.
Yerdlct and judgment for plnlntllf. Defend~Ult brings error. Reversed.
Statement by Mr. Justice GRAY:
'.fhls was au action of trespass on the case,
brought October 19, 1886, ln the ch-cult court
of the United States for the northern district
of. Illinois, by Prentice, a citizen of Ohio,
against the Lnke Shore & Michigan Southern
Hnllway Company, a corporation of Illlnois,
to recover damages for the wrongful acts of
the defendant's servants.
The declaration alleb"ed, and the evidence
introduced at the trial tended to prove, the
following facts: The plalntl.IT wns a physician. The defendant was engnged in operating a railroad, and conducting the business
of a common carrier of passengers and
f1·etght, through Ohio, Indiana, Illinois, and
other states. On October 12, 1880, the plalntllf, his wife, and a number of other persons
were passengers, holding excursion tickets,
on a regular passenger traln of the defendant's rallroad, from Norwalk, ·in Ohio, to
<.:hiCTigo, in Illinois. During the journey the
plaintiff purchased of several passengers
their return tickets, which had nothing on
them to show that they were not transferallle. The conductor of the train, learning
tJ1ls, and knowing that tlle plalntitf had been
guilty of no offense for which he was liable
to arrest, telegraphed for a police ofll.cer, an
{'mploye of the defendant, who boarded the
train as it approarhcd Chicago. The conductor thereupon, In a loud and angry voice;
()ointed out th~ plalntltr to 1he officer, and
-Ordered his arrest; and the oftlcer, by dlre<>,tion ot the conductor, and without any warrant o;o authority of law, seized the plalntUT,
and rudely searched him for weapons, in the
prrsrnce ot the other passengers, hurried him
into another car, and there sat down by hlm
:is a watch, and refused to tell him the cause
-0f his arrest, or to let hlm speak t.o his wife.
\\'hlle the plalntltr was being removed into
the otller c.nr, the conductor, for the purpose
ot dlsgmclug and humiliating him with his fellow passengers, openly declared that he was
under arrest, and sneeringly said to the plain·
tltr's wife, "Where's your doctor now?" On
arrival at ChiCTigo, the conductor refused to
let the plaintiff assist his wife with her parcels in leanng the train. or to give her tue
check for tllelr trunk; and, in the presence

of the plUlllengers and others, ordered him to
be taken to the station house, an-1 be. wus
forcibly· taken tllere, and detained until the
conductor arrived; and, kn•JWIDg that the
plnlntltr had been guilty of no ·offense, entered a false charge against him of dlsorderly conduct, upon whicll he gave ball and was
releasrd, and of wWcll, ou appearing before
a justlee of the peace for trial on the next
clny, and n:> one appearing to prosecute him,
he was tinally dischnrged.
The ueclnratlon alleged that all these acts .
were done by the defendant's agents in the
line of their employment, and that the defendnut was legally responsible therefor; nnd
that tlle plaintil'r had been thereby put to
Pxpense, and greatly injured in mind, body,
nncl reputation.
At the trial, and before the Introduction of
nny evidence, the defendant, by its counsel,
admitted "that the arrest of the plalntiJf was
wrongful, and that he was entitled to recover
actual damages therefor;" but afterwards
excepted to each of the following Instructions
given by the clrcult judge to the jury:
1 "If you believe the statements which have
been made by the plalntitr and the witnesses
who testified in his behalf, (and they are not
denied,) then he ls entitled to a Yerdlct which
will fully compensate him for the Injuries
which he sustained, and in compensating him
you arc authorized to go beyond the amount
that he has ncrually expended in employing
counsel; you may go beyond the actual outlay ln money which he has made. He was
arrestro publicly, without a warrant, and
without cause; and if such conduct as has
been dPtaiied before you occurred, such 1LS
the remark that was addressed by the conductor to the wife tu the plaint11f's pn•seuce,
in compnnsatlng him you have a right to con"ider the humiliation of feeling to which he
was thus publicly subjected. It the company, without reason, by its unlD.wful and oppressive act, subjected him to this public humiliation, and thereby outraged his feelings,
he ls entitled to compensation for that injury and mental angulsh."
"I am not able to give you any rule by
which you can determine that; but, bear in
mind, it is strictly on the line of compensn·
tlon. '!'he plaintltr ls entitled to compensation in money for humiliation of feeling and
spirit, as well as the actual outlay which he
hns made In and about this suit."
"And, further, after agreeing upon the
amount wllich will fairly compensate the
plaintlCf for bis outlay nnd Injured fe cllngs,
you may add sowething by way· of punitive
damag('S ai,":lln."t the defendant, which ls
. sometimes called 'smart money,' if you are
satisfied that the conductor's conduct was illegal, (and it was llll'gal,) wanton, and oppressive. How much that shall be the court cannot tell yoa You must act as reasonable
111en, nnd not indulge vindictive feelings
toward." the defendnnt."
"If a. public cori1orntlon, llke an lndlvldual,
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acts oppn>tlSlvely, wantonly, abusee power,

only as a eatlsfi..ctlon to the Injured person,
but likewlllc as a punishment to the guilty,
zen, In adillUon to strict compensaUon, may
to deter from any such proceeding for the tnb..1:n.'. tht:: lnw snys, something In the way of
t ure, 1111d ns a proof of the detestation of thesmart money; something as punishment for
Jnry to the action itself." Wilkes v. Wood,
the oppressive use of power."
Lo!Tt, 1, 18, 19, 10 Howell, St. T. 1153, 1167,
The jury returned a verdict for th~ plaintiff See, also, Huckle v. Money, 2 Wile. 205, 207;.
lu Ute sum of $10,000. The defendant mo\"ed Snyer, Do.m. 218. 221. The recovery of dam·
for a new trlnl. for error In law, and for ex· ages, beyond compensation for the injury re~·essive 1lamai:;es. The plaintiff thereupon, by
ceived, by wny of punishing the guilty, and
lca\·e of court, remitted the sum of $4,000, as an examole to deter others from oll'N1<Uug·
and asked that jlldgment be entered for $G,- In like manner, ls here clearly recognizer!.
OOO. The court then denied the · motion for
In this collrt the doctrine ls well settled
a new trial. and gave judgmell.t for the plnln- thnt in actions of tort the jury, In addition to
tlll tor $6,000. The defendant sued out this the sum awarded by way of compe>nsation
writ of error.
for the plnlntltr's iujury, may award exemplary, punit.lve, or vlndlctl\"e dnmnges, S-Ome_.Geo. C. Greene, for plaintiff In error. W.
tlmes cnllcd "smart money,'' It the dP.fendA. 1"oste1·, for dctenJant In error.
nnt has actt.><1 wantouly, or oppressively, or
with such malice as implies a spirit of misMr. .Jnstice GRAY, afte>r stating the ·case chief 01· criminal lndlfTc1·<·nce to civil oblli;n:·
ns above, dell\"ered the opinion of the court. tions; lint 1mch i:Uilty intention on the part
The only exceptions t.'1ken to the lnstruc- of the 1le!en<lnnt ls required in ortler te>tious at the trlnl, which hnve been argued In chnrge him with exemplary or punitive damthis court, are to those on the subject of puni- ni:ws. The Amlnl.le !'JRncy, 3 Whe>nt. MG,
i1f.S, 559; Day v. Woodworth, 13 How. 301,
tive dnmnges.
The single question presented for our de- :Jit; R:iilro11d Co. v. Qulgl~y. 21 How. 202,
ciston, therefore, 18 whether a railroad cor- 21a, :!H; R:lilway Co. v. Arms, 91 U. S. 4S!J,
poration can be charged with punitive or ex- 400, 4U~·; H:iilway Co. v. Humes, 115 U. S.
emplary damages for the lll!'gal, wanton, and i\1:!, G~l. 6 811p. Ct. Jtep. 110; Barry v. Etloppressive conduct of o. conductor of one of 111m11ls, HU U. S. 5:i0, GO:!, U63, 6 Sup. Ct.
Rep. ;,01; RnUway Co. v. HaTrls, 122 U. S.
Us trains towards a pa118enger.
l'>IJ7, 6011. 610, 7 Sup. Ct. Rep. 1280; Hallwny
'rhle question, like others affecting the llalllty of a rnilroad corporation as a common Co. v. Heclnvith, 129 U. S. 20, 36, 9 Sup. Ct.
.aniei· of goods or pnssengers,-such as its Rep. 2t)i.
Kxemplary or punitive damages, belngi ;::-ht to comrnct for exemption from responbility tor its own negligence, or its liability awa1-doo, not by way of compensntlon to the ·
beyond Its own line, or Its llaliillty to one of sufferer, but by way of punishment of the·
Its servnnt8 for the net of another person In olTrnclt>r, null as a warning to others, cnn
: Its em11lvyment,-IB a questbn, not of local only be awarded against one who hue partici, law, but of gene11ll jurisprudence, upon pated In the offense. A principal, therefore,
· ' hich thlB court, in. th_g n bs~n!:!e ot exp r~~IL though of course liable to make compen·
tute :regulating the suhjPct, wlll exercise Mtion tor Injuries done hy hie agent within
own judgment, 1mcontrolled by the de- the 11eope of his employment, cannot be held
cisions of the conrle of the several emtes. liable for exemplary or punitive damages,
Jtailroad Co. v. Lockwood, 17 Wall. 357, 368; merely by reason of wnnton, oppresslvi>, or
malicious Intent on the part of the agent.
Liverpool & G. W. Steam Co. v. Phenix Ins.
Co., l!..'9 U. B. 397, 443, 0 Sup. Ct. Rep. 4Gtl; This ls clearly shown by the judgment of this
lf~·rick v. Railroad Co., 107 U. B. 102, 109. 1
C•lUrt In the case of The Amiable Nnncy, 3
Snp. Ct. Rep. 42G; Hough v. Uallway Co., 100 When t. :i40.
u. s. 213, 226.
Jn thnt cnee, upon a libel In admiralty by
The most distinct suggestion of tlw doc- the owner, master, supercargo, and crew of
lline of exemplary or punitivp dnmng-<'s ht :i. nentral \"eesi>l against the owners of an
Englnml before the American Revolution is American privateer, for illeg:illy and wnntontu be found in the remarks of Chief Justice ly seizing and plundering the neutrnl vessel
l'ratt (nfte1·wards Lord Camden) in one of aml maltreating ht•r ofHcers nntl crew, :\lr.
the actions against the king's messengr·rR for Jnstlce Story, speaking for the court, in 181<:1,
trespass and imprisonment, under genprnl l:li<l down the general nile ns to tho li:11Jtlity
warrnntq of the secretary of state, ln which, for exemplary or vindictive dn111nges by w:1y
the plalntltr's oounsel hnvlng asserted. amt of 1n111lshmeut, ns follows: "Upon the facts
the defendant's coWtsel having clt•nlPtl, the dl!oiclosed In the evidence, this mnst be proright to recover "exemplary tlamngl'-;," th<' notmc!'d n cnse of gross and wanton outrag-e,
chief justice lnstruct~cl the jmy as follows: wlthoi1t nny just p1·ovocntlon or excusr. l :n•·1 hn\·e formerly delivered It as my 011inion der such circumstnnces, the 1101101· of the
on another occai,1on, and I still continue of country nnd the duty of the court <'qnally
the enmc mind, tltnt n jury have It In their require that a just cmnpensntlon ehoulrl he
J>Qwer to give dama~es for more than the made to the unotfendlng neutrals "for all the
IDJury receh·ed. Dawugee are deslb"lled, not Injuries and losses actually sustained by
and a citizen In thnt WRY le Injured, the cltl·
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acts oppressively, wantonly, abuses power,

and a citizen in that way is injured, the citi-

zen, in addition to strict compensation, may

have. the law says, something in the way of

smart money; something as punishment for

the oppressive use of power."

The jury returned a verdict for the plaintiff

in the sum of $10,000. The defendant moved

for a new trial. for error in law, and for ex-

cessive damages. The plaintiff therenpon, by

leave of court, remitted the sum of $4,000,

and asked that judgment be entered for $0,-

000. The court then denied the'motion for

a new trial. and gave judgment for the plain-

til1' for $6,000. The defendant sued out this

writ of error.

‘Geo. C. Greene, for plaintiff in error. W.

A. Foster, for defendant in error.

Mr. Justice GRAY, after stating thecase
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as above, delivered the opinion of the court.

The only exceptions taken to the instruc-

tions at the trial, which have been argued in

ihisoourt, are to those on the subject of ptmi-

tive damages.

The single question presented for our de-

cision, therefore, is whether a railroad cor-

poration can be charged with punitive or ex-

emplary damages for the illegal, wanton, and

oppressive conduct of a conductor of one of

its trains towards a passenger.

\\ This question, like others affecting the lia-

bility of a railroad corporation as a common

carrier of goods or passengers,—such as its

right to contract for exemption from respon-

ibility for its own negligence, or its liability

beyond its own line, or its liability to one of

! its servants for the act of another person in

its employment,—is a question, not of local

but of general jurisprudence,

law, upon

A which this court, in_th_e absence of express

statute regulating the subject, will exercise‘

it? own judgment, lmcontrolled by the de-

cisions of the courts of the several states.

Railroad Co. v. Lockwood, 17 Wall. 357, 368;

Liverpool & G. W. Steam Co. v. Phenlx Ins.

Co., 129 U. S. 397, 443, 9 Sup. Ct. Rep. 460;

Myrick v. Railroad Co., 107 U. S. 102, 109, 1

Sup. Ct. Rep. 425; Hough v. Railway Co., 100

U. S. 213, 226. '

- The most distinct suggestion of the doc-

trine of exemplary or punitive damages in

England before the American Revolution is

to be found in the remarks of Chief Justice

Pratt (afterwards Lord Camden) in one of

the actions against the king's messengers for

trespass and imprisonment, under general

wlu-rants of the secretary of state, in which,

the plaintiff's counsel having asserted. and

the defendant's counsel having denied. the

right to recover “exemplary damages," the

chief justice instructed the jury as follows:

“I have formerly delivered it as my opinion

on another occasion, and I still continue of

the same mind. that a jury have it in their

power to give damages for more than the

injury received. Damages are designed, not

only as a satisfwtion to the injured person,

~
I

3()
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them; and, if this were a suit against the

original wrongdoers, it might be proper to

go yet farther, and visit upon them, in the

shape of exemplary damages, the proper pun-

ishment which belongs to such lawless mis-

-conduct. But it is to be considered that this

is a suit against the owners of the privateer,

upon whom the law has, from motives of pol-

icy, devolved a responsibility for the conduct

of the oﬂicers and crew employed by them,

and yet, from the nature of the service, they

can scarcely ever be able to secure to them-

selves an adequate indemnity in cases of loss.

They are innocent of the demerit of this

transaction, having neither directed it, nor

countenanced it, nor participated in it in the

slightest degree. Under such circumstances,

we are of the opinion that they are bound

-to repair all the real injuries and personal

wrongs sustained by the libelants, but they
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are not bound to the extent of vindictive

damages." 3 Wheat. 558, 559.

The rule thus laid down is not peculiar to

courts of admiralty; for, as stated by the

same eminent judge two years later, those

courts proceed, in cases of tort, upon the

same principles as courts of common law, in

allowing exemplary damages, as well as dam-

ages by way of compensation or remunera-

tion for expenses incurred, or injuries or loss-

es sustained, by the misconduct of the other

party. Manufacturing Co. v. Fiske, 2 Mason,

119, 121.t In Keene v. Lizardi, S La. 20, 33,

Judge Martin said: “It is true, juries some-

times very properly give what is called ‘smart

money.‘ They are often warranted in giving

vindictive damages as a punishment inﬂicted

for outrageous conduct; but this is only jus-

tiﬁable in an action against the wrongdoer,

and not against persons who, on account of

their relation to the offender, are only conse-

quentiaily liable for his acts, as the princi-

pal is responsible for the acts of his factor or

agent." To the same effect are The State

llights, Crabbe, 42. 47, 48; The Golden Gate,

McAll. 104; Wardrobe v. Stage Co., 7 Cal.

118; Boulard v. Calhoun. 13 La. Ann. 445;

Detroit Daily Post Co. v. McArthur, 16 Mich.

447; Grund v. "an Vleck, 69 11l. 478, 481; Beck-

er v. Dupree, 75 Ill. 167; Rosenkrans v. Bar-

ker, 115 111. 331, 3 N. E. Rep. 93; Kirksey v.

Jones, 7 Ala. 622, 629; Pollock v. Gantt, 09

Ala. 373, 379; Eviston v. Cramer, 57 Wis.

570, 15 N. W. Rep. 760; Haines v. Schultz,

50 N. J. Law, 481, 14 Atl. Rep. 488; McCarthy

v. De .~\rmit, 99 Pa. St. 63, 72; Clark v. New-

sam, 1 Exch. 131, 140; Clissold v. Machell,

26 L'. C. Q. B. 422.

The rule has the same application to cor-

porations as to individuals. This court has

often, in cases of this class, as well as in

other cases, aﬂirmed the doctrine that for

acts done by the agents of a corporation, in

the course of its business and of their em-

ployment, the corporation is responsible in

the same manner and to the same extent as

1 Fed Cas. No. 1,681.

-scope of his employment;

an individual is responsible under similar
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an lndlvldual ls responsible under similar
them; and, It this were a suit agnin~t the
01iglnal wrongdoe1"B, it might be proper to circumstances. UnU.1·oad Co. v. Quigley, 21
.go yet farther, and visit upon them, in the How. 202, 210; Bank v. Graham, 100 U. S .
.shape of ex.?mplary damages, the proper pun- 699, 702; Salt Lake City v. Hollister, 118 U .
ishment which belongs to such lawless mls- S. 256, :,Wl, 6 Sup. Ct. Itep. 1055; Railw!ly
·conduct. But it 1s t.o be considered that this Co. v. Hanis, L'>2 U. S. 597, 608, 7 Sup. Ct.
fs a suit against the owners of the privateer, Rep. 12S6.
.A corporation ls doubtless liable, like an
upon whom the law has, from motives of polky, devolved a responsilJillty for the conduct individual, to make compensation for any
tort committed by an agent in the course ot
of the o11icers nnd crew employed by them,
and yet. from the nature of the service, they his employment, although the net ls done
can scarcely ever be able to secure to them- wantonly and recklessly, or against the express orders of the principal. Railroad Co.
selYes an adequate indemnity in cases of loss.
'!'hey are innocent of the demerit of this v. Derby, 14 How. 468; Steamboat Co. v.
ctransnctlon, having neither directed It, nor Brockett, l21 U. S. 637, 7 Sup. Ct. Rep. 1039;
countenanced it; nor participated in It in the Howe v. Nmvmnrch, 12 Allen, 49; Ramsden
v. Itnllrond Co., 104 MaBS. 117. A corporaslightest degree. t..:nder such circumstances,
we are of the opinion that they are bound tion mny even be held liable for a libel, oa a
to repair all the real injuries and personal mnllclous prosecution, by its agent wlthln the
wrongs sustained by the libelnnts, but they · scope of his employrnent; and the mnllcc
are not bound to the extent of vindictive necessa1·.v to support either action, It proved
in the agent, may be imputed t.o the corpora-damages." 3 Wheat. 558, 5;;9.
The rule thus lnld down ls not peculiar to tion. Hntko:ut Co. v. Quigley, 21 How. 202,
courts of admiralty; tor, as stated by the 211; f:lnlt Lake City .v. Hollister, 118 U. S.
snme emin!'nt jud~e two yenrs later, those 2.iG, 2G2, 6 Sup. Ct. Hep. 1055; Reed v. Bank,
t:ro Ma~. 44:3, 441;, and cases cited; Krulecourt$ proceed, in cases of tort, upon the
s:uue principles as courts of common law, in vitz v. Rnllro1td Co., 140 Mnss. 573, 15 N. E.
allowing exemplary damages, as well as dam- Rep. 500; McDermott v. Journal, 43 N. J.
uges uy way of compensation or remunera- Law, 4~. and 44 N. J. Law, 430; Bank v.
tion fot• expel.\Scs incurred, or injmies or loss- Owston, 4 App. Oas. 270. But, as well ob.,s sustained, by the misconduct of the other serwd by Mr. Justice Field, now chief justice of Massachusetts: "The logical difficulty
party. Manufacturing Co. v. Fiske, 2 Mason,
11\J, 12 l.l In I\:eene v. LlZ!ll"lli, 8 La. 2U, 33, of Imputing the actual malice or fraud of an
Judge l\fartin said: "It ls true, juries some- ngent to his principal ls perhaps less when
times very properly give what Is called 'smart the principal ls a person than when it is a
mon!'y.' They are often warranted in giving rorpor11tlon; stlll the foundation ot the lmpu'\"ilHlktive damages as a punishment lnfiieted t.atlon ls not that it ls Interred that the prinfor outrageous conduct; but this 1s only jus- cipal actually participated in the mnllce or
fraud, but, the net having been done tor his
tifiable in an actlon against the wrongdoer,
and not agnlnst persons who, on account of benefit by his agent acting within the scope
theh- rdntlon to the ot!ender, are only conse- CJf his employment In his business, It ls just
<lUt•ntlally Uable for his acts, as the princi- that he should be held responsible for it In
pal ls responsible for the nets of his factor or damages." Lothrop v. Adams, 133 Mnss. 4il,
.
ugent." To the E!ame effect are The State 480, 481.
Though the principal ls lln.ble to make com!tights, Cmbbe, 42, 47, 48; The Golden Gate,
McAll. 104; Wardrobe v. Stage Co., 7 Cal. pensntlon tor a libel published or a malicious
118; Boulard v. Cnlhoun, 13 La. Ann. 445; prosecution Instituted by his agent, he ls not
Detroit Daily Post Co. v. McArthur, lG l\Iicb. liable to be punished by exemplary damages
447; Grund v. Van Vleck, 69 Ill. 478, 481; Beck- tor an intent In which he did not pnrtlclpnte.
-er v. Dupree, 75 Ill. 167; Rosenkrans v. Bar- In Detroit Dnlly Post Co. v. McArthur, in
ker, 115 Ill. 331, 3 N. E. Rep. 93; Kirksey v. Eviston v. Cramer, and In Haines v. Scbultz.
Jones, 7 .Ala. 622, 629; l'ollock v. Gantt, 69 above cited, It was held that the publisher ot'
Ala. 373, 379; Eviston v. Cramer, 57 Wls. a newspaper, when sued for a libel published
570, 15 ~. W. Rep. 700; II&ines v. Schultz, therein by one of his reporters without his
50 N. J. Law, 481, 14 Atl. Rep. 488; McCarthy knowledge, was liable for compensatory damv. De Am1lt, 99 Pa. St. 63, 72; Clark v. New- ages only, and not tor punitive damages, uns:un. 1 Exch. 131, 140; Cllssold v. Mnchell, less he approved or ratified the publication;
and in Haines v. Schultz the supreme court of
:,W l'. C. Q. B. 4~2.
Tht' rule has the snme applicatlon to cor- New Jt-rsey said of punitive damages: ''The
porntlons as to individuals. This court has right to award tl1em rests primarily upon the
oftcu, In cnses ot this clns~. as well as in single ground,-wrongtul motive." "It 1s the
other cnsrs, affirmed the doctrine thnt tor wrongful personal intention to injure that
nets done by tlle agents of a corporatlon, in en.Us forth the penalty. To this wrongful inthe course of its business and of their em- tent knowledge Is an essential prerequisite."
"Absence of nil proof bearing on the essenploym~n t, th<' eorporntion Is responsible in
the same manner and to the same extent as tial question, to wit, defendant's motive, cannot be permitted to tnke the place ot evil Fed Cns. No. 1,681.
dence, without lending t.o a most dangero1111
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extension of the doctrine respondent supe-

rior." 50 N. J. Law, 484, 485, 14 Ail. Rep.

488 Whether a principal can be criminally

,prosecuted for a libel published by his agent

without his participation is a question on

which the authorities are not agreed; and,

where it has been held that he can, it is ad-

mitted to be an anomaly in the criminal law.

Com. v. Morgan. 10? Mass. 199, 203; Reg. v.

liolbrook, 3 Q. B. Div. 60, 68, 64, 70, 4 Q. B.

Div. 42, 51, 60.

No doubt, a corporation, like a natural per-

son, may be held liable in exemplary or puni-

tive damages for the act of an agent within

the scope of his employment, provided the

criminal intent, necessary to warrant the im-

position of such damages, is brought home to

the corporation. Railroad Co. v. Quigley,

Railway Co. v. Arms, and Railway Co. v.

Harris, above cited; Caldwell v. Steamboat
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Co., 47 N. Y. 282; Bell v. Railway Co., 10 C.

B. (N. S.) 287, 4 Law~'l‘. (N. S.) 203.

Independently of this. in the case of a cor-

poration. as of an individual, if any wanton-

ness or mischief on the part of the agent,

acting within the scope of his employment,

causes additional injury to the plaintift in

body or mind, the principal is, of course, lia-

ble to make compensation for the whole in-

jury suffered. Kennon v. Gilmer, 131 U. S.

22, ‘J Sup. Ct. Rep. 696; Meagher v. Driscoll,

99 Mass. 281, 283; Smith v. Holcomb, 1d. 532;

Iiawes v. I(no\\‘lt-s, 114 Mass. 518; Campbell

v. Car Co., 42 Fed. Rep. 484.

’In the case at bar, the defendant's counsel

having admitted in open court “that the ar-

rest of the plaintiff was wrongful, and that

he was entitled to recover actual damages

therefor." the jury were rightly instructed

that he was entitled to a verdict which would

fully compensate him for the injuries sus-

tained, and that in compensating him the

jury were authorized to go beyond his out-

lay in and about 1his suit, and to consider

the humiliation and outrage to which he had

been subjected by arresting him publicly

without warrant and without cause, and by

the conduct of the conductor, such as his rc-

mark to the plaintiff's wife.

But the court, going beyond this, distinctly

instructed the jury that, "after agreeing upon

the amount which will fully compensate the

plaintilf for his outlay and injured feelings,"

they might “add something by way of puni-

tive damages against the defendant, which is

sometimes called ‘smart money,”' if they

were “satisﬁed that the conductor's conduct

was illegal, wanton, and oppressive."

The jury were thus told, in the plainest

terms. that the corporation was responsible in

punitive damages for wantonness and oppres-

sion on the part of the conductor, although

not actually participated in by the corpora-

tion. This ruling appears to us to be incon-

sistent with the principles above stated, un-

supported by any decision of this court, and

opposed to the preponderance of wcli-consid-

ﬁred precedents.

In Railroad Co. v. Derby, which was an ac-

extenalon of the doctrine respondeat superior.'' 00 N. 1. Lnw, 484. 485, 14 Atl. Rep.
~
Whether a principal can be criminally
lJrosecuted for a libel published by bis agent
without b1s parUcipatlon la a question on
which the authorities are not agreed: ed.
where it bas been held thnt he can, It Is admitted to be an anomaly ln the criminal law.
Com. v. Morgun, 107 Mass. 199, 203; Ueg. v.
Holbrook, 3 Q. B. Div. GO, 63, G!, 70, 4 Q. B.
Div. 4.2, 51, 60.
No doubt, a corporation, llke a natural per$>D, may be held llllble ln exemplary or punitive damages for the act of nn agent within
the scope of b1s employment, provided the
~rlmlnal Intent, necessary to warrant the imJ>OSltlon of such damages, ls brought home to
the corporation. Rnllroad Co. v. Quigley,
Rnllwny Co. v. Arms, and Rnllway Co. v.
Harris, above cited; Caldwell v. Steamboat
Co., 47 N. Y. 282; Bell v. Rnllway Co., 10 C.
B. (~. S.) 287, 4 Lnw·T. (N. S.) 293.
Independently of tills. 1u the case of a corJ>Or-.itiou. as of an Individual, if any wantonness or mischief on the part of the agent,
ncting within the scope of bis employment,
<~1ust.':i additional injury to the plulntitr ln
body or mind, the principal Is, of course, llahle to make compensation for the whole in·
jury suJfel'\!tl. Kennon v. Gilmer, 131 U. S.
~2. :l 811p. Ct. Uep. 696; Meagher v. Driscoll.
-00 Mass. 281, ~; Smith v. Holcomb, Id. 5:;2;
Hawes v. Knowles, 114 l\lnss. 518; Campbell
T. Car Co., 4.2 Fed. Rep. 484.
---in the case at bar, the defendant's counsel
having admitted ln open court "that the arrest of the plaintitr was wrongful, and that
lie was entitled to recover actual dRrunges
therefor." the jury were rightly instructed
that be wns entitled to a verdict which would
fully compensate him for the Injuries BUS·
talned, and that ln compensating him the
jury were autho1iz<'Cl to go beyoud his outlay ln nnd about 1his suit, and to consltlcr
the humiliation and outrage to which he h:11l
b<.>en subjected by arresting him puulfdy
without warrant nnd without cause, nml by
the conduct of the conductor, such as his l'C·
mark to the plnintlll's wife.
Rut the court, going beyond this, distinctly
lnstmcted the jury that, "after agreeing upon
the amount which will fully compensate the
plalntitr for his outlay and Injured feelings,"
they might "add something by way of punl.·
tlve damages against the defendant, which ls
sometimes called 'smnrt money,'" it they
were "satisfied that the conductor's conduct
was illegal. wunton, and oppressive."
The jury were thus t•)id, ln the plainest
·tem1s, that the corporation was responsible in
punlth"e clawages for wnutonness and oppression on the part of the conductor, although
not actually participated ln by the corporation. This ruling appears to us to be inconsistent with the principles above stated, unmpported by any decision of this court, and
oppoeed to the preponderance of well-coul!id·
\!red precedents.
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In Rnllroad Co. v. Derby, which was un action by a pussenger against 11 railroad corporation for a personnl Injury eu1fered
through the negligence of ltll servants, the
Jury were Instructed that "the damages, if
nny Wl're recoverable, are to be contlned to
the dirL>et and immediate consequences of the
injury sustained;" and no exception was
taken to tills Instruction. 14 How. 470, 471.
In Railroad Co. v. Quigley, which was an
action against a railroad corporation for a
llllE'l puulishcd by its agents, the jury returned 11 verdict for the plaintllf under an lnstructlou that "they are not restricted ln giving damages to the actual positive injury
sust!l.lned by the plalnutr, but may give such
<Jxcmplary damages, if any, as ln their opinion nr<J called for ond justlfled. ln view of nll
the circumstances in this case, to render
r<Jparatlou to the plalntltr, nnd net as an adequate pwlishment to the defendant." Tbls
c•mrt set nsltlc the verdict, because the Instruction given to the jury did not accurately
define the tnf'asure of the defendant's liability; nnd, sp~nklng by Mr. Justice Campbell,
l'tntcd the rules applicable to the cnse in these
wo1"11s; "For acts done by the ngents of the
co11>01·atiou, either ln contrnctu or In dellcto,
ln the L'OUrse of its business and of their employmPnt, the corporation ls responsible, as
un lntllYldual ls responsible under similar clrcm11st1111ces." "Whenever the Injury complnlnr<l ot has been Inflicted maliciously or
wa11to11ly. and with circumstances of contumely or inuli.'11lty, tho jury ore not limited
to the asccrtnlnment of a simple compensation for the wrong committed against the aggrieved person. But the mnllce spoken of in
this rule ls not merely the doing of nn unln wful or injurious net. '.l'he wortl lmplle!I
that the act complained of was concrlved
ln the sph-it of mischief, or criminal lndlffert·nce to ci;ll oblliratlons. :Nothing of this
kind can be Imputed to these defendants."
21 How. 210, 213, 214.
In Hallway Co. v. Arms, which was an action against a railroad corporation, by a passenger injured in a collision c11used by the
n('gligence of tlie scrrnnts of the corporation,
the jury were instmcted thus: "If you find
that thH accident was caw;ied by the gross
negligence of the defendant's servants con' rolling- the tmln, you may give to the plaintiff
pnnltivo 01· exemplary damages." TWs court,
spmking by Mr. Justice Davi<>. and approYlng
and applying the rule of exemplary damages,
as stnt•~tl In Qnigley's Case, held that this
wn.'> a mlstllrcctlon, aml that the failure of
tlie f'mplo)"\'!'I to use the care that was required to avoltl the accldPnt, "whether called
'1-•-ross· 01· 'orclinary' negligence, did not autho1iz<' the jury to visit tl1e company with
da111ages beyond the limit of compensation
for the Injury actually inflicted. To do this,
there mnst have been some willful misconduct, 01· that entire want of care which would
mlsP. the presumption of 11 conscious lntlift'ert!Dce to consequences. Nothing of this kintl
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can be imputed to the persons in charge of

the train; and the court, therefore, misdi-

rooted the jury." 91 U. S. 495.

In Railway Co. v. Harris, the railroad com-

pany, as the record showed, by an armed

force of several hundred men, acting as its

agents and employes, and organized and com-

manded by its vice president and assistant

general manager, attacked with deadly weap-

ons the agents and employes of anothercom-

pany in possession of a railroad, and forcibly

drove them out, and in so doing ﬁred upon

and injured one of them, who therenpon

brought an action against the corporation,

and recovered a verdict and judgment under

an instruction that the jury “were not lim-

ited to compensatory damages. but could give

punitive or exemplary damages, if it was

found that the defendant acted with bad in-

tent, and in pursuance of an unlawful pur-
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pose to forcibly take possession of the rail-

way occupied by the other company, and in

so doing shot the plaintiff." This court,

speaking by Mr. Justice Harlan, quoted and

approved the rules laid down in Quigley's

Jase, and aﬂirmed the judgment, not because

any evil intent on the part of the agents of

the defendant corporation could of itself

make the corporation responsible for exem-

plary or punitive damages, but upon the sin-

gle ground that the evidence clearly showed

that the corporation, by its governing oﬂicers,

participated in and directed all that was

planned and done. m U. S. 610, 7 Sup. Ct.

Rep. 1286.

The president and general manager, or, in

his absence, the vice president in his place,

actually wielding the whole executive power

of the corporation, may well be treated as so

far representing the -corporation and identi-

ﬁed with it that any'wanton, malicious, or

oppressive intent of his, in doing wrongful

acts in behalf of the corporation to the in-

jury of others. may be treated as the intent

of the corporation itself; but the conductor

of a train, or other subordinate agent or serv-

ant of a railroad corporation, occupies a very

different position, and is no more identiﬁed

with his principal, so as to affect the latter

with his own unlawful and criminal intent,

than any agent or servant standing in a cor-

responding relation to natural persons carry-

ing on a manufactory, a mine, or a house of

trade or commerce.

The law applicable to this case has been

found nowhere better stated than by Mr.

Justice Brayton, afterwards chief justice of

Rhode Island, in the earliest reported case

of the kind, in which a passenger sued a rail-

road corporation for his wrongful expulsion

from a train by the conductor, and recovered

a verdict, but excepted to an instruction to

the jury that “punitive or vindictive dam-

ages, or smart money, were not to be allowed

as against the principal, unless the principal

participated in the wrongful act of the agent,

expressly or impliedly, by his conduct an-

thorizing it or approving it, either before or

after it was committed." This instruction

<':tn be Imputed to the persons in chnrge ot
the trnin; nnd the court, therefore, mlsdirected the jury." 91 U. S. 495.
In Uallwny Co. v. Harris, the rallrond company, as the reco1·d showed, by an armed
fo1·ce of several hundred men, acting as Its
:tgPnts and employes, and orgnnized and comOlandecl !Jy Its vice president and a~lstant
gl•neral manager, attacked with deadly weapuns the ngents and employes of another·comp:my ill possession of a mllroad, and forcibly
drnve them out, and in so doing fired upon
:mcl Injured one of them, who thereupon
hrought an action against the corporation,
llll(l recovered a verdict nnd judgment under
nu lnstmction that the jury "were not Umite<l to compensatory damages. but could give
1•11nltivc or exemplary damages, If 1t was
found that the defendant acted with bad intent, awl in pm-,;uance of :m unlawful pur·
prnm to forcibly tak~ possession of the rail·
way occupied by the other company, and in
so doing shot the plnintltr." This court,
speaking by Mr. Justice Harlan, quoted and
:tppL"Overl the 111les laid down In Qulgley's
<Jase, aml affirmed the judgment, not llecams~
:my evil infrnt on the part of the agents of
the defendant corporation .could of Itself
make the corporation responsi!Jle for exemplary or punitive damages, but upon the single ground that the evidence clearly showed
that the corporation, by its governing officers,
participated in and direcwd nil that was
r1Iannetl nnd done. 122 U. S. 610, 7 Sup. Ct.
Rep. 1281.l.
'!'he president and genP1"%1 mnnager, or, in
his absence, the vice president In his place,
actually wielding the whole executive power
of the corporation, may well be treated as so
fnr representing the corporation and ldenttficd with it that any· wanton, malicious, or
oppressive intent of his, in doing wrongful
nchl In behalf of the corporation to the lnjnry of others, may be treated as the intent
of the corporation Itself; but the conductor
of a train, or other subordinate agent or servnut of a railroad corporation, occupies a very
different position, nud ls no more identitied
with his princlpnl, so as to afl'ect the latter
with his own unlawful and criminal Intent,
th:m any ag•mt or servant standing In a corresponding relation to natural persons carryIng on a manutactory, a mine, or a house of
trade or commerce.
The law applicable to this case has been
found nowhere better stated than by Mr.
Jnstice Ilrn~· ton, afterwards chief justice ot
Rhode Island, in the earliest reported case
of the kind, in which a passenger sued a railroad corporation for hls wrongful expulsion
fI"Om a train by the conductor, and recovered
a verdict, but excepted to an Instruction to
the jury that "punitive or vindictive damages, or smart money, were not to be allowed
as ngninst tl1e princlpal, tmless the principal
participated In the wrongful act of the agent,
exprcs.;ily or impliedly, by his conduct autboriztng It or approving it, either before or
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nfter ft wns committed." This instruction
was held to be right, for the follo'\\ing reasous: "In cases where punitive or exemplary
damages have been assessed, It has been
done, upon evidence of such willfulness, recklessne~. or wickedness, on the part of tbeparty at fault, as amounted to crlminnlity,
which for the good of society and warning
to the indl\"ldual, ought to be punished. l.t
In such cases, or in any case of a civil nnture.
It ls the pollcy of the law to visit upon the
offender such exemplary damnges ns will
operate as punishment, and tench the lesson
of caution to pre,·ent a repetition of criminal·
ity, yet we do not see how such damages can
be allowed, where the principal Is prosecuted
for the tortlous act of his servant, unless
there Is proof in the cause to Implicate the
principal and make him partlceps ctimlnls of
hi!; agent's net. No man should be punished
for that of which be 1s riot guilty." "Where
i:he proof does not Implicate the principal.
:md, however wicked the servant may have
been, the principal neither expressly nor lmplledly authorizes or ratifies the act, and the
criminality of It ls as much ng:.1inst him as
against any other member of society, we
think It ls quite enough that be shall be liable
ln compensatory damages for the injury snstalned in consequence of the wrongful act of°
a person acting as his servant." Hagan v.
I:aiit'ou<l Co., 3 R. I. SS, 91.
The like view was expressed by the court
.,f appeals of New York, in an action brought
against a railroad corporation by a passenger>
for injuries suffered by the neglect of a
switchman, who was Intoxicated at the time
of the accident. It was held that evldencethat the switchman was a man of intempernte hnblts, which was known to the agent
of the company having the power to employ
and discharge him and other subordinates,
wns competent to support a. claim for exem11lary damages, but thnt a. direction to the
jury ln general terms thnt in awarding damnges they might add to full compensation for
the injury "such sum for exemplary damnges
as the case oolls for, depending in a great
mensnre, of course, upon the conduct of the
defendant," elltltled the defendnnt to a new
trial; and Chief Justice Church, delh·erlngthe unanimous judgment of the court, stated
the rule as follows: "For Injuries by th&
negligence of a servant whlle engnged in the
business of the master, within the scope of his
employment, the latter Is llll'ble for compensatory damages; but for such nl'gligence.
however gross or culpable, he ls not liable to
be punished In punitive damages unless he
ls nlsv chargenble with gross miscomluct. ~.
Such mlc;conduct may be est:lblll;:hed by showIng that thE> act of the servant was authorIZ('(l or ratified, or that the master employed
or retained the ser\"ant, knowing that he was.
incompetent, or, from bad habits. unfit for
the position he occupied. Something more
than 01·dlnnry negligence 1s requisite; ft must
be reckless. and ot a criminal nature, and
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eieariy established. Corporations may incur

this liability as well as private persons. If a

railroad company, for instance, knowingly

and wantonly employs a drunken engineer

or switchman, or retains one after knowledge

at his habits is clearly brought home to the

t-ompany, or to a superintending agent au-

thorized to employ and discharge him, and in-

jury occurs by reason of such habits, the

company may and ought to be amenable

to the severest rule of damages; but I am not

aware of any principle which permits a jury

to award exemplary damages in a case which

does not come up to this standard, or to

graduate the amount of such damages by

their views of the propriety of the conduct of

the defendant, unless such conduct is of the

character before speciﬁed." Cieghorn v.

Railroad Co., 56 N. Y. 44, 47, 48.

Similar decisions, denying upon like grounds
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the liability of railroad companies and other

mrporntions, sought to be charged with puni-

tive damages for the wanton or oppressive

acts of their agents or servants, not partic

ipatcd in or ratiﬁed by the corporation,

have been made by the courts of New Jersey,

l‘ennsylvanim Delaware, Michigan, Wiscon-

sin. California, Louisiana, Alabama, Texas,

and West Virginia.

It must be admitted that there is a wide

divergence in the decisions of the state courts

upon this question, and that corporations

have been held liable for such damages un-

der similar circumstances in New Hamp-

shire, in Maine, and in many of the western

and southern states. But of the three lead-

ing cases on that side of the question. Hop-

kins v. Railroad Co., 36 N. H. 9, can hardly

be reconciled with the later decisions in Fay

v. Parker, 53 N. H. 342, and Bixby v. Dunlap,

56 N. H. 456; and in Goddard v. Railway Co.,

57 Maine, 212, 228, and Railway Co. v. Dunn,

LAVV DA\[.2d Ed.—3

19 Ohio St. 162, 590, there were strong dis-

senting opinions. in many, if not most, of the

other cases, either corporations were put

upon different grounds in this respect from

other principals, or else the distinction be-

tween imputing to the corporation such

wrongful act and intent as would render it

liable to make compensation to the person

injured, and imputing to the corporation the

intent necessary to be established in order

to subject it to exemplary damages by way of

punishment, was overlooked or disregarded.

Most of the cases on both sides of the ques-

tion, not peciﬂcally cited above, are collected

in 1 Sedg. Dam. (8th Ed.) § 880.

In the case at bar, the plaintiff does not ap-

pear to have contended at the trial, or to

have introduced any evidence tending to

show, that the conductor was known to the

defendant to be an unsuitable person in any

respect. or that the defendant in any way

participated in, approved, or ratiﬁed his treat-

ment of the plaintiff ; nor did the instructions

given to the jury require them to be satisﬁed

of any such fact before awarding punitive

damages; but the only fact which they were

f'learly l'!ltnbHshed. Corporations may lncm·
thJs liability as well as private persons. U a
l1lill'o&l company, for lnstAnce, knowingly
11nd wantonly employs a dmnken engineer
or switchman. or retalna one after knowledge
.. r his habits ls clearly brought home to the
('ompaul·. or to a superintending agent authorized to employ and discharge hlm, and ln,!ury occurs by reason of such habiti!I, the
comp1my may and ought to be amenable
to the severest rule of dnmages; but I am not
nwnre of any principle whku permits a jury
to award exemplary damages ln a cnee whlch
1loes not come np to thls standard, or to
graduate the amo1mt of such damages by
their views of the propriety of the conduct of
the defendant, unlee.~ such conduct ls of the
ch:lmcter before sp<.'Ci.fled." Cll.'ghom v.
Railroad Co., 56 N. Y. 44, 47, 48.
Slmllar decisions, denylug upon llkc grounds
the liability of rnllrond compnnJes and other
corpomtions, sought to be charged with punltlve damages tor the wanton or oppressive
acts of their &J{ents or servnnts, not pnrtlclpated In or ratified by the corpol'atlon,
have been mnde by the courts of New Jersey,
Penn.c1ylvnnh. Delaware, Michigan, Wlsc-0nsln, C:tli!ornin, Loul8lana, Alabama, Texas,
and West Virginia.
It must be admitted that there ls a wide
divergence In the decislons of the state courts
upou. this question, and that corporations
have ))('(>n held liable for such damnges un111.'r sln11lar clrcumsumces In New Hnmp!lhlre, in Maine, and ln mnny of the western
and southern states. But or the three leading cnsC's on that Bide of the question, Hopklrul v. Railroad Co., 36 N. H. 9, cnn hardly
be ~oncllcd with the later decisions in l~ay
T. Parker, 5.'J N. H. 842, and Bixby v. Dunlap,
;"J() N. H. 456; and ln G0<ldard v. Hallway Co.,
:;7 .Maine, 202, 228, and Rnllway Co. v. Dunn,
f,A W JU '.\l.2d Ed.-3

19 Ohfo St. 162, 590, there were strong dissenting opinions. In many, it not most, of the
other t'nses, either corpor-ations were put
upon dit'terent grounds In this respect t1·0111
other principals, or else the distinction betwet-n imputing to the corporation such
wrong(ul net nnd lnt<'nt ns would r<'nder it
lillble to make compensation to the person
injured, nnd imputing to the corporation the
lnt<'nt necessary to be established ln order
to eubject it to exemplary dnmngee by way of
punishment, wus overlooked or disregarded.
l\Iost of the cases on both slctes of the question, not specifically cited above, are collected
In 1 8('(lg. Darn. (8th Ed.) t 380.
In the case at bar, the plalntltr does not appear to have contl'nded at the trial, or to
hal"e Introduced nny evidence tending to
iihow, that tlle conductor was known to the
df'fl'ntlant to be an unsuitable person ln any
rt•spect. or tbat the defendant In any way
pnl'ticlpnt('(l ln, npprove<l, or ratltled his treatmc>nt or the pl11l11ti1T; 1101' clld the tnstructlom
glV<·n to the jury rc1111irc them to be snlli;Jied
cf nny such tnct betoi·e nwa'1'tl1ng pnnltive
dnrnai;1·;;; but the only tac:t which they were
l'cquil"l~lJo._ find, In order to 1.<uppot't n cl111m
for punitive dnmngP.i ngalnst the cor11orntion, was that the conductor's illegnl comlnct
w11s wnnton and opp1·esslve. For this error.
118 we cannot know how mu'.!11 of the vel"llict
was luknded by tl1e jury as a compensation
tor tl1e plnlntUf's injury, and how much by
way ot punL~b.lng the corporation tor nn lnt~nt 1n which it hnd no part, the judgment
must be reversed, and the case rcm:uulcd to
lhe circuit court, with dlrectlons to set aside
the verdict, and to order a new trbll.

Mr. Justice FIEJ,D, Ml'. Justice HART,AN,
nnd :\It'. Justice J,.BIAR took no part In this
1l!'<'isloJL
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GODDARD v. GRAND TRFNK RY. OF

CANADA.

(57 Me. 202.)

Supreme Judicial Court of Maine. 1869.

Action against the Grand Trunk Railway of

Canada to recover damages for an assault

made on a passenger by a brakeman in defend-

ant's employment. There was a verdict for

plaintiff, to which defendant excepted.

G. F. Shepley, for plaintiff. P. Barnes, for

defendant.

WALTON, J. Two questions are presented

for our consideration: First, is the common‘

carrier of passengers responsible for the will-t'

fui misconduct of his servant? or, in other I

words, if a passenger who has done nothing,

to forfeit his right to civil treatment, is as-1

-saulted and grossly insulted by one of the

-carrier's servants, can he look to the carrier
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for redress? and, secondly, if he can, what is

the measure of relief which the law secures

to him‘); These are questions that deeply.

concern,'not only the numerous railroad and

steamboat companies engaged in the trans-

portation of passengers, but also the whole

traveling public; and we have endeavored to

give them that consideration which their

great importance has seemed to us to de-

mand.

1. Of the carrier's liability. It appears in

evidence, that the plaintiff was a passenger

in the defendants' railway ear; that, on re-

quest, he surrendered his ticket to a brake-

man employed on the train, who, in the ab-

sence of the conductor. was authorized to

demand and receive it; that the brakeman

afterwards approached the plaintiff, and, in

language course, profane. and grossly insult-

ing, denied that he had either surrendered or

shown him his ticket; that the brakeman

called the plaintiff a liar, charged him with

attempting to avoid the payment of his fare,

and with having done the same thing before,

and threatened to split his head open and

spill his brains right there on the spot; that

the brakeman stepped forward and placed

his foot upon the seat on which the plaintiff

was sitting, and, leaning over the plaintiff.

brought his ﬁst close down to his face, and

shaking it violently, told him not to yip, if

he did he would spot him, that he was a

damned liar, that he never handed him his

ticket, that he did not believe he paid his

fare either way; that this asault was con-

tinued some ﬁfteen or twenty minutes, and

until the whistle sounded for the next sta-

tion; that there were several passengers

present in the car, some of whom were

ladies, and that they were all strangers to

the plaintiff; that the plaintiff was at the

time in feeble health, and had been for

some time under the care of a physician, and

at the time of the assault was reclining lan-

guldly in his seat; that he had neither said

nor done anything to provoke the assault;

that, in fact, he had paid his fare, had receiv-

ed a ticket, and had surrendered it to this

very brakeman who delivered it to the con-

EXE~IPJ..\RY

GODDAHD v. GHAXD THUXK RY. OF
CANADA.

DAMAGES.

that, In fact, be had paid his fare, had received a ticket, and had surrendered it to tl1ls
very brakeman who delivered lt to the con(57 Me. 202.)
ductor only a few minutes before, by whom
lt was afterwards produced and identified;
Supreme .Judicial Court of Maine. 1869.
that the defendants were immediately notiAction against the Grand Trunk Railway of fied of tl!~ misconduct of the brakeman, but,
Canadn to recover damages for an assault instead of discharging him, retained him In
made on a passenger by a brakeman in defend- his place; that the brakeman was still In
ant's employment. There was a verdict for the defendantJJ' employ ·when the case was
plaintur, to which defendant excepted.
tried and was present In court during the
G. I•'. Shepley, for plalntlff. P. Barnes, for trial, but was not called as a witness, and no
attempt was made to justify or excuse his
defendant.
conduct.
Upon this evidence the defendants contend
WALTON, J. Two questions are presented
for our conslcleratlon: Fli'Flt;"t8lhe-common'"\ that they are not liable, because, as they say,
carrier of passengers responsible for the will- I the brakeman's assault upon the plaintiff
ful misconduct of llis servant? or, in other f was wlllful and malicious, and was not diwords, if a passenger who bas done nothing rectly nor Impliedly authorized by them.
io forfeit his right to clvll treatment, is as- They say the substance of the whole case Is
-saulted and grossly Insulted by one of the · this, that "the master ls not responsible as a
·Carrier's servants, can he look to the carrier 1 trespasser, unless by direct or implied aufor redress? and, secondly, If he can, what ls thority to the servant, he consents to the unthe measure of rellef which the law seeures lawful act."
The fallacy or this argument, when applied
to him? These are questions · that deeply
concern,· not only the numerous mil road and to the common carrier of passengers, consists
steamboat companle11 engaged in the trane- In not discriminating between the obligation
portntion of passengers, but also the whole which be le Wider to his passenger, and the
tra nllng public; and we have endeayo1·ed to duty which he owes a stranger. It may be
glye them that consideration which their true that If the carrier's servant wlilfully
grent Importance has seemed to us to de- and maliciously assaults a stranger, the ma'Ster wlll not be liable; but the law 18 othermand.
I. Of the carrier's liability. It appears In wise when he assaults one of his master's
evl<lcncc, that the plaintiff was a passenger passengers. The carrier's obligation Is to
In the defendants' railway car; that, on re- cnrry his passenger safely and properly, nnd
quest, he surrendered his ticket to a brakl'- to trent him respectfully, and if he intrusts
man employed on the train, who, In the ab- the performance of this duty to his serYante.
sence of the conductor, was authorized to the law holds him responsible for the man<11.'mand and receive It; that the brakeman ner In which they execute the trust. The
afterwards approached the plalntllf, and, In law seems to be now well settled that the
languagP coorse, profane. and grossly Insult- carrier ls obliged to protect his passenger
ing, denied that he had either surrendered or from violence and Insult. from whatever
Rhown him his ticket; that the brakeman source arising. He ls not regarded as an in·
ralled the plalntllf a liar, charged him with 8Urer of his passenger's safety against every
attempting to avoid the payment of his fare, possible source of danger; but he ls bound to
and with having done the same thing befor~ use all such reasonable precautions as hmnau
nnd thrPntened to split bis bead open and judgment aud foresight are capable of, to
spill his brains right there on the spot; that make his passenger's journey aafe and comthe brnkeman stepped forward and placed fortable. He must not only protect his pasbis foot upon the seat on which the plaintltr !H~nger ai,,'11.inst the violence and Insults of
was sitting, and, leaning over the plaintUI, strangers and co-passengers, but a fortiori,
brought bis fist close down to bis face, and against the ylolence and insults of his own
shaking It violently, told him not to yip, if servants. If this duty to the passenger ls
he did be would spot him, tllat he was n r.ot performed, if this protection ls not furdamned liar, that he never handed lllm bis nished, but on the contrary, the passenger ls
ticket, that he did not believe he paid his assaulted and Insulted, through the neglifare either way; that this assault was con- gence or the wlllful misconduct of the cartinued some fifteen or twenty minutes, and rier's servant, the carrier is necessarily r&untll the whistle sounded for the next sta- sponslble.
tion; that there were several passengers
And it seems to us It would be cause of
pres<'nt In the car, some of whom were profound regret if the law were otherwise.
ladles, and that they were all strangers to '.rhe car1ier selects his own servants and can
the plaintiff; that the plaintiff wllB at the discharge them when he pleases, and lt 's
time In feeble health, and had been for but reasonable that he should be responsible
BOme time under the care of a physician, and for the manner in which they execute their
at the time of the assault was reclining lan- trust. To their care and fidelity are intrustguidly In his b~"O.t; that he had neither said ed the llves and limbs and comfort and connor done anything to provoke the a11S&ult; venience of the whole travellng publlc, and It
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is certainly as important that these servants

should be trustworthy as it is that they

should be competent. It is not suﬂicient that

they are capable of doing well, if in fact

they choose to do ill; that they can be as

polite as a Chesterﬁeld, if, in their inter-

course with the passengers, they choose to

he coarse, brutal, and profane. The best se-

curity the traveler can have that these serv- .

ants will be selected with care, is to hold ,

those by whom the selection is made respon-

sible for their conduct.

This liability of the master is very clearly

expressed in a recent case in Massachusetts.

The court say, that wherever there is a con-

tract between the master and another per-

son, the master is responsible for the acts of

his servant in executing that contract, al-

though the act is fraudulent and done with-
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out his consent. Howe v. Newmarch, 12 Al-

len, 55 (paragraph nearest the bottom of the

page). And Messrs. Angeli and Ames, in

their work on Corporations (l8th Ed.] p. 40-l,

§ 38%), say: “A distinction exists as to the

liability of a corporation for the willful tort

of its servant toward one to whom the corpo-

ration owes no duty except such as each citi-

zen owes to every other; and that toward

one who has entered into some peculiar con-

tract with the corporation by which this duty

is increased; thus it has been held that a

railroad corporation is liable for the willful

tort of its servants whereby a passenger on

the train is injured."

In Brand v. Railroad Co., 8 Barb. 368, the

court say, a passenger on board a stagecoach

or railroad-car, and a person on foot in the

street, do not stand in the some relation to

the carrier. Toward the one the liability of

the carrier springs from a contract, ex-

press or implied, and upheld by an adequate ‘

consideration. Toward the other he is under

no obligation but that of justice and humani-

ty. Hence a passenger, who is injured by a

servant of the carrier, may have a right of

action against him when one not a passen-

ger, for a similar injury, would not.

In Moore v. Railroad Co., 4 Gray, 465, the

plaintiff was forcibly put out of a car for not

giving up his ticket or paying his fare, when

in fact he had already surrendered his ticket

to some one employed on the train. The de-

fendants insisted that they were not respon-

sible for the misconduct of the conductor;

and further, that an action for an assault

would not lie against a corporation. But the

court held otherwise, and the plaintif f recov-

ered.

In Seymour v. Greenwood, 7 Iiurl. & N.

354, the plaintif f was assaulted and taken

out of the defendant's omnibus by one -)f

his servants.

he was not liable, because it did not appear

that be authorized or sanctioned the act of

the servant. But it was held in the ex-

'chequer chamber, afﬁrming the judgment of

the exchequer court. that the jury did right

in returning a verdict for the plaintiff.

la certainly as Important that these servants
In Railroad Co. v. Finney, 10 Wis. 388, the
should be trustworthy as it ls that they plalntlfl' was unlawfully put out of a car ty
should be competent It ls not aufliclent that the conductor. After stating that It was iuthey are capable of doing well, If in fact slsted, by the counsel for the railroad, that
they choose to do 111; that they can be as in no case could a cause of action arise
polite as a Chesterfield, if, In their inter- against the princlpaJ for the willful misconcourse with the p8.88engers, they choose to duct of the agent, the court went on to say,
be coarse, brutal, and profane. The best se- that after a careful examination of the posi·
<!llrity the traveler can have that these serv- tiou, they werP- satisfied it was not correct;
ants will be selected with care, Is to hold that where the misconduct of the agent
those by whom the selection ls made respon- causes a breach of the prlnclpal's cont1'8ct,
sible for their ronduct.
be will be liable whether such misconduct
This liability of the master Is very clearly be wlllful 01· merely negligent.
In Railroad Co. v. Vandiver, 42 Pa.. St. aro,
expressed in a. recent case ln Massachusetts.
The court say, that wherever there ls a con- a passenger received injuries, of which be
tract between the master and another per- · died, by being thrown from the platform of
son, the master ls responsible for the acts of a railroad car because be refused to pay hlR
his serT'ant in executing that contract, al· fare or show his ticket, he averring be bad
though the act ls fraudulent and done wlth- bought one but could not find it. The evi-0ut bis ron.sent Howe v. Newmarcb, 12 Al- dence showed be was partially intoxlcat~.
len, w (paragraph nearest the bottom of the It was urged In defense that if the pas11en1mge). And Messrs. Angell and Ames, In ger's deoth was the result of force and viotheir work on Corporations ([8th Ed.] p. 404, lence, and not the result of negligence, then
f 3M), say: "A distinction exists as to the (1:1uch force and violence being the act of the
llablllty of a. corporation for the wllltul tort ugents alone without any command or order
-Of Its sen-ant toward one to whom the corpo- i or the <"<>mpany) the company was not reration owes no duty except such as each citi- l sponslble therefor. But the court held othzen owes to every other; and that toward erw1se. "A railway rompany ," said the
-0ne who has entered Into some peculiar con- court, "i;elects its own agents at its own
tract with the corporation by which this duty pleusm·e, and it ls bound to employ none
is increased; thus it bas been held that a except capable, prudent, nod hulllilne men.
railroad corporation ls liable for the willful In the present case the company and its
tort of Its servants whereby a passenger on agents were all liable for the Injury dcne to
the train ls injured."
the deceased."
In Brand v. Rallroo.d Co., 8 Barb. 368, the
In Weed v. Railroad Co., 17 N. Y. 3112, the
-c ourt say, a passenger on board a stage-coach jury found specially that the act of the se,·vor railroad-car, and a person on foot ln the ant by which the plaintltr wns Injured, wa1:1
street, do not stand In the snme relation to willful. The court held the wlllfuluess of
the <'arrier. T:>ward the one the llabillty of the act did not defeat the plnlntllf's right to
the carrier springs from a contract, ex- look to the railroad compauy for i·edress.
press or Implied, and upheld by an adeqwttc
In Hallrond Co. v. Derby, 14 How. 4HS,
-<'onslderotlon. Toward the other he Is undtlr where the servant of a ratlrood compauy
no obligntlon but that of justice and humani- took an engine and run it over the rood for
ty. Hence a passenger, who ls injured by a his own gratltic:itlon, uot only without conservant of the carrier, may have a right of sent, but rontrary to ex.p1·ess orders, the su.action against him when one not a passen- preme ccurt of the United States held that
ger, for a slmllar Injury, would not.
the rallruad company was respouslhle.
In Railway Co. v. Hinds, r>3 Pa. St. 512, n
In ~loore v. Ua.IIroad Co., 4 Gray, 4G5, the
plalntifl' was forcibly put cmt of a car for not passenge1·'s arm was broken In a tight begiving up his ticket ot paying his fare, when tween some drunken persons that forced
In fnct he had already surrendered his ticket their way into the car at a station near ;111
to some one employed on the train. The de- agricultural fair, and the corupuny was belt!
fendants insisted that they were not respon- responsible, because the conductor went on
flible for the misconduct of the conductor; collecting fares, aud did not stop the train
and further, that an action for an assault and expel the rioters, or demonstrate, by an
would not lle against a corporation. But the earnest etrort, that it was Impossible to do
·COUrt held otherwise, and the plalntltr recov- so.
ered.
In Flint v. Transportation Co., 34 Conn.
In Seymour v. Greenwood, 7 Hurl. & N • 554, where the plalntltT was Injured by the
.354, the plalntUr was assaulted and taken discharge of a gun dropped by some soldiers
-0ut of the defendant's omnibus by one .Jf engaged in a scuffle, the court held that pashis servants. The defendant Insisted that senger carriers are bound to exercise the uthe was not liable, because It did not appear moet vigilance and care to guard those they
that he authorized. or 88.nctloned the act of transport from violence from whatever
the servant. But It was held in the ex- source arising; and the plaintiff recovered a
~bequer chamber, aflirmlng the judgment of
verdict for '10,000.
In I...andreaux v. Bell, 5 La. 0. S. 275, t1">
the exchequer court. that the jury did right
1n returning a T'erdlct for the plalntltr.
court say, that carriers are responsible for
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the misconduct of their servants toward pas-

sengers to the same extent as for their mis-

conduct in regard to merchandise committed

to their care; that no satisfactory distinction

can be drawn between the two cases.

In Chamberlain v. Chandler, 3 Mason, 242,

Judge Story declared in language strong and

emphatic, that a passenger's contract enti-

tles him to respectful treatment; and be ex-

pressed the hope that every violation of this

right would be visited, in the shape of dam-

ages, with its appropriate punishment.

In Nieto v. Clark, 1 Cliff. 145, where the

steward of the ship assaulted and grossly in-

suited a female passenger, Judge Clifford de-

clares, in language equally emphatic, that

the contract of all passengers entitles them

to respectful treatment and protection

against rudeness and every wanton interfer-
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ence with their persons from all those in

charge of the ship; that the conduct of the

steward disqualiﬁed him for his situation,

and justiﬁed the master in immediately dis-

charging him, although the vessel was then

in a foreign port. And we have his authori-

ty for saying that he has recently examined

the question with care, in a case pending

in the lthode Island district, where the clerk

of a steamboat unjustiiiably assaulted and

maltreated a passenger, and that he enter-

tains no doubt of the carrier's liability to

compensate the passenger for the injury thus

received, whether the carrier previously au-

thorized or subsequently ratiﬁed the assault

or not. A report of the case will soon be

published. See 3 Cliff.
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the misconduct of their servants toward passengers to the same extent as for their misconduct In regard to merchandise committed
to their care; that no satisfactory distinction
can be drawn between the two cases.
In Chamberlain v. Chandler, 3 Mason, 242,
Judge Story declared In language strong and
emphatic, that a passenger's contract entitles him to respectful treatment; and he ex)lressed the hope that every violation of this
right would be visited, In the shape of damages, with Its appropriate punishment.
In Nieto v. Clark, 1 Clilf. 145, where the
steward of the ship assaulted and grossly insulted a female passenger, Judge Clifford '1ec:Ia1-es, In language equally emphatic, that
the contract of all passengers entitles them
to respectful treatment a.nd prot~tlon
ngalnst rudeness and every wanton Interference with their persons from all tllose In
charge of the ship; that the conduct of the
steward disqualified hfm tor his situation,
and justified the master In Immediately discharging him, although the vessel was th1m
In a foreign port. And we have his authority tor saying that he has recently examined
the question with care, in a case pending
In tile Rhode Island distrlct, where the clerk
of a steamboat unjustifiably assaulted and
maltreated a passenger, and that be entertains no doubt of the carrier's liability to
<·ompensate the passenger for the injury thus
i-ecel;ed, whether the carrier previously authorized or subsequently ratified the assault
or not. A report of the case wlll soon be
lJUblished. See 3 Cliff.
Aud a recent and well-considered case In
lf:aryland (published since this case has been
'pending before the law court, and very much
like it In all respects), fully sustains this
view of the law. Ilnih'Ond Co. v. Blocher,
27 l\ld. 2i7.

And a recent and well-considered case in

Maryland (published since this case has been

‘pending before the law court, and very much

like it in all respects), fully sustains this

view of the law. Railroad Co. v. Blocher,

27 Md. 277.

The grounds of the carrler's liability may

be brieﬂy stated thus:

The law requires the common carrier of

passengers to exercise the highest degree of

care that human judgment and foresight are

capable of, to make his passenger's journey

safe. Whoever engages in the business im-

pliedly promises that his passenger shall

have this degree of care. In other words.

the carrier is conclusively presumed to have

promised to do what, under the circumstan-

ces, the law requires him to do. We say

conclusively presumed, for the law will not

allow the carrier by notice or special con-

tract even to deprive his passenger of this

degree of care. If the passenger does not

have such care, but on the contrary is un-

lawfully assaulted and insulted by one of the

very persons to whom his conveyance is in-

trusted, the carrier's implied promise is bro-

ken, and his legal duty is left unperformed,

and he is necessarily responsible to the pas-

senger for the damages he thereby sustains.

The passenger's remedy may be either in

assumpsit or tort. at his election. In the

one case, ne relies upon a breach of the

'rhe grounds of the carrier's liability may
be brlelly stated thus:
The law requires the common carrier of
pnssengel's to exercise the highest degree or
care thllt human judgment and foresight are
eapnble of, to make his pasaenger's journey
safe. 'Vhoever engages In the business Impliedly 1>romlses that bis passenger sball
huve this degree of care. In other words,
the <'llrrler ls concluslvely presumed to have
promised to do what, under the clrcumstnnecs, the law requires him to do. We say
condusively presumed, for the law wlll not
allow the ca1·rier by notice or special contract even to deprive his passenger of this
clegree ot ca1-e. It the passenger does not
have such care, but on the contrary ls unlawfully assaulted and Insulted by one or the
vm·y persons to whom hls con;eyance ls lntnisted, the carrier's implied promise ls bro·
ken, and bis legal duty Is left unperformed,
and he ls necessarily responsible to the passenger for the damages he thereby sustains.
The passenger's remedy may be either ln
assumpslt or tort, at hls election. In the
QBe case, ile relies upon a breach ot the

carrier's common-law duty ln support of hl.11
action; In the other, upon a brench of hls
Implied promise. The form of the action ls
important only upon the question of damages. In actions of assumpslt, the damages
are ge~rally limited to compensation. ln
actions of tort, the jury a.re allowed greater
latitude, and, in proper cases, may give exemplary damages.
II. ·we now come to the second b1imch ..if
the case. What Is the measure of relief
which the law secures to the Injured party~
or, In other words, can he reco'\"er exemplary
damages? We hold that he ean. The right
of the jury to give exemplary damages for
lnju1·ies wantonly, recklessly, or mallclousl.v
lntllcted, ls as old as the right of ti·ial by
jury itself; and is not, as many seem to supi;ose, an Innovation upon tile rules of thecommon law. It was settled In Englan<l
more than a century ago.
In 1763, Lord Chief Justice Pratt (afterwards Enrl of Camden), with whom the other judges concurred, declare<! that the jury
had done right In giving exemplary damages.
Huckle v. Money, 2 Wlls. 20::>.
In anothei· cnse the same leamed juclgedeclared with emphasis, that damages arP.deslgned not only as a satisfaction to the Injured person, but llkewlse as a punishment
to tbe guilty. 5 Camp. Lives Chan. (AnL
Ed.) p. 214.
·In 1814, the doctrine ot punitive damagf!s·
was stringently applied In a C'nse where tl1e
defendant, in a state of intoxication, foret!d
himself into the plaintiff's company, and Insolently pe1·Risted In hunting upon his
grounds. The plalntlfT recon~red a verdict
for five huodroo pounds, the full amount of' •
his ad damnum, and tile court refuse<! to.
et It aside. Mr. Justice Heath remarked
In this case that he remembered a case whercthe jury gave five hundred pounds for merely knocking a man's hat ofT, and the court
efused a new trial. It goes, said he, to prevent the practiC'e of dueling, It juries are·
permitted to punlsh Insult by exemplary
damages. Merest v. Harvey, 5 Taunt. 442.
Sc>e, al!lo, to the same effect. Sears v. Lyon ..
' 2 Starkie, 317 (decided In 1818).
In 1844, Lord Chief Baron Pollock said, that
in actions for malicious injuries, juries had
always been allowed to give what are called:
vlndll•tlve damages. Doc v. Fllllter, 13 Mees.
1

I

&

w.

50.

In 1858, In an action of trespass for tak-lng personal property on a fraudulent bill
of sale, the defendant's counsel contended
that It was not a case for the application
of tbe· doctrine of exemplary damages; but
the court held otherwise. No doubt, said'
Pollock, C. B., it w~s a case in which vindictive <lamai:es might be gh·eo. Thomas v.
Harris. 3 Hurl. & N. 961.
In 1800, In an action for willful negligence,
the defendant contended that the plaintiff's
declaration was too defcetlve to entitle blm
to exemplary damage~ but the court held
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otherwise; and the judge who tried the case

remarked that he was glad the court had

come to the conclusion that it was competent

for the jury to give exemplary damages, for

he thought the defendant had acted with a

high hand. Emblen v. Myers, 6 Hurl. & N.

54.

"Damages exemplary," is now a familiar

title in the best English law reports. See

6 Hurl. & N. 969.

It was the ﬁrmness with which Lord Cam-

den (then Chief Justice Pratt) maintained and

enforced the right of the jury to punish with

exemplary damages the agents of Lord Hal-

ifax (then secretary of state) for the illegal

arrest of the publishers of the North Briton,

tint made him so immensely popular in Eng-

land. Nearly or quite twenty of those cases

appear to have been tried before him, in all
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of which enormous damages were given, and

in not one of them was the verdict set aside.

In one of the cases a verdict for a thousand

pounds was returned for a mere nominal im-

prisonment at the house of the oiﬁcer mak-

ing the arrest, and the court refused to set it

aside. Beardmore v. Carrington, 2 Wils.

244. >

“After this," says Lord Campbell, in his

Lives of the Chancellors, "he became the

idol of the nation. Grim representations of

him laid down the law from sign-posts, many

busts and prints of him were sold not only

in the streets of the metropolis, but in the

provincial towns; a ﬁne portrait of him, by

Sir Joshua Reynolds, with the ﬂattering in-

scription, ‘in honor of the zealous asserter

of English liberty by law,' was placed in

the gulldhali of the city of London; ad-

dresses of thanks to him poured in from all

quarters; and one of the sights of London,

which foreigners went to see, was the great

Lord Chief Justice Pratt."

In this country, perhaps Lord Camden is

better known as one of the able English

statesmen who so eloquently defended the

American colonies against the unjust claim

of the mother country to tax them. Lord Camp-

bell says some portions of his speeches upon

that subject are still in the mouths of school-

boys. But in England his immense popularity

originated in his ﬁrm and vigorous enforce-

ment of the doctrine of exemplary damages.

And we cannot discover that the legality of

his rulings in this particular was ever seri-

ously called in question. On the contrary,

we ﬁnd it admitted by his political opponents

that he was a profound jurist and an able and

upright judge. His stringent enforcement of

the right of the jury to punish ﬂagrant

wrongs with exemplary damages, arrested

not only great abuses then existing, but it

has had a salutary inﬂuence ever since. It

won for him the title'of the “asserter of

English liberty by law."

In this country the right of the jury to

give exemplary damages has been much dis-

cussed. It seems to have been ﬁrst opposed

by Mr. Theron Metculf (afterwards reporter

otherwise; and the judge who tried the case
remarked that he was glad the court had
come to thE' conclusion that It was competent
for the Jory to give exemplary damages, for
be thought the defendant had acted with a
lllgh hand. Emblen v. Myers, 6 Hurl & N.
M.

'"Damages exemplary," ls now a familiar
title In the best English law repo1·ts. See
6 Hurl. & N. 009.
It waa the firmness with which Lot·d Camden (then Chief Justice Pratt) maintained and
enforced the right of the jury to punish with
exemplary damages the agents of Lord Halifax (then aecretary of Btate) for the lllegal
arrest of the publlahera of the North Briton,
that made him so Immensely popular In England. Nearly or quite twenty ot those cases
appear to have been tried before him, ln all
of which enormous damages were given, and
Jn not one of them was the verdict set aside.
In one of the casei a verdict tor a thousand
JlOunda was returned tor a mere nominal lml'rlsonment at the house of the oftlcer making the arrest, and the court retulled to set It
aside. Beardmore v. Carrington, 2 Wlla.
!!44.

"After this," says Lord Campbell, In his
IJvea of the Chanrellors, "be became the
idol or the nation. Grim representations of
him laid down the law from sign-posts, many
busts and print.a of him were sold not only
in the streets of the metropolis, but In the
11rovlnclal towns; a ftne portrait of him, by
141r Joshua Reynolds, with the ftatterlng Inscription, 'in honor of the zealous asserter
of English liberty by Jaw,' was placed In
the guildhall of the city of London; adtlresses of thanks to him poured In from all
quartel"S; and one of the sights of London,
which forelgnen11 went to see, was the great
I..ord Chief Justice Pratt."
In this country, perh&Ps Lord Camden ls
better known as one or the able English
statesm·e n who so eloquently defended the
American colonies against the unjust claim
or the mother country to tax them. Lord Campbell says some portions of his speeches upon
that subject are still In the mouths of AChoolboys. But In England his Immense popularity
originated In his drm and vigorous enforcement of the doctrine of exemplary damages.
And we cannot discover that the legality of
his rulings In this particular was ever seriously called In question. On the contrary,
we find It admitted by his political opponents
that be was a profound jurist and an able and
upright judge. His stringent enforcement of
the right of the jury to punish fiagrant
wrongs with exemplary damages, a1Tested
not only great abuses then existing, but It
has bad a salutary Influence ever since. It
won for him the title · of the "asserter of
English liberty by Jaw."
In this country the l'ight or t1'e jury to
give exemplary damages bas been much discussed It seems to have been first opposed
by :Ur. Theron Metcalf \aftel'wards l'eporter

87

aQ61 judge of the supreme com1 of Massachusetts), m an article published In 3 Am. Jur.
387, in 1830. The substance of this article
waa afterwards Inserted In a oote to Mr.
Greenleaf'& work on Evidence. Mr. Sedgwick, in bis work on Damages, took the opposite view, and sustained his position by
the citation of numerous authorities. Professor Greenleaf replied In an article In 9
Bost. Law Rep. 629. Mr. Sedgwick rejoined
in the same periodical (volume 10, p. 49).
Essays on different sides or the question
were also published In 3 Am. Law Mag. N.
S. 537, and -i Am. Law Mag. N. S. 61. But
notwithstanding this formidable opposition,
the doctrine triumphed, and must be regarded u now too firmly established to be shaken
by anything short or legislative enactments.
In tact the decl!!lons of the courts are nearly
unanimous in Us favor.
In a case ln the supreme court of the
United States, Mr. Justice Grier, In delivering
the opinion of the court, says, It Is a wellestabllshed principle or the common law, that
In all actions for torts the jury may lnftlct
what are called punitive or exemplary damages, having in view the enormity of the
offense rather than the measure or compensation to the plaintiff. "We are aware,'' the
judge continues, "that the propriety of this
doctrine bas been questioned by Rome writers;
but If repeated judicial decisions for more
than a century are to be received as the
best exposition of what the law ls, the question will not admit of argument." Day v.
Woodworth, 13 How. 363.
In a case In North Carolina, the court refer
to the note In Professor Greenleaf's work on
Evidence, ana say that It ls very clearly wrong
with respect to the authorities; and ln their
judgment wrong on principle; that It Is fortunate that while juries endeavor to give ample
compensation for the Injury actually received,
they are also allowed Ruch full discretion as
to make verdicts to deter others from ftagmnt violations or social duty. And the
same court hold that the wealth of the defendant Is a proper circumstance to be weighed by the jury, because a thousand dollars
may be a Iese punishment to one man than
a hundred dollars to another. In one cnFe
the same court sustained a verdict which In
terms assessed the actual damages at $100,
and the exemplary damages at $1,000. 'l'he
court held It was a good verdict for $1,100.
Penrllcton v. Davis, 1 Jones (~. C.) :J8; :McAulay v. Birkhead, 13 Ired. 28; Gilreath v.
Allen, 10 Ired. G7.
In fact, Professor Greenleaf Is himself nn\
authol'lty for the doctrine of exemplary dam- ;
ages. Speaking of the action for assault and
battery, he says the jury are not confined to
the mere corporal lnjmy, bnt may consider the
malice of the defemlant, the insulting character of his conduct, the rank lu life of the
several parties. and all the circumstances of
the outrn~e. and therE>npon nwanl such extmplary damages as the circumstances may
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in their judgment require. 2 Greenl. Ev. §.89.

But if the great weight of Professor Green-

ieaf's authority were to be regarded as op-

posed to the doctrine, we have, on the other

hand. the great weight of Chancellor Kent's

opinion in favor of it. He says, surely this

is the true and salutary doctrine. And after

reviewing the English cases, he continues by

-saying it cannot be necessary to multiply in-

stances of its application; that it is too well

settled in practice, and too valuable in prin-

ciple to be called in question. Tillotson v.

Chcetham, 3 Johns. 56, 6~i.

This brief review of the doctrine of ex-

emplary damages is not so much for the pur-

pose of establishing its existence, as to cor-

rect the erroneous impression which some
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member of the legal profession still seem to

entertain. that it is a modern invention, not

sanctioned by the rules of the common law.

We think every candid-minded person must

admit that it is no new doctrine; that its ex-

istence as a fundamental rule of the common

law has been recognized in England for more

than a century; that it has been there strin-

gently enforced under circumstances which

would not have allowed it to pass unchal-

lenged, if any pretext could have been found

for doubting its validity; and that in this

country, notwithstanding an early and vig-

orous opposition, it has steadily progressed,

and that the decisions of the courts are now

nearly unanimous in its favor. It was sanc-

tioned in this state, after a careful and full

review of the authorities, in Pike v. Dilling,

48 Me. 539, and cannot now be regarded as

an open question.

But it is said that if the doctrine of ex-

emplary damages must be regarded as es-

tablished in suits against it3t}_ural_’pe_r§p_n§

for their own willful and malicious torts, it

ought ngt_;,to be applied to coi_"p_o_t;at_igps for

the torts of their servants, especially where

the tort is committed by a servant of so low

a grade as a brakeman on a railway train,

and the tortious act was not directly nor im-

pliedly authorized nor ratiﬁed by the corpora-

tion; and several cases are cited by the defend-

ants' counsel, in which the courts seem to

have taken this view of the law; but we

have carefully examined these cases, and in

none of them was there any evidence that the

servant acted wantonly or maliciously; they

were simply cases of mistaken duty; and

what these same courts would have done if

a case of such gross and outrageous insult had

been before them, as is now before us, it is

impossible to say; and long experience has

shown that nothing is more dangerous than

to rely upon the abstract reasoning of courts,

when the cases before them did not call for

the application of the doctrines which their

reasoning is intended to establish.

We have given to this objection much con-

sideration, as lt was our duty to do, for the

presiding judge declined to instruct the jury
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In their judgment require. 2 Greenl. Ev. t .89. thorlzed nor ratified by the defendant, the
But lf"the great weight of Professor Green- plalntlft' could not recover exempL1ry dam:eaf's authority were to be regarded as op· ages. We cont'~ that It seems to us that
posed to the doctrine, we have, on the other there ls no claBB of Clll!es where the doctrine
hand, the great weight of Chancellor Kent's of exemplary damages can be more benedopinlon in favor of lt. He says, surely this cially applied than to railroad corporations
ls the true and salutary doctrine. And after In their capacity of common can-lers of pasreviewing the English cases, be continues by sengers; and lt might as well not be applied
,saying lt cannot be necessary to multiply ln· to them at all as to limit Us application to
stances of Its application; that lt ls too well cases where the servant ls directly or lmsettled in practice, and too valuable In prln· pliedly commanded by the corporation to
clple to be called In question. Tlllotson v. maltreat and Insult a passenger, or to cases
Cheetham, 3 Johns. 56, 64.
where such an act is directly or lmplledTbls brief review of the doctrine of ex- ly ratified; for no such cases wlll ever ocemplary damages Is not so much for the pur- cur. A corporation is an Imaginary being.
pose of establishing Its existence, as to cor- It has no mlnd but the mind of its servants;
rect the erroneous Impression which some It has no voice but the voice of lts servants;
members of the legal profession stlll seem to and It has no hands with which to act but
entertain, that it Is a modern invention, not the hands of Its servants. All its Rchemes of
sanctioned by the rules of the common law. mischief, as well as its schemes of public en'Ve think every candid-minded person must terprlse, are conceived by human minds and
admit that it ls no new doctrine; that lts ex- executed by human hands; and these minds
lstence as a fundamental rule of the common and bands are Its servants' minds and hands.
law has been recognized in England for more All attempts, therefore, to distinguish betban a century; that It hns been there strln- tween the gnllt of the servant and the gnllt
gently enforced under circumstances which of the corporation; or the malice ot the servwould not have allowed It to pass unchal· ant nnd the malice of the corporation; or the
len~ed. It any pretext could have been found
punishment of the servant and the punishfor doubting Its validity; and that In this ment of the corporation, ls sheer nonsense;
country, notwithstanding an early and vlg- and only tends to confuse the mind and conorous opposition, It has steadily progressed, found the Judgment. Neither guilt, malice,
and that the decisions of the courts are now nor suffering 18 predicable of this ideal exnearly unanimous in lts favor. It was sane- . lstence, called a corporation. And yet under
tloned In this state, after a careful and full cover of lts name and authority, there ls in
review of the authorities, In Pike v. Dilling, fact as much wickedness, and as much that
48 Me. 539, and cannot now be regarded as ls deserving of punishment, as can be found
an open. question.
anywhere else. And since these ideal exlstBut It ls said that if the doctrine of ex- ences can neither be hung, Imprisoned, whlpemplary damages must be regarded as es- ped, or put In the stocks,-elnce in fact no
tabllshed in suits &ga!nst l!!!.t.m"al ~ corrective lnfiuence can be brought to bear
for their own wlllful and mallcloustOrts, ft upon them except that ot pecuniary loss,-lt
ought _!!QL to be applied to coryoratl@S for does seem t.o us that the doctrine of exemthe torts of their se1·vants, especially where plary damages ls more beneficial In its apthe tort ls committed by a servant of 8<> low pllcatlon to them, than in its application to
a grade as a brakeman on a rallwllf train, natural persons. If those who are in the
and the tortious act was not directly nor Im- habit of thinking that It la a terrible hardpliedly authorized nor ratified by the corpora- ship to punish an innocent corporation for
tlon; nnd several cases are·clted by· the defend- the wickedness of its agents and servants,
ants' counsel, in which the courts seem to wm for a moment reflect upon the absurdity
have taken this view of the law; but we of their own thoughts, their anxiety wlll be
have carefully examined these cases, and In cured. Careful engineers can be selected
none of them was there any evidence that the who will not run their trains into open draws;
servant acted wantonly or mallclously; they and careful baggage men can be secured,
were simply cases of mistaken duty; and who will not handle and smash trunks and
what these same courts would have done If band-boxes as is now the universal custom;
a case of such gross and outra~eons Insult had and conductors and brakemen can be had
been before them, as ls now before us, It ls who wlll not assault and Insult passengers;
impossible to say; and long experience has and it the courts will only let the verdicts
shown that nothing ls more dangerous than of upright and lntelllgent Juries alone, and
to rely upon the abstract reasoning of courts, let the doctrine of exemplary damages have
when the cases before them did not call for Its legitimate lnfiuence, we prP.dlct these
the application of the doctrines which their great and growing evlls wlll be very much
rensonlng ls intended to establish.
lessened, If not entirely cured. There ls but
We have given to this objection much con- one vulnerable point about these ldool exlstslderatlou, as It was our duty to do, for the encee, called corporations; and that ls, the
presiding judge declined to Instruct the jury pocket of the monled power that Is concealed
that lf the acts and words of the defendants' behln.d them; and If that Is reached they will
servant were not directly nor impliedly au- wince. When It ls thoroughly understood
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carelessness,

that it is not proﬁtable to employ careless

and indifferent agents, or reckless and inso-

lent servants, better men will take their pla-

ces, and not before.

It is our judgment, therefore, that actions

against corporations, for the willful and ma-

licious acts of their agents and servants in

executing the business of the corporation,

should not form exceptions to the rule allow-

ing exemplary damages. On the cont1ary,

we think this is the very class of cases, of

-all others, where it will do the most good,

and where it is most needed. And in this

conclusion we are sustained by several of the

ablest courts in the country.

In a case in Mississippi, the plaintiff was

carried four hundred yards beyond the sta-

tion where he had told the conductor he

wished to stop; and he requested the con-

Generated for facpubupdates (University of Michigan) on 2014-06-12 19:20 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/mdp.35112105421491
Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd-google

ductor to run the train back, but the conduct-

or refused, and told the plaintiff to get off

the train or he would carry him to the next

station. The plaintiff got ofi. and walked

back, carrying his valise in his hand. The

plaintiff testiﬁed that the conductors manner

toward him was insolent, and the defendants

having refused to discharge him, the jury re-

turned a verdict t'or four thousand ﬁve hun-

dred dollars, and the court refused to set it

aside. They said the right of the jury to

protect the public by punitive oamages. and

thus prevent these great public blessings

from being converted into the most danger-

ous nuisances, was conclusively settled; and

they hoped the verdict would have a salu-

tary inﬂuence upon their future management.

Railroad Co. v. Hurst, 36 Miss. 660.

In New Hampshire, in an action against

this identical road, where, through gross

there was a collision of the

passenger train with a freight train, and the

plaintiff was thereby injured, the judge at

nisi prins instructed the jury that it was a

proper case for exemplary damages; and the

full court sustained the ruling, saying it

was a subject in which all the traveling pub-

iic were deeply interested; that railroads had

practically monopolized the transportation

of passengers on all the principal lines of

travel, and there ought to be no lax adminis-

tration of the law in such cases; and that it

would be diﬁﬁcuit to suggest a case more loud-

ly calling for an exemplary verdict. (If mere

carelessness, however gross, calls loudly for

an exemplary verdict, what shall be said of

an injury that is willful and grossly insult-

ing?) Hopkins v. Railroad Co., 36 N. H. 9.

Judge Rediield, in his very able and useful

work on Railways, expresses the opinion

that there is quite as much necessity ‘for

holding these companies liable to exemplary

damages as their agents. He says it is dlﬂl-

cult to perceive why a passenger, who suffers

indignity and insult from the conductor of

a train, should be compelled to show an ac-

tual ratiﬁcation of the act, in order to sub-

ject the company to exemplary damages. 2

Redf. R. R. 231, note. But if such a ratiﬁ-

that It ls not profitable to employ careless
and lndUferent agents. or reckless and lnso-

. lent servants, better men wW take their places, and not before.
It ls our judgment, therefore, that actions
against corporations, tor tbe willful and ma. llclous acts or their agents and servants In
executing the business or the corporation,
ahould not torm exceptions to the rule allowing exemplary damnges. On the contrary,
we think this ls the very class or cases, ot
. all others, where It wm do the most good,
and where It ls most needed. And ln this
conclusion we are sustained by several or the
ablest courts In the country.
In & case In Ml1!8lsslppl, the plalntllf was
carried four hundred yards beyond the station where he had told the conductor he
wished to stop; and he requested the conductor to rnn the train back, but the conductor refused, and told the plalntltr to get otr
the train or he would carry him to the next
station. The plalntltr got otr &nd walked
back, c&rrylng his valise In his hand. The
plalntltr testified that the conductor's manner
toward him wBB Insolent, and the defendants
having refused to discharge him, the jury re. turne<l a \•erdlct tor tour thousand five hundred dollars, and the court refuse<l to set It
ulde. They said the right of the jury to
protect the public by punitive aamages, and
thua prevent these great public blessings
from being converted Into the most dangerous nuisances, was conclusively settled; and
they hoped the verdict would have a salutary Influence upon their future management.
Railroad Co. v. Hurst, 36 Miss. 660.
In New Hampshire, In &n action ag&lnst
thla Identical road, where, through gross
·carelessnees, there was a collision ot the
passenger train with a freight train, and the
plalntltr was thereby Injured, the judge at
nlsl prlus Instructed the jury that lt was a
proper case tor exemplary damages; and the
run court sustained the ruling, saying It
was a subject In which all the traveling public were deeply Interested; that rallroa$1R had
practically monopolized the transporta tlon
of passengers on all the principal lines of
travel, and there ought to be no lax administration of the law In such cases; and that It
would be dlfticult to BUgJtest a case more loudly calling tor an exemplary verdict. (It mere
carelessness, however gross, calls loudly for
an exemplary verdict, what shall be said of
an Injury that ls willful nnd grossly Insulting?) Hopkins v. Ratlrood Co., 36 N. H. 9.
Judge Redfield, In bis very able and useful
work on Railways, expresses the opinion
that there Is quite aa much necessity "tor
holding these companies llnble to exemplary
damages as their agents. He says It t.s dlfti·
cult to perceive why a passenger, who suffers
Indignity and Insult from the conductor of
a train, should be compelled to show an actual ratlftrotlon of the act, In order to subject the rompaoy to exemplary damages. 2
Redt. R. R. 231, note. But If such a rntlft·
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cation ls necessary, be thinks the corporation. which ls a mere legal entity, Inappreciable to 8ell8e, should be regarded as always
pt'\!Seot In the person of Its servant, and as
directing and ratifying the servant's nets
within the scope of his employment, nnd thus
be made responsible for his willful misconduct. 1 Redf. R. R. 515 et se.1.
And In a recent COiie ln :\larylnnd (published since this case bas been pending before
the law court), a c:ase In all respects Yery
similar to the one we are now considering.
the presiding judge was requested to Instruct
the jury that the plalntltr WM not entltleil
to recover vindictive or punitive damages
trom the defendants, unless they expressly
or Impliedly participated In the tortious act,
authorizing It before or approving It after It
was committed; but the presiding justice
refused so to Instruct the jury, and the full
court held that the request wns properly l'ejected; that It was sl'ttll'd that where the
Injury for which compen!llltlon In damages
Is sought, ls accompanied by force or malice,
the Injured party Is entitled ti> recover cxem·
plary 1lamages. Railroad Co. v. Blocher, 27
Md. 277.
But the defendants say that the damages
awarded by the jury are excessive, and they
move to have the verdict set Mlde and a
new trial granted for that reason. That the
verdict In this case ls highly punitive, and
was so designed by the jury, cannot be doubted; but by whose judgment ls It to be meas·
ured to determine whether or not It IR exceBl!llve? What standard shall be used? It
ls a. case of want.<>n Insult and Injury to
the plalntltr's character, and feelings of selfrespect, and the damages can be measured
by no property standard. It Is a. case where
the judgment will be veey · much ln1luenced
by the eethnatlon In which character, selfrespect, and freedom from Insult are held.
To those who set a. very low value on character, and think that pride and self-respect
exist only to become objects of ridicule and
sport, the damages will undoubtedly be considered excessive. It would not be strange
It some such persons, measuring the sensibilities of others by their own low standal'd,
should view this verdict with envy, and regret that somebody wW not assault and Insult them, It such ls to be the standard of
compensation. Whlle others, who feel that
character and sett-respect are above all prlc:e,
more valuable than lite Itself even, will regard the verdict as none too large. We repeat. therefore, that it 16 a case where men's
judgments will be likely to dillei". And suppose the court Is of opinion that the damages In this case nre greater, much greater
even, thnn they would have awarded, does
It therefore follow that the judgment of the
court ls to be substituted tor that of the
jury? By no means. It Is the wisdom of the
law to suppose that the judgment of the jury
ls more likely to be right than the judgment
of the court, for lt Is to the tonner an LI not
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to the latter that the duty of estimating dam-

ages is conﬁded. Unless the damages are so

large as to satisfy the court that the verdict

was not the result of an honest exercise of

judgment. they have no right to set it aside.

A careful examination of the case fails to

satisfy us that the jury acted dishonestly, or

that they made any mistake in their appli-

cation of the doctrine of exemplary dama-

ges. We have no doubt that the highly puni

tive cha1acter of their verdict is owing

the fact that, after J ackson‘s misconduct wa

known to the defendants, they still retain

him in their service. The jury undoubtedly

felt that it was due to the plaintiff, and due

to every other traveller upon that road, to

have him instantly discharged; and that to-

retain him in his place, and thus shield and

protect him against the protestation of the ,
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plaintiff, made to the servant himself at the

time of the assault, that he would lose his t

place, was a r tical ratitica/th)_'n and ap-

proval of the ::!r;lv€a_n.m()'mﬁct, and would ‘

be so understood by him and by every other -

servant on the road.

And when we consider the violent. long-

continued, and grossly insulting character of

the assault; that it was made upon a per-

son in feeble health, and was accompanied

by language so coarse, profane, and brutal;

that so far as appears it was wholly unpro-

voked; we confess we are amazed at the con-

duct of the defendants in not instantly dis-

charging Jackson. Thus to shield and pro-

tect him in his insoience, deeply implicated

them in his guilt. It was such indifference

to the treatment the plaintiff had received,

such indifference to the treatment that other

travelers might receive, such indifference to

the evil inﬂuence which such an example

would have upon the servants of this and

other lines of public travel, that we are not

prepared to say the jury acted unwisely in

making their verdict highly punitive. We

cannot help feeling that if we should inter-

fere and set it aside, our action would be

most unfortunate and detrimental to the pub-

lic interests. On the contrary, if we allow it

to stand, we cannot doubt that its inﬂuence

will be salutary. It will be an impressive

lesson to these defendants, and to the man-

agers of other lines of public travel, of the

risk they incur when they retain in their

service servants known to be reckless, ill-

mannered, and unlit for their places. And it

will encourage those who may suffer insult

and violence at the hands of such servants,

not to retaliate or attempt to become their

own avengers, as is too often done, but to

trust to the law and to the courts of jus-

tice, for the redress of their grievances. It

will say to them, be patient and law-abid-

ing, and your redress shall surely come, and

in such measure as will not add insult to

your previous injury.

On the whole, we cannot doubt that it is

best for all concerned that this verdict be

allowed to stand.

COMPENSATORY AND EXEMPLARY DAlfAGES.

to the latter that the duty of estimating damages le condded. Unless the damages are so J
large aa to aatlsty the court tba.t the verdict
was not the result of an honest exercise of
judgment, they have no right to set It aside. I
A careful examination of the ca.se falls to
satisfy us that the jury acted dishonestly, or
that they ma.de any mistake In their application of the doctrine of exemplary damages. ·we have no doubt that the highly pun3
tive chuacter of their verdict ls owing
the fact that, after JackllOll's misconduct wa
known to the defendants, they still retain
him In their service. The jury undoubtedly
felt that It was due to the plalntltr, and due
to every other traveller upon that roa.d, to
have him lnstlultly discharged; and that toretain him In hie place, and thus shield and
protect him against the protestation of the
plalntltr, made to the servant himself at the
time or the assault, that he would lose his
place, was a practical_raugc~1 and approval of the servant's con uct, and would
be so understood by him and by every other
servant on the road.
And when we consider the violent, longcontinued, and grossly Insulting character of
the 1UJSault; that It wu made upon a person In feeble he&lth, and was accompanied
by language so coarse, profane, and brutal;
that 80 far as appears It was wholly unprovoked; we confess we are amazed at the conduct of the defendants In not Instantly discharging Jackson. Thus to shield and prote<:t him In his insolence, deeply implicated
them in his guilt. It was such lndll'l'.erence
to the treatment the vlalnUIT had received,
such lnclllference to the treatment that other
travelers might re<:eive, such lndilference to
the evil lnduence which such an example
would have upon the sen·ants of this and
other lines of public travel, that we are not
pre1mred to say the jury acted unwisely In
waking their verdict highly punitive. We
cannot help feeling that if we should interfere and set It aside, our action wquld be
most unfortunate and detrimental to the public interests. On the contrary, it we allow 1t
to stand, we cannot doubt that its Influence
will be salutary. It will be an Impressive
lesson to these defendants, and to the managers of other lines of public travel, ot the
risk they Incur when they retain In their
service servants known to be reckless, lllruannered, and unfit for their places. And it
will encourage those who may sut1'er insult
and violence at the hands of such servants,
not to retaliate or attempt to become their
own avengers, as le too often done, but to
trust to the In w and to the courts of justice, for the redress of their grievances. It
will say to them, be patient and law-abiding, and your redress shnll surely come, and
in such measure as will not add Insult to
your previous Injury.
On the wllole, we cannot doubt that it Is
b(lst for n.11 concemed that this verdict be
allowed to st.and.

We sec nothing In the rulings or charge or
the presiding Judge, of which the defendants
can justly complain. And there la nothing
to lllltlsty us that the jury were prejudiced
or unduly biased; or that they made any
mistake either as to the tacts or the law.
Our conclusion, therefore, 18, that the exceptions and motion must be overruled.
Motion and exceptions ov~led.
APPLETON, 0. J., and DIOKERSON,
BARROWS, and DANFORTH,JJ.,concurred.
TAPLEY, J., did not concur upon the question of damages, and gave his opinion as follows:
In so much of the opinion of Mr. Justice
WALTON as determines the question of the
lla.billty of the defendants to answer In damages for the a.eta of the brakeman Jackson I
concur; but I do not concur-in sustaining the
rulings ot the court at the trial of the cause
fixing the rule of damage for the jury; and I
regard It 80 clearly wrong in principle, inequitable and unjust in practice, and so entirely wanting in precedent, that my duty requires something more than a silent dissent.
So much of the opinion as discusses the
right of a jury to give in civil actions punitive damages, I do not propose now to
view or express any opinion of or concerning,
but it ls to the application of the rule ma.de
in this case by the justice presiding at the
trial of the cause. The rulings upon this
matter are happily so clearly expressed and
positive in terms, that no reasonable doubt
concerning the proposition involved in them
can be entertained. If by .possibility any
doubt could have arisen concerning them, the
opinion he Wu! drawn in the case sets them
at rest.
The case shows that "on the subject ot
damages the presiding justice Instructed the
jury as follows: If the plalntitr has proved
his case so that he is entitled to recover
some <lnmages, the question arises howmuch.
That ls a question which you must determine, 'being guided by the rules of law as I
shall state them to you. In the drst place,
the plu.intltr le entitled to such damages as
he has actually sutrered, and In estlmuting
the amount, you will not be limited to whnt
he has lost in dollars and cents. In fact,
there ls no evidence that he l.tas sut1'cred pecunlarily to any extent. You are to conslde1·
the injury to his feelings, his wounded pride,
his wounded self-respect, his mental pain
and suffering, occasioned by the assault, and
the feeling of degradation that necessarily
resulted from It. There are few men probably that would not rather sutrer a severe
pecuniary loss than a personal and Insulting ·
assault. Hence if one man should spit in
another's face ln public, the jury would not
be limited to ten cents damages on the
ground that tllnt sum would pay him for
washing his rnre. A man's feelings, self-respect, a11tl prille of chnraeter n1·e as much un-
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der the protection of the law in such case as

his property. And in estimating the dam-

ages for a personal assault attended with

opprobrious and insulting language, the jury

have a right to consider the character and

standing of the person assaulted, and the in-

jury to his feelings, as well as the injury to

his person, and then to give him such dam-

ages as. in view of all the circumstances,

will be a just compensation for the injury

actually suffered. This amount must be left,

in every case, to the sound judgment and

discretion of the jury."

Pausing at this point of the ii1sinicli0ns,

we shall notice that they embrace all the el-

ements of compensatory damages recognized

by courts of the most liberal views in thme

matters; and embrace elements which many

courts denominatc exemplary; and they are

stated in so clear and concise a manner, and
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accompanied by so forcible an illustration,

that had they stopped at this point the plain-

tiff might well have expected his verdict to

cover the utmost his injuries would war-

rant. With the rule thus far I am content,

although carrying it to the very verge and

utmost limit of precedent. 1 call attention

to it at this point to show that the jury had,

at this time, instructions which covered all

the tangible and intangible elements of as-

sessment in such cases. Instructions which

if adhered to and followed by the jury re-

store him to the condition in which the as-

saulting party found him, so far as money

can do it. Under these instructions he is to

be made whole in the eyes of the law, just

as if the injury had not been done; in every

particular compensated so far as money can

do it; what is done beyond is not to com-

pensate, it is not to meet mere speculative or

intangible injuries, is not to give him any-

thing due him. for he has his full desert.

These elements reach everything he, as an

individual, can claim by reason of any in-

fringement of his rights.

These instructions having been given, so

full, clear, and liberal, the presiding judge

proceeds to give the next element of damage,

which has not for its basis any injury, inva-

sion of right or privilege, discomfort, incon-

venience, or indeed anything relating to the

plaintiff, or anything in which he has any in-

terest above that possessed by every other

member of the community. It is not act or

deed, word or menace,—these have all been

adjusted; but it is mere motive, thought, in-

terest, and secret desire. Being evil, mor-

ally wrong, somebody must be punished for

their existence, and the judge says:

“There is also another important rule of

law bearing upon the question of damages.

if the injury was wanton, malicious, com-

mitted in reckless and willful disregard of

the rights of the injured party, the law al-

lows the jury to give what is called punitory

or exemplary damages. It blends the inter-

ests of the injured party with those of the

public, and permits the jury not only to give

damages suﬂicient to compensate the plain-

EXl·~llPLARY

dt•r the prote<:tlou of the law ln such case as
his property. Ami ln estimating the damages for a personal aesault _attended with
opprobrlons and insulting language, the jury
have a right to consider the character and
~tandlng of the perBOn &a11&ulted, and the injury to his feelings, as well as the injury to
his 1ier110n, and then to give him such damages as. In view of all the clrcumstan<.-es,
will be a just compensation for the injury
actually sutrered. This amount must be left,
in every case, to the sound judgment and
discretion of the jury."
Pawiing at this point of the instructions,
we llhall notice that they embrace all the elements of compeDB&tory damages recognized
by courts of the most liberal views ln thtWe
matters; and embrace elements which many
courts denominate exemplary; and they are
stated ln so clear and concise a manner, and
aCCQlllpanled by l!Kl forcible an lllwrtratlon,
that bad they stopped at this point the plaintiff might well have expected Ws verdict to
cover the utmost hls injuries would warrant. With the rule thus far I am con~nt,
although carrying lt to the very verge and
utmost limit of precedent. l call attention
to it at this point to show that the jury luid,
at this time, lnstructlons which covered all
the tllllglble and intangible elements of u8e88Dlent In such clUle&. Instructions which
if adhered to and followed by the jury restore him to the condition In which the assaulting party found him, so far as money
can do It. Under these instructions be ls to
be made whole In the eyes of the law, just
as if the Injury had not been done; In every
Il8.rtlcular compensnted 80 far as money can
do It; what Is done bevond ls not to compensate, lt Is not to meet mere speculative or
Intangible injuries, Is not to give him anything due hlm. for he has llls full desert.
These elements reach everything h<', as an
individual, can claim by reason of any Infringement of his rights.
Theee instructions having been given, eo
full, clear, and liberal, the presiding judge
proceeds to give the next element of damage,
which bns not for lts basis any Injury, Invasion of right or privilege, discomfort, inconvenience, or Indeed anything relating to the
plalntllf, or anything In which he has any Interest above that possessed by every other
member of the community. It Is not act or
deed, word or menace,-these have all been
adjusted; but lt la mere motive, thought, Interest, and eecret desire. Being evil, morally wrong, somebody must be punished for
their existence, and the judge says:
"There Is also another Important rule of
law beo1ing upon the question of damages.
If the injury was wanton, mallcious, committed ln reckless and willful disregard of
the rights of the Injured pnrty, the law allows the jury to give what ls called punltory
or exemplary damages. It blends the inter(!Sts of the Injured party with those of the
public, and permits the jury not only to give
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damages sufficient to compensate the plaintltr, but also to punish the defendants. l
feel It my duty, however, to say, that you
ought to be very cautious ln the application
of this rule. The law does not re'qulre you
to give exemplary damages In any case, and
where the damages which the plaintiff ls entitled to recover ln order to compensate hlm
for the Injury be has actually sulfered ls
eutttclent to punish the defendants, and serve
as a warning and example to others, the jury
ought not to give morP. But If they think
lt Is not enough, then the law allows them
to add such further sum as wlll mfl'ke it
enough for that purpose. But they should
be careful In ftxlng the amount not to allow
more than Is just and ree.sonable, and not
to allow their judgment to be swerved by
their passions. Defendants' counsel req\H~t
ed the pre11ldlng judge to instruct the jury,
that the plalntltf is not entitled to recover
against the defendant company, any greater
damages than he might against Jackson
himself, for the same cause of action upon
similar evidence. Upon which request the
presiding judge stated to the jury: I decline to give you such Instruction. I hu,·e
endea'l'ored to give you the correct rules by
which the damages, If any, are to be assessed ln this case; and I think you cannot
rightfully be required to enter Into a consideration of the damagetl which a party not
now before the court, and has not therefore
had an opportunity to be heard, ought to
pay, and then measure the damages In this
cnse which has been bee.rd, by those which
you think ought to be jwit In another which
has not been heard; we wlll endeavor to decide this case right now, and when Jackson"s
case comes before us, If lt ever <loes, we wlll
endeavor to decide that right.
"Defendants' counsel further requested the
presiding judge to Instruct the jury, that If
the jury find that the acts nnd words of
Jackson were not directly nor impliedly authorized, nor ratified by the defendants, then
the plalntUf ls not ln any event entitled to
recover vindictive damages against the defendants, nor damages In the nature of
smart-money, which request was not compiled with, the presiding judge having nlready Instructed the jury upon what state
of facts the plnlntltf would be entitled to
such damages."
I have copied all the instructions "on the
subject of damages." It will be seen toot
these latter instructions are substantially
that the jury having given full compensatory damages, may give others ln their discretion to punish these defendants for the
wanton, wlll!ul, and malicious act of their
brakeman In assaulting a passenger, althou~h they neither directly nor Impliedly authorized or ratified the act.
This proposition must he sustained, lf at
all, upon one of two grounds; either that lt
ls competent to punish one man for the criminal Intent of another, or that the malice of
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the brakcman in this case was that of the de-

fendant corporation.

A brief notice of some of the authorities

touching the liability of the master for the

acts of his servant will, I think, show the

ground of liability, the reason for the rule,

and exhibit a marked distinction between the

ordinary case of master and servant and the

case at bar.

In 2 Dane, Abr. c. 59, art. 2, it is said:

“The master is not liable for the willful,

voluntary, or furious act of his servant."

“If my servant distrain a horse lawfully by

my order, and then use him, this conversion

is his act, and trover lies against him; for

my order extends only to distraining the

horse, and not to using him; this is his own

act." - >

“Nor is the master bound for the volun-
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tary acts of his servants; for if he be bound,

servants may ruin their masters by willful

acts; nor are willful acts, wrongs author-

ized by their masters."

“If I order my servant to do what is law-

ful, and he does more, he only is liable; it

is his own act, otherwise he might ruin me,

and in such case there can be no express or

implied command from me for what he does

beyond his orders; and whenever the ques-

tion is how far-the master is liable for his

servant's acts, the material inquiry must be,

how far he expressly or impliedly author-

ized it."

“The master is liable for the negligent act

of his servant, but not for his willful wrong;

is liable in trover; for which rule several

reasons may be given: (1) A willful wrong

is the servant's own act. (2) To allow him

by his willful tortious act to bind his master

and subject him to damages, would be to al- '

low servants a, power to ruin their masters.

(3) In such cases there is no command from

the master expressed or implied to do a will-

ful wrong."

In 4 Bac. Abr. tit. “Master and Servant,"

it is said: “The master must also answer

for torts, and injuries done by his servant

in the execution of his authority. But

though a master is answerable for damages

occasioned by the negligence or unskillful-

ness of his servant acting in the execution of

his orders, yet he is not answerable in tres-

pass for the willful act of his servant done

in his absence, and without his direction or

assent."

Chancellor Kent says: “The master is on-

ly answerable for the fraud of his servant

while he is acting in his business, and not

for fraudulent or tortious acts, or misconduct ‘

in those things which do not concern his duty

to his master, and which when he commits,

he steps out of the course of his service.

But it was considered in l\IcManus v.

Cricket, 1 East, 106, to be a question of great

concern and of much doubt and uncertainty,

whether the master was answerable in dam-

ages for an injury willfully committed by

his servant while in the performance of his

COMPENSATORY AND EXI-:llPLARY DAM.AGES.

the brakeman ln this cnse was that of the de- maste1·'s business, without the direction or
assent of the master. The court of K. B.
fendant corporation.
A brief notice of some of the authorities went Into an e:xamlnation of all the authoritouching the liability of the master for the ties, and after much discussion and great
acts of his servant will, I think, show the consideration, with a view to put the quesground of llabillty, the reason for the rule, tion at rest, it was decided tba.t the master
and e."<hlblt a marked distinction between the was not liable In trespass for the willful act
orrlinary case of master and servant and the of his servant in driving his master's carriage against another, without his master·s
case at I.Jar.
In 2 Dane, Abr. c. 59, art_ 2, It ls satd: direction or assent. 'fhe court conslde1·ed
"The master ts not liable for the wlllful, that when the servant quitted sight of the
voluntary, or furious act Qf his servant." object for which he was en1ployed, and with"If my servant dlstraln a. horse lawfully. by out having In view bis master·s orders, pm·my order, and then use him, this conversion sued the object which his own malice sugls his act, and trover lies again.st: him; for gested, he no longer acted In pmimance or
my order extends only to dlstralning the the authority given him, and It was deemeil
horse, and not to using him; this ls his own so far a willful abandonment of bis master's
buslne11s. This case has received the sane.
act."
"Nor Is the master bound for the volun• tlon of the supreme court of l\Inst>achusetts
ta1·y acts of his servants; for It he be bound, and New York, on the ground that there was
servants may ruin their masters by wlllful no authority from the master expre11s or Imacts; n.or a1·e willful acts, wrongs autbor- plied, and the servant In that act was not In
the employment of bis mnBter."
'
lzed by their masters."
In Wright v. Wilcox, 19 Wend. 343, Cowen.
"It I order my servant to do what ls lawful, and he does more, he only is liable; It J'., who gave the opinion of the court, says:
is his own act, otherwise he might ruin me, "It the act was willful, the master ls no more
and In such case there Cllll be no express or liable than If hie servant had committed any
hnplled command from me for what he does other assault and bntte1·y. All the cases
beyond We orders; and wheneve1· the ques- agree that a man Is not liable for the willful
tion Is bow far ·the maste1· ls liable for his mischief of his servant, though he be at theservant's acts, the material inquiry must be, tlme In other respects engaged In the service
how far be expre!'SIY or Impliedly author- of the former." After citing several cases
he adds: "Why ls a master chargeable for
ized lt."
"The master Is liable for the negligent act the act of bis servant? Because what a man
of llls se1·vant, but not for his willful wrong; does by another he does by himself. The act
ls liable In trover; for which rule several ls not within the scope of bis agency." Hereasons may be given : · (1) A willful wrong says: "The authorltlee deny that when the
Is the servant's own act.· (2) To allow him servant wlllfully drives over the man, he Is
by his wlllful tortious act to bind his master in bis master's business. They held It a de'-nd subject him to damages, would be to al- parture, and going into the servant's own Inlow servants a. power to ruin their masters. dependent business."
(3) In such cases the1·~ Is no command from
In Turnpike Co. v. Vanderbilt, 1 Hill, 4811,
the muster expre11sed or lm1llled to do a will- case of a colllslon of steamboats, the suful wrong."
preme court held that If the collision waK
In 4 Bae. Abr. tit. "Master and Servant," willful on the part of the defendant's sen·it ls Bald: "The master must also answer ant, the defendant was not liable, refetTlni:
for torts, and injmles done by his servant to 'V1·lght v. WllcoL 'l'he case afterwarcl
ln the execution of his autho11ty. But went to the court of appeals (2 Com. 479)
though a master ls answerable for damages where the doctrine applied in the supreme
occasioned by the ·negligence or unskillful- I court was sanctioned; and It was further
ness of his servant acting In the execution of I held that the corporation was not liable, alhis orders, yet he ls not answerable In tres- though the willful act producing ·the Injury
pass for the willful act of bis servant done l was authorized and sanctioned by the presiIn his absence, and without bis direction or dent and general agent thereof; because a
assent."
general or special agent, when be commits or
Chancellor Kent says: "The master le on- I orders a willful trespass to be committed,
ly answerable for the fmud of his servant acts without the scope of his authority.
while he ls acting In bis business, and not
In Hibbard v. Ualkoad Co., 15 N. Y. 455,
tor fraudulent or tortlous acts, or misconduct which was "an action against the corporaIn those things which do not concern bis duty ; tlon for ejecting a passenger from the cars,
to his ruaste1·, and which when he commits, who, having once exhibited bis ticket, rebe steps out of the course of his service. fused so to do when again requested by the
But it was considered In McMnnus v. conductor," Brown, J., In giving bis opinion
Cricket, 1 East, 106, to be a question of great says, speaking of a requested Instruction
concern and of much doubt and uncertainty, concerning damages, "the object of the rewhether the master was answerable In dam- quest was, that the court should discriminate
ages for nn injury willfully committed by between those acts of the company's agent
his serrnnt while In the performance of his done In the execution of its directions, amf
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those done in the excess of its instructions

and without authority or approbation. This

I think should have been done. The plaintiff

may have been injured by the use of unnec-

essary force to effect what the company had

a right to do. The conductor and those who

aided him are not the company. They are

its agents and servants, and, whatever tor-

tious acts they commit by its direction, it is

responsible for and no other. This is upon

the principle that what one does by another

he does by himself. For injuries resulting

from the carelessness of the servant in the

performance of his master's business the lat-

ter is liable. But for the willful acts of the

servant the master is not responsible, be-

cause such willful acts are a departure from

the master's business ;" and cites the case of

Wright v. Wilcox, and cases there cited.
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In the same case Comstock, J., says: “If

the conductor had no right to eject the plain-

tiff from the train after he had complied with

the request and produced the ticket, then I

do not see upon what principle the defendants

can be made liable for the wrong. The reg-

ulation and instructions to the conductor, as

we have said, were lawful, and they did not

in their terms or construction profess to jus-

tify the trespass and eviction. The result is,

the wrong was done without any authority,

and, therefore, that those who actually did it

are alone -gdanswerable." “If he mistook the

authority conferred upon him both when he

committed the trespass and when he was ex-

amined as a witness, it cannot alter the law

or change the rights of the parties. His own

mistake as to the extent of his powers cannot

make the railroad company liable for acts not

in fact authorized." These cases are all cited

in a subsequent case. Weed v. Raih-oad Co.,

17 N. Y. 362.

The rule is thus stated in Story, Ag. § 456:

“But although the principal is liable for the

torts and negligence of his agents, yet we are

to understand the doctrine with its just limi-

tations, that the tort or negligence occurs in

the course of the agency For the principal

is not liable for the torts or negligences of

his agent in matters beyond the scope of the

agency unless he has subsequently adopted

them for his use or beneﬁt. Hence it is that

the principal is never liable for the unauthor-

ized, the willful, or the malicious act or tres-

pass of his agent."

lilr. Hilliard, in his work on Torts, says:

“In general, a master is liable for the fault

or negligence of his servant; but not for his

willful wrong or trespass. The injury must

arise in the course of the execution of some

service lawful in itself, but negligently or un-

skilifully performed, and not be a wanton vio-

latlon of law by the servant, although occu-

pied about the business of his employer." Hil.

Torts, c. 40.

In Parsons v. Winchell, 5 Cush. 592, Met-

calf, J., says: “But the act of a servant is

not the act of a master even in legal intend-

ment or effect unless the master personally di-

AND EXEMPLARY DAMAGES.

th08e done In the excess of Its Instructions
and wlthont authority or approbation. Tbls
I think should bave been done. The plalntllr
may hnve been Injured by the use of unnecessary force to elrect what the company had
a rlgllt to do. The conductor and those who
aided him are not the company. '11iey are
Its agents and servants, and, wlmtevcr tortious acts they commit by Its direction, It Is
responsible tor and no other. This is upon
the principle that whnt one does by another
he does by himself. f'or Injuries resulting
from the carelessness of the servant In the
performance of his master's business the latter ls Hable. But for the wlllful acts ot the
11ervant the master Is not responHiblc, because such willful acts are a departure from
the master·s business;" and cites the case or
Wriglit v. Wilcox, and cases there cited.
In the same case Comstock, J., says: "It
the conductor had no right to eject the plaintiff from the train after be had complied with
the request and produced the ticket, then I
do not see upon what principle the llefend:rnts
can be made Ila ble !or the wrong. The regulation and instructions to the conductor, as
we have said, were lawful, and they did not
in their terms or construction profess to justify the trespass and eviction. The result Is,
the wrong was done without any authority,
and, therefore, that those who actually did It
are alone ·•answerable." "It he mistook the
authority conferred upon him both when he
committed the trespass and when he was examined as a witness, it cannot alter the law
or change the rights of the parties. His own
mistake as to the extent of his powers cannot
make the railroad company liable for acts not
In tact authorized." These cases are all cited
in a subsequent case. Weed v. Railroad Co.,
17 N. Y. 362.
The rule ls thus stated In Story, Ag. I 456:
"But although the principal ls liable tor the
torts and negligence o! his agents, yet we are
to understand the doctrine with Its just limitations, that the tort or negligence occurs In
the course of the agency / For the principal
ls not liable tor the torts or negligences of
his agent In matters beyond the scope of the
agency unless he has subsequently adopted
them for his use or benefit. Hence It Is that
the principal is never liable !or the unauthorized, the willful, or the malicious act or tres"ass of his agent."
llr. Hilliard, in his work on Torts, says:
"In general, a master Is liable tor the fault
or negligence of his servnnt; but not for his
willful wrong or trespass. The injury must
arise In the course or the execution of some
service lawful In Itself, but negligently or unskUlfully performed, and not be a wanton violation of law by the servant, although occupied about the business of his employer." HU.
Torts, c. 40.
In Parsons v. Winchell, 5 Cush. 592, Metcalf, J ., says: "But the act of a servant Is
not the act of a master even In legal lntendment or e1rect unless the master personally di-
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rects or subsequently adopts It. In other coses, he ls liaule for the acts ot his servant
when liable 1tt all, not ns if the act were done
by himself, but because the law makes Wm
answerable therefor. He ls liable, says Lord
Kenyon, 'to make compensation for the damage consequential for his employing of an unsklllful or negligent servant.' " 1 East, 108.
Ot this latter class of cases, Story says:
"In every such case the principal holds out
his agent as competent and fit to be trusted;
and thereby, In effect, he warrants his fidelity
and good conduct In all the matters of the
agency." Story, Ag. § 452.
In Southwick v. Estes, 7 Cush. 385, Dewey,
J., Instructed the jury "that If the act of the
servant were not done negligently but wlllfully with the Intention of disregarding the directions of the master, he would not be responsible therefor." This instruction was held
correct, and the case of McManus v. Crickett
was cited by the court.
In Railroad Co. v. Langley, 21 How. 202,
l\!r. Justice Ca.mpbell In delivering the opinion of the court snys, "the result of the cases
is that for acts done by the agents of a corporation either In contrnctu or in dellcto In .the
course of Its bus!ness and of their employment, tbe cor110ratlon Is resportslble as an individual ls responsible under similar circumstances."
In Weed v. Rallroad Co., 17 N. Y. 362, this
rule was invoked to relieve the defendantR
from the consequences of the willful act ot the
conductor In the detention of a train whereby a
passenger was made sick and suffered permanent Injury In her health. Strong, J., In delivering the opinion or the court says: "The defendants Insist that they are not liable for the
willful act of the conductor followed by such
a result; and they Invoke, In support or their
position, the rule, well sustained by principle
an!l authority, that a master ls not liable for
a wlll!ul trespass of his servant." He tben
proceeds to say: "It Is Important, therefore,
to Inquire whether that rule extends to a case
like the present, and tor that purpose to consider the basis on which It Is founded. 'l'he
reason of the rule clearly appears by the cases in which It has been declared and applied."
He then examines many of the cases where
the rule has been stated and applied, and cite'l
also Story, Ag. § 456, and then says: "All
the cases on the subject, so far as I have observed, agree In regard to the principle of the
rule, and also In limiting the rule to that principle. For acts of an agent within his authority, the principal ls liable, but not for
willful acts without his authority.'' Railroad
Co. v. Derby, 14 How. 468. Ile then proceeds,
In referenoo to the case then under consitleratlon, to say: "In the light of this examination of the class of cases which has been considered, It cannot fail to be seen that there
Is an Important dltrerence between those cases and the one before the court. The former
are cases o! wUlful, unauthori7.ed, wrongful
acts by agents, unapproved by their princl-
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pals, occasioning damage, but which do not

involve nor work any omission or violation

of duty by their principals to the persons in-

jured; wrongs by the agents only with which

the principals are not legally connected. In

the present case, by means of the wrongful,

willful detention by the conductor, the obli-

gation assumed by the defendants, to carry

the wife with proper speed to her destination,

was broken. The real wrong to the wife in

this case, and from which the damage pro-

ceeded, was the not carrying her in a reason-

able time to Aspinwall as the defendants had

undertaken to do, and this was a wrong of

the defendants unless the law excused them

for their delay on account of the misconduct

of their agent." In the conclusion of his dis-

cussion he says, the rule of law, relied on by

the defendants to sustain their position, is in-
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applicable to the case, and that it makes no

difference whether the act was willful or neg-

ligent as to the liability of the defendants for

a nonfulﬂliment of their contract. From an

examination of these authorities, I think it

will be found that the principal is liable for

the act of his agent in three classes of cases:

I. Where the act is done by the previous

command of the principal, or is subsequently

ratiﬁed or adopted by him.

This command may appear from proof of

speciﬁc directions, or implied from the circum-

stances of the case.

II. Where the agent negligently, nnskillful-

ly or otherwise improperly performs the du-

ties pertaining to his employment.

IIII Where the act of the agent has caused

the breach of a contract, or prevented the pe1-

formance of an obligation due from, and ex-

isting between, the principal and a third per-

son.

The liability, in the ﬁrst class of cases, rests

solely upon the maxim, "Qui facit per alinm

facit per se;" and in no other cases is he liable

as an actor, but in those cases where he has

commanded the act or subsequently ratiﬁed it,

which is regarded in law as a previous com-

mand.

The authorities, ancient and modern, are be-

lieved to be uniform upon this proposition, and

wherever a liability attaches for an unauthor-

ized act, it is founded upon some other rea-

son.

In the second class the agent is held out as

competent and ﬁt to be trusted (by the prin-

cipal), and he, in effect, warrants his ﬁdelity

and good‘ conduct in all the matters of the

agency; by reason of this, as Lord Kenyon

says, he becomes liable “to make compensa-

tion for the damage consequential for his em-

ploying of an unskiiiful or negligent servant."

As to whether this warranty covers the willful

tortious acts of the agent while engaged in and

about the master's business, the authorities do

not all agree. Some hold that as soon as the

act becomes a willful trespass, the master is

no longer liable; others hold that for acts done

in the course of his employment the master

is responsible whatever may be the animus of

pals, occasioning damage, but which do not the actor. A review of the authorities, touchinvolve nor wprk any omlssloo or violation ing this question, wlll be found in the case ot
of duty by their principals to the persons In- Railroad Co. v. Baum, 26 Ind.
jured; wrongs by the agents only with which
The llablllty, In the third claSB of cases,
the principals are not legally connected. In rests not upon the lawfulness or unlawfulthe present case, by means of the wrongful, ness ot the act done by the agent, but as
willful detention by the conductor, the obli- grounded upon the failure of the principal
gation assumed by the defendants, to carry to perform a contract or fulfill an obligation
the wife with proper speed to her destination, with the party Injured. In this class of
was broken. The res.I wrong to the wife ln cases lt matters not whether the act be a
thla case, and from which the damage pro- "wlllful treepaBB" or not; whether lt was
ceeded, was the not carrying her ln a reason- done In the course of the employment of the
able time to Aspinwall as the defendants bad servant ill Immaterial; It the act produces
undertaken to do, and this was a wrong of the breach of the contract, or causes a fallthe defendants unles8 the law excused them ure to fulfill the exlitlng obligation, the liafor their delay on account of the misconduct bility to answer attache11. The gravamen of
of their agent." In the conclusion of bis dls- the charge ls not that the agent has done
cusalon be says, the role of law, relied on by this or that act, but that the principal has
the defendants to sustain their position, is ln- not fultllled his agreement.
appllcable to the case, and that It makes no
That the case at bar comes within this
dllferenoo whether the act was willful oc neg- class of cases I think there can be no doubt,
ligent as to the liability of the defendants for and the liability of the defendants ls well
a nonfulflllment of their contract. From an placed upon those grounds, by Mr. Justice
examination of these authorities, I think. lt WALTON, and rould be sustained upon no
wlll be found that the principal ls liable for other.
the act of his agent In three cla88e8 of cases:
In the light of these authorities and deI. Where the act ls done by the prevlolll cisions, ancient and modern, emanating from
rommand of the principal, or ls mbsequently courts of the highest jurisdiction, character,
mtltled or adopted by him.
and ablllty, what Is the true rule of dami
This command may appear from proof of ages In the ca.se at bar? Or, putting the
! specific directions, or implied from the circum- question ln a more pertinent form, were the
stances of the case.
defendants liable to punltory damages, sueb
II. Where the agent negligently, 11D8ldlltul- as "ls sutnclent to punish the defendants
ly or otherwise improperly performs the du- and serve a1 a warning and example to
ties pertaining to his employment.
others."
III: Where the act of the agent bas caused
U the a.cl..o!...J.nckson was a willful, wanthe breach of a contract, or prevented the pet- ton.. an.U __JU/lllclous --trespass upon his part,
formance of an obllgutlon due from, and ex- llmLwas neither directly nor tmptledly auisting between, the prlnclpnl and a third per- t11orlzed or ratlfted by the defendants, -the
son.
act was neither In fact nor legal lntendment
The llnbilit~. In the first dnss of cases, rests the act ot the defentlantR. This ls quite
&Jlely upon the maxim, "Qui tacit per allum clear from reason and authority. Althougb
tacit per se;" and In no other ra'!eB Is he llnble It may be one which devolved upon them n
as au actor, but In those c-.t!les where he 1uui llabllity, It Is In no sense their act; so that,
commanded the act or tmbsequently ratified It, lf ordinarily the malice of the acting agent
which Is regarded ln law as a previous com- was so inseparably connected with the act
that It would attach to the principal, nolena
mand.
The authorities, ancient and modern, are be- volens, ln those cases where, by legal lnlleved to be uniform UJIOn this proposition, and tendment, lt was bis, the princlpal's act, ln
wherever a liability attal'hes for an unauthor- this case It would not, lt being neither In
ized act, It ls founded upon some other rea- act or legal lntendment the act of the defendants.
eon.
In the second class tbe agent ls held out as
The requested Instruction clearly presentcompetent and fit to be trustro (by the prin- ed the proposition that unlees the act was
cipal), and he, In etrect, warrants bis fidelity authorized directly or Impliedly, or subseand good· conduct In all the matters of the quently ratified by the defendants, they
11gency; by rensun of' this, as Lord Kenyon could not be chargeable with the motive and
says. he becomes liable "to mnke compensa- Intent of the actor. This was refused and
tion for the damage consequential for his em- the rule left, that, regardless of authorlza.ploying of an unskillful or negligent servant." tlon or ratification, they might be punished
As to whether this warranty covers the willful for the willful, wanton, and malicious acts
tortlous acts of the agent while engaged In and of Jackson.
The ruling, lt Is apparent, extends to ca.see
about the master's business, the authorities do
not nll agree. Some hold that as eo<>n as the not within the first class, and the result of
act becomes a willful trespass, the master ls placing It In either of the other classes ls to
no longer liable; others hold that for acts done punish one for the malice of another. To
ln the course of his employment the master relieve the case from this dltll.culty an efIs responsible whatever may be the animus of fort ls made to make corporations an excep-
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tion to the rule, although all the authorities,

whether found in elementary treatises or

judicial decisions, place them upon the same

footing. The idea put forward seems to be,

that the servant is the corporation. In order,

however, that the position may certainly

stand as it is made, and the argument pro-

ceed upon no erroneous deductions of mine,

I quote: “A corporation is an imaginary be-

ing. It has no mind but the mind of its

servants; it has no voice but the voice of

its servants, and it has no hands with which

to act but the hands of its servants. All its

schemes of mischief, as well as its schemes

of public enterprise, are conceived by hu-

man minds and executed by human hands,

and those minds and hands are its minds

and hands. All attempts, therefore, to dis-

tinguish between the guilt of the servant

and the guilt of the corporation; or the
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malice of the servant and the malice of the

corporation; or the punishment of the serv-

ant and the punishment of the corporation is

‘sheer nonsense,' and only tends to confuse

the mind and confound the judgment."

In relation to this proposition one inquiry

may be made, viz.: Have these servants no

“minds," no “hands," and no "schemes" ex-

cept those of the corporation? Are all their

schemes, all their acts, and all the emana-

tions of their minds those of the corporation?

If they have any other, shall the corpora-

tion be punished for them?

Does not the argument attach a respon-

sibility to the corporation for all the acts of

a person in its employ? If it does not,

where is the dividing line? It is all, or part.

What part? This is the question which law-

writers and judges have been answering for

many years, and whether, in the estimation

of any, it be or not “sheer nonsense," they

have distinguished between those acts of

the agent for which the corporation is, and

those for which it is not liable.

What its “volce" commands, what its

“bands" do, and the “schemes" which it ex-

ecutes, it should be and is held responsible

for, whether done by direct or implied au-

thority or subsequently ratiﬁed by them;

and when they do this in wanton and will-

ful disregard of the rights of others, they

may, under the law as now administered,

be punished by punitive damages.

But when the ‘‘voice'' which speaks, and

the "hand" which executes, is not that of

the principal, however wanton, willful, and

malicious it may be, the “stones," even, “cry

out" against inﬂicting upon him a punish-

ment therefor, and the more wanton and

malicious the act, the more horrible is the

doctrine.

Corporations are but aggregated individ-

uals acting through the agency of man.

They may consist of a single individual, or

more, and they are no more ideal beings

when thus acting than the individual thus

acting. For certain acts the individual,

though not manually engaged in it, is held

responsible. For the same acts the body of

tlon to the rule, although all the authorities,
whether found in elementary tre6tises or
judicial declalons, place them upon the same
footing. Tile idea put forward seems to be,
that the servant l8 the corporation. In order,
howeTer, that the position may certainly
stand as It is made, and the argument proceed upon no erroneous deductions of mine,
I quote: "A corporation ls an imaginary being. It has no mind but the mind of lls
serrants; it has no voice but the voice of
its servants, and It has no hands with which
to act but the bands of Its servants. All Its
schemes of mischief, as well as lls schemes
of public enterprise, are conceived by human minds and executed by human hands,
and thoee minds and hands are Its minds
and hands. All attempts, therefore, to distinguish between the guilt of the servant
and the guUt of the corporation; or the
malice of the servant nnd the malice of the
corporation; or the punishment of the serrant and the punishment of the corporation Is
'sheer nonsense,' and only tends to contuse
the mind and confound the judgment."
In relation to this proposition one Inquiry
may be made, viz.: Have these servants no
"minds," no "bands,'' and no "schemes" except those of the corporation? Are all their
schemes, all their acts, and all the emanations of their minds those of the corporation?
If they have any other, shall the corporation be punished for them?
Does not the argument attach a responslltlllty to the corporation for all tbe acts of
a pel'80n In Its employ? If lt cloes not,
where l8 the dividing line? It is all, or part.
What part? This ls the question which lawwrltera and judges have been answering for
many years, and whether, In the estimation
of any, lt be or not "sheer nonsense," they
have distinguished between those acts of
the agent for which the corporation ls, and
those for which lt l8 not liable.
What Its "voice" commands, what its
"hands" do, and the "echemes" which It executes, lt should be and Is held responsible
for, whether done by direct or implied authority or subsequently ratified by them;
and when they do this in wanton and willful disregard of the rights of others, they
may, under the law as now administered,
be punished by punitive damages.
But wnen the "voice" which spl'llks, and
the ''hand" whlcli executes, Is not that of
the principal, however wanton, willful, and
mall<'ious It may be, the "stones,'' even, "cry
uuf' against inflicting upon him a punishment therefor, and the more wanton and
malicious the act, the more horrible ls the
doctrine.
Corporations are but aggregated Individuals acting through the ageney of man.
They way consist of a single Individual, or
more, and they are no more Ideal beings
when thus acting than the lndh·ldual thus
acting. For certain acts the lndh·ldual,
t~ugh oot manually engnged In lt, ls held
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responsible. For the same acts the body or
Individuals, denominated a corporation, are
held responsible. The principal and agent,
In both cases, are separate and Independent
helngs. Agents presupIJQBe a princlpal,somebody to act for. somebody whose orden they are to execute, and somebody for
whom they are to perform service; somebody who Is answerable to them, and who
may be answerable for the acts done under
their direction. Mr. Justice Brown, In Hibbard v. Railroad Co., before cited, says, "The
conductor and those who aided him are not
the company;. they are Its agents and servants." It the employee and se1-vant ls the
corporation, in fact or legal lntendment, It
does not act through agents. Its acts arc
all the direct acts of principals without the
Intervention of any other power, and It carries us back to a responslblllty for all the
acts of a person employed by a corporation,
whether those acts have any relation to hle
particular employment or not, a proposition
too absurd and monstrous In Its results to be
entertained at all. Mr. Jm1tlce Campbell, In
giving the opinion of the supreme court of
the United States, In the case before cited
(21 How. 202), says, the result of the cases Is
that for acts done In the course of its business and of their employment "the corporation is responsible, as an individual Is responsible, under shnllnr circumstances."
I, thel"efore, come to the conclusion that if
liable. at all to be punished for the malice
of Jackson, It must be upon some oth•!L'
grountl than their legal identity with him,
null that In no sense can bis malice be said
to be their malice; and there seems to be
strong Indications In the charge of the presiding judge, that he, at that time, placed lt
upon no such grounds. The defentlants, in
view of this assumption by the plaintiff, "requested the presiding judge to Instruct the
jury thnt the plaintiff Is not entitled to recover against the defendant company any
greatei· damages than he might recover
against Jackson himself, tor the same cause
of action upon similar evidence." This instruction the court declined to give, and rl'marked to the jury, "I think you cannot
rightfully be required to enter into a consideration of the damages which a ))llrty, not
now before the court, and baa not, therefore,
had an op1l011unlty to be heard, ought to pay,
and then measure the damages In tllls <>ase
which has been heard by those which you
think might be just In another case which
l>as not been beard. We will endeavor to
decide this case right now, and when .Jack·
son's case comes before us, If lt ever docs,
we wlll endeavor to decide that right."
I think the argument is very strong from
this remark, that It wal!I not the malice anti
Ill-will of Jackson that was designed to be
punished, t01· he says his case has not been
beard. The court say, sul>stantlally, we
know not what excuses or justlll<'atlon he
mny olrer when llfard, If eve1·, "and when

46
46 COAII‘ENS..\'1‘()RY AND EXEMPLARY DMIAGES.

his case comes before us, lf ever it does, we

will endeavor to decide that right." One

would suppose that it was some “wanton.

malicious act, committed in reckless and will-

ful disregard of the rights of the injured par-

ty," by these defendants that was to receive

such punishment as should “serve a warning

and example to others," and not such an act

done by Jackson. The argument would seem

to proceed and say Jackson, for his act, may

deserve one punishment, and those defend-

ants, for their acts, may deserve another;

and I cannot well forbear the inquiry here,

if there is not here some evidence of an “at-

tempt to distinguish between the guilt of

the servant and the guilt of the corporation;

or the malice of the servant, and the malice

of the corporation; or the punishment of the

, servant, and the punishment of the corpora-

tion?" Was it here that “sheer nonsense"
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was enacted, and “the mind confused," and

the “judgment confounded"?

If it was the maiiclous act of the defend-

ants that was to be punished, the enormity

of Jackson's wrong had indeed nothing to do

with it. If it was the malicious wrong of

Jackson that was to be punished, why should

a party, innocent of all wrong in the matter,

be punished more than the wrong-doer him-

self. If he was the corporation, why would

not all the acts of extenuation and jl.tstiﬁ('il-

tion surrounding him be also the acts of the

corporation, and be proper elements to be

considered in graduating or ﬁxing the pen-

alty? How could his case come before us, if

he was the corporation? Would it be to be

punished for the act of the corporation?

D.‘ we hold both guilty and both liable, it

must be founded upon the idea of two actors,

and that the employee is not only the corpo

ration but somebody else, and the nonentity

of agent becomes itself a nonentity, and in-

stead of a mere imaginary thing which swal-

lows up and extinguishes all the relations of

principal and agent, and renders any attempt

to distinguish between them “sheer non-

sense," we do have two distinct, independent,

accountable subjects, susceptible of being

brought before the courts to answer and be

punished, and we are not left to the ideal ac-

-tion of punishing an ideal existence. Again;

if the actor is brought before the court and

punished, would he be punished for the act

of the corporation or his own act? for the

malice of the corporation, or his own malice?

If imprisoned, should we say the corporation

was imprisoned?

If not, and he is (as undoubtedly he may

be) called to answer for an assault, and pun-

ished for an assault, when we come to ﬁx the

punishment, do we not distinguish between

his guilt and the guilt of the corporation, his

malice and the malice of the corporation?

And when the rule is required that we pun-

ish him in the same manner and to the same

extent as the corporation, should we not reply

very much as did the presiding judge at the

trial? I think there can be no two opinions

‘ cases say, no.
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his case comes before us, If ever It does, we
will endeavor to decide that right.'' One
\'l'ould suppose that it was some "wanton.
malicious act, committed In reckless and wlllful disregard of the rights of the Injured party," by these defendants that was to receive
sueh imnishment as should "serve a warning
nnd example to others," and not such an act
done by Jackson. '.fhe argument would seem
to proc~ and say Jackson, for his act, may
deserre oue punishment, and those defendants, for their nets, may deserve another;
and I cannot well forbear the Inquiry here,
If there ls not here some evidence of an "attempt to distinguish between the guilt of
the servant and the guilt ·of the corporation;
or the malice of the servant, and the malice
of- the corporation; or the punishment of the
serrant, and the punishment of the corporation?" Was lt here that "sheer nonsense"
was enacted, and "the mind confused," and
the "judgment confounded"?
It lt was the malicious act of the defendants that was to be punished, the enormity
of Jackson's wrong bad Indeed nothing to do
with lt. It lt was the malicious wrong of
Jackson that was to be punished, why should
a party, innocent of all wrong In the matter,
be punished more than the wrong-doer himself. It he was the corpol'lltion, why would
not all the acts of extenuation and justification surrounding him be also the acts of the
corporation, and be proper elements to be
considered ln graduating or fixing the penalty? How could his case come before us, if
he was the corporation? Would it be to be
punished for the act of the corpora tlon?
It we hold both guilty and both liable, 1t
must be founded upon the idea of two actoni,
and that the employee is not only the corporation but somebody else, and the nonentity
of agent becomes itself a nonentity, and instead of a mere Imaginary thing which swallows up and extinguishes all the relations of
p1·lnclpal and agent, and renders any attempt
to distinguish between them "sheer nonsense," we do have two distinct, independent,
accountable subjects, susceptible of being
brought before the courts to answer and be
punished, and we are not left to the ideal ac·tlon of punishing an ideal existence. Again;
If the actor ls brought before the court and
punished, would he be punished for the :ict
ot the corporation or his own act? for the
malice of the corporation, or his own malice?
If Imprisoned, should we say the corporation
was impi:lsoned?
If not, and he ls (as undoubtedly he may
be) called to answer for an assault, and punished for an assault, when we come to fix the
punishment, do we not distinguish between
his guilt and the guilt of the corporation, his
malice and the malice of the corpora tlon?
And when the rule ls required that we punish him in the same manner and to the same
extent as the corporation, should we not reply
very much as did the presiding Judge at the
trial? I think there can be no two oplnions

about the matter, and that there ts manifestly
a distinction between the two, and that there
are two to distinguish between, and that
when the act is authorized by any previous
command or subsequent adoption, lt is not,
and cannot In the nn ture of things be made
the act of another than the actor. Laws may
be made making others responsible therefor,
but it ls the act of him who does It, and not
of him who neither does nor authorizes lt;
and no amount of Judlcia.I legislation or refinement can make It so; as before remarked,
It ls not possible in the nature of things.
Again, if this servant ls the corporation,
what becomes of the law regulating the llabllity of the principal for an Injury received
by an employee while in the business of the
corporation. It Is held, that If the lnjmy
was produced by the carelessness or negligence of the master or corporation, they must
respond in damages; but if produced by the
act of a fellow-servant, they are not liable.
Is not here a distinction recognized between
the guilt of the servant and the guilt of the
corporation? Is not here a manifest distinction noted and acted upon between the servant and corporation? If the servant ls the
corporation, lt Is the act of the corporation
when done by the fellow-servant. But these
cases say, no. You assume the risks arising
from the acts of your fellow-servants, but
not the nets of your principal, the corporation; when the corporation ls negligent you
may recover, but when lt ls the servant, you
cannot. Again, I ask, how can this be, if the
servant is the corporation? This new idea,
it appears to me, has in It more of Ingenuity
than logic or substance; lt Is altogether ideal,
and If It finds place ln the law, It will be
among its fictions.
The learned Judge then adds, "And It might
as well not be applied to them nt all, as to
llmit its application to cases where the servant ls directly and specially directed by the
corporation to maltreat and insult a passenger, or to cases where such an act Is directly
and specifically ratified; for no such cases
will ever occur.'' The Instruction requested
and refused, used the term directly or "Impliedly," and with this sentence so amended,
I have simply to say, that if no such case
ever does occur, there ls no occasion, right,
or propriety In lnfilctlng the punishment. It
the act is neither directly nor Impliedly authorized or ratified, there ls hf It no wantonness.
no malice, and no Ill-will towal'd the person
injured, and no public wrong by them don1•
to be redressed or atoned for. Repentance
with them ls absolutely Impossible. The :u.
-Kll.!llent Is sl~_ply . this: If . we-do not punbll
you- when you do not directly .J>L.Ltµplle~tt_
g.uthor1Ze or adop~ a wro,ng, we 8hall neve..have an opportunity, for you never will~
authorize or adopt one. 'l'he argument Is
clearly stated by the learned Judge, and I
leave lt as he left It, remarking, that If the
end to be attained ls the punishment of railroad corporations whether &'UlltY or Innocent,
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the rule requiring them ﬁrst to be guilty of

wrong had better be abolished.

That the learned judge meant to state his

argument thus, is, I think, apparent from the

remark which immediately follows: “that if

those who are in the habit of thinking that

it is a terrible hardship to punish an inno-

cent corporation for the wickedness of its

agents and servants, will for a moment reﬂect

upon the absurdity of their own thoughts,

their anxiety will be cured."

In Railroad Co. v. Baum, 26 Ind. 70, the

court say: “Nor will sound policy maintain

the application of a rule to railways or cor-

porations on this subject, which shall not be

alike applied to others, as has been intimated

in some quarters. The suggestion is not lit

to be made, much less sanctioned, in any tri-

bunal pretending to adminis(er justice impar-

tiaily."
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in another case it is said: "The law lays

down the same rule for all, and we cannot

make a different rule in the case of a serv-

ant of a railway company and an ordinary

tradesman;" “and, therefore, treating Phil-

lips as the servant, the company are not lia-

ble for his tortious act any more than other

individuals would be." Roe v. Railroad Co.,

7 Eng. Law & Eq. 5-i7.

With the criticism (if it be entitled to that

appellation) of the opinion upon railroads and

their management I have,_in the position I

now occupy, no occasion to deal. My duty

I consider performed, and best performed,

when I have endeavored to ascertain the law

as it is, and apply it to causes as they are

presented, rather than in making rules for

any real or supposed grievances. The law-

making power is ample to afford the neces-

sary means of redress where none now ex-

ists; and did these great and growing evils

really exist, we might reasonably expect to

ﬁnd the law-makers, the people, those who

must suffer by their existence, exercising

their corrective powers.

If the evil is not suﬂicient to induce the

sufferers to proﬁde a remedy, it will hardly

justify the judiciary in leaving the clear path

of the duty of exponnding the law, and as-

suming the powers and responsibilities of

law-makers. Perhaps there has been no one

thing that has introduced into the law so

much confusion and embarrassment as me

engrafting policy of courts; adding here a lit-

tle and there a little, till the original is cover-

ed with these judicial excrescences; and not

unfrequently the jewel is lost in its surround-

ings of dross.

The plaintiff, in the printed brief of his ar-

gu'ment presented in this case, says: "It,

therefore, an individual master, perhaps per-

sonally innocent of positive evil intent is

liable to punishment by exemplary damages

for the malice o1! his servant, for a much

stronger reason ought a soulless corporation

to be rmponsible for the wicked and wanton

acts of its sole reprwentative."

In my judgment, if the premise were right

in this proposition, there is no reason why

the role requiring them ftrst to be guilty of
wrong bad better be abolished.
That the learned judge meant to state hts
.argument thus, ls, I think, apparent from the
remark which immediately follows: "that If
those who are In the habit of thinking that
it Is a terrible hardship to punish an Innocent corporation for the wickedness ot Its
agents and servants, will tor a moment reflect
upon the absurdity ot their own thoughts,
their anxiety will be cured."
In Railroad Co. v. Baum, 26 Ind. 70, the
court say: "Nor will sound policy maintain
the application ot a rule to rnllways or cor1iorations on this subject, which shall not be
alike applied to others, as has been intimated
In some quarters. The suggestion ls not tlt
to be made, much less sanctioned, In any tribunal pretending to admlnib\er justice lm1mrtlally."
In another case It ls IJllld: "'l'he law lays
down the same rule for all, and we cannot
make a di.trerent rule in the case of a servant ot a railway company and an ordinary
tradesman;" "and, therefore, treating Phillips as the servant, the company are not liable for his tortious act aoy more than other
Individuals would be." Roe v. Railroad Co.,
7 Eng. Law & Eq. 547.
With the criticism (If It be entitled to that
appellation) ot the opinion upon railroads and
tllelr management I lta'fe, . in the position I
now occupy, no occasion to deal. My duty
I consider performed, and best performed,
when l have endeavored to ascertain the law
as it is, and apply it to causes as they are
presented, rather than In making rules for
any real or supposed grievances. The lawmaking power Is ample to atrord the necessary means of redress where none now exists; and did these great and growing evils
really exist, we might reasonably expect to
ftnd the law-makers, the people, those who
must suller by their existence, exe:r<."'IBlng
their corrective powel'!I.
If the evll is not suftlclent to Induce the
sullerers to provide a remedy, It will hardly
justify the judiciary In loovlng the clea1· path
of the duty of expounding the law, and assuming the powers and responsibilities or
Jaw-makers. Perhaps there has been no one
thing that bas Introduced Into the law "o
much confusion and embarrassment ae tne
engratting policy of courts; adding here a little and there a little, till the original Is covered with these judicial excrescences; and not
unfrequently the jewel ls lost In Its surroundings ot dross.
Tbe plalntlll, In the printed brief of his argtiment presented In this case, says: "If,
therefore, an individual master, perhaps personally innocent of positive evil Intent ls
liable to punishment by exemplary damages
tar the malice of his servant, for a much
stronger reason ought a soulless corporation
to be l'E8poneible for the wicked and wanton
acta of lte 110le representative."
In m;y judgment, It the premise were right
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in this proposition, there ls no reason why
the conclusion is not right. But I know
of no case where the master, Innocent of nil
wrong upon bis own part, bas been held to be
liable to punishment for tl.te malice of his
servant. It Is only where he has been a participator lo some manner In the wanwuness
and malice displayed in tiJe act, and it ls
his own wanton and malicious act that ls
then punished. The plaintiff Btlys further~
"Besides, If corporations cannot be reached
In exemplary damages for the malice of
their servants, they escape entirely, and thus
stand Infinitely better than citizens wno nrn
liable In punltory damages, not only for their
own personal acts, which latter It ls obvious
a corporation can never be guilty of In the
strict sense." If citizens were liable In punltory damages for the malice of their servants,
in nowise participated In by themselves, the
conclusion that corporations would stand better than citizens, It they escaped a punishment for the malice of their servants, Is irresistible; but again I say, I know of no law,
authority, or reason for holding an innocent
citizen to punishment for tlte malice of bis
servant or agent It is quite as much as
one can reconcile with just accountability to
hold him to compensate for Injuries maliciously inflicted in the course of his employment, without adding punishment.
The theory of punitive damages ls the Infliction of a punishment for an offense committed. It presupposes the existence of a
moral wrong, an Infraction of the moral code;
a wrong In which the community bas some
Interest in the redress, and In securing Immunity from In the future. It presupposes
also an ollender, and designs to punish that
ollender. To punish one not an ol'l'ender ls
against the whole theory, policy, and practice
of the law and Its administrators. ''It Is
better that ten guilty men should escape than
one Innocent man should suller." Before the
smallest Hue ron be lnfilcted, evidence, leaving no reasonable doubt of the guilt of the
party to be thus punished, must be adduced.
Evidence that be possessed the evil Intent,
wicked and depraved spirit; that It was he
that was regardless of eocial duty. The Iden.
of punishing one who Is not partlcepa crlmlnls
In the wrong done Is so entirely devoid of
the ftrst principles and tundarueutal elements
ot law, that It can never find pince among the
rules of action In an lntelll&"ent and virtuous
community. There is no parallel, for It 111
In the administration of the law, and courts
ot the highest repute have, whenever the
question baa arisen, declared It unsound In
principle and Inequitable In practice.
In Hagan v. Railroad Co., 3 R. I. 188,
Broughton, J., In delivering the opinion of
the court says: "In cases where punitive
or exemplary damag~s have been assessed,
It has been done upon evidence of such will·
tulness, recklessness, or wickedness on the
part of the party at fault as amounted to
criminality, which for the good of society and

48
48

COMPENSATORY AND EXEMPLARY DA\lAGl-lS.

security to the individual ought to he pun-

ished. If, in such cases, or in any case of

a civil nature, it is the policy of the law to

visit upon the offender such exemplary dam-

ages as will operate as a punishment, and

teach the lesson of caution to prevent repeti-

tion of such criminality, yet we do not see

how such damages can be allowed, when a

principal is prosecuted for the tortious act

of a servant, unless there is proof in the case

to implicate the principal, and make him

particeps criminis of his agent's act. No

man shall be punished for that of which he

is not guilty. Cases may arise in which

the principal is deeply implicated in the serv-

ant's guilt or fault,—cases in which the con-

duct of the principal is such as to amount

to a ratiiication. In all such cases. the prin-

cipal is particeps criminis, if not the princi-
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pal offender; and whatever damages might

properly be visited upon him who commits

the act, might be very properly inﬂicted upon

him who thus criminally participates in it.

But where the proof does not implicate the

principal, and however wicked the servant

may have been, the principal neither express-

ly nor impliedly authorizes or ratiﬁes the act,

and the criminality of it is as much against

him as against any other member of society,

we think it is quite enough that he shall be

liable in compensatory damages for the injury

sustained in consequence of the wrong of a

person acting as his servant."

In Railroad v. Finney, 10 Wis. 388, which

was a case for putting a passenger of f the

cars before reaching the end of the route to

which his ticket entitled him, the court be-

iow instructed the jury that “in this case,

if you ﬁnd the complaint sustained by evi-

dence, you may give such damages as shall

compensate the plaintiff for his loss by the

act of the defendant, and also such exempla-

ry damages as you may ﬁnd proper under

the circumstances." The defendants request-

ed an instruction “that they should give the

plaintiff such damages only as would com-

pensate him for his loss by reason of putting

off the cars; that they could not give vindictive

or punitory damages, called smart-money." This

instruction was refused. The -court, in giv-

ing their opinion, say: “The judge improp-

erly refused to instruct the jury as requested

by defendants' counsel, that the plaintiff was

only entitled to recover such sum as would

compensate him for his actual loss by being

put off the cars, and that he was not entitled

to vindictive damages or smart-money. If

it be admitted that the action of the’ con-

ductor in expelling the plaintiff from the cars

was willful and malicious, or so grossly neg-

ligent, oppresive, or insulting as to bring the

case within the rule authorizing exemplary

damages, if the suit had been brought against

him; yet there was not one word of testi-

mony offered showing, or tending to show,

that such conduct on his part was either pre-

viously directed, or subsequently rntitied or

adopted by the company; although they may
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security to the lndlvldual ought to be pun- be liable In this action to lndemnl.fy the
lsbed. If, In such cases, or In any (•ase of plaintUl' for the actual loes or 11amage whlcb
a clvll nature, lt ls the policy of the law to he sustained by reason of tbe misconduct of
visit upon the offender such exemplary dam- the conductor, because lt occasioned a breach
ages as will operate as a punishment, and of their duty or obligation to carry him from
tencb the lesson of caution to prevent repetl- Madison to Edgerton. Still It does not foltlon or such criminality, yet we do not see low that they may be visited with damages
how such damages can be allowed, when a by way of punishment, without proof that
principal Is prosecuted for the tortlous net they directed the act, or subsequently conof a servant, unless there Is proof In the case firmed It. Defendants are not to be visited
to Implicate the principal, and make blm with damages by way of punishment, wlthpartlceps crlmlnls of bis agent's act. No oftt proof that they directed the act to be
runn shall be punished for that of which he done, or subsequently confirmed It. Such
Is not guilty. Cases may arise In which damages are given by way of punishing the
the principal is deeply Implicated In the serv- malice or oppression, and are graduated by
ant's guilt or fault,--cases In which the con- the Intent or the party committing the wrong.
duct of the principal Is such as to amount But how can such damages be assessed
to a ratification. In all such cases. the prin- against a principal with such intent? Sureclpal Is partlceps crlmlnls, It not the pl"lncl- ly they cannot be. But In an action against
pal oll'ender; and whatever damages might tbe principal for the act of the agent, bow
properly be visited upon him who commits can the question of thelr assessment be propthe act, might be very properly intucted upon erly submitted to the jury when there ls no
him who thus criminally participates in It. evidence connecting the principal .with such
But where the proof does not Implicate the Intent on tbe part of the agent? Clearly It
principal, and however wicked the servant cannot." The damages In this case were
may bave been, the principal neither express- $175, and tbe judgment of the court below
ly nor Impliedly authorizes or mtlfle.s the act, wns reversed.
and the c1·lmlnallty of It ls as much against
Turner v. Ralkoad Co., 34 cal. 594, w11,;
him as against any other member of society, an action for unlawfully ejecting the plaintiff
we think It ls quite enough that he shall be from a car by the cond11ctor. The court bellable in compensatory damages for the Injury low ruled "tbat the Injury, If committed, aml
sustained In consequence of the wrong of a If a wlllful one on ti.a part of the defendants
person acting as his servant."
In their servant the conductor, and accomIn Railroad v. Finney, 10 Wis. 388, whleb ' panted by malice or such acts as In their
was a. ease for putting a passenger off the nature tended to show a purpose of resent~ars before reaching the end of the route to
ment or lll-wlll, or a disposition to degrade
which his ticket entitled him, the court be- the plalntilf, entitled her to what ls called
iow Instructed the jury that "In this case, exemplary damages." After some comment,
1f you tlnd the complaint sustnlned by e\•I- and elting 8tory, Ag. § 45G, 19 Wend. 343.
,lence, you may give such damages as shall and 14 How. 48G, before referred to, th:?
compensate the plalntUl' for his loss by the I court say: "Tested hy these principles, It ii;
act of the defendant, and also such exempla- obvious tbat In this case tbe defendant was
ry damages as you may find proper under not liable for any malicious and wanton COilthe circumstances." The defendants request-1 duct ·of the conductor. It liable at all, tts
ed an Instruction "that they should give the liability must be eonfined to the actual dam·
plalntltr such damages only as would com- ages which the plalntltr suffered. To render
pe111mte him for his loss by reason of putting the defendant liable to punitive damages, It
otr the cars; that they could not give vindictive was Incumbent on the plalntifl' to show that
orpu11ltorydamages,calle1hmart-money." This the act complained of was done with the
lnstrnctlon was refused. The ·cout"t, In glv- authority eithe1· express or Implied of the
Ing their opinion, say: "The jutlge lmprop- defendant, or was subsequently adopted by
erly refused to Instruct the jury as requested I the company." "If her expulsion resulted
by defendants' counsel, tbat the plaintiff was ' from the malice of the conductor, or was aconl;r entitled to recover such sum as would companied by violence or personal Indignity,
compensate him for bis actwil loss by being the conductor alone Is responsible tor such
put oil' the cars, and that be was not entitled damages as she may be entitled to for this
to vindictive damages 01· smart-money. It cause beyond the actual damages resulting
It be admitted that the action of the con- from her exclusion from the car, unle11s as
tluctor In expelling the plaintiff from the cars before stated the company expressly or tncltwns willful and malicious, or so grossly neg- ly pn1·tlcipated In the malice and violent conllgcnt, oppreslve, or lnsultln1; as to bring the duct of the conductor. In other words, If
c·:tse within the rule authorizing exemplary the act of the conductor was wholly uuaudamages, if the suit bad been brought against tborlzed, the company ls liable for the actual
him; yet the1·e was not one word of testl- damage, and the conductor alone for the punlmony offered showing, or tending to show, tlve damages, If any."
that such conduct on bis part was either preThere Is another case In the same volume
vlously directed, or subsequently rntltled or (34 Cal. 586,-Plessants v. Railroad Co.), and
adopte<l by the compn ny; although they may dechled upon the 1111me grnunds.

I
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In Clark v. Newson, 1 Exch. 131, and 1

VVelsb. H. & G. (a case of joint trespass by

two), Pollock, C. B., said: “I think it would

be very wrong to make the malignant motive

of one party a ground of aggravation of dam-

ages against the other party who were al-

together free from any improper motive. In

such case the plaintiff ought to select the

party against whom he means to get ag-

gravated damages."

In relation to the views thus expressed, it

is said by Mr. Justice WALTON, in his opin-

ion, that: “In none of them was there any

evidence that the ser'vant acted wantonly or

maliciously; they were simply cases of mis-

taken duty. And what these same courts

would have done if a case of such gross and

outrageous insult had been before them, as

is now before us, it is impossible to say; and
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long experience has shown that nothing is

more dangerous than to rely upon the ab-

stract reasoning of courts, when the cases be-

fore them did not call for the application of

the doctrines which their reasoning is intend-

ed to establish." Walving, for the present,

the question of fact as to whether they were

or not simply cases of mistaken duty, we

ﬁnd in each of them the question of puni-

tive damages legitimately and clearly raised

and discussed. and the reasoning, such as it

is, is before the profession. The cases are

not cited as mere authority by reason of

their being decided cases by courts of com-

petent jurisdiction, but because the reason-

ing is believed to support the decision. If the

reasoning is bad, fallacious, inconclusive,

some would adopt the plan of exhibiting

these facts by a course of reasoning of their

own, rather than by promuigating a general

proposition that it is unsafe to rely upon

their reasoning. if the reasoning is sound

and applicable to case at bar, it does not

matter that it was, or was not necessarily

called out in the case into which it has been

introduced, and it requires some other an-

swer than mere criticism upon course of pro-

ceeding by the judges in those cases.

That the gentlemen, composing the several

courts alluded to, supposed the cases called

for the decisions and reasonings they made,

cannot well be doubted, and an examination

of the cases as reported in the printed vol-

umes of the reports referred to, will, I think,

leave the reader in no doubt concerning that

question.

There are some other cases to be found in

the books not referred to on the defendant's

brief to which I will advert as indicating the

views of some of the courts in other states.

Ackerson v. Railway Co., 32 N. J. Law,

254, was an action to recover damages for

injuries sustained while traveling in their

cars by reason of the carelessness and diso-

bedience of the employees of the road. The

court say: “It appeared on trial that the de-

fendants had adopted all needful rules and

regulations for the running of their trains,

and had employed competent persons as ten-

In Clark v. Newson, 1 Exch. 131, and 1
W elsb. H. & O. (a case ot joint trespass by
two), Pollock, C. B., said: "l think It would
be very wrong' to make the malignant motive
ot one party a ground of aggravation of damages against the other party who were altogether free from any Improper motive. In
such case the plalntltr ought to select the
party against wlJom he means to get ag·
gravated damages."
In relation to the views thus expressed, It
ls said by Mr. Justice WALTO~, in his opinion, that: "In none of them wns there any
evidence that the ser'rnnt acted wantonly or
maliciously; they were shnply cases of mistaken clut:;. And wllat these same courts
would haYe done If a case of such gross and
outrageous Insult llad been before them, as
is now before us, It Is lmp<>f;slblc to say; and
long experience has shown that nothing ls
more dangerous than to rely upon the abstract reasoning of courts, when the cases before them did not call for the application of
the doctrines which their reasoning ill Intended to establish." Waiving, for the present,
the question of fnct as to whether they were
or not simply cases of mistaken duty, we
find in each of them the question of punitive damages legitimately and clearly raised
and discussed, anti the reasoning, such as It
Is, ls before the profession. The cases are
not cited as mere authority by reason of
their being decided cases by coUl'ts of competent jurisdiction, but because the reasoning ls believed to support the decision. It the
reasoning Is bad, fallacious, inconclusive,
some would adopt the plnn of exhibiting
these facts by a course of reasoning of their
own, rather than by promulgating a general
propoaltlon that It Is unsafe to rely upon
their reasonlng. If the reasoning Is sound
and applicable to case at bar, It does not
matter that It was, or was not necessarily
called out In the case into which It has been
introduced, and It requires some other answer than mere criticism upon course of proceeding by the judges in those cases.
That the gentlemen, composing the several
courts alluded to, supposed the cases called
for the decisions and reasonings they made,
cannot well be doubted, and Dll examination
of the cases as reported in the printed volumes of the reports 1·eferrcd to, will, I think,
leave the reader In no doubt conce1ning thtLt
question.
There are some other cases to be found In
the books not referred to on the defendant's
brief to which I will advert as Indicating the
views of some of the courts In other states.
Ackerson v. Railway Co., 32 N. J. Law,
25!, was an nction to recover damages for
injuries 11ustained while tra \"Piing In thell·
cars by reason of the carele,;s1wss and disobedience of the employees of the road. 'l'he
court say: "It appeared on trial that the defendants had adopted all needful rules and
regulations tor the running of their trains,
and bad employed competent persons as tenLAW DAM.2d Ed.-4

ders of tl1e switch at which the accident occurred. No care or caution, required for the
safety of the passengers, bad been omitted
by the. company. Through the carelessness
and disobedience of their agents the accident happened." "In fact, the only fault or
negligence complained of was that of the·
employees of the company. "'here a rail·
rood company adnpts all rules and regulations needful tor the safety of passengers,
and cmploy1 competent agents, whose duty It
ls to see that these rules :rnd regulations are
observed, I do not think that the company,
In case of Injury to the passengers happening by reason of the failure of the agent toperform his duty, can be held liable for punt~
tlve damages. If, howeYer, the company, as·
such, Is in fault, a dlffci·ent n1le applies.
The company, for Its own cnrclcssness, way
be justly held liable fo1· smart-money. '.l 'hls
rule <loes not prevail where the carelessness
is only that of a subordinate agent. There ls
no justice in punishing the company after It
has done all In Its power to prevent an injury. The agent, If guilty of negligence, may,
in certain cases, be proceeded against by iadlctment. I cannot yield to the argument so ·
ea rncstly urged by the counsel of the plalntitr, that by construction of law the compa:...ny Is guilty of gross negligence whenever its
agent is, and Is, therefore, to be treated the
same as If through Its own negligence the injury happened. I think the verdict was
against the charge or the court in that It is,
to some extent at least, for punltive damages. Full compensation to the plaintiff for
all real loss, present and prospective, was the
measure of damages."
l'orter v. Railway o-.., 32 N. J. Law, 261,
arguctl at the same time, was determined upon the rules announced in this case.
These cnses well Indicate the views of the
court In New Jersey. McKeon v. Railway
Co., 42 Mo. 79, was an action for an Injury
done to a passenger. The court, In giving:
their opinion, say: "If the conduct of tbisdrlver was willful and malicious with Intent
to injure the plaintiff, he might be liable to
Indictment for assault with Intent to kill, or
some other c1'iminal otrense; but his employe1· was not responsible for his crimes,
nor liable for his acts of willful and malicious trespass. The company was answerable only for his negligence, or his incapacity,
or unskillfulness in the performance of the
duties assigned to him. In such cases we
have no hesitation In sn.ylng, that punitory
damages, or any damages beyond a full compensation for the Injury sustained, cannot be
allowed."
Hailrond Co. v. Smith, 2 Duv. (Ky.) 5::iG,
was a case where the eYillcnce tended to
show that the car of the plaintiffs was upset
by the carelessness of their driYer, and defendant injured thereby. The Instruction
was, "That if the car was thrown from the
track by the fast and careless driving of the·
dcfemL'lnts' (now plaintiffs') agent, the)
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should ﬁnd for plaintiff (now defendant), and

that the jury are not necessarily restricted to

actual damages, but may, in their discre-

tion, award such exemplary damages as they

deem just and proper in view of all the facts

in the case." The court say, the facts did

not authorize a punishment of the defend-

ants, and the court below should have re-

stricted them to compensatory damages, and

for this reason the judgment was reversed.

In the case of Hill v. Railroad Co., 11 La.

Ann. 292, the court used the following lan-

guage: “In actions of this kind, it is not

within the province of the jury, although

negligence is clearly proven, to give vindic-

tive damages, as is sometimes allowed in

case of willful and malicious injuries. The

company, in such cases, is not to be pun-'

ished for the negligence of its agents as a

crime."
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Keene v. Lizardi, 8 La. 27, was an action

brought to recover damages of defendants,

ship-owners, for injuries to plaintiff's wife,

at the hands of a master of a vessel on which

she was a passenger. The evidence showed

gross neglect and wanton outrage on the part

of the master against the lady. In deliver-

ing the opinion of the court, the judge said:

“It is true, juries sometimes give what is

called smart-money. They are often war-

ranted in giving vindictive damages as a

punishment inﬂicted for outrageous conduct.

But this is only justiﬁable in an action

against the wrong-doer, and not against per-

sons who, on account of their relation to the

offender, are only coaasequentially liable for

his acts, as the principal is liable for the

acts of his factor or agent."

In Railroad Co. v. Rogers, 28 Ind. 1, it is

said: “Whatever rule of damages would ap-

ply in a suit against a natural person, ought

to apply in a suit against a corporation. Any

discrimination in that regard would shock

the public sense of impartial justice, and

would be an unjust innovation. The instruc-

tions, governing subordinate employees and

agents, may be devised in such utter disre-

gard of the rights of others, that obedience

to them will result in palpable wrong to in-

dividuals; whether it was so here was a

question for the jury,"—thtYs putting the

question whether the acts are done in obedi-

ence to instructions that the execution of

would result in palpable wrong.

Post Co. v. McArthur, 16 Mich. 447, was an

action by l\1('AI'thur for publishing an al-

leged libel. The court say: “The employ-

ment of competent editors, the supervision,

by proper persons, of all that is to be insert-

ed, and the establishment and habitual en-

forcement of such rules as would probably

exclude improper items. would reduce the

blame-worthiness of a publisher to a mini-

mum for any libel inserted without his priv-

ity or approval, and should conﬁne his lia-

bility to such damages as include no redress

for wounded feeling, beyond what is inevita-

ble from the nature of the libel. And no

amount of express malice in his employees
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should find for plalntlfr (now defendant), and
that the jury are not necessarily restrlcte4 to
Rctual damages, but may, in their discretion, award such exemplary damages as they
deem just and proper in view of all the facts
In the case." The court say, the facts did
not autho.rlze a punishment of the defendants, and the court below should have restricted them to compensatory damages, and
for this reason the judgment was reversed.
In the case of Hill v. Railroad Co., 11 La.
Ann. 292, the court used the following language: "In actions of this kind, it Is not
within the province of the jury, although
negligence Is clearly proven, to give vindictive damages, as is sometimes allowed in
case of willful and malicious Injuries. 'l'he
company, in such cases, le not to be pun-·
ished for the negligence of its agents as a
crime."
Keene v. Lizardi, 8 La. 27, was an action
brought to recover damages of defendants,
ship-owners, for injuries to plaintiff's wife,
at the hands of a master of a vessel on which
she was a passenger. The evidence showed
gross neglect and wanton outrage on the part
of the master against the lady. In delivering the opinion of the court, the judge said:
"It ls true, juries sometimes give what Is
called smart-money. They are often warranted In giving vindictive damages as a
punishment inflicted for outrageous c<>nduct.
But this Is only justifiable in an action
against the wrong-doer, and not against persons who, on account of their relation to the
offender, are only consequentially liable for
his acts, as the principal ls liable for the
acts of his factor or agent."
In Hailroad Co. v. Rogers, 28 Ind. 1, it ls
said: "\Vhatever rule of damages would apply in a suit against a natural person, ought
to apply in a suit against a corporation. Any
discrimination in that regard would shock
the public sense of Impartial justice, a.nd
would be an unjust innovation. The Instructions, governing subordinate employees and
agents, may be devised In such utter disregal'll of the rights <>f othe1·s, that obedience
to them will result In palpable wrong to individuals; whether it was so here was a
question for the jury,"-tht!!!I putting the
question whether the acts are done In obedience to instrnctions that the execution of
would result in palpable wrong.
Post Co. v. McArthur, lG Mich. 447, was an
action by l\frArthur for publishing an alleir(•d libel. '.fhe court sa.y: "The employment of competent editors, the supervl::iion,
by l>roper persons, of all that is to be Inserted. and the P.stablishment and habitual enforcement of such rules as would probably
exC'lude improper items, would reduce the
blame-wo1thiness of a publisher to a minimum for any libel Inserted without his prlvlty <>r approval, and should confine his liability to such damages as Include no redress
for wounded feeling, beyond what is Inevitable from the nature of the libel. And no

amount of express malice In his employees
should aggravate damages against him, when
he has thus purged himself from blame."
"While, therefore, In the present case the reporters were guilty of carelessness In receiving hearsay talk of legal charges, which
could only be lawfully published In accordance with the documentary facts, and while
there could be no justification for publishing
outside scandal against an Individual fl'om
any source whatever, yet the defendants
were <>nly responsible beyond the damages
recoverable under any circumstances, for
such a libel to tbe extent of their own conduct in the case, or want of care used In
guarding their columns against the Insertion
of such articles."
In the case of Railroad Co. v. Baum, before
cited, tlte court sav: "But when the act ls
unnecessary to the performance of the master's service, and not really Intended for that
purpose, but ls done by the servant to gratify his own malice, though, under pretense
of executing his employment, it ls not done
to serve the master, and Is not, in fact, within the scope of the employment, and the master ls not, therefore, liable." "Under these
circumstances, last enumerated, It is not easy
to perceive, in the nature of things, any just
reason tor h<>lding the master responsible.
It will not do to say he shall answer In damages, because by employing the servant he
gives him opportunity to maltreat those with
whom he comes In contact in discharging his
duties, that reason would hold the shop-keeper for any outrage committed by his clerk upon a customer; the merchant for the llke
conduct of his journeyman; and, Indeed,. it
would be equally applicable to almOfilt every
department of business in the conduct of
which 1t is neces.'Sllry or convenient to employ assistants to cleal with the publlc. Even
the inn-keeper, whose cook feloniously mingles poison with the ·foocl of a guest, must
tllen respond in damages."
In Kleen v. Railroad Co., 37 Cal. 400, the
court say: "As to the general rule upon that
subject there can be no doubt. If the act
of the conductor, in pulling the plaintiff ol'l
the cars was a wanton and malicious act,
committed out of the course of his agency,
the defendant cannot be held responsible for
the manner in which he did it, unless, however, the defendant expressly authorized the
act."
In the case of The Amiable Nnncy, 3 Wheat.
546, which was a suit for a marine trespass,
Mr. Justice Story, in delivering the opinion
ot the court, among other things snys: "Upon the facts disclosed in the evidence. this
must be pronounced a case of gross and
wanton outrage without any just provocation or excuse; under such circumstances, the
honor of the country and the duty of the
court equally require that a just compensation should be made to the unoffending neutrals for nll the injuries anu losses actually
sustained by them. And If this were a suit
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against the original wrong-doers, it might be

proper to go yet further and visit upon them,

in the shape of exemplary damages the prop-

er punishment which belongs to such lawless

misconduct. But it is to be considered that

this is a suit against the owners of a priva-

teer upon whom the law has, from motives of

policy, devolved a responsibility for the con-

duct of the oiiicers and crew employed by

them, and yet from the nature of the service

they can scarcely ever be able to secure to

themselves an adequate indemnity in cases

of loss. They are innocent of the demerit of

this transaction, having neither directed it,

nor countenanced, nor participated in it in

the slightest degree. Under such circum-

stances. we are of opinion that they are

bound to repair all real injuries and personal

against the original wrong-doers, it might be
proper to go yet further and visit upon them,
1n the shape ot exemplary damages the proper punishment which belongs to such lawless
misconduct. But it ls to be considered that
this is a suit against the owners ot a privateer upon whom the law has, from motives ot
]>Ollcy, devolved a responsibility tor the conduct of the officers and crew employed by
them, and yet from the nature ot the service
they can scarcely ever be able to secure to
themselves an adequate indemnity in cases
-of loss. They are innocent of the demerit of
this transaction, having neither directed It,
nor countenanced, nor particiP!lted in It in
the slightest degree. Under such circumstances, we are of opinion tlmt they are
bound to repair all real injurll'~ and personal
wrongs sustained by the llbl'llunts, but they
are not bound to the extent of vindictive
damages.''

wrongs sustained by the libelinnts, but they

are not bound to the extent of vindictive
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damages."

In Wardrobe v. Stage Co., 7 Cal. 118, the

jury found for actual and exemplary dam-

ages in the sum of $2,500. The chief jus-

tice, in delivering the opinion of the court,

quoted with approval the opinion of Judge

Story in The Amlabie Nancy, and said:

“When it appears that the coach at the time

of the accident was driven by a servant or

agent of the owner, the rule in such case is,

that the principal is liable only for simple

negligence, and that exemplary damages can-

not be enforced against him."

In the case of Moody v. McDonald, 4 Cal.

297, the facts were similar to the above, and

in the action brought against the principal

for tortlous acts of his servant, where the

jury gave $2,500 damages, and $2,500 smart-

money, the court disallowed the verdict for

the smart-money, holding the principal liable

only for compensatory damages.

In McLellan v. Bank, 24 Me. 566, the court

say: "The ﬁrst question obviously presented

by the case is, can a corporation aggregate

be chargeable with malice? Such corpora-

tions have been held answerable in trover;

and might, perhaps. in other actions sounding

in tort for all acts done by their oﬂiccrs un-

der circumstances implying authority to do

them. But it may well be doubted if such

corporations can be implicated by the acts of

their servants in transactions in which mal-

ice would be necessary to be found in order

to the sustaining an action against them

therefor."

Two cases are cited by Mr. Justice WAL-

TON as sustaining the rulings of the presid-

ing judge; one in New Hampshire, and one

in Mississippi.

In the (iise in New Hampshire (Hopkins v.

Railroad Co., 36 N. H. 1) the ruling com-

plained of was, “That if the jury should ﬁnd

the defendants guilty of gross negligence at

the time of the collision, and the plaintiff's

injury was occasioned by such negligence,

they might in their discretion give exemplary

-damages."

“To this

made:

In Wardrobe v. Stage Co., 7 Cal. 118, the
jury found for actual and exemplary damages In the sum of $2,500. The chief justice, In delivering the opinion of tlle court,
quoted with approval the opinion of Ju<li:e
Story In The Amiable Nancy, and said:
"When It appears that the conch at the time
Qf the accident was driven b.r a sernrnt or
agent ot the owner, the rule In such case Is,
that the principal Is liable only for simple
negligence, and that exemplary damages cannot be enforced against him."
In the rose of Moody v. McDonald, 4 Cnl.
297, the facts were similar to the above, and
in the action brought against the principal
for tortlous acts of hl.s servant, where the
Jury gave i2,[J()() damages, and $2,500 smartmoney, the court disallowed the verdict for
the smart-money, holding the principal liable
only for compensatory dnmageii.
In McLellnn v. Bank, 24 Me. 500, the court
say: "The first question obvlo11>1ly presented
by the case ls, can a corporation aggregate
be chargeable with malice"/ Such corporations have been held answerable In trover;
and might, perhaps, in other ll<"tions sounding
in tort for all acts done by their otttcers under circumstances Implying authority to do
them. But It ma.v well be doubted 11' such
corporatiom1 can be lmpllc11tcll by the acts ot
their servnnts In transactions iu which malice would be necessary to be found In order
to the sustaining an action against them
therefor."
Two cases are cited by ~fr. Justice WALTON as sustaining the rulings of the presiding judge; one in New Hampshire, and one
In Mississippi.
In the cnse In New Hampshire (Hopkins v.
Railroad Co., 36 N. H. 1) the rnling complained of was, "That If the jury should ftnd
the defendants guilty of gross negligence at
the time ot the collision, and the plaintiff's
injury was occasioned by such negligence,
they might In their discretion give exem1>lary
-damages."

"To this Instruction two objPctlons are
made:
(1) That It Is not a case tor e.xemplary
damages, because the negligence, which Is
the foundation of the suit, was the negligence
of the defendant's servants;
(2) Because the tacts ot the case disclose
no fraud, malice, vlolenee, cri1elty, or the like,
nor any turpitude or moral wrong."
Upon the last point, the court hold tllat
"gross carelessness In such case Implies a
heedless disregard tor lluman life, and for
the safety of passengers who intrust themselves to the care of the road, which brings
the case very strongly within the rule that
the wrong complained of, to warrant exemplary damages, must have something of a
criminal character."
In relation to the first objection the court
say: "Tue defendants a1·e a corporation, and
cn.u act In no way but by their officers,
agents, and servants; and when their officers, agents, or se1-yauts act within the scope
of their authority and employment, It Is the
act of the corporation, and their negligence
Is the nC'gligence of the coq1orntlon;" 11nc1
the~· clte Ang. & A. Prlv. Corp, 386, and
Clw:stnut Hill Turnpike v. llutter, 4 :::ierg. &
R. U.
It will be noticed that the learned clllet

justice, who drew this opinion. makes only
sucli acts of the agent, as are authorized by
the corporation, their acts. It Is such a~ are
within the scope of theh· authority rts well
ns e11111loyment. He does not say that unauthorized acts by the agent become the acts
of the principal. His proposition conforms
to the rules which we have hf'fore deduced
from the authorities. A recurrence to the authorities, cited by him, wlll show this. Section 38ti, Ang. & A. Prlv. Corp., which is cited.
reads ns follows: "Yet It Is somewhat remarkablcthat the question whether an action
of trespll8s would be against a corporation
should not. until within a very late period,
have been the subject of express judicial decision. In the case of l\Iaud v. Canal Co. It
was expressly decided by the English court
of common pleas, In 18~. that trespass wlll
lie against a. corporation. The action was
b1·ought for breaking and entei"iug locks on
a. canal, and seizing and carrying a wny bar- •
ges and coal. The trespasses, It was proved,
had been committed by an agent of the company, which was incorporated by an act ot
parliament, and the barges and coal, it appeared, had been seized tor tolls claimed to
be due them. The only question being
whether tre~pass would lie against a coqJoration ag:;:r<'gate for an act done by their
agent withiu the scope of their authority.
The court hP.ld, that when It Is established
that trover wlll Ile against a corporation,
there could be no reason why trespass should
not also lie against them; that it was impossible to see any distinction between the two
actions."
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This section which is cited relates alone to

the question whether or not trespass can be

maintained when the act done was within

the scope of their authority; that is the au-

thority conferred by the corporation, and it

is held, when the act is done by the author-

ity of the corporation, it is the act of the cor-

poration, and trespass will lie.

The next section. save one, which follows

(388) says: “It is of importance, however, to

be observed, that an action of trespass can-

not be sustained against a private corpora-

tion for an act done by one of its agents un-

less done communicate consilio, or, in other

words, unless the act has been directed, suf-

fered, or ratiﬁed by the corporation. A cor-

poration is liable for an injury done by one

of its servants in the same manner and to

the same extent only as a natural individual

would be liable under like circumstances.
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The well-known rule of law is, that if the

cause of an injury to a person be immediate,

though it happens accidentally, the author of

it is answerable in trespass as well as in

case; but a master, whether a natural indi-

vidual or an artiﬁcial one, is not liable for a

willful act of trespass of his servant."

With these authorities before him we can-

not wcll suppose he meant to include any

unauthorized act of the agent. He was too

good a lawyer to say that an act done

against the master's orders and directions

was the act of the master. Did these, how-

ever, leave us in doubt, what follows upon

the same page of his opinion would seem to

put the matter at rest, for he proceeds to

say: “Corporations may be sued in trespass

for the authorized acts of their servants;

and if- the trespass is committed by their au-

thority, with circumstances of violence and

outrage such as would authorize exemplary

damages against an individual defendant, it

is not easy to discover any ground for a dif-

ferent rule of damages against the corpora-

tion which the law charges with the conse-

quences of the act as the responsible party.

If a corporation like this is guilty of an act

or default such as, in case of an individual,

would subject him to exemplary damages,

we think the same rule must be applied to

the corporation."

This we understand to be in harmony with

all the authorities, and comes within the

ﬁrst class of cases to which I have referred.

The act is theirs, because done by their au-

thority. Being theirs, they are held as would

be an individual defendant. If unauthor-

ized, it is not their act, although they may,

upon other principles. be liable to compen-

sate for the injury done.

The ground upon which exemplary dam-

ages is allowed is, that the trespass is com-

mitted by their authority with such circum-

stances of violence and outrage as would an-

thorize exemplary damages against an indi-

vidual defendant. I regard the law, as stat-

ed by the chief justice, as directly sustain-

ing the views that I present, viz.: that to be

chargeable with the animus of the transac-

COMPENSATORY AND EXEMPLARY DA.MAGES.

This section which Is cited relates alone to
the question whether or not trespass can be
maintained when the act done was within
the scope of their authority; that is the authority conferred by the corporation, and It
Is held, when the act ls done by the authority of the corporation, it Is the act of the corporation, and trespass will lie.
The next section, save one, which follows
(388) suys: "It ls of importance, however, to
be observed, that an action of trespass cannot be sustained against a private corporation for an act done by one of its agents unless done communicato consilio, or, in other
words, unless the act has been directed, suffered, or ratified. by the corporation. A corporation ls liable for an injury done by one
of Its servants In the same manner and to
the same extent only as a natural Individual
would be liable under like circumstances.
The well-known rule of law Is, that If the
cause of an Injury to a person be immediate,
though It happens accldentn.lly, the author of
It ls answerable In trespass as well as In
case; but a master, whether a natural individual or an artlflclal one, Is not liable tor a
willful act of trespass of his servant."
With these authorities before him we cannot well suppose he meant to include any
unauthorized act of the agent. He wnB too
good a lawyer to say that an act done·
against the master's orders and directions
was the act of the master. Did these, however, leave us in doubt, what follows upon
the same page of his opinion would seem to
put the matter at rest, for he proceeds to
say: "Corporations may be sued ln trespass
fo1· the authorized acts of theh' servants;
and if. the trespass Is committed by their authority, with circumstances of violence and
outrage such as would authorize exemplary
dnmnges agnlnst an Individual defendant, It
Is not easy to discover any ground for a different rule of damages against the corporation which the law charges with the consequences of the act as the responsible party.
If a corporation like this ls guilty ot an net
or default such as, in case of an individual,
woulll subject him to exemplary damages,
we think the snme rule ruust be applied to
the corpora tlon."
This we m1!.lerstand to be In harmony with
1111 the nut horities, and comes within the
first class of cnses to which I have referred.
The act ls theirs, because done by their authol"ity. RPing theirs. they are held as would
be an individual defendant. If unauthorized. it ls not their act, although they may,
upon other 11rincipl<'s. be liable to compensate fo1· the injury done.
The ground upon which exemplary damages is allowed ls, that the trespass Is committed by their authority with such circurustanc:es of violence and outrage as would authorize exemplary damages against an individual defendant. I regard the law, as stated by the chief justice, as directly sustain-

Ing the views that I present, viz.: that to be
chargeable with the animus of the transac·
tlon, It must be theirs by previous authority,
direct or implied, or subsequently adopted or
ratified by them. The instruction in the
court below required the defendants to be
guUty of gross negligence to subject them to
exemplary damages; and the sum total of
the decision was that this was right, and
that If the act was done by the authority of
the defendants. it was the act of the principal. What evidence there was, if any, that
the defendants participated In the act which
produced the injury, does not appear; nor
does it appear tliat the jury found the defendants were guilty of gross carelessness.
All the remarks of the chief justice are made
upon the hypothetical case of an injury happening through the gross carelessness of the
defendant rorporatlon.
The case In Mississi11pl cnme before the
court on a motion to set aside the verdict.
The discussion in the opinion is upon the prop1·iety and uutho1·ity of the court to set aside
verdicts on account of the nmount of damages In those cases whe1·e there Is no fixed
rule of computation. nnd the authorities cited are almost all of them upon this point.
There was no ruling excepted to, and no
question of law presented. Upon the matter
of punitive damages, referred to by Judge
Walton In his opinion, they say: "The case
ls much stronger for the defendant in error,
than were the facts in the cnBe of Helm v.
Mccaughan, 32 Miss. 18. '!'he declson In that
Cl\se was conclusive in this, as to the form or
action as well as the right of the jury, in sucb
cases, to protect the public, by punitive damages, against the negligence, folly, or wickedness which might otherwise convert these
great public blessings Into the most dangerous nuisances."
It will be perceiYed that this case, so far
as any consideration of punitive damages
wns concerned, was regar<led as settled by
the case in 32 l\Iiss.
Looking at that case I find.it wns an action
brought for an act dotle by a partner. Heirn
with others were owners of a vessel. Grant,
one of the owners, was the captain. Thecourt say, by Hand, J.: "There was testimony tending to sllow that tile captain in
charge of the boat, which was published t<>
stop at Pascagoula at the time specified, willfully and capriciously disregarded the obligati(}n incurred by the publication, and that
the failure occasioned g1·eat bodily exposure,
and mental sulfet·ing and disappointment t<>
the plaintiffs (n(}w defendants); these circumstances were properly submitted to the jury,
to be considered by them, with the circumstan<?es of excuse or extenuation relied upon
by the defendants; and it was their province
to determine whether there was such fraud
or willful neglect of duty causing oppresslc>n
to the plaintiffs, and un<ler such circumstances of aggravation as to warrant exemplary
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damages. ‘This was the substance of the rul-

ings of the court upon this point, and we per-

ceive no error in them."

This is the case which decided all that was

said in 36 Miss. about punitive damages, and

was an action brought against several part-

ners for the act of one of them. The value

of this case, in support of the principle that

a railroad corporation may be punished for

the malice of an employee, cannot, I think,

be considered great, especially when, in the

case in the 36th, we ﬁnd this remark: “It

is not enough that, in the opinion of the

court, the damages are too high. It may not,

rightfully, substitute its own sense of what

would be a reasonable compensation for the

injury, for that of the jury." Since the opin-

ion in this case was drawn, and since writ-

ing this opinion, my attention has been di-

rected bv Mr. Justice WALTON to the case
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of Railroad Co. v. Blocher, 27 Md. 277, as

a case sustaining the ruling of the court in

the case at bar.

Upon an examination of that case, it will be

found that a diﬂlcuity arose between the con-

ductor of train upon the appellant's road and

appellee about his ticket; the one contend-

ing it had been surrendered to the conductor,

and the other averring it had not, and to

prevent being put off the train, the appellee

paid his fare; it subsequently appeared that '

he was right, and properly surrendered his

ticket when called upon so to do. He alleged

that the conduct of the conductor was vio-

lent and insulting.

At the trial of the case, the appellants re-

quested the court to instruct the jury as

follows:

“(7) If the jury believe the conductor

caught the appellee violently, etc., by the

collar and dragged him from his seat, while

a passenger in the train, the appellee is not

entitled to recover for the same in this action

against the appellants, unless they believe

the appellants authorized the act, and adopt-

ed and justiﬁed it since its committal.

“(8) That if the jury believe the conductor

wrongfully extorted from the appeiiee the

fare from Martinsburg to Baltimore, after

the appeilee had surrendered his-ticket, etc.,

the appeilee was not entitled to recover vin-

dictive or punitive damages from the appel-

lants, unless they expressly or impliedly par-

ticipated in the tortious act authorizing it be-

fore, or approving it after, it was com-

mitted."

Concerning these two requests, the court

say: “The conductors and employees of the

corporation represent them in the discharge

of these functions, and being in the line of

their duty in collecting the fare or taking up

tickets, the corporation is liable for any

abuse of their authority, whether of omission

or commission. Vide Redf. R. R. 381, note

6, and authorities there cited. The court

was, therefore, right in rejecting so much of

the defendants‘ prayers, as limited their lia-

bility to such tortious acts of their agents as

they had either personally authorized or sub-

damages. ,This was the substance of the rulings of the court upon this point, and we pereel ve no error In them."
This ls the case which decided all that was
8ald In 36 Miss. about punlUve damages, and
was an action brought against several partners tor the act of one of them. The value
of this case, in support of the principle that
a ralkoad corporation may be punished for
the malice of an employee, cannot, I think,
be considered irreat, especially when, In the
ease in the 36th, we find this remark: "It
ls not enough that, In the opinion of the
eourt, the damages are too high. It may not,
rightfully, substitute Its own sense of what
would be a reasonable compensation for the
Injury, for that of the jury." Since the opinion In this case was drawn, and since writing this opinion, my attention has been directed bv Mr. Justice WALTON to the casP.
of Railroad Co. v. Blocher, 27 :\Id. 277, ns
a case sustaining the ruling of the court In
the case at bar.
Upon no exrunlnatlon of that cnse, It will be
found tllllt a difficulty arose between the conductor of train upon the appellant's road and
appellee about bis ticket; the one contending It had been surrendered to the conductor,
and the other averring It had not, nod to
prevent being put otr the train, the appellee
paid his fare; It subsequently appeared that ·
he was rlgbt, and properly surrendered his
ticket when called upon so to do. He alleged
that the conduct of the conductor was violent and Insulting.
At the trln! of the case, the appellants re-<i uested the court to instruct the jury as
follows:
"(7) If the jury believe tl!e conductor
~ught tlre appellee violently, etc., by the
eollar and dragged him from his seat, while
.a paRSenger In the train, the 11ppellee ls not
eQtitled to recoTer tor the same In this action
against the appellants, unless they believe
the appellants authorized the act, and adopted and justified It since Its committal.
"(8) That it the jury believe the conductor
wrongfully extorted from the appellee the
fare from Martinsburg to Bnlthnore, after
the appellee hacl surrendered Ills· ticket, etc.,
the apvellee wus not entitled to recover vln·
dictive or punitive damages from the appellant&, unless they expressly or Impliedly participated In the tortlous act authorizing It before, or approving 1t after, lt was committed."
Concerning these two requests, the court
say: "The conductors and employeei;i of the
eorporatlon represent them In the di8chnrge
of these functions, and being In the line of
their duty In collecting the fare or taking up
tickets, the corporntlon Is Hable for any
abuse of their authority, whether of omission
or commission. Vlde Red!. R. R. 381, note
ti, an<l authorities there cited. 'l'he court
was, therefore, right In rejecting so much of
the defendants' prayers, as limited their lla-
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blllty to such tortlous acts of their agents as
they had either personally authorized or subsequently approTed."
The seventh and eighth prayers, requiring
the plalntltr to prove either previous authority or subsequent approval of the acts of the
conductor to render the defendant liable,
were rejected for rensone before assigned
(those above copied). "The prayer of the appellee dalms compensation.for injury to his
l'l'ellngs and degradation of character. The
appellant's eighth prayer affirms he le not
entitled to recover vindictive or punltory
damages against the company, unless they
expressly or lmplledly participated in the
tort, by authorizing It before, or app1·oving It
after. ",.e have alrC'ady declared our op1nion
on the latter branch of this proposition.
This court, In the case of Gaither v. Blowers,
11 Md. ;;;;2, sold, that where the injury was
accompanle<I with force or malice, the Injured party might recover exemplary damages. 'l'he action being vi et armls, or in
that chnn1cter, the jury were authorize<\ to
give whatever damages the evidence showed
the Immediate consequence of the w1•ong
warranted, and which necessarily resulted
from the act complained of. 2 Green!. Ev.
H 89, 254; McNamara v. King, 2 Gilman,
436; l\IcTaYlsh v. Carroll, 13 lid. 439."
This Is all that Is said upon this question.
I have quoted the requested Instructions, and
the remarks of the court upon them. The
conclusion of the court. and the law of that
case, ls found In these words: "The action
being vi et armls, or In that choracter, the
jury were authorized to give whatever damages the evidence showed the lmmedla te
consequences of the wrong warranted, and
which necessarlly resulted from the act complained of."
A careful examination of that c11se will disclose the fact that the question of damage
raised und decided, was whether the plalntltr h11d a right In such case to recove1· "for
Injury to his feelings, and degradation of
charncte1·." '!'his was the prayer of the appellee, and he asked no more, and no other
instruction was given. These were treated
as exemplary damages by the appellants, nml
they sought, by their request, to limit the
damages to the actual physical and pecuniary Injuries. An examination of the authorities cited IJy the court In their opinion will
lead to the conclusion that they regarded
that as the question, and considered such
damages exC'mplary damages. They cite Mr.
Grcenleuf fo1· the mle they lay down, nnd I
hnzard the opinion that Mr. Greenleaf UC\"Cl"
expected to be quoted as an authority fo1•
punitl\"e damages In civil actions. (Hee his
note to section '.!-33, volume 2, on Evidence.)
The case of Gaither v. Blowers, referred to,
goes no further than l\Ir. Greenleaf, and his
language, totldem verbls, ls used as the authority for the doctrine advanced.
Mr. Greenleaf, in the note refened to,
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speaking of the term “exemplary damages,"

as used by the courts in a case he is review-

ing, says: “From this and other expressions

it may well be inferred, that by actual dam-

ages the court meant those which were sus-

ceptible of computation, and that by exem-

plary damages or smart-money they intended

those damages which were given to the plain-

tiff for the circumstances of aggravation at-

tending the injury he had received, and go-

ing to enhance its amount. but which were

left to the discretion of the jury, not being

susceptible of any other rule."

The rulings, in the case at bar, covered all

these intangible matters before reaching the

point of punishing the defendant corporation.

They had been told “to consider the injury to

his feelings, his wounded pride, his wounded

self-respect, his mental pain and suffering oc-

Generated for facpubupdates (University of Michigan) on 2014-06-12 19:21 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/mdp.35112105421491
Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd-google

casioned by the assault, and the feeling of

degradation that necessarily resulted fromit."

This was going as far as the court in Mary-

land went or was asked to go, and does not

reach the ground of complaint in the case at

bar. I ﬁnd no evidence in it of a design togo

beyond this; the rule was declared in plain

terms to be such damages as “the evidence

showed the immediate consequence of the

wrong warranted, and which necessarily re-

sulted from the act complained of." This

certainly does not include damages by way

of punishing the defendants. Such damages

would not be the immediate consequence of

the wrong, and necessarily resulting from it.

Some comment is made concerning the re-

tention of Jackson in the defendant's em-

ploy. All that I ﬁnd, in the report of the

case concerning the matter, is a statement,

made by the plaintif f in his testimony, that

he had seen him several times since, in per-

formance of duties upon the train.

So far as any question arises upon the rule

of damages laid down in the instruction, it is

quite apparent this is perfectly immaterial,

and could be regarded, in any event, only as

remote evidence of ratiﬁcation. If he was

retained in their employ, we do not know un-

der what circumstances; possibly they were

such as would have furnished to the mind of

any reasonable man a perfect justitication;

sitting here. we must take the report as we

ﬁnd it. The opinion states that the jury un-

doubtedly regarded it as “a practical ratiﬁ-

cation and approval of his conduct." Could

they have done so if they had been correctly

instructed in the theory now advanced?

What was there to ratify? Yea, more, who

was there to ratify? If the servant is the

corporation, and the act of commission was

the act of the corporation, was there any-

thing to ratify? Was it not an original act

of the corporation? Did they ratify their

own act? If the act of commission was orig-

inally theirs, the act of retention was a sub-

sequent act, having no relation to the ﬁrst.

Did that infringe any right of his? If it

did, it was a new and substantive cause of

compnint not embraced in this declaration.

speaking of the term "exemplary damages,"
as used by the courts in a case he ls reviewing, says: "From this and other expressions
lt may well be Inferred, that by actual damages the court meant those which were susceptible of computation, and that by exemplary damages or smart-money they Intended
those damages which were given to the plaintifr fur the circumstances of aggravation attending the injury be had received, and going to enhance Its amount, but which were
left to the discretion of the jury, not being
susceptible of any other rule."
The rullngs, In the case at bar, covered all
these intangible matters before reaching the
point of punishing the defendant corporation.
They had been told "to consider the Injury to
his feelings, hie woundecl pride, his wounded
self-reispcct, bis mental pain and suliering occasioned by the assault, and the feeling of
degmdation that necessarily resulted from it."
Tl!ls was going as far as the court lo Maryland went or was asked to go, and does not
reach the ground ot complaint In the case at
bar. I find no evidence in it of a design to go
beyond this; the rule was declared in plain
terms to be such damages as "the evidence
showed the Immediate consequence of the
wrong warranted, and which necessarily resulted from the act complained of." This
certainly does not Include damages by way
of punishing the defendants. Such damages
would not be the immediate consequence <>f
the wrong, and necess1u·Uy resulting from It.
Some comment ls made concerning the retention ot Jackson in the defendant's employ. All that I find, in the 1·eport of the
case concerning the matter, Is a statement,
made by the plalntitr in his testimony, that
he had seen him several times since, In performance of duties upon the traln.
So tar as any question arises upon the rule
of damages laid down in the instruction, lt ls
quite apparent this ls perfectly immaterial,
and could be regarded, In any event, only as
remote evidence of ratification. It he was
retained in their employ, we do not know under what circumstances; possibly they were
such as would have furnished to the mind of
uuy reasonable man a perfect justification;
sitting laere, we must take the report as we
find It. The opinion states that the jury undoubtedly regarded 1t as "a practical ratitl<'ation and approval of hie conduct." Could
they have done so lt they had been correctly
Instructed in the theory now advanced?
What was there to ratify? Yea, more, who
was there to ratify? It the servant is the
corporation, nnd the act ot commission was
the act of the corporation, waa there anything to mtify? Was It not an original act
of the corporation? Did they mtlfy their
own net? If the act of commission was originally theirs, the act of retention wns a subsequent act, having no relation to the first.
Did thn t Infringe any right or his? It it
did, it was a new and sul>~tantive cause of

compalnt not embraced in this declaration.
It, however, the theory which is now advanced ls not only novel but unsound, and
that previous command or subsequent approval was necessary to warrant the Infliction ot punishment, the matter was ot vital
lmpo11ance, and the defendants should have
had the advantage of the instruction. It is
not quite right, I think, to now assume that
the jury regarded It ns a ratlficntlon. Possibly the gentlemen composing that jury were
not quite prepared to find that the gentlemen composing the administrative and executive departments <>f that corporation were
so lost to all that ls decent and honorable
among men, and so blind to their own inter-.
ests that they would justify an act condemned· by everybody. Giving full force to
the encomiums bestowed lo the opinion upon
juries, mle;ht we n<>t conclude that they
would be more likely to infer, trom the circumstances, that such amends had been ma.de
as honorable gentlemen would require, rather
than convict them of an act that any prison
convict would cry out against?
WUI It do to shield the verdict with that
which the jm-y were substantially told was
immaterial?
I have not c<>nsldered this case upon the
motion, or upon any tacts supposed to be
proved by the evidence reported, nor have I
considered the question whether, under the
plaintiff's declnratlon, he can recove1· upon
the grounds set forth lo the opinion. I have
only considered the rule advanced by the Instructions. Under this rule a railroad corporation may exercise all possible care ln the
selection o! servants, and strictly enjoin them
from day to day against any irregularity of
conduct; yet If <>ne of them, unmindful of
his duty, regardless of his master's interest,
and bent on exercising some private malice
against a person who happened to be a traveler, assaults him, the corporation must not
only make full compensation to1· all the injury, under the most liberal rules, but may
be punished for an act they have used every
endeavor within the res.ch of human power
to prevent. One committed by another,
against their wishes, interest. and positive
commands; and it is to be such a punishment as wlll "serve as a warning and example to others."
If we were punishing the actor himself, we
should consider the probable etrect of a given
punishment upon him; but when, for his offense, we punish another, how can we form
any idea ot the lnfiuence of a punishment he
cannot feel. The master may discharge him
from his employment, and he thus feel the
punishment another suffers Indirectly, and to
that extent. It will be perceived, however,
that this ls the extent for all classes, kinds,
and degrees ot offense. It is the only channel through which he can be ma.de to !eel It.
But suppose lt were otherwise, ls the punishment which ls inflicted upon the innocent
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party any the less keen, unjust, and onerous?

Is that in any degree affected by the man-

ner in which the offender receives the intelli-

gence of its inﬂiction upon another? Again;

how shall the corporation avoid the constant

recurrence of penalties for the offenses of

others? Can they, when they select another

servant, exercise any more care or be more

watchful over him? Can they change the

passions of men? What is their fault if they

have exercised all the care, wisdom, and pru-

dence with which men are invested? Must

they be punished for not being omnipotent?

If the idea and design of punishment is to

restrain the offender and make the punish-

ment serve as a warning to others, how can

it better be done than by making it personal;

inﬂicting it upon the offender? How can its

inﬂuence upon others be made more restrain-

ing than by the reﬂection that they must per-
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sonally suffer the same punishment it they

offend? Is the reﬂection that others will suf-

fer it, more potent with that class of individ-

uals? Has the observation of men led to

this conclusion? And if it has, have all the

principles of reason, right, and justice yield-

ed to it and made it right?

If the punishment, thus inﬂicted, is to serve

as a warning to others, who must take warn-

ing? Evidently the innocent as well as guilty.

The innocent are to be the greatest suffer-

ers by reason of the offense, and punished

alone directly. It is to serve as a warning

to all innocent persons, that they may be pun-

ished for the offenses of others. after having

fully compensated the injury done.

One other consideration I barely suggest.

The liability in this case is based upon a con-

tract; purely so. No liability could, under

the proof, arise by the rules of law applica-

ble to master and servant. Had the plaintiff

been a stranger to the defendants, and had no

claims upon them, except such as each citizen

owes to the other, no liability of any kind

would have attached to these defendants for

the willful trespass of their servant. Not

only would they be saved punishment, but

compensation even. Now it being a case

where no liability would attach, but for the

contract, and the liability which does attach

being for breach of contract. the rule in this

case is not only punishing one for the act of

another, but it is doing this in an action ex

contractu, for this declaration must be con-

strued to be such to meet the law of the opin-

ion.

All consideration of the matter tends to

show the fundamental error in holding an in-

nocent party liable to punishment. In all

these acts, done by the command of the

principal (whether the authority appears by

direct command or by fair implication from

the proceedings of the party charged), there

is propriety in punishing if the act be wrong

and an infraction of the moral code; but

in those cases Where the act is unauthor-

ized, and the principal is in nowise con-

nected with the animus of the actor, and

becomes liable to compensate upon grounds

party any the less keen, unjust, and onerous?
Is that in any degree affected by the manner in wWch the otfender receives the lntelllgence of Its lntllctlon upon another? .Again;
:Pow shall the corporation avoid the con~tant
recurrence of penalties for the otrenses of
others? Can they, when they select another
servant, exercise any more care or be more
watchful over him? Can they change the
oossions of men? What Is their fault If they
have exercised all the care, wisdom, aml prudence wl1h which men are Invested? Must
they be punished for not being omnipotent?
It the idea and design of punishment Is to
restrain the offender and make the punishment sen-e as a warning to othPrs, how can
It better be done than hy making It per!lonal;
lntlictlng It upon the oft'.euder? How can Its
intluence upon others be made more restraining than by the rettectlon that they must personally sulfer the same punishment If they
offend? Is the refiection that others will suffer It. more potent with that class of lnillviduals? Has the observation of men led to
tWs conclusion? And If It has, have all the
principles of reason, right, and justice yielded to It and made it right?
It the punishment, thus lnfilcted, is to serve
as a warulng to others, who must take warning? Evidently the Innocent as well as guilty.
The Innocent are to be the greatest sufferers by reason of the offense, and punished
alone directly. It is to serve as a warning
to all innocent persons, that they may be punished for the offenses of otLcrs, after having
fully compeDSllted the Injury done.
One other consideration I !Jarely suggest.
The liability In this case ls based upon a contract; purely so. No liability could, under
the proof, arise by the rules of law applicable to master and 11ervant. Hod the plalntitr
been a. stranger to the defendants, and had uo
claims upon them, except such as each citizen
owes to the other, no liability of any kind
would have attached to these defendants for
the willful trespass of their servant. Not
only would they be saved punishment. but
compensation even. Now It being a case
where no llabJllty would attach, but for the
contract, and the liability which does attach
being tor breach of contract, the rule In this

case Is not only punishing one for the act ot
another, but It Is doing this In au action ex
contnlctu, tor this declaration must be construed to be such to meet the law of the opinion.
All consideration of the matter tends to
show the fundamental error in holding an innocent party Hable to punishment. In all
these acts, done by the command of the
principal (whether the authority appears uy
direct command or by fair implication from
the proceedings of the party charged), there
Is propriety In punishing if the act be wrong
and an infl·actlon of the moral code; but
In tho8e cases 'there the act ls unautho1·ized, and the principal is In nowise connectL>d with the animus of the actor, aud
becomes liable to compensate upon grounds
other than that the act was done by bis
command, It appears to me that all punishment inflicted, or rather nil sufrerlng lmpo11ed under the name of punishment, is flagrant Injustice; It ls not punishment, for It
has not Its necessary antecedent, wrong: both
reason and authority are opposed to It, and
no case can be found, where the question has
been presented and discussed, In which such
doetrh.~es are not denounced as unsound and
unjul!t. In addition to the cases which I
have cited, there ls the pregnant fact that
no case can be found In :Massachusetts or
New York where It has ever had any sauctlon, even In the Inferior courts; and no cas&
can be found, t}:iat I nm aware of, where any
party has sought to establlsh any such rule
by an appeal to the superior courts or courts
of last resort In those states. Yet these
states are a net-work of ra.llroada, noo questions of liability are constantly arising and
being settled by the courts of those states.
It appears to me the fact has some slgnlflcance.
The rule established In this case Is l!O 1mportan t. and fraught with such results under
the ordinary modes of administering law,
that I have felt Impelled to enter my dissent
at length, and regret that the pressure of
other duties has prevented me from giving
a more extended examination of the authorities, and the compression of them and my
own vlew.s Into a narrower compe.&1.
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/my examination, hearing, or trial.

WHEELER & WILSON MANUF'G CO. et

al. v. BOYCE.

(13 Pac. 609, 36 Kan. 350.)

Supreme Court of Kansas. April 8, 1887.

Supreme Court of Kansas. April 8, 1887.

Error from Shawnee county.
""aters & Emnnlnger, for plaintiffs In era-or. G. N. Elliott, for defendant ln error.

Error from Shawnee county.

Waters & Ensminger, for plaintiffs in er-

ror. G. N. Elliott, for defendant in error.

JOHNSTON, J. This is a proceeding to

reverse a judgment rendered in an action

for glie_in_tEi,s_oAr_nent, brought by Jacob F.

Boyce against the Wheeler & Wilson Manu-

facturing Company, C. S. Baker, and J. W.

Hughes. Hughes was dismissed from the

action. and the judgment went only against

the plaintiff in error. The facts upon which

the case was disposed of are substantially

these: The Wheeler & Wilson Manufactur-

ing Company, a corporation organized for
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the manufacture and sale of sewing-ma-

chines, was engaged in business at Topeka,

Kansas, and C. S. Baker was its general

agent at that place. The company had sold

a sewing-machine to Mary Hatﬁeld, who

subsequently married Jacob F. Boyce, the

defendant in error. She paid a part of the

purchase money, and signed a contract, in

substance that the title to the machine

should remain in the company until the bal-

ance of the purchase money was paid. In

November, 1881, the company directed its

general agent to bring an action of repievin

against Mary Boyce to recover the machine,

claiming that there was a balance due there-

on, a claim which she denied. An action

-of replevin was begun before a justice of

-the peace, and a writ was issued and placed

.in the hands of Constable Hughes, who re-

ported that he had made search for the ma-

chine, and was unable to obtain possession

of it. C. S. Baker, the agent of the com-

pany, then directed Hughes to make and ﬁle

an afﬁdavit before the justice of the peace,

alleging that Mary Boyce and her husband,

Jacob F. Boyce, were in possession of the

-machine, and had refused to deliver it to

him, and thus obtain a warrant for their ar-

rest. This was done, and the justice issued

a warrant to the constable commanding him

to arrest Boyce and his wife, and commit

them to the Shawnee county jail, there to

remain until they should deliver the ma-

fchine. Under this warrant. Jacob F. Boyce

was arrested and placed in jail without be-

ing taken before the justice, and without

The con-

stable informed the general agent of the

company that he had arrested Boyce, and

placed him in the county jail as requested,

and Baker replied: "Now, I guess he will

give up the machine." The repievin action

resulted in a judgment in favor of Mary

Boyce. Jacob F. Boyce was held in the

county jail for 10 days, and was never

taken before any court or oﬂicer for exam-

ination or trial, and was ﬁnally discharged

at the instance of the plaintiffs in error, and

he became sick in consequence of his con-

JOHNSTON, J. This ls a proceeding to
c-e,·erse a judgment rendered ln an action
for false imprisonment, brought by Jacob F.
Ho,l-Ce against the Wheeler & Wilson Manufacturing Company, C. S. Baker, and J. W.
Hughes. Hughes was dismissed from the
action. and the judgment went only against
the plaintiffs In error. The facts upon which
the case was disposed of are substantially
these : The Wheeler & Wilson l\innufacturlng Company, a corporation organized for
the manufacture and sale of sewing-machines, was engaged In business at Topeka,
Kansas, and C. S. Baker was its general
agent at tilat place. The company had sold
a sewing-machine to Mary Hatfield, who
subsequently married .Jacob lo'. Boyce, the
defendant In error. She paid a pni-t. of the
purchase money, and signed a contract, In
substnnce that the title to the mnehine
should remain ln the company until the bal·
ance of the purchase money was paid. In
November, 1881, the company directed .its
general agent to bring an action of replevln
.against Mary Boyce to recover the machine,
claiming that there was a balance due there-On, a claim which she denied. An action
of replevln was begun before a justice of
the peace, and a writ wns Issued and placed
.tn the hands of Constable Hughes, who reported that he had made search tor the machine, and was unable to obtain possession
ot tt. C. S. Baker, the agent of the company, then directed Hughes to make and fl.le
an affidavit before the justice of the peace,
alleging that :\Iary Boyce and her husband,
Jacob F. Boyce, were In possession of the
machine, and had refused to deliver It to
him, and thus obtain a warrnnt for their ar·rest. This was done, and the justice issued
a warrant to the constable co111111aadlng him
to arrest Bo~'ce and his wife, and commit
them to the Shnwnee county jail, there to
remain until they should deliver the mafchlne. Under this wnrront..Tncob lf'. Bovee
·was nrrestecl nml placed In jail without helng taken before the justice, and without
,Jl!IY exnmlnntlon, hearing, or trial. The constable Informed the general agent of the
company that he hnd arrested Boyce, and
placed him In the county jail as requested,
and Baker replied: "Xow, I gul'ss he will
give up the machine." The re11levln action
resulted In a judgment In favor of Mary
Boyce. Jacob F. Boyce was held In the
county jnll for 10 days, and was neYer
taken before any comt or ottlcer for exam·
lnatlon or trial, and was finally dischargell
0

at the Instance of the plaintiffs In error, and
he became sick In consequence of his confinement. He at once Institute~ this action,
and the jury awarded him damages In the
sum of $1,000, and the verdict was approved
by the trial court.
The plainti!Ts In error eomplaln chiefly of the
rulings of the court In the matter of charging
the jury. The jury were Instructed that, If the~
evidence justlfied It, they coulcl find exemplary.
damages or smart-money against the defend- \
ants. After the jury had been Out some
time, and had practically agreed upon their
verdict, the court recalled them, and advised them that he was In err•Jr In gil'ing the
Instruction that they mii:-ht In their discretion assess exemplary damages, and withdrew it-from the jury, telling them that In
their deliberatlous they should ._.consider
the Instruction withdrawn. Objection was
made to the wlthd1·a wal of the Instruction,
and an application of plaintl!Ts in errar for
leave to addt'ess the jury after the :i.1oliificatlon had been made was denied, and this
ruling Is assigned ns el'ror. 'l'his decision'
affords the plalntift's In error no ground fo~
complaint. The action of the com·t was favorable rnther than prejudkial to theit' lnte1·ests. The Instruction given was predi·
cated upon sufficient facts, was warranted
under the Jn w, and the defendant In error
alone had reason to complain of its wlthdra wal. It Is a well-established principle of
jurisprudence that corporations may be held
Hable for torts involving n. wrong Intention, such as false lmpl'isoument; and ex·
emplary damages may be recovered against
them for the wrongful acts of their ser\"·
ants and agents done In the course of their
employment, In all eases and to the same ex·
tent that natural pel'sons committing like
wrongs would be held liable. In such cases · ~
·
the malice and fraud of the authorized ' ·
agents are Imputable to the corpot'll.tlons for\
which they acted. '.l'his principle is too well
settled to require argument, and the authorities sustaining It are numerous and well·
nigh unanimous. Hailroad Co. v. Slusser,
19 Ohio St. 157; Rnlll'Oad Co. v. Dunn, 19
Ohio St. 162; Goddard v. Railway, 57 Me.
202; Hailroad Co. v. Quigley, 21 How. 213;
Railroad Co. v. Arms, 91 U. S. 489; Rallr<>ad Co. v. Balley, 40 lliss. 3D:J; Railroad
Co. v. Blocher. 27 l\Id. 277; Hopkins v. Railroad Co., 36 N. H. 9; Railroad Co. v. Hammer, 72 Ill. 3:J3; Reed v. Bank, 130 Mase.
443; Fenton v. !\Iachlne Co., 9 Phlla. 189;
Goodspeed v. Rnnk:, 22 Conn. 530; Boogher
v. Assodation, 7::> !\lo. 31!); 'Wheless v. Bank,
1 Baxt. 469; Jordan v. Railroad Co.. 74
Ala. S:J; Willinms Y. Insurance Co., 57 Miss.
759; Vance v. Hnilway Co., 32 N. J. Law,
334; Cooley, Torts, 119; 3 Suth. Dam. 270,
and cases cited; 2 Walt, Act. & Def. 447,
and cases cited. The same doctrine has
been fully recognized on seYernl occasions by
this court. Hailroad Co. v. Rice, 10 Kan.
437; Railway Co. v. Weaver, 1G I\:an. -!:JU;
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Railway Co. v. Kessler, 18 Kan. 523; Ball-

way Co. v. Little, 19 Kan. 269; News Co. v.

Wiimarth, 33 Kan. 510, 6 Pac. 786. The

withdrawal of the instruction, although er-

roneous, was beneﬁcial to the piaintiffs in er-

ror, and there can be no reversal unless the

erroneous ruling is injurious to the party

complaining.

It is next contended that the company can-

not be held liable for the wrongful acts of

Baker and the constable, and an instruction

is challenged which holds that, if the agent

of the company caused and procured the lllei-

gal arrest and detention of the defendant in

error as charged, the company and its agent

were both liable. Baker was the mana'gin

agent of the company; his authority was

general, and the constable act§I wholly un-

de‘r’ his direction and sanction. He had not,
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only authority to sell machines, and collect

the money due for the same, but it is con-

ceded that he had authority to institute le-

gal proceedings to recover possession of the

machines conditionally sold, and for which

payment had not been made in accordance

with the terms of sale. . The arrest and de-

tention of Boyce was incidental to the re-

plevin action, and was made, as alleged, to

compel the delivery of the machine under a

provision of the Justices' Code relating to

replevin, which provides that where the de-

fendants, or any other persons, knowingly

conceal the property replevied, or, having the

control thereof, refuse to deliver the same

to the oﬂicer, they may be committed until

they disclose where the property is, or de-'

liver the same to the oﬂlcer. Comp. Laws

1879, c. 81, § 69. He had full authority to

represent the company, and whatever was

done by him was done for the beneﬁt of the

company, and for the accomplishment of its

purpose. His act, although wrongful, was in

the line of his employment. was done in the

execution of the authority conferred upon

him, and must be regarded as the act of the

company. To make the corporation respon-

sible, it is not necessary, as plaintiffs in er-

ror contend, that the principal should have

directly authorized the particular wrongful

act of the agent, or should have subsequently

ratiﬁed it. Judge Story, in treating of the

liability of principals for the acts of their

agents, says that “the principal is held liable

to third persons in a civil suit for tile frauds,

deceits, concealments, misrepresentations,

torts, negligences, and other malfeasances or

misfeasances and omissions of duty of his

agent in the course of his employment, al-

though the principal did not authorize or jus-

tify or participate in, or, indeed, know of

such misconduct, or even if he forbade or

disapproved of them," and to sustain this he

cites numerous authorities. “In all such

cases," he says, “the rule applies, respondeat

superior, and it is founded upon public policy

and convenience, for in no other way could

there be any safety to third persons in their

dealings, either directly with the principal,
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Railway Co. v. Kessler, 18 Kan. 523; Rail- or Indirectly with him through the Instruway Co. v. Little, 19 Kan. 2G9; News Co. v. mentality of agents." Story, Ag. I 452.
Wllmarth, 33 Iinn. 510, 6 Pac. 786. The
They complain, further, of an Instruction
withdrawal of the Instruction, although er- In which the court stated that the watT8.llt
roneous, was benefl.clal to the plalntltrs ln er- under which Boyce was taken and held In
ror, ai1d there can be no reversal unless the custody was Illegal and v<>ld, and lnsumclent
erroneous ruling ls Injurious to the party ' In law to justify his arrest and- Imprison(!Omplalnlng.
ment. The warrant, ns we have seen, was
It ls next contended that the company can- Issued upon an amdaYlt charging Boyce with
not be held llable for the wrongful acts of! having coutrol of the property replevled, nn.l
Baker and the constable, and an lW!tructlon of refusing to dellver It to the officer who
Is challenged which bolds that, lf the agent had the writ. There wns no process Issued
of the company caused and procured the lll~ except the warrant, and lt commanded that
gal arrest and detention of the defendant I~ he be committed at once to the county jail
error as charged, the company and Its agen~ until he shoulrl deliver the prO'perty to the
were both Hable. Baker was the mnna'gingl-. officer. No notice was glveu to him that the
agent of the company; his authority was charge stated In the aflldaYlt bad been made
general, and the constable actw wllolly un- against him, n<>r was an opportunity given
der'bls direction nnd sanction. He bad not, him to refute It. The order ot commitment
only authority to sell machines, and collect' was not based upon any examination, hea1·the money due for tile same, but It Is con- lng, or trial, but was arblt111rlly made, In
<:eded that he hnd authority to Institute le- the absence of Boyce, upon ex parte stategal proceedings to recover possession of tile ment. 'l'he plaintltrs In error attempt to jusmachines conditionally sold, and for which tify this action, though not seriously, we
payment hnd not been made In acco1'tlance think, under section 139 of the Justices' Code,
with the terms of sale. '.rhe arrest and de- already referred to, which reads as follows:
"Whenever it shall be made to appear, to the
t~ntlon of Boyce was Incidental to the replevin action, and was made, as alleged, to sntlsfactlon of the justice, by the affidavit
rompel the delivery of the machine under a of the plalntltr or otherwise, that the defendprovision of the Justices' Code relating to ant, or any other person, knowingly conceals
replevin, which provides that where the de- the prope1'1:y sought to be recovered, or, llavfendants, or any other persons, knowingly lug control thereof, refuses to deliver the
ronceal the property replevled, or, having the same to the omcer, the justice may commit
(!(lntrol thereof, refuse to deliver the same such defendant or other person until he or
to the ofilcer, they may be committed until they disclose where such property ls, or dethey dlsclose where the property ls, or de- , llvel' the same to the offtcer." '.rhe proceedllver the same to the omcer. Comp. Laws ing authorized by this statute Is virtually one
1879, e. 81, f 69. He hnd full authority to for the punishment of contempt. Whether
l'epresent the company, and whatever was a party Is to be brought before the justice
<lone by him was done for the benefit of the. of the peace upon a notice or by attachment,
company, and for the accomplishment of Its or what the lnltlnl proceeding shall be, ls not
purpose. His act, although wrongful, was In expressly provided. The section quoted does
the llne of his employment, was done ln the provide what punishment shall finally be visexecution of the authority conferred upon ited upon a party; but this punishment Is
hlm, and must be regarded as the act of the not to be administered until the guilt of the
company. To make the corporation respon- party ls "made to appear to the satisfaction
sible, It Is not necessary, as plnlntlffs ln er- of the justice." This language Implies that
ror contend, that the principal should hnve there ls to be a hearing and an adjudication
directly authorized the particular wrongful of the charge upon Its merits. When a conact of the dgent, or should have subsequently tempt Is committed ln facle curlre, the punratified lt. Judge Story, ln treating of the IE'hment ls generally summary, and no lnlliability of principals for the acts of their tlal proceeding ls required; but, when it is
agents, says that "the principal ls held liable not committed in the view of the court, the to third persons In a civil suit for tl~ frauds, lnltln.l proceedings are necessary, and the
de<'elts, concealments, misrepresentations, party must have notice and opportunity to
torts, negligences, and other malfeasances or defend. The most common Initial process
mlsfP.asances nnd omissions of duty of bis
Is a rule or order to show cause why nn atagent In the course of his employment, al- tachment or warrant for contempt should not
though the prlncl1lnl did not authorize or jus- Issue, of which service should be made; and,
tify or participate In, or, Indeed, know of In a proceeding to punish for criminal consuch misconduct, or even If he forbade .or tempt, personal notice ot the accusation Is
disappro>ed of them," and to sustain this be lndh1pemmble. Wlmteyer procedure may be
cites numerous authorities. "In nil such adopted, It Is certain that a party cannot be
roses," be says, "the rule applies, respondent condemned without notice: and a final judgsuperior, and it ls founded upon public policy ment rendered, as was done In this case,
and convenJence, for ln no other way could without a hearing or an opportunity to dethere be any safety to third persons In their fend, ls void. Rap. Contempt, § 06. While
deallngs, either directly with the pl'iucipnl, the language of the statute ls not very ex- 1
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pliclt, it does not require the interpretation

contended for, and, it‘ it did, it would neces-

sarily be held void.

The ﬁnal error assigned is that the dam-

ages awarded are excessive. This assign-

ment is as groundless as those already con-

sidered. The case is an aggravated one, and

the conduct of the plaintiffs in error exhibit-

ed a wanton and reckless disregard of the

rights of the defendant in error. He was

not a party to the replevin action, and the

testimony is that the machine in controversy

was purchased long before he was married

to the plaintiff in that action, and that he

had no interest in or control over it. He was

thrust into jail, without warning or trial,

when there was no civil or criminal suit

pending against him, and kept there for 10-

days with 17 or 18 prisoners who were ei- “
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ther charged with or convicted of crimes.

The sewing-machine sought to be recovered

from his wife had been paid for, and belong-

ed absolutely to her; and plaintiffs in error,

with knowledge oif this fact, undertook to

compel the payment of money not due, or

the recovery of property which they did not

own, by the arrest and incarceration of the

defendant in error, without cause, and in a

manner that was clearly illegal. Apart from

the loss of time and interruption to his busi-

ness, as well as the humiliation and indigni-

ty suffered by him by being thrust into jail

upon a false charge, it appears that the con-

ﬁnement resulted in his sickness; and when

we consider the malicious and oppressive

conduct of the plaintiffs in error, and that

the case‘ is one which calls for the inﬂiction

of exemplary or punitive damages, we can

only conclude that the verdict of $1,000 in

favor of the defendant was fully justiﬁed,

if not too small. We can say without hesita-

tion that an award of a larger amount would

not have been disturbed on the ground that

it was excessive.

It follows that the assignments of error

must be overruled, and the judgment of the

district court afﬁrmed.

All the justices concurring.

COMPENSATORY AND EXEMPLARY

pllclt. It does not require the Interpretation
contended for, and, if 1t did, lt would necessarily be held void.
The final error assigned Is that the damag<lS awarded are excessive. This assign·
me;;::.t Is as groundless as those already considered. The case is an aggravated one, and
the conduct of the plaintiffs In error exhibit·
ed a wanton nnd reckless disregard of the
l'ights of the defendant in error. He was
not a party to the replevln action, and the
testimony is that the machine In contl'Oversy
was purchased long before he was married
to the plaint!!! ln that action, and that he
had no Interest in or control over It. He was
thrust Into jall, without warning or trial,
when there was no civil or criminal suit
pending against him, and kept there for 10 .
days with 17 or 18 prisoners who were either charged with or convicted of crimes.
The sewing-machine sought to be recove1·ed
from his wife had been paid for, and belong·
ed absolutely to her; and plaintiffs In error,
with knowledge o~ this fact. undertook to
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compel the payment of money not due, or
the recovery of property which they did not
own, by the arrest and incarceration of the
defendant In error, without cause, and In a
manner that was clearly illegal. Apart from
the loss of time and Interruption to his business, as well as the humiliation and indigni·
ty suffered by him by being thrust Into jail
upon a false charge, It appears that the confinement resulted in his sickness; and when
we consider the malicious and oppressive
conduct of the plalntltrs In error, and that
the case is one which calls for the intlictlou
of exemplary or punitive damages, we cau
only conclude that the verdict of $1,000 in
favor of the defendant was fully justified,
if not too small. We can say without hesitation that an award of a larger amount would
not have been disturbed on the ground that
it was excessive.
It follows that the assignments of error
must be overruled, and the judgment of tho
C!lstrlct court affirmed.
All the justices concurrina:.
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proper Instructions. They were told: "If
the jury believe from the evidence that the
defendant's agenta or employes, or any of
Court of Appeals of Kentucky. Mnrch 5, 1887. them, in charge of defendant's train, carried
the plnlntlll' beyond the station for which
Appeal from circuit court, Marlon rounty. she had purchased a ticket, and refused to
Wm. Lindsay and Rountree & Lisle, for put her off at her station, and were lndec0rous
appellant. Hill & Rives, for appellee.
or Insulting, either ln words, tone,Orlliauner, they should find for the plaintiff, and
HOLT, J. The appellee, Lou. E. Ballard, awarll her .damages In their discretion, not
after purchasing a proper ticket, took pas- exceeding tlve thousand dollars, the amount
sage fr<>m one Intermediate .station to an- claimed lu the petition."
other, upon a passenger train of the Loulsvlll!!
A corporation can act only through nat.
& Nashville Railroad. It failed to stop at ural persons. It of necessity commits ltB
the platform at her place of destination, which business absolutely to their charge. They
was a 11.ag station. It was a down grade at are, however, selected by It. Iu the case of
that point, and there Is some evidence tend- a railroad, the safety and comfort of pasing to show that the car brakes did not op- sengers ls necessarily committed to them.
erate well, In consequence ot which the train They act tor It. Its entire power, pro ha.c
ran some 00 or 60 yards beyond the platform, vice, ts vested In them. and as to passengers
where It was stopped, and the station then In trnnsltu they should be c<>nsldered as th~
announced by the proper person, but the corporation ltselt. It ls therefore as re.1pou;
appellee did not get otr the train. Upon the sible tor their acts In the conduct of the train•
other hand, there ls testimony tending to show and the treatment of the passengers, as the
that this stop was not made, anll that no officers of the train would be for themselves~
etrort was made to stop the train, until tt It they were th.,e owners of It. \Public luterJ
was done at the request of the appellee, at ests require this rule.' They atso demand
a point between her destination and the next that the corporation should be and it is liastation. The weight of the evidence shows ble for exemplary damages In case of an
that the conductor then informed her that Injury to a passenger resulting from a violashe could either go on to the next station, or tion of duty by one of its employM In the
be would stop the train and she could get otr conduct of the train, If It be aecompanied by
there; and that, upon bis so telling her the oppression, fraud, malice, Insult, or other will- !
aecon4 time, be did stop It, and she got otr ful misconduct. evincing a reckless disregard ·
at th&t point, which was a lonely place, and of consequences. Dawson v. Louisville & N.
about a mile beyond her station.
R. Co., 6 Ky.
Rep. 008.
She says that the conductor "seemed very
As to female passengers the i-ule goee
impatient, and bis ton& was rather rough still farther. Their contract of passage emfor a gentleman;" that be did not assist ner braces an implied stipulation that the cory
ln getting otr with her baggage, which con· poratlon will protect them against general
Blsted of a valise and bundle; and that, as obscenity, lmmooest conduct, or wanton apshe jumped from the lower step of the plat- proach. Com. v. Pow~. 7 Mete. (Ma.ss.) 596.
form to the ground, be stooll upon the plat- Craker v. Railway Co., 36 Wis. 657; Nieto
f orm, while a brakeman of the train, who v. Clark, 1 Clift'.. 145, Fed. Cas. No. 10,262;
was standing by, looked at her and "grinned." Chamberlain v. Chandler, 3 Mason, 242, Fed.
Upon the other hand, there ls evidence to Cas. No. 2,u75.
the eaect that the conductor did assist her
It was Improper, however, to Instruct the
out ot the car, and WWI altogether kind and jury, as was In etrect done In this Instance,
polite In bis manner. There was no requ
that "indecorous" conduct alone ls sufficient
upon her part that the train should be back
to authorize exemplary damages. The term
ed to her station, but this should have been ls too broad. It may embrace conduct which
done, under the circumstances. The appel- would not authorize their lnfllction. It ls
lee was compelled to walk back to her sta- true that the pecullar element which, entertion, and from thence, three-quarters of a ing Into the commission of wrongful acts,
mile, to her home, In consequence of which justifies the Imposition of such damages, canshe was confined to her bed the most of the not be so definitely defined, perhaps, as to
tlme for three or four days, and unn ble to meet every
that may arise. It has been
teach her school for a week. 'l'he jury in salcl that they are allowable where tbcwrongtb1s action by her tor damages returned a ful act bas been accompanied with "circumverdict for $3,000.
stances of aggravation," (Chiles v. Drake, 2
Manifestly It cannot be sustained upon tbe Mete. [Ky.] 146;) or If a trespass be "commitground that It did not include exemplary ted In a high-handed and threatening mandamages, and was compensatory only, for a ner," (Jennings v. Maddox, 8 B. Mon. 430;)
breach of the ce>ntract for transportation. If or where the tort ls "accompanied by oppresupheld, It must be upon the ground that she sion, fraud, malice, or negligence so great IUI
was entitled to exemplary damages, and that to raise a presumption of malice," (Parker v.
thla question was submitted to the jury by Jenkins, 3 Bush, 587;) or, as was said In
LOUISVILLE & N. R. CO. v. BALLARD.

COMPENSATORY AND EXEMPLARY DAMAGES.

(3 S. W. 530, 85 K.r. 807.)
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LOUISVILLE & N. R. CO. v. BALLARD.

(3 S. W. 530, 85 Ky. 307.)

Court of Appeals of Kentucky. March 5, 1887.

Appeal f1om circuit court, Marion county.

Wm. Lindsay and Rountree & Lisle, for

appellant. Hill & Rives, for appellee.

HOLT, J. The appeilee. Lou. E. Ballard,

after purchasing a proper ticket, took pas-

sage from one intermediate station to an-

other, upon a passenger train of the Louisville

& Nashville Railroad. It failed to stop at

the platform at her place of destination, which

was a ﬂag station. It was a down grade at

that point, and there is some evidence tend-

ing to show that the car brakes did not op-

erate well, in consequence of which the train

ran some 50 or 60 yards beyond the platform,

where it was stopped, and the station then

announced by the proper person, but the
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appellee did not get off the train. Upon the

other hand. there is testimony tending to show

that this stop was not made, and that no

effort was made to stop the train. until it

was done at the request of the appeiiee, at

a point between her destination and the next

station. The weight of the evidence shows

that the conductor then informed her that

she could either go on to the next station, or

he would stop the train and she could get of

f

there; and that, upon his so telling her the

second time, he did stop it, and she got off

at that point, which was a lonely place, and

about a mile beyond her station.

She says that the conductor "seemed very

impatient, and his tone was rather rough

for a gentleman;" that he did not assist her

in getting off with her baggage, which con-

sisted of a valise and bundle; and that, as

she jumped from the lower step of the plat-

form to the ground, he stood upon the plat-

form, while a brakeman of the train, who

was standing by, looked at her and “grinned."

Upon the other hand. there is evidence to

the effect that the conductor did assist her

out of the car, and was altogether kind and

polite in his manner. There was no reques

upon her part that the train should be back

ed to her station, but this should have been

done, under the circumstances. The appel-

lee was compelled to walk back to her sta-

tion, and from thence, three-quarters of a

mile, to her home, in consequence of which

she was conﬁned to her bed the most of the

time for three or four days, and unable to

teach her school for a week. The jury in

this action by her for damages returned a

verdict for $3,000.

Manifestly it cannot be sustained upon the

ground that it did not include exemplary

damages, and was compensatory only, for a

breach of the contract for transportation. if

upheld, it must be upon the ground that she

was entitled to exemplary damages, and that

this question was submitted to the jury by\

proper instructions. They were told: “If

the jury believe from the evidence that the

defendant's agents or employes, or any of
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Dawson v. Railroad Co., supra, where the

wrongful act is accompanied by “insult, indig-

nity, oppression, or inhumanity."

It would, however, be extending the rule

unwarrantably to hold that they could be

imposed provided the conduct was merely

“indecorous." This, as deﬁned by Webster,

and as commonly understood, means impolite,

or a violation of good manners or proper

breeding. It is broad enough to cover the

slightest departure from the most polished

politeness to conduct which is vuigar and

insulting. It does not necessarily, or, indeed,

generally, involve an insult. The latter as-

sumes superiority, and offends the self-re-

spect of the person to whom it is offered,

while the former excites pity or contempt for

the one guilty of it. A word or act may be

both indecorous and insulting, but yet it

often lacks the essential elements of an in-
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suit.

In the ease now under consideration the

jury may have believed it was indecorous in

the conductor not to stop the train at the

platform, or not to carry her valise for her

when she was leaving the train, or to let

her get off between stations, although she

chose to do so rather than suffer inconveni-

ence by being carried to the next one, or in

merely telling her that she could walk back

to her station; yet none of these things

amounted to “insult, indignity, oppression, or

inhumanity."

The lower court properly refused the re-

quest as made for special ﬁndings. The in-

terrogatories offered merely required the jury

to say what amount they found as compensato-

ry, and what sum as exemplary damages. They

involved mixed questions of law and of fact.

Upon a retrial the question of limiting the

ﬁnding to compensatory damages should be

presented to the jury under proper instruc-

tions. and the difference between them and

those which are exemplary deiined.

The evidence as to the conduct of the brake-

man was competent. It is true that it was

not speciﬁcally complained of in the petition,

but only that of the conductor. The brake-

man was, however, one of the agents of the

railroad company in the management of the

train upon which the appellee was a passen-

ger. It is riot necessary that a petition should

enumerate speciﬁcally that this or that per-

son connected with the management of the

train was guilty of improper conduct in order

to authorize the admission of evidence as to

this or that particular party. It is suﬂicient/I

\

to aver the breach of duty upon the part of

those in control of the train. Besides, in this

instance, the conduct of the brakeman com-

plained of was in the immediate presence of

the conductor, and occurred at the time of

the other alleged acts of which the appellee

complains. We do not mean to say whetner

he was guilty of improper conduct or not,

but it was a part of the rm%az, and there-

fore admissible. Any circumsta ces attending

the commission of a trespass or a wrong, al-

Dawson v. Railroad Co., supra, where the
wrongful act ls accompanied by "Insult, indignity, oppression, or Inhumanity."
It would, however, be extending the rule
unwarrantably to hold that they could be
imposed provided the conduct was merely
"Indecorous." This, as defined by Webster,
and as commonly understood, means impolite,
or a violation ot good manners or proper
breeding. It Is broad enough to cover the
slightest departure from the most polished
politeness to conduct which Is vulgar and
insulting. It does not necessarily, or, indeed,
generally, Involve an Insult. The latter assutnes superiority, and olfends the self-respect of the person to whom it is otrered,
while the former excites pity or contempt for
the one guilty ot It. A word or act may be
both Indecorous and Insulting, but yet It
often lacks the essential elements ot an Insult.
In the case now under consideration the
jury may have believed it wns Indecorous in
tl1e conductor not to stop the train at the
platform, or not to carry her valise tor her
when she was leaving the train, or to let
her get olf between stations, although she
chose to do so rather than sutrer inconvenience by being carried to the next one, or In
merely telling her that she could walk back
to her station; yet none of these things
amounted to "Insult, indignity, oppression, or
Inhumanity."
The lower court properly refused the request as made for special findings. The interrogatories olfered mereiy required the jury
to say what amount they found as compensatory, and what sum as exemplary damages. They
Involved mixed questions of law and of tact.

Upon a retrial the question of limiting the
finding to compensatory damages should be
presented to the jury under proper Instructions. and the difference between them and
those which are exemplary defined.
The evidence as to the conduct of the brakeman was competent. It ls true that It WU
not specifically complained of ln the petition,
but only tllat of tlie conductor. The brakeman wn.~. llowever, one of the agents of the
railroad company In the management of the
train upon wll,lch the appellee was a passenger. It Is not necessary that a petition should
enumerate specifically that this or that person connected with the management of the
train was guilty ot Improper conduct In order
to authorize the admission of evidence ll.8 to
this or that particular party. It Is sufficlen'f1
to aver the breach of duty upon the part o: \
those In control of the train. Besides, In this
Instance, the conduct of the brakeman complained of was In the Immediate presence ot
the conductor, and occurred at the time of
the other alleged acts of which the appellee
complains. 'Ve do not mean to say whetner
he was guilty of Improper conduct or not,
but It was a part of the r~tre. and therefore admissible. Any circumstances attending
the commission of a tres1Jass or a wrong, althou~h not set forth In the declaration, may
be given In evidence, with a view of all'ect.
Ing the question of damages, save where
they within themselves constitute an Independent cause of action. Sedg. Dam. side p.
538, note 3.
•
For the reason Indicated, the judgment below Is reversed, and cause remanded for a
new trial and further proceedings consistent
with this opinion.

COllPEN'SATORY
CO.\IPENSATORY AND EXEMPLARY DAMAGES.
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SOUTHERN KANSAS R. CO. v. RICE.
(16 Pac. 817, 38 Kan. 398.)
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SOUTHERN KANSAS R. CO. v. RICE.

(16 Pac. 817, 38 Kan. 398.)

Supreme Court of Kansas. Feb. 11, 1888.

Error to district court, Johnson county; J.

P. Hindman, Judge.

Action brought by Benjamin Rice against

the Southern Kansas Railroad Company on

October 31, 1885, to recover as damages the

sum of $1,000 for being unlawfully assaulted

and ejected from a passenger car by the con-

ductor thereof while returning from Kansas

City, Missouri, to Olathe, in this state; the

plaintiff at the time having a ticket to ride as

a passenger in the car. Subsequently therail-

road company ﬂied an answer containing a

general denial. Trial had at the \Iarch term,

1886. The jury returned a verdict for the

plaintiff, and assessed his damages at $117.-

46, and also made the following special ﬁnd-
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ings of facts: “(l) Did the conductor act

willfully, and in a grossly negligent manner,

in putting the defendant off the train? An-

swer. He willfully put him off the train.

(2) Did the conductor act with a reckless dis-

regard of the plaintiff's rights? A. Yes. (3)

Did the plaintiff state to the conductor thathe

had purchased his ticket the day before, and

could the conductor have easily ascertained

that fact from the passengers who were ac-

quainted with plaintiff? A. In this case he

could. (4) How much do you allow plaintiff

as exemplary damages? A. $71.75." “First.

How much do you allow plaintiff for pe-

cuniary loss? A. $.71. Second. Was plain-

tiff injured in person by the conductor? A.

No. Third. How much do you allow plain-

tif f for injury to his person? A. Nothing.

Fourth. Did plaintiff lose any time by reason'

of defendant's conductor refusing to honor

his ticket, and, if so, how much? A. No.

Fifth. How much do you allow plaintiff for

loss of time? A. Nothing. Sixth. How much

do you allow plaintiff for inconvenience in

going from his seat to the platform and back

again? A. Nothing. Seventh. Was plaintiﬂ'

treated in an insulting or brutal manner by

the conductor? And, if so, state fully how.

A. An insulting manner. Eighth. How much,

if anything, do you allow plaintiff for injury

to his feelings? A. $10.00. Ninth. How

much, if anything, do you allow plaintiff for

expenses, attorney's fees, or time in prosecut-

ing this case? A. $35.00." The defendant

ﬁled a motion to set aside the verdict of the

jury, and for a new trial, which was over-

ruled. Subsequently, judgment was entered

Supreme Court of Kan8118. Feb. 11, 1888.
Error to district court, Johnson county; J.
P. Hindman, Judge.
Action brought by Benjamin Rice ngnlnst
the Southern Kansas Railroad Company on
October 31, 1885, to recover as damages the
sum of $1,000 for being unlawrully assaulted
and ejected rrom a passenger car by the conductor thereof while returning from Knnsns
City, Missouri, to Olathe, In this state; the
plaintiff at the time having a ticket to ride as
a passenger In the car. Subsequently the railroad company flied an answer containing a
geneml denial. Trial had at the ~larch term,
1880. The jury returned a verdict tor the
plaintltr, and assessed his damages at $117.·
46, and also made the following special findings of tacts: "(l) Did the conductor net
~illfully, and In a grossly negligent manner,
m putting the defendant otr the trnln? Answer. He willfully put him off the tmln.
(2) Did the conductor act with a reckless dlRregard of the plalptlff's rights? A. Yes. (3)
Did the plaintiff state to the conductorthnt be
had purchased his ticket the day betol·e, and
could the conductor have cu111ly asce1·talned
that tact from the passengers who were acquainted with plaintiff? A. In this case be
could. (4) How much do you allow plalntll!
as exemplary damages? A. $71. 73." "First.
How much do you allow plaintiff tor pecuniary loss? A. $.71. Second. Was plaintiff Injured In person by the conductor? A.
No. Third. How much do you allow plnln·
tiff for Injury to his person? A. Nothing.
Fourth. Did plaintiff lose any time by reason'
of defendant's conductor refusing to honor
his ticket, and, It so, bow much? A. No.
l<,ifth. How much do you allow plalntltr tor
loss of time? A. Nothing. Sixth. How much
do you allow plalntlt? tor Inconvenience In
going from his seat to the platform and back
again? A. Nothing. Seventh. Was plalntlft"
treated In an Insulting or brutal manner by
the conductor? Aud, If so, state fully how.
A. An Insulting manner. Eighth. How much,
It anything, do you allow plulntltr tor Injury
to his feelings? A. $10.00. Ninth. How
much, It anything, do you allow plaintiff tor
expenses, attorney's fees, or time In prosecuting this case? A. '35.00." The defendant
filed a. motion to set aside the verdict of the
jury, and for a new tl'lal, which was overruled. Subsequently, judi:mcnt wns t'ntered
upon the verdict. The rnlh·on1l company ex·
cepted, and brings the case here.
Geo. R. Peck, A. A. Hurd, and Robert Dunlap, tor plaintiff In errol'. John T. Little
and Samuel T. Seaton, for defendant in error.

upon the verdict. The railroad company ex-

cepted, and brings the case here.

Geo. R. Peck, A. A. Hurd, and Robert Dun-

lap, for plaintiff in error. John 'l‘. Little

and Samuel T. Seaton, for defendant in error.

HORTON, C. J. (after stating the facts as

above). On October 29, 15553, Benjamin Rice,

a colored man, purchased of the ticket agent

of the Southern Kansas Railroad (.‘ompany

at Olathe, in this state, for 50 cents, a lim-

ited railroad ticket to Kansas City, Missouri,

and return, good for three days; the date of

HORTON, C. J. (after stntln~ the fncts as
above). On Octobe r 29, 188:-., Benjamin Hice,
a colored man, purchased of the ticket a~ent
of tbe Southel'll Kam:as Hailruad Cumpauy

1
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at Olathe, In this state, tor 50 cents, a llm·
lted railroad ticket to Kansas City, Missouri,
and return, good for three days; the date of
Issue being stamped on the back. On that
day he was carried as a passenger by the
railroad ~rupany upon one of Its passenger
trains from Olathe to Kansas City. The
"going coupon" of the ticket wns torn oil'
and taken up by the conductor of the train'.
On the next day, October 30th, Rice, desiring
to retul'll to Olathe, boarded one of the pas·
senger tmins of the company, which left
Kansas City about 10 o'clock p. m.. and,
when the conductor called upon him tor his
tare, presented the "return coupon" or the
ticket, which he hnd purchased the day before. The· conductor took It to the light,
and, after examining· It, han1led 1t back to
Rice, saying It was not good, and informed
him that he could not honor It. Rice Insisted
that the ticket was good, and said to the conductor that be had purchased the ticket the
day bctore, and that he (the conductor) had
carried him upon the tlclrnt to Kansas City
on that day. Another passe11ger also stated
to the conductor, at the time, that he had
seen Rice purchase the ticket on the 2<Jth
The conductor replied that he could not hono;
the ticket, and subsequently took hold of
Rice's coat-collar, and led him out of the car.
Rice had no money to pay any extra fu1·e;
and when be was off the car, or about to get
off,a friend gave him 75 cents, which he gave
to the conductor, who retm·ned him 5 cents,
punched a receipt tor his tare, and permlttl>d
him to ride to Olathe.
On the part of Rice, It Is contended that the
ticket he presented showed plainly on Its
back that it was stamped at Olathe on the
29th of October; that he told the conductor
that he did not have any money to pay any
more fare; that be was quietly in his seat
as a passenger when ordered by the conductor to leave the trn.ln; that he did not make
any forcible resistance to the orders of the
conductor; but that the conductor took him
out ot the cul', and otr upon the steps of the
platform. On the part of the railroad company, It is claimed tlmt the ticket had been
folded up and creased at the date; that the
conductor took It to the light, and examined
It carefully; that the date was oblltemted ·
that the ticket looked so old and worn that
the conductor believed It had expired; that
he Informed Rice that the ticket was not
good, and that he could not ride upon It, but
woulJI have to pay fare; that, when the train
r<>nched Holliday, the comluctor Inquired 01'
Hice what be was going to do; that Rice
then refused to pay fare or get ol! the train;
that the conductor then took bold of Rice's
cont-collar, and led him to the platform or
the station, or. to the last step of the car;
that then a friend told Hice to come I.Jack
and be would give him money to pay hi~
fare; and the conductor permitted Hice to
tnke his sent and ride to his destination;
tllat, when Rice was Informed that he would
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have to pay his fare or leave the car, it was

his duty to do one or the other; that he

should have paid his fare, and relied upon

his remedy to recover it back; that. if he

could not do this, he should have quietly

left the train, and not provoked or made nec-

essary an assault; that therefore he should

have recovered only 71 cents, that amount be-

ing the sum assessed by the jury for his pe-

cuniary loss.

The railroad company asked instructions

which tended to limit the amount of dam-

ages that Rice was entitled to recover to the

exact fare paid by him, with interest thereon.

The court refused to give these instructions,

but directed the jury, among other things, as

follows: “I instruct you that if you ﬁnd the

plaintiff presented to the conductor for his

passage a limited ticket, good only for three

days from the date of its sale; and that the

Generated for facpubupdates (University of Michigan) on 2014-06-12 19:21 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/mdp.35112105421491
Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd-google

conductor, from the mutilated and worn con-

dition of the ticket, was unable to read the

date on the ticket, and honestly believed that

' the ticket was an old one. and not good;

and for this reason, and without any unnec-

essary force or indignity to the plaintiff, re-

quired him to pay his fare or get off, and

did, upon refusal and failure to pay fare. re-

move said plaintiff without any unnecessary

force, and without injury to his person, to

the platform of the car, or to the platform or

ground at a regular station; and then plain-

tiff paid his fare, and continued his journey

on the same train, and without delay,—then,

if you ﬁnd as a fact that the ticket presented

by plaintiff was a good and valid ticket, and

that the conductor had no right to collect

this fare from the plaintiff, you must ﬁnd a

verdict for the plaintiff, and the measure of

his damages would be the amount of fare .

paid by him, with interest at seven per cent.

per annum from October 30th, 1885, and ac-

tual compensation for the injury and outrage, ‘

if any, suffered by plaintiff from the alleged '

assault." We perceive no error in this in-

struction. Inactions for the recovery of dam-

, ages for the wrongful expulsion of a passen-

ger from a train, the passenger may recover

for his time, inconvenience, the rm-essary ex-

penses to which he is subjected, and if treat-

ed with violence, or in an insulting manner,

for the injuries to his person and feelings.

If the expulsion be malicious, or through ‘

negligence which is gross and wanton, then

exemplary damages

“There is a special duty on the carrier to

protect its passengers, not only against the

violence and insults of strangers and co-pas-

sengers, but, a fortiori, against the vio-

lence and insults of its own servants; and

that for a breach of that duty he ought to

be compelled to make the amplest reparation.

The law wisely and justly holds him to a

strict and rigorous accountability. We would

not relax in the slightest degree this strict

accountability. VVe know that upon it, in no

small degree, depends the safety and com-

fort of passengers." Railway Co. v. Weaver,

16 Kan. 456; Railway Co. v. Kessler, 18

COMPENSATORY AND EXEMPLATIY DAMAGES.

have to pay his fare or leave the car, It was 16 Kan. 456; Railway Co. v. Keesler, 18
his duty to do oue or the other; that he Kan. 523. We-fully concede that no one has
should have paid his tare, and relted upon a right to resort to force to compel the perhis remedy to recover It back; that, if he formance ot a contract made with him by
could not do this, he should have quietly another; and a passenger about to be wrongleft the train, and not provoked or viade nec- fully expelled from a railroad train need not
essary an assault; that therefore he should require force to be exerted to secure his
have recovered only 71 cents, that amount be- rights, or increase his damages. l!'or any
ing the sum assessed by the jury for his pe- brooch of contract or gross negligence on the
part of the conductor, or the other employ~s
cuniary loss.
The railroad company asked instructions of a railroad company, redress must be
wlJlch tended to Umlt the amount of dam- sought in the courts, rather than by the
ages tilat Rice was entitled to i·ecover to the strong arm of the person who thinks himself
exact fare paid by him, with Interest thereon. about to be deprived of his rigilts. A pasThe court refused to give these inst:ructlons, senger should not be permitted to invite a
but dlrectP.d the jury, among other things, as w1·ong, and then complain of it. Hall v.
follows: "I Instruct you that If you find tile Railroad Co., 15 Fed. 57; Townsend v. Railplaintit'f presented to the conductor for hie road Co., 56 N. Y. 301; Bral1shaw v. Railroad
passai:e a limited ticket, good only for thr.ee Co., 135 Mass. 409; Railroad Co. v. Connell,
days from the date of Its sale; and that the 112 Ill. 296; Car Co. v. Reed, 75 lll. 125; 3
conductor, from the mutilated and worn con- Wood, Ry. Law, § 3G4. Of course, a party
dition of tile ticket, was unable to read the upon a train may resist when, under the cll'date on the ticket, and honestly believed that cumstances, resistance ls necessary for the
the ticket was an old one. and not good; p1·otectlon of his life, or to prevent probable
and for this reason, and without any unnec- serious injury; nor can a party be lawfully
essary fo1·ce or indignity to tile plalntit'f, re. ejected from a train whlle in motion, so that
quired him to pay his fare 01· get ot'f, and his being put off would subject him to great
did, upon refusal and failure to pay fare. r'1- peril. In this case Rice made no unreasonmove said platntilf without any unnecest1Ury able resistance. He did not resort to force
force, and without injury to his person, to or violence. Having a good ticket, and be·
th.a platform of the ca1·, or to the platform or Ing entitled to ride, he refused to pay fare
ground at a regular station; and then plain- or get off the train. The conductor had no
tiff paid his fare, and continued his journey difficulty in leading him off, and about all
on the same train, and without delay,-then, that Rice did was merely to assert his lawful
If you find as a fact that the ticket presented right to ride upon the trRin. Where a pas-}
by plalntlt'f was a good and Yalid ticket, and eenger with a clear right and a clean ticket ·
that the conductor had no right t<> collect is entitled to ride on that trip and train,
this fare from the plalntlt'f, you must find a and is wrongfully ejected without forcible
verdict for the plnlntlt'f, and the measure of resistance upon his part, the jury are, and
his damages would be the amount of fare ought to be, allowed g1·eat latitude in assesspaid by him, with interest at se>en per cent. ing damages. They should a ward liberal
per annum from October 30th, 188;), and ac- damages in full compensation for the Injuries
tual compensation for the Injury anu outmge, received. The quiet and peaceable behavior
If any, suliered by plaintiff from the allei:ed of a passenger ls to hie advantage, rather
assault." \Ve perceive no error in this in- than to hie detriment.
struction. Inactions for the recovery of damC<>mpla!nt ls also made of other instrucages for the wrongful expulsion of a passen- tions or the court regarding the measure of
ger from a train, the passeni:er may recover damages. Among othf'r things, the court
for his time, inconvenience, the necel>sary ex- said tci the jury that if "the assault was
pen11es to which he ls subjected, and If treat- malicious, and without cause or provocation,
ed with violence, or In an Insulting manner, or was acc<>mpanled by acts of gross insult,
for the Injuries to his person and feelings. outrage, or opp1·eselon, you may award the
If the expulsion be malicious, or through plaintilf exemplary or Yindictlve damages."
negligence which Is gross and wanton, then Also, "that in estimating damages they might
exemplary damages may be awarded. ' take into consideration the indignity, insult,
"There is a special duty on the carrier to and injury to plaintlt'f'e feelings by being
protect Its passeni:ers, not only against the publicly expelled." Further, that, if they
violence and lnsult1:1 of strangers and co-pas- found "there was on the part of the conductsengers, but, a fortiori, against the vio- or either malice, gross negligence, or oppreslence and Insults of Its own ser>ants; and sion, they would not be confined in fixing
that for a breach of that duty he ought to damages to the actual damages received, but
be compelled to make the amplest reparation. were justified In giving exemplary damages.•r
The law wisely and justly holds him to a It Is said that these instructions were misstrict 11.lld rigorous a ccountuuility. We would leading and erroneous, because there was no
not relax In the slightest degree this strict evidence whatever to show that the conaccountability. We know that upon it, in no ductor acted with malice <>r gross negligence.
small degree, depends the safety and com- Upon the evidence of Hice, corroborated by
fort of passengers." Railway Co. v. Weaver, McCulloch, another passenger, who said that
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he saw Rice purchase the ticket on October

29th, there was evidence before the jury up-

on which to found these instructions. Huf-

ford v. Railroad Co. (Mich.) 31 N. W. 544.

The forcible expulsion of Rice from the car

where he was rightfully seated was such a

wrong as is inevitably accompanied with

more or less outrage and insult. There was

‘no excuse for the act of expulsion, except the

honest mistake or the gross negligence of

the conductor. If that mistake was due to

such reckless indifference to the rights of a

passenger on the part of the conductor as

established gross negligence, amounting to

wantonuess, and the jury so found, they

might ﬁnd exemplary damages. Railroad Co.

v. Kessler, supra; Railroad Co. v. Rice, 10

Kan. 426. Whether the conductor was gross-

ly negligent, amounting to wantonness, or

actuated by malice, were matters before the
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jury, for their determination upon the evi-

dence. Under the authority of Titus v. Cor-

kins, 21 Kan. 722, Rice was entitled to re-

cover the expenses incurred by him in the

litigation, iif entitled to exemplary damages.

Hall v. Railroad Co., 15 Fed. 95—97. The

amount of the verdict in this case was only

$117.46; therefore the damages are not so ex-

cessive as to indicate passion or prejudice on

the part of the jury. The other matters sub-

mitted are immaterial.

The judgment of the district court will be

aﬂirmed.

All the justices concurring.

~ eaw Rice purchase the ticket on October
29th, there was evidence before the jury upon which to found these Instructions. Hu.ttord v. Railroad Co. (Mich.) 31 N. W. 544.
The forcible expulsion of Rice from the car
·where he was rightfully seated was such a
wrong as ls lnevital>ly accompanied with
\more or less outrage and Insult. There was
,no excuse for the act of expulsion, except the
honest mistake or the gross negligence of
the conductor. It that mistake was due to
such reckless lndltrerence to the rights of a
passenger on the part of the conductor as
established gross negligence, amounting to
wantonness, and the jury so found, they
might find exemplary damages. Railroad Co.
v. Kessler, supra; Railroad Co. v. Rice, 10
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Kan. 426. Whether the conductor was grossly negligent, amounting to wantonness, or
actuated by malice, were matters before the
jury, for their determination upon the evl·
dence. Under the authority of Titus v. Corkins, 21 Kan. 722, Rice was entitled to recover the expenses Incurred by him In the
litigation, If entitled to exemplary damages..
Hall v. Railroad Co., 15 I!'ed. 93-97. The
amount of the verdict in this case was only
$117.40; therefore the damages are not so excessive as to Indicate passion or prejudice on
the part of the jury. The other matters submitted are Immaterial.
The judgment of the district court wlll be
affirmed.
All the justices concurring.
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(23 S. 'E. 443, 117 N. O. 565.)

‘ rier for pay.

HANSLEY v. JAMESVILLE & W. R. CO.

(23 S. E. 443, 117 N. C. 565.)

Supreme Court of North Carolina.

Oct 22,

18!>5.

Supreme Court of North Carolina. Oct 22,

On petition for reheating. Denied.
1895.

On petition for rehearing. Denied.

Chas. F. Warren and L. T. Beckwith, for

petitioner. John H. Small, \Iat-Rae & Day,

Chns. F'. ·wnrren and L. T. Beckwith, fot
petitioner. John H. Smnll, )Iaelln.e & Day,
and W. B. Rodwap., for defenduJJ.t.

and W. B. Rodman, for defendant

.

FURCHES, J. This is a petition to rehear

this case, decided at September term, 1894.

of this court, and published in 115 N. C. 602,

20 S. E. 528. The defendant is a corpora-

tion under the laws of this state running and

operating its road between the towns of

Washington and Jamesville, transporting

gines, and they were old, worri, and in bad

condition. That plaintif f is entitled to com-
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pensatory damages there can be no doubt,

but as to whether he is entitled to exem-

plary damages is the question. It is said

that railroads are quasi public servants; tha(

they are created by the public (the legislature‘

and owe duties to the public in return for their

right of franchise. And, while this is true, it

can only be considered by us as a reason for es-

tablishing the law as we shall ﬁnd it, and not

1 as a reason for us to establish the law. Nor

can we consider the question as to whether de-

fendant's road is a poor corporation, strug-

- gling for existence, and expending all its

both freight and passengers as a common car- '

The plaintiff, a citizen of

Washington, wanting to go to the town of

Edenton and back, on the 7th of September,

1892, purchased a ticket of defendant to James-

ville, and from Jamesville back to Washing-

ton on the 9th. The defendant carried plain-

tiff to Jamesville on the 7th, and he went

on to Edenton, and was in that town on the

8th of September. (It is not stated in this

case that plaintiff went to Edenton, and was

there on the 8th, but this was stated and

agreed to by counsel on the argument.) On

the 8th of September, soon after leaving

Jamesville for Washington, the axle of de-

fendant's engine broke, and when the plain-

tiff returned from Edenton to Jamesville on

the 9th the defendant was unable to carry

him on its road from Jamesville back to

Washington, as it had contracted to do.

Therenpon plaintiff brings this action for

damages, which he lays at $500, and alleges

tha. del'endant's rondbed was in a bad. shack-

ly, and ruinous condition; that defendant

had but two engines. both of which were

worn and in bad condition, one of them at

that time being in the shops for repair. and

not in a condition to be used; that the bad

condition of defendant's roadbed had rattled

the other one so as to cause the axle, to .

break; that all this showed such willful neg- '

ligence on the part of defendant towards the

public and towards the plaintiff as to entitle

him, not only to compensatory damages,

but to exeniplury damages. The defendant

answered. denying the allegation of negli-

FURCHES, J. This Is a petition to rehear
this case, decided at September term, 180-l,
ot this court, and published In 115 N. C. 602,
20 S. E. 528. The defendant ls a corporatlon unde1· the laws ot this state running and
operating its road between the towns of
'Vashlngton and Jamesville, transporting
botb freight and passengers as a common carrier for pay. The plalntilI, a. citl1.t>n of
\Vashlngton, wanting to go to the town of
Edenton and back, on the 7th of September,
1Sll2, purcha8ed a ticket of defendant to Jamesville, and from Jamesville back to Wa11hlngton on the 9th. The defendant carried plulntitI to ,Jamesville on the 7th, and be went
on to Edenton, and was In that town on the
8th of September. (It ls not stated In this
ca11e that plalntl.lf went to Edenton, and was
there on the 8th, but this was stated and
agreed to by counsel on the argument.) On
the 8th ot September, soon after leaving
Jamesville for Washington, the axle of defendant's engine broke, and when the plaintlft' returned from Edenton to Jamesville on
the Dtb the defendant was unable to carry
him on Its road from Jamesville back to
Washington, as It had controcted to do.
Thereupon plnlntlll' brings this action for
damages, which be lays at $:".00, and alleges
thn, defendant's roodbeti was In a bad. shuckly, and ruinous condition; that defrndant
bad but two engines. both of which werf'
worn and ln bad condition, one of them at
that time being In the shops for repair, nml
not In a condition to be used; that the hail
condition ot defl>ndunt's roadbed had ruttlecl
the other one so as to cause thi: axle ._to
b1·rok; that all this showed such willful negllgence on the part of defendant towards the
1mhlic and towards tlle plniutltr us to entitle
him, not only to com11ensatory damages,
l1ut to exenwlary damages. The defendant
answl're11. 1lPnyin"' the allegation of nei.:ll·
gen<·<'. admits that the road was not In good
condition, says it was poor and struggling
for e:s.istenef. and that it was expending the
whole earnings of the road, and more, In
t1·ylng to keep lt Ix: good repair, and was
not a·hle to do so. Therefore defendant denles that It ls liable to plaintiff for anything,
ancl certainly not for punitive damages.
.And, without reviewing the evidence, It Is
such as to warrant us In saying that the roadbed was In a bad, dilaphlated, and ruloous
condition; that defendant bad but two en-

glnes, and they were old, worn, and In bad
condition. That plaintiff ls entitled to com.
pensatory damages there can be no doubt,
but as to whether he ls entitled to exemplary damages ls the question. It ls sal<f
that mllroads are quasi public servants; thn•
they are crented by the public (the leglslatur<''
and owe duties to the public In rehll'Il for their
right ot franc·hlse. And, while this Is true, It
can only be considered by us as a reason for es' tabllshlng the law as we shau find It, and not
' as a reason for us to establish the law. Nor
can we consider the question as to whether defendant's road Is a poor corporation, struggllng tor existence, and expending all Its
' earnings, and more, on its road; or whether
It ls a rich corporation. These are questions
we bnve no right to consider ln pai:slng upon
the question of law ns to whether plalntltr
Is entitled to 1·ecover dnmages against clefendant or not. Taylor v. Rallrnad Co., 4~
N. H. 317.
The legal question involved in this ca11e Is
, conceded to be nu Important one, and Is
entitled to our best conshleratlon. It ls one
that hns been so much discussed by lnw
' writers and by the courts in judicial oplnIons, In which dHTerent phases or facts ap' pear, that It is somewhat dlfllcult to estabIish om·selves on what we consider solid
gi·ouud. Often a very slight dift'erence In the
facts changes the reason upon which a case
ls decided. We find that decided cases, unless
, cki;:ely attended to, are often misleading. 1 Also often a misunderstanding of some ot
! the factt1, or an Inadvertence to some fact; In
the case, leads to error. This, we think, was
the case with the learned justice who wrote
the opinion we are now reviewing. In stat, Ing the facts in Purcell's Case, 108 N. C. 414,
12 S. E. 954, 956, he stoted that when the
' defendant's tmln passed the depot It "waa
~ overloaded," when there was evidence tendIng to show that there was room for a number ot other passengers; and this was the
hn1othesis upon which the court wns asked
to cha!";!(' the jury. and wllieh was refused
by the t•ourt. This lnndvert<>ncP. RS we think,
led the court to overruli:> P1m·dl's Cose, •mpra. After as full Investigation as we have
be<>n nllle to give to this case, we are or the
opinion that the true groun<t for nllowlng
exemplory damages is lll'rsonal Injury to
plaintiff, caused by the ne~ligence of dt>fendnnt (and we do not undertake here to
enumerate all tl1e mus.es for exemplary damages where there Is per~onnl injury). And
where there ls no 1wrsonnl injury, there mu~t
be in.suit, lmllgnlty. cCJntempt, or something
()f tlie kind, to which the law Imputes bod
motive towards a plulntltr; aml when they
!l.l'f' allowed they are in addition to compen~tory damages.
1 Sedg. Dom. 520; 5 Am.
& Eng. Enc. Law, p. 43, note, and cases
cited. This principle we find is recognized
and enforced In the following roses: A.
railroad conductor kissed a lady passenger
on bis train, and she was allowed to rej
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cover punitive damages, upon the ground that

it was a personal indignity. 5 Am. & Eng.

Enc. Law, p. 43. Where a railroad con- ;

ductor refused to carry a passenger after he

had paid his fare, the road is liable to ex-

emplary damages. 3 Suth. Dam. §§ 935, 937.

This is upon the same ground. Plaintiff is

not entitled to exemplary damages unless

there is a willful or intentional violation of

plaintiffs personal rights. Railroad Co. v.

Arms, 91 U. S. 489. Where a railroad car-

ried a lady passenger a few handred yards

beyond the station, and upon application of

the passenger refused to hack the train to the

station. but put the passenger out ins driving

rain, with her infant child and baggage, the

defendant was held to be liable to punitive

damages. But this was put upon the ground

of personal indignity and insult, as all the
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cases we have cited are; and the fact that

the passenger could not use her umbrella,

got wet, and was sick from the effects. wa

only allowed in evidence upon the measure

of damages. But the grammes of the ac-

tion was the personal indignity with which

the plaintiff had been treated by the defend-

ant. Railroad Co. v. Sellers. 93 Ala. 13, 9

South. 37 5. We might cite many other cases

to sustain the principle we have laid down,

but do not deem it necessary.

We make no question, under our system of

liberal pleading, that plaintiﬂf may recover ei-

ther in contract or tort, if he has made out

his case. But he can no more recover in tort

without making out his case than he could

recover in contract without making out his

case. The fact that the defendant's road was

in bad condition was no insult or indignity

to plaintiff, and as there was no personal in-

jury on account of its bad condition, this at-

fords him no cause of action. The fact that

defendant's engine broke down on the 8th

when plaintiff was in Edenton, was no per-

sonal insult, indignity, or intentional wrong

to plaintiff. No doubt the defendant regret-

ted the brcaking down of the engine as much

as plaintiff. The fact that plaintiff had a

right of action for breach of the contract gives

him no right of action for tort against the de-

fendant. And unless he had the right to

maintain an action of tort, he had no right

to punitive damages.

ages recovered when there is no right of ac-

tion. Damages are not the cause of action,

but the result of the action. Taking all the

evidence in the case offered by the plaintiﬂf,

or that may be considered in his favor, we

do ' faction

‘the defen and that the defend-

ant was entitled to have its second prayer

for instruction submitted to the jury, to

wit, “Taking the entire evidence in view. the

plaintiff is not entitled to punitive damages."

This was refused by the court, and we think

there was error. We have arrived at our

conclusion by a different treatment of the

case, to some extent, from that adopted by

time court in the opinion published in 115 N.
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cover punitive damages, upon the ground that c. 602, 20 S. E. 528; but our juugment ls the
It was a personal indignity. 6 Am. & Eng. same. And In this opinion we do not think
Enc. Law, p. 43. Where a railroad ron- It neces!IRry to disturb the judgment ns an!luctor refused to caITy a paSRenger after he nouneed in Purcell's Case, supra. But the
bad puld his fare, the road ls linl.Jle to ex- 1 judgment In thot case ehoultl be put upon the
"mplary damages. 3 Suth. Dam. §§ {)3ii, !l.17. ground that the defendant trc>atl'll the plnlntlft", Purcell, with indignity 1111d cout<'mpt
This is upon the same ground. Plnlntilr ls
not entitled to exemplary <lnmagMI unll'!!>< In ruKhlng hy the station at raster s11ee1I,
there Is a willful or Intentional violation ot when tbrre wns room for other Jlllssengf'rs,
plaint itrs personal rights. Hailroa<l Co. .... or at least when there was evidence ternliug
Artu>'I, 91 U. S. 489. Where a railroad cnr- to show thlR, nml the court refused the prn~·rr
ried a Indy Jllllt.'l(•nger a few l111111lre1l rnrds tor h1~tr1wtion 1<11hmlttlng this question to the
beyond the station, and upon a11pl11•ati~n ot Jury. 'The 1wtltion is dismissed.
the passenger refused to h1tck the train to the
station. but put the pnf'l't•nger out In a driving
CL\ HK, J. (1·0111·111Tlng In part). Concnrrain. with her Infant child and bnggnge, the ring In the opinion In so far ns lt relnstntes
defendant was held to be liable to punitive the authority of Pnrl'ell v. Railroad Co., 108
damages. But this wi111 put upon the ground
N. C. 4H, 12 ~. K !l:-..t, 9;;6, the v1111t and
of penmnal indignity nnd Insult, us nil the growing- hn[Jortnnee of the prlndples involv·
l'lllW!I we bave cited are; and the ra"t thnt
c>rl In this cnse to ever~- one who slmll trnvel
the paSJ;enger rould not URf' hrr umhrf'lla, ovrr or 1d1!p frl'ight by these great public
got wet, ond was sic-k from thr rlft"'t,;. wus ngt>Ill'le11 forl.Jhls my nc·quieseeuce In some of
only allowed in evidence upon the llll'lll!llre the rm,;onlng relird on In the prt>sent c-n11e.
of tlamages. But the gravamen or thl• uc- In the rl'<·Pnt easr of Rnllroad Co. v. Prention was the personal Indignity with whl1·h ' tlee, Hi ll. S. 100. 13 Sup. Ct. 261, Mr. Justhe plnlntlfT hn<l been trented by the defeud- tlct> Ul'll.\" rommt>111l1< the histol'knl Instruction
ant. Railroad Co. "· 81>l1Prs, !)3 Ala. 13, 9 , or Chh•f .hu•tke l'mtt u1fterwards !Ami Cmn~uth. :-!75. We might cite many other cases
den) thnt: "A Jury llltve It In their power to
to 1<11stnln the principle we have lnld down. give damagt•R for mol'e than the Injury r<'('<'IVbut do not deem It necessary.
eel. Dnmnges ure tlesignl'cl not only as a sat·
We make no questlor, under our system ot isfnctlon to the injurt'<l person, but likl!wise
liberal pleading, that plalntlfI may reco;er el- as a punishment to the J.'Uilty to deter from
ther In contract or tort, 1f he bas madP out any such proceeding fo1· the future, nnd ns a
his case. But he can no more recover in tort proor of the detestntlon of the jury of the acwithout making out hls case than he could tlon itsf'lf." And ~Ir. Justke <:rn~·. tor the
recover ln contract without making out his court, ntltls: "The 1lol'hine h1 well settled"
I'll!!!<•.
The fnct that the de!emlnut's rnad was thnt the jury, in 111l1lilion to compPnRutory
In had c-omlltlon was no Insult or indignity domng-rR, "may nwnrll <'Xl'lllplary, punitive,
to plaintlft", ond as there was no personal In- or vlmli<-tlve dnnmges, sometimes called
jury on account ot its bed couc.litlon, this at- 'smart money,' It the dereud1mt ha!I n<"tt•tl
fords him no c-ause of action. The fnct that wnntonly • • • or with crlmln11l irnlitfPrdf'fl'ndnnt's rngine hroke down on the !<th ent'e to civil olllhmtin1111." In the pn!Rent <'fl!le
when plalntlQ' was In Edenton, was no per· his honor below d111rg-ed the jury th11t: "It
sunal Insult, Indignity, or Intentional wMng defendant fnlled to
vide proper nll'ans for
to plnlutilf. No doulJt the defendant r<'gret- trnnsportntlon of p ·srn1.wn:1,-os, fo1· luted the brrnklog down of the engine as much stnnce, the plaintitI i this c'llse.- as they hall
as plnlntlfT. The fa"t thnt plalntlft" had a \llldl'l't11ken to do, wa tonly 1111<1 " ·lllfully, the
right of action for brerwh ot thP contrnet gh·es jur)' may give punitive or punishing damages;
him no right of action tor tort ai.:11iust the de- and the amount of sueh is lnrgoely a muttrr
rentlant. And unlet1s he hu1l the right to to1· the Jury to dell'rmine, but the court will
11111i11tal11 an action of tort, he Juul no rlA"ht Kl1pt•n·ls1>, so ns to see that no wrong I,; done."
to 1nmitive damages. There cnn he no 1lam· Thlii sums up in a few words the who!<! con:: ;.:es reco;ered when there Is no rig-ht or nc· trm·r rsy in this 1·ase, nnd It Is this 1·liarge
tion. Dama gt'>'! nre not the ea use of m·tion,
whll·h "is thil'I 1luy brought Into lJllPKl ion. "
hut the result of the nrtlon. Tnkiug nil the ' In l'tm·Ptrs Casl'. supi·~. this cour1. In a mmueYi1l1>11C'e In the case otrrrrd by tlw plnlntiff,
lmous opinion, laid rtown the wholt>sonw, lltul
or that may be considered in his favor, we
it would seem the necessary, principle that
1e..u11• •hitik It mokea u Mmw itlJ.ll'tion agu !1111.t
tor the wlllful and wanton violntion by a mil-~._and thnt the ll1•frlHl·
road <'Ol'IHl'lltlon ot the l'l'J."ltlations prescrih<'tl
:mt was entitled to hu ve Its l'<'t·ond prayer , for Its control aml comluct hy the lawmnklng
for instruction submitted to the jury. to · power (Code, § lUll:{) such corporation IR Ilawit, '"Taking the eutire evlllenf'e in viPw, the' l.Jle to punltory damages. These wonh1, "wlllplnintitr Is not entltletl to p1m!tlve dorungrs."
ful and wanton," have a wrll-detinetl menning
This was refused by the court, and we think
in ow· courts, and have llf'Pll eou,;trued in
there was error. 'Ve have arrived nt our
State v. Bl'igmnn, 04 N. C. sss, 1111tl Stnte v.
conclusion by a dllierent treatment or the
Morgan, 08 N. C. 641, 3 S. E. 027, to mean
l'U!'e. to some extent, from thnt adopll'tl hy
"purpost>I~·. lnt entlonnll~', 1111<1 with rf't·kless
the court in the opinion published In 115 N. , dlsr<'gartl of the rights of otllt'l'S." Our courts
U W D.All.:.!d Ed.-0
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have upheld the authority to grant punitory

damages in all proper cases, and if they could

ever be granted against a corporation in any

case it would seem certainly they should lie

whenever the conduct of its oﬂlcials has

shown a “willful. intentional, violation" of

the statutes enacted by the legislature for

the control of these corporations, and a "reck-

less disregard of the rights of the traveling

public" or shippers of freight. The sover-

eignty which, through its agents, created and

gave existence to this corporation, has recog-

nized this rule as wholesome and just, for in

the act creating the railroad commission (Act

1891, c. 320, § 11) it is provided in almost

identically the same words (indeed, leaving

out the word “wantonly") that for a “willful

violation of the rules and regulations made

by the commissioners railroad companies are

liable for exemplary damages." It would be
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the strangest of anomalies if a railroad cor-

poration is liable to exemplary damages for

the willful violation of the regulations of the

railroad commission, but is not thus liable

for the willful and wanton violation of the

regulations prescribed by the legislative pow-

er which created them both. And we should

have this further anomaly in the law: A tele-

graphic dispatch announcing the critical ill-

ness of a near relative is sent. If not deliv-

ered promptly, the sendee, as is properly held

by numerous decisions of this court, is enti-

tled to exemplary damages, though he has

suffered no personal injury, nor has any in-

dignity been inﬂicted upon him. Young v.

Telegraph Co., 107 N. C. 370, 11 S. E. 1044;

Thompson v. Telegraph Co.. 107 N. C. 449.

12 S. E. 427; Sherrill v. Telegraph Co., 11!;

N. C. (355, 21 S. E. 429. The reason is that.

being put upon notice by the tenor of the dis-

patch. it is a wanton and willful violation of

the duties for which it was incorporated for

the company to fail to deliver the message

promptly. and the highest reasons of public

policy require that exemplary damages should

be imposed. Now, suppose the dispatch is

delivered, and the sendee starts for his home,

but the railroad corporation, ﬁnding that it

can send a larger number of passengers to

another point, stops its car,—as in the present

a1se they stopped it. because it was cheaper

to send a broken piece of machinery to Nor-

folk to repair than to keep necessary repair

shops or another engine,—and by this willful

and wanton violation of its statutory duties to

furnish suﬁicient transportation the recipient

of the telegram does not reach the bedside of _

his dying wife, would it not be an anomaly

that for a willful and wanton violation of its

duty to deliver the telegram promptly the tele-

graph company is liable to exemplary dam-

ages, but for an equally willful and wanton

violation by the railroad corporation to trans-

port the passenger according to schedule that

company is only liable to pay the passenger's

board bill during his detention. In a case

where the corporation failed to bring the pas-

senger home on his round-trip ticket, as the

0
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have upheld the authority to grant punltory
dmnagt>K In all proper cases, and If they could
ev<>r be 11,Tllllted ai.:nlnst a corporation In any
case it would seem certainly they 11hould Ile
whenever the conduct of Its oflklnls has
shown a "willful. Intentional, violation" of
the statutes enacted by the legislature for
the control of these corporations, and a "reckless disregard of the rights of the traveling
public" or shippers of freight. The sovereignty which, through lts agents, Cl'eated and
gave existence to this corporation, has recognized this rule as wholesome and just, for In
the act creating the railroad commission (Act
1891, c. 320, § 11) it la provided In almost
Identically the same words (Indeed, leaving
out the word "wantonly") that for a "willful
violation of the rules and regulations made
by the commissioners railroad companies are
liable for exemplary damages." It would be
the strangest of anomalies If a railroad corporation la liable to exemplary damages for
the willful violation of the regulations of the
railroad commlsalon, but Is not thus liable
for the wllltul and wanton violation of the
regulations prescribed by the legislative power which created them both. And we should
have this further anomaly In the law: A telegraphic dispatch announcing the critical lllnPSs of a near relative Is sent. It not delivered promptly, the sendee, as la properly held
by numel'ous decisions of this court, Is entitled to exemplary damages, though he has
su!Tered no personal Injury, nor has any in, dignity been lnftlctf'<l upon him. Young v.
Telegraph Co., 107 N. C. 370, 11 8. E. 1044;
Thompson v. Telegrnph Co.. 107 N. O. 44U,
12 S. E. 427; Sherrill v. Tell'grnph Co., 1111
N. C. 6;);), 21 S. E. 429. The reason Is thnt.
being put upon notl<'e by the tenor of the dlspat<'h, It ls a wanton and willful violation of
the duties for which It was Incorporated for
the <-ompany to fall to deliver the message
prompt!~·. and the highest reasons of public
poll<'Y require that exemplary damnges 11hould
be Imposed. Now, suppose the dlsputch Is
dl'Uvered, and the seudee starts for his home,
but the railroad corporation, finding that It
can send a larger number of passengers to
another point, stops Its car,-as In the prt>Sent
~se they stopped It. becftuse It was cheaper
to 11end a broken piece of muchinery to Norfolk to repair than to kl.'ep 11e<'ett1111ry repair
shops qr another englne,-nnd by thltt willful
and wanton violation of 1t11 tttntutory 1l11tle11 to
furnish sufflelent tram1port11tlon the redplent
of the telegram does not reach the he1l!lide of
his dying wife, would It not be on anomnly
that tor a wllltul and wanton violation of Its
1luty to deliver the tele,mlm promptly the telegraph <'Ompnny ls llnble to exemplary damai:es, but for an equally willful and wanton
violation by the railroad corporlltlon to transport the passenger ac·cordlng to schedule that
company Is only liable to pay the passenger's
board bill during his detention. In a case
where the corporation tailed to bring the pae11enger home on his round-trip ticket, as the

defendant In this case failed to do, p1mlth·e
damages were sustained In Head v. Railroad
Co., 79 Ga. 358, 7 S. E. 217.
But It was contended on the argument that
though the rau~oad corporation ls liable for
the wlllful and wanton violation of its statutory duty In running its trains by a station
without stopping, and thus falling to take on
a passenger when there happens to be a
vacant seat, It ls not so liable If with full
notice of more passengers waiting at a station than the mrs can carry, and In time to
add more cars, It falls to do so. It Is di1Dcult to recognize the authority to hold that
this act of wlllful violation· of Its statutory
duties and wanton disregard of the rights of
the public does not subject the corporation to
punitive damages, while the same willfulness
and wantonness In running by a station without stopping does so subject the corporation
If then: happens to be a vaeant B'eat. It ls
the same willfulness and wantonness to tall
to have suftldent seats when the corporntlon
has notice In time and cars In Its control as
not to stop to fill the empty seat. The statute authorizes no such •liscrlmlnntlon. It provides (Code, t 1003): "Every railroad corporation • • • shall furnish sufllclent llC·
commodation for thf. transportation of all such
passengers and property as shall within a
reasonable time previous thereto be offered
for transportation at the place of stopping
and at the usual stopping places estallllst.ed
for receiving and discharging passengers and
freight for that train, • • • and shall be
liable to the party aggrieved In damages for
any ne1<tlect or refusal." The 11tatute nowhere
Intimates any distinction when•by one will·
rul and wanton violation of the statute Is
cause for exemplary damages, and that auothl'r equally willful and wanton violation of
the same statute incurs no such llablllty.
The rl.'asonable and lmpnrtlal rule laid down
by a unnnlmons court In Pun•ell's Case ls that,
If the brmch of the statute "was mere lnadve1·tence or negligence, or was caused by
an unforesel'n number of passengers presenting themselves, which rendered it unsafe to
take a greater number aboard, and the company could not by reasonable diligence ha\·e
il1<'r('n11ed the number ot cars. then the pl1tlntltf could only recover compensatory dnmagf'll. If, however, • • • the defendant,
h,\· 1·pni:01mhle dlllgl'nce, could have aset>rtnlnt-11 thnt the nnmher of ears was lnsulHclent, and made 110 effort to 11up11ly the dcllc•lency. but, regardless of its duties and of
the rights of those whom It had Invited to
pre11e11t themselves at Its regular station for
1>asMge, or tf, having room for additional
per11ons, It pused without stopping, this tllll·
played a gross and willful dlsrl'gard of the
rights of the plaintiff, which entitled him to
rl't'over punitive damages." This ls sustained
by numerous authorities in other states.
Helrn v. lfrCaughan. 32 MIMB. 1; Railroad
Co. v. Hurst. 3Q .Miss. 000; Silver v. Kent,
00 !\1188. 124; Wilson T. Railroad Co., 63
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Miss. 352; Railroad Co. v. Sellers, 93 Ala. 9,

9 South. 375; 3 Suth. Dam. § 937. It was

urged on the argument that it would be dith-

cult often to decide what state of facts would '

or would not constitute a willful and wanton

disregard of statutory duties. But that does

not authorize a judicial repeal of the statute,

either in whole or in part. It must, in each

use. be determined whether the facts proved

show a “willful and wanton disregard of

statutory regulations," and, if they do, the

jury is empowered to impose exemplary dam-

ages, subject to the protective supervision of

the court to prevent abuse by setting aside

the verdict.

But it was further argued before us that,

while a railroad corporation is by. statute

liable for “a willful violation" of the regula-

tions of the railroad commission, it is not lla-
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ble for “a willful and wanton violation of

statutory regulations"; and hence, when a

train with several vacant seats passes its reg-

ular station without taking on a passenger

waiting there, the liability is only because of

the indignity offered the intending passenger.

But it will be noted that this is a mere sub-

stitution of words. The sole indignity oi!-

fered him is the willful and wanton disregard ‘

of his rights as guarantied by the statute

(Code. § 1963). that “suﬂicient accommodation

for transportation shall be afforded at the

usual stopping places"; and the same indig-

nity is equally offered him by the violation

of the same statute if the company knows in

reasonable time that the number of cars are

insuﬂicient, and can supply them, and fails

to do so, running by without stopping, though

with crowded cars, because it chose not to

supply enough. The duty to furnish suiii- ‘

clent cars is clearly stated in Branch v. Rail-

road Co., 77 N. C. 347, independently of the

express requirement of the statute (Code, i

1963) above quoted. In the present case the

learned judge charged the jury, in accord-

ance with the ruling of this court, that, if the

defendant was guilty of willful and gross

negligence, the plaintiff could recover, other-

wise not; and further, that if the accident

occurred, which they could not have, in the

ordinary course of their business, foreseen

and provided for, this would not be willful

negligence, but, “if the character of the neg-

ligence was such as to satisfy the jury that

the defendant did not care or was indifferent

as to whether they had the train there (to

bring the passengers home), it would be will-

ful negligence." It was in evidence that

when the plaintiff, who held a return ticket,

applied for transportation, the ofﬁcial in

charge gave himself no concern whatever.

I made no effort to have the plaintiff brought

i home, and refused the use of the hand car.

t His honor, after stating correctly and more

fully what facts would constitute willful

negligence and what would not, instructed

the jury that only in the event they found

willful negligence could the plaintiff recover.

There was ample evidence to submit to the
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Miss. 352; Railroad Co. v. Sellers, 93 Ala. 9, made no eft'ort to have the plalntltr brought
9 South. 375; 3 Suth. Dam. I 937. It wa11 home, and refused the use of the hand car.
urged on the argument that It would be dlfft- Hie honor, after stating correctly and more
cult often to decide wbat state of facts would 1 folly what facts would constitute willful
or would not constitute a willful and wanton negligence &11d what weuld not, Instructed
disregard of statutory duties. But tbat does the jury that only In the event they found
not authorize a judicial repeal of the statute, willful negligence could the plaintiff recover.
either In whole or In port. It must, In each There was ample evidence to submit to the
case, be determined whether the tacts proved jury the Inquiry whether or not there was
show a "willful and wanton disregard of wlllful negligence. Both authority and reastatutory regulations," and, If tht>y do, the son sustain the proposition that "the llablllty
jury Is empowered to Impose exemplary dam- of a railroad company for exemplary damng<'N
a1ees, subject to the protectll"e supervision of cannot be made to depend on the ablllty of
the court to prel"ent abuse by setting aside the corporation to earn enough money to keep
lts road In such condition as to be operated
the verdi<'t.
But It was further argued before us thnt, with safety." Railroad Co. T. Johnson, 75
while a railroad <'Orpomtlon ls by. statute 'J'e.x. 158, 162, 12 S. W. 482; Taylor v. Hallliable for "a wlllful violation" of the regula- road Co., 48 N. H. 304, 317. It the company
tions of the rallroad commission, It Is not lia- le unwllllng or unable to furnish money to
ble for "a willful and wanton violation of run Its trains according to the statutory restatutory regulations"; and hence, when a
quirement, It should cease to hold Itself out
train with several varant seats posses Its reg- to the public as K <'Ommon carrier.
ular station without taking on a passenger
The jury having found that there was a
waiting there, the liablllty Is only b~ause of willful violation by the defendant of Its statthe lntllgnlty oft'ered the Intending passenger. utory duty to transport the plalntlft', and a
But It will be noted that this Is a mere sub- wanton disregard of the plalntltr'e rights In
stitution of words. The sole Indignity of- thnt respect, it Is not the province of L1is apfered him Is the wlllt'ul and wanton disregard J>t>llate court to review the tacts and dletmb
of his rights as guarantied by the statute the verdkt.
(Code. I l!J6.11. that "suftklent ll('('Ommodatlon · The principle Involved Is one of universal In·
for transportation shall be aft'orded at the tereet. It ls nothing less, when reduct'd to
usual stopping places"; and the same Indig- Its last analysis, than whether these corporanity Is equally oft'ered hlm by the violation tions, primarily created for the convenience
of the same statute If the company knows In and advantage of the public, with the Inreasonable time that the number of cars are cidental benefit of profit to their owner11, 1ue
lnsumdent, and can supply them, and falls subje<'t to exemplary damages when they wlllto do BO, nmnlng by without stopping, though fully and wantonly violate the statutes passwith <'rowded mrs, bemuse It chose not to ed for their regulation by the power wll!<"h
supply enough. The duty to furnish sum- created them. If they are not, then c-learly
clent cars Is dearly stated In Branch v. Rail- and unmistakably the public are In the power
road Co., 77 N. C. 347, Independently of the and at the mercy of the arbitrary will of eorexpresa requirement of the statute (Code, t poratlons, which, dally aggregating Into larger
19631 abol"e quoted. In the present case the and larger ma&11es, are powt>rful beyond any
learned judge charged the jury, In ac:cord- control other than the law. And 1t they po;i~rss
an<>e with the ruling ot thiB court, that, if the the power of violating willfully and wantondefendant was guilty of willful and gross ly the statutory regulations prescribed for the
negligence, the plalntllr could recover, other- prote<.'tlon of the public, without fear of punwise not; an1l further, that If the accident ishment by the Imposition of exemplary damOC<'Urred, whlc-h they could not have, In the ages at the hands of a Jury. then the lawordinary courEe of t)ielr busluese, fore11een making power, In crt>atlng them, le, llkr. the
and provided for, this would not be willful ' magician In the Eastern story, evoking a
negllgen<'e, but, "It the C"lmrac-ter of the neg- spirit which mastered and destro~·etl h!m.
llgen<-e was such as to sutl11fy the jury that 'fhe rlghtE of the people are too nnwb at
the defendant did not care or wa11 indlft'erent stake In maintaining the principle thnt railas to whether they had the train there (to road corporations are liable to exemplary
bring the passengers home), It would be wlll- damages for the "wlllful violation" of statful negligence." It WM In evidence that utes passed tor their regulation, equally with
when the plalntlft', who held a return tl<·ket, similar l"iolatlons of the n-gulatlons of the
applied for trwieportatlon, the omdul In railroad commission, for any denial or Lmltachafl:'e gave himself no concern whatever, tlon of such principles to pass unnoticed.
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STACY v. PORTLMJD PUB. CO.1

Supreme Judlcinl Court of Maine. J'une 7, 1898.

(68 Me. 279.)

Supreme Judicial Court of .\Iaine. June 7, 1898.

Case for libel. Defendant published in its

paper, under the head of “Personal," the fol-

lowing: "A responsible gentleman of Hal-

lowell informs us that Secretary of State

Stacy was recently arrested in that city for

drunkenness and disturbance. A ten-dollar

note quieted the affair." The plea was the

general issue and justiﬁcation. On the trial,

plaintiff requested an instruction that, if the

jury found that the article was published

with express malice, they might give ex-

emplary damages. This the presiding judge

refused. The verdict was for plaintiff; dam-

ages, one dollar. Plaintiff alleges exceptions,

and moves to set aside verdict for inade-

quacy.

Case for libel. Defendant published in Its
paper, under the head or "PerS1lnal," the following: "A responsible gentleman of Hallowell Informs us that Secretary of State
Stacy was recently arrested In that city for
drunkenness and disturbance. A ten-dollar
note quieted the atralr." The plea was the
general Issue and justification. On the trial,
i.ilalntlft' requested an Instruction that, If the
jury found that the article was published
\ with express malice, they might give exemplary damages. This the presiding judge
refused. The verdict was for plalntltr; damages, one dollar. Plalntll't alleges exceptions,
and moves to set aside verdict for tnadel}Uacy.
0. D. Baker, tor plalntltr. T. B. Reed,
tor defen<lnnts.

O. D. Baker, for plaintiff. T. B. Reed,
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for defendants.

PETERS, J. ' ' ' ' '

The plaintiff's counsel earnestly insists that

it was error on the part of the court to omit

(after request) to direct the jury that puni-

tive damages might be recovered in such a

case as this. Taking the case as it resulted,

we are satisﬁed that the plaintiff has sus-

tained no injury in this respect. Without

overruling former decisions, this court can-

not deny that punitive damages may be re-

covered against a corporation for the mall-

cious conduct of its servants and agents, by

a person injured by it. To the facts and

ﬁndings, however, presented in the case at

bar, our judgment is that the doctrine con-

tended for has no reasonable application.

The charge against the plaintiff was of\a

[serious nature, calculated to wound his sensi-

'biiities, and,to degrade him in his personal

t-haracter.

complete, justiﬁcation of the charge, was

pleaded by the defendants. The plaintiff

was allowed to recover damages for the in-

jury “to his character as a man,a citizen; for

mental pain and suffering, anguish, morti-

tication; and for loss of the beneﬁts of pub-_

lie conﬁdence and social intercourse,"—result- '

ing from the publication. The jury were

permitted to add, as actual damages, for any ;

road Co. v. Sellers, 93 Ala. 9. 9 South. 377,

aggravation of these elements of injury oc-

easioned by the express malice of the person

who published the article complained of. The

jury assessed nominal damages only, the ver-

dict being for one dollar. The legal signiﬁ-

cation of the verdict is, either that there was

no actual and express malice entertained to-

wards the plaintiff by the defendants‘ agent,

or that, if there was, it did the plaintif

f

no injury. There is no room for punitive

damages here. There is no foundation for

them to attach to or rest upon. It is said,

in vindication of the them-y_of punitive dam-

A substantial, but not a full and ‘

ages, that the interests of the individual in-\

jured and of society are blended. Here the

interests of society have virtually nothing to

ages, that the Interests of the individual In-\
jured and of society are blended. Here the
Interests of society have virtually nothing to
blend with. If the Individual has but a
nominal Interest, society can have none. Such
damages are to be awarded agalll.Bt a defemlant for punishment. But, If all the Individual Injury Is merely technical and theoretlenl,
what ls the puni11hmrnt to be lnfllcted for?
If a plalntll't, upon all such elements of Injury as were open to him, Is entitled to recover but nominal damages, shall he be the
recipient of penalties awarded on account or
an Injury or a supposed Injury to others beside himself? If there was enough In the
defense to mitigate the damftges to the Individual, so did It mitigate the damages to the
public as well. Punitive damages are the
last to be assessed, In the elements of Injury
to be considered by a jury, and should be the
first to be rejeeted by facts In mitigation.
We think the Irresistible inference Is that, Ir
the Instruction had been given as It was requested, the verdict would not have been Increased thereby to the extent ot a cent.
There may be cases, no doubt, where the actual damages would be but small, and the
punitive damages large; but this case Is not
of such a kind. It wouhl have been proper
In this case for the presiding justice to hRn~
Informed the jury that If the actual d.11magt>~
were nominal, and no more, they need not
award punitive damages. Any error In the
ruling was cured by the verdict Gilmore v.
Mathews, 67 Me. 517.
Some otht>r points appear to have been
raised at the trial, whi<'h are not discussed
In the very full anti 11 hie brief of the plnlutlft"s counsel, and we may Yt>ry wel! 1·egnrd
them ns ,now waived. A motion Is made
against the vndlct as too sm:lll. The court
rarely Interferes with a verdict In a case of
this kind, whPther moved against as too largt•
or too smull. We <lo not allow the motion.
Motion and excPJ>tlons overruled.

PETERS, J. * • • • •
The plalntltr's counsel eal"nestly Insists that
It was error on the part of the court to omit
(nfter request) to direct the jury that punlth·e do mages might be recovered In such a
l'l\Be as this.
Taking the case as It resulted,
we are satisfied that the plaintltr has SUB, tnined no Injury In this respect. Without
on•rrullng former decisions, this court cannot deny that punitive damages may be recoYercd against a corporation for the malll'lous conduct of Its servants and agents, by
a person injured by It To the facts and
findings, however, presented In the casl' at
har, our judgment ls that the doctrine contended for has no reasonable application.
The charge against the plaintltr was of 1 a
/ serloui; nature, <•alculated to wound bis sens!, l.Jllltles, and to degrade him in his pe1·11onal
<"haral'ter. A substantial, but not a full and
romplete, justification of the charge, was
pll•aded by the defendants. The plnlntltr ,
was allowed to rel'over damages for the In- ' APPLETON, C. J., and WALTON, RAH\
jury "to his character as a man, a citizen; for ROW8, VIRGIN, and LIBBEY, JJ., (•011em·nwntal pain and sutrerlng, anguish, mortl- 1·e<1.
! tl1•ntlon; and for loss of the benefits of pub-. !
NOTE. To the Mille eT!'.Pct. i;t>e Kubu v. Uaillk 1·onfhh•1tre and social lntei·coursr,"-rt>sult- 1 way Co., 74 Iown. 137, 37 x. \V. 11<1; nml Schiplng from the publication. The jury were pel v. Xortou, as Knn. 5H7. lG Pae. HI». Contru.
1wrmltte1l to add, as actual damages, for any see 'Vil11011 ,._ Yuughn. :.!a Fl'<I. :.t'i!l, nod Ruilaggrn n1tiou of these t>lt>nwnts of Injury oc- rond Co. v. ~eilers, ll3 Ala. 9. H South. :r;7,
where the court says: ' '(G) Then• nre respect·
1·asio111•1l hy the express malice of the ppr,;on nhh• nnthorities which uppenr to hold that l'Xwho 1mhllshe<l the article complal11ed ot. ThP eml'lur~- 1lun1111:ws cunnot Ill' nwnr1k<l when tin•
jury US!!l'Sfled nominal damages only, the V<'I'- :11·tu11l injury is 111irPly nominnl. tlw llwnry beiuir
oll<"t being for one dollar. The lt>gal slgnlft- thnt ns l'Xl'lllJ>lary tl:111ut~es are laiol in eoni;ermtion of the iuter\•sts of so<"icty. whio·h for this
1·nt1011 ot the \·erdlct Is, either thnt thert> was
purpose nre consillt•red 'as hlt·mlrd with the in110 actual and express mnllce entertained to- tere"ts of th<? indi\'iohrnl,' wher\• the imlhiduul is
wnr<ls the plaintitl' by the tlefendnnts' agent, injured only nominnily or not at all in fart,
though bh; riirht>< nrc Yiolntt•d. 'th!' inlPl'Psts of
or that, If there was, It dl<I the plnlntll! sol'iety have ,·irtnnlly untiling t o bh•11 oI with,' 11111 1
110 injury. There Is no room for punitive heuee, 'the individnul hn\'illi::" but n nominal in1lnmn~Ps he1·e.
'!'here Is no foun<lntlon tor te1't>Rt. societ~· \'1111 haw 11011r.' etc. :-;tncy ,._
them to attach to or rest upon. It Is sold, Publishing Co., ll8 :\le. :..'l-17. This \'ir•w is s111•do11s, but, WP nppl'l'hPml, 11111 sonnd. 1111' tr111•
In vindication or the tlwory,of punitive dam- tlwory or ('X•'lllJ . lnr~· d1llllll)!l'S is thnt of 111111i>d1- - - ··· - -uwnt, invoh·iul! tht> iil1•11s of rf'frih11tio11 for wil!1 Portion of opinion omittcu.
ful mis..·ouuu(:t, und nu t•xnmplu to dNer from its
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repetition. 'I1te position of the supreme court of

Maine can be sustained in principle, it seems to

us, only by assuming that which is manifestly

untrue, namely, that no act is criminal which

does not inﬂict individual injury capable of be-

ing measured and compensated for in money.

Many acts denounced as crime by our statutes,

or by the common law, involve no pecuniary in-

jury to the individual against whom they are

directed, and which, while the party aggrieved

could not recover damages as compensation be-

yond a merely nominal sum, are yet punished in

the criminal courts, and may also be punished in

civil actions by the imposition of ‘smart money‘;

and, on the same principle, acts readily conceiv-

able which involve malice, willtuiness, or wanton

and reckless disregard of the rights of others,

though not within the calendar of crime, and in-

ﬂicting no pecuniary loss or detriment. measur--

able by a money standard, on the individual, yet
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merit such punishment as the civil courts may

inﬂict by the imposition of exemplary damages.

And upon these considerations the law is, and

has long been, settled in this state that the in-

ﬂiction of actual damage is not an essential pred-

icate to the imposition of exemplary damages.

Parker v. Misc, 27 Ala. 480; l‘ -le;:raph Co. v.

Henderson, 89 Ala. 510, 7 South. 419' Railroad

Co. v. 1-lcddleston, s2 Ala. 218. 3 South. 53.

See, also, 1 Suth. Dam. 748. The charges re-

quested by the defendant to the effect that ac-

tual damage must be shown before punitive dam-

agtes ecgul be recovered were therefore properly

re us .'

rl'petition. The position of the supreme court of
)[sine l."lln be sustained in principle, it seems to
us, only by assuming that which is manifestly
untrue, namely, that no act is criminal which
..toes not inflict individual injury capal)le ot being measured and compensated for in money.
:\Inny acts denounced as crime by our statutes,
or by the common law, involve no pecuniary injury to the individual against whom they are
directed, and which, while the party nggrieved
eould not recover damages as compensation beyond a merely nominal sum, are yet punished in
the criminal courts, and may also be punished in
civil actions by the imposition of 'smart money';
and, on the same principle, acts rea·atty··con~iv
able which involve malice, willfulness, or wanton
and reckless disreprd of the rightl of others,

though not within the calendar of crime, and inflicting no pecuniary loss or detriment. mensurable by a money standard, on the individnnl, yet
merit such punishment as the civil courts may
inflict by the imposition of exemplary damages.
And upon these considerations the Jaw is, and
has long been, settled in this state that the infliction of actual damage is not an essential predicate to the imposition of exemplnry damages.
Parker v. Mise, ZT Ala. 480; Tele!'raph Co. v.
Henderson, 89 Ala. 510, 7 South. 419i,_ Hailroad
Co. v. Heddleston, 82 Ala. 218, 3 Muth. 53.
See, also, 1 Buth. Dam. 748. The charges requested by the defendant to the effect that actual damage must be shown before punitive damages could be recovered were therefore properly
refused."
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STEVENSON v. SMITH et al.

(28 Cal. 103.)

Supreme Court of California. April, 1865.

Appeal from district court, Second judicial

district, Tehama county.

The facts are stated in the opinion of the

court.

George Cadwalader, for appellant.

Long, for respondents.

W. S.

SAWYER, J. This is an action to recover '

a mare and colt seized by the defendant

(sheriff of Tehama county) under an attach-

ment, and damages for their detention.

Plaintiff recovered the ,property. Plaintiff

moved for a new trial on the ground that cer-

tain special damages, claimed to have been

proved, were not found for him. The mo-

tion was denied, and the plaintiff appeals

from the order denying a new trial.
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The appellant claims that the evidence

shows that the animals were placed by'de-

fendants in ﬁelds where the pasturage was

poor, and that in consequence of this act

they lost ﬂesh and depreciated in value to the

extent of ﬁve hundred dollars. Also that the

mare was a valuable brood mare, taken to

Tehama county for the purpose of being bred

to a particular horse, and that by reason of

the taking and detention by defendants the

breeding season was lost, whereby a t'urther

damage was shown to have been sustained

to the amount of ﬁve hundred dollars, and

that the court should upon the evidence have

found these items of damage for plaintiff.

On examination of the pleadings, we iind

no averments in the complaint that would an-

thorize the recovery of the items claimed.

These damages are special, and the facts out

of which they arise must be averred, or they

cannot be recovered.

Mr. Chitty says: “Damages are either gen-

shown with particularity. ' ' ' And

whenever the damages sustained have not

necessarily accrued from the act complained

of, and consequently are not implied by law,

then, in order to prevent surprise on the de-

fendant, which might otherwise ensue at the

trial, the plaintiff must in general state the

particular damage which he has sustained, or

he will not be permitted to give evidence of

it. Thus in an action of trespass and false

imprisonment, where the plaintiff offered to

give in evidence that during the imprison-

ment he was stinted in his allowance of food,

he was not permitted to do so, because the

fact was not, as it should have been, stated

, in the declaration; and in a similar action it

was held that the plaintiff could not give ev-

idence of his health being injured, unless spe-

cially stated. So in trespass ‘for taking a

horse,' nothing can be given in evidence

which is not expressed in the declaration,

and if money was paid over in order to re-

gain possession, such payment should be al-

leged as special damages." Id. 396.

The complaint in this case only alleges the

ownership of the animals, the value, the

wrongful taking and detention, the demand,
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STEVENSON v. SMITH et al.
(28 Cal. 103.)
Supreme Court of California. April, 1861i.
Appeal from district court, Second judicial
district, 'l'ehama county.
The facts are stated In the opinion of the
court.
George Cadwalade1·, tor a1>pellnnt. W. S.
Long, tor respondents.
SAWYER, J. This is an action to recover
a mare and colt seized by the defendant
(sherltr of Tehama county) under an attachm1.:nt, and damages for their detention.
Plaintiff recovered the . property. PlaintitI
moved tor a new trial on the ground that certain special damages, claimed to have been
proved, were not found tor him. The motion was denied, and the plalntltr appeals
from the order denying a new trial.
'l'he appellant claims that the evidence
shows that the animals were placed by'detendants In fields where the pasturage was
poor, and that in consequence of this act
they lost flesh and depreciated in value to the
extent ot five hundred dollars. Also that the
mare was a valuable brood mare, taken to
Tehama county for the purpose ot being bred
to a particular horse, and that by rea!Jon ot
the taking and detention by defendants the
b1·eedlng season was lost, whereby a further
damage was shown to have been sustained
to the amount of five hundred dollars, and
that the court should upon the evidence have
found these Items of damage tor plalntltr.
On examination of the pleadings, we tlnd
no av~rments in the complaint that would authorize the recovery of the items claimed.
These damages are special, and the facts out
of which they arise must be averred, or they
cannot be recovered.
Mr. Chitty says: "Damages are either general or special. General damages are such a
the law implies, or presumes to have accrued
from the wrong complained of. Special damages are such as really took place, and are
not implied by law. and are either superadded to general damages arising from an
act injurious In ltself,-as when some particular damage arises from the uttering of
slanderous words actionable in theruselves,or are such as arise from an act Indifferent,
and not actionable In Itself, but only injurious In its consequences," etc. 1 Chit. Pl. 395.
Again: "It does not appear necessary to
state the former description of the damages
In the declaration, because presumptions ot
law are not in general to be pleaded or averred as facts, etc. • • • But when the law
does not necessnrlly Imply that the plalntltr
sustained the dnmnges by the net complained
of, It is essential to the validity ot the declnraticn that the resultlng damage should be

shown with particularity. • • • Antl
whenever the damages sustained have not
necessarily accrued from the act complained
of, and consequently are not Implied by law.
then, In order to prevent surprise on the defendant, which might otherwise ensue at tht'I
trial, the plaJntur must in general state tht>'
particular damage which he has sustained, or
he will not be permitted to give evidence ot
It. Thus in an action of trespass and false
Imprisonment, where the plalntltr otfered to
give In evidence that during the imprisonment be was stinted in his allowance ot food,
he was not permitted to do so, because the
fact was not, as It should have been, stated
In the declaration; and In a similar action It
was held that the plainti1r could not give evidence of bis health being injured, unless specially stated. So In tres1lllss 'for taking a
horse,' nothing can be given in evidence
which ls not expressed in the declaration,
and It money was paid over in order to regain possession, such payment should be alleged as special damages." Id. 300.
The complaint In this case only alleges the
ownership of the animals. the value, the
wrongful taking and detention, the demand,
and that plaintiff "has sustained damages by
reason of such wrongful taking and detentl<>n
of said chattels and property In the sum or
one thousand dollars."
From these tacts alone the law does not
imply either ot the items of damages claimed
to have been proved. The first Item Is not
even consequential upon any of the facts alleged, but results from other acts of defendants while the animals were In his possession. And the second item of damages
would not necessarily 1·,sult from a mere tak·
Ing and detention. 'l'beee damages depend
upon an extra.ordinary value of the animal
tor a particular purpose, and upon the special use to which she was capable of beingapplied. The facts out of which these items
or special damages arise must be alleged in
the complaint, or they cannot be recovered.
They are not alleged, and are, therefore, not
embraced within the Issues to be tried. For
this reason, If tor no other, the plalntitr is
not entl~ed to judgment for such items of
damages. There was, then, no ,error In 21ot
finding tor plalntltr on these points.
The only other point made by appellant Is,
that the court erred In not giving plalntitr
costs. There is no doubt in our minds that
the plaintiff was entitled to costs. But this
error in no way affects the finding, and ls not
a ground for new tlial. The error cannot.
therefore, be corrected on appeal from an order denying a new trial. The proper mode
of reviewing and correcting this error Is on
appeal from the judgment, but no such appeal bas been taken in this case.
Judgment affirmed.
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WABASH WESTERN RY..CO. v. FRIED-

MAN.

(30 N. E. 353, 34 N. E. 1111, and 146 Ill. 583.)

Supreme Court of Illinois. March 24, 1892.

Appeal from appellate court, First district.

Action by Oscar J. Friedman against the

Wabash Western Railway Company to recov-

er damages for personal injuries. Plaintil!

obtained judgment, which was aﬂlrmed by

the appellate court. Defendant appeals. Re-

versed.

George B. Burnett (Black & Fitzgerald, of

counsel), for appellant. Page, Eliel & Rosen-

thal (J. W. Duncan, of counsel), for appellee.

CRAIG, J. This was an action brought by

Oscar J. Friedman against the Wabash West-

ern Railway Company to recover damages

for a personal injury received on the 1st day

of May. 1888, while plaintiff was a passenger

on the defendant's line of road, running from
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Moberly, Mo., to Ottumwa, Iowa. The fol-

lowing map shows the line of defendant's

road. The accident which resulted in the in-

jury complained of occurred in the state of

Missouri. between Kirksviile and Gienwood

WABASH WESTERN RY. CO. v. FRIEDMAN• .
(80 N. m. 853, 84 N. E. 1111, and 146 Ill. 583.)
Supreme Court of Illinois. March 24, 1892.

Appeal from appellate court, First district.
Actlon by Oscar J. Friedman against the
Wabash Western Railway Company to recover damages for personal Injuries. PlaintilI
obtained judgment, whlch was atBrmed by
the appellate court. Defendant appeals. Reversed.

George B. Burnett (Black & Fitzgerald, of
Page, Ellel & Rosenthal (J. W. Duncan, of counsel), for appellee.

Counsel), for appellant.

CRAIG, J. Thie was an actlon brought by
Oscar J. Friedman against the Wabash West·
ern Railway Company to recover damuges
tor a personal injury received on the 1st day
of Mny, 1888, whlle plaJntllf was a passenger
on the defendant's llne of rood, running from
Moberly, Mo., to Ottumwa, Iowa. The following map shows the line of defendant's
road. The accident which resulted In the Injury complained of occurred In the stnte of
Missouri. between Klrksvllle and rneuwood
Junction, two stations Indicated on the map.

Junction, two stations indicated on the map.

J offuuwg

'1 8LOOM’‘E|_°

Distance from Kirksvilie to G1onwood Junction

25 miles.

The declaration contained ﬁve counts, but

they are all substantially alike. In the second

count, it is averred that defendant was on

May 1, 1888, operating a railroad from Klrks-

operating trains for the conveyance of pas-

sengers for reward; “and the said piaintiff,

at said Kirksviile, then became and was a

passenger in a certain train of the said de-

fendant on the said railroad, to be carried,

and was accordingly then being carried, in

the said train, from Kirksville to said Glen-

wood Junction," for reward, etc.; that it

became and was the duty of the said defend-

ant to properly and safely construct and

maintain the track and road-bed of said rail-

way, but the defendant so negligently con-

structed and maintained the same that the

same were not then safe for the use of pas-

sengers on defendant's trains, "and the rails

of said track of said railroad were then and

IS

Distance from Centralia to Moberly, 24 miles.
Distance from Moberly to Ottumwa, 131 miles.

Distance from Kirksville to Glenwood Junct.iou
95 miles.

there in bad repair and condition, and a cer-

tain rail in the said track had become broken

by reason of the said negligence of the said

defendant, and thereby a certain car then be-

ing in the said train, and of a sort commonly

called ‘sleeping-cars,' was then and thcre

thrown with great force and violence from

andoff thesaid track;"and plaintiff, beingthen

and there asleep and in the exercise of due

care, was thrown from the berth in said car,

in which he was sleeping, with great force

and violence, across the car, and into the op-

posite berth, “by means whereof, then and

there. the spine and spinal column. including

the spinal cord, of the said plaintiff, became

and were greatly bruised. hurt, and injured,

and the said plaintiff suffered and incurred

an injury of the kind known as ‘concussion

and was accordingly then being carried, In
the saJd train, from Kirksville to said Glenwood Junction," tor reward, etc.; thnt It
became and was the duty of the said defendant to properly and safely construct and
maintain the trnck and road-bed of said railway, but the defendant so negligently conetnicted and maintained the same that the
same were not then safe for the use of pal!sengcrs on defendant's trains, "and the i·nils
ot said track of said railroad were then and
there in bad repair and condition, and a ce1·taln rail in the said track had become broken
by reason of the said negligence of the said
defendnnt, and thereby a certain car then being in the said train, and of a sort commonly
called 'sleeping-cars,' was then and thl•re
thrown with great force and violence from
nu<l olf the said track;" and pla1ntllT, being then
an<l there asleep and in the exercise of due
care, was thrown from the berth In said car,
In which he was sleeping, with great force
and violence, acr0i!8 the car, and Into the opposite berth, ''by means whereof, then and
there, the spine and spinal column. including
the spinal cord, of the said plaintiff, became
aml were greatly brulf!ed, hurt, and Injured,
nnd the said plaintflf suffered and Incurred
an Injury of the kind known as 'concussion
of the spine,' " whereby he incurred expenditures, in endeavoring to be ht:aJed, amounting
to $5,000, and becam·e sick, lame, etc., "from
thence hitherto,'' sutrerlng great pain and being prevented from attending to his business,
and thereby losing profits, ett!. In the con·
cluslon of the declaration the plaintiff claimed
damages amounting to $50,000. The defendant pleaded the general lBBue, and on a trial
before a jury the plalntltf recovered $30,000,
and the judgment, on appeal to the appellat~
urt, was affirmed.
It wlll be observed that In each count of
the declaration the plalntitT, In stating where
the relation of passenger and common can·ler
commenced, and whe1-e such relation existed
between the plaintitr and the defendant.
averred as follows: "And the said plaintitT,
at said Kirksville, then became and wns a
passenger on a certain train of the said defendant on the said railroad, to be carried,
and was accordingly then being carried, in
the said train, from Kirksville to said Glenwood Junction," for reward, etc. No evidence
was Introduced on the trial that the plaiutltf became a passenger at Kirksville tor
Glenwood Junction; but the plaintiff testified
thnt he took the sleepC'l' at l\loberly to go to
Ottumwa, nnd that he had a ticket which
rend, from Moberly to Ottumwa, whlch he
had purchased at Mobel'ly in the fall of 1867.
The testimony offered for the purpose of
proving the averment of the declaration was
objected to on the ground of a ;ariance between the evidence and the declaration; but
the court overruled the objection, and allowed the evidence to be Introduced. Upon the
question of vnrlnnce the defendant nsked
the court to instruct the jury as !allows:

r

ville, Mo., to Glenwood Junction, Mo., and

The declaration contained ftve counts, but
they are all substantially alike. In the second
count, It ls averred that defendant was on

May 1, 1888, operating a rallroad from Kirksville, Mo., to Glenwood Junction, Mo., nnd
operating trains for the conveyance of pnssengers for reward; "and the said plnlntltf,
at said Klrksvllle, then been.rue nud was a
passenger in a certain trnin of the said defendant on the snid rnllronrl, to be carried,
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“The averment in plaintiffs declal-ation that

he became a passenger in the train of defend-

ant at Kirksville, Mo., to be carried from

said Kirksville to Glenwood Junction, is

material, and must be proved as alleged;

and if the jury believe from the evidence

that said plaintiff did not at the time in ques-

tion hecome a passenger in said train of de-

fendant at said Kirksville, to be carried to ;

said Glenwood Junction, then the jury will

ﬂnd for defendant, regardlem of all other

questions in the case." But the court refused

to give the instruction as prayed, but quali-

lied it by adding as follows, to-wit: “But if

it appear from the evidence that plaintiff was

a passenger on the train of the defendant

between the points mentioned, traveling from

a point south of said Kirksville to a point

beyond Glenwood Junction, then the aver-

ment in the plaintiffs declaration is suﬂl-
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ciently made out." It may be said that the

question involved is a technical one, and

hence not entitled to that consideration which‘

a court should give to a question which‘

goes to the merits of an action. The plaintiff

had the right, when the question was raised,

to amend his declaration, and thus obviate

the diiiiculty; but he saw proper to take

another course, and he occupies no position

now to complain, should the rules of law

fhat control in such cases be strictly en-

forced against him. But, while the ques-

tion involved may be regarded somewhat

technical, still it will be remembered that

the plaintiff is seeking to recover a large

sum of money, and the defendant has the

right to demand and insist that the grounds

upon which the plaintiff claims a right of

recovery should be clearly and concisely

stated, and that the case made on the decla1a-

tion should be proven as laid. If a plaintiff

mayallege in his declaration one ground of

recovery, and on the trial prove another, a

defendant never could be prepared for trial.

One great object of a declaration is to notify

the defendant of the nature and character

of the plaintiff's demand, so that he may be

able to prepare for a defense; but if one

ground of action may be alleged, and another

proven, a declaration would be a delusion,

and, instead of affording a defendant notice

of what he was called upon to meet, it would

be a deception. Here the plaintiff claimed

that the relation of passenger and common

carrier existed between him and the defend-

ant. nnd that the defendant owed him a duty

growing out of that relation. In speaking of

a declaration in such a case. Chitty on

Pleading says: “When the plaintiff's right

consists in an obligation on the defendant to

observe some particular duty, the declaration

must state the nature of such duty, which

we have seen may be founded either upon a

contract between the parties or on the obli-

gation of law arising out of the defendant's

particular character or situation, and the de-

fendant must prove such duty as laid; and

a variance will, as in actions on contract, be

fatal." Chit. Pl. 382. The same author also
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"The a\"'erment In plaintiff's declaration that
he bceame a pas.seuger In the train of defendant at Kirksville, Mo., to be carried trom
said Kirksville to Glenwood Junction, Is
material, and must be proved as alleged;
and If the jury believe from the evidence
that snld plaintiff did not at the time In questlon become a passenger In said train of detendant at said Kirksville, to be carried to
said Glenwood Junction, then the jury will
find for defendant, regardless of all other
que£itlons In the case." But the court refused
to give the Instruction as prayed, but qualified it by adding as !ollows, to-wit: "But If
It appear from the evidence that plaintiff was
a passenger on the train of the defendant
between the points mentioned, traveling trom
a point south of said Klrksv!lle to a point
beyond Glenwood Junction, then the aver·
ment In the plaintiff's declaration ls suftlclently made out." It may be said that the
question Involved ls a technical one, and
hence not entitled to that consideration whicli
a court should give to a question which
goes to the merits of an action. The pla.lntllr
had the right, when the question was raised,
to amend hie declaration, and thus obviate
the difficulty; but he saw proper to take
another course, and he oc.'Cupies no position
now to complain, should the rules of law
tilat control In such cases be strictly enforced against him. But, while the question Involved may be regarded somewhat
technirol, still It will be remembered that
the plaintiff ls seeking to recover a large
sum of money, and the defendant has the
right to demand and lruilst that the grounds
upon which the plaintiff claims a right of
recovery should be clearly and concisely
stated, and that the case made on the declaration should be proven as laid. If a plaintiff
may allege In his declaration one ground of.
recovery, and on the trial prove another, a
defendant never could be prepared for trial.
One great object of a declaration ls to notlfy
the defendant of the nature and character
of the plaintitf's demand, so tbat he may be
able to prepare for a defense; but If one
ground of action may be alleged, and another
proven, a declaration would be a delusion,
:md, Instead of affording a defendant notice
of what he was called upon to meet, It would
be a deception. Here the plaintiff claimed
that tile relation of passenger and common
carrier existed between him and the defendant. and that the defendant owed him a duty
growing out of that relation. In speaking of
a declaration In such a case. Chitty on
Pleading says: "When the plaintiffs right
consists In an obligation on the defendant to
observe some p111tlcular duty, the declaration
must state the nature of such duty, which
we ha'\'e seen may be founded either upon a
contract between the parties or on the obligation ot law arising out of the defendant's
particular chnl'acter or situation, and the defendant must prove such duty as laid; and
n 'l"Brlanre will, as In actions on contract, be

DAMAGES.

fatal." Chit. Pl. 382. The same author also
says: "In an action on the case found-00. on
an express or implied contract, as against an
attorney, agent, carrier, innkeeper, or othet•
ballee, tor negligence, etc., the declaration
must correctly state the contract or the partlculnr duty or consideration from which the
llablllty results, and on which it ls founded;
1 and a variance In the description of a contract, though ln an action ex dellcto, may be
fatal, as in an action ex contractu. The declaration In such case usually begins with a
statement of the particular profession or
situation of the defendant and his retainer,
and consequent duty or liability. The declaration will be defective If It does not show
that by express contract or by lmpllcatlon
of law, 1n respect to the defendant's particular character or eltuatlon, etc., stated by the
plalntltf, the defendant was bound to do or
omit the act lo reference to which he ls
charged." Chit. Pl. p. 384.
It may, however, be said that the statement In the declaration of the point from
which and to which the plaintiff was being carried was mere Inducement, and need
not be proved as laid. Upon a Question of
this character, Chitty on Pleading (page 2921
says: "In general, however, every allegation In an Inducement which Is material, an<l
not Impertinent and foreign to the cause,
and which, consequently, cannot be rejecte<i
as surplnsage, must be proved as alleged,
and a variance would be fatal; and coruiequently great attention to the facts Is necessary In framing the Inducement, and care
must be taken not to Insert any unnecessary
allegation." If, therefore, the allegation ls
to be rega.rded as Inducement, It was necessary to prove It as alleged. And at page 38,j
the author further says: "It ls also a rule
that if a nece881lry Inducement of the plaintiff's right, etc., even In actions for torts, relate to and describe IJ.Jld be founded on a
matter of contract, It ls necesBOl'Y to be
strictly correct In stating such contract; It
being matter of description. Thus, even In
case against a carrier, It the termini of the
journey which was to be undertaken be ml&stated, the variance will be fatal Here the
allegation In the lntlucement relates to matter of. description." Harris v. Rayner, 8
Pick. 541, ls a case in point. The action was
brought to recover for an Injury sustained
by the oversettlng of a stage-coach. The
plalntlf.r alleged In his declaration that he
paid defendants, for his paBSage In their
stage from Albany to Boston, $10, the usual
fee for said passage, and defendants, In consideration thereqf, undertook and promised
carefully to .transport plaintiff In said pas&age from Albany to Boston. In support of
the declaration, pla.lntlf.r proved that he was
In a stage-coach from Worcester to Boston,
and that just es he arrived at Boston the
coach was overset by the careleBSnesa ot the
driver, and he was thereby Injured. It was
held that the evidence did not prove the
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' leged remains without proof."

contract set out in the declaration, and in

passing upon this point the court said: "We

think there was no suﬁicient proof at the

trial of the contract as alleged in the declara-

tion. The declaration alleges a contract on

the part of the defendants to transport the

plaintiﬂ from Albany to Boston. The proof

was that the plaintif f rode in defendants'

stage from Worcester to Boston; and. al-

though this is part of the route from Albany

to Boston, yet it is part, also, of many other

lines of travel. So that the contract as al-

In Tucker

v. Crackiin, 2 Starkie, 385, and in Railroad

&. Banking Co. v. Tucker, 79 Ga. 128, 4 S. E.

5, actions were brought against carriers for

the loss of goods; and in each case it was

held that a variance between the proof and
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allegation as to the termini of the carriage

was fatal. In Phillips, Ev. (volume 3, p.

268,) the author says: “The plaintif f will be

nonsuited if the termini of the journey are

not correctly set forth." In Railroad Co. v.

Sutton, 53 Ill. 398, the point was made that

an averment in the declaration of defend-

ant's undertaking to convey the plaintiff

from West Urbana to Tolono is not sustained

by proof of an undertaking to convey from

(.lhampaign City to Tolono. In disposing of

the question of variance, it is said: “It

would appear from the testimony that West

Urbana and Champaign City are one and the

same place; consequently, there was no vari-

ance." The averment in plaintiff's declara_-I

tion that he became and was a passenger at

Kirksville, to be carried to Glenwood Junc-

tion, for reward, was, in effect, a statement

that he took the defendant's train at Kirks.

ville for Glenwood Junction, and that he had

paid or was ready to pay his fare from one

point to the other when called upon, where-

upon there was an implied contract on

the part of the railway company to safely

carry him from one point to the other. We

think it plain that the averment in plaintiff's

declaration was not sustained by proof that

he became a passenger at Moberly for Ob-

tumwa. It may be true that plaintiff stat-

ed more in his declaration than he might

have stated; that he might have relied upon

an allegation that he was a passenger upon

defendant's cars, being carried for reward,

without stating deﬁnitely the termini of his

journey on defendant's line of road. But,

having gone into detail in his allegation, the

law requires him to prove them as laid.

What is said in Bell v. Senneff, 83 Ill. 125,»

is in point here: “As a general rule a party

is required to prove the averments of his

pleadings as he makes them. He may aver

more than is required; but, as a general

rule, he must prove them, although unneces-

sarily made." In Derragon v. Rutland, 58

Vt. 128, 3 Atl. 332, it was held that every

averment which the pleadings make material

as a descriptive part of the cause of action

must be proved as alleged; and any vari-

.A~
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set out In the declnrntlon, and in
passing upon this point the court said: "We
think there was no suftlcleut proof at the
trial of the contract as alleged In the declaration. The declaration alleges a contract on
the part of the defendants to transport the
plalntitr from Albany to Boston. The proof
was that the plaintiff rode In defendants'
stage from Worcester to Boston; and. although this Is part of the route fr«>m Albany
to Boston, ;yet It Is part, also, of many other
llnes of travel. So that the contract as alleged remains without proof." In Tucker
v. Cracklln, 2 Starkie, 3&J, and In Rnllrood
& Banking Co. v. Tucker, 79 Ga. 128, 4 S. E •
.i:i, acUons were brought against carriers for
the loss of goods; and In each case It was
held that a variance between the proof and
allegation as to the termini of the can·tnge
was fatal. In Phlllips, Ev. {volume 3, p.
268,) the author saye: "The plaintiff will l>e
nonsulted It the termini of the journey are
not correcUy set forth." In Uallroad Co. v.
Sutton, 53 Ill. 398, the point was made that
an a"erment In the declaration of defenda.nt's undertaking to convey the plalutitr
!rom West Urbana to Tolono Is not su11taJ11ed
by proof of an undertaking tb convey from
Champaign City to Tolono. In disposing of
the question of variance, It Is said: "It
would appear from the testimony that West
Urbana and Champaign City are one and the
same place; consequently, there was no yarlnnce." The averment In plalntlfr's declara-=J
tlon that he became and was a passenger at
KlrkBl'llle, to· be carried to Glenwood Junction, for reward, was, In effect, a statement
that be took the defendant's train at Klrk.&vllle for Glenwood Junction, and that he had
paid or was ready to pa.y his tare from one
point to the other when called upon, whereupon there was an Implied contract on
the part ot the railway company to safely
earry him from one point to the other. We
think It plain that the averment In plaintiff's
declaration was not suetaJned by proof that
he became a lJflS&enger at Moberly tor Ottumwa.. It may be true that plaintiff stated more tn his declaration than he might
have stated; that he might have relied upon
mi allegation that he was a passenger upon
defendant's cars, being carried tor reward.
without stating definitely the termini of his
journey ori defendant's line of road. But,
having gone Into detail ln his allegation, the
law requires him to proYe them as laid.
What Is said In Bell v. Sennetr, 83 Ill. 125,
Is ln point here: "As a general rule a party
la required to prove the averments ot his
pleadings as he makes them. He may aver
more than ls required; but, as a general
rule, he must prove them, although unnecessarily made." In Derragon v. Rutland, 58
Vt. 128. 3 Atl. 332, It was held that every
averment which the pleadings make material
as a descriptive pe.rt ot the cause ot action
must be proved as alleged; and any variance whlrb destroys the legal Identity ot
<~ontract
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the matter or thing averred with the mntter
or thing proved Is fatal In State v. Copp,
15 N. H. 212, it Is said: "It is a most geueral rule that no allegation which Is descriptive ot the Identity ot that which Is legally
essential to the claim or charge can be rejected." See, also, 1 Phillips, Ev. pp. 7W,
710; Steph. Pl. p. 124, appendix. Here the
plaintiff was bound to allege that he was a
passenget· on defendnnt's train of cars for
reward. This was material, and the turther
averment that he became a passenger at
Klrksvllle tor Glenwood Junction was descriptive of the identity of that which was legally
essential. It could not be rejected or disregarded. In conclusion, we think It plain,
under the authorities, that there was a Ynti·
ance between the proof and the declaration;
and the court erred In the admission of the
cnce, and In the modUlcntlon of defenda t's Instruction.
' On the trial the plaintiff was permitted,
against the objection of the de!endant, to
lntl'Oduce evidence tending to prove that
the pluintllf at the time o! the injury was
receiving IL compensation for his services
ns a tt·nrellng 81ll.esman of $3,000 per annum.
The declaration contained no allegation of
any special contract or engagement of the
plaintiff with any person under which he
might earn money for his services. In Hallway Co. v. Klauber, 9 Ill. App. 613, In discussing a question ot this character It le
said: "::-ielther of these allegations points
to any damages growing out ot or dependlug
upon the peculiar circumstances or business
ot the defendant In Tomlinson v. Derby,
43 Conn. 662, the plalntltr was Injured by
means of a defective highway, and hie allegation was that be was thereby 'prevented trom
transacting his ordinary buslne!IS;' and lt
was held that, under such allegation, he
could not show that he was earning $100 a
month ln carting and sawing timber. So,
In Taylor v. Munroe, 43 Conn. 36, under a
similar allegation, It was held that the plain·
tiff could not show that she was a button·
maker, and what wages she earned in that
business. In City ot Chicago v. O'Bt·ennan,
65 Ill. IGO, the plalntltr brought suit tor an
Injury caused by the falllng of a portion ot
the brick and plaste1ing In the common council chamber In the city. The allegation In
the declaration was that 'the plalntltr, who
was pursuing his occupation as journalist,'
was Injured, etc., 'and thereby the plaintiff,
as lawyer, lecturer, and journalist, became
and was sick, sore, and Incapacitated from
attending to his business, and so continued
tor a long time, to-wit, tor two months; and,
as regards plalntltr's profession as a lecturer,
he has been almost wholly, ever since, disabled from pursuing It.' It was held that
under these allegations the plalnti1f could
not give ln evidence the fact of a particular
engagement to lecture ln Virginia, and the
probable gains thereof. The court say: 'In
order to subserve the ends of good pleading,

~
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which are to apprise the opposite party of

the nature of the claim, and prevent surprise,

it was necessary that these special damages,

and the facts on which they were based,

should have been set out in the declaration.' "

Baldwin v. Railroad Corp. 4 Gray, 333. City

of Bloomington v. Chamberlain, 104 Ill. 272,

is also a case in point. There the admitted

evidence was held not to be erroneous, but

the ruling was placed on the express ground

that the evidence was not as to the loss of

proﬁts of a particular engagement. Had the

evidence gone to that extent, as is the case

here, it is plainly laid down that the evidence

would have been erroneous, as held in City

of Chicago v. O'Brennan, 65 ill. 160. This

is apparent from what is said in the opinion

of the court on page 27 . We think the rule

established in the cases cited is the correct

one, and the court erred in the admission of

Generated for facpubupdates (University of Michigan) on 2014-06-12 19:21 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/mdp.35112105421491
Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd-google

the evidence. It cannot be said that the

error was a harmless one, as the evidence

was of a character calculated to produce on

the minds of the jury an impression that the

plaintiff, on account of his capacity to earn

a large salary before the injury, which he

had lost by the accident, and hence should

recover large damages.

It may, however, be said that the error

was cured by an instruction given by the

court as follows: “The court permitted the

testimony of what plaintiff was earning at

the time of the injury charged. This testi-

mony was admitted for no other purpose

than to show plaintiffs capacity to earn

/money. and must not be considered in any

respect as a measure of damages." It is not

entirely clear what the instruction means.

While the court directed the jury that the

evidence was not to be considered as a meas-

ure of damage the court failed to point out

what use they should make of the evidence.

The court ruled, when the evidence was

offered, that it was competent for the con-

sideration of the jury. That ruling was

never changed. The evidence was allowed

to remain with the jury for their considera-

tion, and it could have no other effect than

to swell the damages. Had the court, when

it was ascertained that an error had been

committed in admitting it, excluded the evi-

dence entirely from the consideration of the

jury, the error would in a great measure

have been removed; but that course was not

pursued. The instruction did not, in our

judgment, cure the error. For the errors

indicated the judgment of the appellate and

circuit courts will be reversed, and the cause

remanded.

(Oct. 23, 1893.)

MAGRUDER, J ., (dissenting.) It seems to

me that the petition for rehearing in this

case has demonstrated beyond question the

right of the appellee to a rehearing. First,

the declaration is suﬂicient as a declaration

upon the common-law liability of the carrier;

second, the declaration alleges that the plain-

tiff “was hindered and prevented from trans-

acting and attending to his business and
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which are to apprise the opposite party ot
the nature ot the claim, and prevent surprise,
It was necessary that these special damages,
e.nd the facts on which they were based,
should have been set out In the declaration.' "
!!:tld\vln v. Railroad Corp. 4 Gray, 333. City
of Bloomington v. Chamberlain, 104 Ill. 272,
Is also a case In point. There the admitted
evidence was held not to be erroneous, but
the ruling was placed on the exp1·ess g1·ound
that the evidence was not as to the loss ot
profits of a partlculn1· engagement. Had the
evidence gone to that extent, as Is the case
here, It is plainly laid down that the evidence
would ha ,·e been erroneous, as held in City
of Chicago v. O'Brennan, 65 Ill. 100. This
Is apparent from what is said In the opinion
of the court on page 274. We think the rule
established In the cases cited ls tile cor1·ect
one, and the court erred In the admission ot
the evidence. It cannot be said that the
error was a harmless one, as the evidence
was of a character calculated to produce on
the minds of the jury an Impression that the
plalntitr, on account of his capa~ity to earn
a large salary before the Injury, which he
had lost by the accident, and hence should
recover large damages.
It may, however, be said that the error
was cured by an Instruction given by the
court as follows: "'l'he court permitted the
testimony ol' what plnlntur was earn.Ing at
the time of the Injury charged. '!'his testimony was admitted tor no other purpose
than to show plaintiff's capacity to enrn
, -money. and must not be considered iu any
i·espeet as a measure of damages." It ls not
entirely clear what the instruction means.
While the court directed the jury that the
evidence was not to be considered as a mensure of damage the court failed to point out
what use they should make of the evidence.
The court ruled, when the evidence was
otTered, that It was competent for the con·
sideration ot the jury. That ruling was
never changed. The evidence was allowed
to remain with the jury tor their consideration, and It could have no other effect than
to swell the damages. Hnd the court, when
It waR aseertalned thnt en error lm<l been

committed In admitting It, excluded the evidence entirely from the consideration of the
jury, the error would In a great measure
have been removed; but that course was not
pursued. Tbe instruction did not, In our
judgment, cure the error. For the errors
Indicated the judgment of the appellate and
circuit courts will be reversed, and the cause
remanded.
(Oct. 23, 18!l3.)

MAGRUDER, J., (dissenting.) It seems to
me that the petition for rehearing In this
case has demonstrated beyond question the
right of the appellee to a rehearing. First,
the declaration ls sufficient as a declaration
upon the common-law liability of the carrle1·~
second, the declamtion alleges that the plalntUr "was hindered and pre\·ented from trausact!ng and attending to his business and
affairs, and lost and was deprived of divers
great gains, profits, and compensations,
which he might and otherwise would have
made and acquired.'' This was a sufficient
allegation of special damage to justify the
admission of evidence that plaintiff at the
time of the Injury was receiving a compensation for Ills services as a traveling salesman
of $3,UOO per annum, uncle1· the decision wude
In City of Bloomington v. Chamberlain, 10!
Ill. 2GS. In the latter case the allegation In
the first count or the declaration was that
"plalntitr was hindered f1·om transacting her
business and affairs and deprived ot large
gains and profits, which she otherwise would
have earned," and, In the second count, "that
she had been rendered unable to earn or make
for herselt a living, and bad been depriv·
ed ot large gains and profits which she otherwise would have earned." Under these allegations the plaintiff was there permitted
to testify that she had taught school at
$00 per month. It the law ls a science of
precedents, no Instance can be tound where
a precedent so exactly fits a subsequent state
of facts as the Chamberlain Case fits the
facts disclosed by the record lu the case at
bar upon the second point here designated.
BAU.. EY, C. J., and BAI{ER, J., concur.
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HEISTER v. LOOMIS.

(10 N. W. 60, 47 Mich. 16.)

Supreme Court of Michigan. Oct. 12, 1881.

Error to circuit court, Eaton county.

Crane & Dodge and Michael Kenny, for

plaintiff in error. Henry A. Shaw, for de-

fendant in error.

COOLEY, J. Loomis sued Heister in tres-

pass for an assault and battery. The evi-

dence tended to show that on the 3d day of

August, 1877, Heister, with some other per-

sons, suddenly came upon the plaintiff, and

with words such as, “I have got you where

I want you now," “We'll give you what you

deserve," proceeded to strike and kick him

until he was seriously injured. On the cross-

examination of the plaintiff, defendant sought

to show that, on the previous Sunday even-

ing, in passing,his house, the plaintiff had

stopped in front of it, and used vile and
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abusive language to his wife. Repeated

questions put for this purpose were objected

to by the plaintiff, and ruled out. This rul-

ing was correct. The language attributed to

the plaintiff was exceedingly provoking. and,

if a battery had followed immediately. a

jury might possibly have excused it. or dealt

with it leniently. But the law does not and

cannot, consistently with the safety of society,

admit the provocation of words as an excuse

for blows given after the blood has had time

and opportunity to cool. To do so would be

to encourage parties injured, or thinking

themselves injured, by the misconduct of

others, to take into their own hands the pun-

ishment of the offender; and violence would

beget violence, as each party measured out

according to the vehemence of his passion

the punishment which he thought or imagin-

ed his enemy deserved. The safer view for

society and the violated law is to consider

the fact that a battery has been committed

in revenge for a previous wrong as an aggra-A

vation of the fault, instead of an excuse for

it.

The most important question in the case is

whether the court correctly admitted certain

evidence of special damages. The declara-

tion averred that the plaintiff, because of

the wounds, bruises, and injuries inﬂicted

upon him by the defendant, “was greatly

hindered and prevented from doing and per-

forming his work and business, and looking

after and attending his necessary affairs and

avocations. for a long space of time," etc.

The plaintiff testiﬁed that his business was

that of a farmer; and, under objection. he

was permitted to state that his farm was a

grass farm: that, when assaulted, he was

about half through cutting his hay; that he

was bothered some about help; and that the

cutting was delayed because of his injury;

and that his crop of hay was damaged in

consequence at least $50. The defendant con-

tends that this evidence of injury to his

hay was inadmissible, because the declara-

tion contained no special averments which

would fairly apprise the defendant of the

purpose to offer it.

HEISTER 1'. woms.
(10 N. W. 00, 47 Mich. 16.)
Supreme Court of Mic·higan. Oct. 12, 1881.
Error to circuit court. Eaton county.
Crane & Dodge and Michael Kenny, for
plaintiff In error. Henry A. Shaw, for defendant In error.
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tlon contained no special averments whkh
would fairly apprise the defendant of the
purpose to offer It.
We have been very liberal In this state In
receiving evidence of special Injuries when
the declaration averred them; much more so
than the courts of some other states. The
cases of Chandler v. Allison, 10 Mich. 400,
Allison v. Chandler, 11 Mich. M2, Gilbert v.
COOLEY, J. Loomis sued Heister In tres- Kennedy, 22 Mich. 117, and Welch v. Ware,
pass for an usault and battery. The evi- 32 Mich. 77, wlll sufftclently attest the fact.
dence tended to show that on the 3d day of The dlfl'erence In the rules applicable In cases
August, 1877, Heister, with some other per- ot contract and tort has also been carefully
sons, suddenly came upon the plalntlrr, and marked anti emphasized. Where only a
with words such as, "I have got you where breach of contract Is Involved, the defendant
I want you now," "We'll give you what you ls not to be made liable tor damages beyond
deserve,'' proceeded to strike and kick him what may fairly be presumed to have been
until he was seriously Injured. On the cross- contemplated by the parties at the time the
examlnaUon of the plalntlrr, defendant sought contract was entered Into. The damage alto show that, on the previous Hunday even- lowed In such cases must be something which
ing, In passing. bis house, the plalntilf had could ha l"e been foreseen and reaBonably exstopped In front of It, and used vile and pel'tecl, and to which the deft•ndant can be
abusive language to his wife. Repeated deemed to have assented, expressly or Imquestions put for this purpose were objected pliedly, by entering Into the contract. Borille,
to by the plalntlrt, and rulerl out. Tbls rul- 0. J., In Ruwmlll Co. v. Nettleshlp, L. R. 3
ing was correct. The laugnnge nttrihuted to 0 . P. 4W; IIRclley v. Baxendale, 9 Exch.
the plaintiff was excl'e<llngly provoking. nnd, 344; Hopkins v. Sanford. 38 Mich. 611. But
If a battery bad followed lmmt•1llntt>ly. a In cases of tort the plalutllf does not assist
jury might possibly have eX<'USt'tl It. 01· <h·alt ln making the case; It Is made for him
with it leniently. But the law cloes not and agnlnst bis will by a party who chooses his
<'annot, consistently with the safety of society, own time, place, and manner of committing
admit the provocation ot words as an excuse the wrong; and If the nature of the case
for blows given after the blood bas bad time whl<'h he thus makes up Is such that the
and opportunity to cool. To do so would be elements of Injury are uncertain, amt tbrre
to encourage parties Injured, or thinking Is dlftlculty In arriving at the just m<'nsui-e
themS4'lves Injured, by the mls<'ondnct of of redress, the cons1>quences should fall upon
others, to take Into their own hands the pun- the wrongdoer. "To deny the Injured purtY\
l11hment of the offender; and vlolt>n<'e would the right to recover any actual damages In
beget violence, as each party measured out such cases, because th<'Y are of a nature
according to the vehemence of his passion which cannot be certainly measured, would
the punishment which he thought or Imagin- he to enable parties to profit by and specued his enemy deserved. The safer view for late upon their own wrongs, encourage viosociety and the violated law ls to con11lder lence, and Invite de11redatlon." Gilbert ~
the fact that a battery bas been committed Kennedr, 22 .Mich. 117. 130.
In reYt>nge for a previous wrong as an aggraBut where the damages are such as do not)
vation of the fault, Instead of an excuse for · follow the Injury, 1111 a necessary cons!'quence, they shoulcl be specially alleged l.aJ
it.
The most Important question In the case Is the declaration. This ls a rule of fairness,
whether the court correctly admitted certain that the defendant may know what case It
evidence of special damages. The declara- Is Intended to make against him, and be pretion averred that the plalntUT, because of pared to meet It, If It Is false or falsely colorthe wounds, bruises, and Injuries lnftlcted ed. In the cases above cited from our own
upon him by the defendant, "was greatly Reports, the allegations of special damni.c<~
hindered and prevented from doing and per- wt>re very full and specUlc. But in thlR
forming his work and business, and looking case there ls only a general allegation that
after and attending his necessary affairs and the plaintiff W88 prevented from doing aml
avocations, for a lonir space of time," etc. performing his necessary business, and lookThE' plaintiff testified that his buslne11s was ing after and attt>nding his necessary atl'nlrs
that of a farmer; and, under objection, be and avocations. This llablllty may well IJe
said to ftow ns a necessary consequence from
wm~ permlttl'<l to state that his farm was a
grass farm: that, when assaulted, he was any severe Injury: and It was tht>refore b~lr1
about halt through cutting his hay; that he In Tomlinson v. Town of Derby, 43 Conn.
wall bothered some about help; and that the 502, that su<'h an averment could only be
cutting was delayed because of his Injury; construed as characterizing the Injury anll
and that his crop of hay was damaged In lndlcatln&' Its extent In a general way, and
cons('(1uence at least $.'iO. The defendant con- that It did not lay the foundation for proof
tl.'nds that this evidence of Injury to his of special damages In a pnrtl<"ulnr employhay was lna<lmisslble, because the declara- ment. El"ldence that plnlntl.tr was engag<>d
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in a particular business, at which he was

earning $100 a month, was therefore exclud-

ed in that case, though the declaration was

similar to the one here. Taylor v. Town of

Monroe, 43 Conn. 36, is to the same effect.

Wade v. Leroy, 20 How. 34, must be re-

garded as opposed to these.

in Baldwin v. Railroad Corp., 4 Gray, 333,

similar evidence was held inadmissible, un-

der the general allegation of injury. 'l‘he

action was for a physical injury, and the

plaintif f had been permitted to show that

she was by occupation a school teacher, and

possessed the necessary education and learn-

ing. The court said the evidence “could have

had no relevancy or application to the ones-

tions at issue between the parties except as

forming the basis on which special damages

were to be assessed for the injury of which

she complained. It did not tend to show
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an injury falling within the class of general

damages. That class includes only such

damages as any other person as well as the

plaintiff, under the same circumstances,

might have sustained from the facts set

out in the declaration. Without determining

the more difﬁcult question whether the evi-

dence would be admissible under any form

of declaration, it is clear that this part of

the plaintiff's claim could be founded only

upon a peculiar loss sustained by her by

reason of the interruption to her occupation,

resulting from the tortious act of the de-

fendant. They were therefore, in their na-

ture, damages not necessarily ﬂowing from

the acts set out in the declaration, and of

which the defendants could not be supposed

to have notice unless they were properly

averred." Evidence of this nature was re-

ceived in Railroad Co. v. Coyle, 55 Pa. St.

396, but the report does not give the plead-

ings. See, also, Express Co. v. Nichols, 33

N. J . Law, 434.

The general spirit of our decisions would

perhaps lead to a more liberal rule than

that applied in Connecticut. as above shown,

but would not, I think, support the

ruling complained of here. What was the

special injury complained of in the declara-

tion? Only that the plaintiff, by reason

of the battery, was greatly hindered and

prevented from doing and performing his

work and business, and looking after and at-

tending to his necessary affairs and avocations.

Did this fairly apprise the defendant that

the plaintif f would seek to show, not merely

that he was disabled from pursuing a par-

ticular employment not mentioned, but also

that, by reason of the inability to obtain

laborers, his property went to ruin? If there

is a natural and inseparable connection be-

tween the alleged injury and the damage,

then the defendant should have been pre-

pared to meet such a showing; otherwise, he

was entitled to more speciﬁc allegations. But

there is no such natural and inseparable con-

nection. The circumstances must be alto-

gether exceptional which would cause a farm-

er to lose his crops because he could not
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in a particular business, at which he was
earning $100 a month, was therefore excluded in thnt cuse, though the declarntlon was
similar to the one here. Taylor v. Town ot
Molll'oe, 4:3 Conn. 36, Is to the s1UUe efl'ect.
"\Vadc v. Leroy, 20 How. 34, must be reganled as opposed to these.
In Baldwin v. Railroad Corp., 4 Gray, 333,
similar evidence was held inadmissible, under the general allegation of Injury. The
ac>tion was for a physical Injury, Olld the
plnintitI had been permitted to show that
she was hy occupation a school teacher, and
possessed the necessary education and learning. 'l'he court said the evidence "could have
had no relevancy or application to the ouestions at Issue between the parties except as
forming the basis on which special damages
were to be assessed for the Injury of which
she complained. It did not tend to show
an Injury !alllng within the class of general
damages. That class Includes only such
damages as any other person as well as the
plaintltI. under the same circumstances,
might have sustained from the facts set
ont In the cleclaratlon. Without determining
the more difficult question whether the evidence would be admissible under any form
of dedaratlon, It is clear that this part of
the plaiutltI's claim could be founded only
upon a peculiar loss sustained by her by
1·l•nson of the Interruption to her occupation,
rc>sultlng from the tortlous act of the defendant. They were therefore, In their nature, damages not necessarily tlowlng from
the acts set out In the declaration, and of
which the defendants conld not be supposed
to have notkt> unless they were properly
a¥erred." Evidence of this nature was received In Railroad Co. v. Coyle. 5.'i Pa. St.
300, but the report does not give the pleadings. See, also, Express Co. v. Nichols, 33
N. J. Law, 434.
The general spirit of our deelslons would
perhaps lead to a more liberal rule than
that applied In Connecticut. as aboYe shown,
but would not, I think, support the
ruling complained of here. What was the
special Injury complained of in the declaration? Only that the plalntlft', by reason
of the battery, was greatly hindered and
prevented from doing and per!orming his
work 1md business, and looking after and attencl!ng to bis necessary affairs and avocations.
Diel this fairly apprise the defendant that
the plaintiff would seek to show, not merely
that be was disabled from pursuing a particular employment not mentioned, but also
tltnt, by reason of the Inability to obtain

laborers, his property went to ruin? It there
Is a natural and lnsepamhle connection between the alleged injury and the damage,
then the defendant should ha rn been preparPd to meet such a showing; otherwise, he
was entitled to more specific allegations. But
there is no such natural and Inseparable con·
nect!on. The circumstances must be altogetlwr exceptional which would cause a farm·
er to lose bis crops because he could not
personally gathe1· them. Indeed, according
to the plaint!fl'.'e showing, the circumstances
were exceptional here; for the Injury to the
hay Is attributed to the difficulty of obtaining help to Bllve it. But the defendant, had
be been apprised of the purpose to claim for
such a damage, might perhaps have shown
that the difficulty was wholly Imaginary, or
that the plalntitI wlllfully suft'ered his hay to
be Injured, when be might have arnlded It.
It was his right to make such a showing, If
the facts would warrant It. But he could
not be aware of the necessity untll he was
notified that damage to the hay by reason
of the battery was claimed.
In another particular I think the circuit
judge erred In bis rulings on e\·idence. Tbc>
defPndant not only offered to show abusive
and provoking conduct by the pblntiff on
the pre\'lous Sunday, but also that the plain- .
tiff threatened him on that occasion. Had
any facts been In evidence which tended to
show that defendant, when he committed the
assault, had ren.son to bclleYe ht' was defending himself ngalnst an assault by thtplalntl!l', the proposed evidence or tbrea.t!I
should h1l\"e been received. But there were
no such facts. and the judge properly overruled the ofl'er. But. having done this, he
permitted the plnlntltI to prove the negative,
-that he made no such thrrats. This evidence was foreign to the issue being tried.
and, undet· ordinary clrcumstnuces, could
have had no Influence, but, cominit immediately after the attempt by the defendant to
show thnt he was threatened, was very well
calculated to p1·ejudlce the jury against him.
The evidence, If believed, must have convinced them that not only had the d<>fPnllnnt
committed a serious assault. but that ht> hnd
done so under a wholly gronnille"" pretense
of fear, :rnd had offered to give fnl!<e evidc>nee ot threats In order to deceive and mislPn1l the jmy. It seems to me Impossible
thnt the negative evidence could have been
harmless under such circumstances. Thc>
judgment, I think, should be reversed, and
a new trial ordered. The other justices concurred.
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svE.\'nss.\' v. srara BANK or D norn.

(65 X. W. 1086. 64 Minn. 40.)

Supreme Court of Minnesota. Jan. 29. lttini. ,

Appeal from district court. St. Louis coun- ‘

ty: 8. H. Moer. Judge. .

Action by Becker Svendsen against the '

State Bank of Duluth. Verdict for plaintiff

for nominal damages. From an order deny-

ing a new trial he appeals. Reversed. .

John Rustgard, for appellant. Smith, Mc- I

\Iahon & Mitchell, for respondent. E

I

CANTY, J. During the time covered by

the transactions hereinafter mentioned plain-

tiff was carrying on a mercantile business in

Duluth. and the defendant was carrying on

a banking business in that city. Plaintiff

was a customer of the defendant. and kept
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a deposit in its bank. which he was in the

habit of d1awing out by means of checks,

and which was held by the bank for the

purpose of paying such checks. He had ,

drawn on the bank a check for $42.15 in fa-

vor of one ﬁrm. and another for $54.60 in fa-

vor of another ﬁrm. These checks came |

through the clearing house, and were on the

20th day of October, 1893. presented for pay-

ment to the bank, and payment refused. for '

want of funds. though the plaintiff then had

on deposit in the bank, subject to his check,

the sum of $235.22. The check were return-

ed through the clearing house to the holders i

thereof. The reason why the bank refused *

to honor the checks was that it had by mis-

take charged up to piaintif!‘s account a note 1

for $300. made by him, and held by it, which

was not yet due, but which the bank by mis-

take supposed was due This action was

brought to recover damages l'or'the refusal ‘

to pay the checks. Plaintiff did not allege ‘

or prove any special damages, but claimed

to be entitled to recover substantial general

damages. The court below on the trial ruled

against him on this point, and ordered a ver-

dict in his favor for nominal damages, to '

which he excepted, and from an order deny-

ing a new trial he appeals.

It is held by the authorities that in such

a case the plaintiff's recovery is not limited

to nominal damages, but he is entitled to re-

cover gencral compensatory damages. Ro- '

iin v. Steward, 14 C. B. 595; Schaffner v.

Ehrman (Ill. Sup.) 28 N. E. 91,7; Bank v. 1

Goos (Neb.) 58 N. W. 84; Patterson v. Bank.

130 Pa. St. 419, 18 Atl. 632; 3 Am. & Eng.

Enc. Law, 225; 1 Suth. Dam. (2d Ed.) § 77.

The case of Patterson v. Bank, supra, seems

to place the right to recover more than nomi- ;

nal damages in such a case on the ground 1

‘ of siandering the trader in his business. We

I (-an Ed.) i 191; Odger, smm. & L. (20 Ed.) '

, 80. Respondent's position that an action of /

I fully dishonor

.7.

of public policy. but the other cases place

it rather on the ground that the wrongful act

of the banker in refusing to honor the check

~

l-4,

~r:..v. ~'

of public policy, but the other cnses pl:u•p •
It rnther on the ground that the wrongful nt"t
(65 :"\. W. 1086. 64 Minn. 40.)
of the banker In refusing to honor the chP<'k
Imputes Insolvency, dlsho11l'sty, or bad faith
~urn>ml' C'onrt of ::\linnesota. Jnn. :.'fl. l~i. 1 to the drawer of the check, and bas the efl'<'<'t
of slandering the tmder In his business. Wl'
Appt>al from district court, St. Louis ce>un- I are of the opinion that the reco\"'N"Y of morP p
ty; S. H. Moer. Judge.
than nominal d:unagt>s l'lln. on ~mnd prlnc·I- ·
Action by Rt>C'ker S\"'endsen against the ' 111~. be smshtlue.I on the. latter ground, where :
State Rnnk of Duluth. Ve"rdict for plalntltr the drawer or the <:hP<·k Is a merC'hant or
for nominal damages. From an ortler deny- trader. To rPfuse to honor his check Is a ·
Ing a new trlnl he appeals. Reverst•d.
• mo!lt effectual wny of slautlerl.ng him In hh.; :
.Tohn Rm;tgard. for appellant. Smith, Mc- tm1k, nnd It ls well l!t'ttled that to lmputl•
llabon & ::\lltchell. for respondent.
lnsolwncy to a mer<'hnnt Is m•tlonahle lWI' '
se, and general damages may be recovered
CANTY, 1. During the time covered by for such a slander. Townsn. Sland. & J,. •
the tran11actlo11s hereinafter mentioned plnln- (4th E11.) I 191; Odger, Sland. & L. (2d l<M.) · '
tllT waR C'Rrrylng on a mercantile busl11e11s In 80. Res11ondent's position that an action of ·
Duluth. and the defendant was carrying on 1 tort cannot be maintained In such a case as •
a banking business In that city. PlnlntllT this, and that plal,tllf'li only rernPdy l!lin
was a customer of the deft>ndnnt, and kept action on contrm•t, In whkh ouly nomln,
a deposit In Its bank, which be was In the damages cnu be 1·eeo\·ered, is not RURtain
habit of dmwlng out by means or C'hecks, hy till' authorities. The ease ot:\Ini-zettl
and which was held by the bank for the llnmA, 1 Barn. & Ado!. 415, cited by him, wo11
purpose of paying such checks. He had nn action In tort. The amount or the '"erdle~
drawn on the bank a check for $4::!.15 In fa- Is not rer>orted, but It Is Y<'r~· e,·ldent that •
vor of one firm. and another tor $1'>4.60 In fa- It WllR onh· for a nominal amount, amt the •
\"'Or of another firm. These checks rome only qup11tion before the court wn11 whetht•r "
through the l'lenrlng house, and were on the or not the defendant wus entit!P«l to a non20th day of Oetober, 1893. presented for Pll.Y- Rult het'ftuse the action should have be<'n
ment to the hank, and pnyment refused. for brought on contract, not In tort. The <"ourt
want of funds. though tlil' plalntllT thPn had b"ld ni:nlnst the d('f('ndant on that point, nn!l
on deposit In the bank, .. ul>ject to his check. what Is said beyon«I this Is mnely ohhn.
the sum of $235.22. The <:hecks were return- and was so regnrdt>d In the sub11Pq11ent C'llRe
ed through the clearing huuse to the hold<'rs of Rolin v. Steward. In Prehn v. R~.
thereof. The reason why the hank rerm1etl R. r. Ext•h. ll2, the on!)· «Jll<'Rtlou WRl'I whether
to honor the check!. wai; that It had by mis- plalntllTs were entltl"d tc rerovt>r of the bnnk
take <"imrged up to plalntltr's aecount a note certain RUmR whll'h they hntl paid to siwe
for $300. macle by him, aud 1'eld by it, which thPlr er1•11lt by proeurlng mo11Py elsewhN"l'
was not yet due, but '\\ h'l'h the hank hy mis- to pny blll11 •lmwu hy tllPm on the bank, and
take supposed was due. '.f hls ll<'tiou was to prM·ent the hllJR from going to protest
brought to recover damages tor· the rt~fu!!al aftn the hank had notltled them that It
to pay the checks. Plalntltr did not allege would not pay th!'Be
although
bad
or prove any special damages, but clnlmed funds In Its hands to
hat purpose.
It
to be entitled to recover substantial general was held that tlity c
re<·over the full
damages. The court below on the trial ruled sum so paid by them to prrR<>rve their credagniust him on ti.tis point, and ordered a Ter- it, and the authority of llolln v. Steward
dlct in his favor for nominal damages, to was express!)' rPcog11lzP11. · The casr of
which be excepted, and from an order deny- Rrooke v. Banki.
fi Hun, 202, 23 N. Y. Supp.
ing a new tri:tl he aptleals.
802, was an a
by the re~lver of an
It ls held l>y the authorities that In such h1solv1•nt who
che•·k had bel'U wrong·
a case the plnlntllT's recovery Is not limited fully dh1honor
y the bank. 'l'he plalutllT
to nominal dnmuges, but be ls entitled to re- was forced to conced" that he cou!O not mai11·
co\"'er geneml compPnMtory damages. Ro- taln an action of tort, or recover any damlin v. StPward, 14 C. B. 59a; f:ehntTner v. ages but such special damages as he nllegpl)
Ehrman (Ill. Sup.) 28 N. E. 917; Bank v. and could prove In an action tor breneh of o
Goos (Xeh.) 58 N. W. 84; Pnttt•rson v. Rnuk.
contmct. Tlwse are nil the <'fi!l<'R dted whidJ
130 Pa. St. 419, 18 Atl. ti3::!; 3 Am. & Eng.
have any benring Oll the 1:ase. ThPRe 111"1? thl'
Enc. Law, 225; 1 Suth. Dam. (:.!d Ed.) § 77. only queRtlons raised worthy of con11i«leraThi' (':ll'I(' or l'uitPr!lon v. Bank, fHllH'll, t!t'ems tlon. It necessarily follows from the foregoto plm-c tile right to re1·over more ti.mu nowl· ing conclusions that the order appealed from
nnl rlnma~es In sn<'h a cn!le on the ground
must be reversed. So ordered.
'f.
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NATIONAL COPPER CO. v. MINNESOTA

MIN. CO.

(23 N. W. 781, 57 Mich. 83.)

Supreme Court of Michigan. June 3, 1885.

Error to Ontonagon.

T. L. Chadbourne, for appellant. Chandler,

Grant & Gray and G. V. N. Lothrop, for ap-

pellee.

COOLEY, C. J. This is an action of tres-

pass. The following is a statement of the

mse, as made'for the plaintiff, for the argu-

ment in this court:

“The plaintiff and defendant are corpora-

tions, which for 25 years and more have been

engaged in copper mining in Ontonagon coun-

ty. Their mines adjoin each other. Each

owns the land in fee on which its mine is situ-

ated. The plaintiff, in carrying on its mining

operations, left a wall of rock, from 15 to 18

feet thick, next to the boundary line of de-
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fendant's mine. This was left as a barrier

and protection to its mine against water or

other encroachments from the Minnesota. The

Minnesota left no such barrier; it not only

worked up to the boundary line, but broke

through into defendant's mine. About the

year 1866 the plaintiff, at about 40 feet above

its fourth level, and from 20 to 25 feet from the

boundary line, drilled a hole, of the ordinary

size, about one and one-half inches in diameter,

and when the blast was ﬁred it blew through

into the opening which had been previously

made by the defendant into the plaintiff's ter-

ritory. The drill-hole was left through from

two to two and one-half feet of solid rock.

Capt. Chynoweth, then the agent of plaintiff,

examined this hole and the surroundings, and

immediately gave orders to cease work there.

This was done as a further protection against

the defendant. No work was done at this

point after that until the winter of 1883—i.

The plaintiff had no knowledge of any fur-

ther trespass at thlsr1point until February, 1884,

under the circumstahces related hereafter. The '

pump of the defendant was stopped in 1870,

and that of the plaintiff in 1871 or 1872. Plain-

tiff's mine ﬁlled up to the adit level in about

ﬁve years. Since 1870 the defendant has

worked its mine more or less upon tribute, and

so did the plaintiff, until May, 1880, when it

resumed work. In order to avoid liability for

the trespass committed by it at the plaiptil‘f's

fourth level, (being the defendant's ﬁfth level,)

the defendant sought to show, and did show,

another hole at the ﬁrst level, between the two

mines. A continuation of the inquiry showed

that this hole also was about 20 feet from the

boundary line, on the plaintiff's side, and that

defendant had here trespassed 20 feet upon

plaintlft"s land. We do not think that the his-

tory of mining upon Lake Superior will dis-

close another instance of such reckless disre-

gard of the rights of an adjoining mine-owner.

This encroachment and trespass by the de-

fendant at the defendant's ﬁfth level occurred

about the year 1859.

“In May, 1880, the plaintiff resumed mining

operations and commenced to pump the water

from its mine. The six-inch pump, formerly

NATIONAL COPPER CO. v. MINNESOTA
MIN. CO.

fendant at the defendant's fifth level occurred
about the year 1859.
"In May, 1880, the plaintiff resumed mining
(23 N. W. 781, 57 Mich. 83.)
operations and commenced to pump the water
from Its mine. The six-Inch pump, formerly
Supreme Court of Michigan. June a, 1885.
used by the mlne, and which had always been
adequate to keep the mine unwatered, proved
Error to Ontonagon.
wholly Inadequate, and It was compelled to get
T. L. Chndbourne, tor appellant. Chandler, a 12-lnch pump, and even this was not sutllcient
Grant & Gray and G. V. N. Lothrop, tor ap- In the spring; and In 1882 the water galned 1
pellee.
on them 120 feet, and In 1883, 222 feet, with I
the pump working night and day. Capt. ParCOOLEY, O. J. This ls an action of tres- nell, the agent of the plalntltr's mine, waM
11ass. The following Is a statement ot the thoroughly acquainted with It, having worked
case, as made' tor the plaintiff, tor the argu- In the mine years before; he soon became conment In this court:
vinced that the bulk of the water came from
"The plaintiff and defendant are corpora- the defendant's mine. He found that the wations, which for 25 years and more have been ter came from the fourth level. He cleaned
engaged ln copper mining ln Ontonagon coun- out the level, and, on reaching the point where
ty. Their mines adjoin each other. F..ach the drill-bole bad been made years before, he
owns the land In tee on which Its mine ls situ- found that the rock had been all blasted away
ated. The plaintiff, ln carrying on Its mining from the l'\llnnesota side, and that the water
operations, left a wall ot roclt, from 15 to 18 was rushing through an opening from 20 to 25
feet thick, next to the boundary line of de- feet high and 12 feet wide. When discovered
fendant's mine. This was left as a barrier there was a volume of water seven feet wide
and protection to Its m~ne against water or ftowlng from the Minnesota Into the National.
other encroachments from the Minnesota. The When the defendant made Its second encroachMinnesota left no such barrier; lt not only ment at this point does not clearly appear; {
worked up to the boundary line, but broke according to the defendant's witness Spargo it
through Into defendant's mine. About the was In 1871 or 1872. This witness was an
yea1· 1866 the plaintiff, at about 40 feet above employA of the defendant, and one of its trlbuIts fourth level, and from 20 to 25 feet from the ters. He says he saw the hole from the Minboundary line, drilled a hole, of the ordinary nesota side, and 1t was then six to eight feet
size, about one and one-halt Inches ln diameter, high, and from four to five feet wide. Wlland when the blast was fired lt blew through . llam George, a witness for defendant, last saw
Into the opening which bad been previously the hole In 1870 or 1871. It was then about a
made by the defendant Into the plalntltf's ter- foot In diameter. The witness was then workritory. The drill-hole was left through from ing tor the defendant as tributer and captain.
two to two and one-halt feet of solid rock. Thomas James was In charge of the mine.
Capt. Chynoweth, then the agent ot plaintiff, He admits that the defendant's trlbuters were
examined this hole and the surroundings, and then mining there. This same Capt. James
Immediately gave orders to cease work there. has been In charge of the defendant's mine as
This was done as a further protection against agent ever since.
the defendant. No work was done at this
"It was not denied In the court below, and
point after that until the winter of 1883-4. we presume will not be In this court, that the
The plaintiff had no knowledge of any fur- defendant committed these several acts of tresther trespass at thlElnt untll February, 1884, pass. But, In proof of the fact, we refer to
under the clrcumst ces related hereafter. The · the admission of the agent Harris, the evidence
pump of the deten nt was stopped In 1870, that the track of a tram-road, sollars, and a
nnd that of the plaintiff In 1871 or1872. Plnln- system of timbering were found constructed
tlff's mine fl.lied up ito the adlt level In n bout from the fifth level of defendant's mine Into
five years. Since 1870 the defendant has this opening, and the testimony of plaintiff's
worked Its mine more or less upon tribute, and witnesses already referred to. Furthermore,
so did the plaintiff, until May, 1880, when It It is beyond dispute that the defendant knowresumed work. In order to avoid liability for ingly and willfully committed these acts of
the trespnss committed by It at the plalntllI's trespass, and broke down the barl"ler which
fourth level, (being the defendant's fifth ievel,) the plaintiff bad so carefully left to protect Its
the defendant sought to show, and did show, mine for all future time, and against all possianother hole at the first level, between the two ble dangers.
mines. A continuation of the Inquiry showed
"About 1870 the defendant concluded to
that this hole also was about 20 feet from the abandon regular mining, stopped Its pumps,
boundary line, on the plaintiff's side, and that and commenced what 1s known among miners
defendant had here trespassed 20 feet upon as robbing the. mine. It placed Its tributers
plalntltt's land. We do not think that the his- at work at the bottom of the mine, took out
tory of mlnin~ upon Lake Superior will dis- all the copper ground that could be found, took
close another Instance of such reckless disre- out the supports of the roof of the mine, and
gard or the rights of an adjoining mine-owner. allowed It to settle or cave In. This was all
This encl'oac:hment and tt·es1mss by the de- done untler the direction of the defendant's
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agent, James. The defendant's mine is situ-

ated upon a hill or mountain side. The result

was that the surface of the ground became de-

pressed, and openings were made in it. De-

fendant's agent, James, testiﬁed to openings of

this character on the surface of the Minnesota,

amounting in all to over 500 feet in length;

some were 3 or 4 feet wide. Into these open-

ings the water from rains and melting snow

ran into the defendant's mine, and from thence

ﬂowed into the plaintiff's mine, through the

opening at its fourth level. But for these open-

ings the water would have run down the hill-

side. As one of defendant's own witnesses ex-

pressed it, ‘There has been a general falling

away of the bluff.' There were no such open-

ings on the surface of the National. In fact,

we everywhere ﬂnd the plaintiff conductmg its

mining operations with due regard to the

rights of adjoining owners; while we ﬁnd
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the defendant conducting its operations in

the most reckless disregard of such rights."

The above is a sufﬁcient statement of the

facts for a discussion of the principal question

in the case, viz: Is the plaintiff's right of ac-

tion barred by the statute of limitations? I

The count in the declaration on which the

parties went to trial alleged that the defend-

ant, on March 15, 1882, and on divers days

and times between that day and the com-

mencement of suit, with force and arms broke

down the partition wall between the mine of

the plaintiff and the mine of t.he defendant,

and let the water from its said mine into the

mine of the plaintiff, and then and there ﬁlled

the mine of the plaintiff with water, greatly

damaging its timbering, workings, walls, and

machinery, hindered and prevented the plain-

tiff from carrying on and transacting its law-

ful and necessary affairs and business, caused

the plaintiff great damage and expense in re-

moving water from its mine, etc.

The defendant pleaded the general issue,

with notice that the statute of limitations

would be relied upon. The plaintiff recovered

a large judgment.

1. The time limited for the commencement

of suit for trespass upon lands in this state is

two years from the time the right of action

accrues. How. St. § 8714. This action was

commenced in May, 1884, and it is not claimed

that damages for the original trespass can be

recovered in it. The contention of the plain-

tiff may be succinctly stated as follows: (1)

Had the plaintiﬂ! instituted suit within two

ymrs from the original trespass, the recovery

would have been limited to such damages as

‘ were the direct and immediate result of the

trespass. The subsequent ﬂowage of water

through the opening was not the direct, imme-

diate, or necessary result of breaking down the

barriers; therefore no damages could have

been recovered therefor in an action so brought.

(2) Two trespasses may be the result of one

act. In other words, one trespass may cause

another. and he who commits the wrongful

act in such a case will be responsible for both

trespasses. (3) In this case no action accrued

for the ﬂowage of water into the plaintiff's

agent, James. The defendant's mlne Is sltuated upon a hill or mountain slde. The result
was that the 9tll'f1lce of the ground became depressed, and openings were made In It. Defendant's agent, James, testified to openings of
this character on the surface of the Minnesota,
amounting in all to over 500 feet in length;
some were 3 or 4 feet wide. Into tlle15e openings the water from rains and melting snow
ran into the defendant's mine, and from thence
flowed Into the plalntitf's mine, through the
opening at its fourth level But for these openings the water would have run down the hlllslde. As one of defendant's own witnesses expressed lt, 'There has been a general falling
away of the bluff.' There were no such openings on the surface of the National. In fact,
we everywhere find the plaintiff con<Jucttng tts
mining operations with due regard to the
rights of adjoining owners; while we find
the defendant conducting Its operations In
the most reckless disregard of such rights."
The above Is a sufficient statement of the
facts for a discussion of the principal question
j In the case, viz: Is the plalntltf's right of ac-,
I\ tlon barred by the statute of limitations?
The count In the declaration on which t.h ..
parties went to trial alleged that the defe.-i1ant, on March 15, 1882, and on divers days
and times between that day and the commencement of suit, with force and arms broke
down the partition wall between the mine of
the plaintiff and the mine of the defendant,
and let the water trom Its said mine Into the
mine of the plaintiff, and then and there tilled
the mine of the plalntur with water, greatly
damaging its timbering, workings, walls, and
machinery, hindered and prevented the plaintlfl'. from carrying on and transacting Its lawful and necessary alfalrs and business, caused
the plaintiff great damage and expense in remo¥1ng water from Its mine, etc.
The defendant pleaded the general Issue,
with notice that the statute of limitations
would be relied upon. The plaintiff recovered
a large judgment.
1. The time limited for the commencement
ot suit tor trespass upon lands In this Rtate ls
two years from the time the right of action
accrues. How. St. t 8714. This action was
commenced In May, 1884, and It ls not clahned
that damages for the original tre11p11sa can be
recovered In it. The contention of the plalntlfl'. may be succinctly stated as follows: (1)
Had the plaintiff instituted suit within two
years from the original trespass, the recovery
would ha¥e been limited to such damages as
were the direct and Immediate result of the
trespass. The subsequent tlowage of water
through the opening was not the direct, immedlate, or necessary result of breaking down the
barriers; therefore no damages could have
been recovered therefor In an action so brought.
(2) Two trespasses may be the result of one
act. In other words, one trespass may cause
another, and be who commits the wrongful
act In such a case wlll be responsible for both
trCl'}Jasses. (3) In this case no action accrued
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for the downge of water into the plalntltr's
mine until the dowage actually took place, but
when the fiowage occurred as a result of defendant's wrongful act it was a trespass, and
It it continued from day to 1.lny there was a .
continuous trespass for which repeated actions I
mlgnt be maintained.
Upon these positions the plalntltr plants Its
case, and unless they are sound In law the recovery cannot be supported. All right of recovery for the original trespass, which consisted in breaking through Into the plaintiff's mine,
was long since barred, and It Is not claimed
that there was, from the time ot the first
wrong, a continuous trespass which can give a
right of action now. The merely leaving an
opening between the two mines Is not the
wrong for which suit ls brought, but it ls the
dowlng of water through the opening which Is
complained of as a new trespass; the Ol'igln11I
wrongful act of the defendant In breaking
through being the cause, and the injurious co1!sequence when It happened, connecting Itself
with the cause to complete the right of action.
In support of Its contention that the case
before us may be regarded as one of continuous trespass from the first, se¥eral authorities are cited for the plaintiff, which
may be briefly noticed. Among them ls
Holmes v. Wilson, 10 Adol. & E . 503. It appeared In that case that a turnpike company
had built buttresses on the plalntift''s land for
the support of Its road. The act was a t1·espass, and the plnlntlfl'. recovered damages
therefor; but this, It was held, did not preclude Its malnta.ining a subsequent action for
the continuance of the buttresses where they
bad been wrongfully placed. 'Ihe ground of
the declsl_on was that in the first suit damages could be recovered only fo1· the continuance of the trespass to the time of Its
Institution. '!'here could be no legal presumption that the turnpike company would
persist in Its wrongful conduct, nod cons&qilently, prospective damages, which would
only be recoverable on the ground of such
persistent wrong-doing, would not have been
within the compass of the first recovery.
The cases of Bowyer v. Cook, 4 C. B. 23G;
Thompson v. Gibson, 7 Mees. & W. 4~16;
Russell v. Brown, G3 l\Ie. 203; and Powers
v. Council Bluffs, 45 Iowa, 652, are nil decided upon the same principle. Cumberland,
etc., Co. v. Hitchings, 65 Me. 140, was one of
the wrongful tllllng up of a canal by a trespasser. It wns held that the trespasser was
under legal obligation to remove what he
bad unlawfully placed on the plaintlff"s premises, and that, so long as he suffered the
obstruction to remain, he was guilty of a
continuous trespass from day to day.
In Adams v. Railroad Co.. 18 Minn. 260
(Gil. 236,) and Troy v. Railroad Co., 23 N.
H. 83, railroad companies which, by trespass, bad entered upon the lands of lndlvld uals and constructe~ and beg·tln the oper·
atlon of rallromls, were held 11::.ble as trespassers from day to day so long as the oper-
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ation of the road was continued. The prin-

ciple of decision in all these cases is clear

and not open to question. In each of them

there was an original wrong, but there was

also a persistency in the wrong from day to

day; the plaintiff's possession was continu-

ally invaded, and his right to the exclusive

occupation and enjoyment of his freehold

continually encroached upon and limited.

Each day, therefore, the piaintiff suffered a

new wrong, but no single suit could be made

to embrace prospective damages, for the rea-

son that future persistency in the wrong

could not legally be assumed.

To make these cases applicable, it is nec-

essary that it should appear that the action

of the defendant has been continuously

wrongful from the ﬁrst. Whether it can be

so regarded will be considered further on.
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The plaintiff, however, does not, as we have

seen, rely exclusively upon this view. Its

case is likened by counsel to that of a farmer,

whose fences are thrown down by a tres-

passer; the cattle of the trespasser on a

subsequent day entering through the open-

ing. In such a case it is said there are two

trespasses: the one consisting in throwing

down the fences, and the other in the entry

of the cattle; and the right of action for the

latter would accrue at the time the entry was

actually made. The plaintiff also cites and

relies upon a number of cases in which the

act of the party which furnishes the ground

of complaint antedates the injurious conse-

quence, as the original trespass in this case

antedated the ﬂowing from which the plain-

tit1' has suffered damage.

One of these cases is Bank of Hartford Co.

v. Waterman, 26 Conn. 324. In that case

action was brought against a sherif f for,a

false return to a writ of attachment. The

falsity consisted in a misdescription of the -

land attached. When suit was brought, the

period of limitation, if it was to be com-

puted from the time the return was made,

had already run; but under the statute the

plaintiff was entitled to bring suit only aft-

er he had taken out execution and had a re-

turn made upon it, which would show a

necessity for a resort to the attached lands.

It was only after such a return of execution

that the plaintif f would suffer even nominal

damage from the oﬂicial misfeasance; and

it was therefore a necessary consequence

that the time of limitation must be comput-

ed from that time, and not from the time of

the false return.

Another case is that of McGuire v. Grant,

23 N. J . Law, 356, which is to be referred to

the same principle. The defendant removed

the lateral support to the plaintiff's land by

an excavation. made within his own bound-

aries. Injury subsequently resulted to the

plaintiff in consequence. The statute of lim-

itations was held to run from the time the

damage occurred; the excavation not being

of itself a tort until damage resulted. The

case of Bonomi v. Backhousc, l'll. Bl. J‘; El.
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ntlon or the road wns continued. The principle or decision in all these cases is clear
:md not open to question. In each ot them
there was an original wrong, but there was
nlso a perslstency in the wrong from day to
day; the plalntltl''s possession was continually Invaded, and his right to the exclusive
occupation and enjoyment of his freehold
.continually encroached upon and limited.
Each day, therefore, the plalntltl' sutrered a
new wrong, but no single suit could be made
to P.mbt'llce prospective damages, for the reason thnt future perslstency In the wrong
could not legally be assumed.
To make these cases appllcable, it ls necessary that lt should appear that the action
of the defendant has been continuously
wrongful from the tlrst. Whether it can be
so regarded wlll be considered further on.
The plalntitr, however, does not, as we have
seen, rely excluslYely upon this view. Its
case Is likened by counsel to that of a farmer,
whose fences are thrown down by a tres1msser; the cattle of the trespasser on a
subsequent day entering through the opening. In 1mcb a case it Is said there are two
trespl188es: the one COD.8lstlng ln throwing
down the fences, and the other in the entry
of the cattle; and the rlKht of action for the
latter would accrue at the time the entry was
actually made. The plalntltr also cites and
relies upon a number of cases in which the
act of the party which furnishes the ground
of complaint antedates the injurious consequence, as the origlnnl trespass ln this ca.se
antedated the tlowing from which the plalntltr has sutrered damage.
One of the6e cases Is Bank of Hartford Co.
v. Waterman, 26 Conn. 324. In that case
nctlon was brought against a sberllr for . a
false return to a writ of attachment. The
falsity consisted In a mlsdescri1>tlon of the
land attached. When suit was brought, the
period of limitation, lf lt was to be computed from the time the return was mnde,
had already run; but under the statute the
plalntitr wns entitled to bring suit only after he had taken out execution nn<I had a return made upon lt, which would show a
necessity for a resort to the attached lands.
It was only after such a return or execution
that the plalntltr would suffer CYen uomlnal
damnA"e from the otllclal mlstensance; and
It was therefore a necessary consequence
that the time of llmltt.).tlon must be computed from that time, and not from the time of
the false retum.
Another case Is that of l\feGuh-e v. Grant,
2;; l\". J. Law, 3;jG, which Is to be referred to
the sn me principle. 'l'he defe11<lnnt removed
the In feral support to the plaintiff's lnnd by
nn cxcavatlou, made within his own boundnrles. Injury subsequl'ntly resulted to the
plaintiff 111 consequence. The statute of limitations was held to 1·u11 from the time the
damni:e occurred; the exrn,·ntlon not being
ot Itself a tort until damage resulte(l. The
<'.USP of Bonomi 'I". Bn1•kl10nsl', El. Bl. & El.

622, was like the last in principle, and was
decided ln the same way.
The plalntltt also, ln this connection, likens
Its case to that of one who. ln consequence
of a ditch dug upon his neighbor's land, bas
water collected and thrown upon his premises to his Injury. It is not the act of digging the ditch that sets the time ot limitation to running ln such a case, bnt it ls the
happening of the Injurious consequence.
The case supposed, however, ls not a case of
trespass. The act of digging the ditch was
not ln Itself a wrongful act. The owner of
land ls at liberty to dig as many ditches as
he pleases on his own land, and he becomes
a wrong-doer only when, by means of them,
he causes injury to another. It he tloods his
nelghb01·'s land the case ls one of nuisance,
and every successive Instance of tloodlng is
a new Injury. But here, as ln the case ot a
continuous trespass, prospective damages
cannot be taken Into account, because it
must be presumed that wrongful conduct
will be abandoned rather than persisted ln,
and that the party will either ftll up his
ditches or ln some proper way gua1·d against
the recurrence of Injury. Battlshlll v. Heed,
18 C. B. 696. cases of tloodlng lands by
dams or other obstructions to running water
are clU!es of this description. Baldwin v.
Calkins, 10 Wend. 169; Mersereau v. Pearsall, 19 N. Y. 108; Plate v. Railroad Co., 37
N. Y. 472. So a1·e cases of diverting water, to
the tlow of which upon his premises the plalntllr Is entitled. Langford v. Owsley, 2 Bibb,
210. So a.re cases of the wrongful occupation
of a public street, whereby the access ot
the plalntltr to his premises Is obstructed.
Carl v. Railroad Co., 46 Wis. 625; S. C. 1 N.
i W. 295. Other cases cited for the plalntltr,
and resting on the same principle, a.re Thayer v. Brooks, 17 Ohio, 480; Blunt v. McCormick, 3 Denio, 2&'l; Winchester v. Stevens
Point, 58 Wis. 3:-iO, 17 N. W. 3, 547; Union
Trust Co. v. Cuppy, 26 Kau. 754; Spilman v.
Navigation Co., 74 N. C. 675; Lowetb v.
Smith, 12 Mees. & W. 582.
The case of Whitehouse v. Fellowce, 10 C.
B..(N. S.) 7G5, was one of nuisance. A turnpike company made a covered drain with
gratings at intervals and catchplts. In consequence of the lnsutllclency of the catchpits, 01· or their not being kept in proper condition, the plalntltr's colliery was fioode<l
every time there was a hen vy shower. In
an action for this tlooding it was held that
eve1·y damage was a new Injury and gave n
new right or .action. 'l'he ruling sustnined
the position ta ken for the plalntltl' In the
cnse, which was thus succinctly state<l by
counsel arg-ne111lo: "The dis tiudion which
peryades the cases ls this: ·w11ere the plaintif'f complains or a trespass, the statute runs
from the time when the act of trespass was·
committed, except In the case ot a continuing
tr<'spass. But wbe1·c the cause of action Is
not In ltselt a trespass, as an act done upon
a 11:n11's own land, and the cause ot aNiou Is
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the consequential injury to the plaintiff.

there the period of limitation runs from the

time the damage is sustained."

The case before us was one of admitted

trespass, from which immediate damage re-

sulted. Had suit been brought at that time.

all the natural and probable damage to re-

suit from the wrongful act would have been

taken into account, and the plaintiff would

have recovered for it. But there was no

continuous trespass from that time on. The

defendant had built no structure on the

plaintiffs premises, was occupying no part

of them with anything it had placed there,

and was in no way interrupting the plain-

tiff's occupation or enjoyment. All it had

left there was a hole in the wall. But there

is no analogy between leaving a hole in a

wall on another's premises and leaving
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houses or other obstructions there to in-

cumber or hinder his occupation; the phys-

ical hindrances are a continuance of the

original wrongful force, but the hole is only

the consequence of a wrongful force which

ceased to operate the moment it was made.

If. therefore, the plaintiff had brought suit

more than two years after the original tres-

is_ by no means necessarily conclusive. The

plaintiff must ﬁt: some distinct wrong upon

limitation, or the action must fail; and there

is no such wrong in this case unless the fail-

ure to prevent the ﬂowing constitutes one.

The original act of wrong is no more in ques-

tion now, after having been barred by the

~

nor do we see that it can be important in a

case like the present, where the wrong must

be found in the injurious ﬂowing, whether

there was or was not a wrong originally. If

there was, it stands altogether apart from the

wrong now sued for, with an interval he-

been complained of.. The mere fact that an

opening was nmde by the defendant between

the two mines, would not of itself have been

' a trespass unless the defendant invaded the

plaintiff's premises in making it. Each party

had a right to mine on its own side to the

' boundary, (Wilson v. Weddell, L. R. 2 App.

Cas. 95;) and if the plaintiff had ﬁrst done so,

the defendant might have done the same at

the same point, and in that way have made.

pass, and before the ﬂooding of its mine by (an opening rightfully. The difference be‘-

water ﬂowing through the opening had be-

gun, and if the statute of limitations had

been pleaded, there could have been no re-

covery. The action for the original wrong

would then have been barred, and there had

been no repetition of the injury in the mean

time to give a new cause of action. The

mere continuance of the opening in the wall

the consequential Injury to the pllllntll.T,
there the period of llmltntlon runs from the
time the damage ls sustained."
~e case before us was one of admitted
trespass, from which Immediate dnmagc resuited. Had suit been brought at that time,
all the natural and probable damage to result from the wrongful act would have been
taken into account, and the plalntll.T would
bave recovered for It. But tbere was no
continuous trespass from that time on. The
defendant had built no structure on the
plnlntiO'.'s premises, was occupying no part
ot them with anything It had placed there,
and was ln no way lnterrnptlng the plnin·
titr's occupation or enjoyment. All lt had
left there was a bole ln the wall. But there
ls no analogy between lea vlng a hole in a
wall on another's premises and leaving
houst!S or other obstructions there to Incumber or binder his occupation; the phys!cal hiudmnces are a continuance of the
original wrongful force, but the hole Is only
the consequence of 11 wrongful force which
ceased to operate the moment it was rnado.
If, therefore, the plaintiff bad brought suit
more than two years after the original tres·
pass, and before the flooding of Its mine by
water flowing through the opening had begun, and If the statute of limitations had
been pleaded, thel'e could have been no recovery. The action for the original wrong
would then have been barred, and there bad
been no repetition of the Injury In the mean
time to give a new cause of action. The
mere continuance ot tile opening in the wall
could not be a continuous damage. Lloyd
v. Wlgney, 6 Binj!,'. 489.
/
The right of action, If any, tor which the
plalntHr can complain, must therefore arise
from the flowing Itself as a wrongful act;
there being no longer any action for the origlnal breaking, and no continuous acts of
wrong from that time until the flowing began. The flowage caused a damage to the
plalntUJ; but damage alone does not give a
right of aetlon; there must be a concurrence
of wrong and damage. The wrong, then,
must be found in leaving the opening unclos..ed and permitting the water to fiow through.
It must therefore rest upon nn obligation on
the part of the defendant either to close the
. opening, because pen;ons for whose acts It
wns rt>sponsible Imel made It, or to restrain
wnter whiC'h hncl collected on Its own premj ises from tlo1ving upon the premises of the
, plaintiff to Its Injury. Tbe latter seems to be
the ground upon which the plalntlll' chiefly relies for a re('overy.
In the argument made for the plaintiff in
this court stress Is laid upon the fact that the
damage which has actually resulted from the
flooding could not have lleen anticipated at
the time of the ori~lnal trespass, and therefo1·e could not then have been recovered for.
Thls conslderntlon, it ls urged, oug ht to be
decisive. But, while we agree that It Is to bu
considered in the case for what It Is worth, It

could not be a continuous damage. Lloyd

v. Wigney, 6 Bing. 489. /

The right of action, if any, for which the

plaintiff can complain, must therefore arise

from the ﬂowing itself as a wrongful act;

there being no longer any action for the orig-

inal breaking, and no continuous acts of

wrong from that time until the ﬂowing be-
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Is by no means necessarily conclusive. The
pialntllf must fix some distinct wrong upon.
tbe defendant within the period of statutory·
limitation, or the action must fall; and there
Is no such wrong ln this case unless the fall·
ure to prevent the flowing constitutes one.
The original act or wrong Is no more In question now, after bnvlng llt•.:n llarred by tlw
statute, than it would ba,·e been lf damages
had been recovered or settled for amlcnllly;
nor do we z,;ee that It can be Important ln a
case like the present, where the wrong must
be found ln the injurious fiowing, whether
there was or was not a wrong originally. If
there was, It stands altogether apa1-t from the
wrong now sued for, with an Interval be·
tween them, when no legal wrong could have·
been complained of.. Tlle mere fact that aa
opening was moue by the defendant between
tile two mines, woulu not of Itself have been
a trespass unless the defendant invaded the
plaintiff's premises in making It. Each party
bnd a rigllt to mine on Its own slue to thC'
boundary, (Wilson v. Waddell, L. R. 2 App.
Cas. 95;) and if tile plalntill' bnd first done so,
I the defendant might have done the same at
I the same point, and In that way have wade
4--'an opening rightfully. Tbe difference be'tween the case supposed and this, Is that here
\ the defendant was found to ham gone beyond
the boundary and committed a trespass. But
suppose the defendant had then made comi pensatlon for the trespass, so far as it was
, then damaging; bow would the case have
· differed from the present? The opening would
remain, made by the defendant, through
which, if the water was allowed to collect in
his mine, it must eventually pass; and If he
was under obligation to keep it within the
bounds of his own premises, he would be Ilable tor allowing it to pass; otherwise not. ·
The fact that compensation was not actually
made for the breaking away ot the plalntlft'.'s
barrier ls Immaterial when the statute bas
run, as has been already explained.
The case ot Clegg v. Dearden, 12 Q. B. 5i6"~
Is not unlike in its facts the case before us.
In that case, also, there had been a wrongful
breaking through from one mine to another•
and an injurious flowage of water through
the opening. The facts were found by special
verdict, and Lorcl Denman, in pronouncing
judgment, said: "The gist of the action, as
stated In the declaration, Is the keeping open
and unfilled up of an aperture and ex:cavatlon made by the defendant into the plain·
titl.'s' mine. By the custom the defendant was
entltletl to excavate . up to the boundary or
his wine without leaving any barrier; and
the enuse of action, then•fore, Is the not tllling up of the exearntlon made by him on the
plaintiffs' side of the boundary and withi11
their mine. It Is not, as In tlle cuse of Holm('S
v. Wilson, 10 Atlol. & E. 503, a continuing of
something wrongfully plnC'ed by the dcfendant upon the premises of the plain tiff. .:\ur
Is it a continuing of something placed upon
the land or a third person to tlle nuisance 01'.
J
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the plaintiff, as in the case of Thompson v.

Gibson, 7 Mees. & W. 456.\There is a legal

obligation to discontinue a trespass or remove

a nuisance; but no such obligation upon a

trespasser to replace what he has pulled

down or destroyed upon the land of another,

though he is liable in an action of trespass to

compensate in damages for the loss sustained.

The defendant having made an excavation

and aperture in the plaintiffs' land was liable

to an action of trespass; but no cause of ac-

tion arises from his omitting to re-enter th

plaintiffs' land and ﬁll up the excavatiqiI

Such an omission is neither the continuation

of a trespass nor of a nuisance; nor- is it the

breach of any legal duty. It was, however,

contended on the part of .the plaintiffs, that,
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admitting this to be so, there nevertheless

was a legal obligation or duty upon the de-

fendant to take means to prevent the water

from ﬂowing from his mine into that of the

plaintiffs through the aperture he had made?'

but "the plaintiffs have not alleged any such

duty or obligation in their declaration, nor is

their action founded upon the breach of any

such duty, if it exists, but upon the omission

to ﬁll up the aperture made by them in the

plaintiffs‘ mine.) It appears to us that the

defendant, upon the facts found by the jury,

is entitled to have the verdict entered for

him upon the plea of not guilty."

If this case was rightly decided, it should

rule the one before us. It has been followed

by the supreme court of Ohio in Williams v.

Coal Co., 37 Ohio St . 583, in a case which also

closely resembles this upon its facts, and is

not distinguishable in principle. It seems to

us that these c ses are sound in law as well

as conclusive. The only wrongful act with

which the defendant is chargeable, was com-

mitted so long before the bringing of suit that

action for it was barred. iHad suit been

brought in due time, recovery might have

been had for all damages which could then

have been anticipated as the natural and

probable result of the wrongful act. If the

particular damages which have been suffered

could not then have been anticipated, it is be-

cause it could not then be known that the de-

fendant would cease mining operations and

the plaintiff would not. There could be no

ﬂowing from one mine into the other while

both were worked; and had the plaintiff

ceased operations and the defendant contin-

ued to work, the defendant would have suf-

fered the damage instead of the piaintlff.

But neither party was under obligation to

keep its mine pumped out for the beneﬁt of

its neighbor. Either was at liberty to discon-

tinue its operations and abandon its mine

whenever its interest should seem to require

it. And had the plaintiff brought an action

within two years from the time of trespass,

its recovery would necessarily have been had

with is undoubted right of abandonment in

view. But a jury could not have awarded

PRESENT AND PH.OSPECTIVE DAMAGES.

the plaintlft', as in the cast of Thompson v.
Gibson, 7 Mees. & W. 456. \.__There Is a legal
obligation to discontinue a trespass or remove
a nuisance; but no such obligation upon a
trespasser to replace what he has pulled
down or destroyed upon the land of another,
though he Is liable In an action of trespass to
compensate in damages for the loss sustained.
'l'he defendant having made an excavation
and aperture In the plaintiffs' land was liable
to an action of trespass; but no cause of action arises from his omitting to re-enter th';
plalntlft's' land and fill up the excavatiog..i
Such an omission Is neither the continuation
of a trespass nor of a nuisance; nor- Is It the
breach of any legal duty. · It was, however,
contended on the part of .the plaintJft's, that,
admitting this to be so, there nevertheless
was a legal obligation or duty upon the defendant to take means to prevent the water
from flowing from his mint. Into that of the
( plalntlft's through the aperture he had made;"
but "the plaintiff's have not alleged any such
duty or obligation In their declaration, nor Is
their action founded upon the breach of any
such duty, It It exists, but upon the omission
to fl.11 up the a~rture made by them In the
plalntl1fs' mine. J It appears to us that the
defendant, upon the facts found by the jury,
ls entitled to have the verdict entered for
him upon the plea of not guilty."
It this case was rightly decided, it should
rule the one before us. It has been followed
by the supreme court of Ohio In W111iams v.
Coal Co., 37 Ohio St 583, In a case which also
closely resembles this upon its facts, and Is
not distinguishable in principle. It seems to
us that these cp.ses are sound in law as well
as conclusive. \The only wrongful act with
which the defendant Is chargeable, was committed so long before the br~ging of suit t.hat
action for lt was barred. l Had suit been
brought In due time, recovery might have
been had for all damages which could then
have been anticipated as the natural and
probable result of the wrongful act. If the
particular damages which have been sull'ered
could not then have been anticipated, It la because It could not then be known that the defendant would cease mining operations and
the plaintiff would not. There could be no
1lowing from one mine Into the other while
both were worked; and had the plalntllf
ceased operations and the defendant contin-

ued to work, the defendant would have suffered the damage Instead of the plalnllir.
But neither party was under obligation to
keep lts mine pumped out for the benefit ot
Its neighbor. Either was at liberty to discontinue its operations and abandon Its mine
whenever its Interest should seem to require
it. And had the plaintiff' brought an action
within two years from the time of trespass,
its recovery would necessarily have been had
with tji1s undoubted tight of abandonment In
view. IBut a jury could not have awarded
damages for any exercise of a right, and
they could not, therefore, have given damages for a possl~le Injury to flow from such
an abandonment This is on the plain principle that the me e exercise of a right cannot
be a legal wrong to another, and if damage
~hall happen, it Is damnum absque lnjuria. (
This view of the case ls conclusive; bu
there is another that ls equally so. The
wrong to the plaintiff consisted in breaking
down the wall which had been left by it in Its
operations. U any damage might possibly
result from this which was not then so far
probable that a jury could have taken it Into
account In awarding damages, the plalntitf
was not without redress. It would have been
entltled In a suit then brought to recover the
cost of restoring the barrier which had been
taken away ; and It lt had done so, and made
the restoration, the damage now complained
of could not have happened. It thus appears
that complete redress could have been had In
a suit brought at that time; and, that being
the case, the plaintiff is not entitled to recover now for an Injury far which an award of
means of prevention was within the right of
action which was suffered to become barred.
The right which then existed, being a right to
recover for all the injury which had then been
sull'ered, including the loss of the dividing
barrier, It would not have been competent for
the plaintiff, had suit then been brought, to
leave the loss of the barrier out of account,
awaiting possible special damages to ftow
therefrom as a ground for a new suit. The
wrong which had then been committed was
Indivisible; and the bar of the statute must
be as broad as the remedy was which It extinguishes.
The judgment must be set aside and a new
trial ordered.
·
The other justices concurred.
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DARLEY llADi COLUERY 00. v. MITCHELL.

DARLEY MAIN COLLIERY CO. v. MITCH-

(11 App. Cns. 127.)

ELL.

House ot Lords, Feb. 8, 1886.

(11 ADD. Cas. 127.)

House of Lords, Feb. 8, 1886.

Appeal from a decision of the court of ap-

peal. 14 Q. B. Div. 125.

The respondent having brought an action

against the appellants for damages for in-

juries done to his cottage by subsidence in

the ground on which they stood, caused by the

improper working of the defendants' coiliery,

among other defenses they set up the statute

of limitations. At the trial, before Hawkins,

J., at the Leeds summer assizes, 1883, the fol-

lowing facts were proved or admitted: The

plaintiff was the freeholder of six perches of

land and three cottages thereon, in the parish

of Darﬁeld, Yorkshire. The defendants were

lessees of a seam of coal under the plain-

tiff's land, and worked the coal up to 1868.
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In consequence of that working, a subsidence

of the land took place in 1868, causing injury

to the plaintiff's cottages, in‘ respect of which

the defendants wererequired to and did then

execute repairs. The defendants never work-

ed the coal after 1868, but in 1882 a further

subsidence of the land took place. causing

further injury to the cottages. For this in-

jury this action was brought, in December,

1882.

The special jury having been discharged by

consent, Hawkins, J., on further consider-

ation, entered judgment for the defendants

upon the defense of the statute of limitations.

the plaintiff's counsel admitting that he could

not distinguish the case from Lamb v. Walker,

3 Q. B. Div. 3&). The court of appeal (Brett,

)1. R., Bowen and Fry, L. JJ.) reversed this

decision, and entered judgment for the plain-

tiff for damages to be assessed by an arbi-

trator. 14 Q. B. Div. 125. From this decision,

the defendants appealed.

During the argument of the respondent's

counsel before the house, a discussion took

place as to the cause of the subsidence in

1&2, and in the result the following state-

ment was agreed to, in writing, between the

appellants‘ and respondent‘ counsel: That

after the partial subsidence, in 1868, the

strata remained practically quiescent until the

working of the coal in the next adjoining land,

in 1881, which working caused a “creep" and

a further subsidence; that. if the owner of

the adjoining land (one Cooper) had not work-

ed his coal, there would have been no further

subsidence; but the appellants admit that if

the coal under the respondent's land had not

been taken out, or if the appellants had left

sufﬁcient support under the respondent's land,

then the working of the adjoining owner

would have done no harm.

S. B. Somerville, for appellants Baxter & Co.

Rldsdale & Son. for respondent Saunders,

Xicholson & Reeder.

LORD HALSBURY. My lords, in this case

the plaintiff, the owner of land upon the sur-

face, has sued the lessees of certain seams of

coal below and adjacent to the plaintiffs land

for having disturbed the plaintiff in the enjoy-

Appeal from a deel><ion of the court of appt•:ll. 14 Q. B. DIY. 1:!5.
The respondent having brought an action
against the appellants for damages for in.Juries done to his cottage by subsidence In
tile ground on which they stood, caused by the
Improper working of the defendants' colliery,
among other defenses they set up the statute
<Jf limitations. At the trial, before Hawkins,
.J., at the Leeds summer assizes, 1883, the following facts were proved or admitted: The
plalntlll'. was the freeholder of six perches of
land and three cottages thereon, In the parh;h
-0f Darfleld, Yorkshire. 'l'he defendants were
lessees of a seam of coal under the plaintiff's land, and worked the coal up to H~li8.
In consequence of that working, a suhshlence
-0f the land took place in 1868, causing injury
to the plalntltr's cottages, hr respect of which
the defendants were·requlred to and did then
execut~ repairs.
The defendants ne\'er yvork~d the coal after 1868, hut In 1882 a further
subsidence of the land took pilwe. causing
further Injury to the cottages. Fol' this Injury this action was brought, in Deeember
188"2.

•

'The special jury having been discharged by
eonsent, Hawkins, J., on further consideration, entered judgment for the defendants
upon the defense of the statute of limitations.
the plaintiff's counsel admitting that be could
not distinguish the case from L.1mb v. Walker,
3 Q. B. Div. 380. The court of appeal (Brett,
ll. R., Bowen and Fry, L. JJ.) rHersed this
decision, and entered judgment for the plaintiff for damaJ'{es to be assessed by an arbitrator. 14 Q. B. Div. 12.j, From this decl11lon
the defendants appealed.
'
During the argument of the respondent's
<'Ollnsel before the house, a dlscnst1ion took
place as to the cause of the subsillence In
188'.!, and In the result the following state11).ent was agreed to, In writing, between the
appellants' and respondent's counsel: That
alter the partial subsidence, In 1868, the
strata remained practically quiescent until the
working of the coal In the n~xt adjoiniug land,
In 1881, which working caused a "creep" and
a further subsidence; that. If the owner or
the adjoining land (one Cooper) had not work-ed hls coal, there would hav~ been no further
subsidence; but the appellants admit that It
the coal under the respondent's land bad not
been taken out, or If the appeHants had left
su11lcient support under the respondent's land,
then the working or the adjoining owner
would have done no harm.
8. B. Somerville, for appellants Baxter & Co.
Rldldale & Son. for respondent Saunders,
~lcholson & Reeder.

SS

I,ORD HALSBURY. !l!y lortls, In this case
the plalntltr, the owner of land upon the surface, has sued the lessees of certain seams of
coal below and adjacent to the plalntltr's land
for haY!ng disturbed the plaintiff In the enjoyment of bis property, by causing It to snbside.
The defendants, before and up to the yt>ar
18H8, have worked-that is to say, excavate1l- the se:1ms of coal of w:blcb they were lC'ssN•s.
Their exeavntlon caused a subsidence of the
ground, for which they acknowledged their
liability, and In:lde satisfaction. There were
other subsidences ntter this, and, as the case
originally c:lme before your lordships, It was
m.Hter of Inference only whether these subsldenN•s were or were not In some way connected with, If not forming part of, the original
subsl1lt>m·e. '.!,'he parties have now, by an
admission at your lordshlllS' bar, plared uui
matter beyond doubt.
It has been agreed that the ownPr of the adjoining land worked out his coal suhsequently ,
to 18G8: that, If he had not clone so, tnere
would have been no further subsidence; and
If the defendants' coal had not been tuiit•n
out, or If suffklent support lrnd fl{'{'D left, the
working of the adjoining ownPr wonld have
!lone no harm. Under thPse C'lr1·11111sta11cf's.
the question Is whether the su ti;;fnetlou for
the past suhslllPnce must he tnk ·~n to h:lYe
been equh·alent to a sntl><fn1·tlo11 for nil sul'ceedlng snbsiilen<'PS. l"!:o oup will tl1ink or
disputing the p1·011011it1'>n that tor one cause of
action you must recover all d~m:iges Incident
to It by law onc>e and tor eyer A house that
has received a shock may not a once shew all
the damage done to It, but It Is damaged none
the less then to the extent that It Is damaged:
and the fact that the damage only manifests
Itself later on, by st:igPs, does not alter the
fact that the damage Is there. And so of the
more complPx mechanism of thP human frame·
the dnma-gp Is done In a railway accident;
the whole maehlnery Is Injured, though It may
escape the eye or eYen the consciousness of
the sufferer at the time; the later stagC's of
!IUl'rl'l'ing are but the manifestations of the
origillill damage done, and consequent upon
the Injury originally sustained.
But the words "cause of action" are Bomewhat 11mblguously used In reasoning upon this
suhje<"t. What the plnlntltr bas a right to
complaln of In n. court of law In this case Is
the damal{e to his land, and by the damage I
mean thf.' d:i.mage which had In tact occurred;
and, If this Is all that a plaintiff can complain
of, I do not see why he may not recover totles
quotles fresh damage Is lnftlcted.
~Ince the decision of this house In Backhouse v. Bonomi, 9 H. L. C.1s. j()3, It Is clear
that no action would lie for the exca\'atlon.
It Is not therefore a cause of action. That
case established that It Is the damage, and not
the excavation, which Is the cause of action.
I cannot understand why every new suhi1ldence, although proceeding from the s.1me
original act or omission ot the defendants, Is
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not a new cause of action. for which damages

may be recovered. I cannot concur in ti1e

view that there is a breach of duty in the

original excavation.

In Rowbotham v. Wilson, 8 El. & Bl. 123,

157, Cresswell, J., said that the owner of the

mines might have removed every atom of the

minerals without being liable to an action.

if the soil above had not fallen; and what

is true of the ﬁrst subsidence seems to me

to be necessarily true of every subsequent

subsidence. The defendant has originally

created a state of things which renders him

responsible if damage accrues. If, by the

hypothesis, the cause of action is the damage

resulting from the defendant's act, or an

omission to alter the state of things he has

created, why may not a fresh action be

brought? A man keeps a ferocious dog,

which bites his neighbour. Can it be con‘-
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tended that, when the bitten man brings his

action, he must assess damages for all pos-

sibility of future bites? A man stores wa-

ter artiﬁcially, as in ltylands v. Fletcher, L.

R. 3 H. L. 330. The water escapes. and

sweeps away the plaintiffs house. He re

lmilds it, and the artiﬁcial reservoir con-

tinues to leak, and sweeps it away again.

Cannot the plaintiff recover for the second

house, or must he have assessed in his ﬁrst

damages the possibility of any future inva-

sion of water ﬂowing from the same reser-

voir? With respect to the authorities, the

case of Nicklin v. Williams, 10 Exch. 259, was

urged by the attorney general as an author-

ity upon the question now before your lord-

ships, by reason of some words attributed to

Lord Westhury in Backhouse v. Bonomi, 9

H. L. Cas. 503, 512. If Lord Westbury real-

ly did use the words attributed to him, it is,

I think, open to doubt in what sense they

are to be understood. Baron Parke, in that

case, delivered the judgment against the

plaintiffs, recovering any subsequently ac-

cruing damage. because, he said. the cause

of action was the original injury to the right

by withdrawing support. That principle is

admittedly wrong, and was expressly held

to be wrong in Backhouse v. Bonomi, 9 H. L.

Cas. 503. 512, since, if that had been law.

there could have, been no answer to the plea

of the statute of iimitations in that case. It

is difﬁcult to follow the master of the rolls

when he says it was not necessary to overrule

.\'it-kiin v. “'illinms. l0 Exch. 259. by that

decision. It seems to me to have been the

whole point decided in Nicklin v. Williams.

10 Exch. 259: and how that case so decided

can be an authority for anything I am at a

loss to understand.

I think the decision of this case must de-

pend, as matter of logic. upon the decision

of your lordships‘ house in Baclchouse v.

Bonomi, 0 H. L. Cas. 503. 512; and I do not

know that it is a very legitimate inquiry,

when a principle has been laid down by a

tribunal from which there is no appeal. and

which is bound by its own decisions, wheth-

er that principle is upon the whole advan-
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not a new cirnse of nctlon, for whll'h d:1111:1ges er thnt principle Is upou the whole advanmay be recovered. I cannot concur in the tageous or conveulent; but, If such conslrlemview that there Is a brench of duty in the tions were permissible, I think Cockburn, C.
J ., 1n his judgment In Lamb v. Walker, 3 Q.
orig inn! excn vatlon.
Io Rowbotham v. Wilson, 8 EI. & BI. 123, B. Div. 389, establishes the balance of con157, Crrsswell, J., salcl thnt the owner ot the venience to be on the side of the law, asmiues might hnve rerno,·ed every atom of the estahlished hy Backhouse v. Bonomi, 9 H . L.
minerals without heing llnble to an actiou, Cns. 503, 512. I cannot logically distinguish
If the soil above lrnd not fallen; and what between a first and a second or a third or
is true of tile first subsidence seems to me more subsitlenccs: and after Bnckhouse v.
to be nccessnrlly trne of every subsequent Bonomi, 9 H. L. Cas. M3. 512, It ~s ImposimhsidPnce. The defendant has orlginnlly sible to say that It wns wrong In any s('nse
crl'nted a state of things which rentlers him for the defendant to remove the coal. Cressresponsible if dnmage accrues. If, by tile well, J., hns said, and I think rightly, that ·
hypothrsis. the cause of action Is the d:unage he might remove every atom of the mineral.
The wrong. conRlsts, and, as It appears to
resulting from the defendant's act, or an
omission to alter tbe state of things he has IDl', wholly consists. In causing another man
er<'atetl, wily may not n fresh action be <lnmage; and l think he may recover for that
broui,:ht? A man J;:eeps a ferocious dog, damage as and when It occurs.
F'o1· these reasons, I think that the judA'whkh bites his ne ighbour. Can it be con·tended that, ,...-hen the bitten man brings hi!! ment appealed from should be afli1·med, with
action, he must as;iess damages for all pos- COi>tS.
sibility of future bites? A mau stores waLORD BLAC'KBl;RN. )fy lords. at the
ter artificially, as In H;\·lauds v. Fleteher, L.
R. 3 H. L. 330. The watrr eseapei,i. nllll C'lose of the argument I rame to the coneJu.
Rweeps awny the plaintiff's house. He re- slon that th~ judgment should be 1·eversed;
hulltls It, and the artltlelal 1·rsen·oir con- and prepnr~ and clrculnted an opinion continues to leak, ancl sweeps It away again. taining the reasons whkb led me to that conCannot the plalutitI recover for the second clusion. )Jil three of the other noble aml
house, or must he have assessed In his first lenrned lords who heard the argument have
dnmages the possihility of any future Inva- come to the rouclusiou t1int the judgment
sion of water flowing from the same reser- should be affirmed, and that must be the
vok? With respect to the authorities, the jtulguwut of the house. I think It bett.Pr
case of ~lcklln v. "'llllams, 10 Exch. ~9. was to read the reasons which I bnd hefore writurged by the attorney general as nn author- ten.
ity upon the question now before your lordThis Is an appeal against an orcler of th•"
ships, by reason of some words attributed to court of appeal, by whl<'h It was ordel't'•l
Lord Westbury In Backhouse v. Bonomi, 9 thnt the judgment or Hawkins, J., delivered,
H . L . Cas. fl03, 512. If Lord Westbury real- 011 further conslderntion, on the 18th of December, 1883, should be re,·erse1l. :md jud;{1~· did use the words attributed to him, It Is,
I think, open to doubt In what sense they ment entered for the plaintiff for damages
are to be undl•rstood. Baron Parke, in that to he ai<scssed hy an arl1itrator to he agreed
case. dellvererl the judgment agalnf!t the ll)lon, with cost>1. Before this house ran say
pla Ip tiffs, recoYerlng an y subsequentl;\' ac- whethe1· this order Is right 01· not. It is neccruing damage. bec1rnse, he said. the cause essary to know what was the rnse on which
of action was the original injury to the right Hawkins. J., directed judgment, which this
by withdrawing support. '!'bat principle Is order reverses, to be entt>red for the defernl·
admittedly wrong, and was expressly held ants. '!.'he writ was issued on the 27th of
to he wrong In Bnckhousc v. Bonomi, 9 H. L. Deccml1er. 1882.
'!.'here was an alternntlve def.erise that the
C'aFI. 50.1. !)12, siu<'r, if that had been Jaw,
th('J'e co11JrJ hnve been no nnswer to the plea causes of action did not, nor dlcl any of them,
of the sta tnte of limitations In that case. It first nccrne to the plalntlfl' at any tiule wltl1I!< <liffi r uH to follow the master of the rolls ln six yearR hefore the commeD<'l'lllPllt of
wlu•n he says it was not nPces~ary to overrule the action; and therPfore it lay on the plain:\icklin v. Willinms. 10 Exch. 2."i9. by that tiff to glYe eYidence of some cause of nl'tiou
llreisiou. It ~r r ms to me to have been the subsc>queut to the 27th of DeeemlJer. 18713.
wholp point 1Jed1IC'd in :\lrkliu v. "\\' lllinms.
1 thluk It snflidently appears In Hawkin~.
10 Exch. :!:i!): anrl how that C':tse so deelcled J.'s, judgrnPnt, that the defen<'lants hacl
<·an he an nuthority for anything I nm at a worked out the seams of conl of which thcr
Jo;.;s to urn!Prsrn 1111.
w ere lessees ns Jong ago as 18G8. an<l that
I tlllnk tllC' <keislon of this cnsr must d C'- tlJPr hnd done nothing from thnt time. Arni
pPIHI, ns 1t:a tter of logit'. upon the drcision 11s 1hc def<>ndants Reem to have provetl and
of )·our Jor1l ~ hlps· house in Ba r•khi_
111sp Y. rPlif(l on the fact that YPry consi<!Prable sullTI011oml, l) H. L . Cas. r.o3. fil!.!: nnd I <lo not sic!Pnees had occurred betwPen lllfi8 nnd 1871.
know that It is 11. w:ry legltimatl' Inquiry, whic·h injnrP1l the plaintiff's premises, aml
wlwn n 111·im·iple has hpen !ale! down hy a that the rlefernlants hart heC'n ralle<l uprm
trihunnl from whl<>h there is 110 nppenl. :11111 to <lo. and had paid for. rt->palrs rentlere<l nt-><'·
whlrll is bound by its own tlecisious, wbeth- essnry, It Is dear that the original wo1·kiug·
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was such as to give rise to a cause of action

as early as 1871, and that the plaintiff had

then known it. Lamb v. Walker, 3 Q. B.

Div. 389. was then cited. With a view to

enable the plaintiff's counsel to fully con-

sider that authority. it was arranged that the

jury should be discharged, and that the case

should be reserved for further consideration,

it being expressly admitted by the plaintiff

that damage was done by subsidence in ISHS.

On further consideration, the plaintiff's

counsel is stated by Hawkins, J.. to have

admitted that judgment must be entered for

the defendants. unless Lamb v. Walker, 3 Q.

B. Div. 389, which he intended to question in

a court of appeal, was overruled.

I think it convenient here to see what was

the decision in Lamb v. Walker. 3 Q. B. Div.

381). so as to see whether, while it stands un-

reversed. it was decisive of the case before
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Hawkins, J. Manisty. J. (at page 391). quotes

so much of the plaintiff's stalenfent of claim

as was material in that case. 'l‘here was a

ﬁrst claim. on which the referee gave t/,d.,

which I do not notice. I think the ﬁfth and

sixth paragraphs are, in effect. the same as

the amended statement of claim in the action

now at bar, and set out in the appendix (page

7). But the only plea in Lamb v. Walker. 3 Q.

B. Div. 389, was payment into court of £150,

and the issue joined was whether that was

enough. That was referred, and it was on

the award that the question was raised. The

two material ﬁndings on the award are stated

at page 392: “l2l I estimate the damage

actually sustained by the plaintiff at the date

of the commencement of the action ' ' '

at £400. (3)_I estimate the future damage

which will be sustained by the plaintiff

‘ ' " at £150." He therefore directed

judgment to be entered at £-in0. deducting

the £150 paid into court from those two sums,

amounting together to £550.

The question was raised on a rule to re-

duce the damages. and was “whether the

plaintiff was, in point of law, entitled to re-

cover the sum of £150, which the referee ﬁnds

will be sustained by the Ilhlii1tln by reason

of the defendant's acts." The decision in

Lamb v. Walker. 3 Q. B. Div. 389, was that he

was so entitled. And I think it was rightly

thought that, if damages subsequent to a

writ issued in 1871 could be recovered in an

action on that writ. they were included in the

cause of action then existing. and, conse-

quently. that decision, which was binding on

Hawkins, J., was, at that stage of the pro-

ceedings. conclusive against the plaintiff.

In Lamb v. Walker. 3 Q. B. Div. 389, (Jock-

burn, L. C. J.. differed from the majority of

the court. He said: “Taking the view I do

of the leading case of Bnckhouse v. Bonomi.

9 H. L. Cas. 503, I am unable to concur in

holding that. in addition to the amount to

which he may be entitled for actual damage

sustained through the excavation of the ad-

jacent soil by the defendant. the plaintiff is

entitled to recover in respect of prospective

damage; that is to say, anticipated damage
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-was such as to give rise to a cause of action damage; that ls to say, antlclpated damage
as early as 1871, and that the plalntl1r had expected to occur, but which has not aetually
then known It. Lamb v. Walker, 3 Q. B. ocrurred, and which may never arise." He
Div. :i~. was thC'u citell. With a Yll'w to , e>nters into elnborate reasoning to support this
t>llll hie the plnintll1"s <'onnsel to full,\· con· · opinion, whkh I shall examine presently. I
siller that authority. It wns nrran;:ell that the think, If that opinion had prernlled In Laml.J
jury should he dis<'ha rged, nntl thn t the <'Rse v. Walker, 3 Q. B. Div. 389, nnd a judgment
should be reserved tor further consideration, had Ul'Pn given accordingly, that clecl;iiou
It being expres,;I.\· nilmitt1>rl h,\· the 11lalntlfl' i would hnve hPPn, not only not an authority
that damage was done hy snh;.l!lt•nc·e In v;:1;s. against tht' plnintlft' In this case. but an 1111On further eonsld<•rntioo, the plalntllT's thor·lty lu his fa,·our al! far as tht• 1lt>ft•11se vf
counsel 111 stated hy Hawkins. .J., to hnve the statute of limltntions Is concemed.
admitted that judgmC'nt must he t•nlf'l'l'll for
Thert' must ha,·e hPen some understarnllng
the defendants, unh·ss J"'lmh v. WalkPr, 3 Q. between thl! couusPl fm· the plulntllI 11nd for
B. Div. 38{), whkh he ir1t .. 111lP1l to 11uPstion in the t.Iefeudauts In this Pase as to whn t was to
a court of appeal, "·as o\·rrrnlP1l.
be done In case the final t.leelslon on this ver~·
I think it 1·011\'l'llil·llt hl'l't' to SI'•' wh:1t wn!I
Important question was In conformity with
the t.Ied~ion In Lamb v. \\'nlk .. r. ;! Q. n. Div. the opinion of Cockburn, L. C. J.; uni] I
:·~SH. so as to Sl't' whethC'r, while it :<tatul" llll·
thin!•. though I wish It had bcl'u expressly
reversP1l. It was <l<'d~l•e of tht' (·ast> hPfore statr<I, It must now he takPn that the defend·
Hawkins, J. '.\Ianisty. .l. 1.al pa~P :m11. quoit's nuts' eouusel ugreed that Ile would not, on
so mueh of the plaintiff's stati•1rf:•nt of dalm till' P\' illencc then lwfore the <·nurt, ask for n.
as was matt>rlal In that eas1-. ThPrt' wns a Vl'l'llil't on an~· of the otht>r defenses, but
first dulm. on which tht> refprf'e g:n·e 1-,,1., wonhl in thnt 1·ase <·011sP11t to have the damwhieh I do not notice. I think the fifth nud airt>s s1·ttlt>1l by arbitration.
sixth p11r11grnphs are, In elfl'('t. the same as
Cotld111rn. L. C. J .. couhl not, In Lamb v.
the nnwmle11 !'tatf'lm•nt of elnlm In the nctlon Wall,rr, a Q. B. DIY. :!AA. have meant to go
now at bar. am! st>t out In the nppernlix <page so fm· as to sa~· thnt If 11 house bad IJeen
7). But the only plra In Lamb v. \\·alker, ;{ Q .
shaken, and was evidently going to fall, but
B. Div. 38fl, wa" payment Into <·11111·t of .t:t:.11,
had not yrt complf'tely fallPn, when the writ
and the Issue joined wns whPther that wn8 Issued, the plaintiff could only recover for
enough. That was r<'ft•ITPd, um! It was 9n whnt had already occurrt>d, and would have
the award that the question was rah'leu. The to bring n. frt>Rh action when a further ehi111two matt•rlal findings on the award are stated ney fell. He has not quite sutHclently gu:mlat page 3!12: "<2\ I estimate the damnge ed himself from saying so .
.actually sui<talnPd by the plnintllT at the date
In the present case, there being obscurity
Of the COlll!UPll<'t'lllf'nt Of the lldinD • • •
In the statement of the facts. It was. sonwat £400. (3) .I e>stimate the future damag"e what late In the day, but with the assent of
whi<'h will be sustained Ii,\· the plaintiff the house, agreed to add this furthC'l' admii;• • • at £150." He thl'rPforp direl'tecl slon: "That, If thl' ownn of the :11ljoining
judgment to be eutered at Hoo. 1h·1l11ctlng lnnd [orie Cooper] hml not worked his coal,
the £150 pa Id Into co mt from those two sumg, tlwre would have he1'n no further subskknce;
amounting together to £550.
but the appellants (defendants) ndmit that It
The 11uestion was rnise1l on a rul<' to re- the Pon.I under the l'<' Spoudent's (plalntllT's)
dul'e the damages. and was "whetht>r the land had not he('n takpu out. or If the appel·
plaintltr was, In point of law, e>ntith•u to re- lants (<leff'mlnnts) had left sufficient support
co,·er the sum of £150, whld1 the referee ftn1ls undPr rt>spo1ulent's (plalntitn~) lund, then the
will be sustained by the plninth. hy rC'ason working of the adjoining owner would have
of the dt>fendant's acts." The decision In done no harm." I do not undP1'8ta11d th!:; to
Lamb v. ""nlker. 3 Q. R. Div. :l8!l, was that he he an admission that thr suhsl1lPIH'I' was oc·was so entitlE>cl. And I think It wns rightly <'a~lonet.I by the remontl by the dt>fc•n1lants
thong-ht that, If d11111:1~P~ subsl'•Jll<'nt to a of otll\'l" coal than that the remo,·nJ of whld1
writ issut>d in 18il could be reco,·ert>d In an oe1·asion<'<I th<' suh~i1lC'nce In 1871. Such an
:ic·tion on that writ. they were luehuled In the n1lmlssio11 would lrll\'e rnlsrd a dift't>rent qurs·
l'nnse of :ietlon then l'Xistlng. arnl. conse- tinn. and one the solnt1on of whieh might
qut•nUy. tlmt dPeislon. whleh was hinillng on have rt>quirl'd a further inn~stigatlon as to
Ha wk in~. J .• was, at thnt stng'e of the pro- th<• fads.
C<'f'<lin~s. <'ondnsh·e lll?:tlnst the plaintiff.
I will 11ow procrl'd to consider the <'a><e exIn Lnmb v. WalkC'r. 3 (j. B. Dh·. :_18\1. Co(·k· adly as if It was on appeal from Lamb v.
huro, I.. C. J .. ditTcrell fn1m the waj:irity of \\'alk1·1". ~ Q . B. DI>. 38U. I must fir><t oh·
the eonrt. He snhl: "Taking tlw viPw I 1lo spn·e that ~Irmistr.· .J., In that easf' sa ys ra
of the lemliui;: l':lSC' of 11n<'khnnsp v. Ronom!. Q. n. Div. :m-t): "It ls a wrll-8rttlecl rule of
9 H. L. Cas. 503, I aw unuhlP to eoncnr In law that damagt>s resulting from one and the
holding that. In addition to the amount to snme cause of adion must be assessed an1l
which be may be entitled for aetunl damage recovered once for all." And it Is not disAustnlned throuE:h the exm,·atlon of the ad- puted by Cockbum, L. C. J., that the> rule Is
jacent soll b~· thf' tlt>ff'rnlant. thf' plnintltY Is estahlishf'd that "dnmnires resultinf! from one
entitled to reco,·er In respl•ct of pro!ljlective and the same cause of action must be as-
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sessed and recovered once and for all." 3

Q. B. Div. 403. He joins issue with Manisty,

J., on the application of this rule to cases

arising from subsidence occasioned by min-

ing so as to remove support. And I think

that this rule is established as the general

rule of law. I do not think it is one of those

rules of law which depend upon natural jus-

tice. I think it is an artiﬁcial rule of posi-

tive law, introduced on the balance of con-

venience and inconvenience. I think that,

if it were res integra, a great deal might be

said against the expediency of the rule. I

know nowhere where the objections to the

expediency of the rule are- more clearly and

forcibly stated than by the lord chief justice.

3 Q. B. Div. 405.

But I think it was not disputed in the argu-

ment that at all events, when the act com-

plained of is one which would entitle the
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plaintiff to maintain an action, and recover,

as a matter of law, at least nominal dam-

ages, without any proof of damage in fact,

the rule is ﬁrmly established; and I think

all three judges in the court below agree

that the question is, what was the cause of

action in this case? They adopt the reason-

ing of Cockburn, L. C. J., in Lamb v. Walk-

er, 3 Q. B. Div. 389, that it logically follows

from Bonomi v. Backhouse, El. Bl. & El. 622,

that there are independent and distinct

causes of action, on each fresh distinct cause

of damage, though arising from the same

act of disturbing the soil. Fry, L. J., puts this

very clearly. He does not think that it is

concluded by authority, and says: “I think

we are bound to determine this question on

principle. Now, with reference to principle,

it appears to me to be plain that all damages

which result from one and the same cause of

action must be recovered at one and the same

time, and therefore we are driven to the in-

quiry, what is the cause of action in a case

of this description?" In this I completely

agree, but I have not been able to agree with

the reasoning by which it is sought to be

made out that it logically follows from the

decision in Bonomi v. Backhouse, El. Bl. &

El. 622, in this house, that there are fresh

causes of action at each fresh subsidence

,arising from the old disturbance of the

strata, occasioning fresh damage to the same

property. I decide nothing on a question

which does not here arise, viz. whether, if

the same person has two separate tenements,

say, A. on the north of the seam worked by

the defendant, and B. on the south of it, and

damage has actually occurred to A., and he

sues for the damage done to it, he is bound

to join in the action any claim which he has

or hereafter may have as to B. Whilst the

recent decision of Qrunsden v. Humphrey, 14

Q. B. Div. 141, in the cour o appeal, stands

unreversed (and I do not mean to cast any

doubt on it), it would seem that he is not.

It is desirable to see what the case of Bo-

nomi v. Backhouse, El. Bl. & El. 622, really

was. The writ was issued on the 20th of

May, 1856. The declaration alleged that the
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sessed and recovered once and for all." 3 l\lay, 1856. The declaration alleged that the
Q. B. Div. 403. He joins Issue with )fanlsty, plaintufs, as reversloners of certain buildings
J., on the application of this rule to cases in the occupation of Parkin, were entitled to
arising from subsidence occasioned by min· have the said messuages and buildings s11pIng so as to remove support. And I think ported by the mines and soil "contiguous and
that this rule ls established as the general near to and under the said messuages and
rule of law. I do not think It ls one of those buildings,'' and then in the usual way alrnlt>s of law which depend upon natural jus· leged working by the defendant, disturbing
tlee. I think It ls an artificial rule of posl· the support, by which the walls of the said
th·e law, Introduced on the balance of con· messuages were cracked and Injured, and the
venlence and inconvenience. I think that, ground on which the said messuages and
if It were res lntegra, a great deal might be buildings stood subsided. The pleas were·
said agalnst the expediency of the rule. I (1) not guilty; (2) denial of Parkln's occuknow nowhere where the objections to the pancy as tenant as alleged; (3) denial of the
expediency of the rule are· more clearly and reversion being In the Jllalntiffs as alleged;
forcibly stated than by the lord chief justice. (4) that the plaintiffs were not entitled to.
3 Q. B. Div. 405.
have the said messuages and bulldlngs, or-But I think It was not disputed In the argu. either of them, supported, to wit, by the
ment that at all events, when the act com- mines, earth, and soil underground contiguplained of Is one which would entitle the ous; (5) that the said alleged causes of action
plalntllr to maintain an action, and recover, did not accrue within six yea.rs before this
as a. matter of law, at least nominal dam- suit. The verdict was entered for the 'plainages, without nny proof of damage In fact, tiffs, subject to a special case. One very imthe rule Is firmly established; and I think portant question raised In and decided by
all three judges In the court below agree that case was as to the rights of buildings to
that the question Is, what was the cause of support, as distinguished from the rights of"
action In this case? They adopt the reason- the natural soil to the support. With that
ing of Cockburn, L. C. J., in Lamb v. Walk- we are not now concerned. The arbitrator
er, 3 Q. B. Div. 389, that It logically follows In detail stated very clearly, and, I have no
from Bonomi v. Backhouse, El. Bl. & El. 622, doubt, very accurately, the way in which the
that there are Independent and distinct cleety coal in the Auckland coal field was
worked. I doubt If this account would be
~auses of action, on each fresh distinct cause
of damage, though arising from the same found to be applicable In most coal fields.
act of disturbing the soil. Fry, L. J., puts this I think I may say that it would not in some.
very clearly. He does not think that It Is I do not know what Is the nature of the
concluded by authority, and says: "l think strata In the Yorkshire coal field, where the
we are bound to determine this question on present coal Iles. But It appeared quite
principle. Now, with reference to principle, clear on his statement of the case that.
it appears to me to be plain that all damages though It was apparent In 1850 (more than
which result from one and the same cause of six years before the action) that, unless steps.
action must be recovered at one and the same were taken to stop the progress cJf. the thrust
time, and therefore we are driven to the In- then In operation, the plalntlt'f's houses would
quiry, what ls the cause of action In a case be Injured by the thrust, yet no actual injury
of this description 7" In this I completely was sustained until 1854 (less than six years.
agree, but I have not been able to agree with before the action). He also found that the
the reasoning by which It is sought to be Uirust would continue, and would produce
made out that it logically follows from the damage In future. There was also a finddecision In Bonomi v. Backhouse, El. Bl. & ing, at page 631, that It was posslbl~ to stop
El. 622, In this house, that there are fresh the thrust; "but the expense of so doing
causes of action at each fresh subsidence would ha,·e been very great, and would, on
arising from the old disturbance of the the whole, have amounted to a much larger
strata, occasioning fresh damage to the same sum than the value of the property lnjmed.''
property. I decide nothing on a question He then prQceeded to find In detail the facts
which does not here arise, viz. whether, if on which it was to depend how the issues
the same person has two separate tenements, should be entered, and then proceeded as
say, A. on the north of the seam worked by follows: "If the verdict Is to be entered forthe <lefenclant, and B. on the south of It, and the plaintll'ls upon the Issues joined on the
d111n11ge has ·actually occurred to A., and he 1st, 4th, and ;:ith pleas, another question fo1·
su<:>s for the damage done to it, he Is bound the court Is (4) whether the defendant is reto join in the action an1 claim which he has sponsible for all the damage which has been
or hereafter may have o.s to B. Whilst the sustained by the plaintiffs by reason of th~
recent decision of l!,runsden v. Hum.phrel, 14 Injuries to their said messunges and buildQ. B. Div. 141, In the court or appeal, stands ings above described, or for any and what
unreversed (and I do not mean to cast any part of that damage, and whether he is responsible in any and what respect for the
doubt -0n It), it would seem that he is not.
It Is desirable to see what the case of Bo- probable future damage which may be occanomi v. Backhouse, El. Bl. & El. 022, really sioned in manner abore desrribed, or for th&
was. The writ was Issued on the 20th of damage occasioned by the diminution in val·
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ue of the said messuages and buildings by

reason of their insecure state and condition,

or the injuries which will probably be here-

after occasioned by the further progress of

the thrust as above mentioned." Had this

question, and more especially the part of it I

have marked in italies, been answered, it

would have decided the question afterwards

raised in Lamb v. Walker, 3 Q. B. Div. 389.

But, as the majority of the queen's bench de-

cided that the issue on the ﬁfth plea should

be entered for the defendant. the fourth ques-

tion required no answer from those three

judges, and received none. Wightman, J.,

does give an answer at page 635, which I

think, as far as it goes, is in favour of Cock-

burn, L. C. J.'s, view in Lamb v. Walker, 3

Q. B. Div. 389.

The defendants do not appear to have
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thought the fourth question of importance,

for nothing whatever was said in the argu-

ment in the exchequer chamber about it; and

though the expression in the judgment indi-

cates approval of Nlcklin v. Williams, 10

Exch. 259, so far as regarded the principle

"that no second or fresh action can, under

such circumstances, be brought for subse-

quently accruing damage, all the damage con-

sequent upon the unlawful act being in con-

templation of law satisﬁed by the one judg-

ment or accord," and seems in favour of the

view taken by the majority in Lamb v. Walk-

er, 3 Q. B. Div. 389, yet I do not think it can

be properly said that the court of exchequer

chamber, in their judgment. put their minds

to that question, which was not much, if at

all, argued before them. Before the case was

taken into this house, the damages were

agreed on at £500 ihow or on what principle

we do not know); and, that being so, the

house had no occasion to decide anything

on that fourth question. There seems to have

been no allusion to it in the argument, and I

think no one of the lords makes any reference

to it.

I think that Backhouse v. Bonomi, 9 H. L.

Cas. 503, does decide that there is no cause

of action until there is actual damage sus-

tained, and does decide that the court of ex-

chequer erred when, in Nicklin v. William,

10 Exch. 259, they said that there was an

injury to the right as soon as the support was

rendered insuﬂicient, though no damage had

occurred. But I do not think that it all fol-

lows from this that the act of removing the

minerals to such an extent as to make the

support insufﬁcient is an innocent act, ren-

dered wrongful by the subsequent damage.

That would be a great anomaly, for I think

there is no other instance in our law where

an action lies in consequence of damage

against a person doing an innocent act. There

are many where no action lies against the

doer of an improper act, unless and until dam-

age accrues. One is alluded to by Lord Cran-

worth. The cause of action against the speak-

er of words not actionable per se consists in

the speaking of the words and the damage.

.a~D
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ue of the said messuages and bulhlinA's by
reasos of their insecure state and condition,
or the Injuries which will probably be hereafter occasioned by the further progr,,ss of
the thrust as above mentioned." llad this
question, and mo1·e especially the pnrt of It I
have marked in italics, been answrrcd, It
would have decided the question afterwards
raised In Lamb v. Walker, 3 Q. B. Dh·. 3.~9.
But, as the majority of the queen's bench decided that the Issue on the fifth plea should
be entered for the defmduut, the fourth question required no answer trom those three
judges, and reci>lved none. "·h:htman, J.,
does give an answer at page G3H, whleh I
think, ns far as 1t gol'!I. Is In fa vuur of Cock·
bum, L. C. J.'s, view In Lamb v. "·alkcr, 3
Q. B. Div. 389.
The defendants do not appear to have
thoq:ht the fourth 111wstlon of Importance,
for nothing whateYe1· wn11 snld In the argument In the exchequer dmmber nlJout It; and
though the expression In the judgnwut Indicates approval of Nicklin v. Wllllam11, 10
Exch. 259, so far as regnrde<l the principle
"'that no second or fresh action can, under
such circumstances. be brought for subsequently accruing damage, all the damage cont!t•quent upon the unlawful act being In con·
teruplatlon of law satisfied by the one judgment or accord." and seems In favour of the
,.lew taken by the majority In Lamb v. Wulk·
er, 3 Q. B. Div. 389, yet I do not think It can
be properly said that the <'ourt of exchequer
c•hamber, In their judgm!'nt. put their minds
to that question, which was not much, If at
all, argued before th(•llJ. Hl'fore the ease was
tak<'D Into this homw, the damages were
agreed on at £:-..tJO lhow or on what principle
we do not know): and, that \JP!ng so, the
house had no ot·t·aMlon to dPl'i«IP anything
on that fourth question. There sePms to have
been no allusion to It In the Argument, and I
think no one of the lords makes any reference
to It.
I think that Bnckhouse v. Bonomi, 9 H. L.
ens. 503, does decide that there Is no cause
of action until there Is actual damage snstalne<l, and does decide that the court of e~
chequer erred when, In Nicklin v. Williams,
10 Exch. 259, they said that there was an
Injury to the right as soon as the support was
rendered Insufficient, though no damage had
occurred. But I do not think that It all follows from this that the act of removing the
minerals to such an e:i:tPnt as to make the
support insufficient le an lnnoct>nt act. rendered wrongful by the subsequent damage.
That would be a great anomaly, for I think
there Is no other instance In our law where
an action lies ln consequence of damage
against a person doing an Innocent act. There
are many where no action lies against the
doer of an Improper net, unlP~s nod until damage accrues. One Is allmkd to by Lord Cranworth. The cause of action against the speaker of words not adionnhle per se consists in
the speakiug or the words and the damage.
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It was therefore held In Llttleboy v. Wright,
1 Lev. 69, on error ft-om the palace court,
that an lnfnior court had no jurisdiction over
an action for calling the plnlntilT a whore,
wh .. reby the plaintlft'. lost her marriage, unless
both tl!e SlJl·aking of the words and the loss
of the marringe were averred and shewn to
have occurred within the jurisdiction. But
the cause of action was as much the SJll'llk·
Ing of the words as the damage. It is quite
clear that, It the words were spoken uutlcr
sueh circumstances as to be privileged, no
amount of damage could give rise to nn action. So, where a man beats another's servant, no action arisps to the master until there
Is dnmnge by the loss of the service; but no
nnwunt of damage would give the master an
aetion If the beating wns justlllable. And It
a man, In IJreach of the duty to take reasonable care in the management ot n horSl' In
a public street, gallops along It, no action
lies except at the Instance or a person who
has sulTe!'ed damage. Hut no amount of damage wlll glye a cause of actton against the
owner of the horse unless a breach of duty
Is shewn. And I think that there is a duty
In the owner of land on which his neighbour's
land rests to re!!pect it, and take care that he
does not Injure that support. This Is subject
to many qualifications, some of which were
considered In Corporation of Birmingham v.
Allen, 6 Cb. Div. 284. All I think that Is
really decided in Backhouse v. Bonomi, 9 H.
L. Cas. 503, at least In this house, Is that
where there Is a breach of tbnt duty, followed
by damage, there Is a cause of action, and
that, until there Is damage, there Is no more
cause of action for the brench of duty than
there would be In a per!mn who saw the
breach of duty In the reckless rider of a
hor.11>, but was not damngt>d, though In P<'l'il.
Llttledale, J., said In Hodson v. 8tallebrass,
11 Ado!. & E. 301, speaking or an action IJy a
muster for beating his servant per quod servltlum amlslt: "It Is arguPd that a fresh action might be brought from time to time;
but that Is not so, the action being founded,
not upon the damage only, but upon the unlawful act Jlnd the damage. Without the special damage, this action would not be maintainable .at the plalntllT's suit. A fresh action could not be brought unless there were
both a new unlawful act, and fresh damage."

This, I think, Indicates the real principle.
Xo authol'lty was cited on the argunH'nt
agnlni<t this exc1•pt a clietum of Xol'th, C. J.,
in the l'PJIOl't of I.ol'd Towns<'nrl '" Hughes. 2
~Io<l. Vil, whc·!'e be Is n•1nrtPd to ha Ye sahl:
"'This Is a ciYII action. l1ru11;.:ht h~· tile plalntifr
for words spoken of him. whil'.h, if they are
In their own nature actlonahle, the jury ought
to consider the damage which the party may
sustain; but, if a particular averment of special damages makes tlwm actionable, then
the jury are only to conshler such damages
ns are alrendy sustalne<l, and not such as
w:iy lluppen In future, IJccause for such the
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plaintiff may have a new action." North, C.

J., was a great lawyer; and, though at the

moment engaged in maintaining what seems

a very bad cause, no dictum of his is to be

slighted. But this, if he did say it, was

utterly irrelevant, for his opinion was that

the words spoken were actionable, without

any special damage; such, in the case before

him, being neither averred nor proved. I can-

not therefore attach much weight to this dic-

tum. and .it has never, I think, been acted

upon. I come, therefore, to the conclusion

that the opinion of the majority in Lamb v.

V\'alker, 3 Q. B. Div. 389, was the better opin-

ion.

I should say that I take a very different

view of “'hitchousc v. Fellowes, 10 C. B. (N.

S.) 765, 784, from that taken by the master

of the rolls. I think that was an action for

maintaining a nuisance, which, from time to
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time, caused fresh damage. What Williams,

J.. there says. is: “The true answer to this

objection, as it seems to me, is that no fresh

cause of action arises from each fresh dam-

age, but that where there is not only a fresh

damage, but a continuance of the cause of

damage, such continuance of the wrongful act

which caused the damage constitutes a fresh

cause of action."

This was how the court of error in Ireland

understood that case in Devery v. Canal Co.,

9 Ir. R. C. L. 19.i. So understanding it, and

approving of it, Palles, C. B., in that case,

gave judgment for the plaintiff. I-Iow that

-case is in any way in conﬂict in principle with

1\'icklin v. Williams, 10 Exch. 259, I am un-

able to perceive.

Bowen, L. J., says that, “applying the rea-

soning in Whitchonse v. Fellowes, 10 C. B.

(N. S.) 765. 784, it seems to me that there has

really been not merely an original excava-

tion or act done. but a continual withdrawal

of support." if I could take that view of

the facts, I should agree in the conclusion.

But I cannot take that view of the facts.

One consequence of doing so would be that

where the owner In fee of a scam of coal

worked it out, and died leaving it in this

state, the heir of the land in which the

worked out scam lay would be liable to an

action for continuing a nuisance. Surely, the

facts cannot be such as would produce that

£'ffcct. And, unless they are. I do not think

that they can make the defendants respon-

siblc on this ground.
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plaintiff may have a new action." North, C.
.J., was a great lawyer; nnd, though at the
moment engaged In maintaining what seems
a very bad cause, no dlctmn of his Is to be
f'llghted. But this, If he did say It, was
utterly lrr<>levant, for his opinion was that
;the words spoken were actionable, without
.st n~· spPcinl damngP; such. In the ease before
lllm, lielng neith<>r averred nor proved. I cannot therefore attach much weight to this dictum. and .it hns never, I think, been ncte1l
u)lon. I come, th~·refore, to the conclusion
tlrnt the opinion of the majority In Lamb v.
"'alker, 3 Q. B. l>iv. 389, was the better opinion.

I should say that I take a very dil1'1•rent
'View of ·w11ltPh011s<• v. !o'ellowes, 10 C. B. (~.
S.) 'ili:i, 'i84, from that taken by the master
-0f the rolls. I thluk thnt wns nu action for
malntaiulng a nuisance, whieh, from time to
time, caused fresh dnm11ge. "'hat Wllllams,
J .. there says. is: "The trne answt>r to this
objection, as It seems to me, ls that no fresh
.cause of action arises from each f.rei>h dam:age, but that where there ls not only a fresh
damage, but a continuance of the cause of
damage, sud1 rontinuance of the wrongful net
which caused the damage constitutes a fresh
cause of action."
This was how the court of error In Irelnnd
understood that case in Devery v. Cannl Co.,
9 Ir. R. C. L. UH. So understunding It. and
.nppro\'ing of it, Pnlles, C. B., In that case,
ga,·e judgment for the plalutill'. How that
c11se Is in any way In conflict in principle with
Nirklin v. Williams, 10 Exrh. 259, I am un:ahle to perceive.
Bowen, L. J., says that, "appl~·lng the rensonlng In 'Vhltehonse ,._ Fellowes, 10 C. B.
(X. 8.) 'iH5. 784, it seems to me that there has
really been not merPly an original excavation or net done. hut a coutinual withdrawal
-of support." If I coultl take that ,·iew of
tlw fn!'ts, I should agree in the con('lusion.
But I cannot tak<' thnt view of the f:lcts.
-One consequence of doing so would be that
wlwre the owner in fee of a seam of coal
worked it out, nnrl died lea\'ing it In this
state, the lwir of tile land in whirh the
wo1·ked out sp:un lny would be liahle to an
11etion for c·outinningo a nnlsnnce. Surely. the
fac·ts em1nnt Ile such as would produce that
o<•fft-d. And, unless tl!ey nrl'. I do not think
that tlw~· rn n make the defendants responsililE• on this grom:d.
I therPfore think thnt the order appenl!'d
.11ga Inst f'houlcl be nxersed, and the jmlgml'nt of the 18th ot D"rf'mher, 1883. restorE>11.
The noble anrl karned lords who heard the
.case have each of n,em come to nu oppositr
-com·lusi•Jll. and the onler of the house will
1.Je lu conformity with their view.

I therefore think that the order appealed

against should be reversed, and the judg-

ment of the 18th or December, 1883. restored.

The noble and learned lords who heard the

case have each of them come to an opposite

conclusion, and the order of the house will

be in conformity with their view.

LORD BRAMWELL. My lords. laying

down general propositions is attended with

the same danger as giving deﬁnitions. Some

necessary qualiﬁcation or exception is gen-

erally omitted. Moreover, such propositions

are often and justly called “obiter." With

these dangers before my eyes, I shall, never-

LOI:D BHA:\IWELL. l\Iy lords, laylug
down general propt,sitions is nttPndNl with
the snmP dang-er as giving clefinitlons. Rome
111•1·1·~:<ary 11unlific:1tlo11 or exc·1•ption Is gen·
e1·ally omitted. :uoreo>er, such pro1iositions
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are often and justly called "obiter." With
these dangers before my eyes. I shall, nevertheless, venture on some abstract propositions.
It ls a rnle that when a thing dirPctly
wrongful In itself Is·done to a man, In ltsrlf
a rause of artion, he must. if he sues In
respect ot It, do Sf once and for nil. As, If
he is beaten or wounrted, if he sues. h.e rnust
sue for all his darnaj?e,-pa;;t, pre;oPnt, arnl
future, certniu nnll rnntlngent. He ('annot
maintain an nf'tior. for a broken arm, nnd
subsequently for a ln cken i·ib, though he did
not know of It when •1e commf'n<'Pd his first
action. But, if he sustalne;J two injuries
from a blow,-one to il!R 1Je1·son. another to
his prop<'rty; as. f0r instane<'. danrnge to a
wateh,-there is no doubt that he could maintain two aetlom: In rel'pect of the one hlow.
I may appl>· the test l mentioned In thl' argument. If he he1·:une haukrupt. the right
in res1iect of the watc·h would vest in his
trustee; that fo1· damage to his person would
remain In hlm. I have put the case of a
trespass. The same wonl<l he true of nn nction for consequential damages. A mnn
slandered or llheled by words nctlonahle In
themselves must sue, If nt all. for all ills
damage In one action. Prohnhly, If he ;mstn!ned spednl dnmage, as thnt he lost a contract through hl'ing ehargl'il with theft. he
might muintnln one action for the actionable
slander. auother for the jl<'rilonnl loss,-certa Inly If the ca!'!e in SiclPrfin is right. But
It Is not neC'l'ssary to <l<'cirle th is.
I now come to the case of whPre the \\TOii~
Is not actionable In Itself. Is only nn lnjnria.
but can:;;es a clamnum. In surh a rase it
woulcl seem that ns tile aetlon was only
mnintnlnahle In reRpN·t of the damage, or
not maintainable till the damage, nn action
should lie every time a damage accrued from
the wrongful act. For example, A. says to
B. that C. Is a swindler. B. refuses to enter
Into a conh'art with C. C. hns a cau!'le of
action against A. D .. who wns 1wesent aml
heard It, also refuses to mnke snrh a coutrnct. Surely. anotlwr action would llP.
And so one would think Jf B. !<nhi;eqiwntly
refuses another contrac·t. Of rourse. one can
see that framls might he prn('ti<'e<l. So the~·
may !u any stnte of law. Rnt I cannot st>e
wh)· the speoml artion would not be malntnlnahle if the :;;pc·ond loss wns traced to the
spl'aking. And iwrhnps one might npplr the
same test. \Voulcl not the first right of action pn!'s to the trustrrs of C. if he hef'arne
h11nkrt111t? If the seeond los!l wns after the .
hankrt:pfs 1li:::('h11n::-P. It 1vould not.
'fherP ls still another f'lnss of <'n~ei; to he
rousil!Precl. Ylz. those wht>l'P the Ul't eau><ing
dnmage is not In its••lf wrongful. :\'o easlt>r
ens<' l'llll lw taken tlrnu the above ground
enf<e of nu ex1·a\'ation, wht·rehy an acljoining ow1wr'>1 soil is l<'t down. It cannot be
sai1J that the art of ex<·a,·ation Is unlawful.
A <·ontral't to 110 It 1•011lil hp t•nforced. Xo
lnjunetion against It t·tntld be obtained un-
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less injury was imminent and certain. What

would be the rights of the person damaged

in such a case? I think the former reason-

ing would apply. If there was an excava-

tion 100 yards long, and 50 feet of the neigh-

bouring soil fell in, the right of action would

be in respect of those 50 feet. and not only

in respect of what had fallen in. but what

would in future fall in along the 50 feef.

But. if afterwards the other Tin feet fell in,

there would be a fresh cause of action.

less injury was Imminent and certain. What are right, It follows that, on the least subwould be the rights ot the person damaged sidence hap1wning, a cnuse or action accrues
in such a case? I tlllnk the former reason- once and for nil, tbe statute of llmltatlons being would apply. If there was an excava- gins ta run, and the person Injured must
tion 100 yards long, and 50 feet of the neigh- bring bis action, and claim and recover for
bouring soil fell In, the right of nctlon would 1111 dnnmgP, 11ctu11l, possible, or contingPnt,
be In respect of those 50 feet. nncl not only for nil ti me.
As to the anthorlties, Backhouse v. Bonomi,
in l"l'"llel"t of what had fallrn In. but wllnt
would In futnrP f:tll in 111011~ the :;o fr!'f. 0 H. L. Cns. ri0:i. sPe>ms elenrl~- In the> plainBut. if aftt'rwarcls tile other :;o f1'et ft'll in, tiff's favour. lmlel'd, I have thought of limthere would be a fn•!:'h eau"t' of action. iting my jmlguwnt to the following remnrl;;
Sur('Jy. this m1111t be f.lo. If 10 fe!:'t at one on It. It tlf'<"irletl that the ex<":nntion of the
t-nd fell in. and afterwnnls 10 feet at the coal wns not wrongful, and that the cnnst> or
other, It woni<I he l111p1.,~ihle to sa~· that adion IH'l r11<•d when the damag<' arost•. ThP
there woul<I not he two <":Ill>'"" of ndion. )( cl11m11ge now complained of arose at the last
the excavation was on two si1h,.. nf 11 "'lll•tl"t', subsidence. Thnt subsidence wus no part of
the same eoll!<l't)Ut'nr-e>:. The attorn1·.1··;..:l'n- or eoutinnanee of the fornll'r subsidence, nor
eral denied this, and wns 1lrivPn to tlo so. caused by the same cause only, hut by a furBut sup1>0se A. owm•d tlw n11Joi11i11g 1n·oprr- th<'r 1·ut18<'; In this sense. that without this
ty on one slcle, nnd B. tl1:1t whidt was at <'nnse thl' suhRitlPn<·l• would not hnn• tnken
right angles to It; ther!' mn>'t tlwn be two pince>. Therefore. no c·nuse of action In respl'ct of It a roSL' till It hapve>ned.
causes of action.
:Sow, apply this rensonlng- to thP prP>'P:1t
LOHD FIT7.t:EH.\LD. My lords, tile real,
·case. The1·e arc hy the> n1lml><><ion of the
parties two separnfr a111l 1ii:.:tltwt d1111111i:• •s though not tht• formnl. !Jlll'~tiou for your
<'aused to the pL'lintltr hy tlw ""a<·ts.. --inf'l111J- lortl><hi11i<" dPte>rminntiou, Is wht>thrr Lamh v.
lng lo that word 0111i,..siuns-11f till' 1lef1•nd- Wnlker, 3 Q. B. DI\". :ISll. wns con-edly 1le11uts. 011e a n•movnl ot <·on!. awl 11on111·ovill- d1lt•1l. )[)" nohlt• 11ntl lt'fll"llE'«l frh•111l (Lunl
lng of supports. whkh cause1l 11 suh;:i1IPn!'e BLACKBUR:\') rightly rleab1 with this appeal
111 tl'lti8. A cause ot' action n•·1·rnl'1l tl11•11. In the same lli;ht as if it was an appenl from
Anotlwr <"nuse or 11Ption is tile rP1110,·111 of Lnmb v. Walker. :I Q. H. lliv. :i~n. I do not
eoal. lnf"lnding. perhaps, the con! whi<-h 1·1111s- propose to follow m)· nohlP nnd learnPd frlrnd
•~I the first subslden!'e, hnt douhtle;;s nl;;n n
In hh:o lnstructl\·p PXfllllillllllnn or Lumb Y.
re>moval of coal extending to a i.:-r<'ntn tlis- W11lkf'r. 3 Q. B. Div. :18fl. and Backhousc v.
tam·P. nncl not lnmw11i:i.h·I~- undrr ti.le r1J11in- P.onoml. !) H. L. Cns. fi03. and his criticisms
titr's land, and the nonpro,·irling 11gnl11st the on those cnseR; but I think that we may de<·onse>quem·rs. whit"!!. whl'n till' adjol11ing- li UC'e from the a ut horl ties so1111:• propositions
<1wner to the rleft>rnhmts rr-mm·p1l hl11 c·onl. as now spttlt•<l In Jaw. nn!l appli1·nble to the
~s be lawfully might (though I think thnt
cireumRtancl's of the appeal now before your
1mmatPrinl>. <"llll"l'd n er1·ep iu thl' lil'fPIHl- lortlshlp;;" honi<t'. nnrl to shnih11· cnscs. I proants' land. whkh In timP l'llllSP«I the> furl her CP!'d to RtatP thoRP propoRltionR, though In
l!Uhsideuce. I think this gl\·ps a seeond doing so I n 111 conscious of the 1lunger pointen ni<e of action. I think, tlwrefore>, the judg- ed out h~· my nohl!' nil(\ leanw1l friend, Lord
ment was right.
BJL\.:U\YELL.
It i:eems to me not to mntter that the suh(l) That the> owner of the surface has :1
siclence wns of the same> spot, nor that the natural 1111d )Pgnl right to thP 111111is turhe>d
imruecliatP 1·a11s(' of the seeond suhsidPncc enjoyment of that surfnee, in th«' absence or
was the no11t>xiRte>111·p of 1·0111 mHh·nwatll that nny hlntling 11gn•enwnt to the <·nntrary.
spot. Two damage;; h:t\"f' been 01·e11s!o11r d to
(2) Tl111t the owner of the 11uhj:11·Pnt minthe plaintiff.--0ne. <lirH·tJ~· nnd lmmedifitply erals mny ex ca \·ate nnd remo\"e tht>m to the
11~· tht> remo,·al of tlw l'OHI 1111111'1" hi!'! surface;
utmost l'XtN1t, hut 11houltl ex1!rdiw thn t rh:ht
the other. h~-- that nm! rt-111oval of other <'Oal. 110 ns not to <li!itnrb the lawful enjoyment of
:rnd eo11s1•q11ent <·rt'l'J1i11g :1111! further s11h;;ithe owner of the surf:l(•t>.
df"n(-e. The attornpy J!'f"lll'ral. All I h111·1· snit!,
t:!) That thP pxean1tion 111ul l"l'lllO\":tl of tl1t•
d!'uird that th!'rr 1·nuhl b e two ean;;p" of ac- m irwrnls tloPs not, pPr se. eonstitute any a1·1ion if two ditrt•1T11t part~ of th1· pl11i11titl"s ti11uable inntslon of the rig-ilt of till' ow11 c•r of
land suhsi<l<'d at twr. ll!ffl'rl'tlt tinws. Hut I the SllrfllC('. 11lthot1,1d1 SlllHH'f)lll'llt e\·1•11(1':
i:mrPI.• thPre mubt hi'. Knpp"s" the two show that no aclt•quatP supports haYc b1'l'n
pi<•<·'"' heloni:1•1I to difft>n·nt ow111•rs. as I I ll'ft to s11st:1in the r;nrf:tCl'.
have suggestPd.
t-11 Hut that whPtl. in 1·111t~l'qt1Pnee of not
()( COllr>W. one ("1111 "PP IJJt• t1:11t;.,:Pl" 1111(] ill- I h•:tYiug or )l1'01·1tli11g- >i1tllit-it•11t supports. n tlJ,...
coun•nlence thnt will follow. This !lamng-P t11rha111·e of thl' surfa1·p t akPs pl:H·P. that 11i;;accrues many years 11ft«'r tlw llefl'mlnnts'
turh111we Is :111 im·asion of tlw rig-ht of th1~
~H·t or oml!•sion which has en11sPd It.
If my owner of thl' surface, and constitutes hls
reasoning Is right. m:tn)' y t•ars IH'll<'(• tlwre cnn;;e of netioll.
might be a further action from some furthe r
The fonntlation of thP plalntlft'.'s action,
tiubsidence. But the Inconvenience Is as then, seems to be that, altllou;:h the cxc11Yagreat th«.> other way; for, If the defendants tlons or the mlnernls were nets by the de0

Surely. this must be so. If 10 feet at one

end fell in. and afterwards 10 feet at the

other, it would be imp1.s:-ible to say that

there would not be two causes of action. if

the excavation was on two sides of a square,

the same consequences. The attorncy-gen-

eral denied this, and was driven to do so.

But suppose A. owned the adjoining proper-

ty on one side, and B. that \vhi(-ii was at
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right angles to it; there must then be two

causes of action.

Now, apply this reasoning to the present

case. There are by the admission of the

parties two separate and distinct damages

caused to the plaintiff by the "acts"--inchul-

ing in that word 0nti:si0ns—of the defend-

ants. One a removal of coal. and nonprovid-

ing of supports, which caused a subsidence

in l8li8. A cause of action accrued then.

Another cause of action is the removal of

coal. including. perhaps, the coal which caus-

ed the ﬁrst subsidence. but doubtless also a

removal of coal extending to a greater dis-

tancc. and not immediately under the plain-

tiff's land, and the nonproviding against the

consequences. which. when the adjoining

owner to the defendants removed his coal.

as he lawfully might (though I think that

immaterial), caused a creep in the defend-

ants‘ land. which in time caused the further

subsidence. I think this gives a second

cause of action. I think, therefore, the judg-

ment was right.

It seems to me not to matter that the sub-

sidence was of the same spot, nor that the

immediate cause of the second subsidence

was the nonexistence of coal underneath that

spot. Two damages have been occasioned to

the plaintiff.—one. (iii'eclly and immediately

by the removal of the coal under his surface;

the other. by-that and removal of other cool.

and consequent creeping and further subsi-

dence. The attorney general. as I have said.

denied that there could be two causes of ac- .

tion it‘ two (ilfft-rﬂlt parts of the plaintiﬂ"s

land subsided at two dllll'rent times. But

‘ surely there must be. Suppose the two

pieces belonged to different owners. as I

have suggested.

Oi! course. one can see the danger and in-

convenience that will foilow. This damage

accrues many years after the defendants‘

act or omission which has caused it. If my

reasoning is right. many years hence there

might be a further action from some further

subsidence. But the inconvenience is as

great the other way; for, if the defendants

are right, it follows that, on the least sub-
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fendants in the lawful enjoyment of their

own property, yet, when subsequently dam-

age arose therefrom to the plaintiff in the en-

joyment of his property, the defendants be-

came responsible. For, although the law en-

courages a man to the free use of his own

property, yet if. in doing a lawful thing in

the enjoyment of that property, he occasions

damage to his neighbour, which might have

been avoided, he will be answerable for that

damage whenever it occurs.

Now, as to the cause of action in 1868;

there is no doubt that the mere excavation

prior to or in 1868 was legitimate, and not of

itself alone the foundation of any right of

action; but when the subsidence of that year

took place, and caused damage to the plain-

tiff's houses, then the defendants became

liable to make good that loss, because, though

their acts were in the lawful use of their
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own property, yet the injurious consequences

to the plaintiff might have been avoided. It

is the disturbance. then, when it arises, that

is the cause of action, and not the prior legiti-

mate acts of the owners of the minerals in

the lawful enjoyment of their own property.

But. although this be true, yet. still, the

question which arose in Lamb v. Walker, 3

Q. B. Div. 389, and which was not expressly

decided by this house in Backhouse v. Bono-

mi, 9 H. L. Cas. 503, remains now to be con-

sidered and ﬁnally decided. There was a

subsidence in 1868, causing special damage,

giving the plaintiff a cause of action; and in

respect of that damage he accepted compen-

sation, which, lt seems agreed, is equivalent

to a recovery of damages in an action if such

an action had then been instituted.

In 1882 a fresh and distinct subsidence took

place, causing special damage to the plaintiff.

It was admitted before your lordships, rather

late in the argument, but for the purpose of

better enabling your lordships to come to a

conclusion: “That after the partial subsi-

dence, in 1868, the strata remained practical-

ly quiescent until the working of the coal in

the next adjoining land by the owner thereof,

in the year 1881. which working caused a

creep and a further subsidence.“ And fur-

ther: “That, if the owner of the adjoining

,land had not worked hi coal, there would

have been no further subsidence, and that if

the coal under the respondent's (plaintiffs)

land had not been taken out, or if the appel-

lants (defendants) had left suﬂlcient support

under the respondent's (plaintiffs) land, then

the working of the adjoining owner would

have done no harm."

It will be observed on these admissions that

the partial subsidence of 1868 had practically

ceased, and that a fresh creep and subsidence

took place in 1882, which would not have

taken place if the defendants had left suf-

ﬁcient natural support under the piaintiff's

land, or, we may add, had substituted ade-

quate artiﬁcial support.

There can be no doubt that, though there

has been no act of cmnrnission by the defend-

ants since the completion of the excavation
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1'endants In the lawful enjoyment of their
own property, yet, when subsequently damage arose therefrom to the plaintiff in the enjoyment of his property, the defendants became responsible. For, although the law en•
courages a man to the tree use of his own
property, yet if, In doing a lawful thing in
the enjoyment of that property, ht! occasions
damage to his neighbour, which might have
been avoided, he will be answerable for that
damage whenever It oC'curs.
~ow, as to the cause of action In 1868;
there Is no doubt that the mere excavation
prior to or In 1868 was legitimate, and not of
itself alone the foundation of any right of
action; but when the subsidence of that year
took place, and caused damage to the plaintiff's houses, then the defendants became
liable to make good that loss, because, though
their acts were In the lawful use ot their
own property, yet the Injurious consequences
to the plaintiff might have been avoided. It
Is the disturbance. then, when It arises, that
Is the cause of action, and not the prior legitimate acts of the owners of the minerals In
the lawful enjoyment of their ow1;1 prope1·ty.
But although this be true, yet, still, the
question which arose In Lamb v. Walker, 3
Q. B. Div. 389, and which was not expressly
decided by this house In Backhouse v. Bonomi, 9 H. L. Oas. 503, remains now to be considered and finally decided. There was a
subsidence In 1868, causing special damage,
giving thi> rlalntiff a cause of action; and In
respect of that damage he accepted compensation, which, It seems agreed, Is equivalent
to a. recovery of damages In an action If such
an action had then been instituted.
In 1882 a fresh and distinct subsidence took
place, causing special damage to the plaintiff.
It was admitted before your lordships, rather
late In the argument, but for the purpose of
better enabling your lordships to come to a
conclusion: "That after the partial subsidence, In 1868, the strata remained practically quiescent until the working of the coal In
the next adjoining land by the owner thereof,
in the year 1881, which working caused a
creep and a. further subsidence." And further: "That, If the owner ot the adjoining
land had not worked his coal, there would
have been no further subsidence, and that if
the coal under the respondent·s (plaintiff's)
land bad not been taken out, or If the appellants (defendants) had left sufficient support
nnder the respondent's (plalntilI's) land, then
the working of the adjoining owner would
have done no harm."
It will be obsen-ed on these admissions that
the partial subsidence of 18B8 had practically
ceased, and that a fresh creep and subsidence
took pince In 1882, which would not lla.ve
taken place if the defendants had left sufficient natural support under the plaintiff's
land, or, we may add, bad substituted adequate artificial support.
There can be no doubt that, though there
has been no act of C'o1wnisslon by 01e di:>fend-

ants since the completion of the excavation·
of 1808, yet, if there bad been no subsidence
causing damage to the pla.lntlfr prior to that
of 1882, the present action could be maintained. But It ls alleged that as the plaintiff had
a complete ca.use of action In 1868, arising
from the prior exeiivatlon and the subsidence
of 1868, the statute of limitations then com- ;
menced to operate, and bas barred the present
action. It was further argued that in 1868the plaintiff could and ougllt to have insisted
on reco>el'lng once and for all any d!l.mage
that might arise prospectl>ely from the excavation of 1868, according to the rule of law
which, In order to prevent a multiplicity ot
actions, provides that damages resulting from
one and the same cause of action must be assessed and recovered once and for all.
That rule was applled by the majority of
the court in Lamb v. Walker, 3 Q. B. Div. 389,
and Is not controverted. It ls not intl.exlble,
and admits of exceptions.
·we ha,·e to consider what was the cause of
action in 1868, and whether the cause of action of 1882 (the creep and subsidence of 1882)
Is one and the same cause of action as that
of 181>8. It It Is so, then the defendants areentltled to succeed on the defense ot the statute of limitations.
This appeal represents a class of cases peculiar and exceptional, to meet which, and t()
avoid grave Inconvenience, If not Injustice.
our flexible common law has somewhat moulded Itself. I deprecate discussing some ot the
arguments addressed to us, which seemed tome to be too fine, such as, for Instance,
whether the original act of the defendants
was "Innocent," or "perfectly Innocent." The
question here is not whether the original act
of the defendants was "innocent," but
whether the defendants have oec11sloned damage to the plaintiff without any inevitable
necessltv.
I am of opinion that Cockburn, L. C. J .•
In the case of Lamb v. Walker, 3 Q. B. Div.
389, and the court of appeal In the case be-.
fore us, were respectively right In resting on
Ba<'khouse v. Bonomi, 9 H. L. Cas. 503, and
deducing from It a principle which governs.
the Question.
Backhouse v. Bonomi, 9 H. L. Cas. 503, Is.
not satisfactorily reported. We gather from
the report in your lordships' house with some
dilliculty what was actually decided. llr.
~Ianisty, In hls argument In that case at your
lordships' bar, puts It thus: "The act done
was a perfectly innocent act at the time It
was done. The argument on the other side·
ls that It must be treated as having been Injurious, because it might afterwards become
so. If the action had been brought when
the act was first done, the answer would have
been that the defendant had a right to do
the act, and that no damage bad been occasioned." Lord Westbury says: "I think It
Is abundantly clear, both on principle a~d
authority, that, when the etJjoyment of the·
house ls Interfered with by the actual occur-
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rence of the mischief, the cause of action then

arises, and the action may then be maintain-

ed." And Lord Cranworth adds: "it has

been supposed that the right of the party

whose land is interfered with is a right to

what is called the pillars or the support. In

truth, his right is to the ordinary enjoyment

of his land, and. until that ordinary enjoy-

ment is interfered with, he has nothing of

which to complain. That seems the prin-

ciple on which the case ought to be disposed

of."

It seems to me that Backhouse v. Bonomi,

9 H. L. Cas. 503, did decide that the removal

of the suhjacent strata was an act (I will not

say an innocent act) done in the legitimate

exercise of ordinary ownership, which, per se,

gave no right of action to the owner of the

surface, and that the latter had no right of

action until his enjoyment of the surface was

rence of the mlschlet. the en use of action then
arises, and the action may then be malntnlned" And Lord Cranworth adds: "It has
been supposed· that the right of the party
whose land is lnterCered with Is a right to
what Is called the pillars or the support. In
truth, bis right Is to the ordinary enjoyment
of his land, and. until that ordinary enjoyment Is interfered with, he hns nothing of
'1.'hkh to complain. That !!l'l'lllS the principle on which the case ought to be disposed
of."
It i<<>ems to me that Bnckhouse v. Bonomi,
9 H. L. Cas. 503, did decluP that the removal
of the suhjacent strata wns nn act (I wlll not
say an innocent act) done In the legltlm:lte
exercise of ordinary ownership, which, per 1<e,
gave no right of action to the owner of the
surface, and that the latter had no right of
action until his enjoyment of the surface was
actually disturbed. The disturbance then
constituted his right of action.
There was a complete cause of action In

1868, In respect of which compensation was
given, but there was a liability to further disturbance. The defendants permitted the
state of things to continue without taking any
ste11s to prevent the occurrence of nny future
Injury. A fresh subsidence took place,.cnuslng a new and further disturbance of the
plnin"tifI's enjoyment, which gave him a new
arn:J. dlstluct cause of action.
It this view Is eorrect, then It follows that
the eause of action now Insisted on by the
plalntll'l ls not the same cause of nctlou as
th.1t of 1868, but Is In point of lRw, as lt Is
physlcally, a new and Independent cause .o f
al"tion, arising In 1882, and to which the lll'·
fPnse of the statute of limitations Is not appllenble.
The necessary conclusion Is that Lamb v.
Walker, 3 Q. B. Div. 380, was not correctly
decided, and that the able reasoning of Cockburn, L. C. J., In that case ought to have prevailed. Order appealed from alfirmed, and
appeal dismissed, with cost&
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actually disturbed. The disturbance then

constituted his right of action.

There was a complete cause of action in

1868, in respect of which compensation was

given, but there was a liability to further dis-

turbance. The defendants permitted the

state of things to continue without taking any

steps to prevent the occurrence of any future

injury. A fresh subsidence took place,-caus-

ing a new and further disturbance of the

piaiu'tiff's enjoyment, which gave him a new

and distinct cause of action.

If this view is correct, then it follows that

the cause of action now insisted on by the

plaintiff is not the same cause of action as

that of 1868, but is in point of law, as it is

physically, a new and independent cause of

action, arising in 1882, and to which the de-

fense of the statute of limitations is not ap-

plicahle.

The necessary conclusion is that Lamb v.

Walker, 3 Q. B. Div. 389, was not correctly

decided, and that the able reasoning of Cock-

burn, L. C. J., in that case ought to have pre-

vailed. Order appealed from aﬂirmed, and

appeal dismissed, with costs.
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pany.

JOSEPH SCHLITZ BREWING CO. v.

COMPTON.

(32 N. E. 693, 142 Ill. 511.)

Supreme Court of Illinois. Nov. 2, 1892.

Appeal from appellate court, Third dis-

trict.

Action on the case by Sophie Compton

against the Joseph Schlitz Brewing Com-

Plaintiff obtained judgment, which

was aﬂlrmed by the appellate court. De-

fendant appeals. Reversed.

The other facts fully appear in the follow-

ing statement by MAGRUDER, J.:

.This is an action on the case, begun on

April 17, 1890, in the circuit court of San-

gamon county, by the appellee against the

appellant company. In the trial court the

verdict and judgment were in favor of the

plaintiff, which judgment has been aiiirmed
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by the appellate court. The declaration

consists of two counts. The ﬁrst count al-

leges that plaintiff was possessed of certain

premises in Springﬁeld, in which she and

her family resided, and that the defendant,

to wit, on April_20, 1885, wrongfully erected

a certain building near said premises in so

careless, negligent, and improper a manner

that on said day and afterwards, “and be

fore the commencement of this nit," large

quantities of rain water ﬂowed upon,

against, and into said premises and the

walls, roofs, ceilings, beams, papering,

ﬂoors, stairs, doors, cellar, basement, and

other parts thereof, and weakened, injured,

and damaged the same, by reason whereof

said messuage and premises became and

are damp and less ﬁt for habitation. The

second count alleges that plaintiff was the

possessor, occupier, and owner of said mes-

suage and premises, in which she and her

family dwelt, and the defendant, to wit, on

said day, caused quantities of water to run

into, against, and upon the same, and the

walls, roofs, ﬂoors, cellars, etc., thereof, and

thereby greatly weakened injured, wetted,

and damaged the same. By reason where-

of said premises became and were and are

damp, incommodious, and less ﬁt for habi-

tation. The plea was not guilty. The

proof tends to show that plaintiffs building

is a two.story brick building, with a cellar

underneath, the front room on the ﬁrst ﬂoor

being used as a butcher's shop, and the rest

of the building being used as a dwelling;

that her building was erected several years

before that of the defendant; that defend-

ant's building is on the lot west of plain-

titf‘s lot, and is about 60 feet long, having

an oﬂice in front and a beer-bottling estab-

lishment in the rear, and has one roof,

which slants towards plaintiffs property;

that there are three windows on the west

side of plaintiff's house, besides the three

cellar windows; that her wall is a little

over two feet from the west line of her lot;

that when it rains the water ﬂows against

her west wall, and some of it into her win-

dows and cellar from the roof of defend-
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.TOSEPH SCHLITZ BREWING 00. T.
COMPTON.
(32 N. E. 693, 142 Ill. 511.)
Supreme Court of Illinois. Nov. 2, 1892.
Appeal from appellate court, Third d1s1:1·ict.
Action on the case by Sophie Compton
against the Joseph Schlitz Brewing Company. Plaintiff obtained judgment, which
wns affirmed by the appellate court. Def enrt:int appeals. Reversed.
The other facts fully appear in the following statement by MAGRUDER, J.:
This Is an action on the case, begun on
April 17, 1800, In the circuit court of Sangamon county, by the appellee against the
appellant company. In the trial court the
vci·dlct and judgment were In favor of the
plaintiff, which judgment has been affirmed
by the appellate court. The declaration
consists of two counts. The first count alleges that plalntll'f was possessed of certain
premises in Springfield, in which she and
her family resided, and that the defendant,
to wit, on Aprll 20, 1885, wrongfully erected
a certain bulldi~g near said premises In so
ca1·eiess, negligent, and Improper a manner
that on said day and afterwards, "and before the commencement of this suit," large
qunntltles of rain water fio\ved upon,
against, and Into said premises and the
walls, roofs, ceilings, beams, papering,
tloors, stait's, doors, cellar, basement, and
other parts thereof, and weakened, Injured,
. and damaged the same, by reason whereof
said messuage and premises became and
are damp and less fit for habitation. The
second count alleges that plnlntll'f was the
possessor, occupier, and owner of said messuage and premises, in which she and her
family dwelt, and the defendant, to wit, on
said day, caused quantities of water to run
into, against, and upon the same, and the
walls, roofs, :!loors, cellars, etc., thereof, and
thereby greatly weakened injured, wetted,
and damaged the same. By reason whereof said premises became and were and are
damp, incommodious, and less fit for habitation. The plea was not guilty. The
proo1' tends to show that plaintiff's building
Is a two-story b1ick building, with a cellnr
underneath, the front room on the first fioor
being used as a butcher's shop, and the rest
of the building being used as a dwelling;
that her building was erected several yenrF!
before that of the defendant; that defendant's building Is on the lot west of plaintiff's lot, and Is about 60 feet long, having
11n office In front and a beer-bottling establishment In the rear, and has one roof,
which slants towards plaintiff's propert}';
that there are three windows on the west
side or plaintll'f's house, besides the three
<'eliar windows; that her wall Is a little
over two feet from the west line or her lot;
that when It rains the water flows ngnlmH
her west wall, and some or It into her win-

dows and cellar 1'rom the roof ()f dei'endant's building; that the eave trough is so
far below the eave that the water runs 'Over
It into the windows, etc.
Palmer & Schutt, for appellant.
& Hamilton, for appellee.

Patton

MAGRUDER, J. (after stating the facts).
Proof was Introduced of damage done to
plaintlft"s pl'Ope1iy after the commencement
of the suit by reason of rain storms then
occurring. Tbe defendant asked, and the•
court refused to give, the following instruction: "The court instructs the jury that the
suit now being tried was commenced in the
month of April, 1890, and that they are not
to take into consideration the question as to
whether or not any damage has accrued to
plalntll'f's prop~iy since the commencement
of this suit." The question presented is
whether plaint If was entitled to recover
only su<'h damages as accrued before and
up to the beginning of her suit, leaving subsequent damages to be sued for in subseoquent suits, or whether she was entitled to
estimate and recover In one action all damages resulting both before and after the
commencement of this suit. The rule originally obtaining at common law was, that
in personal actions damages could be recovered only up to the time of the commencement of the action.\ 3 Com. Dig. tit. "Damages," D. The rufe subsequently prevailing In such actions ls that damages accruing after the commencement of the suit may
be recovered, if they are the tJrtnPlll at:
necessary result of the act complained of,
and whem they do not themselves constitute a new cause of action. Wood's Mayne,
Dam. § 103; Birchard v. Booth, 4 Wis. 67;
Sinter v. Rink, 18 Ill. 527; Fetter v. Beale,
1 Salk. 11; Howell v. Goodrich, 69 III. 556.
In actions of trespass to the realty, It Is said
that dama;:es may be recoYered up to the
time of the verdict, (Com. Dig. 363, tit.
"Damages," D;) and the reason why, In
such cases, all the damages may be recovered In a single action, Is that the trespass '
Is the cause of action, and the Injury resulting is merely the measure of damages. 5
Am. & Eng. Enc. Law, p. 16, cn:se cited In
note 2. But In the case of nuisances or repeated trespasses recovery can ordinarily
be had only up to the commencement of the
suit, because every continuance or repetition of the nuisance gives rise to a new
cause of action, and the plaintiff may bring
successive actions as long as the nuisance
lasts. :M:cConnel v. Kibbe, 29 Ill. 483, and
33 Ill. 175; Railroad Co. v. Moffitt, 75 Ill.
524; Railroad C<>. v. Schaffer, 124 Ill. 112, 16
N. E. 239. The cause of action, In case of
an ordinary nuisance, Is not so much the
act of the defendant as the Injurious conse1111ences resultln;.r from his act, and hence
the cause of action d()('S uot arise until such
consequences occur; nor can the damages
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be estimated beyond the date of bringing

the ﬁrst suit. 5 Am. & Eng. Enc. Law, p.

17, and cases in notes. It has been held,

however, that where permanent structures

are erected, resulting in injury to adjacent

realty, all damages may be recovered in a

single suit. Id. p. 20, and cases in note.

But there is much confusion among the

authorities which attempt to distinguish be-

tween cases where successive actions lie

and those in which only one action may be

maintained. This confusion seems to arise

from the different views entertained in re

gard to the circumstances under which the

injury suffered by the plaintiff from the act

of the defendant shall be regarded as a per-

manent injury. “The chief ditiiculty in this

subject concerns acts which result in what

effects a permanent change in the plaintiff's

land, and is at the same time a nuisance or
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trespass." Sedg. Dam. (8th Ed.) § 94. Some

cases hold it to be unreasonable to assume

that a nuisance or illegal act will continue

forever, and therefore refuse to give entire

damages as for a permanent injury, but al-

low such damages for the continuation of

the wrong as accrue up to the date of the

bringing of the suit. Other cases take the

ground that the entire controversy should

be settled in a single suit, and that damages

should be allowed for the whole injury,

past and prospective, if such injury be prov-

en with reasonable certainty to be perma-

nent in its character. Id. § 94. We think,

upon the whole, that the more correct view

is presented in the former class of cases. 1

-Suth. Dam. 199-202; 3 Suth. Dam. 369-399;

1 Sedg. Dam. (8th Ed.) §§ 91-94; Uline v.

Railroad Co., 101 N. Y. 98, 4 N. E. 536;

Duryea v. Mayor, 26 Hun, 120; Blunt v. Mc-

Cormick, 3 Denio, 283; Cooke v. England,

92 Am. Dec. 630, notes; Reed v. State, 108

N. Y. 407, 15 N. E. 735; Hargreaves v. Kim-

berly, 26 W. Va. 787; Ottenot v. Railroad

119 N. Y. 603, 23 N. E. 169; Cobb v.

Smith, 38 Wis. 21; Canal Co. v. Wright, 21

N. J. Law, 469; Wells v. Northampton Co.,

151 Mass. 46, 23 N. E. 724; Barrick v. Schif-

ferdecker, 123 N. Y. 52, 25 N. E. 365; Silsby

Manufg Co. v. State, 104 N. Y. 562, 11 N.

E. 264; Aldworth v. City of Lynn, 153 Mass.

53, 26 N. E. 229; Town of Troy v. Railroad

C0., 23 N. H. 83; Cooper v. Randall, 50 Ill.

317; Railroad Co. v. Hoag, 90 Ill. 339. We

do not wish to be understood, however, as

holding that the rule laid down in the sec-

ond class of cases is not applicable under

some circumstances, as in the case of per-

manent injury caused by lawful public

structures, properly constructed and perma-

nent in their character. In Uline v. Rali-

road Co., supra, a railroad company raised

the grade of the street in front of the plain-

tiﬁ"s lots so as to pour the water therefrom

down over the sidewalk into the basement

of her houses, ﬂooding the same with water,

and rendering them damp. unhealthy, etc.,

and injuring the rental value, etc. In dis-

cussing the question of the damages to

be eetlmated beyond the date of bringing
the 11.rst suit. 5 Am. & Eng. Enc. Law, p.
17, and cases In notes. It has been held,
however, that where permanent structures
are erected, resulting In Injury to adjacent
realty, all damages may be recoYered In a
single suit. Id. p. 20, and cases In note.
But there Is much contusion among the
authorities wWcb attempt to distinguish between cases where eucceseiYe actions lie
and those In which only one action may be
m.alntalned. This contusion seems to arise
t'rom the dlfrerent views entertained In regard to the clrcumstan<'eB under which tlle
injury sullc>red by the plnlntifr from the act
of the det'endant shall be regarde<l as a per-·
manent Injury. "The chief ditficulty In this
subject concerns acts which result In what
etrects a permanent change In the plaintll!"s
land, and le at the same time a nuhmncc or
trespass." Sedg. Dam. (8th Ed.) § 94. Some
cases bold 1t to be unreasonable to asi-ume
that a nuisance or lllegal act wlll continue
rore¥er, and therefore refuse to gl¥e entire
damages as tor a permanent Injury, but allow such damages for the continuation of
the wrong as accrue up to the date ot the
bringing or the suit. Other cases take the
ground that the entire contro'l"ersy should
be settled In a single suit, and that damages
should be allowed tor the whole Injury,
past and proRpectlve, It' such injury be proY·
en with reasonable certainty to be permanent In Its character. Id. I W. We think,
upon the whole, that the more correct view
ts presented ln the former class of cases. 1
· 8uth. Dam. 199-202; 3 Suth. Dam. 369--300;
1 Sedg. Dam. (8th E<l.) I§ 91-W; Uline v.
Railroad Co., 101 N. Y. 98, 4 N. E. 530;
Duryea v. Mayor, 26 Hun, 120; Blunt v. McCormick, 3 Denio, 283; Cooke v. England,
92 Am. Dec. 630, notes; Reed v. State, lOS
N. Y. 407, 15 N. E. 735; Hargreaves v. Kimberly, 26 W. Va. 787; Ottenot v. Railroad
Co., 119 N. Y. 603, 23 N. E. 169; Cobb v.
Smith, 38 Wis. 21; Canal Co. v. Wright, 21
N. J. Law, 469; Wells v. Northampton Co.,
151 Mass. 40, 23 N. E. 724; Barrick v. Schltferdecker, 123 N. Y. 52, 2G N. E. 3w; Silsby
Ma.nurg Co. v. State, 104 N. Y. 502, 11 ~.
E. 264; Aldworth v. City of Lynn, 1:;3 ~lass.
53, 26 N. E. 229; Town of Troy v. Railron!l
Co., 23 N. H. 83; Cooper v. Randall, GU Ill.
317; Rallrond Co. v. Hoag, 90 Ill. 339. We
do not wish to be understood, howeYer, as
holding that the rule laid down In the secO[Jd class of cases Is not applicable untler
some circumstnnces, as In the case of permanent Injury caused by lawful pnhlic
structures, properly constructed and permanent In their character. In llline v. Hnllroad Co., supra, a railroad company r.alsl>i.l
the grade of the street In front ot' the plaintiff's Jots so as to pour the water therefrom
down over the sidewalk Into the basement
of her houses, flooding the snme with water,
and rendering them dn mp, unhealthy, etc.,
and Injuring the rental ,·aim>, etc. In dis·
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cussing the question ot the damages to
which the plaintUf was entitled the court
say: "The question, however, still remains,
wb:lt damages? All her damages upon theassumptlon that the nuisance was to be permanent, or only such damages as she sustained np to the commencement ot the action"! • • • The1·e has never been In this
state before this case the least doubt expresfle<l In any judicial decision • • •
that the plalntitr, in such a case, ls en tit le<!
to recoYer only up to the commencement ot
the action. That such ls the rule Is aa well
settled here as any rule of law can be by repeated and unllorm decisions of all the
courts, and It Is the prevalllng doctrine elsewhere." Then follows an exhamaive review of the authorities, which sustain the
conclusion of the court as above announced.
In Duryea v. Mayor, supra, the action was
brought to reco'l"er damages occasioned by
the wrongful acts of one who bad discharged water and sewerage upon the land of
anotller, and It was held that no recovery
could be hn<l for dnmages occasioned by the
discharge of the water and sewage upon theland after the commencement ot the action.
In Blunt v. McCormick, suprn, the action
was brought by a tenant to recover damages against bis landlord because of the latter's erection of buildlng8 adjoining the demised premises, which shut out the light
from the tenant's windows and doors; and
lt was held that damages could only be recove1·ed tor the time which bnd ela1>sed
when the suit was commenced, and not for
the whole term. Jn Hargreaves v. Kimberly, supra, the action was case to recover
. damages tor causing surface water to flow
on plalntlfr's lot, and for Injury to bis trees
by the use of coke ovens nenr said lot, and
tor Injury thereby to his health and comfort; and It was held to be error to permit
a witness to answer the following question:
"What will be the future damage to the
property from the acts ot' the defendant?"
the court snylng: "In all those cases where
the cause or the Injury ls ln Its nature permanent, and a recovery for such injury
would confer a license on the defendant to
continue the cause, the entire damage mny
be recovered lo a single action; but where
the cnu!<e of the Injury ls in the nature of a
nuisance>, and not permanent In Its charncter, but ot' such a character that it may oo
supposed that the dc>fendant would remove
It rather than suffer at once the entire dnmage which It mny lntlict if permanent. then
the entire darunge cannot be reco\·eri>1l in a
single action; but actions may be maintained from time to time as loug .is the cause
of the Injury continues." In Wells v.
Northampton Co., supra, where a rnllro:vl
company maintained a culvert under Its l'lllbnnkment, which injured land by discharging water on it, it was held that the <'a!le
fell within the ordinary rule applicable to
continuing nuisances and continuing tres-
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passes. Reference was made to Uline v.

Railroad Co., supra, and the following lan-

guage was used by the court: “If the de

fendant's act was wrongful at the outset,

as the jury have found, we see no way in

which the continuance of its structure in its

wrongful form could become rightful as

against the plaintiff, unless by release or

grant by prescription or by the payment of

damages. If originally wrongful, it has not

become rightful merely by being built in an

enduring manner." In Aldworth v. City of

Lynn, supra, where the action was for dam-

ages sustained by a landowner through the

improper erection and maintenance of a

dam and reservoir by the city of Lynn on

adjoining land, the supreme court of Massa-

chusetts say: “The plaintiff excepted to the

ruling that she was entitled to recover dam-
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ages only to the date of her writ, and con-

tended that the dam and pond were perma-

nent, and that she was entitled to damages

for a permanent injury to her property.

An erection unlawfully maintained on one's

‘own land, to the detriment of the land of a

neighbor, is a continuing nuisance, for the

maintenance of which an action may be

brought at any time, and damages recovered

up to the time of bringing the suit. ' " "'

That it is of a permanent character, or that

it has been continued for any length of time

less than what is necessary to acquire a

prescriptive right, does not make it lawful,

nor deprive the adjacent landowner of his

right to recover damages. Nor can the ad-

jacent landowner, in such a case, who sues

for damage to his propeuty, compel the de-

fendant to pay damages for the future.

The defendant may prefer to change his use

of his property so far as to make his con-

duct lawful. In the present case we cannot

say that the defendant may not repair or re-

construct its dam and reservoir in such a

way as to prevent percolation with much

less expenditure than would be required to

pay damages for a permanent injury to the

plaintiff's land."

In the case at bar the defendant did not

erect the house upon plaintiffs land, but up-

on its own land. It does not appear that

such change might not be made in the roof,

or in the manner of discharging the water

from the roof, as to avoid the injury com-

plained of. The ﬁrst count of the declara-

tion, by its express terms, limits the recov-

ery for damages arising from the negligent

and improper construction of defendant's

building to such injuries as were inﬂicted

“before the commencement of the suit."

The second count was framed in such a

way as to authorize a recovery of damages

for the ﬂow of water upon plaintiffs prem-

ises from some other cause than the wrong-

ful construction of defendant's building;

and accordingly plaintiff's evidence tends to

show that the cave trough, designed to car-

ry off the water from the roof, was so

placed as to fall of the purpose for which it
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passes. Reference was made to IDlne v. was intended. It cannot be said that the
Railroad Co., supra, and the following lan- eave trough was a structure of such a perguage was used by the court: "It the de- manent character that It might not be chanfendant's act was wrongful at the outset, ged, nor can It be ea.Id that the defendant
as the jury have found, we see no way in would not remove the cause of the injury
which the continuance of its structure in its rather than submit to a recovery of entire
wrongful form could become rightful as damages for a permanent Injury, or suffer
against the plaintllr, unless by release or repeated recoveries during the continuance
grant by prescription or by the payment of of the injury. The facts In the record tend
damages. It originally wrongful, it bas not to show a continuing nuisance, as the same
become rightful merely by being built in an is defined in Aldworth v. City of Lynn, suenduring manner." In Aldworth v. City of pra. There ls a legal obligation to remove
Lynn, supra, where the action was for dam- a nuisance; and the "law w111 not presume
ages sustained by a landowner through the the continuance of the wrong, nor allow a
improper erection and maintenance of a license to continue a wrong, or a transfer of
dam and reservoir by the city of Lynn on 1:ltle, to result from the recovery of damadjoining land, the supreme court of Massa- ages for prospective misconduct." l Suth.
chusetts 811.y: "The plalntilr excepted to the Dam. 199, and notes. The question now unruling that she was entitled to recover dam- der consideration has been before thls court
ages only to the date of her writ, and con- in Cooper v. Randall, supra. The action
tended that the dam and pond were perma- was for damages to plalntltr's premises,
nent, and that she was entitled to damages caused by constructing and operating a
for a permanent injury to her property. flouring mill on a lot near 811.ld premises,
An erection unla wtully maintained on one's whereby chalT, dust, dirt, etc., were thrown
own land, to the detriment of the land of a from the mill Into plalntitr's house. It was
neighoor, ls a continuing nuisance, for the there held that the trial court committed no
maintenance of which an action may be error In refusing to permit the plalntitr to
brought at any time, and damages recovered prove that the dust thrown upon bis premup to the time of bringing the suit. • • • ises by the mill after the suit was com'.fhat It ls of a permanent character, or that menced had seriously impaired the value of
It has been continued for any length of time the property, and prevented the renting of
less than what ls necessary to acquire a the house; and we there said: "When subprescriptive right, does not make it lawful, sequent damages are produced by subllenor deprive the adjacent landowner of his quent acts, then the damages should be
right to recover damages. Nor can the 'td- strictly confined to those sustained before
jacent landowner, in such a case, who sues suit brought." It is true that the operation
for damage to his propei;ty, compel the de- of the mlll, causing the dust to fly, was the
fendant to pay damages for the future. act of the defendant; but It cannot be said
The defendant may prefer to change his use that it was not the continuing act of the
of his property so far as to mnke his con- present appellant to allow the roof or the
duct lawful. In the present case we cannot eave trough to remain In such a condition
say that the defendant may not repair or re- as to send the water against appellee's
construct Its dam and reservoir in such a house upon the occurrence of a rain storm.
way as to prevent percolation with much Nor Is appellant's house or eave trough any
less expenditure than would be required to more permanent than was the mm in the
pay damages for a permanent injury to the Cooper Case. In Railroad Co. v. Hoag, suplalntitr's land."
pra, a rallroo.d company had turned Its
In the case at .bar the defendant dld not waste water from a tank upon the preme1·ect the house upon plalntllT's land, but up- ises of the plalntllr, where it spread and
on Its own land. It does not appear that froze, and a recovery was allowed for damsuch change might not be made in the roof, ages sutrered after the commencement of
or In the manner of discharging the water the suit; but It there appeared that the lee.
from the roof, as to avoid the Injury com- which caused the damage, was upon plainplained of. The first count of the declara- tiff's premises before the beginning of the
tion, by Its express terms, limits the recov- suit, and the damage caused resulted from
ery for damages arising from the negligent the meltlng of the ice after the suJt was
and Improper construction of defendant's brought. It ·was there said: "The Injury
building to such Injuries as were intticted sustained by appellee between the com"hefore the commencement of the suit." mencement of the suit and the trial was not
The second count was framed in such a from any wrongful act done by appellant
way as to authorize a recovery of damages during that time, but followed from acts
tor the fiow of water upon plaintiff's prem- done before the suit was commenced."
ises from some other cause than the wrong- Here, the water, which caused the Injury,
ful construction of defendant's building; was not upon plaintiff's premises, either In
and accordingly plalntllr's evidence tends to a congealed or liquid state, before the beshow that the eave trough, designed to car. ginning of the suit, but flowed thereon as
ry otr the water from the roof, was so the result of rain storms which occurred
placed as to fall or the purpose for which It after the suit was commenced. We think.
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the correct rule upon this subject is stated

as follows: “If a private structure or other

work on land is the cause of a nuisance or

other tort to the plaintiff, the law cannot re-

gard It as permanent, no matter with what

intention it was built; and da-nlges can

therefore be recovered only to the date of

the action." 1 Sedg. Dam. (8th Ed.) § 93.

it follows from the foregoing observations

that it was error to allow the plaintiff to in-

troduce proof of (lamage to her property

caused by rain storms occurring after the

commencement of her suit, and that the in-

struction asked by the defendant upon that

subject, as the same is above set forth,

should have been given. The judgments of

the appellate and circuit courts are revers-

ed, and the cause is remanded to the circuit

court.
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Judgment reversed.

the correct rule upon this subject Is stnted
as follows: "It a private structure or other
work on land Is the cause of a nuisance or
other tort to the plalntitr, the Ia w cannot regard It as permanent, no matter with what
Intention It was built; and da .n.1ges can
therefore be recovered only to the dnte or
the action." 1 Sedg. Dam. (8th Ed.) 'I 03.
It follows from the foregoing observations
that It was error to allow the plnlntilf to In-

I
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trodu<'e proof of damage to her property
caused by rain storms occurring after the
commencement of her suit, and that the Instruction asked by the defendant upon that
subject, as the same ls above set forth,
should have been given. The judgments ot
the appellate and circuit courts are reversed, and the cause Is remanded to the circuit
court.
Judgment reversed.
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ULINE v. NEW YORK CENT. & H. R. R.

CO.

(4 N. E. 536, 101 N. Y. 98.)

Court of Appeals of New York. Jan. 19, 1886.

Matthew Hale, for appellant. A. J. Park-

er, for respondent.

EARL, J. Colonie street runs at right

angles with and crosses Broadway, in the

city of Albany, and the defendant's railroad

crosses the two streets diagonally at the

place of their intersection, and had crossed

there for at least -10 years before the trial

of this action. The plaintiff owned three

houses and lots contiguous to each other, situ-

ate on the northerly side of Colonie street,

and easterly of Broadway and of the rail-

road. The lot numbers are 85, 83, and 81,

numbered in this order from Broadway. Lots

85 and 83 extend only to the northerly side

of Colonie street, while lot 81 extends to the
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center thereof. When the railroad was orig-

inally built, the two streets were somewhat

raised. About the year 1874, two additional

tracks were laid upon the defendant's road

where it crossed the two streets, one of which

was upon the easterly side thereof, and the

road-bed was raised at its intersection with

Broadway from two and a half to three feet.

It does not appear that either of the tracks,

or any part of the road-bed, was upon any

of plaintiff's land, or that she received any

damage whatever from them. But, to ac-

commodate the grade of Colonie street to the

grade of the railroad, it became necessary

to raise the street and sidewalks thereof, and

the consequence was that the street and

sidewalk in front of plaintiffs lots were ele-

vated about one foot, and all the damage

of which plaintiff complains was caused by

this elevation. She alleged in her complaint

that her lots extended to the center of the

street; that the defendant entered upon her

property (meaning her property in the street),

and tore up the pavement, raised the street,

sidewalks, and gutters, and so shaped the

street and gutters as to pour the water there-

from down over the sidewalk into the base-

ments of her houses, by means of which her

premises were made liable to be ﬂooded with

water, and had been ﬂooded with water, and

were rendered damp, unhealthy, and incon-

venient of access, and her property therein

had been injured, and the rental value and

the value thereof greatly depreciated.

\Iany exceptions were taken at the trial

on behalf of the defendant. which its coun-

sel argned before us. and relied upon for a

reversal of the judgment. -But I shall no-

tice those only which haw reference to the

rule of damages laid down by the trial judge.

Upon the trial it was claimed, on behalf of

the defendant, that the plaintiff could recover

only such damages as she had sustained up

to the commencement of the action. On the

contrary, her counsel claimed that she could

recover damages upon the theory that the

embankment placed in the street in front

of her lots was to be permanent, and that

thus it was a permanent injury to her lots,
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embankment placed In the atreet In front
of her lots was to be permanent, and that
thus It was a permanent Injury to her lots.
(4 N. E. 536, 101 N. Y. 98.)
and so the law was ruled by the trial judge.
Court or Appeals or New York. Jan. 19, 1886.
A witness for the plalntur was asked this
Matthew Hale, for appellant. A. J. Park- question: "W'hat, In your judgment, was
er, for rei;pondent.
the value of these lots 81, 83, and 85 Colonie
street before the grade was raised?" This
EARL, J. Colonie street runs at right was objected to by defendant's counsel as
angles with and crosses Broadway, in the Immaterial and Incompetent, and the objeccity of Albany, and the clefemlaut's railroad tion was overruled, and the witness answered
crosses the two sh'eets dlagoually at the that each lot was worth $3,000, and was
place of tileir intersection, aml had crossed worth less after the change. Then he was
tilere for at least 40 years before the trial asked this question: '"Ho,\· much would It
of this action. The plaintiff owned three be worth since the change In the street?"
houses and lots contiguous to each other, situ- This was objected to by defendant"s counsel
ate on the northerly side of Colonie street, on the grounds that It was lmmntt,rlal and
and easterly of Broadway and of the rail· incornpetent; that a change of market value
road. The lot numbers are s;:;, 83, and 81, between 18i.t aucl that time wns no evidence
numbered In this order from Broadway. Lots of damages In this action; that th!' question
8;'1 and 83 extend only to the northerly side assumes that the d:uuage was pet·rnanPnt;
of Colonie street, while lot 81 extends to the that the proper measure of damages was any
center thereof. When the railroad was orig- injury to the rental ,-alue of the vremises
inally built, the two streets were somewhat prior to the commeneement of the suit nnd
mis('(]. About the year 18H, two additional the cost of restoring the street to its former
tracks were Jaicl upon the defendant"s road condition; and that there was nothing in the
where It crossed the two streets, one of whkh · complaint or In the evidence which rendered
was upon the easterly side thereof, and the material any e\·idence as to the market value
road-bed was raised at Its Intersection with of the propet·ty either before or after the
Broadway from two and a half to three feet. alll.'ged wrongful act. The trial judge ruled
It does not appear that either of the tracks,
that he would allow the Illuintiff to pron!"
or ru1y part of the road-bed, was upon any how much the rental of the property had
of plaintllT"s land, or that she received any been Impaired down to the commencement
damage whate\'er from them. But, to ac· of the adlon, ancl the actual injuries which
1·0.mmodnte the grade of Colonie street to the the property had sustained by the flow of
grn<le of the railroad, It became necessary the water into, upon, and against lt by reu·
to raise the street and sidewalks thereof, and son of the change of the grade of the street
thP ("Onsequence wns that the strl'et and hy the defendant; and to this ruling plalnsidewalk in front or plaintifl"s lots were ele- tilI"s counsel excepted. Subsequently, upon
vated about one foot, and nil the damage further argument on the next day, the judge
of which plnlntllT complains was caused by reversed his ruling, and, among other things.
this elevation. She alleged In her complaint said: "Yesterday an Inquiry was made or
that her lots extended to the center of the I counsel as to tile act of the defendant In constreet; that the defendant entered upon her strn<"ting the additional tmeks, and In raising
p1·operty (meaning her property In the street), the hed of the road. I understood It to be
and tore up the pavement, raised the street, conceded that the act was a pure trespass;
sidewalks, and ·gutters, and so shaped the that the dumping of the ground In the strt>et
street and gutters as to pour the water there- was a trPsJJllss; and that the construction
from down over the sidewalk Into the base- of the trneks was a trespass, and the runments of her houses, by means of which her ning of the c.11·s was a tres1mss,-and I therepremises were made liable to be flooded with fore held that no court would be justified in
water, and had been fiootled with wat<'r, and assuming that an art of that charneter would
wer«.> rendered dump, unhealthy, and lncon- be permanent; therefore that the permanent
YC'IJh•nt of access, and her property therein depreciation In value of the property could
had hf'Pn inj11rC'1l, and the rental value and not be the basis of the damages, but only
tlw ,-nhtf' tlwreof gr«.>ntl)' <h'prerlated.
the depreciated rental during the time of the
::llnny exceptions w«.>re talwn at the trinl continuance of the trespa>1s up to the thul'
on lwhalf of the defemlnnt. whieh Its coun- of the beginning of the snit, and the actual
Sf'l nrgiwd licfore us. nml rC'ii(•cl upon fo1· a i11j11r,\· wltiroh the ftoodiug hncl clone to the
reYer,;al of the judgnwnt. .But I shall 110- proJ'el'l,1'. I think, If these farts be conC'edtier tlw~e onlr whlc)l have rl'ferenee to the e11. that the plaintiff can only rr>co\•er the
rnle of d:tmagl's laltl down by the trial j111lgc. rtntal whkh she Jrn1I lost, and the actual Inrpon tlte trial it wns clalmerl. on behalf of jury to the premb:>~ down to the time of tlte
the <lC'f{'ndant, that the plalntlft' could recover bringing of the suit." He then culled attt•uonlr i>neh damni.:es ns sue had "nstalned up tion to the complaint, aml snid that it did
to the commencPment of the aetion. On the not chnrge that the defendant's nets were ·
contrary, her counsel clnltue1l that she could Illegal, or thnt they were a pme trei1pass uprecover damages upon t!Je theory that the 011 the st1·eet, and that the pleadings show-

co.

97
l'RESE.\ T .\.\' ll P_lt()Sl'ECl‘I \'E DAM.“ lES.

97

street were not illegal or unlawful, and there-

ed that the acts were legally done by the

defendant under its charter; and, further:

"if that proposition be sound, how can the

court act upon an assumption that here was i

a mere trespass committed by the railroad 1

company upon a street which they had no .

right to do? My decision yesterday rested '

upon an assumption that, purely and simply, ,

here was a trespass committed upon the

street which the company had no right to 1

commit, and which, because a trespass. the '

court could not assume would be of a per-

manent character. I'pon that supposition.

and upon that theory, it was held that the

plaintiff could not recover as for a permanent ‘

injury to the property, but must be limited .

in her recovery to the damages which she

had sustained by a loss of rental up to the
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time of bringing the action, and to the actual

injury done to the property."

Plaintlffs counsel stated that “they had

never claimed this was a case of mere tres-

pass; that, as to two of the lots, they did

not own the soil in the street, and it could

not be a trespass." The trial judge then held

that, because the acts of the defendant in the .

fore not a trespass. they might be regarded

as of a permanent nature, and that the plain- i

tiff could therefore recover for the perma-

nent injury done to her property; and he i

overruled defendant's objection to the ques-

tion; and the witness answered that each

lot. immediately after the change, was worth

about $1,500. Similar questions put by plain-

tiffs counsel to other witnesses were object-

ed to by defendant's counsel. The objec-

tions were overruled, and the witnesses an-

swered in substantially the same manner.

Evidence offered by the defendant to show

how much it would cost to restore the street

to its former condition was, on the objection

of the plaintiff, excluded.

At the close of all the evidence defendant's

counrlel moved for a nonsuit upon the follow-

ing groimds: “(ii That no title has been prov-

ed in plaintiff in the property in question;

t2) there is no proof of any interference by

defendant with property in question; (3)

plaintiff has failed to make out a cause of

action; and upon the further ground there

is no proof of any unlawful or illegal inter-

ference by defendant with the property in

question." The trial judge said: “I agree

with you; there is no proof of any illegal in-

terference. That involves another very

grave question,-—I concede that;" and he de-

nied the motion, and defendant's counsel ex-

cepted. The judge charged the jury that the

plaintiff could recover, for the permanent in-

jury to her property, the diminished market

value thereof. He was requested by defend-

ant's counsel to charge as follows: “If the

jury believe that the act of the defendant in

raising the street was not unlawful, but was

by the permission of the city of Albany, then

the defendant is not, under the proof, liable

to plaintiff for any injury done to the plain-

ed 1h:1t the n<"ts werP legally done by the 1 tlft' hy reaso11 of such grade." The jud1w n•defendant under Its charter: Allll, further: plled: "I decline to charge that. I a!l111i1
··rr that proposition be sound. how can the that lm-oh'f'I> a very dltfkult pl'Oblem of
t'Ourt act upon an assumption that here was law." l li•frndnnt's counsel also 11sk1•d him
a nwrl' trespass committed by the rallroa1l to chnrgl': ''If the jury believe such ads
com111111y upon a street which they had no were done wlthont the 1wrmissio11 of the cit~'.
right to do? My decision yesterday rested and W<'re 1111l11wful, then thP U1P11sure of damupon an assumption that, purely and simply, ages would lJe the actual injury 1mstalned by
ht>rt' wns a trespass committed upon ihe plalutltr before the commf'llCl'lllPnt of this 1wi<t1·eet which the com111111y hail no right to tlon, Including the loss of rt>ut and the Injury
commit, and which, h€'<'at11<e a tr1•1<pa"'"· the to the use and enjoyment of the p1·ope1·ty beforl' the 1·0111wencement of the action, If
(~onrt could not ass11m1• woul!l he or n 1wr.\ml tlw judgi> said: "I decline to
manent character. r11011 that s11111m1<iti1111. an~·.
11ud upon that theory, It wa11 lwM thnt the cht11'.I:'" that. h••1·11 usP t ht>l'P ls no proof ont•
plalntltr could not reco\'er ns tor a pennnuent way or the otht'I' upon the 11uc"tion. \\'hPthinjury to the property, hut mnst he llwlted er there was an authorized or unn11thorilw1I
In her reco\"ery to the dawngPs which she act, there Is no presumption In favor of thl'
had sustained by a loss of rental up to the trespass."
Dt>femtant's counsel further nsk1:"d thl'
time of hrlnglog the action, and to the actual
judge to charge "that upon the e\'lrl1•1w1• !ht>
Injury don<' to th1~ property."
Plaintlft"s coun!!el stated that "they had jury will not be justified In rendering a V<'l'ne\"er claimed this was a <'&se of nwre trl's- dlct for the supposed dlft'erence In markt>t
pas111; that, as to two ot the lots, they dill 1 \"Rine In the preml1>es before and aftt'I' tl11• aet
not own the soil In the i:trPet, and It could in question," antl he refused so to chnrgt>;
not be a trespass." 'l'h1• trhtl jmll-(t' then h1•l1l and to nil the refusals defPntlant's <"Ol11114t'I
that, because the nets of thP tlt•fputlant lo till' PXcepted. The judge then said: "1"or thP
. street were not lllPgal or unluwful, and there- puri>ose of p1·esentlng that queRtlon Rhnr)Jly,
fore not a trespass. they might be r<'1:11r1lP1l J n1•glt·1·1t•rl to 1'1111rg1', us I shall 110 II<I\\'. t1111t
as of a permanent nature, and that tht> plain- 1 the plnJntllT cnn rl'1·o'l"e1· the dlft't•r1•n1·p h1 th•·
!Uf could tben'fOre rel'OVer for the IWl'lllll- rental \'&lue of tilt' proprrty, provided you
nent Injury done to her property; and he find thnt the act of tlw 1h•fl't1tlnnt has imoverruled defendant's objection to the IJUt!K- paired the market vahit', amt to the extent It
tlon; and the witness answered that each has lmpalrt>!l it;" and to this defendant's
lot. Immediately after the change, was worth coumiel also excl'pted.
ahout $1,500. Similar questions put by plalnAt the gPneral term tlw rule of daµiagt•11
rilf's <·01meel to other wltne!!lleS W€'re ohjecf- laltl dowu hy the trio! judge wns approved,
l'd to by defendant's counsel. The ohjec- for the reason111 glvt•u by him, to-wit: That
tlons were overruled, and the witr11>sse11 an- the raising of the street was not 111egal or
swered ill substantially the sume manner. unlawful, and was apparently peNilanent.
E\"lden<.-e otre1·ed by the defendant to show Judge Boardman, wrltlng an opinion in
how much It wouhl <·ost to restore the street which Judge RO<'kPs concurred, a.mong othto Its tormPr condition was, on the ohjertlon er tblnJ.."ll, said: "The right of the defPndant
of tht> plaintiff, excluded.
to occupy the street must be presumed from
At thP dose of all the evidence defendant's the length of time It has used It." "We can<~llln."l'I mo\"ed for a nonsuit upon the follownot l!ftY that plalntllT had any title to the
ing J:roimd11: "'11 That no title has been prov- street, or thnt the occupation of the street b~
ed in plalntift' In the pro1ll'rty In question; the deft>ndant was unlawful." Judge Learn121 thf'rt• Is no proof of any Interference by ed concuned In the result, apparently with
tlt>ft•ntlaut with property In qut>stlon; (:l) some hesitation. He said that, ln regard to
plnlntlft' has falle1l to make out n cause of the question of damages, he thought the mataction; and upon the further ground there ter did not depend altogether "on the permnis no proof of any unlawful or lllPgal lnter- neuey of the struf'tnre"; that If A. trespossPK
ff'n>nce by dt•ft>n<lant with tht> propN·ty lu on the land or B., and erects a stn1ct111·1>,
qu('Stlon." The trial judJ!:P said: "I agree howevPr ~rm:rnent, he euppased that In at·with you; there Is no proof of any lllegal In- tlon for trespass damages could be recoverl'1l
terference. '.rbat lnvol\"es another very only fc-r Injuries up to the time of the corngra\"e question,-! concede that;" and he de- mem·ement of the action; and that, If tlw
nl<•<l the motion, and defemlant's counsel ex- trespass were continued, another action eoulll
CPpted. The jQdge charged the jury that the be brought. But he seemed to be of opinion
plaintiff could recovpr, rnr the pe1·waoent In- that, as the railroad company ·could legally
jury to her prope1·ty, tlw diminished market acquire property needed for Its track, and a
'l"alue thereof. He was rt>11uested by defend- right to construct its road upon a street.
aut'a counsel to ch11rg1• as follows: "If the when they have taken possession, and have
Jury belleYe that the act of the defendant In In fact used a street In a mnnner Indicating
raising the street was not unlawful, but was a permanent use, It la not unreasonahle tllat
hy the permlMlon of the city of Alban~-. then lJl an action against them dnruag1•,; should
the defendant Is not, under the proof. llahle be recovered for the whole Injury.
I ha\"e thus carefully and fully stated tlwseto plnlntltr for any Injury done to the plalnLA W HA:U.2d Ed.-7
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facts to show the precise theory upon which

the damages were recovered at the trial term,

and the judgment was aiiirmed at the gen-

eral team; and that the theory is fundamen-

tally and ra(ii(.'ally erroneous, I can have no

doubt. Railroads are authorized to be built

by law; but, before a proposed railroad can

be lawfully built, its builders must obtain the

right of way. They cannot take private prop-

erty for that purpose without ﬁrst making

compensation therefor, and if they do they

become trespassers. If the railroad be built

upon or over a highway, the public right or

license must be obtained not only, but, so far

as individuals own private rights or interests

in the highway, or the soil thereof, they must

also be lawfully acquired; and it is equally

true, whether the railroad be built upon a

highway, or be built elsewhere without ac-

quiring the private right or property, that
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the builders are liable for all the damages

suffered by the owners of such rights and

property. As to them and their rights, the

railroad is un1awful,—a continuing nuisance

which they can cause to be abated;—and so

it has been settled by repeated decisions.

Williams v. Railroad Co., 16 N. Y. 97; Ma-

hon v. Railroad Co., 24 N. Y. 658; Plate v.

Railroad Co., 37 N. Y. 472; Henderson v.

Railroad Co., 78 N. Y. 423; Story v. Railroad

Co., 90 N. Y. 122; Mahady v. Railroad Co.,

91 N. Y. 148. But wherever a railroad is

lawfully built, with proper care and skill,

there it is not a nuisance. What the law

sanctions and authorizes is not a nuisance,

although it may cause damages to individual

rights and private property. If a railroad

be built upon a highway after acquiring the

public right,

any, in the street, or the soil thereof, then

the owners thereof are not responsible for

any damages necessarily resulting from the

construction or operation of the railroad to

private property adjacent or near to the road;

and, so, too, the law has been settled in this

state by many decisions. Radeiiffs Ex'rs v.

Mayor, etc'.,4 N. Y. 195; Davis v. Mayor, etc.,

14 N. Y. 506; Bellinger v. Railroad Co., 23

N. Y. 42; Kellinger v. Railroad Co., 50 N. Y.

206. The case of Fletcher v. Railroad Co.,

25 Wend. 462, so far as it holds a contrary

doctrine, has been overruled by the cases

just cited.

Here there was no complaint that the work

done by the defendant in the street was not

done with sufﬁcient care and skill, and it was

assumed at the trial that it was legally and

lawfully done, and that the defendant was

not a trespasser in the street. That assump-

tion implies that the defendant had the pub-

lic license to do what it did not only, but

also that it invaded no property rights of the

plaintiff in the street. The assumption was

warranted by the facts. This railroad com-

pany in a populous city had been there a

large number of years, and it cannot be as-

sumed that it was there without right, and

there is no allegation in the complaint that it

and the private property, it‘ ~
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facts to show the precise theory upon which was. There was no proof that the rallroalf
tlle damages were recovered at the trial term, embankment was made any wider on tht>
nnd the judgment was affirmed at the gen- easterly side, towards the plalntilf"s lots, and
eral tenm; and that the theory Is fundamen- hence It may be assumed that the additional
tally and rndlcally erroneous, I can have no track was laid upQD Its embankment and undoulit. Railroads are authorized to be built der rights early acquired and long possessed
by law; but, before a proposed railroad can by It at that place. As before stated, there
he lawfully built, Its builders must obtain the Is no proof that elt!ler the railroad tracks,
right of way. They cannot take private prop- or any part of the railroad embankment, was
erty for that purpose without first making pla<"ell upon the soil of the plalntltf In the
<-ompensatlon therefor, and If they do they Htrt>et, and In fact neither was. Even If the
b\'come trespassers. It the railroad be buUt plnlutltr's lots were bounded southerly by
u11on or over a highway, the public right or the center of Colonie street, all the defendlkense must be obtalnl'd not only, but, so far ant did was to raise the street and sidewalk
us individuals own private rights or lntere11b; In front of her lots so as to conform the grade
in the highway, or the soil thereof, they must of the street to the grade of the railroad and
also be lawfully acquired; and it is equally of Broadway, over which It passed. This,'
true, whether the railroad be built upon a we ru ust assume, It had from the city the
highway, or be built elsewhere without ac- right to do, and so much It was bound by law
quiring the private right or property, that to do under the general railroad act (Laws ,
the builders are liable for all the damages 1850, c. 140, § 28, subd. 5), by which It was
suffered by the owners of such rights and bound to restore the street to "such state as
property. As to them and their rights, the not unnecessarily to have Impaired Its userailroad Is unlawful,-a continuing nuisance fulness." Here there was no allegation nor
which they can cause to be abated,~and so proof that the street, as a street for travel,
It bas been settled by repeated decisions. was In any way Injured, and much less that
Williams v. Railroad Co., 16 N. Y. 97; Ma- Its usefulness was unnecessarily Impaired. !
hon v. Railroad Co., 24 N. Y. 658; Plate v. It was not, In front of plnlntltr's premises, by \
Railroad Co., 37 N. Y. 472; Henderson v. the act of the defendant, devoted to anything
Railroad Co., 78 N. Y. 423; Story v. Railroad but street purposes; and, as the city could
Co., 00 N. Y. 122; Mnhady '" Railroad Co., have raised the grade of the street without
91 N. Y. 148. But wherever a rallroad Is liability to abutting owners, so it could au- 1
lawfully built, with proper care and skill, thorlze the defendant to do so without such
there It Is not a nuisance. What the law liability.
We have a case, then, where the defendant
sanctions and authorizes Is not a nuisance,
although It may cause damages to lndh·ldual did acts In the street entirely lawful, and
rights and private property. It a railroad where It was held liable for the consequenbe built upon a highway after acquiring the tial damages to the plalntltf's adjacent proppublic right, and the private property, It erty caused by the careful use of Its lawful
any, In the street, or the soil thereof, then authority and the proper exercise of Its legal
the owners thereof are not responsible for rights. To uphold this recovery upon such
any damages necessarily resulting tram the a theory would subvert a very important
construction or operation of the railroad to rule of law about which there has been no
private property adjacent or near to the road; substantial question In this state for at least
and, so, too, the law has been settled In this 30 years. The rule was recognized by nil
state by many decisions. Radclltf's Ex'rs v. the judges who wrote opinions In Story v.
Mayor, etc:,4 N. Y. 195; Davis v. Mayor, etc., Hnllroad Co., and by the judge who wrote In
14 N. Y. 506; Bellinger v. Railroad Co., 23 Mahady v. Railroad Co., the latest cases In
N. Y. 4!?; Kelllnger v. Railroad Co., 50 N. Y. which the rule has been under consideration
The case of Fletcher v. Rnllroad Co., ht't-e. Even If the assumption that the act11
206.
25 Wend. 462, so far as It holds a contt·a1-y done by the defendant In Colonie street were
doctrine, has been overrnle<l by the cases I lawful was not warranted by the facts, yet,
I as the lawfulness of the nets was assumed
just cited.
Here there was no complaint that the work by the court, and substantially conceded by
tlone by the defendant In the street wus not plnintltr's counsel at the trial, the assumption
done with sufficient care and skill, and It wns sh9uld preyail here, because but for it the
assumP1l at the trial that It was legally and dl:fendant might have proved that Its acts
were lawful.
Iaw!ull~· done, and that the defendant was
But the learned counsel fQr the plalntltr.
not a trespasser In the street. That assumption Implies that the defendant had the pub- as we understand his brief, does not attempt
lic license to do what It did not only, but to sustain this judgment upon the theory
also that It Invaded no property rights of the adopted by the trial judge. He claims that
plnlutllT in the street. The assumption was the Interference by the defendant with the
wnr1·1rnt1•d by the facts. This railroad com- street was unlawful and a nuisance, and
pnny In n populous city had been there a that, therefore, the plalntltf was entitled to
Inrice nnmhf'l" of years, and it cannot be as- recover damages enm1ed thereby; and If he
s11rul'1l thn t it wns there without right, and Is right In his contmtion that this embankth1•re is no allegation In the complaint that It ment pla<'e<l in the street by the defendant
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was unlawful, and therefore a nuisance, then

the plaintiff was entitled to recover damages.

The question, however. still remains. what

damages? All her damages, upon the as-

sumption that the nuisance was to be perma-

nent? or only such damages as she sustained

up to the commencement of the action? We

have here for consideration an important

principle of law which has to be frequently

applied. and which ought to be well known

and thoroughly settled. There never has been

in this state, before this case, the least doubt '

expressed in any judicial decision, so far as

I can discover, that the plaintiff in such a

case is entitled to recover damages only up to

the commencement of the action. That such

is the rule is as well settled here as any rule

of law can be, by repeated and uniform de-

cisions of all the courts; and it is the pre-

vailing doctrine elsewhere. In Hambietou v.

Generated for facpubupdates (University of Michigan) on 2014-06-12 19:21 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/mdp.35112105421491
Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd-google

Veere, 2 Saund. 170, the learned annotator in

his note says: “So, in trespass and in tort,

new actions may be brought as often as new

injuries and wrongs are repeated, and there-

fore damages shall be assessed only up to

the time of the wrong complained of."

In Iioseweil v. Prior, 2 Salk. 460, the plain-

tiff being seized of an ancient house and

lights, defendant erected a building whereby

plaintiffs lights were estopped. There was a

former recovery for the erection, and the sec-

ond action was for the continuance of the '

erection; and it was held that the former

recovery was not a bar. In Bowyer v. Cook,

4 Man. G. & S. 236. there had been an action

of trespass for placing stumps and stakes on

plaintiffs land. and the defendant paid into

court in that action 40 shillings, which the

plaintiff took in satisfaction of that trespass.

The plaintiff afterwards gave the defendant

notice that unless he removed the stamps and

stakes a further action would be brought

against him; and in the second action it was

held that the leaving the stumps and stakes

on the land was a new trespass, and that the

plaintiIf was entitled to recover. In Holmes

v. Wilson, 10 Adol. & E. 503, the action was

trespass against a turnpike company for con-

tinuing buttresses on plaintiff's land to sup-

port its road. Plaintiff had recovered com-

pensation for the erection of the buttresses

in a former action, and the money had been

paid into court, and received by him; and it

was held that after notice to defendant to re-

move the buttresses, and a refusal to do so,

plaintiff might bring another action for tres-

pass against the company for keeping and

continuing the buttresses on the land, and that

the former recovery was not a bar to such

an action. In that case it was argued for

the defendant that (he damages given in the

ﬁrst action were to be regarded as a full com-

pensation for all injuries occasioned by the

buttresses, and were to be considered as the

full estimated value of the land permanently

occupied by the buttresses; that the damages

were in respect of prospective as well as past

injury, and that the judgment operated as a

purchase of the land. Patterson, J., said,

was unlawful, and therefore a nuisance, then
the plaintiff wae entitled to recover damages.
The question, however, still remains, what
damages? All her damagt>s, upon the assumption that the nulsan<'t.' was to be permanent? or only such damages as she sustained
np to the commencement of the action? We
have here for consideration an Important
principle of law which has to be frt>quently
applied. and which ought to be well known
and thoroughly settled. There never baa been
In this state, before this case, the least doubt
expressed In any Judicial decision, so far as
I can discover, that the plalntlfr In such a
case la entitled to recover damages only up to
the commencement of the action. That such
1a the rule ls as well settled here as any rule
of law can be, by repeated and uniform declaiona of all the courts; and It Is the prevailing doctrine elsewhl're. In Hamllh•tou v.
Veere, 2 Saund. 170, the learned annotator In
bla note says: "So, In trespass and In tort,
new actions may be brought as often as new
Injuries and wrongs are repeated, and therefore damages shall be aesessed only u11 to
the time of the wrong complained of."
In Roeewell v. Prior, 2 Salk. 460, the plain·
tlfr being seized of an ancient houlle and
Ugbts, defendant erected a building whereby
plalntltra lights were estopped. There wa11 a
former recovery for the erection, and the IM'Cond action was for the continuance of the
erection; and It wae held that the tormt!r
recovery was not a bar. In Bowyer v. Cook,
4 Man. G. & 8. 236, there had been an action
ot trespass for placing stumps and stakes on
plalntltrs land, and the defendant paid Into
rourt In that action 40 shllllngs, which the
plalntHr took In Mtlsfactlon of that trespass.
The plalntlfr afterwards gave the defendant
notice that unless he removed the stumps and
stakes a further action would be brought
against him; and In the eecond action It was
held that the leaving the stumps and stakes
on the land Wal! a new trespaBB, and that the
plaint.Ur was entitled to recover. In Holmes
v. Wllson, 10 Adol. & E. 50.'I, the action was
trespass against a turnpike company for continuing bnttr~sses on plalntlff's land to support Its road. Plalntltr had recovered compensation for the ert>c·tlon of the butt1·t•ssee
In a former action, am\ the money had lwen
paid Into court, and received by him; aud It
was held that after notk"f' to defendant to remove the buttre1u1e11, and a rt•fmml to <lo so,
plalntlft' might bring another action for trespaBS Rgalnst the compnny for kPeplng nncl
continuing the butt1·1·ii111•s on the IRrul, Rtul that
the former recovery was not 11 bar to 8ttch
an action. In that case It was nrguecl tor
the defendant that Lhe damages given In the
first action were to be regarded as a full compensation for all Injuries occasioned by the
bnttreSBes, and were to be considered RB the
full estimated value of the land permant>ntly
occupied by the buttresses; that the damRgt>s
were ln respect of prospeetive as well as pust
Injury, and that the jl1!lgment operated a» a

purchase of the land. Patterson, J., said,
In reply to the argument: "How can you convert a recovery and payment of damages for
the trespass Into a purchase? A recovery of
damages for a nwsance to land
not prevent another action for continuing it." And
It was argued by learned counsel for the
plalntlft', In reply to the argument that the
former judgment operated as a purchase of
the land: "As to the supposed etrect of the
judgment In changing the property of the
laud, the consequence of that doctrine would
be that a person who wants hla neighbor's
land might always buy It against bis will,
paying only such purchase money as a jury
might asseBS for damages up to the time of
the action. U the property was changed,
when did It pass? Suppose the plalntlft' had
brought eJectment for the part occupied by
defendant's buttresses, would the recovery of
damages In trespass be a defense? There Is
no case to show that when land Is vested In
a party and fresh lnJurles are done upon It,
fresh actions will not lie."- Bee, also, '.rhompson v. Gibson, 7 Mees. & W. 456; MltchPll
v. Colliery Co., 14 Q. B. Div. 125; Whitehouse
v. J.'l•llows, 10 C. B. (N. 8.) 765.
I find no case In England now regarded as
authority ln conn.let with these cases. The
case of Beckett v. Railroad Co., L. R. 3 C. P.
81, does not lay down"a dltrerent rule. That
cu11e arOBe under the railroad clauseJJ oonsolldatlon act and the land clauses c1>nsolldatlon
act, which require full compensation to be
made by railroad companies, not only for
lands taken, but also for damages to land Injuriously affected. Under those act.a the
plalntlfr recovered, not only the value of his
lands taken, but for permanent Injury to his
other lands. The case of Lamb v. Walker, 3
Q. B. Div. 389, was overruled In Mitchell v.
Colliery Co., supra, and Is no longer authority
In England.
·
The same rule of damages which I run trying to enforce prevails generally, and with
very rare exceptions, In the other states of
this Union. In Esty v. Baker, 48· lie. 495,
Appleton, J., said: "1.'he mere <.'Ontlnuance
of a building upon anothel"s land, even iltter
the recovery of damages tor Its erection, la
11 trespass tor which an action wlll lie."
In·
RusRPll v. Brown, Ga Me. 203. the action wu!I
trespass quare clausum, tor eontlnulug upon
the plaintlft''s land the wull of a building
9 Inches wide, and 106 feet long. The defendant pleaded In bar a former judgment recovered for building the wall, and satisfaction,
und It was held that the were continuance
of a structure tortlously ere<•tetl upon another's land, even after recoYery and sat111factlon of a judgment for Its wrongful erection, Is a trespass for which another action of
trespass quare clausum wlll lie, and that a
recovery with satisfaction for ereetlug a structure does not operate as a purchase of the
right to continue such erection. In Canal
Corp. v. Hitchings, 60 Me. 140, the action
was trespasa tor tilling about 200 yards of

will
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canal, and the justice instructed the jury,

inter alia: “Whatever diminution there is in

the value of the property by reason of the

trespass is an element of damage.“ The de-

fendant excepted to this instruction, and it

was held erroneous; that the recovery should

have been limited to such damages as were

sustained down to the commencement of the

action. Wilton, J., writing the opinion, said:

"It is now perfectly well settled that one

who creates a nuisance upon another's land

is under a legal obligation to remove it, and

successive actions may be maintained until

he is compelled to do so." “The doctrine of

all the cases i that a recovery of damages

for the erection of a building or other struc-

ture upon another's land does not operate as

a purchase of the right to have it remain

there; and that successive actions may be
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brought for its continuance until the wrong-

doer is compelled to remove it." "As a nec-

essary result of this doctrine, it has been

held, and we think correctly, that in the ﬁrst

action brought for such a trespass the plain-

tiff can recover such damages only as he had

sustained at the time when the suit was com- ‘

menced, because, for any damage afterwards

sustained, a new action may be maintained;

and the law will not allow two recoveries for

the same injury." “The injury complained of

was the iilling up of the canal. The defend-

ant, acting under authority from the city of

Portland, had extended Commercial street

over and across the canal, by means of a

solid embankment. No opening was left for

the passage of either boats or water. As-

suming that this embankment was unlawfully

placed there; that the canal should have been

bridged, not ﬁlled up,—and we have a nul-

sance upon the plaintiffs land,—something

placed there which can, and in contemplation

of law ought to be, removed,. For such an

injury successive actions may be maintained

until a removal is compelled. The damages

must therefore be limited to such as the plain-

tiff has sustained at the date of the writ.

The rule given to the jury/—namely, that the

measure of damages was the diminution of

the value of the property,—was inappropriate,

,and must have led to an erroneous result."

In Bare v. Hoffman, 79 Pa. St. 71, the plain-

tiff had a dam from which he conducted

may. be brought as long as the obstruction is

maintained. A recovery in the ﬁrst action es-

tablishes the plaintiff's right. Subsequent ac-

tions are to recover damages for a continu-

ance of the obstruction."

In Thompson v. Canal Co., 17 N. J. Law,

480, it was held that the title to lands does

not pass, by a verdict for the plaintiff, in

an action of trespass; that it remains in the

plaintiff, and therefore a verdict for dama-

ges to the full value of the land is manifest-

ly wrong. In Thayer v. Brooks, 17 Ohio.

489, the action was case for nuisance in di-

verting water from the mill of the plaintiff.

The injury complained of in the declaration

was that the mill was rendered less useful

PRE~E:\''l'
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<·nnal, and the justice lnst!'ueted the jury,
inter alia: "Whatever diminution there ls In
the '\"Ulue of the property by r1•11R<Jn of the
trespass Is an element of 1t:11nngP." The defendant excepted to this lnstrn('tion, and It
was held erroneous; that the recovery should
have been limited to such damages as were
sustained down to the commencement of the
action. Wilton, J., writing the opinion, said:
"It ls now perfectly well settled that one
who creates o. nuisance upon another's land
Is under a legal obligation to remove lt, and
successive actions may be maintained until
lw Is compelled to do so.'' "The do<'trlne of
all the cases Is that a !'ecovery of damages
for the erection of a. building or other structure upon another's land does not operate as
a purchase of the right to hnve It remain
there; and that successive actions may be
llrouiht for Its continuance until the wrongdoer Is compelled to remove It." "As a necPssary result of this doctrine, It has been
held. ancl we think corredly, that In the first
n<'tion brought for such a trespass the plaintiff can recover such damages only as he had
i<ustalned at the time when the suit was commenced, because, for any damage afterwards
sustained, a new action may be maintained;
and the law will not allow two recoveries for
tht> same lnjm·y." "The Injury complained of
was the tllllng up of the canal. The defendu nt, acting umter authority from the city of
l'orth11ul, had extended .Corrnne1·clal street
over nnd across the canal, by means of a
i;olld embankment. No op1>nlng was left for
1 the pasRagf.' of either boats or water. AsR111nlng that this emhnnkmt•nt was unlawfully
placed therf.'; that the canal should have bePn
b1·ldged, not tlllecl up,-and we llave a nuisance upon the plnlntlfl's Iand,-somethlng
pluce1l lllPrP whleb can, and In contemplation
of law oni::-ht to be, removed. For such an
Injury sm·<·e~ooln~ actions mn~; be mnlntnlrn~d
until a rPmovnl Is compelled. 'l'ht• <htlllllJ!PS
must thert>fort' he limltetl to such as the pin Intl tr has su>!tnlued at the date of the writ.
The rule given to the jury,-namely, that the
measure of damages was the diminution of
the value of the property,-wae inap11roprl11t1',
.and roust have led to an erroneous result.''
In Bm·e v. Jloft'nurn, 70 Pa. Rt. 71, the plnint11T had a. dam from which he rondul'tt>d
wnte1· to his tannPry, uml the defendant n111tll'
IL clam lwlow, Into which the surplus w:i h•r
m'<'l' plalntltl''s dam flowed, and from his d1un
t11t• <ll'femlnnt. hy a pill!', corulucted the wntPr
to his tannery, hy whieh the plnlntlft' lost tlw
use of the wntt•r required to carry th1• o!Tnt
from his tannery, und It was held thnt t>Yldenee of permanent Injury to the markt•t
value of plaintifl's tamwry was lnadmll'!s!hh•:
that the Injury was not of sueh a chnrneh•r
as to nssumP that it would be permauPnt. nml
to aMset1s damages accordingly; aml that , ns
a general l'Ule, succe1<11h·r actions may be
brought so long as thP ohstr1wt Ion Is eontlnued. Mel'cur, J., writing tlw opinion. snh'I:
""The general rule Is that l!lll't'l'l!Slve actiums
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may. be brought as long as the obstruction ls
maintained. .\. l'e('Overy In the tlrst action establishes the plnlntitT's l'lght. Subsequent actions are to r<'eover damages for a continuance of the obstru('tion."
In Thompson v. Canal Co., 17 N. J. Law,
480, it was held that the title to lands does
not pass, by u. verdict for the plalntlll', In
an action of trespass; that It remains In the
plu.lntlfl', and therefore a "Verdict for damages to the full rnlue of the Jund ls manifestly wrong. In Thayer Y. Bl'Ooks, 17 Ohio.
489, the nl'tlou was e:ise for nuisance In diverting wn ter from the m!ll of the plain till'.
The Injury complained of In the declaration
was tliat the mill was rendel'ed less useful
by reason of a diversion of a. portion of the
water from the stream by menus of a ce.nal
cut by defendant. The court Instructed the
jury that the o'vner of the mill was entitled
to reeon•r such damagps as the jury belle\•ed
he had sustnlned by the mlll-slte having been
diminished In value In conse<JUPUce of the diversion of the wuter. Blr1'1111rd, C. J., writing the 011lnlon, snid: '"'!'his wu.s going too
far. Su)lpoi<e the party liable at all, he
wns only liable, mulei· nny form of declaration. for the dnm:tgc>s ud1111 lly sustalnl'll
prior to the commt'llC'Plllent of the suit."'
In Ra.!ll'Oad Co. v. K<>rnodl<>, 54 Ind. a14, It
was held that where a railroad compan~·
In the construction or Its road-bed, v1ltho11t
taking the steps presc1·lhed by In w to condemn Its right of way, unln wfully entt>r!<
upon and takes possession of laud, 1uul suit
Is brought by the ownPr thereof to recovl'r
damnl('t'R for s1wh tr<>spaRs, the dnmagPs al'lseRse1l Rhouhl lnl'ln<lt' co111pe111o111t1on for tlw
lnjur~· luflh·ted, un1l such punitive damagps
as Ill'<' :mthori:wd by lnw, hut not the valm•
of the land Ru usPd or ap11ro11rlated; th:it
In sut•h an nctiou 110 jmlgnwut that the court
trying s1wh cause ls author!zf'cl to rendet'.
will glvP till' rnllrond co1111111n~· a title to
the land uppropr!nte1l. In Jfan•iugton ,..
Railroad Co., l 7 Minn. :!lii lGll. 188), \1'hPrc•
the defendant had hullt Its rond in the str1•t>t
adjoining plnlntlft''s l1tnd, It w:ts h<'lll thnt
It was a continuing 11ulK1111ce for whlt·h SU<'<'l'!'sin• actions could be brought; amt 1m
N1nlt11hle action for an lnjunctlou wns sustnllt<>d for the reaRon that It would obvlnt<'
the neeesslty of 11 mnltlplldty of suits. Jn
,\1l11111s Y. Hnllroml l'o.. t~ ~Jinn 2r.o <Gil.
:!:{H). tlw plnintltT Wll>! the owuPr and In
11ossc·s1don of n Int sltuntt><I on the sldP of"
th1• street, whidt also Pxtentlf'd to tlw centl'l·
of Ute street, suhjeet out~· to n public t>mwnwut to use the same for !ltl'P<>t 1m11>o111.•s.
The clefen<lant, n. railroad co111p1111y. without
first aequlring the i·lght so to do, <'Onstrm·tl>tl
its rond along the stref't In front of plnlutitl'"s premlsPs; nncl It wns lwld that tlu·
dt>f<>n<lnnt, In thm1 n1111roprl11tlnl( th<> stn•1•t
to !ts own use. was a. tr<>spns><PI', nud that
Its aet11 t'onstit.11tt>1l a prln1t,. nul11auce ll"11g11htl'lt tlw plalntllf. entltliui: him to maintain 1111 action tlll'refo1·, ullll lllat the dam··
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ages would be for the unlawful withholding

of the possession of the premises up to the

commencement of the action. Ripley, C.

J.. writing the opinion. said: "As there is

no presumption of law that such illegal

running of trains and other trespasses will

be continued in the future,—timt the unlaw-

ful act of to-day will be repeated on the

morrow,—it is, of course, obvious that while

the jury, in the present case, could asse:-is

past damages, they could not assess_the

permanent damages to accrue from an as-

sumed continued use thereafter of the land

by the defendant in the same way."

In Ford v. Railroad_Co., 14 Wis. 663, the

owner of lots abutting on a street in a city

brought an action against a railroad com-

pany to recover damages caused by the

construction of its road-bed through the
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street in front of his lots, and for an in-

junction restraining the defendant from lay-

ing down its rails in front of his proper-

ty. Dixon, L‘. J., in writing the opinion,

said: “It seems that the past damages, or

those occasioned by the trespass, might have

been assessed by the court, or the judge

might have ordered a jury for that purpose; .

but the permanent damages. or those which

would accrue to the plaintiff by the contin-

ued use of the land by the company, can

only be ascertained in the manner prescribed

by the statute."

in Carl v. Railroad Co., 46 Wis. 6|5, 1 N.

W. 295, the complaint alleged that plaintif

f

owned in 1869, and continued to own until

1873, a city lot, with a dwelling-house there-

on; that in 1869 defendant constructed its

road, with embankment and ditches, along

and on each side of the center of the street,

in front of the lot, and maintained the same

to the commencement of the action, and

thereby obstructed access to the house and

lot. and diminished their value; that by rea-

son of the premises plaintiff, before the

commencement of the action, was compelled

to sell and did sell his property for a sum

less by $1,000 than could otherwise have

been procured for it, and that defendant

had refused on demand to make compensa-

tion for the injuries so sustained, and had

taken no steps under its charter to have the

damages ascertained, and judgment was

asked for the sum of $1,000; and it was

held that the action must be treated as one

for damages for a continuing trespass, and

that the complaint stated facts sutiicient to

sustain such an action; that the plaintiff

in such an,action, however, can recover noth-

ing more than the damages to the property

resulting from the trespass between the

building of the road and the commencement

of the action; that such a recovery. would

be no bar to a future recovery by plaintiff

or his grantee for subsequent damages to

the property by a continued maintenance of

the road; and that evidence of the per-

manent depreciation in the value of the
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lll(l'M wuulll be for thl' unlawrul wltbholdlug · slhle. The Judge writing the opinion said:
of the poMl'llBlon of th<> pl't'IUIMPM up to the "The reco\·ery Jn the present action will ht>
<'OWWt>nN:'w1•11t of tht> action. Hlpley, C. a bar only as to dn11111g1•s sustained prevlou11
J.. writing tle oplnlos. snit!: ...\11 the1·e 111 to the commt>net'lllent of the same, and the
no i>n>sumptlon of law that >11wh Illegal &>lnlntltr or her. grantPes can recover In
running of trains and other t1·p1111a1-1iw11 will another action for any Injury caused to the
lot by the malntt-nance of such railroad subhe continued In the future,-thut the unlaw·
ful act of to-day will be rt>1wated on the sequent to the rommencement of this acworrow,-lt Is, of course, obYlous that while tion."
the jury, in the present case, could as11e>1M
In Blesch v. Hallroad Co., 43 Wis. 183, It
11ust damages, they could not &Slless the was held that the rule of damages In such
111'rmanent damages to ac(·ruP from an· ns- ' 11 case as that, I.II the tUtrerence In value of
sumecl contlnued use thl'rt>nftPr of the h1ml the use of the lot, without the railroad track
by the defendant In thl' same way."
and with the railroad track, between the
In Ford v. Rallroa<lCo., H Wis. llU3, the date of building the same and the commenceol\·ner of lobs abutting on a strt>et In a city ment of the action. Justice Cole, In deliver·
11rougbt an action against a railroad com- Ing the opinion, said: ··The damages reJJany to reco,·er du111age11 1·111111t>d by the coverable In the action are, of course, for
construction of Its rontl·l~d through the the past Injury to the freehold and posse11street In front of his lots, n.nd for an in· alon; that la, the pecuniary losa which the
junction restraining tb1• dPfendant from lay- tre11pass had caused the plalntllf In the use
ing down Its rails In from of his proper- and enjoyment of his property when the
ty. Dixon, l'. J., In writing the opinion, suit was commenced." And, further: "One
Mid: ..It seems that the past damnges, or reason why a railroad company can be
those 0C<.'aslon1'<1 by the tr1•sp11ss, might have chargL"ll with the permanent damages for
heen aSNPl<Ml'fl by the court, or the Judge taking land fot· Its use only In a proceeding
might ha\'l' onfored a jury for that 1mrpose; under the 11t11tnte for nsse1·tJng the right of
hut the permanent damages. or those which 1 eminent domain, ls that, when such damn.vmuld ne1•rue to the plalntltr by the contin- ge11 an• puld. the company Is entitled to
ued use of the land by the company, can have a clear title to the property so taken,
only ht• a1wt>rtalned In the manner pre1wrlbed 1 and such title cannot be acquired In an acliy the statute."
tlon for a trespass or nuisance. Another
In Curl v. Railroad Co., 46 Wis. ti25, 1 N. 1 reason Is that, In the action to recover damW. 21.l:i, the complaint allPit•'<l that plaintiff ngl'!I for the nulsnncl', the 11h1lntllf mny
owned In 1800, and contlniwd to ()Wn until hn,·e judgml'nt to abate the u11lt11lm,1>, aud
187~, a city lot, with a dwelll11g-house thereIt would he clearly unju11t that the plalntllT
on; tllat In 1860 defendant <'onstruch'<i Its should recover damages for a eoutlmrnnt·e
rond, with embankment nnd dlkhes, along of the nulHanCl', and at the same tlmt• hun•
and on each side of the center of the strel•t, 1 judgml'!tt to abate and remo\·e the same."'
in front of the lot, and maintained the same Rt.-c., alHO, Canal Co. Y. Bourquin, 51 Ga. 3W.
to the commencement of the action, and
In harmony with thPse authorities are the
thereby obstructed acCPss to the house and views of approved text writers. 3 Bl.
lot. and diminished their value; that !Jy rea- Comm. 220; Sedg. Meas. Dam. 151'; Mayne,
son of the premises i>lalntllf, before the Dam. (1st Aw. Ed.) §§ 110, 111; 1 Suth.
commen<'ewent of the action, was compelll'd Dam. 100, 202, 369, 399. While the authorto sell and did sell his property for a sum ities In other states are not entirely harmoless by $1,000 than could otherwise ha ,·e nlou.i. those which I have cltl'd give the
been procured for It, and that defendant ge1wr11l drift of the decisions.
had refused on demand to make comp1•nS11But whatever dlfl'erence there may be
tion for the Injuries so sustained, and had In other states as to the rule of damages
taken no steps under Its charter to have the untler consideration, In this statl' there Is
damages 1tscertalned, and jndgment was none whatever. Here the authorltlt>s are
ai,oked for the sum of $1,000; uncl lt was Pntlrt>ly unlrorm, that In sut•h an action as
held that the action must be treated as one this damages can be recovered only up to
for damages for a continuing trespass, and the commencement of the action, and that
that the coru11lalnt statl'd facts sufHclPnt to tltl' remedy of the plaintiff Is hy successln•
sustain sm·b an action; that the plulntltr 11..tlons tor his damages until the irnlsanee
In such an.action, however, can recover noth· shall be abatrd. The law was so nnuounct>d
Ing more than the damages to the propt•rty ln Gt·een v. Itallroad Co., (l:J How. Prac. 154;
resulting from the trPspa::<s hetw1•1•n the Taylor Y. Railway Co., 50 ~- Y. 1-lupi>r. Ct.
building· of the road and the commencement 31:.l; Duryea v. Mayor, etc., :.!t> Hun, l:.!0,of the aC'tlon; that such a recovery would all C'ases entirely analogous to this. In Mcbe no har to a future rpcovery by plalutltr Keon ,., See, 4 Rob. 4-UI, It was hl•ld that the
or bis grantee for su!J11e11uent damages to only damnges which the plalntll'C Is entitled
the property by a continued mnlntennnce of to 1·1•cover In an nction against an mljoinlng
the roa1l; 111111 that evidence of tht• pPr· ow1wr for a nuisance upon the prt' llllses of
manent depreciation In the vnhw or the tht' ln ttt'l" n re those for a tkJH'Pl°iH tlou of
Jnml rl'f!ultlni;! from ~uch road wus l11111h11I,.;- tltl' 1·<'nt uml loss of tenants c1111t1Ptl by such

!
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nuisance previous to the commencement of

the action. In Whitmore v. Bischoff, 5 I‘Iun,

176, it was held that the damages which a

party can recover for a private nuisance

are those which he has sustained previous

to the bringing of the action, and that it is

error to allow a recovery for the diminution

in value of the premises based upon the as-

sumption that the nuisance is to continue

forever. In Duryea v. Mayor, etc., 26 Hun,

120, the action was brought to recover the

damages occasioned by the' wrongful act

of one who had discharged water and sew-

age ‘upon the land of another, and it was .

held that no recovery could be had for dam-

ages occasioned by discharge of water and

sewage upon the land after the commence-

ment of the action. In Blunt v. McCormick,

3 Denio, 283, the action was case for dam-
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ages in consequence of the erection of a

building adjoining plaintiff's, whereby plam-

tiﬂ:"s light was obstructed.

was defendant's tenant. The court at the

trial charged the jury that if the plaintiff ‘

was entitled to recover they should give dam-

ages for the injury which he would suffer

during the whole of his term. It was held

that this charge was erroneous, and that a

recovery could be had only for such dam-

ages as had occurred at the time the suit

was commenced, and not for the whole term. ‘

In Plate v. Railroad Co., 37 N. Y. 473, the

action was brought to recover damages

caused by keeping and maintaining the de-

fendant's railroad track, and ditches along

the side thereof, in such manner as to cause .

the water to ﬂow back upon the plaintift"s

land. There had been a former recovery

of damages for the same cause, which was

alleged as a bar to the second action; but

it was held not to be a bar. The judge

writing the opinion said: “If, indeed, he

could have recovered damages, not only for

all injuries which had occurred previous to

the commencement of the action, but also

for all injuries which may possibly there-

after occur, the ﬁrst recovery would be a

bar to the second."

In Williams v. Railroad Co., 16 N. Y. 97, and

Story v. Railroad Co., 6 N. Y. 85, a resort to

equity was allowed because the necessity of

bringing successive actions to recover dam-

ages would thus be obviated. If, in those

cases, the plaintiffs could have recovered all

their damages, past and prospective, in actions

at law, equitable actions would have been

unnecessary and unauthorized. The case of

.\Iahon v. Railroad Co., 24 N. Y. 658, is a pre-

cise authority; and, if there were no other,

ought to control the decision of this case. In

that case the railroad company constructed

its road and laid its tracks upon a highway

in front of Mahon's premises. His title to the

adjoining premises extended to the center of

the street, and in 1842 he commenced an ac-

tion against the railroad company to recover

damages in consequence of the construction

and operation of the railroad in the hign\vay

PRESENT AND PHOSPE(,"TIVE DAlIAGES.

nuisance previous to the commencement of ln front of his premises, and he recovered :r
the action. In "'hltmore v. Blschotr', l'i Hun, Judgment. Afterwards he died, and then his
176, it was held that the damages which a executo1·s Instituted an action to recover damparty can recover tor a pl'lvate nuisance ages sustained, during the lifetime of the tesare those whlcb he hns sustained previous tator, subsequently to the former recovery.
to the bringing ot the action, and that lt ls for a continuance ot the railroad and Its conerror to allow a recovNy tor the diminution , tinued operation In the street; nnd to the last
In value of the premises hast>cl upon the as- 1wtlon the defendant Interposed as a defen1o1..
1mmptlon that the nui11nncc Is to continue tlw former recon·ry, and It was held not to
forever. In Duryea v. Mayor, etc., 26 Hun, he a bar. As disclo!lf.'d by the printed pa120, the action was brought to recover the pers to be found In .the state library, the decdamages oceasloned by th~ · wrongful act Jarntlon In the first action contains four
ot one who had discharged water and sew- counts. In the first and fourth, among other
age upon the land ot another, and It wa.s things, It was alleged that the plaintltr' lawheld that no recovery could be had tor dam- fully owned and poseessetl a lot, and dwellnges occasioned by discharge ot water and ing-house thereon, aud that the defendant
sewage upon the land after the commence- caused to be wrongfully constructed an emment of the action. In Blunt v. McCormick, bankment of earth of the height of five feet
3 Denio, 283, the action was case for dam- In front of bis premises. and wron11:fully conages In consequence ot the erection of a tinued and maintained the same, and operbuilding adjoining plalntltr"s, whereby plaln- ated Its railroad thereon, by means whereof
tltr"e light was obstructed. The plalntltr' he could not have and enjoy his tree and unwa1!1 defendant's tenant. The court at the obstructe<l passage into and upon his lands
trial charged the Jury that lf the plalntltr' and to and from his dwelling-house, and his
was entitled to recover they should give dam- lot and dwelling-house were dooded with waages for the Injury which he would sutrer ter, and rendered damp, and his buildings
during the whole of his term. It was held nod property were greatly Injured and dethat this charge was erroneous, and that a preciated In value. It Is thus seen that the
recovery could be had only for such dam- character of the injuries complained of lo
ages as had occurred at the time tbe suit that action were like those complained of
, was commenced, and not for the whole term. here, and that a depre<:latlon In the value ot
In Plate v. Railroad Co., 37 N. Y. 473, the the property was claimed. If the complaint
action was brought to recover damages here Is broad enough to recover for permacaused by keeping and maintaining the de- nent diminution of the value of the property.
fendant's railroad track, and ditches along upon the theory that the nuisance ·was to be
the side thereof, In such manner as to cause permanent, so tbe declaration there was
tbe water to dow back upon the plalntltr''s broad enough to recover damages upon the
land. There had been a former recovery same theory; and if the facts of this case are
of damages for the same cause, which was suftlclent to justify and uphold a recovery
alleged as a bar to the second action; but for permanent Injury and diminution lo value
It was held not to be a bar. The judge of the property, so, clearly, were the facts of
writing the opinion said: "If, Indeed, be that case. In the argument before this court
could have recovered damages, not only for of the second case, which ls above cited. It
all Injuries which bad occurred previous to was claimed that the declaration In the fir;it
the commencement of the action, but also suit was broad enough to embrace the damfor all injuries which may possibly there- ages which Mahon's property sustained by
after occur, the first recovery would be a tile construction of the railroad, through all
bar to the second."
time, and that, whether It was or not, the reIn Williams v. Railroad Co., 16 N. Y. 97, and sult should be the same, as the damages re8tory v. Railroad Co., 6 N. Y. 81'i, a resort to sulting trom the construction of the railroad .
t'Qulty was allowed because the necessity of were Incapable of being split up and made the
bringing successive actions to recove1· dam- subject of an infinite number of actions; and
ages would thus be obviated. It, In those that the true rule In such a case was that
<'Uses, the plalntltr's could have recovered all the plaintiff was at liberty to prove, nod the
their damages, past and prospective, In actions jury were bound to consider, what damages
at law, equitable actions would have been might probably be the result ot the net comunnecessary and unauthorized. The case of plained of, and the finding Jn one case must
llahon v. Railroad Co., 24 N. Y. 658, ls a pre- embrace all the damages. On the other hand,
<'l!!e authority; and, If there were no other, it was clnlmi!d th!lt the plalntltr' lo that suit
ought to control the decision of this case. In could have recovered damages legally only
that case the railroad company constructed up to the commencement ot the suit. The
Its road and laid Its tracks upon a highway court at the trial of the second action held
In front of Mabon's premises. His title to the that the former recovery was n bar, and upon
adjoining premises extended to the center of that ground nonsulted the plaintiffs. They
the street, and In 184.2 he commenced an ac- then appealed to the general term, where the
tion against the railroad company to recover prevailing opinion for aftirmnnce waa written
damages In consequence of the construction by Judge Allen. He held that the former re:rnd operation of the railroad in the hlgnwny covery was a bar; uut st.ated In his opinion
1
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that “if the wrong complained of had been

a technical nuisance, in the legal sense of the

term, a recovery for damages for the erec-

- tion would not bar an action for the continu-

ance;" that "every day's continuance would

be a legal wrong, for which an action would

lie;" that “a right cannot exist to continue a

nuisance, and every party affected by it may

insist upon its removal, and the neglect to

comply with the duty resting upon a party to

abate a nuisance which he has either erected

or maintained gives an action to any party

injured by the neglect." But he held that

the railroad was not to be treated as a nui-

sance, and that the company had permanent-

ly appropriated the highway to its use, and

therefore permanent damages could be recov-

ered; and his opinion, if sound, would uphold

this recovery. Judge Pratt wrote a dissent-
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ing opinion. taking an opposite view. In his

opinion he said: “If the injury complained

of was of that nature that he was entitled to

recover prospective damages. he should have

proved them in that suit. The law will not

suffer a party to unnecessarily split up de-

mands, and thus needlessly multiply suits."

And, t'urther: “The track and embankment

would. under such circumstances, be a con-

tinuing nuisance, and the defendants would

be liable to a new action every day so long

as they kept it up, and damages would accrue

to the owner. A person. by erecting a nui-

sance on the lands of another. or by trespass-

ing on such lands, acquires no right thereby,

and a recovery of damages for the injuries

sustained does not have the effect to vest the

title in the wrong-doer, as in the case of a con-

version of personal property." And here the

judgment was unanimously reversed. Clerke,

-1., writing the opinion, commenced by say-

ing: “If the plaintiffs testator could have re-

covered all that he was entitled to in the ﬁrst

action, it is, of course, a bar to the second;

and this depends chieﬂy. though not alto-

gether, upon the question whether the Utica

& Schenectady Railroad Company in any

way transcended the authority constitution-

ally vested in them by the legislature. If

they did. their road is a nuisancc,—a perpet-

ual nuisance,—and every day's continuance

of it is a legal wrong for which they are

liable in'damages after they have accrue( ."

And he held that the railroad company did

transcend its authority by entering upon the

highway without ﬁrst causing \Iahon's dam-

ages to be assessed and paid; and that the

illegal appropriation of the highway made it

liable to damages in successive actions as the

damages accrued. And he further said:

"The railroad company, therefore. having.

without compensation to those entitled to the

reversion of the lands. constructed, main-

tained. and operated their road upon the high-

way in question, acted and continued to act

unlawfully. are liable to damages from time

to time as they accrued, and on this ground

the second action is maintainable." In the

course of the opinion, this language is used:

that "It the wrong comph1lned of bad IM>t>n
a technical nuiMnce, In the legal sense of the
term, a recovery tor damages for the erection would not bar an action for the contlnuau~;·• that "every day's continuance would
be a legal wrong, for which an action would
Ile;" that "a right cannot exist to continue n
nuisance, and every party a1feeted by It mny
Insist upon Its removal, and the neglect to
<'Omply with the duty resting upon a 11arty to
abate a nuisance which be baa either t.>rccted
or maintained glvea an action to any party
Injured by ihe neglect." But he held that
the railroad was not to be treau'<l as a nuisance, and that the company had permanently appropriated the highway to Its use, and
therefore permanent damages could be recovered; and hie opinion, If sound, would uphold
this recovery. .Judge Pratt wrote a dl88elltlng opinion, taking an opposite view. ID hie
optn'lon hf- Paid: "If the Injury complained
of was of that nature that he was entitled to
recover prospective damage&, he should have
proved them in that suit. The law wlll not
suft'er a party to unnece888rlly spilt up demand&, and thus needleaely multiply suits."
And, further: ''The track and embankment
would. under such circumstances, be a continuing nuisance, and the defendants would
be liable to a new action every day so long
as they kept It up, and damages would accrue
to the owner. A person, by erecting a nuisance on the lands of another, or by treepaHlng on such lands, acquires no right thereby,
and a recovery of damages for the Injuries
sustained does not have the eft'ect to vest the
title In the wrong-doer, aa In the case of a conversion of personal property." And here the
judgment was unanimously reversed. Clerke,
.J., writing the opinion, commenced by saying: "If the plaintltr'a testator could have recovered all that he was entitled to In the ftrst
action, It le, ot course, a bar to the eecond;
and this depends chlefty, though not altogether, upon the question whether the Utica
& Schenectady Railroad Company In any
way transcended the authority constitutionally vested In them by the legislature. If
they did, their road ts a nulsance,-a perpetual nolsance,-and every day's <'ontlnuance
of It ls a legal wrong for whl<-"h tht>y are
liable In · damages after they have Rf'<•rm><l."
And be held that the railroad L'Ompany did
transcend Its authority by enh•rlng upon the
highway without first cnu1dng ~lnhon's damages to be assessed and pa ht; and that the
lllegal appropriation of thl' highway made It
liable to damages In succesalve actions as the
damages accrued. And he further said:
''The railroad company, therefore, having,
without compensation to those entitled to the
reversion of the lands. constructed, maintained, and operated their road upon the highway ID question, acted and continued to act
unlawfully, are liable to clnmages from time
to time as thPY accnlt'd, aud on this ground
the second RC'tlon Is maintainable." In the
('()Urse of the opinion, this language la used:
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"It they did not transcend their authority.
and yet. In ronstrul'tlng their road ha'"" lll'<"·
e98arlly Injured the rights of others, thf'y are
equally i1able w reMpond for prospective as
well as accrued damages; and In such case
they <'lmnot be vexed again In a second action."
It Is not apparent precisely what was ml'ant
by1 this phrase. It le a mei:e dictum, and
<·ertnlnly announces an erroneous rule or law.
It may be that the learned judge was mlsl<'<l
by the doctrine ap1Jarently laid down lo
J<'letcher v. Railroad Co., supra. 'l'he same
judge, In Plate v. New York Cent. R. Co., supra. !ilIJt>llking of that paragraph says: "I am
Inclined to think there le some clerical or
typographknl mistake bere; or, perhaps,
there was some Inadvertence on my part In
the haste of writing;" and that It can, "at
most, be ronsldered nothing more than a dictum, and therefore cannot control the present
case."
There la no authority to be found In this
state holding any other rule of damages In
such a e1111e. The cal<<' of Henderson v. Railroad Co.. 78 N. Y. 42.'I, Is not In conftlct, as
that was an equitable action; and In the opinion written In thut case the rule Is recognized
to be otherwise In actions at law; and the
case ot llabon v. Railroad Co. ls exprl'!!11ly
recognized, !Uld It was certainly not Intemle1t
to overrule or depart from It or nny or the
prior authorities. The judgment there Wll!il
based entirely upon equitable prlndples, an<I
then It was ordered that, upon payment of
the sum awarded by the referee, the plalntlll'
ahould convey the title to the defeml1rnt. If
the <·aee of :Mahon v. Railroad Co., supportt>tl.
as It le, by abundant authority, and ba11ed upon common-law principles, which In this state
have always been recognized, Is to be disregarded In the decision of this case, It had better be distinctly overruled, and no longer left
to lurl' the legal wayfarer by Its fal11e light.
See. also, Schell v. Plumb, 55 N. Y. 592, 51l8.
The rule contencled for by the plalntlft', and
afllrmt>tl hy the supreme court In this case,
would lead to some embarraBBments and to
great Inconvenience. The plalntlfl's recovery
cannot dh·t>st her of any legal rights she has
In the strC{>t, either to an easement ot· to the
!<Oil: nud If we may assume that IJPr recovery woul1l hnr any future recovery for tlH~
prec•ise 1>111 hankment and the pret•lse UNe
thereof which existed at the time of the commen<·emt•nt of her action, yet It would not
bar a recovery It there should be a change In
the embankment or the use thereof. If the
defendant should run a few more trains of
care, or raise Its embankment, or widen It,
or change It In any way, the plalntlll' would
be permitted to Institute a new action, and to
repeat her action every time there should be
any change. And yet she has recovered
damages In this 111·tlon upon substrintlally th~
same theory d1111111i;ces would have hf'<'ll
awa1·ded It tll('re hacl heeu an a11pralse111e11t
under the statute wllleh vested title In the
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defendant. If the rule aﬂirmed be the cor-

rect one, then a railroad company authorized

to construct its road may enter upon the

lands of any private person, and t1ike them,

and in a suit for trespass the plaintiff must

recover his entire damages, and the railroad

company must become substantially vested

with the title to the land; and thus, instead

of conforming to the statute. it may acquire

‘land by a pure trespass. And so the owner

of land, instead of resorting to the constitu-

tional tribunal for the appraisement of his

damages, may have them appraised by an

action which really vests no perfect title.

Can the statute of frauds be subverted, and

a perpetual easement or right in land, with-

out a grant, be thus conveyed by mere estop-

pel? In this case has happened what may

happen in many cases. The defendant sup-

posed, and had the right in good faith to
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suppose. that it had satisﬁed plaintiffs dam-

ages and acquired all her property interest

in the street until the verdict of the jury un-

deceived it; and then, if the verdict shall

stand, it became obliged to pay her for per-

petual damages, although they had come to

an end, and to make the same compensation

which it would have been required to make

if it had acquired a perfect title under the

statute: and yet it is left without a perfect

title, liable to successive suits.on the claim,

to be established on the uncertain evidence

of witnesses that its burden upon or interfer-

ence with the street had been changed or in-

creased. It was not left the option either to

abate the alleged nuisance, or to perfect its

title, in the mode prescribed by law, to any

easement or interest the plaintiff might have

in the street.

The law will not proceed upon the assump-

tion that a nuisance or illegal conduct will

continue forever. The impolicy aml absurd-

ity of such an assumption is illustrated in

this case, as the defendant offered to prove,

and hence it may be taken as true. that since

the commencement of the action it has re-

duced the street to its former grade. The

rule laid down in the cases which I have

cited, and which I contend is the true one.

gives any party who has suffered any legal

damages by the construction or operation of

a railroad ample remedy. He may sue and

recover his damages as often as he chooses,

—once a year, or once in six years,—and have

successive recoveries for damages. He may

enjoin the operation of the railroad, and

compel the abatement of the nuisance by

an action in equity, and where his premises

have been exclusively appropriated, or where

a highway, in the soil of which he has title.

has been exclusively appropriated by a rail-

road, he may undoubtedly maintain an action

of ejectment. Brown v. Galley. Hill & D.

30.5‘; Etz v. Daily, 20 Barb. 32; Rediield v.

Railroad Co.. 25 Barb. 54. It certainly can-

not be necessary to subvert the law as it has

been well established. in order to give the

plaintiff ample remedy for any wrong which

the defendant has done or can do her in the
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dPft'ndirnt. If the rule aftlrmed be the corr1•t·t one, then a mllroad company nuthotizPtl
to construct its road may enter upon the
l:mds of any private person, and tllkl! them,
nnd lu a suit tor trespass the plalntltr must
ret·ovt>r his entire damages, and the railroad
l'ompany must bPl'ome substantially vested
with thP title to the land; nnd thus, lnstPnd
uf 1-outorming to the statute, it may acquire
'laud l>y a pure trespaM. And so the owner
or l11nd, i&slt-nd or relilOrtlng to the ronstltutlonal tribunal tor the appralsement ot his
dam11ge11, may have them appraised lJy an
action which really vests no perfect title.
Can the statute ot frauds be subverted, and
a perpetual ensement or right in land, without a grant, be thus com·eyed by mere estoppel? In this case has happened what may
happen In many cases. The defendant sup.
posed, and had the right In good faith to
suppo1w, that It had satisfied plalntltl"s dnmagps and acquired all her property interest
In tht• l'ltreet until the verdict of the jury under1•ln•d It; and then, It the ,-ertllet shall
staud, It became obliged to pay her tor perpt>hutl damages, although they had come to
nu end, and to makP the same compensation
which it woul<l have
required to make
Ir it bad acquired a pprfect title under tlfe
1dntutl'; and yet it Is lt•ft without a perfect
title, liable to su<'cessh·e suits.on the claim,
to be establh1hl'(I on the uncertain· evidence
of witnesses that Its burden upon or lnterft>rence with the strpet bud been C'hnnged or ln<"reasetl. It was not left the option either to
11h11te the nllf'ge<l nuisance, or to perfect Its
title, in thP mode pt'l'S<'rlhed b)" law, to any
••nsrml•nt or Interest th1• plulntilT mii.:ht have
In the strel't.
The Jaw will not procePd upon thP nssumptlou that a nuisance or lllPgal l'OU1hwt will
continue forever. The hnpollcy aml absurdity of such an assumption Is ilhtstrnted In
this cast>, as the d€fe:idnnt offered to prove,
and hence It may be taken ns true. that since
the commencement ot the action It has reduced the street to Its former grade. The
ntle laid down In the cnAPS which I have
l'lted, and which I ccntend ls the tn1e one.
irlws any party who bas 1mtrered any legal
1hu11n~Pl'I hy the constmctlon or operation ot
a railroad ample remldy. He may sue and
rl'COVer his damagPs as often as be choose&,
-once a year, or orwP In six years.-and have
i:;ucc·psslve recooverles tor damages. He may
t-ujoln the 01M!ratlon ot the rallroad, and
c·om11PI the nbatelT'ent of the nuisance by
an adlon In equity, and where his premises
have been exclusively appropriated, or where
n highway, In the soil of whl<'h he ha.e title,
has been exclu11lvely appropriated by a rnllrond, hi' may undoubted))· maintain an action
of ejec·tment. Brown v. Galley, Hill & D.
308; Etz v. Dally, 20 Barb. 32; Re1ltlt•ld v.
Itnllrond Co.. 25 Barh. !"'>4. It certainly cannot be necPssary to ~11hn•rt the law ns It bas
b<>l'n well estahllshecl. lu order to give the
11lnlntltr ample t'E.'nwdy for any wrong which

been

th<> clPfPml11nt bas done or can do her In the
street in front of her premises. Nor ean it
bl' ex1>edlent to Introduce Into the nomenclnture of the law a new actlon,-one to recover tor the conversion ot real property, to
be followed by the same consequences as an
action tor the conversion ot personal prop.
t'l'ty.
As to this rule of damages, It matters not
whnt the form of tl1e complalut In the first
action was. The plnlntltr Is bound to recover In his first action all the damages to
which be Is entitled. It be ls pntltled to
damages tor permanent Injury to lllll pro11erty, It Is not optional for him to s1111t thl'm
up, and recover port ot them In the first action, and then l>1·lng subsequent actions for
the re~t. It entltletl to recover damages only
up to the commencement ot his action. no
form o! complaint will entitle him to re<'oYer
more. In the cnse of Mabon v. Rallro1id l'o.
It was proved t1111t the former recovery was
for damages only to the commencement of
the formt>r B<'tlon, and yet that circumstance
was uot deemed material.
Since writing the above, the case ot City of
North Vernon v. Voegler (Ind.) 2 N. E. 821,
containing a very elaborate opinion, has come
to our attention. I have carefully exnmlned
that cn!!C', and find that ft le not authority
for the 11Inlntltr on the question now ~nder
<11Kcusslon. '!'here the city hall the right to
grade one of Its streets, but did It so negllgentl;y as to cause damage to the adjoining
lots or tlte plaintiff, and It was held that he
<'OUld rccol'er, and was bound to recover, Rll
his damages In a single action. It Will! decided that, In the absence ot negligence. therl'
would have been no liability tor consec1uentlnl damages caused by what was rightfully
done In the street. The judge, wrltlug the
opinion, said: "Our decisions have long and
steadily maintained that mnn!C'lpal corporations are not responsible !or cousequeutlal
Injuries resulting from the grading of strPeh1
when the work Is done In a careful and ~klll
!ul manner, but they have quite as 11trnlllly
maintained that, where the work Is done In
a. negligent and unskillful manner, the corporation Is liable tor Injuries resulting to
adjacent property."
Here there was no allegation or proof or·
claims of negligence or unskillfulness In thP
construction of the embankment In the street;
and, as I have shown, It was assumed and
concPded upon the trial thnt It was lawfully
and legally constructed. The trial judge did
not submit to the jury any question of neg1lg1•nce; but charged them, If they found
agnlnst the defendant as to the release. then
It wRs absolutely liable tor plalntitrs damages, and that the only question tor their consideration was the amount of the damages.
Hence that cnse Is an authority for the views
I have ex11ri>R11t>d upon the first ground of
error herein di!l(•ussed. Rut the cnse Is nl~u
l11fer1>11tlully authority t or thP 1<econd grou111l
ot error upon which I h1n·e hasC'1l my coudu0
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ifullv done it can be made liable.

cease to be careless, or remedy the effects of

sion. The judge writing the opmion there

is very careful to place his decision upon

the ground that the structure in the street

was rightful, but negligently made. and he

recognized the rule, as to successive actions,

to be different where the structure is wrong-

fully in the street, and is there a nuisance.

lie said: "This is not the case of a nuisance.

it is the case of a negligent improvement in

a street. The improvement was in itself

rightful and legal. but the manner in which

slon. The judge writing thl' opmlon there
ls very cnreful to place bis cled!ilou upon
the ground that the structure lu the street
was rightful, but negligently mnd(', and he
recognized the role, as to suN'esslve aetlons.
to be different where the stru<"tnre Is wrongfully In the street, aml Is tht•n• a nul><nnce.
Hf> AA Id: "This Is not thf' c·u><t' of a uui><a twl'.
It ii! the case of a negligent lmpro'l"emeut In
:1 l'.llre<'t.
Tbt• lmµrm·t'luent wns in lt"'rlf
l'i1d1ttul nucl lt>gnl. hut the manner In whkh
tht' i11111ro¥enwnt was mart(' was wrongful.
The wruug was not In gmding tile street, but
In the manner of doing It. It Is not n nui·
;;;mce tor a municipal corporation to grnlle
its streets. hut It ls an actlonahle wrong to <fo
it 11egligP11tly. The wrong In negllg.. ntl~·
grading the strt•Pt Is the bnsls of the n<•tlon.
for there are 110 fnl'ts alleged constituting n· j
nulsa nc-e. It Is not a nulsanee to <lo what
the law authorizes. hut It mny be tort to do
the authorl7.ed act In a negligent manner. It
ls e'l"ldent, therefore. that the cases whh·h j
l1old ihnt a continuance of a nnlsnnce will
1<upply ground for an action hn,·e no influ- '
ence upon this case." And hence those ca,.es
were not cited. It Is <'l('nrly to be lnf1>1-rNl
that Ir that court hncl lit>t•n ch•allng with tbe
«nse of an unlawful emb1111kment plaC'ed In
the street It would have hehl that suct·l'~SIYe
actions could be mnlntnlnPd. But I nm of
opinion that that decision Is de:trly ummund
as to the precise question ndjud;.:cd. \\"hnt
right wai> there to assume that the strt>l't
would he It-ft permanently In a neglii:N1t (·011 <lition. nnd then hold that the plaintllT <·onlfl
recover damages upon the theor~ thnt the
<·nreles1mess would fore'l"er continue? · A· municipality or a railroad corporation. unclrr
proper authority, may erect an embankm!'nt ·
In n street; and, If the work be carefully
nod skillfully done, It cannot be mnclc llul>le :
for the consequential damages to ndjac<>nt 1
; property; but If It be cart-IPi;sly and unsklll · ·
~lone It can be made liable.
It nm~·
<>ease to be careless, or remedy the etrects or
its carelessness, and It may apply the requisite skill to the embankment; and this It mny
do nftl'r Its carelesimess and unskillfulness.
and the con!'equent damages, hn'l"e bet-n eRtahllshed by n reco'l"ery In an action. The
moment nn action has been comnwnced, "hall
the defendant In such a case be precluded
from rt>medylng Its wrong? Shall it be i:;o
preelrnh-11. after a recovery against It? Does
it estnhlish the right to rontinne to be a
wrong-due1· forever by the payment of the
reco\·('r,\· against It? Shall It have no henef\t
by- dl!wontlnulng the wrong, And shall It not
he left the option to discontinue It? Arni.
shall the plaintiff be obliged to anticipate his
1!amages with prophetle ken. and fore11ee
them long before-it may be many yenrs bf>-:
tore-they actually occur. aml re<"over th~m
1111 In his ftrst action? I think it Is quite .
:ihsurd nnd lllogknl to assume thnt a wrong
or any kind will forevN· be continued, nnd
that the wrong-doer will not discontinue or
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n•nwdy It; null tlrnt the com·enJent and just
rule. sanctioned by all the authorities In this
state, and by the great '\\'eight of authority
l'l"ewlwre, ls to permit recoveries In sneh
C'ASPll by successive actions until the wrong
or nulsnncc shall be terminated or abatl'fl.
Hut, whether that ease was properly decld1~1
01· not. it Is not In conftlct with the coneln·
sious I lun·e reached In this casC>, but ls In
('lltlre hnrmony with them. Therefore, n1w11
hoth i:rounds conshlered In this case, tlwr1•
should he a reversal of this judgment, nnd a
new trial.
All eoncur, ex<'ept DANFOH'l'H .•T.. who
rt>nds dissenting opinion, and MILi.i'm, J.,
not Yotlng.

I'

the improvement was made was wrongful.

'l‘he wrong was not in grading the street, but

in the manner of doing it. It is not a uni-

sance for a municipal corporation to grade

its streets. but it is an actionable wrong to do

it negligently. The wrong in negligently
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grading the street is the basis of the action.

for there are no facts alleged constituting a'

nuisance. It is not a nuisance to do what

the law authorizes. but it may be tort to do

the authorized act in a negligent manner. It

is evident, therefore. that the cases which

hold that a continuance of a nuisance will

supply ground for an action have no inﬂu-

ence upon this case." And hence those cases

were not cited. It is clearly to be inferred

that if that court had been dealing with the

case of an unlawful embankment placed in

the street it would have held that successive

actions could be maintained. But I am of

opinion that that decision is clearly unsound

as to the precise question adjudged. What

right was there to assume that the street

would be left permanently in a negligent con-

dition, and then hold that the plaintiff could

recover damages upon the theory that the

5-arelessuess would forever continue? "Xma-

'nicipality or a railroad corporation. undcr_

proper authority, may erect an embankment

in a street; and, if the work be carefully

and skillfully done, it cannot be made liable;

for the consequential damages to adjacenti

fproperty; but if it be carelessly and unsklll

It may

its carelessness, and it may apply the requi-

site skill to the embankment; and this it may

do after its carelessness and unskillfuiness,

and the consequent damages, have been es-

tablished by a recovery in an action. The

moment an action has been commenced, shall

the defendant in such a case be precluded

front remedying its wrong? Shall it be so

precluded, after a recovery against it? Does

it establish the right to continue to be a

wrong-doer forever by the payment of the

recovery against it? Shall it have no beneﬁt

by discontinuing the wrong, and shall it not,

be left the option to discontinue it? And,

shall the plaintiff be obliged to anticipate his~

damages with prophetic ken, and foresee

them long before—it may be many years be-I

fore—they actually occur. and recover them

all in his ﬁrst action? I think it is quite‘

absurd and illogical to assume that a wrong-

of any kind will forever be continued, and

I

I

DA:\FORTII, J. (rtlssentlnit). Th(' aetion
was cownwuced Nowmher 5, IRiR. l'pou th<•
f\rst trial the plaintift' hatl a n•rlliet. whieh
upon n(l(1!'11l was set nsltfo. l'.pou the seeond
the jury tlbagreed. rpon the thir1l and lnl't
she agnlu sm·<·eeded, and the n•snlt has heen
upprov('d by the g<'nernl tf'rm. It Is now ohjt'C"tecl by the defenclnnt that the trial (·om·t
t>rred (1) In Its rulings ori the qul',,tlon ot
1lnm111t1•M; (2) In rc:gard to evh.le11l'1·; (:l) In
1111 dinrg(' to the jury,-and hen<'e the cast>
should go back again for another trial.
The plaintiff all"~"d and proved that Rh<'
ownPtl and occupied, In person :mil by tenants. certain lmpro'l"ed lots of land lying on
the north£>rly side ot Colonie .street. and exfrncllng to Its center; that between tlll' homw,.
on those lots and the traYeled roadway wa;: a
shJewalk; and, by her complaint, nllegPu that
the defendant entered upon the property, and
tore up the pa'l"ement In Colonie street In
front of the houses, raised the street higher
than It was before, and also the street west
of snld premises and between said houses and
tlw west side of Rroa1lwa~·. nncl tore up and
ral11!'d the sidewalks In front of her homw;;,
and raised aml lllletl up thf' gutter In front
ot them, and so shaped the stre<'t and gutter:;
as to pour the water therefrom down over
said sidewalk and Into the basements of said
boui;ps, by reason of which the premises arc
made liable to be flooded with water. and
haw been at different times flooded with mud.
tilth. and water, ancl the propert~- tht>rl'in lnJnrPd, nnd the said premises reuderf'tl tlnmp
and unhealthy, and by which the rental ¥nh1t>
of sni<l houses was greatly de1>n•c·late<l; and
also thnt the shape given to tlw surfn<·t• of
snhl street by the defendant Is sueh as to
make the approach to said houses lneonvenIPnt nnd unsafe, nnd to Interfere with the u;;e
of tlw s11111i>.. and depreciate it~ Ynlne. n111l that
said street Is made so steep in Its de<'llne oil
the no1tli side that wagons cannot safel.r or
conveniently stand In front of said premi;.;ps •
of said µJaintlt?; and asked for clarungcs sust1lne<l hy rt-ason of these acts. The evlclf'nce
fairly tended to est1blish the truth of these
a\·er111Pt1t!'. anrl sbowc~d that the nets <'Omplnin('d of were <lo1w hy the 1lPfernlnnt In
widening and raising Its roa<l-IJed and mn k -
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, vexed for the same cause.

ing additional tracks. In doing this they

raised the carriage-way of the street from two

to three feet, making it higher than the side-

walks. Evidence was received, against the

objection of the defendant, to show a depreci-

ation, caused by these changes, in the market

value of the houses and lots, and afterwards

witnesses were called by the defendant to

speak upon the same subject. The question

was fairly litigated. The defendant did not

claim that damages did not result from its

acts, but insisted that “the proper measure

of damages should be any injury to the rental

value prior to the commencement of the suit,

and the cost of restoring the street to its

former condition: that there is nothing in the

complaint or in the evidence which renders

material any evidence as to the market value
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of the property, either before or after the al-

leged wrongful act;" but the court held that

there was nothing in “the case to show that

the alteration in the street, and construction

of tracks, was for a temporary purpose. or a

mere trespass; but. on the contrary, appeared

to be of a permanent kind and character, and

the complaint suﬂlcient." The case was sub-

mitted to the jury, in a way not excepted to,

to say upon the evidence whether there had in

truth been a depreciation of the property aris-

ing from the acts of the defendant in and

upon the street; but, being asked by the de-

fendant's counsel to charge “that under the

evidence the jury will not be justiﬁed in ren-

dering a verdict for the supposed differencé

in market value in the premises before and

after the act in question," the judge refused

to do so, and added: “For the purpose of

presenting that question sharply, I charge

that the plaintiff can recover the difference in

the market value of the property, provided

you ﬁnd that the act of the defendant has ,

impaired the market value, and to the extent i

it has impaired it." Defendant's counsel ex-

cepted. The defendant asked the court to

charge: “If the jury believe such acts were

done without the permission of the city, and

were unlawful, then the measure of damages

would be the actual injury sustained by plain-

tiff before the commencement of this action,

including the loss of rent and the injury to the

use and enjoyment of the property before the

commencement of this action, if any." The

court declined to charge that, saying: “There

is no proof one way or the other upon that

question. Whether this was an authorized

or an unauthorized act. there is no presump-

tion in favor of the trespass." Defendant's

counsel excepted.

Upon this branch of the case the defendant

is without merit, unless it is liable to be again

It took possession

of the plaintiff's property without permission,

and is called upon to pay so much only as

will make good her loss,—no more than she

would have been entitled to had the defendant

made her an involuntary vendor under com-

pulsory proceedings, by which the same result
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ing additional tracks. In doing this they
raised the carriage-way of tlle street from two
to three feet, making it higher than ibe sidewalks. Evidence was received, against the
objection of the defendant, to show a cleprecl11 tion, caused hy these changes, In the market
,·alue of the houses and lots, and afterwards
witnesses were called by the defendant to
spe.-ik upon the same subject. The quf'stlon
was fairly litigated. The defendant dill not
elnlm that damages did not result from Its
acts, but insisted that "the proper measure
of damages sllould be any Injury to the rental
value prior to the commencement of the smt,
and the cost of restoring the street to Its
former condition; that there Is nothing In the
complaint or In the evidence which renders
material any evidence as to the market value
of the property, either before or after the alleged wrongful act;" but the court held that
there was nothing In "the case to show that
the alte1":1.tlon In the street, and construction
of tracks, was for a temporary purpose, or a
mere trespass; but, on the contrary, appeared
to be of a permanent kind and character, and
the complaint sufficient." The case was submitted to the jury, In a way not excepted to,
to say upon the evidence whether there bad In
tt·uth been a depreciation of the property a.rising from the acts of the defendant in and
upon the street; but, being asked by the defendant's counsel to charge "that under the
1•vldenee the jury wlll not be justified In rendering a ve1·diet tor the supposed difference
In market Yalue In the premises before llDd
after the act In question," the judge refused
to do so, and added: "For the pufPose of
presenting th.at question sharply, I charge
that the plalntttr can recover the dltrerence In
the market value of the property, provided
you find that the act of the defendant has
Impaired the market value, and to the extent
It bas Impaired It." Defendant's counsel excepted. The defendant asked the court to
1·llnrge: "If the jury believe such acts were
done without the permission of the city, and
were unlawful, then the measure of damages
would be the actual Injury sustained by plalntitr before the commencement of this aetion,
Including the loss of rent and the Injury to the
use and enjoyment of the property before the
1~ommeneement of this action. if any."
The
court declined to charge that, saying: "There
Is no proof one way or the other UPon that
question. Whether this was an authorized
or au unauthorized act, there Is no presumption In favor of the trespass." Defendant's
counsel excepted.
Upon this branch of the case the defendant
Is without merit, unless It ls liable to be again
. vexed for the same cause. It took possession
ot the plalntU'r's property without permission,
arnl Is called upon to pny so much only as
wlll make good her loss,- no more than she
would hue been entitled to had the defendant
mad<' her an Involuntary venrt01· nuder compuh:ory 1iroceedl11g;;, hy which tht~ s;une result
would have be<>n reached. In sueh a 1·;1!!e as-
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tuteness would be misapplied, when the onlypurpose is to obtain a new trial, to be fol·
lowecl, 11s Is conceded, by a verdl<'t for somr
amount, and, after that, statutory proceedings to acquire title In deference to the law
(Laws 1R47, c. 272; L.'lWS 1850, c. 140, § 21.
amemled by Laws 1869, c. 237, § 1) whleb
proyldes for a case where a railroad company
shall not have acquired a valid and sufficient
title to any land upon which they sh.all haveeom1trncted their track. Under these statutes application might be made to the court
by petition, and compensation for the lanl?
determined by a Jury. It ts true, these arenot the proceedings before us, but the samething has been accomplished.
The defendants were without title. They
have constructed their tracks, and the compensation to be made bas been determined by
a jury. In some way, It cannot be doubted
that the plalntltr ts entitled to damages oreompensatlon upon the scale applied by the
trial court. Of course, the defendant should
not be liable to enlarged eompell.81ltlon, nor t<>
a double payment. Here there ts no unusu.d
compensation. It ts measured by the amount
for which the property would be depreciated
In market value by the change of roadway t&
accommodate the new tracks and structure
which the de1'.endant placed upon the street.
This represents merely the plalntltr's actual
loss and damage, and its payment should pr<>teet the defendant from further action. l
think it will. Where the wrong consists of
a single act of destruction, the cause of action Is complete, and the party Injured must
have full compensation In the first suit, ·not
only for the act, but for all the consequences
which could arise from it. Clegg v. Dearden.
12 Q. B. 576.
The statutes referred to, allowing the assessment of compensation where the railroad company has without right placed Its tracks upon
the land of another, In terms apply to any
such ease, and go upon the assumption that
the appropriation of" the use of the land, and
the structure placed upon It, are permanent;
and such Is Its nature. It Is for the purposes
ot Its incorPoration; public polley requires
that It should remain, and although 1n the
first Instance without right, yet, after compensation has been determined and paid, the company be<.'Ome possessed of such land during
the continuance of the corporation. Laws
1847, c. 404, § 3.
This principle was applied In the Henderson
Case, 78 N. Y. 423, wllcre, In behalf of the
defendant, It was argued, as It Is here, that
the defendant's acts amounted simply to a
series of trespasses which might be the subject of fresh actlons,-a new one every day .
The defense did not prevail, and unless a
distinction favorable to the defendant can he
drawn from the fact that this Is an action at
law, and that a suit In eqult "· It Is decislYI'
here. In that case full compensation was
awarde1i upon conditions whi.!h, when complied with, protected the defl>ndant in the en-
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joyment of the property trespassed upon. In

this case the same result follows. The com-

plaint charges, as the result of the defend-

ant's acts, depreciation of the value of the

property,—in substance, diminution of its mar-

ket value. That suggested the proper inquiry,

and would be the proper measure of compen-

sation in any proceeding to acquire title or

ﬁx compensation for an unwilling vendor.

The evidence was directed to that end. The

charge of the judge gave that question to the

jury as the only one which, when answered,

was to determine the amount of damages.

The complaint shows, indeed, as consequent

upon defenuant's act, not only that water has

been directed into the basements of the houses,

but that they are thereby “made liable to be

ﬂooded"; and as consequent upon that and

other effects, depreciated in value. That was

the subject of the action. The other things
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were simply its ingredients, not independent

or of themselves causes of action, but mere

effects of the act complained of, resulting in

diminution of value to the property, for which

alone damages were demanded and given.

The record shows these things, and that the

adjudication covered all damages prospective

as well as past that might be sustained by the

plaintiff by reason of the act of the defend-

ant.

The appellant cites various cases in support

of a contrary view; but I think them in-

applicable. So far as those from the courts

of this state are concerned, they relate to

acts which obviously were or might be of a

temporary and not permanent character.

The Mahon Case, 24 N. Y. 658, was of the

former class. It was considered in the Hen-

derson Case, supra, and thought to be no ob-

stacle in the way of allowing complete and

ﬁnal damages where the act causing injury

was necessarily permanent. In other states

the courts differ. The appellant cites the

Carl Case, 46 Wis. 625, 1 N. W. 295; but

on the other hand are Town of Troy v.

Cheshire R. Co., 23 N. H. 83, quoted in the

Henderson Case, supra, 435; Powers v. City

of Council Bluffs, 45 Iowa, 652; Railroad v.

irabiil. 50 Ill. 241. Still others are cited by

the respondent. It cannot be necessary to

refer to them.

The concession of the appellant is, in sub-

stance, that the correct measure of damages

was adopted, provided the defendant is se-

cure against further interference by the plain-

tiff. as it was in Henderson's Case, supra.

The struggle, then. is over the form of the

action. There is little in it. The defendant

has. and will have during its corporate life,

the enjoyment of the premises. and the plain-

tiff will have been paid for its surrender.

Nothing more could have been secured by

either, whether by statutory proceedings or

by suit in equity.

The next question arises on the new matter

set up by the defendant as a defense, viz.,

that one Sarah Wallace, the plaintit'f's moth-

er, was in possession of the premises, claim-

ing to be owner at the time of the act com-
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joyment of the property trespassed upon. In
this case the same result follows. The com·
plaint charges, as the result of the defend·
ant's acts, depreciation of the value of the
property,-ln substance, diminution of Its market value. That suggested the proper Inquiry,
and would be the proper measure of compensation In any proceeding to acquire title or
fix compensatlon for an unwllllng vendor.
The evidence was directed to that end. The
charge of the judge gave that question to the
jury as the only one which, when answered,
was to determine the amount of damages.
The complaint shows, Indeed, as consequent
upon defenuaot's act, not only that water hai1
been directed Into the basements of the houses,
but that they are thereby "made liable to be
dooded"; and as consequent upon that and
other effects, depreciated ID value. That was
tbe subject of the action. The other things
were simply Its Ingredients, not Independent
or of themselves causes of action, hut mere
effects of the act complained of, resulting In
diminution of value to the property, tor which
alone damages were demanlled and given.
The record shows these things, and that the
adjudication covered all damages prospective
as well as past that might be sustained by thr.
plaintiff by reason of the act of the deft•mlaot.
The appellant cites various cases lo support
of a contrary view; but I think them Inapplicable. So far as those from the courts
of this state are concerned, they relate to
acts which obvlou1ly were or might be of a
temporary and not permanent charac·t1•r.
Tlie Mahon Case, 24 N. Y. 658, was of the
former class. It was considered lo the Hf.'nderson Case, supra, and thought to be no obstacle In the way of allowing complete and
final dama~es where the act causing lnjnry
waa necessarily permanent. In other stntl's
the courts differ. The appellant cites the
Ca.rt Case, 46 Wis. 625, 1 N. W. 295; but
on the other hand are Town of Troy v.
Cheshire R. Co., 23 N. H. 83, quoted In the
Henderson Case, supra, 435; Powers v. City
of Council Bluffs, 45 Iowa, 652; Railroad v.
Grabill, 50 Ill. 241. Still others are cited by
'the respondent. It cannot be necessary to
refer to them.
The concession of the appellant Is, In substance, that the correct measure of damages
was adopted, proV'lded the defendant 111 secure against further Interference by the plain·
tttr, aa it was In Henderson's Case, supra.
The struggle, then, Is over the form of the
action. There Is little in It. The defendant
bas, and wm have during Its corporate lite,
the enjoyment of the premises, and the plain·
tltr will have been paid for Its surrender.
Nothing more could have been secured by
either, whether by statutory proceetllngs or
by suit In equity.
The next question arises on the new matter
set up by the defendant as a defense, viz.,
that one Sarah Wallace, the plalntlt'f's mother, was In possession of the premises, claim-
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ln11: to be owner at the time of the act complained of, and that she agreed with the defen<lnut to receive $500, In full settlement
tht.>rt>for, and for a Keneral release, and that
this sum was In fact paid to her on the
thirtieth of September, 1875, ID the presenC\'
of one De Pfuhl; and alleged that, In exe('ntlng it, Mrs. Wallace acted In behalf and
by the authority of the plalntllT. These
things were controverted. The name of Mr1t
Wallace was alleged to be a forgery, and
that no money was received by her, and
whether It was or not was made the lmnortant question upon the trial. Among other
things, the defendant gave In evidence a
check made by it on the Chemical Bank for
$500 payable "to the order of Sarah Wallace." This purported to be lndorsed "S.
Wallace," then by De Pfuhl as second ludorser, and after him by Wendell, cashier, to
the Fourth National Bank of New York. or
order. There was no direct evidence either
that :Mrs. Wallace signed the receipt, or lndorsed or received the check. De Pfuhl was
a lawyer by profession, and, at the times In
question, in the employ of the defendant,
"In the Jaw, real-estate, and claim department" His trRtlmony was taken In 1880.
but his recollf.'ctlon of the events was sll:?ht
and Imperfect. He 11ald be had many lntrrvlews with Mrs. Wallace on the subject of
settlement, hut could recall nothing said "by
her, by !llmRl'lf, or any one else." He hurl
no recollection of seeing l\lrs. Wallace sign
the receipt. but had no doubt the slgnaturl'
to it of bis name as witness was genuine.
adding: "I have no recollection of seeing
Sarah Wallace sign that paper, but I have no
doubt that she did, from the fact of my witnessing her signature. The body of the paper Is In my own handwriting. I cannot
remember anything about the drawing or
execution of this paper." Being shown the
check, be said: "I believe the name 'Francis
De Pfuhl,' on the back of this check, Is In
my handwriting. I have no doubt that Mrs.
Sarah Wallace wrote the name 'S. Wallace'
on the back of this check. I have no recol·
lectlon about this chE'<'k bl'lng ('ashed at any
bank In the <'ltY of Alban~-. I do not know
who had the money on said check. I have
no recollection of anything furtbl'r In regar!l
to said check."
Witnesses for plaintiff, qualified to speak,
discredited the genuineness of the signature
purvortlnK to be that 'of Mrs. Wallace. The
plalntltr testified that she went with her
mother a number of times to the defendant's
omce about the damage, and always when
her mother went she, "so far a.s she knew,"
was with her; shows an offer ot $500. aud
Its rejectloh, and other circumstances Indicating efl'.orts to compromise, but failure to rlo
so; and that she ftrst' beard It claimed that
any money had been paid when It was 1wt
up by the dl'fendanf!! an~wer. In 1875 IH'r
mother wa!! r..5 years olcl. aurl they lived to·
getber during her life. She kept bank-ac-
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counts then and for some years before, at

the F. & M. Bank, and at the Albany Sav-

ings Bank. Her bank-books were produced

by the witness. These were all her mother

had. It was her habit to deposit all her

rents and other money to these accounts, so

far as witness knew. She kept but a triﬂing

sum of money by her at any time, and had

no expenses except those known to witness,

nor debts, nor any busmess transaction call-

ing for $500, or any such sum. Witness

knew all her business transactions, and to

her knowledge she did not have any such

sum of money as $500 in 1875, or at any

subsequent period; nor at the time of her

death, in 1877, did she have any money what-

ever in the house. The bank-accounts ran,

in one case from 1870, and in the other from

1869, both to 187'], and the accuracy of the
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pass-books was proven by ofﬁcers of the dif-

ferent banks. The pass-books were then of-

fered in evidence, against the objection of

the defendant. The exception then taken

raises the second point made by the appel-

lant. In its support the learned counsel cites

the case of Carroll v. Deimel, 95 N. Y. 252.

There the matter of “no deposit" in the bank

was brought out as an independent and isolat-

ed fact. As such it had no legal tendency to

prove the issue. Here it takes its place in

the affairs of Mrs. Wallace, and, combined

with other circumstances in evidence, was

proper for the consideration of the jury. Of

itself it proved nothing; but when her con-

duct in the disposition of money was shown;

when it appeared that her habit was uni-

form in regard to it; that she incurred no

debts; kept little money about her, but uni-

formly placed such as she received in one of

two banks,—it would permit an inference that

so large a sum as $500 would have gone in

that direction had she received it: and if not

found there, that fact might, with other cir-

cumstances, bear upon the question of its

receipt. True. she might have received and

lost it, or otherwise disposed of it. That

was also to be weighed by the jury. It was

part of the defense that, with knowledge of

the plaintlf f and in her behalf, the claim for

damages had been settled and paid for to

Mrs. Wallace. . How was this to be disprov-

ed? The plaintiff had not received the mon-

ey. Sarah Wallace was dead. Might not

the tenor of her conduct be shown? Would

not the fact that, after the time of the al-

icged payment, she was or was not possessed

of a sum of money of that or about that

amount, otherwise unaccounted for, be rcle-

vant? It seems to be so. A state of things.

then, which gives an opportunity to show it

in her possession at that time, or to show

that it was not in her possession, may be

proved: and. as her habit of business was to

deposit money received in one or the other

hank, information as to that fact must also

be relevant. The defendant says the money

was paid. The evidence tends to show that.

if paid, it would have been deposited. That
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<·mmts then and for some years before, at
the F. & M. Bank, and at the Albany Saviugs Bank. Her bnnk-hooks were produced
by the witnt>sti. These were all her mother
had. It was her hubit to depo~t all her
r1;1nts llllu other money to these accounts, so
fur as witness knew. She kept but a trifling
sum of money l1y her at any time, and Imel
no expenses except those known to witnesH,
nor deuts, nor any business transaction calling for $500, or any such sum. Witness
knew all her business transactions, and to
her knowledge she did not have any such
sum of money as $500 In 18i5, or at any
snusequent 11erlod; nor at the time of her
death, in 18i7, did she have any money whateYer in the house. The uank-account11 ran,
In one case from 1870, and in the other from
18611, both to 1877, and the accuracy of the
pass-books was proven by omcers of the different banks. The pass-books were then off<>red In e\"ldence, against the objection of
the dt•femlant. The exception then taken
raises the setoud point made by the appellant. Jn its support the learned counsel <>Iles
the case of Carroll v. Delmel, 91S N. Y. 252.
There the matter of "no deposit" in the bank
was brougllt out as an independent and isolatetl !net. As such it had no legal tendency to
prove the issue. Here it takes its pince in
the aO'airs of Mrs. "'allace, and, combined
with othet· circumstances in evidence, was
proper for the consideration of the jury. Of
Itself it proved nothing; but when her contluct in the disposition of money was shown;
wlwn it appeared that her habit was uniform in regard to it; that she incurred no
debts; kept llttle monPy about her, but uniformly placed such as she received in one of
two banks,-lt would permit llD inference that
so lari:e a sum as $500 would have gone In
that direction had she received it; and if not
found there, that fact might, with other circumstances, bear upon the Question of Its
receipt. True. she might have rec<'IYed ancl
lost it, or otherwhw dlspo11ed of it. That
was also to be weighed by the jury. It was
part of the defense that, with knowledgr of
the plalntllT and In her behalf, the dnim for
damages had been sett!Pd and paid for to
Mrs. Wallace.. How was this to be disproved? 'fhe plnlntllT had not received the money. Sarah Wallace was dead. Might not
tl1e tenor of her conduct be shown? Woultl
not the tact that, after the time ot the all<•gecl pa~·lllent, she was OT was not possessed
ot a sum of money of that or about that
amount, otherwise unaccounted tor, be r<>leYant? It Sl'ems to be so. A stnte of thlng>1.
then, which gives an opportunity to show it
In her po11sr sslo11 at that time, or to show
that it was not in her possession, may ue
proved; nnd. as her habit of business wns to
clt•poslt money r<>celved in one or the other
hank, tnfomrntlon as to thnt fact must also
he relevant. The defendant says the ruonry
was paid. Thl' evidence tends to 11l10w that.
If pahl, it woulcl have been deposited. That
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tt was not deposited, therefore, 111 Inconsistent with its re<>elpt, and ls pertinent evldenee
that it was not iiald. The conduct of Mrs.
Wnllace at that time may speak, although
she ls unable to. What she <lid or what she
did not do, and even her omission to mention
the receipt of money to her daughter, the
plnlntllf, for whom the defendant assumes
she actetl, and to whom, therefore, it would
have been natural, if not her duty, to mention It lf made, also has a bearing upon th1!
question whether payment was in fact matle.
Notwithstanding the evidence of De Pfuhl
as to the signature to the release, and the
lndorsement of the draft in the name of Mrs.
'Yallace, it was conceded by the defendant
that neither slgnnture was made hy her. The
claim upon this trial was thnt it was made
hy Mrs. t:llne, the plaintiff. antl the court
charged the jury to Inquire whether Mrs.
UUne did write those names, antl whether
"the $GOO was paid to either, or paid as they,
or either of them, dlrected the money to be
paid. If Mrs. IDlne," be said, 11slg11P1l the
name of Mrs. 'Vallace to those papers. and
the $500 has been paid, then she cannot recover. If, on the other . hand, she did not
sign the papers, or If she did sign them, and
the $500 has not been paid either to her .or
to her mother, or to such persons aa she or
either of them dlrec>ted It to be paltl, th1•n
she can recover, and should recover such
damages as you find the property has been
injured by the act of the defendant." Arni
later on, after presenting the evidence in a
manner satisfactory to both parties, thl'
learned judge said: "If you find that :Mrs.
Ullne did sign the receipt, and did indorse
the check tn her mother's name, and, further,
that either she or her mother received the
money, or it was paid to some person to
whom they directed it to be paid, then your
verdict must be for the defendant."
There was no exception to the charge in
any respect, but at its close the counsel for
the defendant asked the court to charge "that
It Francis De Pfuhl received the money o.n
the check under Mrs. Wallace's lndorsement,
nod at her request, In so doing he acted as
her agent, and the payment to him was a
payment to Mrs. Wallace." And the court
re1illed: "If she made him her agent for the
purpose of re<>elvlng the money for her, just
as you reqlwsted, then the loss would be
hers, and uot the loss of the company. If,
howev!'r, De Pfuhl, ncth}g In behalf, or professedly actinic in behalf, or the company,
proposed to her, if she would sign her name
to the papers, he wo~d go and get the money
for the purpose of completing the arrnngement with her. ancl would return her the
money, then I think that the loss will be the
loss or the company, and not the loss of
l\Irs. Ullne or Mrs. Wallace."
It was not suggested by the defendant that
the evidence would not warrant a finding tu
rlther alt<'rnatlve. 'l'he charge reque!iltl'd
was given. Thrre was no refusal. It was
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not error to state to the jury the law upon

the other state of facts. The request “that

if De Pfuhl's indorsement on the draft raises

any presumption that he received the money

on it, the legal inference is that he so re-

ceived it for and on account of Mre. Wal-

lace, the payee, and that the money so re-

ceived by him was a paymcm to Mrs. “'al-

lace, if her indorsement was gemiinc," was

not unlike the one referred to. and was well

disposed of. The court had already charged

upon the question as affected by the indorse-

ment, and could not, in view of the conces-

sion and course of trial. be required to sub-

mit any proposition to the jury which as-

sumed that the signature purporting to be

that of Mrs. Wallace was genuine. But if

the request be treated as implying also that

the signature was by her authority. then the
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court properly answered it. Amplifying

what in substance had been twice stated. he

declined to pass directly upon that question.

saying: “I think it depends upon how the

jury tind upon that fact. If Mrs. l‘line or

Mrs. Wallace wished this man to obtain the

money upon this check for them, and desired

him to go to the bank for their beneﬁt

and draw the money. then, if he used the

money and mlsapplied it, it would not be the

loss of the company. If. however, lie Pfuhi,

professing to act for his employer, the de-

fendant. proposed to her that he would ob-

tain the money for her in order that the

transaction might be completed, and she, un-

der those circumstances, put her name upon

the paper, and sent him to the bank, then

she would not be chargeable with the loss of

the money if De Pfuhl did not pay it ovcrz"

adding: “As both of these theories are con-

sistent with the appearance of the paper, I

cannot say as matter of law that either one

is the presumptive one upon the more face

of the papers." There was no error in this.

Nor was it claimed that the learned trial

judge either misstated the evidence, or the

ﬁndings which it would support. The court

cannot be contined to a single abstract propo-

sition, but might. and it was its duty to.

submit to the jury in its discretion such topics
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not error to state to the jury the luw upon
the other state of facts. The request "!lint
It De Pfuhl's lndorsement on the llraft raises
any presumption that he re<-elw1l the money
on it, the legal lnfl!rence Is thnt be so re('('ived It tor and on account or '.\Irs. 'Vnllace, the payee, nml that thP mont>y so r1•ceived by him wus n Jlll)'Ull'llt to '.\h·s. "·nl·
lace, If her ln1lorsement wns gpnuint>," wns
not unlike the one reterretl to. anll wns w1•ll
tllsposed of. The court bail alr1•:HI,· d1:1ri:1•1l
upon the 11uestlon as atr1•t'f P11 by the lndorsl'ment, and L'<>Uld not, In view of the conet>sslon and eonrse of tt·lal. IX> rr11uh·1•1I to 1<uhmlt any propo11itlon to th<' jury whlt·h nssmned that the 11ignaturP llllrJ>ortlui: to be
that of Mrs. "·ann<"e was grnuine. nut If
the l'l''luest ht> treated as huplring al,;o !hut
1lw i<ll!nuturc was by her authority, tlwn lht>
ennrr i1ropPrly answert>il it. Amplir~·lng
whnr In s11l1st11n<'e had h1•1•0 twh'e 11t11tl'el. hi'
1lt•1·1im'l1 to pnss dlre<'lly upon that 11uestioo.
sa,·ing: "I think It de111•ntl11 upon how the
Jury thul upon that faet. If Mrs. rlilJf• or
llri<. ""all:iee wished this man to ohtaiu the
nwue)· upon this t·he<'k tor them, aud tleslr<'ll
him to go to the bank for their h<'11Pftt
and draw the money, then, It he used the
moot·~· and mlsappllf'd It, It would not be the
10~>1 of the l'om1iany.
If. boW<'Vl'r, I>t> Pfuhl,
proft>!<slog to ac·t for his employer, the de!Pnrlant. propoMed to h(>r that he would olJ..
111i11 the money for her lu ordPr that the
1r:insactlon might be completed. noel she. un11f•r those clr<'umstan<'l'!I, put her nam<' upon
the paper, and sent him to the bank. then
she would not be chargeable with th<' loss of
the money If De Pfuhl rlld uot puy It on•r:''
adding: "As both or these th1•orles are <"onslstent with the appl'arnnee of th!' pa11E>r. I
eaonot say as matt<'r of law thnt 1•lth1•r 0111•
Is the presumptive one upon t111> nwre fa1·e
of the papers." 'fhf'r(' was no t>rror In thlR.
Nor was It C'lnlm(>tl that tlw l1>11r11E>d trlnl
judge either ml11Rt11ted the evlcl<'nce. or till'
llndlngs whieh It woul1l support. The court
111noot be confilJt>tl to a Nlngle abstral'I propn·
11ition, but might. and It wn11 Its clnt)· to.
submit to tbt> jury lo Its dlsc1·etion such to1tt1·s
as either bore upon or were In that connection worthy ot thE>ir attention.
The other eXC't'ptlom1 haVE' he!'n f'XRrulnP11.
They point to no error. The issue11 w1•re
carefully trlPd. and we think th!' judgnll'nt
rendered upon the verdkt shoulcl stand. It
ls therefore affirmed.

as either bore upon or were in that connec-

tion worthy of their attention.

The other exceptions have been examined.

They point to no error. The issues were

carefully tried. and we think the judgment

rendered upon the verdict should stand. It

is therefore atiirmed.

NOTE. In Hargreaves v. Kimberly, 26 W.

Va. 787, the court, after disposing of other

matters, said:

It is also assigned as error that the court per-

mitted the witness Butterﬁeld to give his opin-

ion as to the amount of damage the plaintiffr

i

had suffered by the acts of the defendant; and

Yost v. Conroy, 92 Ind. 464. is cited. it is there

held, that the opinion of a witness as to the dam-

age a ditch would cause to the lands of a party

is not proper evidence. Elliot, J .. delivering the

SOTE. In Hargreues v. Kimberly, 26 W.
Va. 7tr1, the court, after disposing ot other
matters, said:
It ie also assigned a11 error that the court per·
mitted the witnes11 Butterfield to give his opinion as to the amount of damage the plaintift'H
had suffered by the acts of the defend1111t; aud
Yost v. C-0nroy, 92 Ind. 464, is cited. It is there
held, that the opinion of a witness as to the damage a ditch would cause to the lands of a party
i11 not proper evidence. Elliot, J .. delivering the
opinion of the eourt, says: "Opinions ot wit111~ a11 to the amount or bent•fit or d11m1111'e
11T1st;iinf'fl hy a party an> not com!X'tent." lie
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cites a liue o! lndiuua decisions to sustain him.
and further 1111ys: "It mny well be hE>ld, thnt
these enses declare the genernl rule co1·reetl.'"
since to boltl otherwise woulil 111' to 1mt the wit·
nes81's in the place or the juror,., and commit to
them the amount of the reeovl'r)·. A contrary dew·
trine would also ,·iolate the mil'. that witm,,;se~
cuuuot expreHH an opinion upon the preci>1e point.
which the i11i;111•i; present for tht• decision of tbl"
jury." But thl' karnl'd eourt did hold in that
t'll:<l'. that "tht• npinion of 0111• ncquninted with
the t•ro(ll•rty II!! to it11 rnlue with nod without till'
ditch i11 prO\l<'r evitl1•nce." :\"ow, it i<t!E'llli< to
nn•, thnt it IM a \"Pry niet• eli><tinctiou. If tlll'
witnP><s tl'i<tifies, thnt tlw 11roprrty is worth
$1,000 without the ditch nnd $~00 with tlw
diteh. has he uot givl'n hiH 011i11iou. thnt the•
land wu11 d1111111ge<l jm•t $200'~ \Yhy 11111y th ..
rnqniry n•Jt at once be made: "How much i"
thr. land injnred by the dit<-h ~" I! lw 11118\\'Pr"
:f:20I!, then enu not all bi11 renson11 !or hi,.
opinion be elicited on crosi;-examinution '! In
~now v. Ruiirond. 65 Me. 2:10. It i~ ht'icl, thnt
when the \'nlue o! renl <'Rtatt• tnkl'n for a rnii·
road. or the umount o! damage <'11111•1•11 by suC'h
taking is in qm•Mtion. 1u•rsons uequuintt•d with
it muy Htnte their opinions as to its Yulue. nr
us to the nmount of dumage done, it all is not
tnkrn. In Vnndine v. Burpee, 13 l\Ictc. (l\la>1>1.)
:!88, a <'RSI' much like this, it a)lpe11re1I, thnt
on the trinl of un Rl'tion to re1~ovl'r d11 m1t1C•'"
for injury <lone to thP plaintiff's gurdl'n 1111<1
u11ri;ery by the smoke, lwnt and gns proce•t•dini.:
from the defe-ndant'ii hrie•k kiln. arter two 1rnr·
deners, who hnd much <'xperience in r1ii11inJ.:"
and cnitivntiug fruit trPPK, Khrubs and 11lant1'.
had t1>i<tilied to the purtit·nlars u! the pluintiff""
injury, thry wPre 11Kkr1l by the plaintiff. "\Y~u I
wus the uruunnt of d111nngl'" C'aus1•1l Li,\' tlw 111jury, to which they hull ·1... rore '"'diliecl: nn•I
it was held that th<'l<I' witnei;MPH miKht 1'iYI'
their O!Jinion as to tlw 11111011nt of Klll'h d11111·
&ft(>. Dewey, J., said: "It >tPl'lll" to 111; thnt it
would be irnpral'tiCRhie to di1<pen1H! with tlri>t
11peC'ies of tC'>1ti11111ny in mnny ndionM of tro\'c1·
tor personal pro1wrt~·. where no eJ('tail of fn<"ts
could adeqnutl'ly inform the jury of the vnlue
ot the nrtici<'>t. Tht> opinion or 11 witness as
to the value o! a horse is mul'h more snti11f11ctory eviden<'e thnn n detniied 1<tntt•ment or his
sizt>, color, ag<'. &c.. to gh·e thi• jury the rl'quisih• informntion to Pnnhle thl'm to 11,,;sei,;s
dam1tjl'es for the conv('1·11ion o! such 11 horse."
In Hnilroad Co. ,., Foremun. 24 \V. Vu. 002,
it wns held, that such ('\·idence was ndmis11ihlP. Till' <'onrt in thnt c•n,... i<nid. hy OrPl'n••T. :
"ThPrt• is no nhjPrtion to taking tlw opinion
of witnt'H><!'H 111< to l'ith1•r till' n11101111t or elnm1\gl's or llfl to thr 1111101111t or tlll' lu•npfit. It ill
thr nsuul pra1·ti1·p in t hi>< ><tall• nml \"iriciniu.''
He ritl'R n ·nmnh"r of )ll'rtinrnt nnthot"itirs to
!!URtain the po,.ition.
Hnt the eonrt •lid l'rr in Jl(>rmitting the witness 1tg1ti11st th•• ohjel'tiou of till' tlef<>ndnnt's
r01111s1•l to nnswl'r till' followinii: •flll'stion:
"~t11t1> if you can whnt will he the probnhle
1ln11111J.:"e tbnt will O<"<"nr in the future from
whnt hail already been done to the nm in the
wny of digging, or ehanii:ing its l'Onri;r?" The
witm.•ss nni-;wcred, tl1•ft>ndnnt l'Xl'.CIJting to 11nei.;tio11 und answer: "·" rell it is prl'tty hurd fur
me to nm1wer the qul'!ltion as to the amount of
da1111tge, bnt I think it will he C'Onsidernhll',
pruvidl'rl the water course is left in the Hl\DIC
l'Onrliti1,tn it is, becauRe it Is wnRhing out nnturn 11~· •...:ht against the bank: and if it bud
bet'n i<'ft tnll Op levl'l to th1• roud wh1•re tlH"
water used to go. of eounie the bank would
have held up. This bas took half the lot
nwuy; but the prospect ls there will be 11
great den! of Blips there With the run." 'Vby
thi11 eviden<·c 'Was offered I do not understand.
Tlw eounsel !or the defendant in error in his
hri.t·r s1tys: "The pluintiffs were unquestionably 1•ntitled to recover in this netion the dam·
ajl'es which were likt•ly to oc<"ur in 'the future
as well ns tho!!e wbieh had ulrl'ndy oecnrred
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in the past." He cites no authority, neither

does he gresent any argument. It seems to me

that hot reason and authority are agamst his

position.

In Smith v. Railroad, 23 W. Va. 453. Green,

J'.. said: “Where the damage is of n perma-

nent character, and affects the value of the es-

tate, a recovery may be had at law of the en-

tire damages in one action; but where the ex-

tent of the wrong may be apportioned from

time to time, separate actions should be

brought to recover the damages sustained. He

cites Troy v. Railroad Co., 23 N. H. 101;

Turnpike Co. v. Stevens. 13 N. H. 28: Parks

v. City of Boston, 15 Pick. 198; Blunt v. Mc-

Cormick, 3 Denio, 283; Thayer v. Brooks. 17

Ohio, 489; Anon., 4 Dall. 147; Tucker v. New-

man, 11 Adol. & E. 40. ,

In Thayer v. Brooks. supra, the action was

case for nuisance in diverting the water from
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the mill of the defendant in error, and the

court held that the rule of damages in an ac-

tion for nuisance is the injury actually sustain-

ed at the commencement of the suit.

In Blunt v. McCormick, supra. the court

said: “The rule of damages laid down by the

court was erroneous. In this action the plain-

tiff could only recover for injuries actually sus-

tained before suit was brought, and not for

supposed prospective damages. Supposing the

lease to contain a covenant not to obstruct the

light, and the action to have been brought on

such covenant, the_ rule of damages would be

otherwise, for the covenant being a smgle

cause of action, one recovery on it would be an

absolute bar to any future action. But a _re-

covery in an action on the case, for obstructmg

the light prior to the time when the action

was commenced would not bar a future suit

for the continuance of the same injury."

In Turnpike Co. v. Stevens, supra, it was

held. that where an action on the case was

brought to recover damages for laying out a

highway around a turnpike gate, so as to di-

vert the travel from the turnpike, and dam-

ages were recovered for the loss of toll occa-

PR lCb‘I‘l.\' 'l‘ A N 1) 1' ROS l'It‘C'l'l \'E DAMAG ES.
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sioned by the opening of the higlm-ay to the

date of- the plaintiffs suit. subsequent suits

might be maintained for further damage ac-

cruing from time to time, as long as the high-

way was kept open. A recovery had been had

before for dividing the tolls, and it was insist-

ed that no action could be maintained for con-

tinuance of the road after recovery had been

once had for the opening of the way. But Up-

ham, J., for the court, said: “This is erroneous.

The cause of action remains so long as the

cause of the injury is upheld by the defendant.

It has been in the defendant's power at any

time to discontinue the grievance complained

of, and so long as this power remains it would

be unjust to visit him with damages except

during the actual time the damage has been

sustained. The injury is not necessarily per-

manent in its character, and recovery therefor

can only be had for the past, as it may cease

Pltl-:KKXT AXIJ

l'IWSl'I~lTIYI<:

in the past." He cites no 1tuthority, neithl•r
does he present any argument. It seems to me
th1tt both rea.'!on and nuthority arc against his
1>ositio11.
In Smith v. Railroad, 23 W. Va. 453, Green,
J., said: "Where the damage is of a permanent character, and affects the value of the estate, a recovery may be had at law of the entire damages in one action; but where the extent of the wrong may be apportioned from
time to time, separate actions should be
brought to recover the damages sustained. He
cites Troy v. Railroad Co., 23 N. H. 101;
Turnpike Co. v. Stevens. 13 N. H. 28; Purks
" · City of Roston, 15 Pick. 198; Blunt "· Me('ormick, 3 Denio, 283; '.rhayer v. Brooks. 17
1 lhio, 489; Anon., 4 Dall. 147; Tucker v. Newman, 11 Ado!. & E. 40.
In Thayer v. Brooks, supra, the action was
rase for nuisance in diverting the water from
the mill of the defendant in error, and the
court heltl that the rule of damages in en action tor unisance is the injury actually sustained at the rommencement of the suit.
In Blunt v. McCormick, supra, the court
said: "The rule of damages laid down by the
court was erroneous. In this action the plaintiff could only recover for injuries actually sustained before suit w11s brought, and not tor
supposed prospective damages. Supposing the
lease to contain a covenant not to obstruct the
light, and the action to have been brought on
such covenunt, the rule of damages would be
otherwise, for the' covenant being a single
cause of action, one recovery on it would be an
absolute bur to nny future action. But a recoverr in an action on the case, tor obstructing
the hght prior to the time when the action
was commenced would not bar a future suit
for the continuance of the same injury."
In Turnpike Co. v. Stevens, supra, it was
hPld, thnt where an action on the case "·as
hronght to recover damages for laying out a
highway around a turnpike gate, so as to dlnfrt the travel from the turnpike, and damages were recovered for the loss of toll occa-

DAl:L\.GJ<;S.

i<ioned by the Ol?ening of the highway to tl1tdate of. the plaintiff's suit, 1111biol'q11ent suitR
might be mamtained tor further damage accruing from time to time, as long as the high"
way was kept open. A recovery had been had
before tor dividing the tolls, and it was insisted that no action could be maintained for continuance of the road after recovery had been
once had for the opening of the way. But Upham, J., for the court, said: "This is erroneous.
The cause of action remains so long as the
cause of the injury is upheld by the defendant.
It has been in the defendant's power at any
time to discontinue the grievance complained
of, and so long as this power remains it would
be unjust to visit him with damages except
during the actual time the damage has been
sustained. The injury is not necessarily permanent in its character, and recovery therefor
can only be had tor the past, ns it may cease
at any moment. The injury is of the same
character as that arising from a nuisance, and
is subject to the same rule of law."
It seems to me that in nil those cases, where
the cause of the injury is in its nature permanent, and a recovery for such injury would
confer a license on the defendant to continue
the cause, the entire damage may be recovered
in a single action; but, where the cause of the
injury is in the nature of a nuisance and not
11ermanent in its character, but of such a
character that it may be supposed, that the
defendant would remove it, rather than suffer
at once the entire damage, which it might inflict, if permanent, thep the entire damage
can not be recovered· in a single action; but actions may be maintained from time to time,
as long as the cause of the injury continues.
Here the cause may be removed, and it is supposed will be by the defendant, rather than
submit to having the entire damages recovered
against him, for a permanent injury, or to suffer repeaterl recoveries as long as the cause
of the injury continues. The court erred in
admitting this evidence, and for thh1 reawm
the judgment will have to be reversed.

PltEl:n~.;~T .\.~IJ
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STODGHILL v. CHICAGO, B. & Q. R. CO.

(5 N. W. 495, 53 Iowa, 341.)

Supreme Court of Iowa. April 20, 1880.

Appeal from circuit court. Wapeiio county.

Christopher Stodghill was the owner of a

farm of some 480 acres in Wapelio county.

Part of said farm consisted of a tract of 29

acres of creek or pasture land. The defend-

ant's right of way for its railroad was located

along the north line of said tract. The nat-

ural channel of North Avery creek ran across

the right of way upon said tract. meandered

through it, and recrossed the north line of

the land and the right of way. When the

railroad was constructed, bridges were built

across the creek which spanned the channel

and did not obstruct the passage of the water

in the stream, nor divert it from where it

was wont to ﬂow. In 1874 the defendants
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cut a channel on the north side of their right

of way and ﬁlled in the bridge where the

stream entered plaintiff's land with earth,

which diverted the stream into the new chan-

nel entlrely, “except as the water backed

through a culvert at a point where the water

recrosses the right of way; the said bridge

at the last named point having been previ-

ously removed, a culvert there constructed,

and the stream ﬁlled in at this point, except

the culvert aforesaid."

Christopher Stodghili commenced an action

against the defendant for damages to his land

by reason of the diversion of the stream.

He recovered a verdict and judgment for one

dollar and costs. The cause was aﬂirmed

upon appeal to this court. See Stodghill v.

Railroad Co., 43 Iowa, 26. Said Stodghili

died in the year 1876, and by his last will

and testament, which was duly admitted to

probate, he devised the said 29 acres, with

other of his lands, to the plaintitlf. This ac-

tion was commenced in February, 1877, to re-

cover damages for continuing to divert the

water from the natural channel of said creek,

and for a judgment, directing the abatement

and removal of the embankments in the origi-

nal channel. There was a trial by the court,

without the intervention of a jury, and a

judgment was rendered for plaintiff for one

dollar actual damages, and $75 exemplary

PUOSl'ECTl n; DA.\LHa;s.

STODGIDLL "· CHICAGO, B. & Q. R. CO.
(5 N. W. 496, 53 Iowa, :Hl.)
Supreme Court of Iowa. April ~'(). 1880.
Appeal from circuit court. Wapello county.
C'hrlstopher Stodghill was the owne~ of a
farm of some 480 acres In Wapello county.
Part of said farm consisted of a tract of 29
acres ot creek or pasture land. '£he defend·
ant's right of way for Its railroad was located
along the north line of said tract. The nat·
ural channel of North Avery creek ran across
the right of way upon said tract, meandered
through It, and recro88ed the north line of
the land and the right of way. When the
railroad was constructed, bridges were built
across the creek which spanned the channel
and did not obstruct the passaite of the water
in the stream, nor divert It from where It
was wont to 1low. In 1874 the defendants
cut a channel on the north side of their right
of way and filled In the bridge where the
stream entered plaintiff's land with earth,
which diverted the stream Into the new cban·
nel entirely, "except as the water hacked
through a culvert at a point where the water
recrosses the right of way; the said bridge
at the last named point having been previously removed, a culvert there constructed,
and the etream ft.lied In at this point, except
the culvert aforesaid."
Christopher Stodghill commenced an action
against the defendant tor damages to bis land
by reason of the diversion of the stream.
He reco'l"ered a verdict and judgment for one
dollar and costs. Tbe cause was afllrmed
upon appeal to this court. See Stodghill v.
Railroad Co., 43 Iowa, 26. Said Stodghill
died in the year 1876, and by bis last will
and testament, which wns duly admitted to
1•rohnte, he devised the said 2H acres. with
otht'r of his lands, to the plaintiff. This ac·
tlon was commenced In Jo'ebruary, 1877, to re·
'~ver damages for continuing to divert the
water from the natural channel of salcl creek,
and for a judgment, directing the abatement
nud remo'l"al of the embankments In the original channel. There was a trial by the court,
"·lthont the Intervention of a jury, and a
judgment was rendered for plnlntltr tor one
•lollar actual damages, and $75 exemplary
dnruagea, and an order was made requiring
the dt>fendant to abate and remove said ob1<trnctlons from the natural channel of tbe
•·reek. Defendant appenll!.
Stiles & Lathrop, for nppPllnn,t. Wm. lie·
Xett and H. B. Hendershott, tor appellel'.

damages, and an order was made requiring

the defendant to abate and remove said oh-

structions from the natural channel of the

creek. Defendant appeals.

Stiles & Lathrop, for appellant. Wm. Mc-

.\ett and H. B. Hendershott, for aP1)t-ii(‘t-.

ROTHROCK, J. 1. When the earth was

deposited in the channel of the creek, and

raised to a suﬂicient height to cover over the

bridge, and make a solid embankment upon

which to lay the railroad track, the water in

the creek was at once turned into the new

channel. The principal question in the case

is whether the judgment for damages, in fa-

vor of Christopher Stodghill. was a full adju-

dication for all injuries to the land, not only

up to the commencement of that suit. but for

all that might thereafter arise.

UOTHHOC'K, J. 1. When the earth was
dPpo!lltf'fl in the cbanut>l of the crP!'k, and
rnli<P<l to a sufficient height to cover o\·er the
bridge, and mnke a solid embankment upon
which to lay the railroad track, the water In
the creek wal! nt once turned Into the new
<"ham1el. ThE> principal question In the case
ls whethrr the Judgml.'nt for tlamnges, In fa·
Tor of Christopher StOll~hlll. wni;; a fnll adjucll<·ntlon tor ull Injuries to tin~ lnud, not only
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up to the commencement of that suit, but for
nil that might thereafter arise.

In Powers v. City ot Council Bluffs, 45
Iowa, 6ri2, the question being as to what Is
a permanent nuisance, It was held that where
· u was ot such n chnrnrter that Its contluu~
ance Is nec1•ssarlly an Injury, and that when
It Is of a permnnPnt cbnracMr, that wlll con·
tlnue without chnugt' from any cause but
human labor, the damage Is original, and
may be at once fully estimated and compensated; tbat successive actions will not lie.
and that the statute of limitations commences
to run from the time of the commencement
of the Injury to the property. Tbat was a
cause where the plalntllf sought to recover
damages against the city tor diverting the
natural channel of a stream called Indian
creek by excavating a ditch In a street In
such a manner that It widened and deepened,
by the action of the water, so a11 to Injure
plalntllT's lot abutting upon said street. The
same rule was recognized In Town of Troy
v. Cheshire R. Co., 3 Fost. (N. H.) 83. In
that case the defendant constructed the embankment of its railroad upon a part of n
highway. The action was by the town to
recover damages. The plalntltr claimed that
It was entitled to recover for the entire damages for the permanent Injury. The court
said: "The railroad Is, In Its nature, design
and use, a permanent structure, which cannot be assumed to be liable to change. The
appropriation of the roadway and materials
to the use of the railroad ls therefore a per·
manent diversion of that property to that new
use, and a permanent dispossession of the
town of It as the place on which to main·
taln a highway. '£be Injury done to the town
Is, then, a permanent Injury, at once done
by the construction of the railroad, which ls
dependent upon no contlng<•ncy of which the
law can take notice, a11d for the Injury thus
done to them they arc entitled to recover at
once their reRBOnable damages."
The case at bar Is a much stronger Illustration of what Is a permanent nuisance or trespass, for which damages, past. present and
prospective, may be recovered, than Powers
v. City of Cmmcll Bluffs. In this case the
damages, to the whole extent, were at once
apparent. The water was diverted from the
natural channel as soon ns the embankment
wns raised to a sufllclent height to turn the
rurrl'nt Into the new channel. The Injury to
the land wali then susceptible of estimation.
BR It e'l"er afterwRrtls could be, and without
<'alrnla ting any futurr contlngenrles. · In thr
othet· <'lll!l'. wh<'ll th(• wate1· c::omml'n<:ed to
ft.ow In the new dmnnel, the plalntltf"s lots
were not Injured. It required time to wash
a way the banks and work hnckward before
the Injury commenced. It Is not necessary
to dwell upon this question. 'l'he rule established" In Powers v. City of Council Bluffs.
supra, Is decisive of the c·nse. RPe. also, Railroad Co. v. Mnher (Sup. Ct. 111.) Chi. Leg.
N. July 5, 1879. Coum;pJ tor npp..tlees con-
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tend that the railroad embankment is not per-

manent. because it is liable to be washed out

by freshets in the stream, and cannot stand

without being repaired.

There is no evidence in this record tending

to show that the embankment is insuﬂlcient‘

to accomplish the purpose for which it was

erected; that is“, to make a solid railroad

track and divert the water into the new

channel. One witness testiiied that it is from

16 to 18 feet high. We will not presume that

defendant was guilty of such'a want of en-

gineering skill as not to raise its embank-

ments so that they will not be affected by

high water. It seems to us that a railroad

embankment of proper width. and raised to

the proper height, is about as permanent as

anything that human hands can make. Be-

fore leaving this branch of the case, it is
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proper to say that the acts complained of

were done within the limit of the defendant's

right of way, and the injury, if any. to the

plaintiffs land was consequential. The de-

fendant did not enter upon plaintiffs land to

take a right of way for its railroad, and

Christopher Stodghill did not bring his action

to recover upon that ground. As we have a

statute providing for proceedings to condemn

the land necessary to be taken for right of

way for railroad purposes, it may be that the

mode of ascertaining the damages prescribed

by the statute must be pursued. See Daniels

v. Railroad Co., 35 Iowa, 129. That question

is not in this case, and we only refer to it

lest we may be misunderstood.

2. (‘hristopher Stodghill. in his petition in

the former action, averred that the diversion

of the stream from its natural course across

said land perpetually deprived him from the

use thereof, to his great damage in the prose-

cution of his business, and in the deprecia-

tion in value of his said farm and pasture

iands, and he claimed damages in the sum

of $499. The court instructed the jury in

that case that they were not to consider the

question in regard to any permanent damage

to the land, for the reason that plaintiff had

the right to institute other suits to recover

damages sustained after the ('oIinn0n('0nu1nt

of the action.

But the plaintiff claimed danmges generally.

and by his pleading he and those holding un-

der him must be bound. Indeed. we do not

understand counsel for appellee to contend

otherwise. The damages being entire, and

susceptible of immediate recovery, the plain-

tiff could not divide his claim and maintain

successive actions. The erroneous instruc-

tions of the court to the jury did not affect

the question. It was the duty of the plain-

tiff to have excepted and appealed.

“An adjudication is ﬁnal and conclusive,

not only as to the matter actually determined.

but as to every other matter which the par-

ties might have litigated and have had de-

cided, as incident to or essentially connect-

ed with the subject-matter of litigation."

Freem. Judgm. § 249. And see Dewey v.

PIU<;RENT AND PR08PECTIYE D.UL\GES.

tend that the railroad embankment Is not per- of the strt>am from Its natural course ncros"
manent. because It te liable to be washed out said land perpetually deprived him from tht>
use thereof, to hie great damage ln the proseh~· freshets 1D the stream, and cannot stand
without ht>lng repaired.
cution of hie business, and In the depreciaThere le no evidence In this record tending tion ln value of bis said farm aml pasture
to show that the embankment le lneufllclent · lands, and he claimed damages In the sum
to uccom1lllsh the purpose tor which It was of $400. The court Instructed the jury in
e1·e«tc.>t.l; that ltt, to make a eolld railroad that case that they were not to consider the
track uml dlYert the water Into the new question in regard to any permanent damage
<'hannel. One witness testified that It le from to the land, for the reason that plnintl!T had
ltl to 18 feet high. We will not presume that the right to Institute other euJtis to recoYer
1lt>fe11d11nt was guilty of such.a want of en- tlamages sustained after the ro111m1•11<·t•mt•11t
irlneerlng sklll ae not to rais<' Its embank- of the action.
ments eo that they will not be n!Tected by
But the plalntl!T claimed d11m11!(t•11 gPnemll~-.
high wnter. It seems to ue that a railroad mul by his pleading he aud tho111• holding unc>mbanknwnt of proper width. and raised to der him must be bound. Indeed. we do not
the pro11er height, Is about 011 11ern11rnent ae understnnd eoun11el for appellee to contend
nnything that bumun hands cnn make. Be- otherwi!lt'. The damages being entire, and
fore leaYlng this branch of the case, It Is suse<'ptlble of Immediate recovery, the plaln)lro)ler to say that the acts complalnt!l.1 of tltr could not divide bis claim and malntaln
were done within the limit of the defendant's successive actions. The erroneous Instrucright of way, and the Injury, If any, to the tions of the court to the jury did not atreet
plalntIJr's land was consequential. The de- the question. It was the duty of the plalnfendant did not enter upon plalntltT's land to tltT to haYe excepted and appealed.
"An adjudication ls final and conclusive,
take a right of way for Its railroad, and
Christopher Stodghill did not bring hie action not only ae to the matter actually determined,
to recover upon that gro1md. Ae we have a but as to every other matter which the parstatute providing for p1·oceedlngs to condemn ties might have litigated and have had detile land necessary to be taken for right of cided, as ln<'ldent to or essentially connectway fo1· railroa<l purposes, It may be that the ed with the subject-matter of litigation."
mode> of ai;certalnlng the damages preR<•rlbed Freem. Judgm. § 249. And see Dewer ""·
by tht• Rtatute must be 1mrsued. See Daniele Peck, 33 Iowa, 242; Schmidt v. ZahenMnrf.
v. Railroad Co., 35 Iowa, 129. That q1wstlon 30 fowa. -rnR
Is not In this case, and we only r<•fer to It . 'l'lw for1•i.rolng considerations dispose of the
ease. and It ht•l'onwe unnect>ssary to examine
lest we may be misunderstood.
1
2. C'hrl1<topher Stodghill. In hie pet1tlon ID 01· determine other queetlou discussed by
the torwer action, averred that the diversion eounael. Reversed.

•
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FILER v. NEW YORK (‘E.\"l‘. R. CO.

(49 N. Y. 42.)

_Court of Appeals of New York. 1872.

Action by VVilliam F. Filer against the New

York Central Railroad Company for damages

for personal injuries sustained by plaintiﬁ"s

wife while alighting from defendant's train.

Judgment for plaintiff. and defendant appeals.

Aﬂlrmed.

_Court of A11rienls of ="t>w York. 18i2.
Action by "William F. I•'llt>r aga!m;t tlw :\t'W
York Ct>ntral Hailrond l'ompuuy for 1h11u:1ges
for personal iujurii>s s11><t:1i11Ptl h)· plaiutllf",;
wife wilile alighting from defernlunt's tmin.
Jutl;:nwnt for plaintiff. and deft•111l1111t nppt•uls.
Atti1111ed.

Ueorge G. Munger. for n111wllant.
?tlarti111lnle. for re,..pornlt•nt.

J. ll.

George G. Manger. for appellant.

ltlartindalc. for respondent.

J. 11.

ALLEN, J. h‘necessive actions cannot be

brought by the plaintiff for the recovery of

damages, as they may accrue from time to

time. resulting from the injury complained

of. as would be the case for a continuous

wrong or a continued trespass. The action

is for a single wrong, the injury resulting
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from a single act, and the plaintiff was en-

titled to recover not only the damages which

had been actually sustained up to the time

of the trial. but also compensation for future

damages; that is. compensation for all the

damages resulting from the injury. whether

present or prospective. The limit in respect

to future damages is that they must be such

as it is reasonably certain will inevitably and

necessarily result from the injury. To ex-

clude damages of that character, in actions for

injuries to the person, would necessarily. in

many cases. deprive the injured party of the

greater part of the compensation to which

he is entitled. Curtis v. Railroad Co., 18 N.

Y. 534; Drew v. Railroad Co.. 26 N. Y. 49.

Any evidence therefore tending to show the

character and extent of the injury and its

probable results. as well as the probability of

a return of the disease induced by the injury,

in the ordinary course of nature, and without

any ext1insic superinducing cause, was com-

petent to enable the jury to determine the

compensation to which the plaintiff was en-

titled.

In the case of a fractured limb, it was

thought that the present and probable future

condition of it were proper matters of in-

quiry. Lincoin v. Railroad Co.. 23 Wend.

425. The consequences of a hypothetical

second fracture were deemed too remote. The

question to Dr. Faling as to the probability,

from his experience and medical knowledge,

of a recurrence of an inﬂammation of the in-

jured muscle. and his answer that he could

not say the probabilities were very strong.

but that he should feel. speaking from ex-

perience. that there was danger of the return

of the inﬂammation and accumulation of the

linid. was competent.

The evidence was that of a medical ex-

pert, as to the ordinary or probable course

LAW DA M.2d Ed.—8

of disease in the injured muscle. which had

resulted directly from the injury complained

of, and related to the future condition of the

person injured. so far as that condition could

be ascertained from medical learning and ex-

perience. So too the opinion of the saun-

ALI.I:-;~, J.
Km·1·Ps1li\"e uetlun11 eaunot be
brought by the plnlutilf for thr re1•u\·ery o!
damages, n.s they n111y ul'crue from t!nw to
time. resulttng from the Injury comphtlned
o!. as would be the case for a c·ontlnuous
wrong or a continued tre11p'.lss. Tiu• u .. tlon
Ii; for a single wrong. the Injury re11ultlng
from u iol11gll' act. 1U1tl the plulutlff "'"" t•JI·
titled to rt>eo\·er not only the darungt•s whleh
had ))('c•JI at:tually sust11hw1l up to th1• time
o! the trial. hut also com1w111<:1tio11 for future
damaire;i; that ls. c·orupt>nAAtion for nil the
Jamagt>s resulting fl'oru the lnjmy. wllt'tlll'r
pre11eot or pr0Kpet·th·1•. Thi' limit In l"l'Sl>l'•·t
to future damages Is that thf.'y must he sud1
Ull it ls reasonably eertaln will llwv!tuhl~· 111111
necessarily result from the lojur)·. To exclude damages of that charactt'r, In net Ions tor
Injuries to the person, would nN·1.,•11arlly. In
many cases. deprive the Injured purty of lhc
greater part of the com1lt'nsnllon to whlt-h
he Is entitled. Curtis v. Rnllr011d Co., 18 X.
Y. 534; Drew v. Rnllroail l'o.. :.?H ~. Y. 41).
Any evlrlt>nre therefore tending to show the
charaeter and extent ot the Injury and Its
probahle results, ns well as thf.' prohah!llty of
a return of the dlsease Induced by the Injury,
In the ordinary eourse of nature, and without
any extrinsic superlnduclng enu~e. wni1 competent to Pnahlf' the jury to determine the
•~1111pens1ulon to whkh thP plaintiff was en-

litlt>tl.

In thi> c·a>Je of 11 fntctured limb, It was
thought that the prf'!lent and pt•ohnble future
condition or It wrrf.' proper mntlt>rs of In·
quiry. Lineolo v. Hnllrond Co.. 2:1 Wencl.
-125. The com1eqnt>o('e!I or a bypothetfcal
SN'Ond rractun.• were deemed too remote. The
question to Dr. l<'allnir as to the prnhahlllty,
from bis expt>rlenct> nod uw1lkal kuowletlge,
of a recurrenee of an lnflnmmntlon or thf' Injured muscle. and bh1 answer that he f•ould
not aay the prohnbllltlt•s Wt'rP \'Pry >1trong,
hut that he should ff'f'l. 11p1•11kl11g froru ex111•rif'ON'. that tlwre was d1111g1•r of the rPtnrn
of the !nOammatloo nnd acc•mnnlntlon of the
llultl. was competent.
The evldt>n<'e wni; thnt of a medienl expert, aa to the ordinary or probable course
LAW DAM.2tt Ed.-8
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of tli><t>USI' in the injured ruus<'ie. which bad
t·1·rnltC'cl tlin•l'lly from the lujnQ· complahlt'tl
of. mul rt•intecl to tl\e future cornlitlon of tile
ltt>rHon lojuretl. 110 fat· as tl111t <·ontlltion couhl
hf' :tSl't'l'l:IilH'•I from lllt'cli1·11l lt•aruinr:: HIHI l'X·
p1•rh•11t'I'. So too till' opluinn of the HUlllP
ph~·,:ii-lan. that 111• "houlcl PXpl'd, If tlwre Wl'l'P
uu 1-Ptnru of iutt:1111mat!un. ti.lat tlll' gt•nt>ml
llt'nlth uf )fr:<. Flit'!' woulll imJlr<J\'t•, lmt woulci
ulwn~·,.. lu• Sl•llle\\'h;tt imJialred. wn!l prop.·r
mul 1·om1wtt•11t. to l'trnhle tile Jury to a>'l't•r·
ta!t1 the 1H·t11:1l extf'llt of the injury to thr
pl:1l11ti!I.
'l'lien• Is no P\'ideuce otlw1· than thnt of
eX)lt'l'IH hy whld1 COlll'IH llllU j111°lf.'S euo di'·
tt•rmlue whPlht•r a dlscuse or un lujury l111s
Ileen or mn he permanl'ntly cured. or wl111t
Its elft•ct will be upon t Ile lu•111th and c:-11111b!llty or the JUjlll't'll per!IOll in th<' fllttlrt•.
The hypotl1t>tical 011lnion or Dr. H!lhrnm as
to the t'llllSI' uf thl' :1h,.:l't'S8' waR t."Olll)lt'h'llt.
antl lilt• uuswl'l". l':lntiously r::lveo. that If thPy
c·oul•l ti11tl uu otlwr 1·1111i<l'. tl.ll'~· would naturally attrlhute it to th<' lujury <·om11Ialm~1 of.
and that stwh iujm·~· t't•<·eh'C'tl In 181i4 was
1·01111ll'tt'llt to protluee tht> co1u1!1iou hi! saw i11
· 1Sti7, \\'t'l'I' propl'l'ly al11>we11.
Some latitude must IH'l't'HS:t ril)' ht• r::in•11
In tlw t•xnmlnntlou of n1C'<l!e11l 1•xpt•rt><. 111111
In the proponndini.: of hypothetical 111wstio1111
tor thelt· opinions. the lwtll'r to enahle tlu•
jury to pnMs upon the qtMHions 1mhmltt1•1I to
them. The opinion ls the opinion of 11 ... l'X1wrt. nnd lf the fuels nn• found b~· tlu• jury
11>1 the counsel by ills tJU<'~tlons assumt>s tht•m
to lw. tlw opinion may han' som!' W<'lght.
othet·w!sc not. It Is the prlvilf.'ge o! the <·011111!(>) 111 Mnd1 cases to assume, within the limits
of tht> rvideJl!'f'. any state of fncts whieh h1·
cloims the evidC'nc•e justlltes, aml hnYI' the
opinion or expert;i upon the tnct11 thuM n~
sttm('(l. Tiu.' fnct;i 11r1.• n11M11111e<I for the purpo!>!i>s or the que,;tlon, Rll<I for no other purpose.
Tilere w11s no error In till' refmml to d111rg..
ns requested. 'rht' q11t>stloJ1 snhm!tt('(l wn1<
whether the e hscC'ss aud 1·01111eq1wnt lllnes1<
were cansNl b~· the lnjur~· n>ceh·pd in ~oVt'rn
het·, lRH4, aml If that wnM found In the affirmative. the plnlntllT. It the otht>r !nets Wt"re
ro11111l lo his favor, wai; t"11titled to re<:on•r.
Tht>re w1111 no evhltc•ttc•e anthorb;log thf' sul:m!s:<lou or the q1wstlon wht•ther thP 11h!<e1•ss
might not hnYe been In part <•1111111•d h~· 1l1t'
Injury spoken of, and In pnrt by some otlwr
11u•ans. 'fbe othPr questions made upon this
appeal are consld!!t"e<.I and disposed of in till'
111•tion at the Rult of Helen l\I. !•'lier.
1'hf!re was no error upon the trlnl. and thl•
Judgment must be atHrmt>d. All concur exeept CHURCH, C. J., wl\o dhl not vote.
.Jndgmeot aftlrmed.
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PARKER v. RUSSELL.

(133 Mass. 74.)

Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts.
l<'rauklin. June 28, 1882.

Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts.

Franklin. June 28, 1882.

Action by Isaac Parker against Electa P.

Russell. The declaration alleged “that the

defendant, in consideration of the convey-

ance by the plaintiff to the defendant of cer-

tain real estate in Deerﬁeid, promised and

agreed to support and maintain the plaintiff,

furnishing him with all things necessary and

convenient in sickness and in health, during

the natural life of the plaintiff; that the de-

fendant accepted said conveyance, and has

occupied and used said estate, but has re-

fused and neglected and still neglects and

refuses to perform her said agreement."

The evidence showed that in March, 1873.

the defendant, for a good consideration, agreed
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to support the plaintiff during his life; that

she did support him in her house from that

time till October 1, 1878, when her house was

destroyed by ﬁre; and that for two years since

the ﬁre the defendant had furnished no sup-

port to the plaintiff.

The jury returned a verdict for the plaintiff

for $972.25; and found specially that the

support of the plaintiff. under the terms of

the contract, from the date of the ﬁre to the

date of the writ, was of the value of $377.40,

and that the same from the date of the ﬁre to

Action by Isaac Parker against Electa P.
The declaration alleged "that the
defendant, In consideration of the conveynnce by the plalntltr to the defendant of certain renl estate In Deerfield, promised and
agreed to support and maintain the plalntltr,
furnishing him with all things necessary nnd
convenient in sickness and in henlth, during
the natural life of the plalntltr; that the defendant accepted said conveyance, and bas
occupied and used said estate, but has refused and neglected and still neglects and
refuses to perform her said agreement."
The evidence showed that In March, 1873,
the defendant, for a good consideration, agreed
to support the plalntll'f during his life; that
she did support him In her house from that
time till October 1, 1878, when her house was
destroyed by fire; and that for two years since
the fire the defendant had furnished no support to the plalntl.tr.
The jury returned a verdict for the plaintiff
for $972.25; and found specially that the
suppo1"t of the plalntll'f, under the terms of
the contract, from the date of the fire to the
date of the writ, was of the value of $377.40,
and that the same from the date of the fire to
the date of the· trial was of the value of
$473.60. The defendant excepted.
A. De Wolf, for plaintiff. F. L. Greene, for
dl'fenclant.
Ilm~sell.

the date of the‘ trial was of the value of

$473.6(). The defendant excepted.

A. De Wolf, for plaintiff. F. L. Greene, for

defendant.

FIELD, J. In an action for the breach of

a contract to support the plaintiff during his

life, if the contract is regarded as still sub-

sisting, the damages are assessed up to date

of the writ, and not up to the time when the

verdict is rendered. Fay v. Guynon, 131

Mass. 31.

But if the breach has been such that the

plaintiff has the right to treat the contract as

absolutely and ﬁnally broken by the defend-

ant, and he elects so to treat it. the damages

are assessed as of a total breach of an entire

contract. Amos v. Oakley, 131 Mass. 413;

Schell v. Plumb, 55 N. Y. 592; Remelee v.

Hall, 31 Vt. 592; Fales v. Hemenway, 64 Me.

373; Sutherland v. “',ver, 67 Me. 64; Lamo-

reaux v. ltoife. 36 N. H. 33; \Iullaly v. Aus-

tin. 97 Mass. 30; Howard v. Daly, 61 N. Y.

362.

Such damages are not special or prospec-

tive damages, but are the damages naturally

resulting from a total breach of the contract,

and are suffered when the contract is broken,

and are assessed as of that time. From the

nature of the contract they include damages

for not performing the contract in the fu-

ture as well as in the past. The value of

the contract to the plaintiff at the time it is

broken may be somewhat indeﬁnite because

the duration of the life of the plaintiff is un-

certain, but uncertainty in the duration of a

life has not, since the adoption of life tables,

been regarded as a reason why full relief in

FIELD, J. In an action for the breach of
a contract to support the plalntur during his
life, If the contract Is regarded as stlli subsisting, the dama&'es are assessed up to date
of the writ, and not up to the time when the
verdict Is rendered. Fay v. Guynon, 131
Mass. 31.
But If the breach has been such that the
plalntll'f has the right to treat the contract as
abf.lolufely and finally broken by the defendant, and he elects 110 to treat It, the damages
are ass!'sscd as of a total breach of an entire
contract. Amos v. Oakley, 131 llass. 413;
~chell v. Plumb, 05 N. Y. 592; Remelee v.
Hall, 31 Vt. l'i1'l2; F11!Ps v. Hemenway, 64 :\le.
37'1; SuthPrland v. Wyer, 67 :\le. 64; Lamoreaux v. HolfP. an X II. :tl; :\Iullaly v. Austin. 97 Mass. 30; How1ml Y. Daly, 61 N. Y.
:lfi2.
~u<'h 1lnmai:es are not special or prospcctin• dnmnges, but 11re the dnmngcs naturally
1·1•1<ultlnit from a total breach of the contract,
mid are suffered when the conti·act is broken,
arnl are :i";.:pio;sed as of that time. From the
n11ture of the contract they Include damages
for not 1wrformlug the contract In the futnr<' as wt>ll RR ln the pa!!t. 1'hc value of
the contrul't to the plalntltr at the time It Is
11rokt>11 111ny he somf'what l111ll'ftnlt1• hN•nuse
the 1lurntl1111 of the llfe of tlJP plnlntllT Is un-

certain, but uncertainty In the duration of a
life has not, since tbe adoption of lite tables,
been regarded as a reason why full relief In
damages should not be atrorcted for a failure
to perform a contr:wt which by its terms
was to continue during life.
When the defendant, for example, absolutely refuses to perform such a contract after
the time for entering upon the performance
has begun, It would be a great hardship to
compel the plaintiff to be ready at all times
during his life to l>e supported by the defendant, If the defendant should at any time
change his mind; and to hold that he must
resort to successive adlons from time to time
to obtain his dam11gcs piecemeal, or else leave
them to be recovered as an entirety by his
personal representatives after his death.
Daniels v. Newton, 114 Mass. 530, decides
that an absolute refusal to perform a contract
before the performance Is due by the terms
ot the contract Is not 11 present breach of the
contract for whleh any aetlon can be maintained; but It does not decide that an absolute refusal to perform a contract after the
time and under tile conditions In which the
plalntll'f Is entitled lo require performance,
Is not a breach cf the contract. even although
the contract Is by Its terms to continue In the
future.
The cases cited by the defendant are not
Inconsistent with t.Jese views. In Pierce v.
"Woodward, 6 Pick. 206, the declaration was
for a breach of a negative promise, namely,
"not to set up the business of a grocer" wltliln certain limits; and It was held that the
damages could be assessed only to the date
of the writ. The defendant might at any
time, without tt.c cOI:sent · of the plaintiff,
stop carrying on the bl'slness, when the plalntll'f's damages would nl'cessarlly cease.
Powers v. Ware., 4 Pick. 100, was an action ot covenant broken, brought by the oversel'rs of the poor, under St. 1793, c. 59, § 5,
for the hrench of a covenant to maintain :m
apprentice under an indenture of n11prentleeshlp. The court in the opinion· spenk of the
common-law rulf' m assf'sslng damages only
to the date of the writ. But the statute under which the action was brought preventt><l
the overseers frvm treating the contract as
wholly at an end, because It gave the a11prPntlce a right :ir action when the tem1 Is
f'Xpirect. "for damages for the causf's afore·
said, othl'r thnn 1mch, It 11ny, ·for which damages may have been recovert.>d as uforesnhl,"
that Is, hy the overseers.
Hambleton v. Veere, 2 Saund. 169, was an
action on the cnse for enticing away an apprentice; and Wnrd v. Rich, 1 Vent. 103, wus
an action for abducting a wife; and nelthl'r
throws much light on the rule of damuJ?NI
for breach of a contract.
Horn v. Chandler, 1 Mod. 271, Wll8 cove·
nant broken upon an Indenture of an Infant
npprentl<>e, who under the custom of London
hnd bournl himself to serve the plalntltt for
seven years, the declnratlon alleged a lm111

PRESE:'\1' AND PHOSl'ECTl \.E DA.MAGES.
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of service for the whole term, a part of which

was unexpired; on demurrer to the plea, the

declaration was held good, but it was said

“that the plaintlf f may take damages for the

departure only, not the loss of service during

the term; and then it will be well enough."

But if this be law to-day in actions on in-

dentures of apprenticeship, it must be re-

membered that they are peculiar contracts,

in which the rights and obligations of the

parties are often affccted by statutory regu-

lations. and in some cases they cannot be

avoided or treated as at an end at the will

of the parties.

In this case, the declaration alleges in ef-

feet a promise to support the plaintiff dur-

ing his life, from and after receiving the

of service for the whole term, a part of which
was unexpired; on demurrer to the plea, the
declaration was held good, but It was said
"that the plalntur may take damages for the
departure only, not the loss of service during
the term; and then It will be well enough."
But If this be law to-day In actions on indentures of apprenticeship, It must be remembered that they are peculiar contracts,
In which the rights and obllgntlons of the
parties are orten alt'ected by statutory regulations, and In sowe cases they cannot be
avoided e>r treated alt at an end at the will
of the parties.
In tbl.s case, the declaration alleges In effect a promise to support the plalntllt' during bis life, from and after receiving the
conveyance of cerWn real estate, an acceptance of such conveyance, and a neglect and
rf>.fusal tC> perform the agreement. These are

115

sufftclent allegations to enable the plalntltr
to recover damages as for a total breach.
The co11rt Instructed the jury that, "It the
defendant for a period of about two years
neglected te> furnish aid or support to the
plalntul", without any fnult of the plaintiff,
the plaintiff might treat the contract as at an
end, and recover damages for the breach of
the contract as a whole.'' We cannot say
that this lnstructlon was erroneous as applied te> the facts in l'Vldence In the cause,
which are not set out.
The jury must hne found that the plaintiff
did treat the contract as ftnally broken by
the defendant, and the propriety of this finding on the evidence Is not before ua. Judgment on the verd:ct for the larger sum.
NOTE. See, also the cases under head of
"Damages tor BreaCh of Contract tor Per~onal
Services," post, 314.

conveyance of certain real estate, an accept-

ance of such conveyance, and a neglect and

refusal to perform the agreement. These are
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sufﬁcient allegations to enable the plaintiff

to recover damages as for a total breach.

The court instructed the jury that, “if the

defendant for a period of about two years

neglected to furnish aid or support to the

plaintiff, without any fault of the plaintiff,

the plaintiff might treat the contract as at an

end, and recover damages for the breach of

the contract as a whole." We cannot say

that this instruction was erroneous as ap-

plied to the facts in evidence in the cause,

which are not set out.

The jury must have found that the plaintiff

did treat the contract as ﬁnally broken by

the defendant, and the propriety of this ﬁnd-

lug on the evidence is not before us. Judg-

ment on the verdict for the larger sum.

NOTE. See, also, the cases under head of

"Damages for Breach of Contract for Personal

Services," post. 314.

v

(
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DIRECT AND CONSEQUENTIAL DAM.-&GI‘IS—lN CO.\"J.‘RAUT.

HADLEY et al. v. BAXE.\'DALE et ul.

(9 Exch. 341.) -

Court of Exchequer, Hilary Term. ‘Feb. 23,

1854.

The ﬁrst count of the declaration sia ted that,

before and at the tithe of the making by the

defendants of the promises hereinafter men-

tioned, the plaintiffs carried on the business

of mllicrs and meal men in co-partnership, and

were proprietors and occupiers of the City

Steam Mills, in the city of Gloucester, and

were possessed of a steam engine, by means

of which they worked the said mills, and

therein cleaned corn, and ground the same

into meal, and dressed the same into ﬂour,

sharps, and bran; and a certain portion of

the said steam engine, to wit, the crank shaft

f the said engine, was broken, and out of

epair, whereby the said steam engine was
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prevented from working. and the plaintiffs

were desirous of having a new crank shaft

made for the said mill, and had ordered the

same of certain persons trading under the

name of W. Joyce & Co., at Greenwich, in the

county of Kent, who had contracted to make

the said new shaft for the plaintiffs; but be-

fore they could complete the said new shaft it

was necessary that the said broken shaft

should be forwarded to their works at Green-

wich, in order that the said new shaft might

be made so as to ﬁt the other parts of the said

engine which were not injured, and so that it

might be substituted for the said broken shaft;

and the plaintiffs were desirous of sending the

said broken shaft to the said W. Joyce & Co.

for the purpose aforesaid; and the defendants.

before and at the time of the making of the

said promises. were common carriers of goods

and chattels for hire from Gloucester to Green-

wich, and carried on such business of common

carriers under the name of Pickford & Co.;

and the plaintiffs, at the request of the defend-

ants, delivered to them, as such carriers, the

said broken shaft, to be conveyed by the de-

fendants as such carriers from Gloucester to

the said W. Joyce & Co., at Greenwich, and

there to be delivered for the plaintiffs on the

second day after the day of such delivery. for

reward to the defendants; and in considera-

tion thereof the defendants then promised the

plaintiffs to convey the said broken shaft from

Gloucester to Greenwich, and there, on the

said second day. to deliver the same to the

said W. Joyce & Co. for the plaintiffs; and, al-

though such second day elapsed before the

commencement of this suit, yet the defendants

did not nor would deliver the said broken shaft

at Gre wlch on the said second day, or to the

said . Joyce & Co. on the said second day,

but wholly neglected and refused so to do for

the space of seven days after the said shaft

was so delivered to them as aforesaid.

The second count stated that. the defendants

being such carriers as aforesaid, the plaintiffs,

at the request of the defendants, caused to be

delivered to them as such carriers the said

broken shaft, to be conveyed by the defend-

ants from uioucester, aforesaid, to the said
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worked. The ste.'nn engine was manufactur-

ed by Messrs. Joyce & Co., the enginee1s, at

Greenwich, and it became necessary to send

the shaft as a pattern for a new one to Green-

wich. The f1acture was discovered on the

12th, and on the 13th the plaintiffs sent one

,f their servants to the oﬂice of the defend-

ants. who are the well-known carriers trad-

ing under the name of Pickford & Co., for the

purpose of having the shaft carried to Green-

wich. The plaintiffs‘ servant told the clerk

that the mill was stoplwd, and that the shaft

must be sent immediately; and in answer to

the inquiry when the shaft would be taken

the answer was that if it was sent up by

1weive o'clock any day it would be delivered

at Greenwich on the following day. On the

following day the shaft was taken by the de-

fendants, before noon, for the purpose of be-

Generated for facpubupdates (University of Michigan) on 2014-06-12 19:21 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/mdp.35112105421491
Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd-google

ing conveyed to Greenwich, and the sum of

£2 ~is. was paid for its carriage for the whole

distance. At the same time the defendants‘

clerk was told that a special entry, if requir-

ed, should be made, to hasten its delivery.

The delivery of the shaft at Greenwich was

delayed by some neglect, and the conse-

quence was that the plaintiffs did not receive

the new shaft for several days after they

would otherwise have done, and the work-

ing of their mill was thereby delayed, and

Ihe_v thereby lost the proﬁts they would oth-

erwise have received.

On the part of the defendants it was object-

ed that these damages were too remote. and

that the defendants were not liable with re-

spect to them. The learned judge left the

case generally to the jury, who found a ver-

dict with £25 damages beyond the amount

paid into court.

Kcating & Dowdeswell, showed cause.

“'hateley. Willes & Phipson, in support of

the rule.

The judgment of the court was now deliv-

ered by

ALDEltSO\', B. We think that thereought

to be a new trial in this case; but in so do-

ing we deem it to be expedient and necessary

to state explicitly the rule which the judge,

at the next trial. ought, in our opinion, to di-

rect the jury to be governed by when they

estimate the damages.

It is, indeed, of the last importance that

we should do this; for, if the jury are left

without any deﬁnite rule to guide them, it

will, in such cases as these, manifestly lead

to the greatest injustice. The courts have

done this on several occasions; and in Blake

v. Railway Co., 21 L. J. Q. B. 237, the court

granted a new trial on this very ground, that

the rule had not been deﬁnitely laid down to

the jury by the learned judge at nisi prins.

"There are certain established rules," this

court says, in Alder v. Keighlcy, 15 .\ices. &

W. 117, “according to which the jury ought

to ﬁm." And the court in that case adds:

“And here there is a clear rule that the

amount which would ha - 1- '

i the contract had been kept is the measure of

111'.i
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or putting up at the time. and that they only

wished to send back the broken shaft to the

engineer who made it, it is clear that this

would be quite consistent with the above cir-

cumstances, and yet the unreasonable delay

in the delivery would have no effect upon the

intermediate proﬁts of the mill. Or, again,

suppose that, at the time of the delivery to

the carrier, the machinery of the mill had

been in other respects defective then, also,

the same results would follow.

true that the shaft was actually s nt back to

serve as a model for a new one, and that the ‘

want of a new one was the only cause of the

stoppage of the mill, and that the loss of prof-

its really arose from not sending down the

new shaft in prope.r time, and that this arose

from the delay in d ivering the broken one

to serve as a modelj But it is obvious that
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in the great multitide of cases of millers

sending of! broken shafts to third persons by

a. carrier under ordinary circumstances, such

consequences would not, in all probability,

Here it is ‘

have occurred; and these special circum-

stances were here never communicated by the

plaintiffs to the defendants. It‘ follows,

therefore, that the loss of proﬁts here cannot

reasonably be considered such a consequence

of the breach of contract as could have been

fairly and reasonably contemplated by both

the parties when they made this contract.

For such loss would neither have ﬂowed nat-

urally from the breach of this contract in the

great multitude of such cases occurring un-

der ordinary circumstances, nor were the spe-

cial circumstances, which, perhaps, would

have made it a reasonable and natural conse-

quence of such breach of contract, communi-

cated to or known by the defendants. The

judge ought, the1efo1e, to have told the jury

‘ that upon the facts then before them they

ought not to take the loss of proﬁts into con-

sideration at all in estimating the damages.

There must therefore be a new trial in this

case.

Rule absolute.
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or putting up at the time, and that they only
wished to send back the broken shaft to the
engineer who made It, lt Is clear that this
would be quite consistent with the above cir·
cumstances, and yet the unreasonable delay
In the delivery would have no effect upon the
Intermediate profits of the mill. Or, again,
suppose that, at the time <>f the delivery to
the carrier, the machinery of the mill had
been ln other respects defectlve~then, also,
the same results would follow. Here lt ls
true tbat the shaft was actually s nt back to
serve as a model for a new <>ne, and that the
want <>f a new one was the only cause of the
st<>ppage of the mill, a.nd that the l<>Bs of profits really arose from not sending down the
11ew shaft In proper time, and that this arose
from the delay In djh·ering the broken one
to serve as a model. But lt ls obvious that
In the great multltl <le ot. cases of miller•
sending off broken shafts to third pereons by
a carrier under ordinary circumstances, such
consequences would not, ln afl probablllcy,

1

have occurred; and these special circurustances were here never communicated by the
plalntltre to the defendants. It · follows,
therefore, that the l<>Bs of profits here cannot
reasonably be considered such a conseqnl'nce
of the breach of contract a.s could have been
fairly and reasonably contemplated by both
the parties when they made this contract.
For such loss would neither have ft.owed naturally from the breach of this contract In the
great multitude of such ca.see occurring under ordinary circumstances, nor were the special circumstances, which, perhaps, would
have made it a reasonable and natural consequence of such breach of contract, communicated to or known by the defendants. The
judge ought, therefore, to have told the jury
that upon the facts then bet<>re thew they
ought not to take the loss of profits lnto consideration at all ln estimating the damages.
Thtire must therefore be a new trial in thill

case.
Rule absolute.
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CORY v. THAMES IRONWORKS & SHIP-

(L. R. 3 Q. B. 181.)

BUILDING 0O.

(L. R. 3 Q. B. 181.)

Court of Queen's Bench, Hilary Term. Jan. 17,
1868.

Court of Queen's Bench, Hilary Term. Jan. 17,

1868.

This was an issue directed by the court of

chanccry under 8 & 9 Vlct. c. 109, to ascer-

tain the amount of damages to which the

plaintiffs were entitled, inter alia, by reason

of the delay by the defendants in the deliv-

ery of the hull of a ﬂoating boom derrick, un-

der a contract of sale.

At the trial before Shee, J., at the sittings in

London, after Hilary term, 12461. a verdict

was taken for the plaintiffs, subject to a case

to be started by an arbitrator.

1. The plaintiffs are coal merchants and

ship owners, having a very large import trade

in coal from Newcastle and other places into
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the port of London. The defendants are iron

manufacturers and ship builders in London.

2. The plaintiffs had introduced, at the

docks where they discharged the cargoes of

coal from their ships, a new and expeditious

mode of unloading the coals by means of iron

buckets, which were worked by hydraulic

pressure over powerful cranes, and the plain-

tiffs‘ trade having considerably increased they

were desirous of improving the accommoda-

tion offered in the discharge of their vessels

by the above mode; this the defendants were

not aware of.

3. The defendants had been building for the

Patent Derrick Company the hull of a large

vessel called a patent boom derrick, which

was constructed and ﬁtted with heavy and

powerful machinery for raising sunken ves-

sels or other similar purposes requiring great

power. The derrick was a large ﬂat-bottom-

ed iron vessel or ﬂoat, 250 feet long by 90

feet wide and 14 feet deep, divided by iron

bulk heads of great strength into more than

eighty compartments, measuring generally 15

feet long by 13 feet wide, she was decked

over all and had hatchways leading from the

deck to the interior.

4. During the constructing of this vessel the

derrick company became insolvent, and as

the defendants could not obtain payment for

the vessel they were obliged to take it upon

their own hands and sell it for the best price

they could obtain.

5. On the 1st of October, 1861. the plaintiffs

entered into the following agreement with

the defendants: The defendants agree to

sell and the plaintiffs agree to purchase “for

the sum of £3,500, the hull of the ﬂoating

boom derrick now lying in Bugsby's Hole in

the river Thames. It is agreed between the,

parties hereto that payment shall be made in

the following manner, that is to say, the sum

of £350 at the signing of this memorandum,

a further sum of £1.40‘) when possession is

given, which is to be given within three

months from the date hereof, and the sum of

£1,750 by a bill of exchange to be dated on

the day when possession is given, and to be

drawn at six months‘ date" by the defend-

This was an Issue directed by the court of
chancery under 8 & 9 Viet. c. 109, to ascertain the amount of damages to which the
plalntl1fs were entitled, Inter alla, by reason
of the delay by the defendants ln the dellv·
ery of the hull of a tloatlng boom derrick, UD·
der a contract of sale.
At the trial before Sbee, J., at the sittings In
Londo;_, after Hilary term, 18f'.4, a verdict
was taken tor the plalnturs, subject to a case
to be started by an arbitrator.
1. The plalntllra are coal merchants and
ship owners, having a very large Import trade
ln coal from Newcastle and other places Into
the port of London. The defendants are Iron
manufacturers and ship builders In London.
2. The plalnturs had Introduced, at the
docks where they discharged the cargoes of
coal from their ships, a new and expeditious
mode of unloading the coals by means of Iron
buckets, which were worked by hydraulic
pressure over powerful cranes. and the plalntlfrs' trade having considerably Increased they
were desirous of Improving the accommodation oft'ered In the dlseharge of their veasels
by the above mode; this the defendanta were
not aware of.
3. The defendants had been building for the
Patent Derrick Company the hull of a large
vessel called a patent boom derrick, which
was constructed and fitted with heavy and
powerful machinery for raising sunken ves·
sel.8 or other almllar purposes requiring great
power. The derrick was a large tlat-bottomed Iron veuel or doat, 250 feet long by 00
feet wide and 14 feet deep, divided by Iron
bulk heads of great strength Into more than
eighty compartmenta, measuring generally 15
feet long by 18 feet wide, she was decked
over all and had hatchways leading from the
deck to the Interior.
4. During the constructing of this vessel the
derrick company became Insolvent, and as
the defendanta could not obtain payment for
the vessel they were obliged to take It upon
their own bands and sell It for the best price
they could obtain.
5. On the lat of October, 1861, the plalntltrs
entered Into the following agreement with
the defendants: The defendants agree to
sell and the plalntltrs agree to purchase "for
the sum of £3,!500, the hull of the tloatlng
boom derrick now lying In Bugsby's Hole In
the river Thames. It Is agreed between the
parties hereto that payment shall be made lo
the following manner, that Is to say, the sum
of £350 at the signing of this memorandum,
a further sum of £1.400 when posseRslon Is
given, which ls to be given within three
months from the date hereof, and the sum of
£1,700 by a bill of exchange to be dated on
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the day when possession ls given, and to be
drawn at slx months' date" by the deft>tHlants and accepted by the plaintiffs. The defendants were to be at liberty to sell the
tripod, boom, and other machinery ln the
bull.
6. The plalntllrs purchased the derrlrk for
~e purposes of their business, In order to
erect and place In It, as they ln fact did, hug,~
hydrnullc cranes and machinery, such as thc>y
had pre,·lously used at the docks, and by
means of these cranes to transship their coals
from colliers Into barges without the nc>cc>sslty for any Intermediate landing, the derrick, for this purpose, being moored In the
river Thomes, and the plalntl1fs paying the
conservators of the river a large rent for allowing It to remain there.
7. The derrick was the first vessel of the
kind that had ever been built ID this country,
and the purpose to which the plalntltfs sougI1t
to apply It was entirely novel and exceptional. Xo hull or other vessel had ever been
fitted either by coal merchants or others In a
similar way or for a similar purpose; and
the defendants at the date of the agreement
had notice that the plalntlft's purchased the
derrick for the purpose of their business, considering that It was Intended to be used as
a coal store; but they had no notice or knowledge of the special object for which It was
purchased and to which It was actually a11·
piled.
8. At the date of the agreement the defendants believed that the plalntltrs were pur·
chaBlng the derrick for the purpose of using
her In the way of their business as a <>onl
store; but the plalnturs had not at that time
any Intention of applying the dert·lck to any
other purpose than the spedal purpose to
which she wae In fact afterwards applied.
9. It the plaintiffs had been prevented from
applying the derrick to the special purpose
for which she was purchased and to which
she was applied, they would have endeav·
oured to sell her to persons In the bulk trade
as a hulk for storing coals, and had they
been unable to sell her, they could and would
have employed her ln that trade and In that
way themselves; that was the most obvious
use to which such a vessel was capahle of
being applied by persons In the plalntltrs•
business, but the hulk trade Is a distinct
bran<'h of the coal trade, and neither formP11
nor forms any part of the business carried on
by the plalntlft's; and the derrick being an
t>ntlrely novel and exceptional vessel and the
first or the kind built, no vessel of the sort
had ever been applied to such a purpose. 'l'he
derrick was, however, capable of being applied to and profitably employed for that purpose, and had she been purchased for that
purpose her non-delivery at the time fixed by
the agreement would have occasioned loss
and damage to the plalntllfs to the a10ount
of £420.
10. Great difficulty was experienced In re·
_m oving the tripod and other things from tl.Je
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hrll in consequence of their enormous weight

and size, and the hull was not cleared until

the latter end of May, 1862, when it was

found that some damage had been done to

the bottom and other parts of the vessel in

the course of removing the machinery.

11. Upon the hull being cleared, the de-

fendants gave notice to the plaintiffs that

they were ready to deliver it to them.

12. The plaintiffs, however, refused to re-

ceive the hull until the damage had been

properly repaired, and some difference arose

between the respective surveyors of the

plaintiffs and defendants as to the extent of

the injury and the proper mode of repairing

it. The plaintiffs continued to make objec-

tions to the sutiiciency of the repairs until the

1st of July, 1862, when the vessel was deliv-

ered.
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13. The plaintiffs, on the 1st of October,

1861, duly paid to the defendants £350 in

part payment of the purchase-money, and

they also duly paid the remainder of the pur-

chase-money at the time when the hull was

delivered to them.

14. The three months within which, accord-

ing to the terms of the agreement, the de-

fendants were to give up to the plaintitis pos-

session of the hull, expired on the 1st of

January, 1862, but the defendants did not

deliver it to the plaintiffs until the 1st of

Jul_\‘, 1862.

15. The injury caused to the bull in the re-

moval of the machinery depreciated her to

the amount of £50.

to. The plaintiffs, in anticipation of the de-

livery of the bull in January, 1862, entered

into a contract with Sir William Armstrong

for the construction and delivery to them at

a very heavy outlay of the necessary machin-

ery for the purpose for which they purchased

the hull, and in consequence of the delay in

the delivery of the hull by the defendants

the plaintiffs were prevented from taking

delivery of the machinery from Sir William

Armstrong. and the plaintiffs, on the 25th

of July, 1862, paid Sir Willlam Armstrong

£3,000, the interest of which was lost to

them. The plaintiffs also purchased, at a

large cost, two steam tugs to be used, in con-

junction with the bull, in towing the coal

barges to and from the same, and which

steam tugs were comparalively useless to the

plaintiffs during the time in which the hull

was undelivered, and the interest‘of the

money expended on the same was lost to the

plaintiffs; but none of the circumstances

were known to the defendants.

17. if the defendants had delivered the bull

to the plaintiffs in proper time the plaintiffs

would have realized large proﬁts by the use

of it in the aforesaid manner, and they were

put to great in(.'onveniencc and sustained

great loss owing to their not having posses-

sion of the bull to meet the great increase in

their trade.

18. The plaintiffs also lost £8. 15s. for in-

terest upon the portion of the purcinlse-mon-
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merely technical rule, via, that you are to en-

deavor to ascertain the real amount of dam-

ages that the plaintiff has sustained, and if

it is just and reasonable that the defendant

should make good this amount, he must pay

it: provided that if he had no notice of any

circumstance which makes the plaintitl"s loss

greater than it ordinarily would he. he cannot

be called upon to pay this extra damage; and

' the court of exchequer say if this limit were

not put there would be no limit to what de-

fendants in certain circumstances might be

called upon to pay; and therefore, say the

court, in order to recover from the vendor the

damage accruing on account of some special

sub-contract or other circumstance. the vendee

must affect hhn with notice. And the court lay

down the rule that the plaintiff can only re-

cover such damages as are the natural result
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of the breach of contract in ordinary circum-

stances, or,—which would appear to be an-

other mode of expressing the same thing,—

what were in the contemplation of both par-

ties at the time of the contract.

[BLACKB['R.\'. J. The damages are to be

what would be the natural consequences of

a breach under clrcumstances which both par-

ties were aware of.]

Accepting that as the statement of the law.

what are the facts here? 'l'he subject-matter

of the contract is entirely novel: and the pur-

pose for which it was intended to be used in

point of fact was entirely novel and excep-

tional; but any use of this hull would be novel

and exceptional. so that the £420 comes as

much within the rule in Hadley v. Baxendale.

9 Exch. 341. 2% Law J. Exch. 179, as the other

and larger loss actually sustained.

[(X)CKBURN, C. J. No doubt, in order to

recover damage arising from a special pur-

pose the buyer must have communicated the

special purpose to the seller: but there is one

thing which must always be in the knowledge

of both parties, which i that the thing is

bought for the purpose of being in some way

or other proﬁtably applied]

No doubt; but the arbitrator has not found

that. He ﬁnds the special purpose for which

the hull was bought. and to which it was

in fact applied. and also the amount of dam-

‘age which the plaintiffs would have suf-

fered had they applied it to another special

purpose.

[BL-\(Jl(BUltN, J. Yes: but the arbitrator

(paragraphs 8 and 9) says that was the most

obvious purpose. and the one to which the de-

fendants supposed the hull was intended to

be applied]

But it is a use totally distinct from that to

which the plaintiffs applied and intended to

apply it.

[COi’.‘KBl‘RN. C. J. The two parties cer-

tainly had not in their common contemplation

the application of this vessel to any one spe-

ciﬁc purpose. The plaintiffs intended to ap-

ply it in their trade, but to the special pur-

pose of transshipping coals; the defendants be-

lieved that the plaintiffs would apply it to the
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which one of them has broken, the damages

which the other party ought to receive in

respect of such breach of contract should

be such as may fairly and reasonably be

considered, either arising naturally, i. e.

according to the usual course of things, from

such breach of contract itself [that is one

alternative], or such as may reasonably be

supposed to have been in the contemplation

of both parties, at the time they made the

contract, as the probable result of the

breach of it." Now, in the present case

the breach of contract was the non-delivery

at the agreed time of a hull capable of be-

ing used as a hulk for storing coals, and the

consequences that would naturally arise

from such non-delivery of it would be that

the purchaser would not be able to earn

money by its use, and this loss of proﬁt
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during the delay would be the measure oi.

the damages caused by the non-delivery.]

But the purpose supposed by the defend-

ants was not part of the business of the

plaintiffs, the hulk trade being a distinct

branch; so that it is impossible to say that

the loss of proﬁt which might have been de-

rived trom this supposed purpose could have

reasonably been contemplated as the nat-

ural consequence of the defendants‘ breach

of contract.

[MELLOR, J. That is tying down the ar-

bitrator's ﬁnding too strictly. There must

be some proﬁtable purpose, and this was the

most obvious proﬁtable purpose. Suppose

there are two equally proﬁtable but distinct

modes of using the same thing, and the buy-

er contemplates one use, and the seller the

other, it is not because the one party con-

templated one use and the other the other,

that the buyer is not to get any damages at

all.]

The answer is, such a case is not within

the rule in Hadley v. Baxendale, 9 Exch.

341, 23 Law J. Exch. 179.

UOUKBURN, C. J. I think the construc-

tion which Mr. Coleridge seeks to put upon

the case of Hadley v. Baxendale, 9 Exch.

341, 23 Law. J. Exch. 179, is not the correct

construction as applicable to such a case

as this. It that were the correct construc-

tion, it would be attended with most mis-

chievous consequences, because this would

follow, that whenever the seller was not

made aware of the particular and special

purpose to which the buyer intended to

apply the thing bought, but thought it was

for some other purpose, he would be re-

lieved entirely from making any compensa-

tion to the buyer, in case the thing was not

delivered in time, and so loss was sustained

by the buyer; and it would be entirely in

the power of the seller to break his contract

with impunity. That would necessarily fol-

low. if Mr. Coleridge's interpretation of Had-

ley v. Bnxendale, 9 Exch. 341, 23 Law J.

Exch. 179, was the true interpretation. My

Brother BLACKBURN has pointed out that

that is not the true construction of the lan-
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ages could never be anything but what both

parties contemplated; and where the buyer

intended to apply the thing to a purpose which

would make the damages greater, and did not

intend to apply it to the purpose which the

seller supposed he intended to apply it, the

consequence would be to set the defendant

free altogether. That would not be just, and

I do not think that was at all meant to be

expressed in Hadley v. Baxendale, 9 Exch.

341, 23 Law J . Exch. 179. Here the arbitrator

has found that what the defendants supposed

when they were agreeing to furnish the der-

rick was that it was to be employed in the

most obvious manner to earn money, which

the arbitrator assesses at £420 during the six

ages could never be anything but what both
MELLOR, J. I am entirely of the same
parties contemplated; and where the buyer .oplolon. The question ls, what ls the limit of
Intended to apply the thing t.o a purpose which damages which are to be given against the
would wake the damages greater, and did not defendants for the breach of this contract?
intend to apply It to the purpose which the They will be the damages naturally resulting,
seller supPoSed he Intended to apply It, the and which might reasonably be in contempln·
consequence would be to set the defendant tlon of the parties as likely to ftow, from the
free altogether. That would not be just, and breach of such contract. It is not because the
I do not think that was at all meant to be parties are not precisely ad idem as to the use
expressed In Hadley v. Baxendale, 9 Exch. of the article In question that the defendants
341, 23 Law J. Exch. 179. Here the arbitrator are not t.o pay any damages. Both parties
bas found that what the defendants supposed contemplated a profitable use of the derrick;
when they were agreeing to furnish the der· and when one finds that the defendants con·
rick was that It was t.o be employed lo the templated a particular use of It as the obmost obvious manner to earn money, which vious mode In which It might be used, I think
the arbitrator llssesses at £420 during the six as against the plalntttrs they cannot complain
months delay; and, &JI I belleYe the natural that the damages do not extend beyond that
consequence of not delivering the derrick was which they contemplated as the amount likely
that that sum was lost, I think the plalnturs t.o result from their own breach of contract.
should recover to that extent.
Judgment tor the plalntltrs accordingly.

months delay; and, as I believe the natural

consequence of not delivering the derrick was

that that sum was lost, I think the piaintiffs

Generated for facpubupdates (University of Michigan) on 2014-06-12 19:21 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/mdp.35112105421491
Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd-google

should recover to that extent.

. opinion.

MELLOR, J. I am entirely of the same

•

The question is, what is the limit of

damages which are to be given against the

defendants for the breach of this contract?

They will be the damages naturally resulting,

and which might reasonably be in contempla-

tion of the parties as likely to ﬂow, from the

breach of such contract. It is not because the

parties are not precisely ad idem as to the use

of the article in question that the defendants

are not to pay any damages. Both parties

contemplated a proiitahle use of the derrick;

and when one ﬁnds that the defendants con-

templated a particular use of it as the ob-

vious mode in which it might be used, I think

as against the plaintiffs they cannot complain

that the damages do not extend beyond that

which they contemplated as the amount likely

to result from their own breach of contract.

Judgment for the plaintiffs accordingly.

•
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HORNE v. MIDLAND RY. CO.

(L. R. 7 O. P. 583.)

Court of Common Pleas. Trinity Term. June 6,

1872.

The plaintiffs, who were under a contract to

supply a quantity of military shoes to Hick-

son & Sons in London (for the use of the

French army), at 4s. per pair, an unusually

high price, to be delivered there by the 3d

of February, 1871, sent the shoes to the de-

fendants' station at Kettering in time to be

delivered in the usual course in the evening

of that day, when they would have been ac-

cepted and paid for by the consignee; and the

station-master had notice (which for the pur-

pose of the case was assumed to be notice to

the company) at the time that the plaintiffs

were under a contract to deliver the shoes
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by the 3d, and that, unless they were so de-

livered they would be thrown on their hands,

but no notice was given to the defendants

that the contract with Hickson & Sons wa,

owing to very exceptional-circumstances, not

an ordinary contract. The shoes not arriving

in London until the 4th, Hickson & Sons re-

jected them, and the plaintiffs were ultimately

obliged to sell them at a loss of 1s. 3d. per

pair,—'—2s. 9d. per pair being the ordinary mar-

ket value.

Sawhridge & Wrentmore, for plaintiffs.

Beale. Marigold & Beale, for defendants.

WILLES, J. This case raises a very nice

question upon the measure of damages to

which a common carrier is liable f r a breach

of his contract to carry goods-. It would

seem that the damages which he is to pay

for a late delivery should be the amount of

the loss which in the ordinary course of things

would result from his neglect.‘ The ordinary

consequence of the non-delivery of the goods

here on the 3d of February would he that the

consignee might reject them, and so they

would be thrown upon the market generally,

instead of going to the particular purchaser;

and the measure of damages would ordinaril

be in respect of the trouble to which the con-

signor would be put in disposing of them to

another customer, and the difference between

the value of the goods on the 3d and the

amount realized by a reasonable sale.!That

prima facic would be the sum to be p id, in

the absence of some notice to the carrier

which would render him liable for something

more special. These consequences would re-

fer to the value of the goods at the time of

their delivery to the carrier, the goods being

consigned to an ordinary market and being

goods in daily use and not subject to much

ﬂuctuation in price. In the present case. tak-

ing 2s. 9d. per pair as the value of the shoes,

the ordinary damages would be the trouble

the plaintiffs were put to in procuring some

one to take them at that price, plus the dif-

ference, if any. in the market value between

the Lid and the 4th of February. I ﬁnd noth-

ing in the case to shew that there was any

diminution in the value betweenthose days.

CONTRACT.

Ing In the case to shew that there was any
diminution In the value between_ those days.
The plalntilTs' claim, therefore, In that reCourt of Common l'l<'us. 'l'r1nity Term. June 6, spect, would be covered by the £20 paid luto
18i2.
court.
But they claim to be entitll'd to £26i 3s. {ltl.
The plalntltfs, who were under a contract to
over
and above that sum, on the ground that
sUJlply a quantity of military shoes to Hickson & Sons in London tfor the use of the these shoes bad been sold by them at 4s. a
French army), at 4s. per pair, an unusually pair to a consignee who required them for a
high price, to be delivered there by the 3d contract with a Fr<'nch house for supply to
of February, 1871, sent the shoes to the de- the F1·ench army, wW<'l1 price he would hnve
fendants' station at Kettering In time to be been bound to pay ff the shoPs had been dedelivered In the usual course In the evening livered on the 3d of February. The special
of that day, when they would have been ac- price which the consignee had agreed to pay
cepted and paid for by the consignee; and the was the consequence of tile extraordina1·y destation-master had notice (which for the pur- mand arising from the wants of the l~rench
pose of the case was assmped to be notice to army; and the refusal of the consignee to acthe company) at the time that the plnlntlft's cept the goous on the 4th was cnused by the
were under a contract to deliver the slloes cessation ot the demand for shops of that
by the 3d, and that, unless they were so de- character by reason of the war having come
livered they would be thrown on their hands, to an end. The market-price, therefore. we
hut no notice was given to the defendants must assume, to have been 2s. 9d. a pair when
that the contract with Hickson & Sons was, the shoes were delivered to the carriers: and
ow lug to very exceptional. circumstances, not the circumstance which <'aused the difference
an ordlna ry contract. The shoes not arrh-lng was that the plaintil'fs had bad the ach·antage
In Lornlon until the 4th, Hiekson & Sons re- of n contmct ut 4s. a pair before the extruor·
jPC'!etl the41, aud the plalntllfs were ultimately dinnry demand had ceased. \Vas that, then.
ohligf'<l to sf'll them at a loss of ls. 3d. per an exct>ptlonal contract? It was not, I take
rmir,_:_2s. !)d. per pair b eing the ordinary mar- It, at the time the contract was entered Into;
but It was at the time the shoes were delivlwt ''alue.
ered to the carriers. The plaintilTs sustainP1l
~awbrhlg-P & Wrf'ntmore, for plalntllis.
a loss of ls. 3d. a pair on the 4;)95 pairs of
Rrale. l\Inrigold & Beale, for defendants.
shoes which they failed to deliver In pursuance of their contract. It was, so to s1wak.
WILLES, J. This case rnlses a very nice a penalty thrown upo{ them by reason of
question upon the measure o.f damages to the breach of contract. In that point of view.
whld1 a common carrier Is liable f<f a breach the contrac t was an e ce1Jtional one at t he
of his contract to carry goods.
would\ time the shoes were dellvcrPd to the C'arriPrs;
s<'em that the damages which he Is to pay and they onght to haYe been Informed of the
for a late delivery should be the amount of fact that b~· reason of special circumstances
the loss whieh In the ordinary course of things the sellers would, If the delivery had taken
would result from his nPglect.I The ordinary place In time, ha•e been entitled to receive
consf'quence of the non-dPllvery of the goods from the consignee a larger price for the
hf're on the 3d of l<'ebruaQ· would he that the shoes than they would have been entitled to
consignee might rejf'ct them, nnd so tbPy in the ordinary course of trade.\ It must be
would be thrown upon the market generally, rpmemhered that we are denhng 1w1th the case
Instead of going to the particular purchaser;f of a common carrier, who Is bournl to acce11t
and the measure of damages would ordinarily' the goods. It would be hnrd Indeed If the
be In respe('t of the trouble to which the con- law were to fix llim with the further liability
signor would be put In disposing of them to which Is here sought to be imposed upon him,
another customer, and the difference hetWN'll hecnuse he hils vecelved a notice which does
the value of the goods on the 3d and tM not disclose the \Special nnd exceptional conamount realized by a re:tsonable sale. I That sequences which will or may result from a
prima facle would be the sum to be pbld, In dclayc·d d1•1ivcry.J I think the law In this
the ahsPnce of some notice to the carrier res1wct bns gone quite as fnr as good sense
whi!'h would !'l'ntlrr him liable for i'rnmething warr1111ts. The cases as to the measure of
w ore special. These consequences would r e- damag-es for a tort do not «p11ly to a cnsP
fl>r to the value of the goods at the time of of contract. That was su~g-..sted In a casC!
tlwlr <l!'livery to the currier, the goods bdng In Bulstrode,-Everarcl v. Hopkins, 2 Bul~t.
1·onslgnerl to an ordinary market and b1·ing :::a2.- but the notion was corn•c h•ll in Hadlf'y
goods In dally use and not subject to mul'l1 v. B7~endale, 9 Exch. 841, 2:1 Law J. Exch.
tluetuatlon In price. In the pn•sent cnse. tak- li9. \The !lamai:Ps are to be limitl'cl to those
ing 2s. lcld. pe1· pair ns the ,·aluc of the shoPs, that are till' natural and ordinary consethe ordinary d11m11;:ws would be the trouhle quences whlf'11 mny be supposed to hn•e been
the plail1tifl'l" w!'rP pnt to In procuring some In the cont<•m11lation of the parties at thl'
one to t:1ke thPm nt that pricl', plus the dif- time of nrnklug the contract.' I go furt her.
for<•t1<'l', If 1111~·. in the market ,·aJue h(•t w1•l'n I aclherf' to what l !>aid in Saw-.Mlll Co. v.
ti1t' :Id and the 4th of February. I find uoth·
NcttlPship, L. R. 3 C. P. 491), at p. 509, viz.
HOTINE v. }IIDLAND RY. 00.

1'24

DA:~\l.A.GES-IN

(L. R. 7 C. P. 583.)
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that “the knowledge must be brought home to

the party sought to be charged, under such

circumstances_that he must know that the

person he contracts with reasonably believes

that he accepts the contract with the special

condition attached to it." Was there any

notice here that the defendants would be held

accountable for the particular damages now

claimed? In the ordinary course of things,

the value of the shoes was 2s. 9d. a pair at

the time they were delivered to the defend-

ants to be carried. There was no change in

their market value between the 3d of February

and the 4th; and no notice to the carriers

that the consignees had contracted to pay

for them the exceptional price of 4s. a pair.

The defendants had no notice of the penalty,

so to speak, which a delay in the delivery

would impose upon the plaintiffs. It would,
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as it seems to me, be an extraordinary result

to arrive at, to hold that a more notice to

the carriers that the shoes would be thrown

upon the hands of the consignors it they did

not reach the consignees by the 3d of Feb-

ruary, should ﬁx them with so large a claim.

by reason of facts which were existing in the

minds of the consignors, but were not com-

municated to the carriers at the time

For these reasons, I come to the conclusion

that enough has been paid into court to cover

all the damages which the plaintiffs are en-

titled to recover, and that there must be judg-

ment for the defendants.

KEATING, J. I am of the same opinion.

upon the ground stated by my Brother

WILLES, viz. that the damages claimed are

the consequence not of that which could have

been contemplated by the parties, but of an

exceptional state o1. ‘ things. No doubt, a car-

rier who fails to deliver in due time goods en-

trusted to him is linble, in damages for the

ordinary and natural consequences of his

breach of contract. But I think, giving the rur-

lest effect to Hadley v. Baxendale, 9 Exch. 341.

23 Law J. Exch. 179, and the rule there laid

down, but which ought not to be extended,

we cannot hold the defendants liable in re-

spect of a loss resulting from an exceptional

state of things which was not communicated

to them at the time. There must, lf it he

sought to charge the carrier with consequen-

ces so onerous, be distinct evidence that he

had notice of the facts and assented to ac-

cept the contract upon those terms. That

evidence is not disclosed in this case.

Judgment for the defendants.

NOTE. See this case atiirmed in exchequer

chamber. L. R. 8 O. P. 131.
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GRIFFIN v. COLVER et al.

(16 N. Y. 489.)

Court of Appeals of New York, March Term,

1858.

Action to recover the purchase price of an

engine. Defendants sought to recoup dam-

ages for delay in delivery of the engine.

There was a judgment for plaintiff, from

which defendants appealed.

John C. Churchill, for appellants.

for respondent.

D. Coats,

SELDEN, J. The only point made by the

appellants is that in estimating their dam-

ages on account of the plaintiffs failure to

furnish the engine by the time speciﬁed in

the contract, they should have been allowed

what the proof showed they might have

earned by the use of such engine, together
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with their other machinery, during the time

lost by the delay. This claim was objected

to, and rejected upon the trial as coming

within the rule which precludes the allow-

ance of proﬁts, by way of damages, for the

breach of an executory contract.

To determine whether this rule was cor-

rectly applied by the referee, it is necessary

to recur to the reason upon which it is

founded. It is not a primary rule, but is a

mere deduction from that more general and

fundamental rule which requires that the

damage claimed should in all cases be

shown, by clear and satisfactory evidence,

to have been actually sustained. It is a

well-established rule of the common law

that the damages to be recovered for a

‘breach of contract must be shown with cer-»

1tainty, and not left to speculation or conjec-

ture; and it is under this rule that proﬁts

are excluded from the estimate of damages

in such cases, and not because there is any

thing in their nature which should per se

prevent their allowance. Proﬁts which

ould certainly have been realized but for

he defendant's default are recoverable; those

which are speculative or contingent are not.

Hence, in an action for the breach of a

contract to transport goods, the difference

between the price, at the point where the

goods are and that to which they were to

be transported, is taken as the measure of

damages; and in an action against a vendor

for not delivering the chattels sold, the ven-

dee is allowed the market price upon the

day ﬁxed for the delivery. Although this,

in both cases, amounts to an allowance of

proﬁts, yet, as those proﬁts do not depend

upon any contingency, their recovery is per-

mitted. It is regarded as certain that the

goods would have been worth the estab-‘

lished market price at the place and on the

day when and where they should have been

delivered,

On the other hand, in cases of illegal cap-

ture, or of the insurance of goods lost at sea,

there can be no recovery for the probable

loss of proﬁts at the port of destination. The

principal reason for the diiicrencc between

lJiiLE()'.i' AND (JOSb'klQUE){'l'iAL DAMAGES-—1N (JON'l‘RACl‘.

1:‘?

the breach of one contract from availing

himself of some other collateral and inde-

pendent contract entered into with other par-

ties, or from performing some act in rela-

tion to his own business not necessarily

connected with the agreement. An instance

of the latter kind is where a canon of the

church, by rwson of the non-delivery of a

horse pursuant to agreement, was prevented

from arriving at his residence in time to col-

lect his tithes.

In such cases the damages sustained are

disallowed, not because they are uncertain,

nor because they are merely consequential

or remote, but because they cannot be fairly

considered as having been within the con-

templation of the parties at the time of

entering into the contract. Hence the objec-

tion is removed, if it is shown that the con-
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tract was entered into for the express pur-

pose of enabling the party to fulﬁll his col-

lateral agreement, or perform the act sup-

posed. Sedg. Dam. c. 3.

In Blanchard v. Ely the damages claimed

consisted in the loss of the use of the very

article which the plaintiff had agreed to

construct; and were, therefore, in the plain-

est sense, the direct and proximate result of

the breach alleged. Moreover, that use was

contemplated by the parties in entering into

the contract, and constituted the object for

which the steamboat was built. It is clear,

therefore, that the rule of Pothler had noth-

ing to do with the case. Those damages

must then have been disallowed, because

they consisted of proﬁts depending, not, as

in the case of a contract to transport goods,

upon a mere question of market value, but

upon the ﬂuctuations of travel and of trade,

and many other contingencies. The cita-

tlnn, by Cowen, J., of the maritime cases to

which I have referred, tends to conﬁrm this

view. This case, therefore, is a direct au-

thority in support of the doctrine that when-

ever the proﬁts claimed depend upon con-

tingencies of the character referred to, they

are not recoverable.

The case of Masterton v. Mayor, etc., of

Brooklyn, 7 Hill, 61, decides nothing in op-

position to this doctrine. It simply goes to

support the other branch of the rule, viz.,

that proﬁts are allowed where they do not

depend upon the chances of trade, but upon

the market value of goods, the price of labor,

the cost of transportation, and other ques-

tions of the like nature, which can be ren-

dered reasonably certain by evidence.

From these authorities and principles it is

clear that the defendants were not entitled

to measure their damages by estimating what

they might have earned by the use of the

engine and their other machinery had the

contract been complied with. Nearly every

element entering into such a computation

would have been of that uncertain character

which has uniformly prevented a recovery

for speculative proﬁts.

But it by no means follows that no allow-

l:.'.8
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to be estimated by ascertaining the amount

of business which could have been done by

the use of the engine, and the proﬁts that

would have thence accrued. This claim was

rejected by Mr. Justice Harris, before whom

the cause was tried, upon the precise ground

taken here. But he, nevertheless, held that

compensation was to be allowed for the "loss

of the use of the plaintiffs mill and other

machinery." He did not, it is true, specify

in terms the mode in which the value of

such use was to be estimated; but as he had

previously rejected the probable proﬁts of

the business as the measure of such value,

no other appropriate data would seem to

have remained but the fair rent or hire of

the mill and machinery; and such I have no

doubt was the meaning of ‘the judge. Thus

understood, the decision in that case, and
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the reasoning upon which it was based, were,

I think, entirely accurate.

Had the defendants in the case of Bian-

chard v. Ely, supra, taken the ground that

they were entitled to recoup, not the uncer-

tain and contingent proﬁts of the trips lost,

but such sum as they could have realized by

chartering the boat for those trips, I think

their claim must have been sustained. The

loss of the trips, which had certainly oc-

curred, was not only the direct but the im-

mediate and necessary result of the breach

of the plaintiffs' contract.

The rent of a mill or other similar prop-

erty, the price which should be paid for the

charter of a steamboat, or the use of ma-

chinery, etc., are not only susceptible of

more exact and deﬁnite proof, but, in a ma-

jority of cases would, I think, he found to

be a more accurate measure of the damages

actually sustained in the class of cases re-

ferred to, considering the contingencies and

hazards attending the prosecution of most

kinds of business, than any estimate of an-

ticipated proﬁts; just as the ordinary rate

of interest is, upon the whole, a more accu-

rate measure of the damages sustained in

consequence of the non-payment of a debt

than any speculative proﬁt which the credit-

or might expect to realize from the use of

the money. It is no answer to this to say

that, in estimating what would be the fair

rent of a mill, we must take into considera-

tion all the risks of the business in which it

is to be used. Rents are graduated accord-

ing to the value of the property and to an

average of proﬁts arrived at by very ex-

tended observation; and so accurate are the

results of experience in this respect that

rents are rendered nearly if not quite as cer-

tain as the market value of commodities at

a particular time and place.

The proper rule for estimating this por-

tion of the damages in the present case wi1s,

to ascertain what would have been a fair

price to pay for the use of the engine and

machinery, in view of all the hazards and

chances of the business; and this is the rule

which I understand the referee to have

nmECT .AND COX::iEQUE:-.iTl.A.L DAMAGE::l-IN CONTHACT.

to be estimated by ascertaining the amount
of business which could have been done by
the use of the engine, and the profits that
would have thence accrued. This claim was
rejected by l\!r. Justice Harris, before whom
tile cause was tried, upon the precise ground
taken here. But be, nevertheless, held that
compensation was to be allowed for the "loss
of the use of the plalntil'f's mill and other
machinery." He did not, it Is true, specl!y
In terms the mode in which the value of
such use was to be estimated; but as he had
previously rejected the probable profits of
tile business as the measure of such value,
no other appropriate da.ta would seem to
have remained but the fair rent or hire of
the mill and machinery; and such I have no
doubt was the meaning of ·the judge. Thus
understood, the decision In that case, and
the reasoulng upon which It was based, were,
I think, entirely accurate.
Had the defendants in the case of Blanchard v. Ely, supra, taken the ground that
they were entitled to recoup, not the uncer·
taln and contingent profits of the trips lost,
but such sum as they could have realized by
chartering the boot for those trips, I think
their claim must have been sustained. The
loss of the trips, which hlld certainly occurre«, wns not only the direct but the Im·
mediate and necessary result l)f the breach
of the plfiintltrs' contract.
The rent of a mill or other similar property, the price which should be paid for the
charter of a steamboat, or the use of machinery, etc., are not only susceptible of

more exact and definite proof, but, In a majority of cases would, I think, be found to
be a more accUl'ate measure of the damages
actually sustained in the class of cases referred to, conside11ng the contingencies ancl
hazards attending the prosecution of most
kinds of business, than any estimate ot anticipated" profits; just as the ordinary rate
of Interest Is, upon the whole, a more accurate mee.sure of the damages sustained in
consequence of the non-payment of a debt
than any speculative profit which the creditor might expect to realize from the use <JC
the money. It ls no answer to this to say
that, In estimating what would be the fair
i·ent of a mill, we mu.st take Into consideration all the risks of the business in which It
Is to be used. Rents are graduated according to the value of the property and to an
a;erage of profits arrived at by very extended observation; and so accurate are the
results of experience in this respect that
rents are rendered nearly if not quite as certain as the market value of commodities at
a particular time and place.
The proper rule for estimating this p01·tlon of the damages In the present case was.
to ascertain what would have been a fair
p1·lce to pay tor the use of the engine and
machinery, In view of all the hazards and
chances of the business; and this ls the rule
which I understand the referee to have.
adopted. '!'here ls no error In the other' al_.
lownnces made by the referee. The judg..:
ment should, therefore. be a1Hnned.
Judgment aftlrmed.
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LEONARD v. .\'EW YORK, A. & B. ELEC-

TRO—\IAGNI€'l‘IC TEL. CO.l

(-11 N. Y. 5-H.)

Court of Appeals of New York. 1870.

The defendants in 1856 owned and oper-

ated a telegraph between Buffalo and New

York, connecting at Buffalo with the Western '

Union Telegraph Company to Chicago, and

at Syracuse with a line to Oswego. The

plaintiffs were manufacturers of, and dealers

in salt, at Syracuse. and had agents, Magill

& Pickering at Chicago, and Staats at Os-

wego. Magiil & 1‘icl..'erin;; had authority to

order salt from Staats for sale at Chicago.

On Sept. 24, 1856, Magiil & Pickering. act-

ing for plaintiffs. delivered to the Western

l'nion Company at Chit-ago, a dispatch to

be sent to Slants at ()<\\-ego, as follows:

“D. B. Staats, Oswegol Send 5.000 sacks of
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salt immediately. .\lagill & Pickering." Q-And

paid the usual charges for transmission. The

dispatch was sent by the Western Union

Company to Buffalo. and there delivered to

the agent of the defendants. It was trans-

mitted by the defendants over their line to

Syracuse; and in transcribing it at this point

for the purpose of delivery to the Oswego

line, the agent of defendants negligently

wrote the word "casks" in place of "sacks.“

so that when the message was delivered to

the Oswego line, and by that line to Staats,

it read as follows: “D. B. Staats. Oswego:

Send 5,000 casks of salt immediately. \Iagill

& Pickering."

The term “sacks" in the salt trade desig-

nates ﬁne salt in sacks containing fourteen

pounds, and the term “casks" designates

coarse salt in packages containing not less

than three hundred and twenty pounds.

Staats received the telegram on the after-

noon of Sept. 24, 1856, and that evening or

the next morning, chartered the schooner S.

H. Latbrop, to take the salt to Chicago, and

shipped by her 2,733'.100/28° barrels of coarse

salt. As soon as Staats received the dis-

patch he telegraphed to plaintiffs at Syra-

cuse as follows: “Shall I ship \Iagill &

Pickering 5.000 casks? Just received or-

der." On Sept. 25, plaintiffs answered Staats

by telegram. as follows: “You may ship

Magill & Pickering the 5.000." The last dis-

patch was received hy Slants on the 25th,

and on the same day he telegraphed plain-

tiffs: “Ship along immediately; ﬂeet in,

Magill & Pickering telegraphed, send us 5,-

000 casks salt immediately; I suppose

coarse." The plaintiffs received the last dis-

patch on Sept. 25. On Sept. 26, plaintiffs

telegraplfed from Syracuse to Magill & Pick-

cring at Chicago, as follows: "What kind of

salt do you want? Coarse or ﬁne? Answer."

On the same day Magill & Pickering answer-

1 Opinions of HUNT and I.()'l"l‘. JJ.. and dis-

senting opinions of “'()OI)liUl“l" and DAN-

IELS. JJ.. omitted.

LAW DA\I.2d Ed.—9

ed the plaintiffs as follows: “Three-quarters

ﬁne; balance coarse." Plaintiffs immediate-
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cago, with the costs of transportation added

thereto, with interest from the time of the ar-

rival of said salt at Chicago." Judgment was

aﬂirmed.

The cause was submitted in June, 1868; a

reargument was ordered in Sept. of the same

DIRECT AND CONSEQUEN'l'IAL DAMAGES-IN CONTRACT.

cago, with the costs of trnnsportntlon added
thereto, with interest from the time of the arrival of snid salt at Chicago." Judgment was
affirmed.
The cause was submitted In June, 1868; a
renrgument was ordered In Sept. of the same
year, and It was renrgued Jn l\larch, 1869;
and the court being again divided, another reargument was ordered, which took place at
the January term, 1870.

year, and it was reargued in .\Iarch, 1869;

and the court being again divided, another re-

Grosvenor P. Lowery, for appellants.
Charles Andrews, for respondent

argument was ordered, which took place at

the January term, 1870.

Grosvenor P. Lowery, for appellants.

Charles Andrews, for respondent.

EARL, C. J. The appellant seek a re-

versal of this judgment upon two grounds,

and unless we ﬁnd its position right in refer-

ence to one or both of them, it is conceded

that the judgment must be afﬁrmed.

1. It claims that the plaintiffs‘ agent,

Staats, was guilty of negligence in not stop-
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ping and unloading the vessel, after he re-

ceived plaintiffs‘ dispatch of the 26th of

September, and thus avoiding most of the

damage which plaintiffs sustained. Before

this dispatch was received, the loading of the

vessel was completed, the bill of lading was

signed and delivered to the master, and he

had procured his clearance from the port of

Oswego. Staats knew these facts, and knew

also that it was usual for vessels, at that

season of the year, to hurry their departure.

Relying upon these facts, and supposing the

vessel had actually sailed, he made no effort

to detain her. From all this, the referee

found that there was no negligence on the

part of Staats, and I see no good reason for

disturbing his ﬁndings. There were sufﬁcient

grounds for concluding, in good faith, that the

vessel had sailed; the facts indicated that she

had sailed, and I do not see how Staats could

be charged with the want of ordinary dill-

gence, in relying upon them. The greatest

degree of diligence would doubtless have re-

quired Staats to have made inquiries for the

vessel, after he received the dispatch. But he

was only bound to ordinary diligence, and I

do not see how we can ﬁnd the want of such

a degree of diligence against the ﬁnding of

the referee, and in favor of a party, who

upon this question, has the aﬂlnmatlve. Ham-

ilton v. McPherson, 28 N. Y. 76; Milton v.

Steamboat Co., 37 N. Y. 210; Costigan v.

Railroad Co., 2 Denio, 609; Dorwin v. Pot-

ter, 5 Denio, 306; Shear. & R. Neg. § 598.

But aside from this, it is by no means cer-

tain that Staats could have obtained the salt

from the vessel, if he had made the effort

.

He had made a valid contract to have the

salt transported to Chicago, and the other

party to the contract had taken possession

of the salt, and entered upon the execution

of the contract. What right had Staats to

take the salt away from him? I know of no

process of law by which he could have done

it. And what right did the defendants have

to ask Staats to violate his contract with

that third party, in order to shield it from

the consequences of its own wrong? I am

EARL, C. J. The appellant seeks a reversal of this judgment upon two grounds,
and unless we find its position right In reference to one or both of them, It Is conceded
that the ju1lgment must be affirmed.
1. It claims that the plnlntiffs' agent,
Staats, was guilty of negligence in not stopping and unloading the vessel, after he re/ cel vcd plulnUl!s' dispatch of the 2Gth of
September, and thus nvoidlng most of the
damage which plalnUft's sustained. Before
this dtspntch was received, the loading of tht'
vessel was completed, the bill of lading was
signed and delivered to the master, and be
had procured bis clearance from the port of
Oswego. Staats knew these facts, and knew
also that it was usunl tor vessels, at that
season ot the year, to hurry their departure.
Relying upon these facts, and supposing the
vessel had actually sailed, he made no eft'ort
to detain her. From all this, the referee
found that there was no negligence on the
part of Staats, and I see no good reason for
disturbing his findings. There were sufficient
grounds for concluding, In good faith, that the
vessel bad sailed; the facts Indicated that she
bad sailed, and I do not see how Staats could
be charged with the want of ordinary diligence, In relying upon them. The greatest
dl'gree of diligence would doubtless have required Staats to have made Inquiries for the
vessel, after he received the dispatch. But be
was only bound to ordinary diligence, and I
do not see how we can find the want of such
a dt•gree of diligence against the finding of
the referee, and in favor of a party, who
upon this question, has the affirmative. Hamilton v. McPherson, 28 N. Y. 76; l\lllton v.
Steamboat Co., 37 N. Y. 210; Costigan v.
Ralll'oad Co., 2 Denio, 609; Dorwin v. Potter, 5 Denio, 306; Shear. & R. Neg. § 598.
But aside from this, It Is by no means certain that Staats could have obtained the salt
from the vessel, It be had made the el!ort.
He bud made a valid contract to have the
salt transported to Chicago, and the other
1rn rty to the contract hod taken possession
or the salt, and entered upon the execution
of the contmct. What right had Staats to
take the sa It a way from him? I know of no
process or law by which he could have done
It. And what right did the defendants have
to ask Staats to violate bis contrnct with
that tblrd party, in order to shiehl It from

the consequences of Its own wrong? I am
therefore clearly of the opinion that the alleged negligence furnishes no defense to the
action.
2. It Is also claimed that the referee adopt- 1
ed an erroneous rule of dwmages, and that
the plalntlft's should not in any event have recovered more than they actually disbursed
for freight on the salt to Chicago. The
measure of damages to be applied to cases as
they arise has been a fruitful subject of discussion In the courts. The difficulty le not
so much In laying down general rules, as In
applying them. The cardinal rule undoubtedly ls, that the one party shall recover all the
damages which has been occasioned by the
breach of contract by the other party. But
this rule Is modified ln Its application by two
others. The dnmages must flow directly a.nd
naturally from the breach of contract, and
they must be certain, both In their nature and
in respect to the cause from which they proceed. Under this latter rule speculntlve, contingent and remote damages, which cannot be
directly traced to the breach complained of,
are excluded. Under the former rule, such
damages are only allowed as may fairly be
supposed to have entered Into the contemplation of the parties when they made the contract, as might naturally be expected to follow Its violation. It is not required that the
parties must have contemplated the actual
damages which are to be allowed. But the
damagl's must be such as the parties may
fairly be supposed to have contemplated
wheu they made the contract. Parties entering Into contracts usually contemplate that
they will be performed, and llot that they wlll
be violated. They very rarely actually contemplate any damages which would fiow from
au~· breach, a.nd very frequently have not
sufficient information to know what such damages would be. As both parties are usually
e11ually bound to know and be Informed of
the facts pertaining to the execution or breach
of a contract which they have entered into,
I think a more precise statement of this rule
ts, that a party ls liable for all the direct
damages which both plll'tles to the contract
would have contemplated as 1lowlng from its
breach, if at the time they entered Jnto it they
bad bestowed proper attention upon the subject, and had been fully informed of the
tacts. In this case then, In what may pl·operly be called the fiction of law, the defendant must be presumed to have known tbat
this dispatch was an order tor salt, as an
article ot merchandise, and that the plalntll!
would fill the order as delivered; and that if
the salt was shipped to Chicago, It would be
shipped there as an article ot mercllllndlse, to
be sold In the open m~rket. And the market
price ln Chicago being less than the market
price In Oswego, that they would lose the
cost of transportation, and the dlft'erence between the market price at Chicago and the
market price at Oswego. I think therefore
that the rule of damages adopted by tbe
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referee was sufﬂciently favorable to the de-

fendant. The damages allowed were certain,

and they were the proximate, direct result of

the breach.

I do not think, under the facts of this case,

that the plaintiffs, when they found the state

of the Chicago market, were bound to reship

this salt to Oswego. For any thing that ap-

pears in this case, the cost of transportation

to Oswego would have been equal to the dif-

ference in the market price between the two

places. Then there was the risk of the lake

transportation at that season of the year,

and the uncertainty in the Oswego market

when the salt should again be landed there.

If the plaintiff had shipped it, and it had

been lost upon the lake, the total loss would

not have been chargeable to the defendant.

By the wrongful act of the defendant, the salt
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had been placed in Chicago, one of the largest

commercial centers in the country, and the

plaintiffs had the right to sell it there in good

faith, and hold the defendant liable for the

loss.

I have therefore reached the conclusion that

the judgment must be adirmed; and in reach-

ing this conclusion, I believe I am sustained

by princlples'well settled, and by adjudged

cases quite analogous. Sedg. Dam. 37; Had-

ley v. Baxendale, 9 Exch. 841; Saw Mill Co.

v. Nettleship, L. R. 3 C. P. 499, 508; Wilson

v. Dock Co., L. R. 1 Exch. 177; Griﬂin v.

Colver, 16 N. Y. 489; Hamilton v. McPherson,

28 N. Y. 72; Kent v. Railroad Co., 22 Barb.

278; Medbury v. Railroad Co., 26 Barb. 564;

Scoville v. Grifﬁth, 12 N. Y. 509; Cutting v.

Railway Co., 13 Allen, 381; Squires v. Tele-

graph Co., 98 Mass. 232; Telegraph Co. v.

Wenger, 55 Pa. St. 262; Telegraph Co. v.

Dryhurg, 35 Pa. St. 298; Williams v. Barton,

13 La. 404.

Judgment aﬂirmed, with costs.

GROVER, J., dlssents.

referee was sufficiently favorable to tbe defendant. The damages allowed were certain,
and they were the proximate, direct result of
the breach.
I do not think, under the facts of this case,
that the plalntllrs, when they found the state
o! the Chicago market, were bound to re-ship
this salt to Oswego. For any thing that appears in this case, the cost of transportation
to Oswego would have been equal to the di!·
Cerence In the market price between the two
places. Then there was the risk of the lake
transportation at that season of the year,
and the uncertainty ln the Oswego market
when the salt should again be landed there.
If tbe plalntllr had shipped It, and It had
been lost upon the lake, the total loss would
not have been chargeable to the defendant.
By the wrongful act of the defendant, tlle salt
bad been placed In Chicago, one of the largest
commercial centers In the country, and the
plalntl1fs bad the right to sell It there ln good
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faith, and hold the defendant liable tor the
loss.
I have therefore reached the conclusion that
the judgment must be a.1Brmed; and In reach·
lng this conclusion, I believe I am sustained
by ,principles •well settled, and ~Y adjudged
cases quite analogous. Sedg. Dam. 37; Hadley v. Baxendale, 9 Exch. 341; Saw Mill Co.
v. Nettleshlp, L. R. 3 C. P. 499, f>OS; Wilson
v. Dock Co., L. R. 1 Exch. 177; Griffin v.
Colver, 16 N. Y. 489; Hamilton v. McPherson,
28 N. Y. 72; Kent v. Rallroad Co., 22 Barb.
278; Medbury v. Railroad Co., 26 Barb. 5G4;
Scoville v. Grlftl.th, 12 N. Y. 509; Cutting v.
Railway Co., 13 Allen, 381; Squires v. Telegraph Co., 98 Mass. 232; Telegraph Co. v.
Wenger, 05 Pa. St. 262; Telegraph Co. v.
Dryburg, 35 Pa. St. 298; Williams v. Barton,
13 La. 404.
Judgment a.1Brmed, with costs.
GROVER, J., dissents.
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BOOTH v. SPUYTEN DUYVIL ROLLING

MILL CO.

(60 N. Y. 4 .)

Court of Appeals of New York. 1875.

Action against the Spuyten Duyvil Rolling

Mill Company for breach of a contract to

make and deliver by a certain date a quan-

tity of steel caps for rails. At the time of

making the contract, defendant was inform-

ed that the caps were to be used in making

rails to ﬁll a contract which plaintiff had

made with the New York Central Railroad

Company, but defendant was not informed

as to what price plaintiff was to receive for

the rails. Both parties knew that the caps

could not be procured elsewhere in time to

ﬁll the sub-contract. The caps alone had no

market value. Defendant's mill was burned

Court of Appeals of New Y~rk. 1875.
Action agllinst the Spuyten Duyvil Rolling
Mlll Company for breach of a contract to
wake and deliver by a certain date a quantity of steel caps for rails. At the time of
making the contract, defendant was Informed that the caps were to be used ln making
rails to fill a contract which plaintltr had
made with tbe New York Central Railroad
Company, but defendant was not Informed
as to what price plaintiff was to receive fol'
the rails. Both pa1'ties knew that the caps
could not be procured elsewhere In time to
fill the sub-contract. 'l'he caps alone had no
market value. Defendant's mill was burned
before tbe time for furnishing the caps had
expired, and they were never furnished.
There was a judgment for plalntltr, from
which defendant app1>..aled.

before the time for furnishing the caps had
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expired, and they were never furnished.

There was a judgment for plaintiff, from

which defendant appealed.

CHURCH, C. J. The point made, that the

ﬁestruction of the mill by ﬁre was an excuse

for the non-performance of the contract by

the defendant, is not tenable. in the ﬁrst

place it does not appear nor is it found as a

fact, that the burning of the mill prevented

such performance. The contract was made

December 27th, and the steel caps were to

be delivered on the 1st of April thereafter.

The mill burned on the 10th of March; and

the proper construction of the ﬁnding is, that

the defendant was prevented after that time

from completing the contract, but there was

ample timcprior to that event to have man-

ufactured the eaps. A party cannot post-

pone the performance of such a contract to

the last moment and then interpose an acci-

dent to excuse it. The defendant took the

responsibility of the delay. But the case is

not within the principle decided in Dexter v.-

Norton, 47 N. Y. 62, and the authorities upon

which it was based. That principle applies

when it is apparent that the parties contem-

plated the continued existence of a particular

person or thing which is the subject of the

contract. as in the case of the Musical Hall

destroyed by ﬁre (Taylor v. Caldwell, 3 Best

& S. 826); in the case of an apprentice who

became permanently ill (Boast v. Frith, L.

R. 4 C. P. 1); and of a woman who, from

iliness, was unable to perform as a pianist

(Robinson v. Davison, L. R. 6 Exch. 269).

In these and analogous cases a condition is

implied that the person or thing shall con-

tinue to exist. In Dexter v. Norton, supra,

this principle was applied to relieve a party

from damages for a failure to deliver prop-

erty which was burned without his fault,

but it has no application to a case of this

character. There was no physical or natural

impossibility, inherent in the nature of the

thing to be performed, upon which a condi-

tion that the mill should continue can be

predicated. The article was to be manu-

factured and delivered, and whether by that

particular machinery or in that mill would

CHURCH, C. J. 'fhe point made, that the
!destruction of the mlll by fire was an excuse
I tor the non-performance of the contract by
the defendant, ls not tenable. In the first
place it does not appear nor is It found as a
fact, that the burning of the mill prevented
such performance. The contract was made
December 27th, and the steel cape were to
be delivered on the let of Apr\! thereafter.
The mill burned on the 10th of March; and
the proper construction of the finding ls, that
tbe defendant was prevented after that time
trom completing the contract, but there was
ample time ·prior to that event to have manufactured the caps. A party cannot postpone the performance of such a contract to
the Inst moment and then Interpose an accident to excuse It. The defendant took the
respcnslblllty of the delay. But the case ls
not within the principle decided In Dexter v ..
No1·ton, 47 N. Y. 62, and the authorities upon
which It was based. That principle applies
when It Is apparent that the parties contemplated the continued existence of a particular
person or thing which ls the 1mbject of the
contract, as In the case of the Musical Hall
destroyed by fire (Taylor v. Caldwell, 3 Best
& S. 82G); In the case of an apprentice who
became permanently lll (Boast v. Frith, L.
n. 4 C. P. 1); and of a woman who, from
llhll's.~. was unable to perform as a pianist
(Robinson v. Davison, L. n. 6 I~xch. 260).
In tlwse and analogous cases a condition is
Implied that the person or thing shall continue to exist. In Dexter v. Norton, supra,
this principle was applie{l to relieve a party
from damages for a fallme to deliver property which was burned without his fault,
but It ha.s no application to a case of this
character. There was no physieal or natural
lm~slblllty, Inherent In the nature of the
thing to be perfornlC'd, upe>n whkh a condition that the mill shouhl eontill\ll! can be
predicated. The artide was to be manu-

CO~TRACT.

factured and delivered, and whether by that
particular machinery or In that mill would
not be deemed material. True, the contract
specifies the mill as the place, but tt necessarlly has no Importance, except as designating the place of delivery. For aught that appears, other machinery could have been sul>stltuted. The defendant agreed to furnish a
certa1n manufactured article by a specified
day, and It cannot be excused by an accident, even if It prevented performance. It
It sought protection against such a contingency It should have been provided for in
the contract. Harmony v. Bingham, 12 N.
Y. 99; Tompkins v. Dudley, 25 N. Y. 272;
School Dist. v. Dauchy, 2.3 Conn. 530. This
case belongs to a clnss clearly distinguishable
from those before refc1·red to.
The more Important question relates to thel
proper rule of darnage11. The referee finds/
that prior to the contract with the defendant,
the plalntltr ha.d contracted with the New
York Central Railroad Company to sell and
deliver to It by the 1st of June, four hundred
tons of rails to be composed of an iron foundation and steel caps, for the Invention ot
which the plaintltr had obtained a patent; ,
and that when the contract was made with.:
the defendant he Informed It that he wanted
the caps to perform the contract; that If they :
I had been delivered by the 1st of April tbei
plnlntltr could have performed his contract;'
and he finds, also, facts showing that the
plalntltr would have realized the amount ot
profits for which the recovery was ordere<l.
The damages for which a party mny recover for a breach of contract are sn~h as
ordinarily and naturally flow from the nonperformance. They must be proximate and
certain, or capable of certain ascertainment.
and not remote, speculative or contingent.
It ·ls presumed that the parties contemplate
the usual and natural consequences of a
breach when the contract ls made; and If
the contract ls made with reference to special circumstances, fixing or all'ecting the
amount of damages, such special circumstances are regarded within the contemplation of the parties, and damages may be assessed accordingly. For a brooch of · au executory contract to sell and deliver personal
property the men.sure of damages ls, ordinarily, the difference between the coutract-price
and the market-value of the article at the
time and place of delivery; but if the contract 1
is made to enable the plalntill' to perform a '
sub-contrnct, the terms of which the defend·
ant knows, he may be held liable for tbe
difference between the sub-contract-price and
the principal contract-price, and this Is upon
tho ground that the parties have Impliedly
fixed the measure of damages themselves, or ·
rather made the contract upon the basis of 11.
fixed rule by which they may be ai•se58e<l.
'.rhe authorities cited on both sides recogni7-a
these general rules. Griffin v. Col'l"cr, 1G ~.
Y. 48H; Borries v. Hutchinson, 114 E. C. I..
445; Horner v. Railroad Co., L. n. 7 C. P.
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587; Hadley v. Baxendale, 26 Law & Eq.

398; Stockweli v. Phelps, 34 N. Y. 364;

Messmore v. Lead Co., 40 N. Y. 422; Ran-

dall v. Raper, 96 E. C. L. 82; Parks v. Tool

.Co., 54 N. Y. 586; Cary v. Iron Works Co.,

L. R. 3 Q. B. 181; Smeed v. Foord, 1 El. &

El. 002; British Col. Co. v. Nettleship, L. R.

3 C. P. 499; Horner v. Railroad Co., L. R.

8 Exch. 131. The diﬂiculty is in properly ap-

plying general rules to the facts of each par-

ticular case. Here it is found in substance

that the contract was made to enable the

plaintiff to perform his contract with the rail-

road company, and that this was known to

the defendant. It is insisted however that as

the price which the railroad company wasto

pay the plaintiff for the rails was not com-

municated to the defendant it cannot be said

that it made the contract with reference to
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such price. It is expressly found that there

was no market-price for the steel caps, and

it does not appear that there was any market-

price for the completed rail. The presump-

tion is. from the facts proved, that there was

not. It was a new article, and the contract

was made to bring it into use. The result of

the able and elaborate argument of the learn-

ed counsel for the defendant is, that in such

a case, that is when, although the contract

is made with reference to and to enable the

plaintiff to perform a sub-contract, yet if

the terms of the sub-contract, as to price,

are unknown to the vendor, and there is no

market-price for the article, the latter is not

liable for any damages, or what is the same

thing, for only nominal damages. I have

examined all the authorities referred to, and

I do not ﬁnd any which countenances such

a position, and there is no reason for exempt-

ing a vendor from all damages in such a

case. It is not because the vendee has not

suffered loss, as he has lost the proﬁts of his

sub-contract; it is not because such proﬁts

are uncertain, as they are ﬁxed and deﬁnite,

and capable of being ascertained with cer-

tainty; it is not because the parties did not

contract with reference to the sub-contract,

when it appears that the contract was made

for the purpose of enabling the vendee to

perform it. If the article is one which has

a market-price, although the sub-contract is

contemplated, there is some reason for only

imputing to the vendor the contemplation of

a sub-contract at that price, and that he

should. not be held for extravagant or ex-

ceptional damages provided for in the sub-

contract. But the mere circumstance that

the vendor does not know the precise price

speciﬁed in the contract will not exonerate

him entirely. He cannot in any case know

the precise market-price at the time for per-

formance. Knowledge of the amount of dam-

'ages is impracticable, and is not requisite.

It is only requisite that the parties should

have such a knowledge of special circum-

stances, affecting the question of damages,

as that it may be fairly inferred that they

contemplated a particular rule or standard .
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587; Hadley v. Baxendale, 26 Law & Eq. for estimating thl'm, and entered Into the
398; Stockwell v. Phelps, 34 N. Y. 364; contract upon that basis. In Hadley v. Bax.Me86more v. Lead Co., 40 N. Y. 422; Ran- enuale, 9 Exch. 341, whkh Is a lending .::ase
dall v. Raper, 96 E. C. L. 82; Parks v. Tool on the subject In the English courts, the
Co., M N. Y. 586; Cary v. Iron Works Co., court after speaking of the general rnle, say!!:
L. R. 3 Q. B. 181; Smecd v. Foord, 1 El. & "It the special circumstances under which the
El. 1m; Brltlsh Col. Co. v. Nettleshlp, L. R. contract was actually maue were comllluui3 C. P. 499; Homm· v. Railroad Co., L. R. cated by the plaintiffs to the defendants, m1u
8 Exch. 131. The difficulty Is in properly ap- thus known to both parties, the damages replying general rules to the facts ot ench par- sulting from the breach of such a contrart.
ticular case. Here It ls found In substance which they would reasonably contemplate,
that the contract was made to enable the would be the amount of Injury which would
plalntur to perform his rontract with the rail- ordinarily follow from a breach of the .conroad company, and that this was known to tract under the !'peclal circumstances, so
the defendant. It Is Insisted however that as known and communicated."
the price which the railroad company was .to
This case has been frequently referred to,
pay the plaintiff for the ralla was not com- and the rule as laid down somewhat crltlmunicated to the defendant It cannot be said clseu; but the criticism Is confined to the
that It made the contract with reference to character or the notice, 01· communication or
sucb price. It Is expressly found that there the special circumstances. Some ot the
was no market-price tor the steel caps, and judges, In commenting upon it, have held
ft does not appear that there was any market- that n. bare notice ot special consequences
price for the completed rail. The presump- which might result from a breach of the contion ls, from the tacts proved, that there was tract, unless unuer such circumstances as to
not. It was a new article, and the contract Imply that It formed the basis of the agreewas made to bring It Into use. The result of ment, would not be suftlclent. I concur with
the able and elaborate argument of the learn- the views expressed In these cases; and I
ed counsel tor the defendant Is, that In such do not think the court In Hadley v. Baxena case, that ls when, although the contract dale, Intended to lay down any different docls made with reference to and to enable the trine. Sec authorities b.e fore cited. Upon the
plaintltr to perform a sub-contract, yet if point Involved here, whether the defendant
the terms of the sub'.contract, as to price, Is exempted from the payment of any damare unknown to the vendor, anu there ls no ages when there ls no market-price, and the
m:J.rket-prlce tor the article, the latter ls not price In the sub-contract Ls not known, th~re
liable for any damages, or what ls the same Is no conflict of authority that I have been
thing, for only nominal damages. I ha ,.e able to discover. In the first place, there ls
~xamlned all the authorities refen-ed to, and
considerable re8.80D 'tor the position that
I do not find any whkh countenances such where the vendor le distinctly Informed that
a position, and there ls no reason tor exempt- the purchase Is made to enable the vendee
ing a vendor from all damages In such a to fulfill a sub-eontract, and knows that there
~se. It Is not because the vendee has not
Is no market-price for the article, he assutrered loBS, as he has lost the profits or bis sumes the risk of being bound by the price
sub-contract; It ls not because such profits named In the sub-contract, whatever that
are uncertain, as they are fixed and definite, may be, but it Is unnecessary to go to that
and capable of being ascertained with cer- extent. It Is sutllclent to hold, what appears
tainty; It ls not because the parties did not to me to be clearly just, thnt he Is bound
contract with reference to the sub-contract, by the price, unless It Is shown that such
when It appears thnt the contract was made price Is extravagant, or of an unusual and
for the purpose of enabling the ven<lee to exceptional character. The presumption Is,
perform It. It the article Is one which has that the price at which the property was sold
a market-price, although the sub-contract ls was its fair value, and that ls to be taken as
contemplated, there ls some reason for only the market-price for the purpose of adjusting
Imputing to the vendor the contemplation of the damages In tile particular case. This
a sub-contract at that price, and that be presumption arises here. The profits were
should not be held for extravagant or ex- not unreasonable, certainly not extravagant.
<'C'ptlonal damllges provided for In the sub- About fifteen per cent was allowed for profits,
contract. But the mere circumstance that Including the use of the patent, and no evithe vendor does not know the precise price dence was oll'cred, or claim made, that the
specified In the contract w111 not exonerate price was not the fair value of the article.
him entirely. He cannot In any case ltnow \Ve must assume that It was, and hence
the precise market-price at the time for per- within the contemplation of the parties. The
formance. Knowledge of the amount of dam- case of Borries v. Hutchinson, 114 E. C. L .
. ages ls impracticable, and ls not requisite. 443, Is quite analogous to this. The article,
It Is only requisite that the parties should caustic soda, was purchased to be sold to a
; have such a kx:owledge of special clrcum- foreign conespondent, which the defendant
. stances, atrectlng the question of damages, kn1>w. There were !<everal Items of dnmai:e
·as that It may be fait'ly Inferred that ti1ey claimed. The profits on the sub-contract
("ODtemplated a p:uticulnr rule or standard were conccdeu, null the mu11cy paid into court,
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but the court held, in passing judgment, that

the plaintiff was entitled to recover such

proﬁts. Erie, C. J., said: “Here the ven-

dor had notice that the vendee was buying

the caustic soda, an article not ordinarily

procurable in the market, for the purpose of

resale to a sub-vendee, on the continent. he

made the contract, therefore, with the knowl- ‘

edge that the buyers were buying for the

purpose of fulﬁlling a contract which they

had made with a merchant abroad."

The case of Elbidger v. Armstrong, L. R.

9 Q. B. 473, also illustrates the rule. That

was a contract for the purchase of six hun-

dred and sixty-six sets of wheels and axles,

which the plaintiff designed to use in the

manufacture of wagons; and which he had

contracted to sell and deliver to a Russian

company by a certain day, or forfeit two
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roubles a day. The defendant was informed

of the contract, but not of the amount of

penalties. Some delay occurred in the de-

livery, in consequence of which the plaintlf!

had to pay £100 in penalties, and the action ‘

‘

was brought to recover that sum. There was

no market in which the goods could be ob- '

tained, and the same point was made there

as here, that the plaintiff was only entitled

to nominal damages; but the court says:

“When from the nature of the article, there

is no market in which it can be obtained,

this rule (the difference between the contract

and market value) is not applicable, but it

would be very unjust if, in such cases, the

damages must be nominal."

It is true that the court held that the plain-

tif f could not recover the penalties as a mat-

ter of right, mainly upon the ground that

such a consequence was not, from the nature

of the notice, contemplated by the parties;

and yet the judgment, directing the amount

of the penalties pa-id, was allowed to stand,

as being a sum which the jury might reason-

ably ﬁnd. Cary v. Iron Works Co., L. R. 3

Q. B. 181, decided that when the article pur-

chased was designed by the purchaser for a

peculiar and exceptional purpose unknown to ,

the seller, the latter was nevertheless liable

for the damages which would have been in-

curred if used for the purpose which the

seller supposed it would be used for.

The case of Horner v. Railway Co., L. R.

8 C. P. 134, is not in conﬂict with the posi-

tion of the plaintiff. In that case the article

had a well-known market-value. The sub-

contract was at an unusual and extravagant

price, of which the defendant was not in-

formed. Besides, the defendant was a car-

rier, and it was seriously doubted by some

of the judges whether the same rule would

apply to a carrier as to a vendor. The ques-

tion in all these cases is, what was the con-

tract? and a carrier who is bound to take

property offered at current rates would not,

perhaps, be brought within the principle by

a notice of ulterior consequences, unless such

responsibility was sought to be imposed as
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MATHER v. AMERICAN EXP. CO.

(138 Mass. 55.) '

Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts.‘

Hampshire. Nov. 1, 1884.

Action against the American Express Com-

pany for breach of a contract to transport a

package containing an architect's plans for a

house. There was a ﬁnding for plaintilf, and

defendant excepted.

J. 6. Hammond,

(138 MaA. 56.)
Supreme J'udicial Court of Massachusetts.
Hampshire. NoT. 1, 1884.
Action against the Awe1·lcnn Express ComJ>8.117 for breach of a contract to transport a
package containing an arcbltect's plans tor a
house. There was a finding tor plaintitr, nnd
defendant excepted.
J. O. Hammond, for plaintiff. D. W.
Bond, for defendant.

Bond, for defendant.

for plaintiff. D. W.

FIELD, J. It is not denied that the de-

fendant is liable in damages for the reason-

able cost of the new plans, and for other ex-

penses, if there were any reasonably incurred

in procuring the new plans; but it is denied

that the defendant is liable in damages for

the delay in constructing the house occasion-
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ed by the loss of the plans. It is assumed

that the plans had no market value, and

were only useful to the plaintiff. The rule

of damages then is their value to the plain-

tiff. As new plans could not be bought in

the market ready made, some time necessar-

ily must be consumed in making them, and

the plaintiff contends that the value of the

plans for immediate use, or for use at the

time he would have received them from Bos-

ton. if the defendant had duly performed its

contract, is their value to him, and that this

Value is made up of the cost of procuring the

new plans and the damages occasioned by

the delay. Whatever he calls it, it is dam-

ages for the delay in constructing the house,

caused by the loss of the original plans, that

he seeks to recover. It does not appear that

FIELD, J. It Is not denied that the defendant Is Hable ln damages for the reasonable C06t of the new plans, and for other expenses, it there were any reasonably Incurred
In procuring the new plans; but lt Is denied
that the defendant ls liable In damages for
the delay In constructing the house occnsloned by the loss of the plans. It Is assumed
that the plans had no market value, and
were only useful to the plaintiff. The rule
ot damages then ls their value to the plalntlf!. As new plans could not be bought ln
the market ready made, some time necessnrlly must be consumed ln making thew, nnd
the plalntitl' contl'nds that the value of the
plans for Immediate use, or tor use at the
time he would have received them from Boston. If th4' ilt>fernlnnt hlld duly performed Its
contract. ls their value to him, and that this
rn1u~ Is made up of the cost of procuring the
new plans and the damages occasioned by
the delay. Whatever he calls It, It ls damages for the delay In constructing the house,
caused by the loss of the original plans, that
he seeks to recover. It does not appe&r that
the defendant had notice of the contents of
the package at the time It was delivered for
transportation, or any notice or knowledge

the defendant had notice of the contents of

the package at the time it was delivered for

transportation, or any notice or knowledge

that the plaintiff needed the plans for the

construction of a house which he had begun

to build. The damages caused by the delay

are not such as usually and naturally arise

solely from a breach of the contract of the

defendant to carry the package safely to its

destination, nor were they within the rea-

sonable contemplatlon of both parties to this

contract, as likely to arise from such a

breach. The fact that the plans had a spe-

cial value to the plaintiff, and could not be

purchased, does not touch the question of in-

cluding in the damages the injury to the

plaintiff occasioned by reason 0i. other con-

tracts which he had made, and of work which

he had undertaken in expectation of having

the plans for use immediately, or after the

usual delay involved in sending the plans to

Boston, and in having them traced and re-

turned to him. Damages for such injury are

not given unless the circumstances are such

as to show that the defendant ought fairly to

be held to have‘ assumed a liability therefor

when it made the contract

.

We think that Hadley v. Baxendale, 9

Exch. 341, which has been cited with ap-

proval by this court, governs this case.

'---- ------ .

13::i

that the plaintiff n ~cJcd the plans for the
construction of a house wllich be bad begun
to build. The damages caused by the deL'ly
are not tmch as usually and naturally arise
solely !rom a breach of the contract of the
defendant to cnrry the package safely to lt11
destination, nor were they within the reasonable contemplation of both parties to tllis
contract, as likely to arise from such a
brcncll. Tbe fact that the plans had a special value to the plalntitr, and could not be
purchased, does not touch the question of Including In the damages the Injury to the
pla.lntltr occasioned by reason of other contracts which he had made, and of work which
he had undertaken In expectation of having
the plans for use immediately, or after the
usual delay Involved ln sending the plans to
Boston, and In having them traced and returned to him. Damages tor such Injury are
not given unless the circumstances are such
as to show that the defendant ought fairly to
be held to have· assumed n llablllty therefor
when It made the contract
We think that Hadley v. Baxendale, 9
Exch. 341, which has been cited with apprnval by this court, governs this case.
The case of Green v. Railroad Co., 1::!8
:\!ass. 221, on which the plaintiff relies, was
an action to recover the value of an "oil
painting, the portrait of the plalntltr's father."
The opinion attempts to lay down a rule for
determining the value of such a pnlntlng
when the plaintiff bad no other portrait of
bis father, and when, so far as appears, It
had no market value; but the opinion does
not discuss any question of damages not Involved In determining the value of the por·
trait to the plaintiff. The plaintiff In that
case made no claim for damages occasioned
by a loss of a profitable use of the portrait.
Exceptions sustained.
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ABBOTT et a1. v. HAPGOOD et 11l.

(22 N. E. 907, 150 Mass. 248.)

Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts.

(22 N. E. 907, 150 Mase. 248.)
Supreme .Judicial Court of Massachusetts.
Worcester. Nov. 29, 1889.

Worcester. Nov. 29, 1889.

Report from superior court, Wofcester

county; HAMMOND, Judge.

This is an action brought to recover damages

for breach of contracts made by the defendants

to furnish the Penn Match Company, Limited,

of Philadelphia, certain machines used in the

manufacture of matches, and certain match

splints for the manufacture of matches. Tile

said contracts are the same which were be-

fore the supreme judicial court in the case of

Match Co. v. Hapgood, 141 Mass. 145, 7 N.

E. Rep. 22. The plaintiffs in this writ are

described as “Francis R. Abbott, Charles

Kee, and Wm. B. Kempton, all of Philadel-

phia, in the state of Pennsylvania. as they
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are copartners and associated together in

business under the ﬁrm name and style of the

‘Penn Match Company, Limited.‘ " The dc-

fendants did not call attention at the trial to

the speciﬁc fact that they made any point in

defense that the use in the writ of the pres-

ent tense of the verb in f‘as they are co-part-

ners" described this ﬁrm as it existed at the

date of the writ, viz., May 12, 1888. It had

in fact appeared in the plaintiffs' testimony

that Kempton had been in the business only

a year or two, and was not connected with it

at all when this suit was brought. It being

agreed that the questions raised by the de-

murrer might be raised at the trial with the

other questions, the following evidence ma-

terial to the questions raised by the report

was put in: The plaintiffs Abbott and Kee,

with one William Brown, entered into acou-

tract under the act of assembly of Pennsyl-

vama approved June 2. 1874. Brown died

about January 13, 1882. and the affairs of

that concern were wound up, and a release

from the administrator of Brown's estate was

given February 7, 1882. The defendants had

sold match splints to said concern, and had

received a letter dated January 23, 1882,

signed “1'l:NN Maren Co., Luu-rnn, FRAN-

cis R. Annorr, 'l‘r.," ordering one each of de-

fendants' “setting" and “rolling-off" ma-

chines, and at the time of the contracts sued

on were making said machines. About the

middle of February, lS\,'2, the plaintiff Kemp-

ton agreed verbally to join them in forming

a company, under the said statute of Penn-

sylvania, of the same name as the former, to

prosecute the same business of manufactur-

ing matches. in l‘hiladelphia. The plaintiffs

together agreed that they would organize

said company under said statute, and would

build a factory for the purpose of such man u-

factory, provided they could get the machin-

ery, such as is mentioned in the contracts '

sued on. Thereupon, for. the purpose of car-

rying out said agreement, and in the name of

and for the beneﬁt of the projected company.

the plaintiffs apphed to the (left-ndants, who

made the contracts in qnestlon, the plain-

l tiffs made known to the defendants that the

R<>port from superior court, Worcester
eounty; HAllllfOND, Judge.
This is an action brought to recover damages
for breach of contracts made by the defendants
to furnish the l'enn Mat,ch Company, Limited,
of Philadel1·hia, CPrtain machines used in the
manufncture of matches, und certain match
spli11ts forthemauufactureof matches. ~he
snid conlriwts are the same which were be·
fore the supreme judicial court in the case of
Match Co. v. Hapgood, 141Mass.145, 7 N.
E. Rep. 22. 'rhe plaintiffs in this writ are
descrill('d RS "Francis H. Ablmtt, Charles
Kee, and Wm. B. Kempton, all of Philadelpl1ia, in the state of Pennsylrnnin, as tht-y
are copartners and 11ssociated togt•the1· In
busine."8 under the lirm name and style of the
• l'enn Match Company, J,imited.'" The dofendauts did not call attention at the trial to
the specific fact that they made any point in
defense that the use in the writ of the present tense of the verb in ."as they are co-partners" described this firm as it existed at the
date of the writ, viz., May 12, 1881:!. It had
in fart appeared in the plaintiffs' testimony
that Kempton had been in the business only
a yt-ar or two, and was not connected with it
at all when this suit wa.':I brought. It being
agreed that the qtwstwns ruh1ed by the demurrer might be raised at the trial with the
other questions, the following evidence material to the questions raised by the report
was put in: The plaintiffs Abbott and Kee,
with one William Brown, entered into a contract under the act of assPmbly of Pennsylvania approvi;d June 2, 1874. lfrown died
about January 13, 188~. and the aliuirs of
that concern wern wound up, and a re!Pase
from the administrator of Brown's t-state was
gi \"en February 7, 1882. The defendants had
sold match splints to said concern, and had
received a letter dated January 23, 1882,
signed "l'.J::NN MATCll Co., J,u11·rED, FnAN·
<.i1s R. AnnoTT, Tr.," ordering one rach of defendants' "st-tting" and "rolling-off" machint-s, and at the time of the contracts sued
on were making said marhines. About the
middle of Fcl.Jruary, 18~::!. the plaintiff Kempton agreed verlmlly to join them in forming
a company, under the said statute of Pennsylvania, of the same name ns the former, to
JHosecute the same business of manufacturing matd1e:1, in l'hiladelpl1ia. The plaintiffs
together agreed that they would organize
said company under sai<I statute, and would
buil<I a filclory forlhe purpose of such rnanufactory, provided tlwy could get the machinery, such as is menlioned in the co11tracls
sued on. Thne11po11, for.the purpose of carrying out said agret:>ment, and in tht~ name of
flnd for the benefit of thti pr.>je('tr<l company,
the plaintiffs 11pplieli to tllf' dt-f1•111iants, who
nrnde the contracts in qucst:on, tlie pLiin-

DAMAGES-IN

CO~TRACT.

tiffs made known to the defendants that the
projected company would proceed with .its
organization, 1rnd would cause a factory to
be built for It only in case they could make a
contract with the defendnnb to furnish the
machines. 'fhe pla_inliffs tole.I the defendants
they would like them to give a written contract for the ma('hint>s alrt'ady onlered,-that
is, one rolling-off machine and one setting
machine,-and also attach to it an additional
order for fou1· more setting maehinPs and
one rolling-off machine. After some conversation, the defemlants signt-d and delivered
the contracts sued on. Aftt>r the contracts
were made, the plaintiffs gave up the idea of
building the factory jointly, and Abbott and
Kempton proceeded to build the factory for
the use of the firm. with the arrangement
that It sho:ild be verbally leased to the Penn
Match Company, Limited, for the purpose of
transacting its business, to-wit, the match
business the plaintilis had agreed to go into.
The factory wa~ completed about July 15,
1882, and the Penn .Match Company paid
rent from that timti. On October a. 1882,
the plaintiffs made an agreement lo carry out
the arrangement entered into in February,
1882, and no business w11s done until after
July 15th, when the factory was finished, elCcept that the plaintiffs made some matchbolCeS, with a view preparat:>ry to this company (the Penn Mateh Company) being orffllnized, and so as to have them on hand.
The records required by the statutes of Pennsylvania, as to limited partnerships, were
duly made. Evidence was offered that in
May, 1882, th~ defendants, after some letters
stating that the machines would soon be
made, refused to perform said contracts,' The
plaintiffs offered evidence of damage to tl1e111,
as individuals, indt-pendent of their membership of their association. They likewise offered evidence of t'Xpenses incurred and damages sutlerect by the association in consequence of the defendants' refusal to deliver
the machines and the match splints. The
defendants put in the judgment for the defendants, which wa.'I rendered on the demurrer 11fter the decision of the supreme judicial
court in Match Co. v. Hapgood, 141 :Mass.
146, 7 N. E. He[>. 22.
'l'he defentlanls asked the court to rule:
(1) There is nu evidence to warrant a verdict
for the plaintiffs. (2) The contracb1 are in
terms with the Penn ~latch Company, Lim. ited, and that company was not organized at
the time of the contracts, and there neve1· was
any contract whic'h would bind that company,
and the plaintiffs cannot recover. (3) The
judgnwnt in the case of Penn Match Company, Limited, v. Hapgood and another is a
a bar to this action. (4) Jr, after the 1leath
of llrown, Urn present J•laintiffs agreed together to form a limit!'d partner~hip, undt>r
the statut+i of Pennsylvania, which has bPen
put into the case, for the manufacture of
matches, under the name of the" Penn Makh
Comp11ny, Limited," and with the purpose
and to the end of doing so, aml in the name
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of and for the beneﬁt of the projected limited

partnership procured these contracts, the

afonsaid judgment is a bar to recovery in

this case. The court declined to rule as re-

quested by the defendants, and ruled that the

association, by the agreement of October 3,

1882, is so far different from the organiza-

tion of the plaintiffs, as general partners,

that in this case no damages suffered by

the association can be assessed, and the

only damages which can be recovered are

such as the plaintiffs themselves have suf-

fered independently of their membership of

the association.

excepted to this ruling, so far as it limit-

ed damages. The court overruled the de-

fendants‘ demurrer, and they appealed; the

ruling being that the plaintiffs could recover

such damages as they suffered independently
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of the association formed under the statute,

by reason of the non-performance of the con-

tracts. A verdict was directed for the plain-

tiffs, with the understanding that the case

should be reported, and the same is now re-

ported, for the determination of the supreme

judicial court. If the rulings are correct, the

parties agree that the case shall be sent to an

assessor to assess the damages. If the de-

murrer should have been sustained, or if, up-

on the evidence, a verdict should have been

ordered for the defendants, the verdict is to

be set aside, and judgment for the defendants

entered; unless the ground for ordering judg-

ment is such that it could have been cured

by amendment. if it had been pointed out at

the trial, in which case the court shall enter

such judgment or order as shall seem just.

If the plaintiffs are entitled to recover such

of and for the benefit of the projected limited
partnership procnrw tht'Se contr11.cts. the
afort-said judgment is a bat· to recovery in
tllis case. The court declined to rule as requested by the defendants, and ruled that the
association, by the agreement of October 3,
1882, is 80 far different from the organization of the plaintiffs. RS general partners,
that in this case no damages suffered by
the nssociation can be nssessed. and the
<>nly damages which can be recovered are
such 88 the plaintiffs themselves have suftered independently of their mernbc-rship of
the association. The plaintiffs objected 1md
ilxcepted to this ruling, so far as it limited damages. The court overruled the defendants' demnrr"r, and they appealed; the
ruling being that the p~aintiffs coold recover
such dRmage!I as they suffered indt>pendently
<>f the assoL"rntion fornwll under the statute,
by reason of the non-performance of the contracts. A verdict was dirPcted for the plaintiffs, with the understanding that the case
should be reportrd, and the same is now rep01-t01I, for the determination of the supreme
judicial comt. If the rulings are correct, the
parties Rgree that the case shall be sent to an
assessor to 118sess the damag"eS. If tho demurrer should have been sustained, or if, upon the evidence, R verdict should have bePn
ordered for the deft>ndRnts, the verdict is to
be set aside, 1rnsJ. judgment for the defendant.~
entered; unless the ground for ordering judgment is such that it could have been cured
Ly amendment, If it had been pointed out at
the trial, in wflich case the court shall enter
8uch judgment or order as shall seem just.
Jr the plaintiffs are entilled to recover such
damages as were suffered by the assgciation
organized under the agreement of October 3,
18~2. the verdict is to ue st:t aside, anti a 11ew
trial ordered.
IV. s. B. Hopkins, for plaintiffs. F. P.
Goulding, for dde11danls.

damages as were suffered by the association

organized under the agreement of October 3,

1882. the verdict is to be set aside, and a new

trial ordered.

W. S. B. Hopkins, for plaintiﬂs.

Goulding, for defendants.

F. P.

KNOWLTON. J. According to the terms

of the repo1t in this case, if the demurrer ‘

should have been sustained, on grounds which

could have been removed by amendment, the

plaintiffs are to be permitted to amend. The

defendants have made no point upon the

use of the present tense instead of the past

tense in the allegation in the writ as to the

partnership of the plaintiffs. and, if that is

material, it may be corrected by amend-

ment. In each count of the declaration,

after alleging that there was a valuable

conside1ation for the defendants' contract,

the plaintiffs aver that the contract was

reduced to writing, and set out as the

contract a writing which shows no consider-

ation nor mutuahty, but merely an undertak-

ing on one side. To state the contract truly,

they should set out in each count their own

agreement which constituted the considera-

tion for the agreement made by the defend-

ants. The substantive grounds of defense

rest upon the ruhngs. and refusals to rule, in

KNOWLTON. J. According to the terms
<>f the l't'po1t in this cal:!P, if the demurrer
should have been 11ustained, on groumls which
could have bt!en removt•d by amt>nd111ent, the
plaintiffs are to be permitted to 11mt'nd. The
defendants have made no point upon the
use of the present tense instead of the past
tense in the allegation in the writ as to the
partnership of the plaintiffs, and, if that is
material, it may be corrected by Rmendment. Jn each count of the declarnlion,
after alleging that there was a valuable
consiil1!iation for the dt>fPntlants' contract,
the plaintiffs aver that the contract was
reiluced to writing, and set out as the
contract a writing which Rhows no consitleration nor mutualitv. but merelv an undertaking on one side. 'i'o state the contract truly,
they shoul1l set out in Pach count tlwir own
agreement which co11slit11ted the consideration for the agreement 111a1le by the dt•fend·
ants. The sulistanti ve gron nds of defense
rPi1t upon I he rulings, aml refusals to rule, in
i·et;ani lo the effect of the evidence. There
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was an 11ttempt to recover under the contracts now uefore 11s, by a suit brought in the
na1~1e of thi. Penn .Mutch Company, Limited,
a~1unst these defendants.
In that case the
plaintiff was allt>ged to be a corpuration, and
the hearing and decision were upon a demurrer which admitted that allegation to be true:
, If we assume that the limited partnl'l'Rhip
: organized under the laws of Pennsylvania was
' ao far an entity, separate from th6 persons
: who were membl•rsof it, that IL could sueaml
'. be sued in this commonwealth us a co1poration can, it is quite clear that it was not a
, party to the contracts dPclared on. Maleh
I Co. v. Hapgood, 141 Mass. 145, 7 N. E.
Uep. 22.
If a contra..:t is made in the
name and for the Ut>nefit of a projected
corporation, the corporation, after its
organization, cannot Lecome a party to
the contract, eYen by adoption or ratification of it. Kelner v. Baxtn, L. U. 2
C. P. 17,1; Gunn v. Insurance Co., 12 C. B.
(N. B.) 694; Melhado v. Hail way Co.. L. H.. 9
C. P. 503; In re Enginee1 ing Co., L. U. 16
Ch. Div. 125. Upon the fads reported in
the presf'nt ca!!e, the deft>t11lants, as well as
the 11laintilfs, must ha\"e un<lt>r~tood that the
limited partnership was only projected, anti
that the plaintiffs. acting jointly as individuals, or a8 general part nns, cons tit utPd the
only party who could contract with the dPfendants in the manner proposed. It is evidt>nt that bnth parties inten1le<l to f'nter i11to
binding contracts. As l'ecited in the report,
for th11 purpose of CRrrying out theil" agree' meut to form a limited partnership, "and in
the name of and for the bPnefit of the project! ed company, the plaintiffs applied to the defentl11nls who m:1de the contrn!'ts in question,
and the plaintiffs made known to the defend: ants that the projeded company would proceed with its organization and would cause
a faclory to l.Je built for it, O!llY in case t\1~y
I could m;ike a contract with the defendants
to furnish the machines."
We are of opinion, in view of the facts
known to both parties, that the plaintiffs
must be deemed to have been jointly contracting in the only way in which th ..y could
lawfully contract, and that they assumed the
n111uo "l1 e1111 .Match Cv111pany, LimiltJ," as
that in which the\• chose to do business, in
reference to the pri;jerted li111ite1l partnership,
until their orgm1ization should be completi-d,
and they should turn over the business to the
new company, which would be composed of
themselves in a new relation. This seems to
be warranted uy the language of the repo1 t,
and entirely con!listent with their puriose
ma•le known to the defendants, an<l in tliis
way only can efft'ct be given to their acts.
The judgment in the former suit is no liar to
this act ion, for that suit was brought by a
different 1•lai11tiff.
On tlie :rnbjl•ct of dam:1ges, the report does
not sufliciently slate the evidence to enable
us fully to det"nuine lht! rights of the parlies.
As we unclt>rstand LIH~ rule laid down by the
presitling justice, that ''the only damages
J

1

1

1

I
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which can be recovered are such as the plain-

tiffs themselves have suffered independently

of their membership of the association," we

are of opinion that it is too narrow. In the

view which we take of the agreement, the

plaintiffs contracted for articles to be deliv-

ered to themselves. They informed the de-

fendants that they had agreed to organize a

limited partnership, of which they were to

be the sole members, and that they made the

contracts to enable them proﬁtably to carry

0!! business in their new organization. By

reason of the defendants' breach of contract,

the plaintiffs were unable to turn over to the

new company the property which they should

have received for that purpose, and they have

been unable to establish that company. and

start it in its work under such favorable au-

spices, and with such an equipment for the
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transaction of a proﬁtable business, as if the

defendants had performed their contracts.

The only damages for which the defendants are

liable to any one must be recovered in this

action, and, inasmuch as the machines could

not be procured in the market, we are of

opinion that the parties must be presumed to

have contracted in reference to the declared

purpose for which they were to be furnished,

and that that purpose may be conside1ed in

assessing the damages. Machine Co. v. Ry-

der, 13‘J Mass. 366; Manning v. Fitch, 138

Mass. 273; 'l‘ownsend v. Wharf Co., 117 Mass.

501; Somers v. Wright, 115 Mass. 292; Cory

v. Iron-Works, L. R. 3 Q. B. 181; Portman

v. Middleton, 4 C. B. (N. S.) 322; McHuse v.

Fulmer, 73 Pa. St. 365.

We do not intimate that the plaintitfs are

to receive any damages as members of the

limited partnership, but only that the dam-

ages which they suffered, if any, by reason

of the defendants' preventing them from suc-

cessfully establishlng and ﬁtting out a busi-

ness to be conducted by them as a limited

partnership, may be recovered. The mere

fact that they arranged to conduct their busi-

ness by a limited partnership, under the stat-

nte of l'ennsylrania. does not deprive them

of the rights which they then had in the busi-

ness, nor of the advantages which properly

belonged to it. The value of the articles con-

tracted for may be estimated in reference to

their intended use in the business for which

the defendants were to furnish them. The

plaintiffs are to have leave to amend their

writ and declaration as they shall be ad vised,

and the case is to stand for trial. So ordered.

DIHECT AND CONl::iEQUENTIAL DAMAGES-IN CONTiiACT.

which can be recovered are such as the plaintiffs themselves have suffered i!l_d(!p<'~<le1_1tly
of their membership of the association," we
are of opinion that it is too narrow. In the
view which we take of the agreement, ihe
plaintiffs contracted for arLicles to be <leliv·
ered to themselves. They Informed the defendants that they had agreed to org1\nize a
limited partnership, of which they were to
be the sole members, an<l that they made the
contracts to enal.Jle them profitably to carry
O!l business in their new organization. lly
reason of the defendants' breat:h of contract,
the plaintiffs were unable to tum over to the
new company the property which they should
have received for that purpose, and they have
been unable to establish that company, and
start it in its work under such favorable auspices, and with such an equipment for the
transaction of a profitable business, as if the
defendants had performed their contracts.
The only damages for which the defendants are
liable to any one must be recovered in this
action, and, inasmuch as the machines could
not be procured in the market, we are of
opinion that the parties must be presumed to
have contracted In reference to the declared
purpose for whicb they were to be furnished,

and that that purpose may be consi,Je1ed in
assessing the damages. Machine Co. v. Ryder, 139 Mass. 366; Manning v. Fitch, 188
Mass. 273; Townsend v. Wharf Co., 117 Mass.
501; Somers v. Wright, 115 Mass. 292; Cory
v. Iron-Works, L. H.. 3 Q. B. 181; Portman
v. Middleton, 4 C. B. (N. 8.) 322; Mc Huse v.
Fulmer, 73 Pa. St. 365.
We do not intimate that the plnfntiffs are
to receive any damages as members of the
limited partnership, but only that tho damages which they suffered, if nny, by reason
of the defendants' preventing them from successfully establishing and fitting out a business to be comlucted by them as a limited
partnership, may be recovered. '.fhe mere
fact that they arranged to conduct their busi·
ness by a limited partnership, under the statute of Pem:sylvania, does not dPprive them
of the rights which they then had in the business, nor of the 11dvantages which properly
belonged to it. The value of the articles contracted for may be estimated in reference to
their intended use in the business for which
the defendants were to furnish them. The
plaintiffs are to have leave to amend thefr
writ and declaration as they shall be ad\'ised,
and the case is to stand for trial. So ordered.
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BROWNELL et al. v. CHAPMAN.

(51 N. W. 249, 84 Iowa, 504.)

Feb. 2, 1892.

Appeal from superior court of Council

Bluﬂfs; J. E. F. McGee, Judge.

Action on a contract. in substance as fol-

lows: “April 12th, 1889. D. Chapman, Esq.,

Council Bluffs, Iowa—Dear Sir: We will

furnish you one of our Scotch marine boil-

ers, 54 dla., 84 long, made of 60,000 T. S.

marine steel shells. 5-16; ' ' ' all the

above delivered and set up, (you to do all

wood-work.)-for the sum of ten hundred

and twenty-three dollars, ($1,023.00.) We

will allow you three hundred and sixty dol-

lars ($360.00) for your two engines, boiler,

heater, and inspirater, wheels, shafting, and

couplings. Hoping to receive your order, we

are, yours truly, Brownell & Co. P. S. We
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guaranty to deliver above in thirty days from

April 13th. It is understood you are to have

90 days' option on sale of engine and boiler

you have." “Accepted. D. Chapman." This

action is to recover the balance of the con-

tract price, after deducting the $360 for the

defendant's engines, etc. There was a fail-

ure to deliver the boilers, etc., on the part

of the plaintiffs for some 18 days after the

time speciﬁed in the contract; and the de-

fendant presents a counter-claim because of

the failure and for defective workmanship

in putting in the boilers. A reply put in is-

sue certain allegations of the counterclaim,

and a trial by jury, resulting in a verdict

and judgment for the defendant for $31.25.

The plaintiffs appeal.

Supreme Court of Iowa.

Isaac Adams, for appellants. D. B. Daily,

Emmet Finley, and Ambrose Burke, for ap-

peilee.

GRANGER, J. 1. Lake Manana is a

small lake in the vicinity of Council Bluffs,

in Pottawattamie county, and is a summer

and pleasure resort. Boats are used on

the lake for the accommodation of visitors,

and among them was one known as the “M.

F. Rohrer," belonging to the defendant. The

boat was operated on the lake in the season

of 1888, and the boilers and machinery con-

tracted for, as known to the parties, were to

reﬁt the boat for use in the season of 1889.

A breach of the contract on the part of

plaintif f by a failure to deliver within the

time is not questioned, and the important

question on this appeal is as to the proper

measure of damage. The superior court ad-

mitted evidence to show, and instructed the

jury on the theory, that the measure of dam-

age was the rental value of the boat during

the time the defendant was deprived of its

use in consequence of the breach. The ap-

pellants‘ thought is that the measure of dam-

age is the “interest of the capital invested in

the boat." This latter rule has something

of mpport in authority, but it is far out-

weighed by the number of cases and the rea-

soning supporting the rule adopted by the

court. In considering the question we must
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tlcle has never been rented it has no rental

value, any more than it would to say that

because an article had never been sold it

has no market value. We should assume

that an article suitable and adapted for use

at a time and place has both a market and

rental value, at least until the contrary ap-

pears. In Jemmison v. Gray, 29 Iowa, 537,

this court approved_an instruction that “the

fact, if proven, that 12,213 ties could not

have been purchased for immediate delivery

in the market at the places where said ties

were to be delivered on the 1st day of Oc-

tober, 1869, would not, of itself, establish

the fact that there was not 2. market price

for such ties at such time and place." The

holding affords a strong presumption in favor

of a market price. A like presumption

would prevail in favor of an article having a
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value for hire at a time and place where such

articles are in demand for use. The testi-

mony shows that boats. varying in size were

rented on the lake during the season, both

by the day and for trips. This boat had per-

haps twice the carrying capacity of any other

boat on the lake, and in that respect formed

an exception; but the rental value of boats

depended on their size and adaptation for

use, and it was competent for persons hav-

ing knowledge of the business and prices

paid for other boats to give an opinion as to'

the rental value of such a boat as the one in

-question. It is contended that the method

of ascertaining the rental value involves the

uncertainties and facts on which proﬁts are

excluded as a rule of damage; but we think

not. It is true that rental values are general-

ly ﬁxed from a calculation of the proﬁts to

be derived from the use, but the rental is a

ﬁxed, deﬁnite value, agreed to be paid, and

the bailee assumes the uncertainties as to

the proﬁts.

The appellants say: “For an analogous

case to the one at bar, in there being an at-

tempt to prove a rental value to property

when the facts showed that the property in

question had no rental value, the court is

referred -to Coal Co. v. Foster, 5'.) Pa. St. 3 "'."

The case, as we we read it, is without a

bearing on the question. The defendant

agreed to furnish for the coal company an

engine of a particular size and make. There

was no other engine of the kind that the

company could use. There was a delay in

the delivery, and the company was compell-

ed to transport its coal by horse||-power, as it

had before done. The trial court gave the

rule “that ihedneasurc of damage for the de-

lay was the ordinary hire of a locomotive

during the period of delay." The reviewing

court gave the rule as the diffQrencc between

the cost of transporting the coal by horse and

by locomotive power, but placed its ruling

on the fact that the parties knew there was

ne other engine to be operated on the track

of the cotnpany, and could not have had such

damage in view in making the contract. it

will be seen that the cases are different. If

DIHECT A.ND
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tlcle has never been rented It hns no rental
value, any more thnn it would to say that
because nn article had never been sold It
has no market value. We should assume
that an article suitable and adapted for use
at a time and place has both a market and
rental value, at least unt'h the contrary appears. In Jemmlson v. Gray, 29 Iowa, 537,
this court approved. an Instruction that "the
fact, if proven, that 12,213 ties could not
have bC<'n purchased for immediate delivery
in the market at the places where said ties
were to be dellvered on the 1st day of Oc·
tol>er, 1869, would not, of itself, estal>llsh
th!! fact that there was not a market price
for such ties at such time and place." The
h(}ldlng affords a strong presumption in favor
of a market price. A like presumption
would prevail In favor of an article having a
value tor hire at a time and place where such
a1'ticles are lo demand for use. The testimony shows that boats. varying in size were
rented on the lake during the season, both
by the day and for trips. This boat had perhaps twice the carrying capacity of any other
boat on the lake, and lp. that respect formed
an exception; but the rental value of boats
depended on their size and adaptation for
use, and It was competent f(}r persons having knowledge of the business and prices
pnld for other boats to give an opinion as to
the rental value of such a boot as the one In
-question. It ls contended that the method
of ascertaining the rental value involves the
uncertainties and fads on which profits are
excluded as a rule of damage; but ";e think
not. It ls true that rental values are gene1:ally fixed from a calculation of the profits to
be derived from the use, but the rental is a
fixed, definite value, agreed to be paid, and
the bailee assumes the uncertainties as ti}
the profits.
The appellants say: "For an analogous
case to the one at bar, tn there being an attempt to prove a rental value to property
when the facts showed that the property In
quetition had no rental value, the court ls
referred-to Coal Co. v. l<'oster, 50 Pa. St. 365."
The ease, as we we read it, is without a
benrlng on the question. The defendant
ag1·eed to furnish for the coal company an
engine of a particular size and make. There
was no other engine of the kind that the
company could use. There was a delay ili
the delivery, and the company was compelled to tran!'por{ its coal by horse-1>ower, as it
ha(l before done. Tile t1·lal court gave the
rule "thnt lhe-tnensure of dnwnge for the de·
la~· was the ordiuar~· hire of a locomotive
during the period of d{•lny." The reviewing
-court gilve the rule as the difference between
the cost of transporting the conl by horse and
l>y locomotive power, but placed Its ruling
on the fact thnt the 1>nrties knew there wns
lii· other engine to be operated on the track
of the companr. and could not hnve had imch
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damage ln view In making the contract. lt
will be seen that the cases are different. If
In the case at bar the defendant's boat had
been opemted at an additional cost by doing the same amount of work during the
delay, it would be reasonable to say the damage to him was the difference In the cost.
But his is an entire loss of use, and the value
of such use Is the damage, where it is proxl·
mate, and not speculative or uncertain.
2. A part of the counter-claim Is for loss
of time by men kept in readiness by defendant to do the part of the work belonging to
him In adjusting the boilers and machinery,
as provided by the contract. On this brnncli
of the case the court gave the following Instruction: "(5) If you tind from the evidence, and under the third and fourth instructions, that there was a cont1·act, as set
out, between plaintiffs and defendant, and
that plaintiffs were In default In carrying
out said contract; and If you find that, by
reason of such default, defendant was damaged; and if you fmiher find that defendant
was In readiness to carry out his part of
said contmct at the time specified therein;
and that at the time he was lu readiness to
i·un and operate his boat; and that the boat
was necessarily idle during the period of
plalntifTs' default, by reason of such default,
-then the defendant would be entitled to
recover the ordinary and reasonable rental
v11l•1e of said boat during the time of said
default, and such i·easonable and necessary
amount (If there be any such amount) as he
may ha-ve been required to pny to any men
that he may have employed during said enforced Idleness for the purpose of running
said boat, if be had any such men in bis
employ who remained In his employ and Idle
by reason of such default; and if you find
that the defendant had placed himself In
readiness to work upon said boat himself
at the time specified ln the contract for the
furnishing of said machinery, nnd that he
necessarily remained idle during the time of
such default, if any, of the plaintiffs, and
used ordiilllry diligence to find other employment for that time, you will then further
find the fair and reasonable value of his
services during the period of such default
as part of the damage, if any, which defendant sustained." Complaint ls made of the
instruction, as stating an erroneous rule of
damages, but we discover no error. If, because of the breach, the defendant lost his
or the time of his employes, for su<'h time
aml ex1>ense he should be reimbursed. The
rule ls recognized iu Mining Syndil'ate v.
1"rasc1·, supra. The instruction fairly protects the rights of the plaintiffs. A nu111l1Pr
of other qu<'Stions are argued, all of whil'll
we have examine.cl, and find no prejmlieial
error. It woulil i:;erve no gooil purpo>1E' to
extend the opinion to present them. Till~
judgmeut ls affirmed.
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MASTERTON ET AL. v. MAYOR, ETC.,

MASTERTON ET AL. v. MAYOR, ETC.,
OF CITY OF BROOKLYN.
(7 Hill, 61.)
Supreme Court of New York. Jan. Term,
1845.

OF CITY OF BROOKLYN.

(7 Hill, 61.)

Supreme Court of New York. Jan. Term,

1845.

This was an action of covgmnt commenc-

ed in 1840, and tried at the New York cir-

cuit in June, 1843, before Kent, C. J. The

case was this: January 26, 1836, a cove-

nant was entered into between the defendants

and the plaintiffs, by which the latter agreed

at their own risk. costs and charges, to

furnish, cut, ﬁt, and deliver (properly and

suﬂiciently prepared for setting). at the site

of the city hall in the city of Brooklyn, all

the marble that might be required for build-

ing the said city hall, according to certain

, plans and speciﬁcations then exhibited and
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" signed by the respective parties, and in

conformity with such drawings, molds and

patterns as should from time to time be far-

nished by the superintendent or architect of

the said city hall; all of the said marble to

be of the same quality as that used for the

ornamental and best work on the new custom-

house in the city of New York, and of the

best kind of sound white marble from Kain

& Morgan's quarry, in Eastchester, free from

spalts, cracks, and blemishes, and wrought

in the best manner of workmanship, and

tooled and rubbed. etc., as should be ordered

by the superintendent. It was further

iagreed by the plaintiffs that they would pro-

gceed forthwith to the execution of the work

i with all diligence and with a sufﬁcient force;

‘and that they would commence the delivery

of the marble as soon after the opening of

navigation in the spring as might be re-

quired, and continue delivering the same in

such order and at such times and as fast as‘

the superintendent should direct. They also

agreed that the marble thus delivered should

be subject to inspection and rejection by the

superintendent, and remain at the risk of the

plaintiffs until the superintendent inspected

and accepted it. And the defendants, in

consideration of the above stipulations,

agreed to pay the plaintiffs the sum of $271,-

600, at the times and in the manner follow-

ing, viz. the sum of $10,000 when the base-

ment of the said city hall was half up; the

sum of $15,000 when the whole of the base-

ment was up; the sum of $20,000 when the

lirst story was half up; the sum of $20,000

when the whole of the ﬁrst story was up;

the sum of $20,000 when the second story

was half up; the sum of $20,000 when the

whole of the second story was up; the sum

of $20,000 when one-half of the cornice of

the superstructure was up; the sum of $20,-

000 when the whole of the cornice was up;

the sum of .,\'.')ll,000 when the columns and

capitals were up; the sum of $25,000 when

the entahiature was complete; the further

sum of $20,000 when the interior work was

done; and the remainder when the building

was ﬁnished. '1‘he declaration alleged a

This wns an acUon or coY~nt commenced In 1840, und tried at the New York circuit in June, 18!3, before lient, C. J. The
case was this: January 26, 18&.i, a covenant was entered Into between the defendants
and the plnlntltrs, by which the lntter ag1·eed
at their own risk. costs and charges, to
furnish, cut, fit, and delh'e1· (properly and
sufficiently prepnred for setting), at tile site
of the city haJI In the city of Brooklyn, 1111
the marble thnt might lJe required for lrnildlng the said city ball, according to certain
, pl.nns and specltkntlon8 then exllibitetl and
' signed by the respecti\'"e parties, and In
conformity with such drawings, molds and
patterns as sllould from time to time be furni!'lhed by the supel"intendent or architect of
the said city ball; nJI of the said marble to
be or the same quality as that used for the
ornarueutal nnd best work on the new customb9use In the city of New York, and of the
best kind of sound white marble from Kain
& Morgan's quarry, In Eastchester, free from
epalt1:1, cracks, and blemishes, and wrought
In the best manner of workmanship, nnd
tooled and rubbed, etc., as should be ordered
by the superintendent. It was further
agreed by the plalntltrs that they would proceed forthwith to the execution of the work
wltb all diligence and with a sutflcient force;
and that they would commence the delivery
9f the marble as soon atter the opening or
navigation In the spring as might be required, and continue delivering the same In
such order and at such times and as fast ns
the superintendent should direct. They also
agreed that the marble thus delh·ered should
, be subject to Inspection and rejection by the
~ superintendent, and remain at the risk of the
plaintiffs until tl1e superintendent Inspected
and accepted It. And the defendants, In
con!'ideratlon of the a!Jove stipulations,
agreed to pay the plalntltl's the sum ot $:!71,600, at the times nnd In the manner tollowl11g, viz. the sum of $10,000 when the basement of the S.'lid city boll wns half up; the
sum of $15,000 when the whole of the basement was up; the sum or $:!0,000 when the
first sto1·y wns hnlf up; the sum of $:.!0,000
when the whole of the first story was up;
the sum of *:.!0,000 when the scconcl story
was halt up; the sum or $:!0,000 when the
whole of the second story was up; the sum
ot $:.!0,000 when cme-half of the corniC"e of
the supcrstructnre wns up; the sum of $'.!0,000 when the whole of the cornice was up;
the sum of :f.jll,000 whl'n the ( 1dm1111s aud
capitals were up; the snm of $:.!;i.OUO when
the en ta hlnture was complete; the further
sum of $:.!0.000 when the Interior work was
done ; 1111tl the remai11<ler when the building
was finished. The dedarntiou alleged a
0
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breach of this covenant In 1837, and claimed)
various Items of special damage.
llarch 7, 1836, the plnlntitl's entered Into a
covenant with Kain & Morgan. This covenant, ufter referring to the one entered Into
with the defendants, and reciting a part of
the i;ame, provided that Kain & Morgan
should furnish from their quarry, In Eastchester, all the marble required for erecting,
completing and finishing the city hnll In the
city of Brooklyn, in such blocks, piC<'es and
proportions, and In such condition for wol'k·
Ing, as ls usunl and customary; and deliver
the same to the plaintiffs, tree or ull ex- \
pense, on a wharf In the city or Brooklyn,
etc.; the blocks to be delivered so that there
should be sufficient time to work and fit the
same for the said superstmcture, and equal
In quality to that used for tile superstructure
and 1.nterlor above the basement of the new
custom house in the city of New York, etc.
Tile remainder of the covenant wns as follows: "And the said parties of the first
pnrt (the plaintitl's), in consldemtlon, etc.,
do hereby covenant and agree to pay the
said parties of the second part (Kain & Morgan) In the agg1·egate the sum of $112,3!..15,
which nwount shall be paid In d.ltrcrent
sums, from time. to tlwe, out of the sum of
$271,UOO to be pnid by the said mayor, etc.
(the defendants), to the snld parties of the
first pa.rt, as the same from time to time
may be paid to them, etc.; that Is to say:
The said parties of the first part shaJI and
will make payment to the said parties of the
second part at the same times that they,
the said parties of the first pa1·t, receive
· their payments from the mayor, etc. (the defendants). And the several payments thus
to be made to the said parties of the second
part shall bear the same proportion, respectively, to the whole amount they are to receive from the snld parties or the firat part as
the corresponding payment to the said parties
of the first part by the mayor, etc., bear to
the whole amount they are to receive under
their contrnct from the said mayor, etc.
And It Is expressly understood and mutually
covenanted and agreed that In no eYcnt slmll
the parties of the second pnrt look to the
said parties of the first part, or hold them
respousl!Jle for nny payments, uutll the imid
parties of the first part are first pl11.ced In
sufficient funds by the mayor, etc. (the defenclants), to ena!Jle them to make such payme nt al"("Orcllng to tile herein last !Jeforeruentioned provi!'ions," etc.
The covenant with Kain & l\Iorgan wus
reu!I in cvhlence by the plaintlll's, subject to
the right of the defewlants to raise such objections to its admissilJillty, during the progrl's,; of the cnuse, as they might think proper. 'l'he plaintiffs also proved that they
commenced the delivery of the marble In
pursunnce of the covenant between them and
the defendants, and continued so to do until
.Tuly, 18:17, when the defendant~ suspended
operations upon the building fur wnnt or
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funds, and refused to receive any more ma-

terials of the plaintiffs, though the latter

were ready and offered to perform. The

entire quantity of marble necessary to ful-

till the contract on the part of the plaintiffs,

according to the estimates made at the trial,

was 88,819 feet. At the time the work was

suspended, the plaintiffs had delivered 14,-

779 feet, for which they were paid the con-

tract price. The plaintiffs then had on

hand, at Kain & Morgan's qu'arry, about

3,308 feet, which was suitably ﬁtted and pre-

pared for delivery. A witness swore that

this was not of much value for other build-

ings, and would not probably bring over

two shillings per foot. Other witnesses

swore that, had the work progressed with

ordinary diligence, it would have taken

about iive years to complete the contract on
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the part of the plaintiffs. Considerable testi-

mony was given tending to show the cost

of marble in the quarry, and the expense of

raising, dressing, and transporting it to the

place of delivery. And the plaintiffs offered

to show “what would be the difference be

tween the cost to them of the marble in the

contract, and the price that was to be paid

for it by the contract," which evidence was

objected to, but the circuit judge admitted

*‘it, and the defendants excepted. The wit-

nesses answered that in 1836 the difference

would be about 20 per cent.; in 1837, from

25 to 30 per cent.; in 1838, about 25 per cent.;

in 1839, from 25 to 30 per cent.; and in

18-ll), from 30 to 40 per cent. The witnesses

‘ also testiﬁed that the ordinary proﬁt calcu-

lated upon by master stone cutters was from

10 to 20 per cent., and that 15 per cent; was

a fair living proﬁt. All this testimony was

objected to, but the circuit judge admitted

it, and the defendants again excepted.

When the plaintiffs rested, the defendants

moved that all the testimony, in relation to

the contract of Kain & Morgan with the

plaintiffs, and the contract itself, be exclud-

ed from the consideration of the jury as ir-

relevant, but the circuit judge overruled the

motion, and the defendants excepted.

The circuit judge charged the jury, among

other things, that they were to allow the

plaintiffs as much as the performance of the

contract would have beneﬁted them; that

the plaintiffs were entitled to recover for the

unﬁnished marble not accepted, subject to

a deduction of what should be deemed its

fair market value; that the jury should con-

ﬁne the damages to the loss of the plaintiffs;

but that the beneﬁt or proﬁts which they

would have received from the actual per-

formance constituted such loss. The cir-

cuit judge also charged as follows: “The

defendants ought to be allowed what the

jury should think just as to interest on the

outlays of the plaintiffs; also what the jury

might think just for the risk of transporta-

tion, and the reasonable value of the marble

unacccpted and unquarried. As to damages

on the rough marble to be delivered by Kain
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funds, and refused to receive any more ma- & llorgan, It appears by the contract with
terials of the plaintlfl's, though the latter the defendants that the plaintil!s were obwere ready and ofl'ered to perform. The lij:"ed to procure 1t from this quarry. The
entire quantity of marble necessary to ful- plalntift's' contract with Kain & Morgan, if
fill the contract on the part of the plaintiffs, made in good faith, was entered into as a
according to the estimates made at the trial, reasonable part of the performance by the
was 88,819 feet. At the time the work was plaintitrs of their own contract; and if the
suspended, the pla!ntlft's had dellvered 14,- defendants, by stopping the work, obliged
779 feet, for which they were paid the con- the plaintiffs to break their contract with
tract price. The plaintil!s tJ~en had on Kain & l\lorgan, then the damages on the
hand, at Kain & Morgan's quarry, about latter ought to be allowed to th'e plaint!fl's,
3,308 feet, which was suitably fitted and pre- who would be responsible to Knin & Mor- .
pared for delivery. A witness swore that ga.n for the same. The jury, In respect to ·;
this was not of much value for other build- this contract, are to give the difference beings, and would not probably bring over tween the contract price and what it would
two shillings per foot. Other witnesses cost Knin & Morgan to deliver the article,
swore that, had the work progressed with deducting the value of it to them, and mak01·dinary diligence, it would have taken ing all proper allowances as in the case of
about five years to complete the contract on the principal contract. In fixing the dam- .
the part of the plaintiffs. Considerable test!- ages to be allowed the plaintitrs, the jury are
. mony was given tending to show the cost to take things as they were.at the time the
of marble in the quarry, and the expense of work was suspended, and not allow for any
raising, dressing, and transporting it to the increased benefits they would have received
.place of delivery. And the plaintiffs ofl'ered from the subsequent fall of wages or subseto show "what would be the dil!erence be- quent circumstances." etc.
tween the cost to them of the marble in the
The defendants excepted to the charge,
~ontract, and the price that was to be paid
and requested the circuit judge to Instruct
(or It by the contract," which evidence was the jury, among other things, that no damtobjected to, but the. circuit judge admitted ages should be allowed on account of any su~ 1
-· 1it, and the defendants excepted.
The wit- posed profits which the plaintiffs might have
nesses answered that in 1836 the ditrerence made out of the unfinished work; and that
would be about 20 per cent.; in 1837, f1·om the damages allowed should be confined to
25 to 30 per cent.; in 1838, about 25 per cent.; the actual loss which the plaintiffs had susin 1839, from 25 to 30 pe1· cent.; and in tained. The judge refused to charge fur1840, from 30 to 40 per cent. The witnesses ther, and the defendants excepted. The jury
also testified that the ordinary profit calcu- found a verdict in favor of the plaintiffs for
lated upon by master stone cutters was from $72,999, and the defendants now moved for
10 to 20 per cent., and that 15 per cent was· a new trial on a bill of exceptions.
a fair living profit. All this testimony was
D. Lord and C. O'Conor, for plalntttrs. B.
objected to, but the circuit judge admitted
F. Butler and G. Wood, for defendants.
it, and the defendants again excepted.
When the plalntift's rested, the defendants
moved that all the testimony. in relation to
NELSON, C. J. The clamages for the
the contrnct of l{ain & Morgan with the marble on hand, ready to be delivered, were
plaintil!s, and the contract itself, be exclud- not a ms.tter in dispute on the argument.
ed from the consideration of the jury as ir- The true measure of allowance in respect to
relevant, but the circuit judge overruled the that item was conceded to be the difference ·
motion, and the defendants excepted.
between the cootract price and the market ·
The circuit judge charged the jury, among value of the article at the place of delivery . .
<>ther things, that they were to allow the This loss the plaintift's had actually sustainplaintil!s as much as the performance of the ed, regard being had to their rights as accontract would have benefited them; that quired under contract.
,...the plalntift's were entitled to recover for the
The contest arises out of the claim ror damunfinished marble not accepted, subject to ages in respect to the remainder of the mar-,
a deduction of what should be deemed Its ble which the plaintift's had agreed to furnish,·
fair market value; that the jury should con- but which they were prevented trom furnishfine the damages to the loss of the plaintltrs; ing by the suspension of the work in July,
but that the benefit or profits which they 1837. This portion was not ready to be dewould have received from the actual per- livered at the time the defendants broke up
formance constituted such loss. The cir- the contract, but the plaintiffs were then
. cult judge also charged as follows: "The willing and otrered to perform in all things
defendants ought to be allowed what the on their part, and the case assumes that they
jury should think just as to interest on the were possessed of sutncient means and abiloutlays of the plaintiffs; also what the jury ity to have done so.
might think just for the risk of transportaThe plalntlft's insist that the gains they
tion, and the reasonable value of the marble would have realized, over and above all exunaccepted nnd unquarrled. As to damages penses, In case they had been allowed to peron the rough marble to be delivered by Kain form the contract, enter into and properly
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constitute a part of the loss and damage oc-

casioned by the breach; and they were ac-

cordingly permitted in the course of the trial

to give evidence tending to show what

amount of gains they would have realized if

the contract had been carried into execu-

tion.

On the other hand, the defendants say that

this claim exceeds the measure of damages

,allowed by the common law for the breach

They insist that it]

is simply a claim for the proﬁts anticipatedl

of an executory contract.

from a supposed good bargain, and that these

are too uncertain, speculative, and remote

form the basis of a recovery.

it is not to be denied that there are pro s

or gains derivable from a contract which are

uniformly rejected as too contingent and
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speculative in their nature, and too dependent

upon the ﬂuctuation of markets and the

chances of business, to enter into a safe or

reasonable estimate of damages. Thus any

supposed successful operation the party

might have made, if he had not been prevent-

ed from realizing the proceeds of the con-

tract at the time stipulated, is a considera-

tion not to be taken into the estimate. Be-

sides the uncertain and contingent issue of

such an operation in itself considered, it has

no legal or necessary connection with the

stipulations between the parties, and cannot,

therefore, be presumed to have entered into

their consideration at the time of contracting.

It has accordingly been held that the loss of

any speculation or enterprise in which a par-

ty may have embarked, relying on the pro-

ceeds to be derived from the fulﬁllment of

an existing contract, constitutes no part of

the damages to be recovered in case of

breach. So a good bargain made by a ven-

dor, in anticipation of the price of the article

sold, or an advantageous contract of resale

made by a vendee, conﬁding in the vendor's

promise to deliver the article, are considera-

tions always excluded as too remote and con-

tingent to affect the question of damages.

Clare v. Maynard, 6 Adol. & E. 519, and Cox

v. Walker, in the note to that case; Walker

v. Moore, 10 Barn. & C. -116; Cary v. Gru-

man, 4 Hill, 627, 628; Chit. Cont. 458, 870.

The civil law is in accordance with this

rule. “In general," says Pothier, “the par-

ties are deemed to have_ contemplated only

the damages and interest which the creditor

might suffer from the nonperformanee of the

obligation, in respect to the particular thing

which is the object of it, and not such as may

have been incidentally occasioned thereby in

respect to his other affairs. The debtor is

therefore not answerable for these, but only

for such as are suffered with respect to the

thing which is the object of the obligation,

‘ “Damni et interesse ipsam rem non habltam."

1 Evans. Poth. 91.

5, § 2. arts. 3-6.

When the books and cases speak of the

proﬁts anticipated from a good bargain as
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appeared that the defendant contracted in

November for a quantity of oil, one-half to

be delivered to him in February following,

and the rest in March; but he refused to re-

ceive any part of it. And the court held that

the plaintiff was entitled to the difference

between the contract price and that which

might have been obtained in market on the

days when the contract ought to have been

completed. See M'Lenn v. Dunn, 4 Bing. 722.

The case of Leigh v. Paterson, 8 Tauut. 540,

was one in which the vendor was sued for

not delivering goods December 31st, accord-

ing to his contract. It appeared that in the

month of October preceding he had apprised

the vendee that the goods would not be deliv-

ered, at which time the market value was

considerably less than December 31st. The

court held that the vendee had a right to re-
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gard the contract as subsisting until Decem-

ber 31st, if he chose and recover the differ-

ence between the contract price, and the mar-

ket value ou that day. See, also, Gainsford

v. Carroll, 2 Barn. & C. 624.

The above are cases, it will be seen, in

which the proﬁts of a good bargain were re-

gnrded as a legitimate item of damages, and

constituted almost the only ground of recov-

ery. And it appears to me that we have only

to apply the principle of these cases to the

one in hand, in order to determine the meas-

ure of damages which must govern it. The

contract here is for the delivery of marble,

wrought in a paticular manner, so as to be

ﬁtted r use in the erection of a certain build-

ing. The 'plaintiffs‘ claim is substantially

one for Jnot accepting goods bargained and

sold; as much so as if the subject-matter of

the contract had been bricks, rough stone, or

any other article of commerce used in the

process of building. (The only diﬂiculty or

embarrassnlent in applying the general rule

grows out of the fact that the article in ques-

tion does not appear to have any well-ascer-

tained market value. But this cannot change

the principles which must govern, but only

the mode of ascertaining the actual value of

the article, rather the cost to the party pro-

ducing it) Where the article has no market

value, an investigation into the constituent

elements of the cost to the party who has

contracted to furnish it becomes necessary;

and that, compared with the contract price,

will afford the measure of damages)" The

jury will be able to settle this upon evidence

of the outlays, trouble, risk, etc., which enter

into and make up the cost of ﬁle article in

the condition required by the contract at the

place of delivery. ‘If the cost equals or ex-

ceeds the contract price, the recovery will of

course be nominal, but, if the contract price

iexcoeds the cost, the difference will constitute

the measure of damages)

It has been argued that inasmuch as the

furnishing _of the marble would have run

through a period of ﬁve ycars,—of which

about one ywr and a half only had expired at

the time of the suspension,—the beneﬁts
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‘ will be obliged to go into an inquiry as to

the actual cost of furnishing the article at

the place of delivery; and the court and jury

should see that in estimating this amount it

be made upon a substantial basis, and not

be left to rest upon the 1oo e and specula-

tive opinions of witnesses. he constituent

elements of the cost should be scertained

from sound and reliable sources;\ from prac-

tical men, having experience in the particu-

lar departmen of labor to which the con-

tract relates. t is a very easy matter to

ﬁgure out large proﬁts upon paper; but it

will be found that these, in a great majority

of the cases, become seriously reduced when

subjected to the contingencies and hazards in-

cident to actual performance. [A jury should

scrutinize with care and watchfuluessany spec-

ulative or conjectural account of the cost of
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furnishing the article that would result in a

very unequal bargain between the parties, by

which the gains and beneﬁts, or, in other

words, the measure of damages against the

defendants, are unreasonably enhanced.

They should not overlook the risks and con-

tingencies which are almost inseparable from

the execution of contracts like the one in

question, and which increase the expense in-

dependently of the outlays in labor and cap-

ital.

These views. it will be seen, when con-

trasted with the law as expounded and ap-

plied by the circuit judge, necessarily lead to

the granting of a new trial. .

BEAHDSLEY, J. The circuit judge clearly

erred in that part of his charge to the jury

which related to the con ract of the plaintiffs

with Kain & Morgan. n2‘No damages are al-

lowable on account of t s contract, nor am I

able to see how it can be regarded as rele-

vant evidence upon any disputed point con-

nected with theamount for which the de-

fendants are liable. ‘‘

The main question in the case arises out of

the claim of the plaintiffs in respect to that

portion of their contract with the defendants

which remained wholly unexecuted in July,

1837.‘ I think the plaintiffs are entitled to

recover the amount they would have realized

as proﬁts had they been allowed fully to

execute their contract. (The defendants are

not to gain by their wrongful act, nor is that

to deprive the plaintiffs of the advantages

they had secured by the contract, and which

would have resulted to them from its per-

formance. £he jury must, therefore, ascer-

tain wha i would probably have cost them

to complete the contract, over and above the

materials on hand, including the value of the

marble required, the labor of quarrying and

preparing it for use, the expense of transpor-

tation, superintendence, and insurance against

all hazards, together with every other ex-

pense incident to the fulﬁllment of the under-

taking. The aggregate of these expenditures

is to be deducted from the amount which

would be payable for the performance of this

LAW DAM.2(i Ed.—10

will be obllged to go Into an inquiry as to
the actual ('OSt ot furnishing the article at
the place of delivery; and the court and jury
should see that in estimating this amount lt
be made upon a substantial basis, and not
be left to rest upon the loope and speculative opinions of witnesses. U'he constituent
elements of the cost should be 11scertained
from sound and reliable sources~\ fror:iJ. practical wen, having experience In the p:uticular departlllen\of labor to which the con·
tract relates.
t ls a very easy matter to
figure out large profits upon paper; but it
will be found that these, In a great majority
of the eases, become seriously reduced wilen
euhjeded to the contingencies urnl ilaznrds Incident to actual performance. {A jury should
scrutinize with care and watcll!ulncssnny speculutiYe or conjectural account of the cost of
furnishing the ertklc thnt would result In a
very unequal bargain between the parties, by
which the gains and benefits, or, 1q other
words, .the measure of damages against the
defendants, are unreasonably enhanced.
They should not overlook the risks and contingencies which are almost Inseparable from
the execution of contracts like the one In
question, and which Increase the expense Independently of the outlays in labor and capital.
These views, It will be seen, when contrasted with the law as expounded and applied by the circuit judge, necessarily lead to
the granting of a new trial.
BEARDSLEY, J'. The circuit judge clearly
erred ln that part of his charge to the jury
which related to the co1ract of the plaintiffs
with Kain & Morgan. No damages are allowable on account of t s contract, nor am I
able to see how It can be regarded as relevant evidence upon any disputed point connected with the. n~ount for which the defendants are llable. I
The main question In the case arises out of
the claim of the plalntltrs in respect to that
portion of their contract with the defendants
which remained wholly unexecuted ln July,
18:.li. · I think the plnlntllTs are entitled to
recover the amount they would have realized
as profits had they been allowed fully to
execute their contract. (The defendants are
not to gain by their wrongful act, nor is that
to deprive the plaintiffs of the advantages
they had secured by the contract, and which
would have resulted to them from Its performance.) frhe jury must, therefore, ascertain wha( !~would prnbably have cost them
to complete the contract, over and above the
materials on hand, including the value of the
marble required, the labor of quarrying and
preparing 1t for use, tile ex11eni;e of transportation, superintendence, and Insurance against
all hazards, together with every other expense Incident to the fulfillment of the undertaking. The aggregate of these expenditures
ls to be deducted from the amount which
would be payable for tile performance of this
LAW DAM.2d Ed.-10
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part of the contract, nccortllng to the prit-es
therein stipulated, and the balance will Ue
the damages which the jury ~hould allow tor
the Item under consideration. I
/Remote and contingent damages, depending
dn the result of suc·cesslve schemes or Investments, nre never allowed for the violation
of any contract. nut profits to be earned
and made by the faithful ex:ecutlon of a fair
contract are not of this description. A right
to damages equivalent to such profits re1mits
clkectly and Immediately from the net of the
party who prevents the contract from being
performed.
Where a vendor has agreed to sell and deliver personal property at a pnrticulur 4ay,
and fails to perform his contract, the :\'emlee
may recover In damages the difference IJetween the C<>Dtract price and the market value
of the property at the. ti1ne when 1t should
have been dellver~d.I Chit. Cont. (::ith Aw.
Ed.) 445; Dey v. Do'x, 9 Wend. 129; Gainsford v. Carroll, 2 Barn. & C. 624; Shepherd
v. Hampton, 3 Wheat. 200; Quarles v. George,
23 Pick. 400; Shaw v. Nudcl, 8 Pick. 9; 2
Phil. Ev. 104. So, if a person who has
agreed to purchase goods at a certain price
refuses to receive them, he must pay the difference between their market value and the
enhanced price which he contracted to pay.
2 Starkie, Ev. (ith Am. Ed.) 1201; Boorman
v. Nash, 9 Barn. & C. 145.
'fhese principles are strictly appllcable to
the present case. In reason and justice there
can be no dllYerence between the damages
which should be recovered tor the breach of
an ordinary agreement to buy or sell goods
and one to procure building materials, fit
them for use, and deliver them In a finit;hed
state, at a stipulated price. In neither case
should the wrongdoer be allowed to protlt by
his wrongful act. The party who ls ready
to perform ls entitled to n full Indemnity for
the loss ot his contract. (He should not be
made to suffer by the delinquency of the
other party, but ought to recover precisely
what he would have made by performance.)
This Is as_ sound In morals as It ls In law.
Shannon v. Qomstock, 21 Wend. 4Gl; l\liller
v. Mariner's Church, 7 Green!. 51; Shaw v.
Nudd, 8 Pick. 13; Swift v. Barnes, 16 Pick.
l!>fJ; Royalton v. 'furnplke Co., H Vt. 311.
The plaintilfs were not bound to wait till
the period hacl elapsed for the complete performance of the agreement, nor to make successive offers of performance, In order to re·
cover all their damages. They might regard the contract as broken up, so far as to
absoi ,·e them from making further efforts to
perform and give them a rig-ht to recover full
damages as for a total breach. I am not prepared to sny that the plnlnUtis might not
have brought successive suits on this covenant, had they from time to time made :.,_
peated otrers to perform on their part, which·
were refused by the defendants, but this the·
plnlntlft's were not bound to do.
There can IJe no serious difficulty in as-
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sessing damages according to the principles

which have been stated. he contract was

made in 1836; and, acco ing to the testi-

mony, about ﬂve years would have been a

reasonable time for its execution. That time

has gone by. The expense of executing the

contract must necessarily depend upon the

prices of labor and materials. If prices ﬂuc-

tuated during the period in question, that

may be shown by testimony.\ In this respect .

there is no need of resorting to conjecture,

for all the data necessary to form a correct

estimate of the entire expenses of executing

the contract can now be furnished by wit-

nesses.

If the cause had been brought to trial be-

fore the time for completing the contract ex-

pired, it would have been impracticable to

make an accurate assessment of the dam-
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ages. (This is no reason, however, why the

injured party‘should not have his damages,

although the diﬂiculty in making a just as-

sessment in such a case has been deemed a

suﬂicient ground for decreeing speciﬁc per-

formanc . Adderly v. Dixon, 1 Sim. & S.

607, and cases there cited. In Royalton v.

Turnpike Co., 14 Vt. 311, 324, an action was

brought on a contract which had about twelve

years to run. And the court held, in grant-

ing a new trial, that the rule of damages

“should have been to give the plaintiffs the

difference between what they were to pay

the defendants, and the probable expense of

performing the contract; and thus assess the

entire damages for the remaining twelve

years." No rule which will be absolutely

certain to do justice between the parties can

be laid down for such a case. Some time

must be taken arbitrarily at which prices are

to be ascertained and estimated; and the

day of the breach of the contract, or of the

commencement of the suit, should perhaps be

adopted under such circumstances. But we

need not, in the present case, express any

opinion on that point. No conjectural esti-

mate is required to ascertain what would

have been the expense of a complete execu-

tion of this contract; but the state of the

1 market in respect to prices is now susceptible

of explicit and intelligible proof. And where

that is so, it seems to me unsuitable to adopt

an arbitrary period, especially as the esti-

mate of damages must, in any event, be

somewhat conjectural.

I think the defendants are entitled to a new

trial, and that the damages should be assess-

ed upon the principles stated.

BRONSON, J. As the marble had no mar-

kot value, the question of proﬁts involves an

inquiry into the cost of the rough material in

the quarry, and the expense of raising, dress-

ing, and transporting it to the place of deliv-

ery. There may have been ﬂuctuations in

the prices of labor and materials between the

day of the breach and the time when the con-

tract was to have been fully performed; and

this makes the question on which my broth-

ren are not agreed. I concur in opinion with
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SHERMAN CENTER TOWN CO. v. LEON- I have pa-oiitabty carried on the hotel busi-

ARD.

(26 Pac. 717. 46 Kan. 354.)

Supreme Court of Kansas. May 9, 1891.

Error from district court,

county; Loms K. PRATT, Judge.

Hardy & Sterling, for plaintiff in error.

Bagley & Andrews, for defendant in error.

Sherman

.IOH.\S'll'()N. J. Thomas P. Leona rd rr- -

covered a judgment for $600 against the

lSherman Center Town Company as dam-

'.age for the breach of acontract. Leon-

ard owned a hotel in Itasca.and Sherman

Center: which was three miles away, was

a candidate for county-scat of Sherman

county.

increase the population and inﬂuence of

Sherman Center and strengthen its can-
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didacy, held out inducements to the citi-

zens of the surrounding towns to remove

their buildings and establish themselves

in business in Sherman Center, and unite

in an effort to make that town the coun-

ty-seat of the county. Accordingly they

entered into an agreement with Leonard

by which Leonard was to join them in

building up the town, and remove his

hotel from Itasca, in consideration of

which the company was to convey to

him certain lots in Sherman Center, and

provide at its own e.\'peu.\r men and ma-

chinery to remove the hotel, and place it

over a cellar of equal size. and on a foun-

dation of a similar kind, asit was then

resting upon in Itasca. 'l‘he plaintiff ai-

ieged that the company had failed and re-

fused to remove the hotel in accordance

with the terms of the contract; that the

other buildings which were then situated

in Itasca have been removed to Sherman

Center, and the town of Itasca has be-

come depopulated, and the business of

hotel-keeping of no value; and that the

hotel now stands alone, with no town

nearer toit than Sherman Center, which is

nearly three miles distant. He further ai-

ieged that it was a large and well-fur-

nished hotel. and that the cost of its con-

struction and the furniture contained

therein was about $4,500. It is alleged

that the cost of removal would be about

the sum of $00, and that he suffered dam-

ages by the refusal of the company to

comply with the contract in the sum of

r$l.200. He therefore asked judgment for

$2.000. The company by its answer de-

nies the execution of the contract, or that

it is authorized by its charter to enter in-

to the contract alleged tohave been made.

There are several errors assigned by the

company, but only one of them requires

attention. it appears that the company

has conveyed the lots to Leonard, as stip-

- ulated in the contract, but the hotel has

not been removed, and, according to

plaintiff's testimony, the non-removal is

owing to the refusal of the company to
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contract-results in the loss of deﬁnite

proﬁts, which are asurtainable, and were

within the contemplation O1 the contract-

ing‘ parties. they may generally be recov-

ered; but the prospective protits do not

furnish the correct measure of damages in

the present case. Aside from the remote,

conjectural, and speculative character of

the anticipated beneﬁts, it cannot be said

that the loss of them is the direct endan-

nmidable consequence of the breach.

The plaintiii‘ could not sltidle an indeli-

nite len,e,'th_of time, and safely count on the

recovery of $150 per month as damages.

If there was a breach of the contract, it

was his duty. upon learning of it, to at

once remove the building‘. or employ oth-

ers to do so. and charge the cost of the re-

moval to the town company. The law

] requires that the injured party shall do
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whatever he reasonnbiycan, and improve

all reasonable opportunities to lessen

the injury. From the testimony it ap-

pears that Leonard could have procuredl

others to move the hotel: and in such a

case the ordinary measure of damages is

the cost of removal, and the reasonable

expenses of avoiding the consequenc

the defendant's wrong. Railway Co. v.

Mihlman. 17 Kan. 224; Loker v. Damon.

17 Pick. 284; 1 Sedg. Dam. 165, and cases

cited. Counsel ior plaintiff in error say

y the court: but the ad-

mis i of the objectionable evidence,

nga s the opposition of the plaintiff in

error would indicate that the cour

adop d an incorrect measure of damages.

and id not limit the recovery to.tb_e_ex-

pense of the remoyal. The liability of the

plaintiff in Error ior any loss is not con-

ceded. It is shown in the testimony that

soon after the time ior the removal of the

building the people O! Sherman Center

abandoned the attempt to obtain the

county-seat, and all or nearly ll of them

I-F/bliaclaimed

by plainﬁﬂin error that Leo ard objected

to the removal ol his building mftil the-

question of the location of the county-seat

was settled. He testiﬁed at the trial thag

he did not intend to move the buildingx-

to Sherman Center. and that he would

not move the building at all, until the

county-seat was permanently located. I!

the non-removal of the building was due

to the lault of Leonard, he is not entitled

to recover anything. This is a disputed

question of fact, which must be settled on

another trial. For the error of the court

in admitting testimony the judgment of

the court below will be reversed. and

moved to another place. I ‘

cause remanded for a new trial. All the

justices concurring.
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THOMAS, BADGLEY &. W. .\IA. 1 CO.

v. WABASH, ST. L. & P. RY. .

(22 N. W. 827, 62 Wis. 642.)

Supreme Court of Wisconsin. March 31, 1885.

Appeal from circuit court, Milwaukee coun-

ty.

Chapin, Dey & Friend, for appellant. Van

Dyke & Van Dyke, for respondent.

COLE, C. J. On the tenth of November,

1882, the plaintiff, as consignee, caused to be

delivered to the defendant, a common car-

rier, at St. Louis, 11 pipemachine, circular

||shaft, box of dies, and wrenches accompany-

‘ing, and being a part of the pipe-machine,

to be transported over its road and connect-

ing lines to Milwaukee. The machine and

its attachments were badly broken and de-

stroyed while in the custody of the defend-
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ant through the negligence of its servants.

‘The machine was a patented one, and the

right to make and sell it was vested in the

manufacturer at St. Louis, of whom it was

purchased by the plaintiff. The machine

was devised for cutting pipe and making t

nipples, and was ordered by the plaintiff to

be used in its business in Milwaukee, of

ﬁtting pipe and manufacturing brass goods,

etc. The plaintiff sues to recover damages

for the loss of the machine, and the loss of

its use in its business while another was be-

lug procured. The case was tried by a jury,

which found a special verdict. The plaintiff

had judgment for the value of the machine,

which was proven to be $275, and for the loss

of its use for 85 days, at the rate of $1.50 per

day, and interest thereon from the com-

mencement of the action.

The questions presented on the appeal are

as to the proper rule of damages. There

was evidence which tended to show that the

machine, though badly broken and some of

its parts destroyed, might have been repair-

ed by the patentee at St. Louis, who was

the manufacturer. The plaintiff refused to

accept the machine at Milwaukee, but left

it in the possession of the carrier, and or-

dered a new machine of the manufacturer.

One question arising in the record is wheth-

er it was thp duty of the plaintiff, under the

circumstances, to have received the machine

in its damaged condition, and to have made

proper and reasonable exertions to have it

repaired, so as to render the loss to the car-

rier as light as possible. There is a class of

.cases which decide that it is not only the

moral but the legal duty of a party who

seeks redress for another's wrong, to make

use of his opportunities of lessening the dam-

age caused by the other's default. If it had

been within the power of the plaintiff to

have supplied the broken parts of the ma-

chine, or to have repaired it with reason-

able labor and expense, it might have been its

duty to have done so within this rule of law.

delivered was useless; that the cost and ex-

pense to the plaintiff to repair it would have

amounted to the price of a new machine.
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the bill of lading that in case of loss or dam-

age to goods during transportation, whereby

.' the defendant incurred a responsibility, that

:' then it should only be liable for the value of

the property computed at the place and time

of shipment. This was precisely the extent

of the rccovery' on this item of damages.

The next question is, was the plaintif f en-

titled to recover for the loss of the use of

the machine while another was being pro-

cured to supply the place of the one destroy-

ed‘! This question, upon the circumstances

of this case, we think must be answered iii

the negative. n the ﬁrst place, it is to be ob-

served that there is no allegation in the com-

plaint, and no proof was give on the part of

the plaintiff, which tended to show that the

defendant had notice of the use to which the

machine was to be put, or even knew that the
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plaintiff intended to use it in its business.

On the contrary, the agent of the defendant

who made the contract of shipment ays he

had no notice of the purpose for which the

machinery was to be used. He said he was

applied to by the manufacturer in St. Louis

about this particular shipment, and gave

special rates, less than the regular tariff, on

representation made by the manufacturer

that the goods were not liable to injury, and

that he wanted to introduce the machine,

which was a new one, through the west, and

wished the assistance of the witness in do-

ing so. This is all the knowledge the de-

fendant had about the property, or the use

to which it was to be put. It is said the

fact that the consignee in the bill of iading

was a manufacturing company was suﬂicient

notice that the machine was intended to be

used by it in its business. We do not think

so. The defendant certainly had no notice

of the business in which the plaintif f was

engaged, and did not know that this ma-

chine had been procured for ﬁtting pipe and

making nipples. Should we presume—as we

i have no right to do—that the defendant had

knowledge of plaintiff's business, surely we

could not presume that this machine was

' ordered by it for immediate use.

This being the state of the evidence, on

what ground can the plaintiff claim dam-

ages for loss in the use of the machine? The

president of the plaintiff testiﬁed that his

company was doing business of steam-ﬁtting

and selling pipe at wholesale, and in the fall

of 1882 he was told he would need a ma-

chine to cut the pipe. This was the reason

for buying the machine. He says: “We

were, besides, doing some steam-ﬁtting our-

selves. and, of course, we have to cut pipe

all the time to get special lengths, and in-

stead of using men we paid a man to do it

with the machine. The machine would do

the work of one man." This is really all

there is in the case to base a claim for loss

in the use of the machine upon. The de-

fendant did not know what the machine was

designed for: did not know the use to which

it was to he put; did not even know the
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the blll of lading that in case of loss or dam- plaintiff would use it; and, of course, did
age to goods during transportation, whereby not know that the plaintiff w'o uld sustain
: the defendant incurred a responsibll1ty, that any special damage if the property failed to
tllen It sllould only be liable for the value of be delivered promptly, In good order. From
the property computed at the place and time the nature of the subject It ls difficult t<>
of shipment. 'l'hls was precisely the extent state an inflexible rule of damages which
will aJ:)'ply to all contracts. This court bas .
. of the recovery" on this ltew of damages.
} \ Tile ue..\:t question ls, was the plaintitr en- often referred to, and has p111ctlcally acted ~
titled to recover for the loss of the use of upon, the rule laid down in the leading case
tile machine wblle another was being pro- of Hadley v. Baxendale, 9 Exch. 3.U. In
cured to supply tile place of the one destroy- that case the plaintiffs, who were owners of
ed ·1 This question, upon the circumstances a dour-mill, sent a broken iron sba!t to an
of tills case, we think must be answered lb office of the defendant, a common ca1Tler, to
the negative. fVT.n the first place, it Is to be ob- be conveyed to the consignee, to have a new
served that there ls no allegation in the com- shaft made. The defendant's clerk was told
plaint, and no proof was give on the part of . that plaintlfl'.'s mill was stopped, and that
the plaintitr, which tended to show that the the broken shaft must be dellvered Immedidefendant bad notice of the use to which the ately to the consignee, but It was delayed
nmchlue was to be put, or even knew tba t the for an unreasonable time. In consequence
plalntitr intended to use lt ln lts business. of the delay the plalntlfl'.s did not receive the
On the contrary, the agent of the defendant new shaft for some days after the time they
who made the contract of shipment says be ought to have receiyed it, and they were
had no notice of the purpose for which the unable to work their mill for want of the
machinery was to be used. He said he was new shaft, and thereby Incurred a. loss of
applied to by the manufacturer in St. Louis profits. The court held that under the cirabout this particular slllr.>ment, and gave cumstances such loss could not1 be recovered
special rates, less than the regular tarltr, on ln an action against the common camer.
representation made by the manufacturer because the special circumstances were nevtllat the goods were not liable to Injury, and er communicated to It by the plalntitrs. Althat he wanted to introduce the machine, derson, B., in giving the decision, states the
which was a new one, through the west, and rule of damages as follows:
wished the assistance of the witness in do"Where two parties have made a contract.
ing so. This Is all the knowledge the de- which one of them has broken, the damages
fendant had about the property, or the use which the other party <>ught to receive In reto which lt was to be put. It ls said the spect of such breach of contract should be
fact that the consignee In the blll of lading such as may fairly and reasonably be conwas a manufacturing company was suftlcient sidered either arising naturally, 1. e., acnotice that the machine was Intended to be cording to the usual course of things, from
used by it in its business. We do not think such breach of contract Itself, or such as
so. The defendant certainly had no notice may reasonably be supposed to have been in
ot the business in which the plaintiff was tile contemplation of both parties, at the
engaged, and did not know tbnt this ma- time .they Jnnde the contract. as the probchine bad been pro<!'llred for fitting pipe and able result of the breach of It. l Now, 1f the
making nipples. Should we presume--as we special circumstances under w1ilch the conr hnve no right to do-that the defendant had
tract wrui actually made were communicated
', knowledge of plaintlff"s business, surely we by the plaiutlfl'.s to the defendants, and thus
· could not presume that this machine was known to both parties, the damages resultordered by it for lmmedJate use.
ing from the breach of such a contract, which
This being the state of the evidence, on they would reasonably contemplate, would
what ground can the plaintiff claim dam- be the amount of injury which would ordiages for loss In the use of the machine? Tbe narily follow from the breach of contract
president of the plaintiff testified that his under these special circumstances so known
company was doing business of steam-fitting and communicated. But, on the other hand,
and Reiling pipe at wholesale, and in the fall It these special circumstances were \Vholly
of 1882 he was told he would need a ma- unknown to the party breaking the contract.
chine to cut the pipe. This was the reason be, at the most, could only be supposed to
for bny!ng the machine. He says: "We have had in his contemplation the amount
were, besides, doing some steam-fitting our- of injury which would arise generally, and,
seh·cs. and, of rourse, we have to cut pipe In the great multitude of cases, not atrected
nil the time to get special lengths, and In- by any special circumstances from sucll a
stead of using men we paid a mnn to do it breach of contract."
with the machine. The machine would do
This rule has been sometimes criticised.
the work of' one man." This is really all and It has been said that, generally, when
there Is In the case to base n claim for loss parties enter Into a contract, they do not
in the use of the machine upon. Tile de- contemplate Its breach or the probable result
fendant did not know what the machine was of a breach, and that the rule might be mor&
designed for: did not know the use to which accurately expres~ed. See Palle!>, C. B .. In
It was to l:t> pnt; uhl uot eYcn know the Hamilton v. ~IcGill, 12 Ir. Law, 202. But.
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without reﬁning on the rule, its application

to the question we are considering is ob-

vious and decisive; for here the defendant

was not informed by the plaintiff that the

machine was one which it needed for use in

its business of cutting and titting pipe, and

that it was procured for that purpose. If

one desires to trace the judicial discussion

of the rule in Hadley v. Baxendale, he will

tind a most excellent and accurate analysis

of the English and American decisions in

/note a, 1 Sedg. Dam. (7th Ed.) top p. 218.

Also see note 2 to section 772, Iintch. Carr.

p. 597.

In Brayton v. Chase, 3 Wis. 456, which

was an action by the vendee against the

vendor for failure to deliver a reaper which

the plaintiff purchased to harvest his crops,

the plaintiff sought to prove that he suffered

great loss and damage in his crops, and in
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the extra expense of hiring hands, by rea-

son of the non-fulﬁllment of the contract to

deliver. The evidence was excluded, and

this court aﬂlrmed the ruling, holding that

such damages did not result naturally and

directly from the injury complained of. It

may be doubtful whether this decision is

entirely consistent with Richardson v. Chyno-

weth, 26 Wis. 656; Smeed v. Foord, 1 El. &

El. 602; Gee v. Railway Co. 6 Hurl. & N.

211; Collard v. Railway Co. 7 Hurl. & N. 79;

Elbinger Actien-Gesellschafft v. Armstrong,

L. R. 9 Q. B. 473; Wilson v. Railway ()o. 9

C. B. (N. S.) 632; Griﬂin v. Colver, 16 N. Y.

490; Vicksburg & M, R. Co. v. Ragsdale, 46

.\Iiss. 458; and cases of that class. For, as

we unde1stand the Brayton Case, the vendor

knew that the reaper was wanted for the

purpose of harvesting the plaintiff's crop

that season. If it were not delivered in time

for that purpose the parties might well be

presumed to have known that the vendee

would be put to additional expense in secur-

ing his cropst But still the case is fully sup-

ported by British Columbia Saw-mill Co. v.

Nettleship, L. R. 3 C. P. 499. In this case

“the platntlffs delivered to the defendant's

servants, on a quay at Glasgow. for ship-

ment on board the defendant's vessel. which

lay along-side, several cases containing ma-

ehinery, which was intended for the crec-

tlon of a saw-mill at Vancouver's island.

The master gave a bill of lading for them,

describing the cases as containing “merchan-

dise." The defendant knew generally of

what the shipment consisted. On the ar-

rival of the vessel at her destination, one of

the cases, which contained machinery with-

out which the mill could not be erected,

could not be found on board, and the plain-

tiffs were obliged to send to England to re-

place the lost article. Held, that the defend-

ant was liable for the loss of the machinery,

as delivery to the defendant's servants along-

side the vessel was equivalent to a delivery

on board. Held, also, that the measure of

damages for the breach of the contract was

the cost of replacing the lost articles in Van-

couver's island, with interest at 5 per cent.
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BRIGHAM et al. v. CARLISLE.

(78 Ala. 243.)

Dec. Term, 1884.

Appeal from circuit court, Lee county;

Henry D. Clayton. Judge.

Action against Brigham & Co. for breach

of a contract employing plaintiff as a trav-

eling salesman to sell goods on commission.

There was a judgment for plaintiff, from

which defendants appealed.

J. M. Chilton, for appellants.

Barnes, contra.

Supreme Court of Alabama.

W. H.

CLOPTON, J. It may be conceded that

at common law a defendant can insist upon

the beneﬁt of the statute of frauds by plea

of the general issue. Under our statute,

which provides that “in all suits where the
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- defendant relies on a denial of the cause of

action as set forth by the plaintiff he may

plead the general issue, and in all other

cases the defendant must brieﬂy plead spe-

cially the matter of defense." The statute of

frauds must he pleaded, or it will be consid-

ered as waived. Ritch v. Thornton, (35 Ala.

309; Petty v. Dill, 53 Ala. 641. No plea of the

statute of frauds having been interposed, the

validity of the contract, because not in writ-

ing, cannot be raised by a charge.

If the statute had been pleaded, the con-

tract, as set out in the bill of exceptions,

does not come within its inhibition. It was

made in September, 1881, and, as testiﬁed

by the plaintiff, was to commence on the

1st of October, and continue at least eight

months, and longer if mutually desirable at

the end of that time. By its terms it was

‘capable of performance within a year. The

statute applies to contracts which, by ex-

lpress stipulation, are not to‘ be performed

within one year from the making thereof,

and not to contracts which by their terms are

determinate within that period, but may be

continued longer at the option of the parties.

Heﬂin v. Milton. 69 Ala. 35-i.

The third charge requested by the defend-

ants based their right to abandon the con-

tract on the naked fact, unexplained, that the

plaintiff did not commence the performance

of the contract until January 1, 1882. The

violation of a contract by one of the parties,

or when he is unable to perform the acts or

services stipulated, may be suﬂicient to an-

thorize the other party to abandon it. Sick-

ness of the plaintiff for a protracted period,

such as would probably have disabled him

from making sales during the appropriate

season, as contemplated and intended by

the contract, might perhaps have authorized

the defendants to abandon the contract; but

there was no implied condition that the

plaintif f would continue in health. Its

tabaudonment in such case is at the election

of the defendants; and they will be held to

have waived their right to renounce the con-

tract when, after the delay has terminated,

they regard and treat it as continuing and
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(But there are damages, which are in the

contemplation of the parties at the time of

makingthe contract,andare the natural and

proximate results of ltsbreach which are not

recoverable. The parties must necessarily

contempiat the loss of proﬁts as the direct

and necessary consequence o1 the breach of

a contract. and yet all proﬁts are not with-

in the scope of recoverable damages. here

are numerous cases, however, in which prof-

its constitute, not only an element, but the

measure, of damage. While the line of de-

marcation is often dim and shadowy, the

distinctive features consist in the nature

and character of the proﬁts. When they

form an elemental constituent of the con-

tract, their loss the natural result of its

breach, and the amount can be estimated

with reasonable certainty,—such certainty as
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satisﬁes the mind of a prudent and lmpartial

person,—they are allowed. The requisite to

their allowance is some standard, as regular

market values, or other established data, by

reference to which the amount may be sat-

isfactorily ascertained. Illustrations of prof-

its recoverable are found in cases of sales

of personal property at a ﬁxed price, evic-

tions of tenants by landlords, articles of part-

nership, and many commercial contracts.

On the other hand, “mere speculative prof-

its, such as might be conjectured would be

the probable result of an adventure, defeated

by the breach of a contract, the gains from

which are entirely conjectural, and with re-

spect to which no means exist of ascertain-

ing even approximately the probable results,

cannot, under any circumstances, be brought

within the range of recowrable damages."

1 Suth. Dam. 141. Proﬁts speculative, con-

jectural orremote are not, generally, regarded

as an element in estimating the damages. In

Pollock v. Gantt, 69 Ala. 373, it is said:

"‘What are termed 'speculative damages‘-

V

that is, possible, or even probable, gains, that

it is claimed would have been realized but

for the tortious act or breach of contract

charged against a defendant—are too remote,

and cannot be recovered." The same rule has

been repeatedly asserted by this court. Cul-

ver v. Hill, 68 Ala. 66; Higgins v. Mansﬁeld,

62 Ala. 267; Burton v. Holley, 29 Ala. 318;

White v. lililler, 71 N. Y. 118; French v.

Ramge, 2 Neb. 254; 2 Smith, Lead. Cas. 574;

Oimstead v. Burke, 25 Ill. 86. The two fol-

lowing cases may serve to illustrate the dif-

ference between proﬁts recoverable and not

recoverable. In Insurance Co. v. Noxson,

8-i Ind. 347, an insurance agent, who had

been discharged without cause before the

expiration of his contract, was allowed to

include in his recovery the probable value of

renewals on policies previously obtained by

him, upon which future preminms would, in

the usual course of business, be received by

the comp ny, on the ground that the amount

of compe ation due on such renewals can

be ascertained with requisite certainty by
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( But there are damages, which are In the
0>ntemplatlon of the parties at the time of
making the contract, and are thl' natural and
proximate results of lts breach which are n1>t
recoverable. J The parties must necessarily
<X>ntemplat.f the loss of profits as the direct
and necessary consequence o} the breach of
a contract, and yet all profits are not within the scope of recoverable damages. frhere
.are numerous cases, however, In which profits constitute, not only an element, but the
measure, of damage. While the line of demarcation is often dim and shadowy, the
-distinctive features consist In the nature
and character of the profits. When they
form au elemental constituent of the contract, their loss the natural result of Its
breach, and the amount can be estimated
with reasonable certalnty,-iluch certainty a.s
11atlsfies the mlutl of a prudent and lmpru-tlal
person.-they are allowed. The requisite to
their allowance is some standard, as regular
market values, or other established data, by
reference to which the amount may be satisfactorily ascertained. Illustrntlom1 of profits recoverable are found In cases of sales
of personal property at a fixed price, evictions of tenants by landlords, articles of partnership, and many commercial contracts.
On the other band, "mere speculative p1·orits, such as might be conjectured would be
the probable result of ll.11 adYenture, defeated
by the b1·eacb ot'. a contract, the gains from
which are entirely conjectural, nnd with reApei?t to which no men.us exist ot ascertaining even approximately the probable results,
cannot, under any circumstances, be brought
within the range of recoyernble damages."
1 Suth. Dam. 141. Profits speculative, conjectural orremote are not, generally, regarded
as an element In estlmn.tiug the damages. In
Pollock v. Gantt, 00 Ala. 373, it ls said:
/ "'What ara termed 'speculative damages'. that ls, possible, or even probable, gains, that
it ls claimed would lln.ve been realized but
for the tortlous net or breach of contract
charged against a defendant-are too remote,
and cannot be recovered." The same rule has
been repentedly asserted by this court. Culver v. Hill, 6S Ala. 06; Higgins v. Mansfield,
62 Ala. 207; Burton v. Holley, 29 Ala. 318;
White v. !IJiller, 71 N. Y. 118; French v.
Rnmge, 2 Neb. 2:H; 2 Smith, I,ead. Cas. 574;
Olmstead v. Ilurke, 2:> lll. 80. The two following cases may serve to illustrate the dit'.ference between profits recoverable and not
recoverable. Iu Immrauc·e Co. v. Noxson,
84 Ind. 347, an insurance agent, who had
lieen discharge(! without cause before the
~xplratlon of his contract, was allowed to
lndnde in his recovery the probable value of
renewals on policies previously obtained by
him, upon which future premiums would, In
the usual course of business, be received by
V the complJny, on the gronJ)(J that the amount
of compe'1sntlon clue on snC'h renewals can
be ascertained with re1111iRite certainty by
I the use or actuary's life ta hies and t·ompnrl·
son11, and that the basis of the right to dam-
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ages existed, and was not to be built In the
future. In Lewis Y. Insurance Co., 61 Mo.
534, which is cited with approval In the
other case, the same rule as to the probable
value of renewals was held; but 1t was also )
held that an estimate of the probable earnings of the agant thereafter, derived from //
proof ot the amount of his co\lectlonli' and
commlsiolons before the breach or the contract, In the absence of othei· proof, ls too
speculnth·e to be admissible.
Profits are not excluded from recovery because they are profits; but, when excluded,
it Is on the ground that there are no criteria
by which to estimate the amounCwilliThe
certainty on which the adjudications of
courts and the ft ndlngs of jmies sbould be
base<l. The amount ls not susceptible of
proof. In 3 Suth. Dam. 157, the autho1· dlscrlrulnntlngly observes: /'When it Is advisedly said that profits are uncertain and
speculative, and cannot be recovered, when
there ls au alleged loss of them, It ls not
meant that profits are not recoverable mere-ly because they are such, nor because profits are necessarily speculative, contingent,
n.nd too uncertain to be proved; but they n1·e
rc:>jectE'd when they are so; and It is probable
that the Inquiry for them has been generally
proposed whE!n It must end ln fruitless uncertainty; and theretorellt Is more a general
truth than a general prl~iple that a loss of
pl'oflts Is~ ground on which damages can
bo glYen." Vhen not allowed because specu·
latlve, co tlngent, n.nd uncertain, their ex·
cluslon ls founded by some on the ground of
remoteness, and by others on the presumption that they are not In the legal contemplation or the parties. )
The plaintitr, by the contract, undertook
the business of traveling salesman for the
defondauts. The amount ot'. his commissions
dependetl, not merely on the number and
amounts or snle!j he might make, but also on
the proportional quantity of the two classes
of goods sold, his commissions being different on each. The number and amounts of
sales depended on many contingencies,-the
state or trade, the demand tor such goods,
their suitableness to the different markets,
the fluctuations of business, the skill, ene1·gy,
nud lndu'!try with which he prosecuted the
business, the time employetl In etrectiug different sales, and upon the nccept-nnce of his
sales by the defendants. There are no crlterla, no established data, by reference to
which the profits are capable of any estimate.
They are purely Rpeculative nnd conjectural.
Besides, the c\'idence ls the mere opinion
nnd conjecture of the plalntift', without giving any facts on which It was based. The
bare statement, uncorrob~rnted by any facts,
n.nd without a basis, that " the reasonable
sales would have been fifteen thousand dollars, and that the net profits on that a.mount
of sales would have been four hundred and
fifty dollars." ls too conjectural to be ad·
mlsslblc. Washbum v. Huubard, 10 Laus. 11.
Reversed and remanded.
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HITCHCOCK v. SUPREME TENT OF

KNIGHTS OF )lACC:\‘BEES OF

THE WORLD.

(58 N. W. 640, 100 Mich. 40.)

Supreme Court of Michigan. April 10, 1894.

lirror to circuit court, §aginaw county;

John A. Edget, Judge.

i

be agreed upon between him and the tents.

The aforesaid proportion of charter fee,

, membership fee, per eapita tax, etc., shall

I

7

Action by Edward M. Hitcheock against -

the Supreme Tent of the Knights of Mac-

cabees of the World. From a judgment in
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his favor, plaintiff brings error on account of

insuiiiciency. Reversed. ‘

The defendant is a corporation organized

under the laws of this state, and author-

ized to issue endowment certiﬁcates, payable

on the death oi."Tnembers, to beneﬁciaries

selected by them, and is operated under the ‘

lodge system, the lodges being known as

“tents." It was incorporated in 1885 by ﬁve

incorporators, three of whom constituted the

board of trustees. A Mr. Boynton was sec-

retary and one of the trustees, and to him

was committed the chief management of '

, the association. The organization appears to

' have met with great favor, and before the

close of the ﬁrst year was in active operation

in many states and in Canada. It had from

50 to 75 agents engaged in organizing tents.

These agents were compensated by a part

of a membership fee, a certiﬁcate fee, and i

a quarterly per capita tax. No tents could

places of 5,000 population, or with less than

25 members in places of over 5,000 popula-

tion. Plaintiff was a man of considerable

experience in organizing associations of this

character. Negotiations between him and

Mr. Boynton resulted in the execution of a

contract dated October 5, 1885, by which

plaintiff was given the sole control of in-

stituting and organizing new tents or subor-

dinate bodies in the state of Indiana. The

contract ﬁxed the following compensation for

, his services: “First. Sixty dollars of the

charter fee for each tent he or his deputies

may institute in said state of Indiana. Sec-

i

be instituted with less than 15 members in ‘

ond. All the membership fee on all over ‘

ﬁfteen, and under twenty-ﬁve, members put

in new tents on organization. Third. One-

half the membership fee on all members put

into new tents on organization, over twenty- ‘

ﬁve members. Fom'th. All the per capita

itax collected by him from the ﬁrst ﬁfteen

members in each new tent. Fifth. One-

fourth of the annual per capita tax on the

entire membership in the state of Indiana

shown to be in good standing on the books

of the supreme tent at the close of each
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terprise is more expensive than that which

follows, and that after the work is fairly

started it is easier to organize tents than at

ﬁrst. He also offered a statement taken

from the books of the defendant, showing

the organization of 40 tents after the breach

of the contract; 125 members in new tents,

over 15 and under 25; 66 members in new

tents, over ‘.15; and the total number of

new members. From this statement he

made up his total claim. as follows: Char-

ter fees, 40 tents, $2,400; membership fees

under clause 2 of the contract, $625; mem-

bership fees under clause 3, $165; per capita

tax under clause 4, $300; per caplta tax un-

der clause 5, $2,956.83.

The rule governing these cases is estab-

lished by an unbroken line of authorities,-

that damages which are pm-ely speculative

Generated for facpubupdates (University of Michigan) on 2014-06-12 19:21 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/mdp.35112105421491
Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd-google

in character, and dependent on so many

contingencies that they cannot be traced

with reasonable certainty to the breach of '

the contract, are not allowable. The diﬂl-

culty lies in determining whether the facts

of a particular case bring it within or with-

out this rule. There is no sounder basis for

damages for breach of contracts of this char-

acter than the proﬁts, when they can be de-

termined with proximate and reasonable cer-

tainty. In fact, there is no other basis.

They are the natural and proximate results of

a breach, which the law presumes that each

party foresees. The rule does not require

that such data be furnished that they can

be computed with mathematical exactness.

When one breaks a contract which the other

party has partly performed, and the violator

then performs the work himself, from which

he has reaped the proﬁts which the other

party might have made, he cannot escape

liability for damages, if such other party

can show the proﬁts made while he was

execnting it, and the beneﬁts received from

its subsequent completion. The contract in

ithis case was speciﬁc and deﬁnite in all

respects, ﬁxing the amount of work, and

the price. It was contemplated that the

1 plaintiff should make proﬁts, and the de-

1 fendant was to be beneﬁted by his work.

These results were being successfully accom-

)plished when the contract was broken. In

L case of a breach by plaintiff, defendant could

perform the work, and recover as damages

the difference between the price agreed up-

on and the cost of completion. In case of a

breach by defendant, the proﬁts lost consti-

tute the legitimate measure of damages.

The law is not so blind to justice as not to -

require the defendant to respond in damages,

if there is any reasonable basis for their

ascertainment. There is ifo presumption,

egal or otherwise, that the plaintif f could

not have completed the work. The defend- ‘

ant was satisﬁed with the uceess of the

plaintiff. It is a fair presumption that he

would have succeeded. It is a fair infer-

ence from the evidence that the defendant's

oiiicers broke the contract because of this
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we think this case comes within, and is 304, 52 N. W. 609. The case of Wnkeman

ruled by, the following authorities: Wake- v. Manufacturing Co. is similar in its facts

man v. Manufacturing Co.. 101 N. Y. 205, 4 to the present case, and many of the author-

N. E. 264; Treat v. liiles (W'ts.) 50 N. W. ities are there collated and discussed. Judg-

896; Mueller v. Spring 00., 88 Mich. 390, mont reversed, and new trial ordered. The
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50 N. W. 319; Oliver v. Perkins, 92 Mich. other justices concurred.
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6

ALLISON v. CHANDLER.

(11 Mich. 542.)

Supreme Court of Michigan.

Oct. 20, 1863.

Crror to circuit court, Wayne county.

C. I. Walker, for plaintiff in error. Jerome

& Swift and A. B. Maynard, for defendant

in error.

CHRISTIANCY, J. When this cause was

formerly before us (Chandler v. Allison, 10

Mich. 460), one of the questions involved

was whether Allison, the plaintlff, was

rightfully in possession of the store at the

time the trespass was committed, or wheth-

er his right of possession was dependent up-

on Chandler's election to rebuild, and ceased

when that election was made; and one of

the grounds upon which the judgment in
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that case was reversed was the rejection of

evidence tending to show that Allison‘s

right of possession was thus qualiﬁed. But

as the case now appears before us upon ex-

ceptions taken on the new trial, the ﬁnding

of the jury, whether right o1 wrong,—uo ex-

ception having been taken to the evidence

or the charge upon this point,—rcquires us

to treat this question, so far as we are now

to consider the case. as settled in favor of

the plaintiff; and the defendant must be

considered as a trespasser, entering upon

the premises and tearing down the store

while in the rightful possession of the plain-

tiff, under a lease for a term which would

not expire till the 1st day of May following.

The only question presented by the pres-

ent bill of exceptions, and not already dis-

posed of by our former decision, is the ques-

tion of damages; and in this action of tres-

kaass (as parties are under no necessity of

protecting themselves by contract against

trespasses) the question of damages is to be

treated in all respects as it would have been

had the trespass been committed by a party

between whom and the plaintiff the relation

of landlord and tenant did not exist, except

so far as the good faith of the defendant,

and the absence of malice on his part,

might preclude the plaintiff from the recov-

ery of damages of a punitory and exem-

plary character, beyond the amount which

would compensate the actual loss. Upon

this point (the question of exemplary dam-

ages) we think the court below was right in

instructing the jury that, if they should

ﬁnd the defendant, in tearing down the

store, acted in good faith, and under an

honest belief that he had a legal right to do

so, then the plaintiff could only recover his

actual damages. This qualiﬁcation of the

right of a jury to give punitory or exempla-

iry damages in actions of trespass is, we

ink, in accordance with the principle up-

Et which such damages are sometimes al-

wed to be given. But whether the rulings

of the court upon the admission of evidence,

and in the charge to the jury, did not lay

down too narrow a rule for the estlmationi
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down too narrow a rule· for the estlmatloDf
of actual damages, Is the main question for!
our conslderatJon.
While In many cases the rule or damages
SQpreme Court of Michigan. Oct. 20, 1863.
ls plain and easy of appllcatl<>n, there ure
Error to circuit court, Wayne county.
many others In which, from the nature of
C. I. Walker, for plalntlll' In error. Jerome the subject-matter, and the peculiar circum& Swltt and A. B. :Maynard, for defendant stances, It ls very difficult-and In some
in error.
cases Impossible-to lay down any definite,
fixed rule of law by which the damages ncCHIUSTIANCY, J. When this cause was tnally sustained can be estiwated witll a.
formerly before us (Chandler v. Allison, 10 reasonable degree or accuracy, or en•n a
Mich. 460), one of the questions in¥Olved probable approximation to justice; and the
was whetller Alllson, the plalntlll', was Injury must be left wholly, or In g1·eat part,
rightfully In possession of the store at tile unredressed, or the questi<>n ruust be left to
time the trespass was committed, or wheth- the good sense of the jury upon all the facts
er his right of possession was dependent up- and circumstances of the case, aided by
on Chn.ndler's election to rebuild, and ceast->d such advice and Instructions from the court
wheu that election was made; and one of as the peculiar facts and circumstances of
the grounds upon which the Jud,:ment In the case may s~m to ret1uire. But the
that case was reversed was the rejection or strong Inclination of the courts to ailmlnlsevidence tending to show that Allison's ter !£>gal redress upon fixed and certain
right of possession was thus qualified. But rules has sometimes led to the adoption of
as the case now appears before us upon ex- such rules In cases to which tlley coulil not
ceptions taken on the new trial, the finding be consii,itently or justly applied. Hence
of the jury, whether right 09 wrong,-no ex- there ls, perhaps, no branch of the law upon
ception having been taken to the evidence which the1·e is a greater cont!lct of judicial
or the charge upon this polnt,-requlres us decisions, and none In which so many mereto treat this question, so far as we are now ly arbitrary rules have been adopted. Weto consider the case, as settled In fav<>r of have carefully examined all the cases cited
the plalntlll'; and the defendant must be In the very elaborate brlefi,i of the resr>ectlve
considered as a trespasser, entering upon counsel, and the most approved elementary
the premises and tearing down the store treatises upon the subject, and, without atwhile In the rightful possession of the plaln- tempting here to compare and analyze them
tUr, under a lease for a term which would (which would require a treatise), we are
not expire till the 1st day of May following. compelled to say that the line of mere auThe only question presented by the pree- thority upon questions of damages like that
ent blll of exceptions, and not akeady dis- here presented, If any such line can be·
posed <>f by our former decision, Is the quee- traced through the cont!lct of hostile deciltlon of damages; and In this action of tres- sions, le too confused and tortuous to guide·
"ass (as parties are under no necessity of us to a safe or satisfactory result, without
protecting thewselves by contract against resort to the principles of natural Jui;tlcetrespaeses) the question of damages Js to be and sound policy which underlie these questreated In all respects as It would have been tions, and which have sometimes been overhad the trespass been committed by a party looke<l, or obscured by artltlclal distinctions
between whom and the plalntil'l the relation and arbitra1·y rules.
The principle of compensation for the lose
of landlord and tenant did not exist, except
so far as the good faith of the defendant, or Injury sustlllned Is, we think, that which
and the absence of malice on his p1ut, lies at the bosle <>f the whole question of
might preclude the plaintur ft-om the recov- damages In most actions at common law,
ery or damages of a punltory and exem- whether of contract or tort. We do not
plary chtu"llcter, beyond the amount which here speak of those actions In which pm..iwould compenRate the actual loss. Upon tory or exemplary damages may be given,
this point (the question of exemplary dam- nor of those whose principal object Is the
ages) we think the court below was right In establishment of a right, where merely nomInstructing the jury that, If they should inal damages nre p1·oper. But, with these
find the defendant, In tearing down tile exceptions, the only just theory of an aetio11
store, actetl In good faith, and under an for damages, and Its primary object, wouhl
honest hP! iPf that he had a legal right to do seem to be that tl1e damages to be rceover
\ so, then tl!e plalntltr could only rcco'l"er his ed should compensate the loss or Injury susactual damages. Tbis qualltkatlon of the tained. We concur entirely with the court
right of a Jury to give punitory <>r exempla- of nppea1'1 In New York In Griffin v. Colver,
ry damages lu actions of trespass Is, we 10 N. Y. 4V2, In repudiating the doctrlr11>
lnk, In accordance with the pl"inclple up- adopted by l\lr. Sedgwick from Domat
n which such damages nre sometimes nl- (Sedgw. Dnm. 3, 37, 38, etc.), that "the law}
wed to be given. But whether the n11lngs alms not at the satisfaction, but the diviof the court upon the ndmlssl<>n of evidence, sion of the loss." Such, It Is true, Is often
and In the charge to the jury, did not lay the result of an action, but neYer the object
ALLISON "· CHANDLER.
(11 Mich. 54.2.)
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-of the law. The law may, and often does,

fail of doing complete justice, from the im-

perfection of its means of ascertaining

truth, and tracing and apportioning effects

to their various causes; but it is not liable

to the reproach of doing positive injustice

by design. Such a doctrine would tend not

only to make the law itself odious, but to

corrupt its administration, by fostering a

disregard of the just rights of parties. In

actions _uunn contracg especially, and those

nominally in tort, but Substantially upon

contract, courts have thought it generally

safer, upon the whole, to adopt certain def-

inite Iules for the government of the jury

by which the damages could be estimated,

at~the risk of falling somewhat short of the

actual damages, by rejecting such as could

not be estimated by a ﬁxed rule, than to
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leave the whole matter entirely at large

with the jury, without any rule to govern

their discretion, or to detect or correct er-

rors or corruption in the verdict. In such

cases, therefore, there has been a strong in-

clination to seize upon such elements of cer-

tainty as the case might happen to present,

and as might approximate compensation,

and to frame thereon rules of law for the

measurement of damages, though it might

be evident that further damages must have

been suffered, which however, could only be

estimated as matter of opinion, and must

therefore be excluded under the rules thus

adopted. And it is not to be denied that this

course of decision has sometimes been ex-

tended to actions purely of tort.

But whatever plausibility there may be in

the theory of Mr. Sedgwick when applied to

actions upon contract,—a plausibility which

arises from mistaking the result for the ob-

ject,—the injustice of such a principle, when

applied to cases of actual, positive tort, like

that here in question, would be so gross as

to shock all sense of justice.

It has been frequently said that the rule of

amages, where there is no fraud, willful neg-

ligence, malice, oppression, etc., is the same in

actions of tort as in those upon contract. But

though the remark is doubtless true in its ap-

,plication to those cases of tort where, from the

nature of the case, elements of certainty exist,

by which substantial compensation may be

readily estimated, and other cases which are

but nominally in tort, we do not think it can

be accepted as a principle of universal applica-

tion; nor, in our opinion, can it be justly ap-

plied to any case of actual, aggressive tort,

where, from the nature and circumstances of

the case itself, no such elements of certainty

are found to exist, or none which will apply

substantially to the whole case: nor to any

case where the rule applicable to breaches of

contract would exclude a material portion of

the damages the injured party may have suf-

fered, though the amount of the latter may not

be capable of accurate calculation by any ﬁxed

and deﬁnite rule.

There are some important considerations
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the law. The law may, and often does,
fall of doing complete justice, from the imperfection of its means of ascertaining
truth, and tracing and apportioning effects
to tlwir various causes; but it ls not liable
to the reproach of doing positive Injustice
by design. Such a doctrine would tend not
only to make the law itself odious, but to
corrupt its administration, by fostering a
dls1·egard of the just rights of parties. .lJl.
.acti9US JWOJl .cont~ ~specially, and those
nominally in tort, but 1mbstantlally upon
contract, courts have thought It generally
safer, upon the whole, to adopt certain definite rules for the government of the jury
by which the damages could be estimated,
at-the risk of falling somewhat short of the
actual damages, by rejecting such as could
not be estimated by a fixed rule, tllan to
leave the whole matter entirely at large
with the jury, without any rule to govern
their dlsc1·etlon, or to detect or correct errors or con·uption in the verdict. In such
-cases, therefore, there hns been a strong inclination to seize upon sul'h elements of certainty as the case might happen to present,
and as might approximate compensation,
and to frame thereon rules of law for the
measurement of damages, though it might
be evident that further damages must have
been suffered, which however, could only be
estimated as matter of opinion, and must
therefore be excluded under thl.! rules thus
adopted. And it is not to be denied that this
course of decision has sometimes been extended to actions purely of tort.
But whatever plausibility there may be In
the theory of Mr. Sedgwick when applied to
actions upon contract,- a plausibility which
arises from mistaking the result for the object,-the injustice of such a principle, when
applied to cases of actual, positive tort, like
that here In question, would be so gross as
to shock all sense of justice.
It has been frequently said that the rule of
mages, where there Is no fraud, willful neggence, malice, oppression, etc., Is the same in
tions of tort as In those upon contract. But
though the remark Is doubtless true in Its ap1Jllcation to those cases of tort where, from the
natm·e of the case, elements of certainty exist,
by which substantial cowpensntion way be
readily estimated, and other cases which are
but nominally In tort, we do not think it can
be nceepted as a p1·tnclple of universal application; nor, In our opinion, can lt be justly applied to any case of actual, aggressive tort,
where, from the nature and circumstances of
the case itself, no such elements of certainty
are found to exist, or none which will apply
substantially to the whole case; nor to any
case where the rule applicable to breaches ot
contract would exclude a material portion of
the damages the injured party may have suffered, though the amount of the latter may not
bf! capable of accurate calculation by any fixed
.and definite rule.
There are some Important considerations

~

1

which tend to limit damages in an action upon
contract, which have no application to those
purely of tort. Contracts are made only by
the mutual consent of the respective parties;
and each party, for a consideration, thereby
consents that the other shall have certain
rights as against him, which he would not otherwise possess. In entering into the contract
the parties are supposed to understand Its legal effect, and, consequently, the limitations
which the law, for the sake of certainty, has
fixed for the recovery of damages for !ts
breach. If not satisfied with the risk which
these rules Impose, the parties may decline to
enter Into the contract, or may fix their own
rule of damages when, In their nature, the
amount must be uncertain. Hence, when suit
Is brought upon such contract, and It ls found )
that the entire damages actually sustained can
not be recovered without a violation of such
rules, the deflciency Is a loss, the risk of which
the pai·ty voluntarily assumed on entering Into
the contract, for the chance of benefit or advantage which the contract would have given
him In case of performance. His position ls
one in which he has voluntarily contributed to
place himself, and in which, but for his own
consent, he could not have been placed by the
wrongful net of the opposite party alone.
Again, In the majority of cases upon contract, there Is little difficulty, from .the nature
et the subject, In finding a rule by which substantial compensation may be readily estimated; and It ls only in those cases where this
cannot be done, and where, from the nature of
the stipulation, or the subject-matter, the actual dawages resulting from a breach, are
more or less uncertain In their nature, or difficult to be shown with accuracy by the evidence, under nny definite rule, that there can
be any great failure of justice b adhering to
such rule as will most nearly ap
!mate the
desired result. And It ls prec y in these
classes of cases that the parties
e It in their
power to protect themselves
mst any loi-s
to arise from such uncertain
by estimating
their own damages In the co
ct Itself, and
providing for themselves th ules by which
the amount shall be mensur , In case of a
breach; and it they neglect this, they ·m ay be
presumed to have assented to such damages as
may be measured by the rules which the law,
for the sake of certainty, has adopted.
Again, In analogy to the rule that contracts
should be construed as understood and assented to by the parties,-lf not as a part of
that rule,-damages which are the natural
and, under the clrcumstnnces, the direct and
necessary result of the breach, IU1L.Qften ver
p
·l • r ·ec
b
ll"
t
be considered a.s having been within t)N COJr
templiiiion of thal"ea~~r!l_es a t tQe..iiin_e...
of ~·Ing int<_:>_!!i~_contrnct.
· ··
None o-riiiese several considerations have
any bearing In nu action purely of t01·t. The
Injured party l..tas consented to enter Into no
relation with the wrongdoer by which any hazard of loss should be incurred; nor has he re-
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ceived any consideration, or chance of beneﬁt

or advantage, for the assumption of such haz-

ard; nor has the wrongdoer given any consid-

eration, nor assumed any risk, in consequence

of any act or consent of his. The injured par-

ty has had no opportunity to protect himself

by contract against any uncertainty in the es-

timate of damages; no act of his has contrib-

uted to the injury; he has yielded nothing by

consent; and, least of all, has he consented

that the wrongdoer might take or injme his

property or deprive him of his rights, for such

sum as, by the strict rules which the law has

established for the measurement of damages

in actions upon contract, he may be able to

show, with certainty, he has sustained by such

taking or injury. Especially would it be un-

just to presume such consent, and to hold him

to the recovery of such damages only as may

Generated for facpubupdates (University of Michigan) on 2014-06-12 19:21 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/mdp.35112105421491
Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd-google

be measu1ed with certainty by ﬁxed and deﬁ-

nite rules, when the case is one which, from

its very nature, affords no elements of cer-

tainty by which the loss he has actually suf-

fered can be shown with accuracy by any evi-

dence of which the case is susceptible. Is he

to blame because the case happens to be one

of this character? He has had no choice, no

selection. The nature of the case is such that

the wrongdoer has chosen to make it, and upon

every principle of justice he is the party who

should be made to sustain all the risk of loss

. which may arise from the uncertainty pertain-

ing to the nature of the case, and the diﬂiculty

of accurately estimating the results of his own

Iwrongful act. Upon what principle of right

can courts of justice assume, not simply to

divide this risk, which would be thus far un-

just. but to relieve the wrongdoer from it en-

tirely. and tluow the whole upon the innocent

and injured party? Must not such a course of

decision tend to encourage trespasses, and op-

erate as an inducement for parties to right

themselve by violence, in cases like the pres-

ent?

Since, from the nature of the case, the dam-

ges cannot be estimated with certainty, and

there is a risk of giving by one course of trial

less, and by the other more than a fair com-

Jpensation,—to say nothing of justice,—does not

sound policy require that the risk should be

thrown upon the wrongdoer instead of the in-

ljured party? However thi question may be

answered, we cannot resist the conclusion that

it is better to run a slight risk of giving some- ‘

what more than actual compensation, than to

adopt a rule which, under the circumstances of

the case, will, in all reasonable probability,

preclude the injured party from the recovery

of a large proportion of the damages he has

actually sustained from the injury, though the

amount thus excluded cannot be estimated

with accuracy by a ﬁxed and certain rule.

i,Certainty is doubtless very desirable in esti-

, ating damages in all cases; and where, from

‘_ e nature and circumstances of the case, a

lie can be discovered by which adequate com-

l ‘ nsation can be accurately measured, the rule

s 'ould be applied in actions of tort, as well as
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-celved any conslderntion, or clumce of benefit ill those upon contract. Such Is quite gener<>r advantage, for the asi,"Umption of such haz- ally the case In .trespass and trover for the
ard; nor bas the wrongdoer given any consid- taking or conversion of personal property, if
eratl<Jn, nor assumed au~· risk, in co11se<1ueuce the property (as it generally Is) be sucl! as can
of any act or consent of l!is. The injured pnr- be readily obtained in the market and has a
ty bas had no opportunity to protect himself market value. But shall the iujured party l~
by contract agaiust any uncertainty in th1' cs- an action of tort, which may happen to furnls
timn te of d:uunges; no net of his has contrib- no element of certainty, be allowed to recove
uted to the injury; be l!as yieltled uothiug by no damages (or merely nominal) because be
-consent; and, least of all, has be cousented cannot show the exact amount with certainty,
that the w!'ongdoer might take or injw·e his though he ls ready to show, to the satisfaction
property or deprive him of bis rights, for such of the jury, that he has suliered large damages
sum as, by the strict rules which the law has by the injury? Certainty, It ls true, would
established for the measm·ement of damages thus be attained; but It would be the certainIn actions upon contract, he may be able to ty of injustice. And, though a rule of cershow, with certaiuty, he bas sustained by such tainty may be found which will measure a portaking or injury. Especially would It be un- tion, and only a portion, of the damages, and
just to presume such consent, and to bold him exclude a very material portion, which it can
to the recoYery of such damages only as may be rendered morally certain the injured party
be ml'asured with certainly by fixed and defi- has sustained, though !ts exact amount cannot
nite rules, when the case Is one which, from be measured by a fixed rule; here to apply
its very nature, atiords no elements of cer- any such rule to the whole ease, ls.to misapply
tainty by which the loss he bas actually suf- It; and so tar as It excludes all damages
fered can be shown with accuracy by any evi- which cannot be measured by it perpetrates
dence of which the case Is susceptible. Is be positive injustice under the pretense of adminto blame be.:ause the case happens to be one istering justice.
of this character? He bas had no choice, no
The law does not require impossibilities,
1:1election. The nature of the case is such that nnd cannot. therefore, require a higher dethe wrongdoer bas chosen to make it, and upon gree of certa.Jnty than the nnture of the
~very principle of justice he ls the party who
case admits. And we can see no good reason
Jshould be made to sustain all the risk of loss tor requiring any higher degree of certainty
, which may arise from the uncertainty pertain- In respect to the amount of damages than
ing to the nature of the case, and the dilttculty In respect to any other branch of the cause.
· ot accurately estimating the results of bis own Juries are allowed to act upon probable and
}wrongful act. Upon what principle of right inferential, as well as direct and positive
can courts of justice assume, not simply to proof, And when, from the nature of the case,
divide this risk, which would be thus far un- the amount of the damages cannot be esti~
just, but to relieve the wrongdoer from It en- mated with certainty, or only a part of them
tirely, and throw the whole upon the innocent can be so estimated, we can see no objection
and Injured party? Must not such a course of to plncing before the jury all the facts and
decision tend to encourage trespasses, and op- circumstances of the case, having any tenderate as an Inducement for parties to right ency to show damages, or their probable
themselves by violence, In cases like the pres- amount; so as to enable them to make the
most Intelligible and probable estimate which
ent?
Since, from the nature of the case, the dam- the nature of the case will permit. This
1J.ges cannot be estimated with certainty, and should, of course, be done with such instruc-It.here Is a risk of giving by one course of trial tions and advice from the court as the cirless, and by the other more than a fair com- cumstances ot the case may require, and as
)pen:;ation,-to say nothing of justlce,-does ~ot may tend to prevent the allowance of such
sound policy require that the risk should be as may be merely possible, or too remote or
jthrown upon the wrongdoer Instead of tl!e ln- fanciful In their character to be snfely conljured party? Howeyer this question may be sidered as the result of the injury.
answered, we cannot resist the conclusion thnt
In the adoption of this comse It will selIt Is better to run a slight risk of giving some- dom happen that the court, bearing the eviwhat more than actual compensation, than to dence, will not thereby possess the means of
adopt a rule which, under the circumstances of forming a satisfactory judgment whether
the case, will, in all reasonable probability, the damages are unreasonable or exorbitant;
predude the injured party from the recovery and, it satisfied they are so, the court have
of a large proportion of the damages he has always the power to set aside the verdict
actually sustained from the Injury, though the and grant a new trial.
amount thus excluded cannot be estimated
The justice of the principles we have enwith accuracy by a fixed and certain rule. deavored to explain wm, we think, be suffi\Certainty ls doubtless very desirable In estl- ciently manifest In their application to the
ting damages In all cases; and where, from present case. The evidence strongly tended
e nature and circumstances of the case, a to show an ouster of the plalntltr for the
e can be discovered by which adequate com- balance of the term by the defendant's ad.
nsntlon can be accurately measured, the rule This term was the property of the plaintiff;
ould be applied In actions of tort, as well as I and, as proprietor, he was entitled to all the

l
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beneﬁts he could derive from it. He could I

not by law be compelled to. sell it for such ,

sum as it might be worth to others; and, i

when tortiously taken from him against his will, he cannot justly be limited to such sum ,

—or the difference between the rent he was 1

paying and the fair rental value of the prem- i

ises—if the premises were of much greater i

and peculiar value to him, on account of the

business he had established in the store, and 1

the resort of customers to that particular

place, or the good will of the place. in his

trade or business. His right to the full en-

joyment of the use of the premises, in any

manner not forbidden by the lease, was as

clear as that to sell or dispose of it, and

was as much his property as the term itself,

and entitled to the same protection from the

laws. He had used the premises as a jewel-

ry store, and place of business for the re-
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pairing of watches, making gold pens, etc.

This business must be broken up by the

ouster, unless the plaintiff could obtain an- |

other ﬁt place for it; and-if the only place

he could obtain was less ﬁtted and less valu- ‘

able to him for that purpose, then such busi-

ness would be injured to the extent of this

difference; and this would be the HMHI, di-

mt, and im.media..te.eonsequence of the injury.

To conﬁne the plaintiff to the difference be-

tween the rent paid and the fair rental value

of the premises to others for the balance of

the term would be but a mockery of justice.

To test this, suppose the plaintiff is actually ;

paying that full rental value, and has estab-

lished a business upon the premises, the clear

gains or proﬁts of which have been an aver-

age of one thousand dollars per year, and he i

is ousted from the premises. and this busi-

ness entirely broken up for the balance of the

term, can he be allowed to recover nothing but

six cents damages for his loss? To ask such

a question is to answer it. The rule which

would conﬁne the plaintiff to the difference

between such rental value and the stipulated

rent can rest only upon the assumption that

the plaintiff might (as in case of personal ,

property) go at once into the market and oh- '

tain another building equally well ﬁtted for ‘

the business. and that for the same rent;

nd to justify such a rule of damages this

assumption must be taken as a conclusive

presumption of law. However such a pre-

sumption might be likely to accord with the

fact in the city of New York, in most west-

ern cities and towns it would be so obviously

contrary to the common experience of the

facts as to make the injustice of the rule

gross and palpable. But we need not further

discuss this point, as a denial of any such

presumption was clearly involved in our'

former decision.

The plaintiff in this case did hire another

store, “the best he could obtain, but not

nearly o good for his business"; “his cus-

tomers did not come to the new store, and

there was not so much of a thoroughfare by

it,—not one-quarter of the travel; and he

relied much upon chance custom, especially
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benefits he could derive from It. He could
not by law be compelled to. sell It for such
sum as It might be worth to othe1·s; and,
when tortlously taken from him against his
will, he cannot justly be limited to such sum
-or the difference between the rent he was
paying and t11e fair rental value of tile premises-if the premises were of much greater
and peculiar value to him, on account of the
business he had established in the store, and
tile resort of customers to that particular
place, or the good will of the place. In his
trade or business. His l'ight to the full enjoyment of tile use or the premises, In any
manner not forbidden by the lease, was as
clear as that to sell or dispose of It, and
was as much his pl'Operty as the term itself,
and entitled to the same protection from the
laws. He bad used the premises as a jewelry store, and place of business for the repairing of watches, making gold pens, etc.
This business must be broken up by the
ouster, unless the plaintiff could obtain another fit place for It; and- If the only place
he could obtain was less fitted and less valuable to him for that purpose, then such business would be Injured to tile extent of tills
difference; and this would be the IUIJ.ll!'al, !U~t, and !mJlll}Qiote eonsequence of the Injury.
To confine the plalntil'f to the difference between the rent paid and the falr rental value
or the premises to others for the balance of
the term would be but a mockery of justice.
To test this, suppose the plaintiff ls actually
paying that full rental value, and has established a business upon the premises, the clear
gains or profits of which have been an average of one thousand dollars per year, and be
ls ousted from the premises, and this buslnese entirely broken up for the balance of the
term, can he be allowed to recover nothing but
six cents damages for his loss? To ask such
a question is to answer It The rule which
would confine the plalntil'f to the difference
between such rental value and the stipulated
rent can rest only upon the assumption that
the plaintltr might (as In case of personal
property) go at once into the market and obtain another building equally well fitted tor
the business. and that for the same rent;
nd to justify such a rule of damages this
nssumpt!on must be tnken as a conclusive
presumption of lnw. However such a presumption might be likely to accord with the
fact In the city of New York, in most western cities a nd towns it would be so obviously
contmry to the common experience of the
facts as to make the Injustice of the mle
gross and palpable. But we need not further
discuss this point, as n denial of any such
presumption was clearly Involved In our
former deeisiou.
The pl:tintiff in this case did hire another
store, "the best he could obtain, but not
nrn rly so good for his business"; "his cust omers did not come to the new store, nnd
there 'lrns not so much of a thoroughfare by
lt,-not one-quarter of the u·ayel; and he

relied much upon chance custom, especially/
in the watch-reparing and oilier mechanical
business." This injury to the plaintiff's business WIUI as elearly a part of his damages as
tile loss of the term Itself. This point, also,
was decided in the former case, and we there
further held that the declaration was suffi.cient to admit the proof of this species of
loss.
I Now, If the plaintil'f ls to be allowed to
I recover for this injury to his business, It
would seem to follow, as a necessary consequence, that the value of that business before the injury, as well as after, not only
might, but should be shown. as an imlispensable means of showing the amount of
loss from the injury. If the business were a
losing one to the plaintitr before, bis loss
from its being broken up or diminished (If
anything) would certainly be less than 11'. It
were a profitable one. It is not the amount
of business done, but the gain or profit arising from It, wh!eb constitutes Its value.
But it Is Insisted that loss of profits con\
stitutes no proper ground or element of dam
ages. It there be any such rule of law It I~
certainly not a unlversnl, and can hardly b"l
called a general, rule. Decisions, It is true,
may be found which seem to take It fo1·
granted that the rule Is universal. But there
are numerous cases, even for breach of contract, in which profits have been properly
held to constitute not only an element, but
a measure (and sometimes the only measure),
ot damages, as In Masterton v. Mayor, 7 Hiil,
61; Railroad Co. v. Howard, 13 How. 344.
And In actions for breach of contract In not
delivering goods (as wheat or other articles)
having a marketable value, as well as In
most actions of trespass or trover for the
taking or conversion of such property,-whereever the difference between the contrac~
price, or the market value at the time o
taking or conversion, and the higher market
value at any subsequent period, is held to
constitute the damages,-in all such cases
this difference of price ls but another name
for profits, and is yet very properly held to
be a measure of damages. 'l'here is nothlng1
therefore, In the nature of profits, as such
which prevents their allowance as damage@
But in many, and perhaps the majority, of
cases upon contract in which the question
has arisen, they have been held to be too
remote or dependent upon too many contingencies to be caleulated with reasonable certainty, 01· to have been within the contemplation of the parties at tile time of entering Into the coutrnct.
But there are also cases for breach of conb·aet where, though the profits were In their
nature samewhat uncertnin and contingent
(and in most of them quite as mucb so as
in the present case), they were yet held to
constitute, not strictly a measure, but an
element of damnl!'es proper fo1· the cousldf'rntlon of a jury t o enable them to form a jm1goment or probable estimate of the dama ges;
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as in \Ic.\'eiil v. Reid, 0 Bing. (SS; Bagley

v. Smith, 10 X. Y. 489; Gale v. Leckie, 2

Starkie, 107; Ward v. Smith, 11 Price, 19;
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mate1fal aill to the jury In urrlviug at a fair
p1·obable estimate of the futuro profits, had
the business still continued without 1nterDriggs T. Dwight, 17 Wend. 71. And see 111ptlou.
Acc01'tllngly such past profits have been
Passenger v. Thorburn, 35 Barb. 17. And
In Waters v. Towers, 20 Eng. Law & Eq. allowed for this purpose, both in actions ex
410, the jury were allowed to take Into con- · contmctu and ex dellcto, though more fresideration the profits which might have bel'll i quently in the latter, where trow the nature
made upon a collateral contract, though void i of the case no element of greater certainty
by the statute of frauds (and see :\IcNelll appeared, and the nctunl damages muet be
v. Ueld, supra), while by the American au- more or less a matter of opinion; and where,
as In the preeent case, though somewhat Jn.
t horltles profits of this description ha Ye lx>Pn
almost uniformly rejected. But whatenn· 1 conclusive, It was the best evidence the
may be the rule in actions upon contract, nature of the case admitted. See Wllkes v.
rn tWnk a more liberal rule In regard to Hungerford, 2 Bing. N. C. 281; Ingram v.
lnmages for profits lost should prevail in Lawson, 6 Bing. N. C. 212; Lacour v. Mayor,
ctlons purely of tort (excepting perhaps the 4 Duer, 406; and the following in actions
dlon of trover). Not that they should be upon contract: D1·lggs v. Dwight, 17 Wend.
allowed In all cases without dlstiuction, for 71; Bagley v. Smith, 10 N. Y. 489.
there are some cases where they might, In
But It Is urged by the counsel tor the detheir nature, be too entirely remote, specula- fendant that damages for the loss of profits
tive, or contingent to form any reliable basis ! ought not to be allowecl. because they could
for a probable opinion. And perhaps the not have been within the contemplation or
decisions which have excluded the anticipat- the defendant. \Vhether, as matte1· of fact,
ed p1-ofits of a voyage broken up by illegal this Is likely to h1l'l"e been true, we do not
CllJlture or collision may be properly justifiecl deem it lm11ortant to Inquire. It ls wholl)·
upon this ground. Upon this, however, we humaterlal whether the defendant, In comcxp1'L'f!B no 011lnlon. But generally, ln an ac- mitting the tl-espass, actually contempln te~ I
tion purely of tort, where the amount of this or any other species of damage to tlw
profits lost by the Injury can be shown with plaintllr. This is a consideration whlch lt1
reasonable certainty, we think they are not confined entirely to cases of contracts, where
only admissible In evidence, but that they the question ls, what was the extent of
constitute, thus far, a safe measure of dam- obligation, In this respect, which both pnrtle:i
ages; a.s when they are but another name understood to be created by the contract?
for the use of a. mlll (for exam11l1!), as In
ut where a party commits a trespass hel
White v. Moseley, S Pick. 356; or for the use must be held to contemplate nil the damages
of any other prope1·ty where the value 01· which may legitimately follow from bis 11profit of the use can be mode to appear with legal act. And where a party, though acting
reasonable certainty by the light of pui;t In good faith, yet knowing his right to be
experience, as might often be done where disputed by a party In poll!Jesslon, lnstend of
such profits had been for a couslt.lemble l'l sorting to n judldal trial of bis right, astime uniform at the sume eeaeon of the year, sumes to take the Jnw into his own hancl~.
nod there are no circumstances tent.ling to and by violence to seize the property or right
1<how a probable diminution, had the luJury In dispute, be must he lit'l<1 thereby to 111'1·
uot occuITed. And possibly the same view, sume, on the one hand, the risk of belug
1mbJect to the like quulltlcaUons, might have able to show, when the other party brings
hee n taken of the profite of the plalutllr's him Into court, that the property or right
h11Riness had It been confined to the me- was his, or that his act was legal; or, on\
chanical trade of repairing watehes and mak- the other, of paying all the damages the ·
ing gold pens, partkulnrly If done purely ns Injured party may have sullerecl from the
a cash business. But this business seems injury; and, lt those damnges are In thl'ir
to have been carried on with tlmt of the 1.1ature unl'ertaln, then such as, from all the
sale of jewelry. He kept a jewelry stoce, circumstances, or the best light the nature of
and the pt•ofits of so much of his business as the case alrords, a jury, in the exercise of
may be regardecl na mercantile business good sense and sound discretion, may find to
are dependent upon many more contlngen- be a full compensation.
<"les, and therefore more uncertain, eRpeclally
We are therefore entirely satisfied that all
It sales are mnde upon credit. Past profit:i, the questions put to the witness Alllson
therefore, could not Rafely be taken as the touched the nature. extent, and profits of the
exact measure of futill'e profits; but nil the business before and afte1· the trespass were
various contingencies by which such profits C<'mpetent, and imp1·operly oveITuled; and
would probably be nlfectecl should \Je taken that the charge of the court, so far as It exInto consideration \Jy the jury, antl allowed cludecl all consideration of the good wlll of
such weight as they, In the exercise of good the place, its peculiar value to the plalntll"r,
eense and sound discretion, should think nnd his probable profits, was erroneous.
thew entitled to. ra:>t profit!! In such cases,
The judgment must be reversed, with costs
where the business hnl! been continued fo1· to the plalntlfT, and n new trial grouted.
some length of time, would constitute a Yery
The other justices concurred.
as iu :\lcNeill v. Hehl, 0 Bing. US; Bagley
,.. Smith, 10 :X. Y. 4Sll; Uale , .. Leckie, :.!
Starkie, 107; Ward v. Smith, 11 Price, 19;

1

Driggs v. Dwight, 17 Wend. 71. And see

Passenger v. Thorburn, 35 Barb. 17. And

in Waters v. Towers, 20 Eng. Law & Eq.

410, the jury were allowed to take into con-

sideration the proﬁts which might have been

made upon a collateral contract, though void

by the statute of frauds (and see McNeill

v. Reid, supra), while by the American au-

thorities proﬁts of this description have been

almost uniformly rejected. But whatever

may be the rule in actions upon contract,

we think a more liberal rule in regard to

lamages for proﬁts lost should prevail in

ctions purely of tort (excepting perhaps the

action of trover). Not that they should be

allowed in all cases without distinction, for
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tberc are some cases where they might, in

their nature, be too entirely remote, specula-

tive, or contingent to form any reliable basis

for a probable opinion. And perhaps the

decisions which have excluded the anticipat-

ed proﬁts of a voyage broken up by illegal

capture or collision may be properly justiﬁed

upon this ground. Upon this, however, we

express no opinion. But gene1ally, in an ac-

tion purely of tort, where the amount of

proﬁts lost by the injury can be shown with

reasonable ce1tainty, we think they are not

only admissible in evidence, but that they

constitute, thus far, a safe measure of dam-

ages; as when they are but another name

for the use of a mill (for example), as in

White v. Moseley. 8 Pick. 356; or for the use

of any other property where the value or

proﬁt of the use can be made to appear with

reasonable certainty by the light of past

experience, as might often be done where

such proﬁts had been for a considerable

time uniform at the same season of the year,

and there are no clrcumtances tending to

show a probable diminution, had the injury

not occurred. And possibly the same view,

subject to the like qualiﬁcations, might have

been taken of the proﬁts of the plaintiffs

business had it been conﬁned to the me-

chanicai trade of repairing watches and mak-

ing gold pens, particularly if done purely as

a cash business. But this business seems

to have been carried on with that of the

sale of jewelry. He kept a jewelry store,

and the proﬁts of so much of -his business as

may be regarded as mercantile business

are dependent upon many more contingen-

cies, and therefore more uncertain, especially

if sales ‘are made upon credit. Past proﬁts,

therefore, could not safely be taken as the

exact measure of future proﬁts; but all the

various contingencies by which such proﬁts

would probably be affected should be taken

into consideration by the jury, and allowed

such weight as they, in the exercise of good

sense and sound discretion. should think

them entitled to. Past proﬁts in such cases,

where the business has been continued for

some length of time, would constitute a very

~

I
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DIRECT AND CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES—IN TORT.

HILL v. Wi.\'SOR.

(118 Mass. 251..)

Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts.

Suffoik. Sept. 4, 1875.

At the trial of an action of tort for per-

sonal injuries sustained in consequence of

the defendants' steam-tug striking the fender

of a bridge on which the plaintiff was at

work, the plaintiffs evidence tended to show

that the fender, which was built to protect

the bridge, consisted of piles driven perpen-

dicularly into the bed of a stream about

twelve feet apart, with other piles driven at

an angle to each of these, one of which was

fastened to the top of each perpendicular

pile, with a cap on top extending along the

whole row of piles; that the plaintiff was at

work standing on a plank nailed to the piles,

and, in order to ﬁt an inclined pile to the

perpendicular one and the cap, he had put in
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a brace about a fcot long to keep the in-

clined pile and the upright one apart while

he was at work; that, while so at work, he

saw the tug coming towards the fender. and

tried to get on the cap, when the tug struck

the fender some distance from him, and the

jar caused the brace between the piles to

fall out, the piles came together, he was

caught between them, and severely injured.

The defendants' evidence tended to show that

the plaintiff was not seen by those on the

tug until after the accident, though other.

men at work on the fender were seen; that

the tug was drifted against the fender by

the tide, and then started up; that it was

the only way it could get away from the

fender; and that it was usual for vessels.

when so caught by the tide, so to do.

E. H. Derby and W. C. Williamson, for

plaintiff. O. W. H_ol_mes,_Jr., and W. A.

Munroe, foifdefendants.

COLT, J. In actions of this description,

the questions whether the plaintiff was him-

self in the ‘exercise of due care, and the de-

fendants' act negligent. whether the injury

uffered was due to that act, as well as the

mount of damage to the plaintiff, are, as a

general rule, practical questions of fact to be

settled by the knowledge and experience of

the jury. The defendants' liability depends

upon circumstances which, as the cases arise,

are of inﬁnite variety and combination. If

there is any evidence upon which the jury

may legally found a verdict for the plaintiff,

that verdict cannot be disturbed on excep-

tions as matter of law, unless there has been

some error in the conduct of the trial, or the

judge has failed to state the true test of lia-

bility in his instructions as applied to the

facts disclosed.

Under the instructions given in the present

case. the jury must have found that the in-

jury of the plaintiff was caused by the neg-

lcct or want of ordinary care on the part of

those who. as agents and servants of the

defendants, had cha’ge of the tug-boat; and

that this negligence consisted in not using

such care in its navigation and management

as persons of ordinary prudence would use

DIRECT AND CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES-IN TORT.

HILL v. WIXSOR.
that this neillgence consisted In not u1d11g
such care In Its na·;lgatlon and management
(118 Mass. 251.)
as persons of ordl11ary prudence would use
Supreme Judicial Court of Mnssacbusetta.
under circumstances of like exposure and danSuffolk. Sept. 4, 1875.
ger. They must have also found that the
At the trlnl of an action of tort for per- plalntlfr was himself In the exercise of due
sonal Injuries susta:ned In consequence of care In attempting to escape the peril to which]
the defendants' steam-tug striking the fender he was exposed by the defendants' conduct,
of a bridge on whl<.:h the plalntlft' was at and that his Injury was therefore due solely
work, the plaJntltl"s evidence tended to show to the defendants' negligence. 'l'he evldenec
that the fender, which was built to protect reported justifies these findings. The structhe bridge, conslsled of piles driven perpen- ture upon which the plalntur was at work
dicularly into the bed of a stream about was Imperfect and out of repair. Its conditwelve feet apart, w1th other piles drl"'en at tion at the time, the plalntllT's exposed posian angle to each of these, one of which wns tion upon It, and the knowledge of that exfastened to the top of each perpemllenlnr posure which those In charge of the boat had,
pile, with a cap on top extending along the or In the exercise of due care might -have
whole row of plles; that the plaintiff was at had, were elements affecting the question of
work standing on a plnnk nailed to the piles, the defendants' negllge>nce to which the atnnd, In order to flt an Inclined pile to the tention of the jury was especially ~led. It
perpendicular one t.nd the cap, he had put In cannot be said, as matter of law, that the
a brace about a fcot long to keep the In- jury might not properly find It obvlo ly probdined p!Je and the upright one apart while able that Injury In some form woultl be caushe wns at work; that, while so at work, he ed to those who were at work on the fender
saw the tug coming towards the fender. and by the a l of the defendants In running
tried to get on the cap, when the tug struck against It This constttutea negligence, and
the fender some distance from him, and the It ls not n essary that Injury In the precise
Jar caused the brace between the pllt-s to form in which It In fact resulted should have
fall out, the piles c.ame together, he was been foreseen. It Is enough that It now a11eaught between them, and severely Injured. pears to ha\e been a natural and probable
'l'he defendants' evidence tended to show that consequence.( Lane Y. Atlantic Works, 111
the plaintiff was not seen by those 011 the Mass. 136, and cases cited.
tug untll after the accident, though other.
A majority of the court are of opinion tbnt
men at work on the fender were seen; that there was no error in refusing to givP. thP
the tug was drifted against the fender by specific instructions requested; and that, so
the tide, and then started up; that It was far as they contain correct propositions of law
the only way It could get away from the applicable to the facts presented, tht-y apfender; and that It was usual for ves11el1<, pear to ha Ye been given. The rourt was not
when so caught by the tide, so to do.
lmu111l to ndopt the precise language of the
E. H. Derby and W. C. Wllliamson, for request. As tO the second and sixth, It Is
plaintiff. O. W ..H!ll.Dlea&_ Jr., and W. A. enough to say that there Is no rule of law
whleh exempts one from the consequences of
~(unroe, foi:-aefendants.
his negligent conduct upon proof that he
COLT, J. In actlcns of this description, proceeded In the usual mamwr anti took th••
the questions whether the plalntU'f was hlm- usual course pursued by partlet! shullnrly sit 11 ·
selt In the ·exercise of due care, and the deated, although M was ~'thout notice thut h •
endnnts' act negligPnt, whether the lnjnry ('OUld not safely do so. The dt>fendants 1·a11·
uft'ered was due to that act, as well as the not protect them11elYes y proving the CRl'I'·
mount of damage to the plaintiff, are, as a lPss practices of others, and the clrcumstanees
ifPneral rule, practt,.al que>stlons of fact to be here were sueh os to justify the lnferenl't1mttled by the knowledge and experience of that the defenints were bound to take notice
the jury. The defendants' liability depends of the danger.
upon ch·cumstances whl!'h. as the cases arise,
The third a
fourth requests lmpropl:'rly
nre of Infinite variety :mrl romhlnatlon. If made the plaintl.IT's right to recover wholly
thrre Is any evldenre upon whid1 the jury dependent on the tae>t that notice to the 1tPmny legally found a verdict for the plalntlft', fe11dants had bePn given by the pnrtle11 Jn
that yerdlrt cannot he disturbed. on excPp- charge of the work, that the fender was not
tlons as mutter of law, 11nle11s there has bepn In proper contlltlon for use, although thl'rt•
some error In the conduct of the trial, or the was e\•hlence that the.men on the tug saw
jmlgf' bas foiled to 11tale the true test of ll11- the workmen 011 the bridge and the dangPr to
l11lfty In his Instructions as appll<'d to the whl<'h they .were exposed In time to have prevented the Injury.
fa<"t11 1llsrlosed.
The seventh and eighth are In effect reUniter the lnstrnltlone given In the prPRent
cnsP, the jury must bnve found that the In- quests for lnstrtl('tlons that the defenltants
jury of the plalntltr was caused by the neg- ·were not liable If they used ordinary care, omt
l1•1·t or want of ordinary eare on the 1inrt of this rule was given to the jury, as we ha\·e
tho11r who. as agcnt11 and servont11 or thf' seen.
Exl'i'ptlons .overruled.
1l<'ft-111lnnts, had ('ha1 ge of nie tug-bout; and

~
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SCHUMAKER v. ST. PAUL & D. R. (48 N. W. 559, 46 Minn. 39.)

SCHUMAKER v. ST. PAUL & D.R. CO.
(48 N. W. MD, 46 Minn. 39.)
Supreme Court of Minnesota. April 8, 1891.

Supreme Court of Minnesota. April 8, 1891.

Appeal from district court. Ramsey

county; KELLY. Judge.

Wm. H. Bliss, for appellant. Erwin :2:

Wellington, for respondent.

COLLINS, J. To plaintiff's complaint

herein the defendant corporation inter-

posed a demurrer, upon the ground that

it failed to state facts sufﬁcient to consti-

tute a cause of action. Upon the argu-

ment of this appeal defendant contended

that its negligence in the premises was in-

sufﬁciently pleaded: that the injury com-

plained of. provided the same could besald

to have been the result of defendant's act,

was not proximate, but was too remote a

consequence to be chargeable to it; and,

further. that from the allegations of the
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complaint it was manifest that plaintiff

himself was guilty of contributory negli-

gence. Very little need be said on any of

these points,for none are well taken. The

complaint contains much that is superﬁn-

ous, but in respect to negligence itavers the

defendant's duty to have been to furnish

transportation to plaintiff, a car-repairer

in its employ. from the wrecked caboose,

which he had been sent out to repair by

the foreman. back to St. Paul, when he

had completed his work, and that it

rwrongfully, unlawfully, and negligently

failed and omitted so to do, or to furnish

plaintiff with transportation to any other

place where shelter or food could be ob-

tained, and that by reason ofsuch negligent

failure and omission plaintiff was com

pelled to and did walk to the village of

White Bear,a distance of nine miles,in the

night-time, in extremely cold and danger-

ous weather. that being the nearest point

at which the necessary shelter and food

could behad; thatplacing rciianceuponde-

fendant‘s performance of its duty towards

plaintiff when he had completed his work.

by furnishing transportation back to St.

Paul from the place on its line of road

where he had been taken to repair the ca-

boose, plaintiff was wholly unprepared

with means for properly sheltering or

clothing himself. It was also uverred

that the facts and circumstances with ref-

erence to the location of the caboose, the

inclemency of the weather, the distance to

shelter or food, and that plaintiff, by rea-

son of his reliance upon being transported

back to St. Paul when through with his

work. had not provided himself with

proper clothing for such weather, were

then well known to the defendant. The

negligence of the defendant might have

been speciﬁed with greater certainty, but

from an inspection of the pleading it ap-

pears that defendant is charged with hav-

ing unnecessarily and unreasonably placed

its servant,tbe plaintiff.in serious danger,

from which injury resulted, by carelessly

and negligently omitting to perform a

Appeal from district court, Ram11ey
county; K KL!.Y, Judge.
U'm. H. Bliss, for appellant. Erwla &
'R'Pllln/rf,un, for fl'8pondent.

COLLINS, J, To plRlntlff'e complaint
herein the> defenrtan t corpora tlon interpoll('(\ a demurrer, upon the ground that
it fallecl to Rtate facts eumcient to constitute a cuu11e of action. Upon the argu.
ment or thle appt'tal defendant contended
the t Its negligence In the premises was lnsutDclently pleaded; that the hijury complalnPd or, provided the same couhl be said
to have been the reRult of defeodttnt's act,
wnR not proximate, bot was too remote a
consequence to be chargeable to It; anil,
further, that from the 1tllegntlune of the
complaint it WRB manifest that plalntlH
himself was guilty or contrllrntory negligence. Very llttle need be said on any of
these points, for none arewell taken. The
complttlnt contains much that ls 1mperfluous, but In respect to negllJrence It ft \'era the
defentlant'e duty to ha\•e been to furnl1.1h
transportation to plulntlft, a car-re1111lrer
In Its employ, from the wrecked cahonse,
wbtcb he had been sent out to rPpalr l>y
the foreman, back to St. Paul, when he
hRd completed bis work, and that It
wrongfully, unlawfully, and negligently
'railed and omitted HO to do, or to furoh1h
plaintiff with transportation to any other
place where shelter or food could be obtained, and that by reason ofeucb negligent
failure ana omlHSlon plaintiff w11e cum
pelled to and did walk to the village or
White Bear, a dlstanct't of nine mlle11, In the
night-time, In t!Xtremely cold nn!l damrerou11 weather, that helng the nearest point
at which the necf.>eRary Hhelter and food
coulcl be had; that 11laclng rellnm~e upon defendant's J>erformance Of. ltFI duty towurdt1
plaintiff when he had completed bis work,
by furnishing transportation back to St.
Paul from the place on Its line of road
where be had been taken to repair the caboose, plalntlft was wholly unpr<!pared
with means for properly sheltering or
clothing lllmself. It was also uverred
that the facts and clrcunu;tanct•H with reference to the location or the caboose, the
inclemenl'y of the weHther, the dlst11nce to
Rhelter or food, and that plalnttn, by reneon of his reliance upon being transporte<l
back to St. Paul when thruu:,th with hl11
work, bad not provided hlmFlelf with
proper clothing for such weather, were
then well known to the defendant. The
negligence ur tho defendant might have
been er1ecltled with greater cert a In ty, but
from an ln11pectloo of the pleading It appears that defendant Is charged with having unnect:sl!larlly and unreat1onubly placed
its servant, the plalntlH, In serloui.c danger,
from which Injury resnltecl, by carelet1Hly
and nt>gllgently omitting to perform a
<luty Immediately connected with his
work, on the performance nf w hlch he bad
a right to and did f\!ly. With full knowledge of the situation as to we11tber an•l
tbe Jocallty,consequeotly of the danger to
be apprehended, It n.-glectetl and nban-

cloned the plaintiff nuder clrcumstanceM
which he alleges resulte<I. la perl!lonal Injury to him. It bad no m~ rl11:ht to unnecessarily an•f unreasonably hiave him to
a dangerous place. to expo11e him to ati
unnece1111ary and unreasonable rlHk from
the elements, by falilng to furnish tram1portntlon from the place where he harl
been put Rt work, when that work WUH
comoleted, It being Its duty so to do, according to the complaint, than It had to
onnecessarlly and unreasonably expol!le
him to rlRke and dangers while he was at
work ,-srn:h rlakA anti dangers a11 were
dlaco\•erable by the ase of ordlnnry precaution and diligence. The defendunt
should have been reasonably diligent, ancl
could not, without Incurring llablllty, detiert the plaintiff In the manner and under
the circumstances set forth In the complaint.
·
·
'l'he Important qul'etlon In tht1t caHe,
however, le whether. from the complnint[
It appears that defnulant Is llHhle for th
Injuries which resulted from plulntiff'R efforts to obtain Ahelter and food on the
occasion referrPd to; the former. nH be
fortt stated, nrirulng that, as alleired, they
are too remote, and are not the proximate results of lte act. It Is averred tliut,
by reuson of thl' unavolduble exposure or
the r11al11tlff, he waA made sick, contracted
rbeumathnn, ha11 e\·er since t1ufferecJ grent
pain and alony, and has been permanently Injured. It mnst not be forgotten that
the gra va
n of the action le the negllgenl'e[
ond careleseneasof thPdefendant In lea vlng
J.•laintiff at a place where llconld uot procure either ebeltnor foo& It le an action
In tort, nnd not fOJ' a hre ch of contract.
It Is the negligence of the defendant which
Is com)llalned of, a nil not the breuch of a
contrad to return the plnlntiH to St. Paul
when he had pPriormetl his luhor. It was,
of course, eHsentlnl that the plalntiH'FI relation with the defendant be matlc to
appPur, for, unlPSR be was a ee1·,·uot to
whom the defendant owed a duty, there
COUid arise no liability by rl'!on of ltR neglect to perform that duty . ThA rel a tiun
of mni;ter and servant firs ha vlng bet'n
shown to exl11t, the law fixes the duty of
tbeformertowards the latter, and a vlolntlon of this <In~ Is a~ not a breach
of the contract. Thie, then, 111 an action In
which the wro g-doer ts llnhle fur the nutural end probable consequences of ltt1 nPgllgent act or omission; the genPrel ruleH
wnlch limit the <lamages In actions of
of tort being, In many respects, dl!eot
from those In actions on contructA. Tb
Injury must be the ~lrect rcHult of th misconduct nttrlbuted and the general rule
In respect to dttm \ges 111 thut whoe\·er
commtt11 a tre11pas1& or other wrongful net
Is llahle for all the direct Injury resulting
therefrom, although Hnch re1mltlng lnjnry
could not have bcl'n contPmplaJed DR
probahle rel!lult of tl•c act done. I Se4lg
Dam. 130, note, 1rnd cases cited; lfford v.
Ru ii road Co., 11 Colo. aaa, l :! Pac. R"P· 219,
a caHe much like this. He who cor.:. mits
ft trespa1111 mu>1t be held to contPllll1late
all tile dumai:tes whleh may lealtlmutely
flow from hl>1 lllt>gal act, whether he
may hRve for•!Seen them or uot; and,
so far al!I It ts plainly trncenble, hf' .mu~t
muke compenHation for tbe wrung.
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The damages cannot be considered too

remote if, according to the usual ex-

perience of mankind, injurious results

ought to have been apprehended. It is not

necessary that the injury in the precise

form -in which it, if fact, resulted, should

have been foreseen. {It is enou;:,h that it

now appears to have been a natural and

probable consequence. I Hill v. Winsor, H8

Mass. 251. The question is whether the

negligent act complained of—leaving the

plaintiff in the open countryI in the night-

time, in extremely cold and dangerous

weather, along distance from shelter or

food—was the direct cause of the injuries

mentioned in the complaint, or whether it

\was a remote cause. for which an action

'wili not lie, and it must be taken for grant-

d that the walk of nine miles and incident
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exposure brought about the alleged sick-

ness, pain, aml disability. There was no

intervening independent cause of the in-

jury, fur all of the acts done by the plain-

tiff. his effort to seek protection from the

inclement and dangerous weather, were

legitimate, and compelled by defendant's

failure to reconvey him to the city. Had

he remained at the caboose, and lost his

hands, or his feet, or perhaps his life, by

freezing. no doubt could exist of the de-

fendant's liability. It must not be permit-

ted to escape the consequences of its

wrong because the injuries were received

in an eﬂort to avoid the threatened dan-

ger, or because they differ in form or seri-

ousness from those which might have re-

sulted had the plaintiff made no such ef-

fort. An efﬁcient, adequate cause being

found for the injuries received by plaintiff,

it must be considered as the true cause,

unless another. not incident to it. but in-

dependent of it, is shown to have inter-

vened between it and theresult. Thisis the

substance of very clear statements of the

law found in Kellogg v. Railway Co., 26

Wis.223, and in Railway Co. v. Kellogg. ‘J4

U. S. 469. -And upon the point now under

consideration we fail to distinguish be-

tween the case at bar and Brown v. Rail-

wayCo.,54 Wis.342,11 N. W. Rep.3:'\6,91l,—.

an action brought to recover for like dam-

ages said to have been caused by directing

passengers to alight from a train at a

place about three miles distant from their

destination. At all events, the question

as to what was the proximate cause of a

plain tiff's injuries is usually one to be de-

termined by ajury. As was said in Rail-

way Co. v. Kellogg, supra, the true rul

is that what is the proximate cause of a§\

injury is ordinarily one for a jury. it is

not a question of science or legal knowl-

edge. it is to be determined as a fact, in

view of the circumstances attending it.

Finally, the defendant insists that plain-

tiff was guilty of contributory negligence.

because, from the complaint, it appears

that he was wholly unprepared with

l

DIHECT AND CONSEQUE~TIAL DAMAGES-IN TORT.

The clnmageR cannot be cumd1lered too
remote if, according to the usual experlPnce of nranklnd, lnjurloa11 result&
ought to have been apprehended. It ls not
nect'eeary that the Injury In the precb1e
form· In which it, 11,1 fact, resulted, ebauld
have been foreseen. l It is enough that It
now appem·e to hll\'e been a natural and
probable conwequence. I Hill v. Winsor, 118
Mase. 251. The question le whether the
nei;tllg<mt act com1>Ialned of-leaving the
plulntltt In the open country ln the nighttime, in extremely cold and dangerous
weather, t1 long r'llet11nce from shelter or
food-was the direct cause of the lnjnrles
mentioned in the complaint, or whether It
1was a remote 'cause, for which an action
not lie, and It must be tak1m for grantd that the walk of nine miles and Incident
xpoeure brought about the alleged slckne11s, pain, ancl dleablllty. There was no
lntprvenlng Independent cause of the Injury, for all of the nets done by the plaintiff. hie effort to 1:1eek protection from the
Inclement and danger<1ue weather, were
lebritlmate, and compelled by defendant's
failure to reconvey him to the city. Had
he relllalned at the caboo&e, and lost his
hands, or hie feet, or perhaps hie life, by
freezln~. no doubt coulrl exist of the de·
fendant'e liability. It must not be permitted to esca1>e the consequences of Its
wrong because the injuries were received
In an eHort to avoid the threatened danger, or beenuee they differ In form or eerlommese from those which might have reHulted had the plnlntlff made no such effort. An elticleut, adequate cause being
found for tb3 Injuries recel'\"ed by plaintiff,
rt must be considered as the true cause,
unless another, not lncltlcnt to It. but independent of It, ie shown to have intervened betweeuitand tllereeult. This ls the
Rubetance of very clear sta temente of the
lnw fonnil ln Kello<>'"' v. Railway Co., 26

- Evlll

Wis. 22'J, and In Railway Co. v. Kello~g. !14
U. S. 469. ·And upon the point now undl!r
conelderntlon we fall to distinguish hetween the case at bar and Brown v. Rallway<.'o., 54 Wl11.842,ll N. W.Rep.~'16,911,
fln action ln·ought to recover for like dnu1ages said to have been caused by directing
passengers to alight from a train et a
place about tbree miles diet ant from their
destination. At all events, the question
ae to what was the proximate ca use or I\
phtlntlft'e Injuries le usually one to be !l<ltermlned by a jury. As was said In Rullway Co. v. Kellogg, 1111pra, the true rul~
Is thnt what Is the proximate cause of au
Injury le or<lluurlly one for a jury. It Is
not a question of science or legal knowledge. It le to be determined as n fact, In
view of the c:lrcumetances attenfllng it.
Flually, the defendant Insists that plaintiff was guilty of contributory negligence,
because, from the complaiut, it appesm
that he wait wholly unprepared with
t•lothlng sufficient for the occnslon, nnd
because be left the shelter of the cabooHewhen he undertook hie journey upon foot
to the vlllagl' of White Bear. The plaintiff, undouhtecll.v, wPnt prepared with such
clothing a.s he would ordinarily and naturally need for the occnHion, had the deftmdan t pt>rformed Its alleged duty, and
thle was all that was required of him.
He wa" not obliged to anticipate the defendant's nl'gllgcnce or omission, and prepare for It, nor does It follow that, because there was a l'abouse at the piece"'"
where he worked, It afforded him adequate and proper shelter for the night..
If this wae the fact, It can quite proper!~
be shown a.11 a. defense upon the trlul o ·
thP case. But the complRiut negative
such a r.oncluslon. Order affirmed.
MITCHELL. J., did not participate In.
the ruaklug and filing of this declillon.
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COX~EQUENTIAL

VOSBURG '" PUT!l."EY.
(00 N. W. 403, 80 Wis. 623.)

VOSBURG v. PUTNEY.

(50 N. W. 403. 80 Wis. 523.)

Supreme Court of Wisconsin. Nov. 17, 1891.

Appeal from circuit court, Waukesha

county; A. Scorr Snoss, Judge. Re-

v'ersed.

Action by Andrew Vosburg against

George' Puthey for personal injuries.

From a judgment for plaintiff, defendant

appeals.

The other facts fully; agplear in the fol-

lowing statement by Y , J.:

The action was brought to recover dam-

ages for an assault and battery,alleged to

have been committed by the defendant up-

on the plaintiff on February 20. 1889. The

answer is a general denial. A . the dateof

the alleged assault the plaintiff was a

little more than 14 years of age, and the
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defendant a little less than 12 yea rs of

age. The injury complained of was caused

by a kick inﬂicted by defendant upon the

leg of the plaintiff, a little below the knee.

Thefransaction occurred in aschool-room

in Waukesha, during school hours, both

parties being pupils in the school. A

former trial of the cause resulted in a ver-

dict and judgment for the plaintiff for

$2,800. The defendant appealed from such

judgment to this court, and the same was

reversed for error, and a new trial award-

ed. 78 Wis. 84, 47 N. W. Rep. 99. The case

has been again tried in the circuit court,

and the trial resulted innverdlct forplain-

tlff for $2,500. The facts of the case, as

they appeared on both trials, are sufﬁ-

ciently stated in the opinion by Mr. Jus-

tice ()n'ro.\' on the former appeal,and re-

quire no repetition. On the last trial the

jury found a special verdict, as follows:

u(1) Had the plaintiff during the month

of January, 1889, received an injury just

above the knee, which became inﬂamed,

and produced pus? Answer. Yes. (2)

Had such injury on the 20th day of Feb-

ruary, 1889, nearly healed at the pofnt of

the injury? A. Yes. (3) Was the plain-

tiff. before said 20th of February, fame, as

the result of such injury? A. No. (4)

Had the tibia in the plaintiff's right leg

become inﬂamed or diseased to some ex-

tent before he received the blow or kick

from the defendant? A. No. (5) What

was the exciting cause of the injury to the

plaintil‘f'sleg? A. Kick. (6) Did the de-

fendant, in touching the plaintiff with

his foot, intend to do him any harm? A.

No. (7) At what sum do you assess the

damages of the plaintiff? A. Twenty-ﬂve

hundred dollars." The defendant moved

forjudgment in his favor on the verdict,

and also for a new trial. The plaintiff

moved for judgment on the verdict in his

favor. Themotionsofdefendant were over-

ruled, and that of the plaintiff granted.

Therenpon judgment for plaintiff. for

$2.500 damages and costs ofsuit. was duly

entered. The defendant appeals from the

8oprl'me Court of Wisconsin. Nov. 17, 1891.

Appeal from circolt court, Waukesha
A. ScoTT 8LOA.!I., Judge. Reversed.
Action by Andrew Vosburg against
George Putlley for personal Injuries.
From a Judgment for plaintiff, defendant
appeals.
The other facts fully app_ear in the following statement by LYON, J.:
The action was brought to recover 1lamages for RD al!llaul t and battery, aJleged to
bu ve been committed by tbti defendunt upon the plaintiff on February :W. 1~9. The
anawer ls a gP.neral denial. .\ . the date of
the alleged ussnult the plaintiff was a
little more than 14 years or age, and the
defendant a little luse than 12 yea ni of
age. 'J'be Injury complained of was caused
by a kick lnftlctf'd by defendant upon the
leK of the plaintiff, a little lJelow the knee.
The t ransactlon occurred In a school-room
Jn Waukesha, during school hours, both
parties being 1mplls In the school. A
former trial or the cause resulted In a ver·
diet and Judgment for the plaintiff fur
$2,800. The delendant appealed from such
Judgment to this court. and the same was
reverse<) for error, aud a new trial a ,,·ttrded. 78 Wis. i-;i, 47 N. W. Rep. 99. 'I'he case
hns lJeen aguln tried In the circuit court
no<l the trial reHulted lo a nrdlct for pluln ~
tltf for $2,500. 'l'he facts of the case, as
tht-y uppeare!l on hoth trials, are sufficiently stnted In the opinion l.Jy Mr. Justice OuTo;o.; 0!1 the former appenl, nu1l require nu repetition. On the last trlul the
Jury fou111l a speclul ver<llct, os fulluws:
"(11 Had tf\e plaintiff 1lurlngthemonth
or Junuury, 1~. received an Injury just
ftbove the knee, which became Inflamed,
and producPd pus? Answer. Yee. (2)
Hnd such injury on the 20th day of FebTuary, HIS9, nearly healed at the point or
tht> Injury? A. Yell. (3) Was the plaintiff, before sold 20th of February, lame, ail
the result of such Injury? A. No. (4)
Had the tihla lo the plalntl1f'1:1 right Jeg
become lnflnmed or dlseasell to some extPnt before he recPtved the blow or kick
from the defendant? A. No. (6) What
was the exciting cause of the Injury to the
plalutlff's leg? A. Kick. (6) Did the defendant, In touching the plnlntltf with
hie root, Intend to do him uny harm? A.
No. (7) At what sum do you assess the
1inmal(e11 of the plaintiff? A. Twenty-five
hundred dollars." 'J'he defendant moved
for judgment In bis favor()() the verdict,
and nlHu for a new trial. The plaintiff
mo\·ed for ju1lgment ou the verdict lo hill
favor. The motions of defPnda nt wt-re overrule(], and tbnt of the plaintiff grunted.
Thereupon jud,:rmen t for plain UH. for
$2.500 damuges and costs of suit, wttsdulv
enternd. The defendant appeuls from tlie
Judicment.
'l'. W. Hai"ht (J. V. Qnarlee,of counFlel),
for oppellant, to sustain the prupoRition
thut where there le no evil Intent there can
h! 1~0 recO\•ery, cited: 2 Greeol. Ev.§§ 8280: 2 Add. Torts,§ 790; Cooley, 'l'orts, p,
16!!; Cowarcl v. Baddeley, 4 Hurl. & N. 478;
~unty;
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Cbrlatopherson v. Bare, 11 Q. B. 478; Holl·
man v. Eppers, 41 Wis. 251: KrnJI Y. Lull,
49 Wbt. 4-05, 6 N. W. Rep. 874; Ort11d111l v.
Transportation Co., 16Fed. Rer.7.>; Br.iwo
v. Kendall, 6 Cush. 292.
Ryan a: Merton, for respondent.

LYON, J. (after 11tatlnsc tbefncts}. Severul errors are assigned, only three or
which wlll be considered.
I. The Jury ha vlng found that the defendant, In touching the plnlntift with bis
foot, did not Intend to do him any harm
counsel for defendant maintain that the
plaintiff has no cause of action. and that defendont';; motion for judgment on the special verdict ehonld have heen granted.
In support of this propm1ltlon counsel
quote from 2 Greenl. Ev. § ~ the rule\
that" the Intention to <lo harn; 111 of the
essence of an assuult." Such' bl the rule,
no doubt, In actions or prosecutions !or
mere assaults. Bnt this 1.8 no action to
recover <lamnges for an alleged asRault
and battery. In such caRe the rule Is correctly stated, In many of the authorities
clt~d by counsel, that plalntltt must show\
either that the intention was unln wful, or
that the defendant is lo fnnlt. If the Intended act ls unlawful, the lutention toj'
commit It must neCflfiRerlly be unlawful.
Hence, as applied to this coRe, if the kicking of the plaintiff by the defendant wa11
an unln wful act, the Intention of defendant to kick him was also unlll wful. Had
the rmrtiee been upon the ploy-gronnds
of the school, eng;oged In the mmaJ boy.
i11h Rports, the <lefendant bei1111: free from
malice, wantonness, or ne~lli.tencE', and
Intruding no harm to 11lnlntlff In what ht•
<lid, we should hesitate to huhl the art of '
thP clefenchrnt unln wful, or that he con Id
he hel1l lluble In this action. Some co11Rlder11tlon is due to the Implied llrenM of
the JJlay-grouncls. But It appears that
the lnj ury Wl\B lnfiicte<l In the school. alter
It hud been cnlled to order h.v the teacher,
and nfter the regular exercises of the
school had commenced. Under these cir~
cumstnnces, no Implied license to do tbe
act cumpluined of existe<l, ond 1:1uch act
was a violation of the order nnd decorum
of the school, and necetaearily unln wful.
Hence we are of the opinion thnt, un<ln
the evldPnl'e and verdict, the al.'tlun muy
lJI' sustulne1l.
II. The plaintiff testified. as o wltnct1s In
bis own behulf, as to the clrcumstancl'B of
the Rlle~ed Injury Inflicted upon him bv the
defl'IHlnut, noel lliSO in reatard to the wound
be l'E'l'elvecl In January, near thesume knee
mentiom•tl In the special verdict. '.I'he de:
fen1lant claimed tbRt such wound was the
proximate cause of the Injury to plalntlH'R
leg, In thu t It produced a 1llseat1ed condition of the bone, which tllsense was In act1ve progresH when he received tlrn kick
and that such kick did nothing more than
to change the loctttlon, and perha11R somewhat hasten the pro1trcss, of the disease.
The testimony or Dr. Bacon, a witness ror
plaintiff, (who was plaintiff's attending
physician,) elicited on cross-exR min a tlou
tends to some extent to establish such
claim . Dr. Bacon fir11t saw the lnJnred leg
on l"l'hrnury 2:>th, nn<I Dr. Philler also
one of plnintlH's wltne.ises, ftrt1t s~ w It

16ti
‘166

DIRECT AND CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES—1N TORT.

,on the shin-bone."

March 8th. Dr. Philler was called as a

witness after the examination of the plain-

tiff and Dr. Bacon. On his direct examina-

tion he testiﬁed as follows: “I heard the

testimony ofAndrew Vosburgin regard to

how he received the kick, February 20th,

from his playmate. I heard read the tes-

timony of Miss More, and heard where he

said he received this kick on that day."

(Miss More had already testiﬁed that she

was the teacher of the school, and saw de-

fendant tanding in the aisle by his seat,

and kicking across the aisle, hitting the

plaintiff.) The following question was

then propounded to Dr. Philler: “After

hearing that testimony, and what you

know of the case of the boy, seeing it on

the 8th day of March, what, in your opin-
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ion, was the exciting cause that produced

the inﬂammation that you sawin that

boy's leg on that day?" An objection to

this question was overruled, and the wit-

ness nnswered: “The exciting cause was

the injury received at that day by the kick

It will be observed

that the above question to Dr. Philler

calls for his opinion as a medical expert,

based in part upon the testimony of the

plaintiff, as to what was the proximate

cause of the injury to plaintiff's leg. 'l'he

plaintiff testiﬁed to two wounds upon his

leg, either of which might have been such

proximate cause. Without taking both

of these wounds into consideration, the

expert could give no intelligent or reliable

opinion as to which of them caused thein-

jury complained of; yet. in the hypothet-

ical question propounded to him, one of

these probable causes was excluded from

the consideration of the witness, and he

was required to give his opinion upon an

imperfect and insufﬂcienthypothesis.—one

which excluded from his consideration a

material fact essential to an intelligent

opinion. A consideration by the witness

of the wound received by the plaintiff in

January being thus prevented, the wit-

ness had but one fact upon which to base

his opinion, to-wit, the fact that defend-

ant kicked plaintiff on the shin-bone.

Based, as it necessarily was. on that fact

alone, the opinion of Dr. Philler that the

kick caused the injury was inevitable.

when, had the proper hypothesis been

submitted to him, his opinion might have

been different. The answer of Dr. Philler

to the hypothetical question put to him

may have had, probably did have, a con-

trolling inﬁinence with the jury, for they

found by their verdict that his opinion

was correct. Surely there can be no rule

of evidence which will tolerate a hypothet-

ical question to an expert, calling for his

opinion in a, matter vital to the case,

which excludes from his consideration facts

already proved by a witness upon whose

testimony such hypothetical question is

DIRECT AND CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES-IN TOltT.

March 8th. Dr. Phlller was called as a
.witness after the f'Xamlnatlon of the plaintiff and Dr. Bllcon. On hie direct examlnathm he testified us folio we: "I beard the
testimony or Andrew Voebur~ In regttr<l to
how he reeeh·ed the klr.k, February 20th,
from his playmate. I heard read the testimony or Mias More, and heard where he
said he recPlved this kick on that day."
(Miss More had alread.v testified that she
was the teachrr of the sclrnol, and !!law defendnn t standing In the aisle by his seat,
and klcklni;!; ncross the aisle, hitting the
plnlntlff.) 'l'he following question wue
then propounded to Dr. Ph Iller: "After
hearing that te11tlmony, and what you
know of the case of the boy, seeing It on
tllA 8th llay of March, what, In your opinion, was the exclttnir cause that produced
the lnOammatlon that you saw In that
boy'1:1 leg on that day?" An obJt>ctlon to
thlti queKtlon was overruled, nod the witness answered: "'l'he excltlnJP; cause waa
the Injury received at tba t day by the kick
on the shin-bone... It will be obst'rved
that the nhove question to Dr. Pillller
callR for hie opinion as a medical expert,
baPed In part npon the tPstimony of the
plaintiff, as to what wus the proximate
cause of the Injury to plaintiff's leg. The
plaintiff testified to two \~ounds upon hie
leg, either of whlcl1 ml1otht ha\"P. bt>en such
proximate cause. Without taking both
uf th(:se wounds into con11lderatlun, the
expert conld give no lntelllgent or reliable
opinion as to whleh of them ~a used the lnjnry complained of; yet, In the hypothetical question propounded to him, one of
these probable causes was exc.:luded from
the consideration of the wltneBs, Hnd he
was required to give his opinion upon an
Imperfect and lnsufflclt~nt hypothesls,-one
which excluded from his consideration a
material fact eRsentl11l to an lntE>lligent
opinion. A conshleration by the wltne11s
of the wound received by the plaintiff In
.January being thus prevented, the wltnetis had bot one fact upon which to base
his opinion, to-wit, the fart thiAt defendant kicked plaintiff on the shin-bone.
Ba11ed, as it necessarily was, on that fact
aloue, the opinion of Dr. Ph Iller thn t the
kick caused the injury was lne\·itable,
when. had the proper hypothesis been
sulJmltted to him, his or>lnion might have

been different. The answer of Dr. Phlller
to the hypothetical question put to him
may have had, probably did have, a controlling lnfluP-nce with the Jury, for they
found by their verdict that hie opinion
waR correct. Surely there cau be no rnle
of evidence which will tolerate a hypothetical question to an expert, callln11: for his
opinion In a matter vital to the ens~.
which excludes from his coneldera tlon facts
alrearly proved by a witness upon whose
testimony such hypothetical question is
bR11ed, when e consideration of such facts
by thP P.Xpert le absolutely essential to enable him to form an lntelllgent opinion
concerning such matter. The objection to
the question put to Dr. Philler should
have been sustained. The error in permitting the wltneeR to anRwtir the quel!!tlon
Is material, and necessarily fatal to the
Judgment.
III. Certain questions were propo11ed on}
behalf .of defendant to be submitted to
the jury, founded upon the theory that
only such damages could be recovered as
the defendant might rea11onably be sup.\
poRed to hll ve contemplated as likely to
result from hl11 kicking the plainttrf. The·
court refuNed to 1111brult Ruch que11tlonR to
the Jur.v. The rulln11; was rorrect. The
rule or dnme11:es In nctlooR for tortR was
held In Brown v. Railway Co., 54 Wis. 842,
11 N. W.Rep.3')6,911, to he that the wrong~
doer ls liable for all Injuries resultlnic di
rectly from the wrongful act, whether they
eould or could not have been foresef!n by
him. The chief Justice and the writer of
this opinion dissented from the judgment
In that case, chiefly because we were of the
opinion that the complaint stated a cause
of nctlon f'Jr contractu, and not ex df'licto,
and hence that a different rule of damages
-the rule here contended for - was ap.
pllcable. We did not question that the
rule In actions for tort was correctly
stated. Thht case rules this on the question of damageR. The remaining errora
assigned are upon the rulings of the court
on objections to testimony. 1'hese rulings are not very likely to be repeated on
unother trial, and are not of sufficient Importance to require a review of them on
this appeal. The judi:mrnt of tile elreul~
court must he reversed, and the cause will\
be remanded for a new trial.
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TUNNICLIFFE v. BAY CITIES CONSOL.

' RY. CO.

(61 N. W. 11, 102 Mich. 624.)

Supreme Court of Michigan. Dec. 7. 1894.

Error to circuit court, Bay county; Andrew

C. Maxwell, Judge.

Action by Louise M. Tunnicliffe, by her

next friend. William H. Tunnicliffe, against

the Bay Cities Consolidated Railway Compa-

ny, for personal injuries. Judgment was

rendered for plaintiff, and defendant brings

A~I> CO~SEQl"ENTIAJ,

TUNNICLIFFE v. BAY CITIES CONSOL.
RY. CO.
(61 N. W. 11, 102 Mich. G2-l.)
Supreme Court of Micblgao. DPl'. 7, 1894.
Error to circuit court, Bay county; Andrew
C. Maxwell, Judge.
Action by Louise M. Tunnlclllfe, by her
next friend, William B. Tnnnlclllfe, against
the Bay Cities Consolidated Railway Company, for personal Injuries. Judgment was
rendered for plalntl!f, and defendant brings
error. Reversed.
T . .A. E. & J. C. Weadoek, for appellant.
James Van Kleeck, for a11pellee.

error. Reversed.

T. A. E. & J. C. Weadock, for appellant.

James Van Klecck, for nppellee.

\

MO.\TGOMERY, J. Plaintiff is a married

woman and a minor. She sues by her next

friend to recover for personal injuries re-

ceived while attempting to alight from a
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car of the defendant. Plaintiff recovered,

and defendant brings error. The negligence

alleged was that "while plaintiff, with the

consent and permission of said defendant,

with due care and diligence on her part, was

passing out of said car, and onto and over

the rear platform of the same','Tbr the pur-

pose of alighting therefrom and leaving said

car, and was stepping from the platform of

said car to the steps thereof, said car being

then and there stationary, said defendant

carelessly and negligently caused said car,

from which she was then departing and

stepping off, to be suddenly started, jerked,

and moved forward, by means whereof this

plaintiff, while in the exercise of proper care

and diligence on her part, was thrown down

and against said car, and down and upon

the platform thereof, and down and upon

and against the steps of said. car, and her

dress skirt or skirts caught on said bolt, so

negligently put, placed, and permitted to be

and remain in said platform by said defend-

ant as aforesaid, and she was held fast to

and against said car, and against the plat-

form of said car, and to and against the

steps thereof, and partially upon the ground,

and was so held, dragged, and carried along

by the motion of said car," etc. The decla-

ration had previously alleged that defendant

had "carelessly and negligently‘ placed. and

permitted to be and remain, an iron bolt,

extending and projecting above the rear

platform, to wit, ﬁve inches."

1. In the course of the charge to the jury,

the circuit judge asked for suggestions from

counsel. Defendant's counsel therenpon ask-

ed the court to charge that the plaintif f could

not recover under any circumstances by rea-

son of the location of the bolt or pedal, and

called attention to a portion of the charge

of the court as follows: “I do not under-

stand that it is seriously contended by the

defendant if the accident happened because

of this bolt remaining in an improper place

during the journey, to endanger women get-

ting off the car, but what the company is

llable,"—and asked that it be modiﬁed. The

plaintiff's testimony was to the effect that

MONTGOMERY, J. Plalntur Is a married
woman and a minor. She sues by her next
friend to recover for personal Injuries received whlle attempting to alight from a
car ot the defendant. Plalntllf recovered,
and defendant brings error. The negligence
alleged was that '"while plalotllf, with the
consent and permlMlon of said defendant,
with due care and dlllgence on her part, was
pa881ng out of said car, and onto and over
the rear platform of the sam~r the purpose of alighting therefrom and leaving said
car, and was stepping trom the plat!orm of
said car to the steps thereof, said car being
then and there stationary, said defendant
carelessly and negligently caused said car,
from which she was then departing and
stepping otr, to be suddenly started, jerked,
and moved forward, by means whereof this
plalntltr, while In the exercise of proper cace
and dlllgence on her part, v;as thrown down
and agailnst said car, and down and upon
the platform thereof, and down and upon
and against the steps of said. car, and her
dress skirt or skirts caught on said bolt, so
negligently put, placed, and permitted to be
and remain In said platform by said defendant as aforesaid, and she was held fast to
and against said car, and against the platform of said car, and to and against the
steps the1·eof, and partially upon the ground,
and was so held, dragged, and carried along
by the motion of said car," etc. The declaration had preYlously alleged that defendant
had "carelessly and negligently placed, and
permitted to be and remain, an Iron bolt,
extending and projecting above the rear
platform, to wit, five Inches."
1. In the course of the charge to the jury,
the circuit judge asked for suggestions from
counsel. Defendant's counsel thereupon asked the court to charge that the plalntllf could
not recover under any circumstances by reaeon ot the location ot the bolt or pedal, and
called attention to a portion of the charge
ot the court as follows: "I do not unde1·1tand that It Is seriously contended by the
defendant It the accident happened because
of this bolt remaining In an Improper place
during the journey, to endanger women getting oll the car, but what the company Is
llable,"-and asked that It be modified. The
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plaintiff's testimony was to the etrect that
she was In the act ot stepping otr the car
when It started, and that she was thrown
backward, and her clothing caught.
She
further testified: "I took it for granted that
my clothes were caught; I didn't know In
what. I could not see, but In my struggle
I threw my arm behind me, and, as I did 110.
my hand came down on something that projected from the platform, and I pulled my
skirt, and a bolt came out from ·the platform." On cross-examination she testified:
"I should think the bolt had no part In
throwing we down, 'aside from the jerking
of the car." It Is claimed by the defendant
that there was no room under this testimony
for the jury to ftnd that her clothing was
caught before she was thrown backward.
But we think this construction ot the testimony Is too narrow. It would appear from
the charge of the court that defendant had
contended before the jury that plalntlll'11
story was unreasonable and that the Injury
could not have occurred In the manner supposed by plalntllf. The jury had a right to
construe the tacts, and If, in their judgment,
It was more reasonable to suppose that her
clothing had been caught upon the bolt without her knowledge before the car started,
and threw her to the ground, we cannot say
that the circumstances of the case did not
furnish a justlftcatlon for that Inference.
2. On the trial the plalntur was permitted,
against the defendant's objection, to testily
that before the Injury she had painted for
profit, and was able to earn five to ten nnd
fifteen dollars per week, and that by the
Injury she was rendered unable to do this
kind of work. The court charged the jury
upon the subject of damages aa follows:
"She Is entitled to recover, In case you so determine from the evtdence,-she Is entitled,
first, to the value of her time. Whatever
It was worth a month or week, you will
give it her, If you come to that conclusion,
as I said before." It was error to admit
this testimony, and permit the recovery for
the Impairment of the plaintiff's ab1llty to
earn money. '.l'he husband Is, prlma tacit\
entitled to the earnings of the wife. Hicks
v. McLachlan, 94 Mich. 282, 53 N. W. 1107.
But It ls contended In the present case that,
as the husband was a party to the proce<~·
Inge as next friend to the plaintiff, he would
be estopped by the verdict Crom brlnglug
suit hereafter to recover these damages, and
hence that no Injury· could have been done
defendant; and Baker v. Railroad Co., 91
Mich. 298, 51 N. W. 897, Is clt.ed as sustain.
Ing this contention. The case cited fully
recognizes that the objection as made In a
suit prosecuted by the next friend Is good;
but It was held In that case that Inasmuch 1111
such testimony was admitted, and as plaintiff actually received payment upon the judgment 1n his capacity as next friend, he oughl
not to be permitted to recover It again In his
individual capacity. In the present cust!,
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the defendant, upon making the objection,

had no reason to apprehend that the plaintift

expected to claim a recovery for any dam~

ages not within the issue, and particularly

was this true under the circumstances of

this case, as it appears conclusively that the

defendant could not have understood that it

was necessary to offer any proof to meet the

plaintiff's testimony; for, after the plaintiffs

testimony, above quoted, had been given, a

question was put to another witness on the

same line, which was objected to, and the

court said: “I think the husband is entitled

to the wages. I guess there is no use going

into that in this case at all." After this,

certainly, the defendant's counsel could not

be expected to meet such proofs as had crept

in on this subject; and the subsequent

charge, above quoted, was not only errone-
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ous as matter of law, but, given, as it was,

after the previous intimation which cut oﬂf

proofs, on the part of the defendant, was

based upon a necessarily ex parte showing

3. The testimony tended to show that one

of the results of the injury to plaintiff was

a miscarriage. The court charged the jury

as follows: “As to this child, if the plain-

tif f lost a child by reason of the liability of

l

i

l
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the defendant in this case, you may give ‘

damage for it.

prospective services of the child is a recog‘

nized element in that regard, and you may

give what it is reasonably worth." This

charge was clearly erroneous. There was,

The society, enjoyment, and I

physical or mental suffering attending til‘

miscarriage is a part of it, and a proper sub,

ject for compensation. But the rule goes no

further. Any injured feelings following the‘

miscarriage, not part of the pain naturally

attending it, are too remote to be consid-]

ored an element of damage. If the plain-

tiff lamented the loss of her offspring, such

grief involves too much an element of senti-

ment to be left to the conjecture and caprlce

of a jury. If, like Ki_lQ1_9L_§l£§ZﬂDt-:05-he!

children. and would not be comfortgd, a

q es on o con numg (amagg_jg_p;g;gpted,

t9.o4io'lL('lte to "(.§_\_v_(‘_1igl1_(:d_l)y_t1_t_u'_.sc‘.i1.lte-!

whl_ch_t.l1e_1aLv has ' _t, jnygn ." The only

case which we‘ lave found wh ch is in scem~

ing conﬂict with this is that of Smith v

Overby, 30 Ga. 241; but the supreme court

of that state, in the later case of Railroad

Co. v. Randall, 85 Ga. 297, 11 S. E. 706, it

treating of a charge which permitted of a

recovery for the pain, suffering, or sorrow

resulting from miscarriage, said: “We would

suggest that the word ‘sorrow' be omitted

from the charge of the court on the next

trial. It is most too remote to be considerm

an element of damage, unless it is that sor

row which accompanies the actual injury

and is suffered at the time of the miscar

the <lt>fendant, upon making the objection, j physical or mental suffering attenlling
had no reason to apprehend that the plalntitr miscarriage is a pa1·t of it, and a proper sub,
(•xpectccl to claim a recovery for any dam. : ject for compenRat1on. But the rule goes M
ages not within the issue, and particularly further. Any Injured feelings followlnJ.! the!
was tills true under the circumstances !Jr miscarriage, not part ot th.e pain naturallyl
this CllSe, as lt appears conclusively that the attending It, are too remote to be consid<lefendant could not have understood that it ered an element of damage. It the plalnwas necessary to offer any proof to meet tue tltr lamented the loss of her offspring, such
plalntlfl:"s tei;;tlmony; for, after the plaintiff's grief Involves too much an element of sentitestimony, above quoted, had bet•n given, a ment to be left to the conjecture and caprice
question was put to another witne8!1 on the of 11 jury. It, like ll.!.ll'hel, she wept Cpr leer
same line, which was o!Jjected to, and the chlltlren. nm.l woultl not b comfor , a
murt said: "I think the husband Is entitletl q C's on o con mt ng damn_ge is nri;~ted,
to the wages. I guess there Is no use going ~tetoue~~d._llY . .a.~~~
into that In this case at all." After thlR, wl!!.ch...th~~ has~e_t)JJ.r.eu~l." The on!~
eertalnly, the defendant's counsel could not case which we nave found which Is in seembe expected to meet sueb proofs us had crept ing conflict with this is that of Smith v
in on this subject; and the subsequent Overby, 30 Ga. 241; but the supreme court
eharge, nhove quoted, was not only errone- i ot that state, In the later case of Rallroa•'
ous as matter of law, but, given, as 1t wM, Co. v. Rnndnll, 85 Gn. 2U7, 11 S. E. 706, 1r
ufter the previous Intimation which cut olf treating of a charge which permitted of a
proofs, on the part of the clefPnrlant, wns l'('('overy for the pain, suffl'ring, or sorrow
rt•snltlng from miscarriage, said: "We woald
based upon a llPCl'ssarlly l'X pa1·te showln~
3. The testimony tendf>d to show that on., suggPSt thnt the word 'sorrow' be omittell
of the results of the Injury to plaintiff wns 1 from the charge of the court on the next
a mii:1cnn·lnge. The court C'hargecl tile jury trial. It Is most too remote to be considereij
ns follows: "As to this child, If the plnlu· nn element of damage, unless tt Is that sor
tiff loRt a ehild by rN\Son of the lla!Jillty of row which accompnnles the actual Injury
the dl•fendnnt In this case, you may give nnd ts suffered at the time of the mlsca•·
damage for It. 'l'he society, enjoyment, and ringe. The loss of the child by a mis<"arprospt'<:·tlve servlct't! of tile child ls a recog. riage would atrect women so differently tlmt
ulzN1 element ln that regard, and you mny 1t would be bard for men, sitting as jurors,
gh·e what it ls reasonably worth." This to estimate It as an element of damage; and
C'h11rg;• wns dl'arly erroneous. There wnt1, we therefore think that It would be better to
of com·se, no proof ln the cnse as to the omit in the future any Instruction to the
pr1,,.;pP<"tive parulngs of the child, eYen If i.hG jury upon the question or son·ow ns an elemother would be the proper person to re- ment or damage. Pain and suffering gin~
cove1· for sneh loss. Nor would the loss of a wide latitude to juries, and there are very
tile child's so<'iPt~· be ll pro1ier elt•ment ot few complaints made of the smallness or
damages. While the jm·y Is allowed to con- the amounts found by juries upon these two
isldl'r th<' l'Hse with all ,its fnM11, n111l to talm elements of damage,"-eitlug the case of
into ucC'ouut, fo1· the p11r1>ose of com1wnsa- Bovee v. Town of Dllllville, above cited.
tlon, not only the physil'1tl pain, but al81> See, also, 15 Am. & Eng. Rue. I.aw, 42. •
Numerous other questions are dlscussc1l
mental suffering, in detennlulng the award
of damages, and while, of necessity, this ln the briefs or counsel, but we think it unInvolves to some extent a consideration of necessary to consider them at length. Those
the nature of the Injury, and cannot exclurte relating to the expressions ot pain and com.
from the consideration of the jury the fact plaints of present suffering are within the
thut the physical and mentnl sutrPrlng of thn previous rulings or this court. See Glrur.J
mot!IC'r by renson of such an injury would v. City ot Kalamazoo, 92 Mich. 610, 52 N.
W. 1021; Lacus v. Railway Co., 92 Mich. 412.
l><! 111ore Intense thuu In the case ot the
onlinary fracture of a limb, yet beyond thli. 52 N. W. H::>, and cases cited. None of th•·
other questions are likely to arise on a nt•\\"
it would not be compett•11t for the jury -;;o
trial. For the errors pointed out, the jud1~
1w. and to attempt to compensate for th&
l«>rrow and grieving of the motlwr. As waa ment will !Je reversed, with costs, and a new
11aicl ln Bovee v. Town of Danville, 53 Vt. trial orde1-ed.
183: "It the violence done her person result·
ed. In the miscarriage, the miscarriage was a
GRANT, ;r., did not sit. 'l'he other juslegitimate result of such nPgllg1!nce. Anj tices concurred.
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~IcN.Ul.\llA

v. VILLAGE OF CLINTONVILLE.

ltit)

.\IcNA\lARA v. VH.LAGE OF CLINTON-

VILLE.

(22 N. W. 472, 62 Wia. W.)

Feb. 3. 1885.

Appeal from circuit court, Waupaca county.

About 6 o'clock on the evening of Decem-

ber 22, 1881, the plaintiff started from a drug-

store in the village to go to his boarding-

place. In doing so, it became necessary to

cross New London street in front of the drug-

store, and go southward to, and then upon

the sidewalk on, the east side of that street.

That sidewalk crossed a ravine over a tretic-

work, and upon each side of it, and imme-

diately over the trestle-work there was a

railing. The north end of the sidewalk com-

menced about four rods north of the north

end of the trestle-work; and near the north

end the surface of the walk was about six
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inche above the surface of the ground; and

as it approached the trestle-work where the

railing began, the surface of the walk he-

came more elevated from the ground until at

a point near the north end of the trestle-

work, where it was about 30 inches above

the surface of the ground; and that is the

point where the testimony tends to show that

the piaintiff stepped or fell off the walk and

was severely injured. The night was very

dark. and the plaintiff had no light. It had

rained. The walk was about ﬁve feet and

four inches wide, and turned to the west-

ward about seven inches in nineteen feet.

There was no railing or barrier on either side

Supreme Court of Wisconsin.

of this elevated walk north of the north end .

of the trestle-work. The plaintiff‘s testi-

mony tends to prove that at the time of the

injury he was walking carefully, with his

hands out before him feeling for the railings

as he approached them. The plaintif f was

familiar with the locus in quo. At the close

of the plaintiff's testimony, the defendant

(22 N. W. 4i2, 6'i Wis. 207.)
0 "
Supreme Court of Wisconsa·o. Feb
· • 3 • 1"
oou.
Appeal from circuit court, Waupaca county.
About 6 o'clock on the evl'nlng or December 22, 1881, tbe plalntltf started rrom a drugstore In the village to go to bis boarding11lace. In doing so, It became necessarv to
<·ross N1•w London street In front of the drugstore, and go southward to, aml then upon
the sidewalk on, the east side or that strl'c>t.
That sidewalk crossed a ravine o'\"er a trestlework, and upon each side of It, and Immediately OYer the trestle-work thf'n• w 1u 1 a
railing. The north end or thP sltll'wnlk t·ommenced about four rods north or the north
<'lid or the tn•stle-work; and lll':tl' the north
~nd the eurrace or the w11lk was ul>out six
lnches abo\•e the smface ot the ground; and
llS It approached the trestle-work wht>re the
railing began, the surface or the wnlk became more elevated from the ground until at
a point near the north end of the trest~work, where It was about 30 Inches nl>ove
the surface of the ground; and thnt Is tlle
point where the testimony tends to show that
the plalntllr stepped or fell otY the walk and
was sevC'1·ely Injured. The night wns very
dark. and the plalntift' hnd no light. It hnd
mined. The walk wne about five fC'et and
four lnehes wide, and turned to the we!!t·
ward ahout seven IJlches In nineteen fret.
'l'here w11s no railing or barrier on elthN side
ot this t•lPvnted walk north of the north entl
of the trestle-work. The plaintiff's teRtl·
mony tends to prove that at the time of the
Injury he wne walking carefully, with his
hmuts out lwforc him ft>ellug for the railings
as he approached them. 'J.'he plalntlft' was
fnmlllnr with the locus In quo. At the close
of the plaintiff's testimony, the defrndant
moved for a nonsuit, which was denlell. The
jury found for the plalntlft', and assessed bl~
damages at $1,350. The (]efendant . moved
for a new trial upon the minutes o:I' the judge,
and the same was overn1led. From the judgment entered therl'on this nppenl Is brought.

moved for a nonsuit, which was denied. The

jury found for the plaintiff, and assessed his

Finch & Barber and F. M. Gurnsey, for appellant. E. P. Smith nod John I<'. Burke, tor

damages at $1,350. The defendant -moved

respondf'nt.

for a new trial upon the minutes of the judge,

and the same was overruled. From the judg-

ment entered thereon this appeal is brought.

Finch &, Barber and F. M. Gurnsey, for ap-

pellant. E. P. Smith and John F. Burke, for

respondent.

CASSODAY, J. Upon principles too well

established by this court to require reitera-

tion, the question whether the sidewalk was

defective at the place of the injury was

for the jury, and not for the court. Kaples

v. Orth (Wis.) 21 N. W. 633: Hill v. (‘ity of

Fond du Lac, 56 Wis. 246. 14 N. W. 25:

Wright v. Fort lioward, 60 Wis. 119, 18 N. W.

750; Kenworthy v. Town of Ironton, 41 Wis.

IH7; Kavanaugh v. City of Janesville. 24 Wis.

G21: Cuthbert v. City of Appleton, 2- i Wis. 383.

The same is true with respectto the plaintiffs

alleged contributory negligence. Id. Such

negligence,'vvhen not disclosed by the plain- ingly increased the damages. The jury

tii.'f's testimony, is purely a matter of defense.

Kelley v. Railway Co. (Wis.) 19 N. W. 522;

J, Upon principles too well
by this court to require reiteration, tlle question whether the sidewalk was
derectl'l"e at the pince or the Injury was
for thP jury. and not for the court. l{nplee
v. Orth (Wis.) 21 X. W. r.:~.'J; Hlll v. ('itv or
l•"ond du L:w. ;,1; Wis. 2-IH. 14 N. w _' :!i>:
Wright 'I". Fort Howard, GO Wis. 110, 18 N. W.
7:".0; Kenworthy '" Town of Ironton, 41 Wis.
l>li; Knv111111ugh Y. City or .Tanesvlllc>. 24 "Wis.
ii21: Cnthhcrt v. City of Appleton, 24 Wl!'I. 383.
'I'h<> same ls tru<>wlth respPctto the plaintiff's
nll<>ged contributory nc>gllgt>nce. Id. Such
nf'gllgence, when not dlsC'lm•f'd by thl' plainCAS~ODAY,

~stnblli;hcd

tiff's testimony, Is purely a matter or defense.
Kelley v. Railway Co. (Wis.) 19 N. W. 52'..?:
Wright v. Fort Howard, GO Wis. 125, 18 N.
W. 750; Hoth v. Peters, 55 Wis. 405, 13 N.
W • 219 ; R andall v. Telegraph Co., M Wis.
147, 11 N. W. 419. Here, the court went so
far as to Indicate that the burden of proving
the absence of contrll>utory negligence was
on the plaintiff. There Is no ground for the
defendant's exception to the submission of
these questions to the jury, nor to the manner In which they were submitted. Exeep, tlon le taken because the court refused to
, charge, In effect, that durlug the time plain, tur had no diploma he could not recover "for
1 any loes of service~" which he had sustained
· ns a practicing physl~lan. Under the stat~
' ute the plaintiff could not" recover compen
: eatlon for su<'h sf'rvices ren1h•red during thnt
' period; nor could ht'. during that prrlod, t es.tlfy as such expert. Rev. ~t. § 1436. But
I neltlwr or thoi'!P questions is here Involved.
The stntutP did not undertake to make the
buslnPss or srt·vlce unlawful, nor to prohlblt or punish the reception of voluntary
pa:nnents for such sf'rvlces. Lm'k v. Ripon,
52 Wis. :!01, 8 N. W. 815. The law In this
n·spect has not been changed by the act to
1 prevent
quacks from dt>eelvlng the people
b~· assuming a professional title. Chapter
2511, Laws 1881 ; chapter 40,
1882.
loss sustained through Inability to contl1111~
a lucrative professional practice may be con
eldered In estlmntlng such dnm11gc>s. Phillips v. Railway Co., 5 C. P . Div. :!SO; Ehr1
gott v. Mnyor, etc., 96 N. Y. 2ti4. 'l'lll's1•
things being so, the plalntll'l was not preeluded fNm reeoverlng such damages as h~
had actually sustained, even though he had
no diploma to1· a portion or the time hC' was
so dlsnhled, nnd hPnce the Instruction wlls
properly rejc>l'tP11. Luck v. Ripon, ::i2 \Vis.
i 201, 8 N. ~V. 81:..
i Exception Is tuken becnui<e the court charged the jury, In el'lect, that It they found ·
for the plaintiff, then no deduction should be
made from the damages sustained; by reason
of his disability having been prolonged In
consequence of a predisposition to Inflammatory rheumatism, and because the court
ed
refus
to charge, In effect, that the plnlntllT could not recover 1:1' the Injury was the
rc>sult of the disease, nod not the direct and
proximate result of the defendant's negligence. There Is no evidence that would
warrant the jury In finding that the disPase
Interfered In the least with the plaintilT's
powers or locomotion, or In any wny contributed to his stepping or falling from the
sidewalk at the time and place In question.
The jury have found, In effect, that there
was no negligence on the part of the plaintiff contributing to the Injury, and hence
that It was the direct and proximate result
o:I' the d efendant's negligence alone.
presence of the dls!'ase may have nggra\'nted and prolonged the Injury, and correspondingly increased the damages. The jury
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were expressly authorized to include in their

verdict such increased or additional damage,

and we must assume that they did. Was

this error? Under the repeated decisions of

this court, we must answer this question in

the negative. Oliver v. La Valle, 36 Wis.

592; Stewart v. Ripon, 38 Wis. 584; Brown

v. Railway Co., 54 W15. 342, 11 N. W. 3536,

911. In one of these cases the plaintiff was

allowed to recover increased damages by

reason of an organic tendency to scrofula in

his system, and in each of the others by rea-

son of a miscarriage in consequence of the

injury. In the Brown Case the distinction

was made between actions for tort, where

the wrong-doer is held liable for all in-

juries naturally resuiting directly from the

wrongful act, though unforeseen, and ac-

tions for the breach of contract, where the
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damages are limited to such as arise nat-

urally from such breach of contract itself,

or from such breach committed under circum-

stances in the contemplation of both parties

at the time of the contract, “as in Flick v.

Wctherbee. 20 Wis. 392; Richardson v. Chy-

noweth, 26 Wis. 656; Candee v. Telegraph

Co., 34 Wis. 71; Walch v. Railway Co., 42

Wis. 23; Hill v. Chapman. 59 Wis. 218, 18

N. W. 160; Hadley v. Baxendalc, 9 Exch.

341; Hobbs v. Railroad Co., L. R. 10 Q. B.

111; Hone v. Railway Co., L. R. 8 C. P. 131;

Jones v. George, 48 Am. Dec. 280; Baglcy

v. Railroad Co., 30 Am. Law J. 490.

The rule applicable to contracts thus quot-

ed is taken from the opinion of the court in

the recent case of Hamilton v. it-Ia(;iii, L. R.

12 Ir. 202, and is there said to be a more

accurate statement than is found in Hadley

v. Baxendale. To the same effect are the

notes to that case in Shir. Lead. Cas. 227-

230, and Harvey v. Railroad Co., 124 Mass.

425. See, also, the late case of McMahon

v. Field, 7 Q. B. Div. 595, where the plain-

tiff recovered on contract for the injury to

his horses, who caught cold from unneces-

sary exposure to the weather. In that case

Hobbs v. Railway is severely criticised and

narrowly limited, if not entirely overruled.

The distinction taken in the Brown Case has

been recognized in several of the more recent

cases, and in some of them that decision is

expressly sanctioned. Railroad Co. v. Kemp,

30 Am. Law J. 92,'61 Md. 74, 619; Railroad

Co. v. Eaton, 9-1 Ind. 474; Ehrgott v. Mayor,

etc., 96 N. Y. 281; Tice v. Munn, 94 N. Y.

621; Murdock v. Railroad Co., 133 Mass.

15; Beauchamp v. Mining Co., 50 Mich. 163,

15 N. W. 65; McMahon v. Field. 7 Q. B. Div.

591; and see Mr. Irving Brown's notes, 47

Am. Rep. 381, 387; 41 Am. Rep. 53, .-' . See.

also, as bearing upon the question, Railroad '

Co. v. Staley, 1 Am. Law J. (Ohio) 136, 30

Am. Law J. 110; Lewis v. Railway Co.

(Mich.) 19 N. W. 744. In actions on con-

tracts of carriage it has often been held that

a corporation or party could not by contract

wholly exempt itself from all liability for

injury inﬂicted by its own negligence. Rich-

DIIU<X,''l' AND

CU~:SEQUENTIAL

were expressly authorized to Include In their
Yerdlct such lnc1·ea>1ed or additional damages,
and we must assume that they did. Was
this error'! lJmler the repented decisions of
this court, we must answer this question In
the negative. Oliver v. La Valle, 36 Wis.
502; Stewart v. Ripon, 38 Wis. 584; Brown
v. Railway Co., 54 Wis. 342, 11 N. W. 356,
nu. In one of these cases the plalntur was
allowed to recover increased damages by
reason of an organic tendency to scrofula In
' his system, and In each of the others by reason of a miscarriage In consequence of the
Injury. In the Brown Case the distinction
was made between actions for tort, where
the wrong-doer is held liable for all inj urles naturally resuttlng directly from the
wrongful act, though unforeseen, and actions for the breach ot contract, where the
damages are limited to such as arise naturally from such breach of contract Itself,
or from such breach committed under circumstances In the contemplation of both parties
at the time of the contract, "as In lt'llck v.
Wetherbee, 20 Wis. 392; Richardson v. Chynoweth, 26 Wis. 656; Candee v. Telegraph
Co., 34 Wis. 471; Walch v. Railway Co., 42
Wis. 23; Hill v. Chapman, 59 Wis. 218, 18
N. W. 100; Hadley v. Baxendale, 9 Exch.
341; Hobbs v. Railroad Co., L. R. 10 Q . B.
111; Bone v. Railway Co., L. R. 8 C. P. 131;
Jones v. George, 48 Am. Dec. 280; Bagley
v. Railroad Co., 30 Am. Law J. 490.
The rule applicable to contracts thus quoted ls taken from the opinion of the court In
the recent case of Hamilton v . .MaGlll, L. R.
12 Ir. 202, and ts there said to be a more
accurate statement than Is found In Hadley
v. Baxendale. To the same eft'ect are the
notes to that case in Shir. Lead. Cas. 227230, and Harvey v. Railroad Co., 124 MOBS.
425. See, also, the late case of McMahon
v. Field, 7 Q. B. Div. 595, where the plalntllf recovered on contract for the injury to
bis horses, who caught cold from unnecessary exposure to the weather. In that case
Hobbs v. Railway is severely criticised and
narrowly limited, If not entirely overruled.
The distinction taken In the Brown Case has
been recognized in several of the more recent
cases, and in some ot them that decision Is
expr<'1111ly sanctioned. Rallrond Co. v. Kemp,
30 Am. J,aw J. 92, "61 .Md. 74, G19; Hallroad
Co. v. Eaton, 94 Ind. 474; Ehrgott v. Mayor,
<'tc., 96 N. Y. 281; Tice v. Munn, 94 N. Y.
621; l\Iurdock v. Railroad Co., 133 Mass.
Hi; Beauchamp v. Mining Co., 50 Mkh. 1G3,
15 N. W. 65; McMahon v. 1''1eld. 7 Q. B. ntv.
!l91; and see .Mr. Irving Brown's notes. 47
Am. Rep. 381, 387; 41 Am. Hep. iJ:I, r~. ~ee,
also, as bearing upon the qul.'1<tlo11, Hnllronll
Co. v. Staley, 1 Am. Law J. (Ohio) 13G, 30
Am. Law J. 110; Lewie v. Hallway Co.
(Mich.) 19 N. W. 744. In actions on contracts of carriage It has often been held that
a corporation or party could not by contract
wholly t>xempt Itself from all liability tor
Injury Inflicted by Its own negligence. Rich-
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ardson v. :{lailway Co. (Wis.) 21 N. W. 50;
Canfield v. Railroad Co., 45 .Am. ltep. 268~
Sager v. Railroad Co., 50 Am. Dec. 600. · In~
such cases the damages recoverable cannot
be within the contemplation ot the contract
tor they are recovered In spite of It. In .Mc
Mabon v. Flell,l one of the judges went s<> ·
far as to say that "the parties never con~
templated a breach, and the rule should
rather be that the damage recoverable is
such as is the natural and probable result o
the breach of contract." To the s1tme etTec
is Ehrgott v. Mayor, etc., 96 N. Y. 280. In
this New York case the court say: "When
a party commits a tort resulting In a personal Injury, he cannot foresee or contemplate the consequences of his tortlous act.
• • • A city may leave a street out or
repair, and 110 one can anticipate the possible accidents which may happen, or the injuries which may be caused. • • • Th~
true rule, broadly stated, ls that a wrong
doel' ls liable for the damages which h
causes by his misconduct." 96 N. Y. 281.
"The general rule in tort," says Mr. Sutherland (3 Suth. Dum. 714), "Is that the party
who-commits a tl'espass, or other wrong!ul
act, is liable for all the direct injury resulting from such act. although such resulting
injury could not have been contemplated as
the probable result ot the act done." This
is expressly sanctioned In the Maryland case
cited where a cancer was the Intervening
cause. It is a contradiction to say that parties contt>mplate--have Jn mind-things or
which they are supposed to be unmindful.
In the case cited from Indiana the court say
a wider range of Inquiry is permissible In
actions for tort than for the simple breach
of a contract See Shirley's notes, 329. In
that case the court quotes approvingly the
rule stated by Mr. Thompson, which ls substantially the same rule quoted from Addison approvingly in the Maryland case, that
"whoever does a wrongful act Is answerable
for all the consequences that may ensue In
the ordinary and natural course of events,
though such consequence be Immediately an~
directly brought about by intervening cause
if such lnterYening causes were set in m
tlon by the original wrong-doer." Here the
action Is not on contract, but tor a tort consisting of a breach of statutory duty. The
defect In the walk is supposed to have been
known to the ofticers of the munlcl1l111lty.
The predisposition to lnftnmmatory rheumatism was an Intervening cause, but It was
set In motion by the tortlous act complalne11
of. It ls not likely that the ofti<·ers ot the
villajle a1•tt1ally contemplated that the lnjm·y
In qut>Ktlon would result from the detect In
the walk. They must have known, bowe,· ·
er, thnt all classes of peoplt>, Infirm as well
as firm, diseased as well us healthy, were
liable to tra,·el upon the walk. l!nder ordinary elrcumstnnces the lnlirm and diseased
would han• no difficulty In passing over the
walk without Incurring injury.
But the
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plaintiff, under the circumstances stated, as

found by the jury, incurred the injury with-

out any fault on his part. The mere fact

that he was more susceptible to serious re-

sults from the injury by reason of the pres-

ence of disease, did not prevent him from

rccovering the damages he had actually sus-

tained.

For the reasons given, the judgment of the
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circuit court is aﬂlrmed.

plafntuf, under the clrcumstnnces stated, as
tound by the jury, lncurrt:d the Injury without any fault on hls part. The mere fact
that he was more susceptible to serious results from the Injury by reason ot the pres-

171

ence of disease, did not prevent him from
rN'OY<'rlng the damages be had actually sustained.
For the reasons given, the judgment of the
<'ircnlt court Is aftlrmed.
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The p1·cscnt suit w~s
brought against the railroad, and seeks to re
cover damages from lt for this a.lleged negll
gent killing of plalntltr's Intestate. The n
llgence charged (and there ls no other pr tended, or attempted to be shown) ls that the
train was being moved at a greater rate of
speed than four miles an hour. Some of
plalntll'f's witnesses testified that it was moving at the mte of six or seven miles au hour.
On the other band, defendant's witnesses
placed the speed, some as low as three, and
none above four, miles nn hour. This was
not the first time intestate bad attempted to
spring on moving trains, and be had been
more than once cautioned against such attemptB. Assuming that the speed of the
train was In P.xcess ot four miles au hour,
was there a causal connection between such
breach of duty on the part of the railroad
company and the Injury done to plnlntltr's
lntestnte?
•
Persons who perpetrate torts are, as a rule.
responsible, and only responsible, for the
proximate consequences of the wronga they
commit. In other words, unleea the tort b..
the proximate cause of the Injury complained
of. there ls no leiral accountability. In that
able and vahm.ble work, 16 Am. & Eng. Enc.
Law, 4;-s6, its this Jan.image: "A. 'proximate~
cause' may be deftned as that cause which I
natural nod continuous seauence. unbroken
by any efficient Intervening cause, producing
the result complained of, and without wbk'h
that result would not have occurred; and It
ls laid down ln mnny cases, and by leading
text writers, that, In order to warrant a finding that negligence, or an act not amounting
to wanton wrong, la the proximate cause of
STONE, C. J. The plalntllf, George Mutch, an Injury, It must appear that the Injury was
was a resident of Opelika. His son, James the natural and probable consequence of the
Mutch, was 9¥.i years old, well grown and de- negligence or wrongful act, and that lt was
veloped fOl' bis age, and, in intelligence and such as might or ought to have beell foreseen,
b1·lghtness, was above the average of boys In the light of the attending circumstances."
of hls age. He went at large without being On page 431 of the same volume It ls said:
attt·nded by a nmse or protector, and was at- "To constitute actionable negligence, there _
tending scilool. 'l'he Western Itallway of Ala- m11st be not only a. causal connection between
bama. nms through Opelika, and has a sta- the negligence complained of and the Injury
tion and depot In that city or town. There sulrered, but the connection must be by a
was an ordinance of force In Opelika which natural and unbroken SCQUen<'e, without inmade Lt unlawful to run a train of cars with- tervening etHclent causes; so tllat, but for
in the corporate limits at a higher rate of the negligence of the defendant, the Injury
11pced than four miles an hour, and Imposing woulcl not have occurred. It must not only
a penalty for Its violation. A freight train be a cause, but lt must be the proximateot the rallroad was comlng into Opelika on that Is, the dl1·ect and lmmedlate, e:fllclentan afternoon In ~!arch, 1889. It hnd box cause of the Injury." That philosophic law
cars, and attached to the side of one of them writer Dr. Wharton, (I..aw of Negligence, I
wnM a ladder, placed there to enable brake- 715,) expresses the principle as follows: "Il.
men to reach the top of the car. The little the consequence fiows from any particular
boy, Jnmes, havlng placed hlms(>)t at the side negligence, according to ordinary natural seof the track, attempted to seize the ladder as quence, without the Intervention of any huIt p:i.ssed him, that he might climb up on It, man agency, then such sequence, whether
and thus enjoy a ride. He did succeed In foreseen as probable, or unforeseen, ts Imcatching a round of the ladder, but, In at- putable to the negligence." Quoting from
tempting to ascend, be missed his footing, fell Chief Baron Pollock with apparent approval,
under the train, and was so Injured and be (In section 78) says: "I entertain consldcnlllhcd thnt he died of the wounds. Up to emhle doubt whether a person who bas been
this 110lnt there ls no conflict or unce1·talnty guilty or negligence ls responsible for all the
WEST~R:\'
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WESTERN RAILWAY OF ALABAMA v.

MUTCH.

(11 South. 894; 9? Ala. 19-1.)

Supreme Court of Alabama. Dec. 1, 1892.

Appeal from circuit court, Lee county; J.

M. Carmichael, Judge.

Action by George Mutch, administrator of

James Thomas Mutch, against the Western

Railway of Alabama, to recover for the al-

leged negligent killing of his intestate by de-

fendant. Judgment for plaintiff. Defendant

appeals. Reversed.

After the rendition of the judgment for

plaintiff, defendant moved the court for a

new trial on the following grounds: (1) Be-

cause the jury found contrary to the evidence{

(2) because the evidence did not authorize a

verdict against the defendant; (3) because

Mr. Augustus Barnes, one of plaintiff's at-

Generated for facpubupdates (University of Michigan) on 2014-06-12 19:22 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/mdp.35112105421491
Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd-google

torneys, in his argument to the jury, in

speaking of defendant's employes who were

witnesses in this case, said “that he would

not say, as a north Alabama attorney had

said, that they ‘testiﬁed with halters around

their necks;' but he would say that they tes-

tiiied with a conscious regard to their posi-

tion." The court overruled the motion for a

new trial, andthe defendant duly excepted.

On this appeal, prosecuted by the defendant,

there are many assignments of error, in

which were included the overruling of de-

fendant's motions for a new trial, but under

the opinion it is deemed unnecessary to notice

them in detail.

' Geo. P. Harrison and R. F. Ligon, Jr.. for

appellant. A. 8; R. B. Barnes. W. J. Samford,

and J. M. Chilton, for appeilee.

STONE, C. J. The plaintiff, George Mutch,

was a resident of Opeiika. His son, James

Mutch, was 9% years old, well grown and de-

veloped for his age, and, in intelligence and

brightness, was above the average of boys

of his age. He went at large without being

attended by a nurse or protector, and was at-

tending school. The Western Railway of Ala-

bama runs through Opellka, and has a sta-

tion and depot in that city or town. There

was an ordinance of force in Opelika which

made it unlawful to run a train of cars with-

in the corporate limits at a higher rate of

speed than four miles an hour, and imposing

a penalty for its violation. A freight train

of the railroad was coming into Opelika on

an afternoon in March, 1889. It had box

cars, and attached to the side of one of them

was a ladder, placed there to enable brake-

men to reach the 0op of the car. The little

boy, James, having placed himself at the side

of the track, attempted to seize the ladder as

it passed him, that he might climb up on it,

and thus enjoy a ride. He did succeed in

catching a round of the ladder, but, in at-

tempting to ascend, he missed his footing, fell

under the train, and was so injured and

crushed that he died of the wounds. Up to

this point there is no coniiict or uncertainty

in the testimony. The present suit was

brought against the railroad, and seeks to re
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RAILWAY OF ALABAMA 1'.
MUTCH.
(11 South. 894; 97 Ala. 194.)
Supreme Court of Alabama. Dec. 1, 1892.
Appeal from clrcult court, I.ee county; :S.
M. Carmichael, Judge.
Action by George Mutch, administrator of
James Thomas Mutch, against the Western
Ilallway of Alabama, to recover for the alleged negligent kllllng of his Intestate by defendant. Judgment for plalntltr. Defendant
appeals. Reversed.
After the rendition of the judgment for
pl:i.lutllT, defendant moved the court for a
new trial on the following grounds: (1) Because the jury found contrary to the evidence;
(2) because the evidence did not authorize a
verdict against the defendant; (3) because
~Ir. Augustus Barnes, one of plaintltr's attorneys, In his argument tc- the jury, In
speaking of defendant's employee who were
witnesses In this case, said "that he would
not say. as a north Alabama attorney had
said, that they 'testified with halters around
their necks;' but he would say that they testified with a cons<:lous regard to their position." The court overruled the motion for a
new trlnl, :i.ud ·the def(•ndant duly excepted.
On this appeal, prosecuted by the defendant,
there are many assignments of error, In
which were Included the overruling of defendant's motlons for a new trial, but under
the opinion It Is deemed unnecessary to notice
them In detail.
Geo. P. Harrison and R. F. J,lgon, Jr., for
appellnnt. A. & R. B. Barnes, W. J. Samford,
and J. M. Chilton, for appellee.

In the testimony.
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consequences which may under any circum-

stances arise, and in respect of mischief

which could by no possibility have been fore-

seen, and which no reasonable person could

have anticipated. I am inclined to consider

the rule of law to be this: That a person is

expected to anticipate and guard against all

reasonable consequences, but that he is not

by the law of England expected to anticipate

and guard against that which no reasonable

man would expect to occur." In the same

ection he quotes approvingly the following

language from Lord Campbell: “If the

wrong and the legal damage are not known

by common experience to be usually in se-

quence, and the damage does not, according

to the ordinary course of events, follow from

the wrong, the wrong and the damage are

not sufﬂciently conjoined or concatenated, as
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cause and effect, to support an action." In

Shearman & Redﬂeid's Mw of Negligence

(section 26) the principle is thus stated: “The

proximate cause of an event must be under-

stood to be that which, in a natural and con-

tinuous sequence, unbroken by any new

cause, produces that event, and without

hich that event would not have occurred."

The authorities from which we have quoted

are everywhere regarded as standard. What

they assert is but the condensation of the ut-

terances of a very great number of the high-

est judicial tribunals, wherever the principles

of the common law prevail. See 16 Am. &

Eng. Enc. Law, 428, 429; Railway Co. v.

Kellogg, 94 U. S. 469; Herring v. Skaggs, 62

Ala. 180; Daughtery v. Telegraph Co., 7 5 Ala.

168. Lynch v. Nurdin, 1 Q. B. (N. S.) 29, 41

E. C. L. 422, is the strongest of the cases re-

lied on in support of the present action. The

injury in that case occurred in a city. The

headnote contains a summation of the facts

as follows: “Defendant (a cart man) negli-

gently left his horse and cart unattended in

the street. Plaintiff, a child seven years old,

got upon the cart in play. Another child in-

cautiously led the horse on, and plaintiff was

thereby thrown down, and hurt." It was held

that the action was maintainable for the re-

covery of damages, “and that it was properly

left to the jury whether defendant's conduct

was negligent, and the negligence caused the

injury." In delivering his opinion, Lord

Denman used the following language: “If I

am guilty of negligence in leaving anything

dangerous in a place where I know it to be ex-

tremely probable that some other person will

unjustitiably set it in motion, to the injury of a

third, and if that injm-y should be so brought

about, I presume that the suilerer might have

r0(ir€'SS by action against both or either of

the two, but unquestionably against the ﬁrst.

' ' ' Can the plaintiff, then, consistently

with the authorities, maintain his action,

having been at least equally in fault? The

answer is that, supposing that fact ascertain-

ed by the jury. but to this extent: that he

merely indulged the natural instinct of a

child in amus.-ing himself with the empty cart

conaequenees which may under any clrcumstaneee ariae, and In respect of mischief
which could by no poulblllty have been foreseen, and which no reasonable person could
have anticipated. I am Inclined to consider
the rule of law to be this: That a person ls
xpeeted to anticipate and guard against all
easonable consequences, but that he Is not
by the law of England expected to anticipate
and guard against that which no reasonable
:nan would expect to occur." In the same
ectlon be quotes approvingly the following
language from Lord Campbell: "If the
wrong and the legal damage are not known
by common e:xperienee to be usually In ~
quence, and the damage doetJ not, according
to the ordinary course of events, follow from
the wrong, the wrong and the damage are
not sufliclently conjoined or concatenated, aa
ca\Hle and effect, to support an action." In
Shearman & Redfteld's Law ot Negligence
(section 26) the principle Is thus stated: "The
roxlmate cause of an event must be undertood to be that which, In a natural and eonnuous sequence, unbroken by any new
use, produces that event, and without
hlch that event would not have occurred."
he authorities from which we have quoted
are everywhere regarded as standard. What
they as11ert ls but the condensation of the utterances of a very great number of the highest judicial tribunals, wherever the principles
of the common law prevail. See 16 .Am. &
Eng. Enc. Law, 428, 420; Railway Co. v.
Kellogg, 94 U. S. 469; Herring v. Skaggs, G2
Ala. 180; Daughtery v. Telegraph Co., 75 Ala.
168. I,yncb v. Nordin, 1 Q. B. (N. S.) 29, 41
R. C. I,. 422, Is the strongest of the cases relied on ln support of the p1·esent action. The
injury In that case occurred lo a city. The
headnote contains a summation of the fncts
as follows: "Defendant (a cart man) negligently left his horse and cart unatteuded In
the street. Plalntltr, a child seven years old,
got upon the <.'8.rt In play. Another child Incautiously led the horse on, and plaintiff was
thereby thrown down, and hurt." It was held
that the action was malntalnable for the recovery or damages, "and that It was properly
left to the jm·y whether defendant's conduct
was negligent, and the negllgt>nce caused the
injury." In dellnrlng his opinion, Lord
Denman used the following language: "If I
am guilty of negligence In lcnvlng anything
dangerous in a place where I know It to be extremely probable that some other pe1">SOn wlll
unjll!ltlliably set It In motion, to the injury of a
third, and lf that lnjw·y 11houlll he so brought
about, I presume that the s11fferc1· might have
redre88 by action Rg"nlnst butll or either of
the two, but unqucstlonnbly against the first.
• • • Can the plalntllT, then, consistently
with the authorities, maintain his action,
having been at least equally In fault? The
answer Is that, sup110slng that fact ascertained by the jury, but to this extent: that he
merely lmJulA"Cfl the natnml Instinct of a
chih.l In awtffi ng 11:.;nsclf wltil tile empty cart

~

~

and deserted horse, then we think that the
defendant cannot be permitted to avail hlmselt of that fact. The most blamable carelessness of his servant having tempted the
child, he ought not to reproach the child wltll
yielding to that temptation." Reading the
case of Lynch v. Nurdln In the llgilt shed upon It by Lord Denman's reasoning, no one
can fall to note the marked difference between
that case and the one we have in hand. '!'he
argument by which the learned lord chief
justlee supported the judgment he announced
bu no appllcatlon to the present one. That
case was manifestly decided on the wellrecognized prtnclple that If one leave dangerous machinery, or any other thing of similar
nature, unattended, and In an exposed place,
and another be Injured thereby, an action on
the case may be malntalned for such injury,
unlesa plaintiff waa gnllty of contributory
negligence. Clark v. Chambers, 3 Q. B. Div.
327; Kunz v. City of Troy (N. Y. App.} 10 N.
E. 442; Stout v. Railroad Oo., 2 Dl.ll. 294,
Fed. Cas. No. 13,504; Beach, Contrlb. Neg.
H 140, 206. Infants of tender years, andi
wnntlug In discretion, are not amenable to
the disabling effects of contributory negll
gence. In the opinion of the court In the case
of Lynch v. Nurdln the causal connection between the negligence and the injury was so
direct and patent that the driver, exercising
ordinary care and prudence, should have anticipated and guarded against It. The lm1>1l·
caUon from Lord Denman's language is very
stl"Ong that he regarded the cart man's conduct as gl'Oll81y ~gllgent. Contrlbutocy negligence ls no defense to Injuries which result
from groes negligence. But the principle declared In Lynch v. Nurdln wa., lf not materially shaken, at least shown to be lnappllcable to a case like the present one, In the two
later English cases of Hughes v. Yacfte, 2
Hurl. & l '. 744, and Mangan v . .Atterton, L. R.
1 Exl'h. 2:l9. See, also, l\lcAlpin v. Powell,
70 N. Y. 12H: Wendell v. Railroad Co., 91 N.
Y. 420; Rnllroad Co. v. Bell, 81 Ill. 76. The
case of :\Icl!~nger v. Dennie, 137 Maes. 1U7,
ls a strong authority against the right to
maintain the present action. Another case
i·elled on In support of the present actlo.n ls
Hnllroad Co. v. Gladmon, Ui Wall. 4-01. That
case ts wholly unlike the present one, nnd
rests on a different principle. The negllgence of defendant's agent was manifest, and
the injury was the natural consequence of
the negligence. Had tile driver been looking
nhend, as he should have been, he would
have seen the child's danger, and could ancl
would have stopped hls car before his horses
did the Injury. The causal connection In
that case was complete, beCllnse the Injury
resulted so naturally ~rom the driver's Inattention that the law regards It as the p1·obnble consequence of his negligence. None ot
tile eases cited support the contention of appellee.
The ordinnnee of Opelika, rl'Strictlng the
speed of trains within the co11Jurate limits to
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four miles an hour, had one purpose,—one pol-

icy. Opelika is a town probably of four or

more thousand inhabitants. The railroad

antedated the town, and caused its location

there. It runs centrally through the busi-

ness portions of the place. In such condi-

tions, men pursuing business avocations, as

well as idlers and curiosity seekers, will con--

gregate about the depot and track of the rail-

road, and will be constantly crossing, if not

standing on, the track. They do both.

Knowing this habit of men, most towns

located on railroads have ordinances requir-

ing trains passing through them to move at a

low rate of speed. Why? Not because they

apprehend that reckless persons will at-

tempt to board the train while in motion.

The wildest conjecture would scarcely take

in an adventure so fraught with peril. The
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policy was to enable persons who might be

standing on the track, or whose business pur-

suits required them to cross it, to get off the

track, and thus escape the danger of a col-

lision. The ordinance had no other aim.

\We hold as matter of law that there was

no proof whatever in this case tending to

show a causal connection between the negli-

gence charged and the injury suffered. To

illustrate our views: Let us suppose that

the negligence charged against the railroad

company had been, not the too rapid move-

ment of the train, but some imperfection, de-

cay, or derangement of the ascending ladda

which caused plaintiff's intestate to fall and

lose his life. Would any one contend the

railroad company would be liable for such

accident? And is there a difference in prin-

ciple between the case supposed and the one

we have in hand? Charge No. 21, the gen-

eral charge in favor of the defendant, ought

to have been given. The great English com-

mentator sald, "Law is the perfection of hu-

man reason." This, in a sense, is true. It

is the expression of the combined wisdom of

DIHEC'f AND CON:SEQUENTIAL DAMAGES-IN TOR'£.

fo1,1r mlles an hour, had one purpose,--0ne policy. Opelika Is a town probably of four or
more thousaml Inhabitants. The railroad
nntedated the town, and caused Its location
there. It runs centrally through the business portions of the place. In such conditions, men pursuing business avocations, as
well as Idlers and curiosity seekers, wlll con-'
gregate about the depot and track of the railroad, and wlll be constantly crossing, It not
standing on, the track. They do both.
Knowing this habit of men, most towns
located on railroads have ordinances requit·lng trains passing through them to move at a
low rate of speed. Why? Not because they
apprehend that reckless persons wlll attempt to board the train while In motion.
The wildest conjecture would scarcely take
In an adventure so traugbt with peril. The
policy was to enable persons who might be
standing on the track, or whose business pursuits required them to cross It, to get otr the
track, and thus escape the danger of a collision. The ordinance bad no other aim.
~We hold as matter ot law that there was
no proof whatever In this case tending to
show a causal oonnectlon between the negligence charged and the Injury suliered. To
Illustrate our views: Ll!t us suppose that
the negligence charged against the railroad
company bad been, not the too rapid movement of the train, but some Imperfection, decay, or derangement ot the ascending ladder
which en.used plalntltr's Intestate to fall and
lose his life. Would an;v one contend the
railroad company would be liable for such
11ccident? And ls there a dltrerence In principle between the case supposed and the one
we have In hand? Charge No. 21, the general charge In favor of the defendant, ought
to have been given. The great English commentator said, "Lllw ls the perfection of human reason." This, In a sense, ls true. It
Is the expn.-sslon of the combined wisdom of
the legislative body. It .ls the creature, however, of human thought, and nothing human
Is perfect. Nor Is 1t true that leglslntive
policy Is unchanging. Conditions cluwge,
and the law which should adapt Itself to human wants must change with them. Stlll,
while the law stands on the statute book, It

I

the legislative body. Itis the creature, how-

should be obeyed and conformed to as a rule
of action. It we cut loose from its restraint!!.
we expose ourselves to the tempests of human passion and human prejudice, and, like
a ship at sea without rudder or compass, will
surely be dashed on some of the many
shoals which are found all along the voyage
of life.
Trial by jury le a bulwark of American, as
It has long been of English, freedom . It
wisely divides the responsibility of detel'llllnatlve adjudication, of punitive administration, between the judge, trained In the wisdom and Intricacies of the law, and 12 men
chosen from the common walks of nonprofessional life; chosen for their sound judgment
and stern impal'tlallty. The one declares the
rules of law applicable to the Issue or issues
formed, In the Ught ot the testimony adduced; the other weighs the testimony, dete1·mlnes what facts it proves, and, molded
by the law as declared by the court, renders
Its verdict. In the jury box, and under tlw
oath the jurors have solemnly sworn on the
holy evangelists of Almighty God, there Is
no room for friendship, partiality, or prejudice; no permissible discrimination between
friends and enemies, between the rich and
the poor, between corporations and natural
persons. The ancients painted the Goddess
of Justice aa blindfolded, and jurors must
be blind to the personal consequences of
the verdicts they render. If the testimony convinces their judgments of the existence of certain facts, they must be blind to
the consequences which result from those
facts. A wish that it were otherwise furnishes no excuse for deciding. against their
convictions. Justice thus administered commands the approbation of heaven and earth
alike; and a verdict thus rendered meets all
the requirements of the juror's oo.th, In the
fullest sense of the word,-a true expression
of the convictions fixed on the minds of the
jury by the testimony. Independent of tlw
legal question considered above, and which
we have declared to be determinative of this
case, the verdict of the jury was so palpably ngninst the evidence that a new trial
ought to have been granted on that account.
Reversed and remanded.

ever, of human thought, and nothing human

is perfect. Nor is it true that legislative

policy is unchanging. Conditions change,

/

and the law which should adapt itself to hu-

man wants must change with them. Still,

while the law stands on the statute book, it

should be obeyed and conformed to as a rule

of action. If we cut loose from its restraints.

we expose ourselves to the tempests of hu-

man passion and human prejudice, and, like

a ship at sea without rudder or compass, will

surely be dashed on some of the many

shoals which are found all along the voyage

of life.

Trial by jury is a bulwark of American, as

it has long been of English, freedom. It

wisely divides the responsibility of determi-

native adjudication, of punitive administra-

tion, between the judge, trained in the wis-

dom and intricacies of the law, and 12 men

chosen from the common walks of nonprofes-

sional life; chosen for their sound judgment

and stern impartiality. The one declares the

'\
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CHAMBERLAIN v. CITY OF OSHKO .

(54 N. W. 618, 84 Wis. 289.)

Supreme Court of Wisconsin. Feb. 21, 1893.

Appeal from circuit court. Winnebago

county; George W. Burnell, Judge.

Action by Anna Chamberlain against the

city of Oshkosh to recover for personal in-

juries caused by defendant's alleged negli-

gence. From a judgment for plaintiff, and

an order denying a new trial, defendant ap-

CHAMBERLAIN T. CITY OF OSHK.Or!l.
(M N. W. 618, M WiL 289.)
Supreme Court of Wleconain. Feb. 21, 1893.
Appeal from clrcult court, Winnebago
county; George W. Burnell, Judge.
Action by Anna Chamberlaln a.galnst the
dty of Oshkosh to recover for personal injurlee caUBed by defendant's alleged neglt·
gence. From a jud~ent for plalntltf, and
an order denying a new trla1. defendant "appeals. Reversed.
H. I. Weed, for appellant.

peals. Reversed.

H. I. Weed, for appellant.

Finch & Barber, for respondent.

For an ordinary, general, and transient

slipperiness, due to the ordinary action of

the elements only, and capable of being

removed by such ordinary action of the ele-

ments, there is no liability, but for a local,

unusual, and permanent slipperiness, caused
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by a defect in the street, and which the ordi-

nary action of the elements would not re-

move, the city is liable. Cook v. City of

Milwaukee, 24 Wis. 270, 27 Wis. 191; Per-

kins v. City of Fond du Lac, 34 Wis. 435;

Hill v. City of Fond du Lac, 56 Wis. 242, 14

N. W. Rep. 25; Stilling v. Town of Thorp,

54 Wis. 528, 11 N. W. Rep. 906; Grossenbach

v. City of Milwaukee, 65 Wis. 31, 26 N. W.

Rep. 182; Paulson v. Town of Pelican, 79

\Vis. 445, 48 N. W. Rep. 715; McDonald v.

City of Ashland, 78 Wis. 251, 47 N. W. Rep.

434; Cromarty v. City of Boston, 127 Mass.

329; Taylor v. City of Yonkers, 105 N. Y.

2%, 11 N. E. Rep. 642; Todd v. City of Troy,

61 N. Y. 506; Pomfrey v. Village of Sara-

toga Springs, 104 N. Y. 459, 11 N. E. Rep.

43; Kinney v. City of Troy, 108 N. Y. 567,

15 N. E. Rep. 728; Kenney v. City of Cohoes,

(N. Y. App.) 3 N. E. Rep. 189; Speilman v.

Inhabitants of Chicopee, 131 Mass. 443;

Keith v. City of Brockton, 136 Mass. 119:

Cloughessey v. City of Waterbury, 51 Conn.

405; Congdon v. City of Norwich, 37 Conn.

414; Burr v. Town of Plymouth, 48 Conn.

460; Landolt v. City of Norwich, 37 Cont.

615; Dooley v. City of Meriden, 44 Conn. 117;

Hubbard v. City of Concord, 35 N. H. 52;

Darling v. Town of Westmoreland, 52 N. H.

401; Clark v. City of Chicago, 4 Biss. 486:

Mosey v. City of Troy, 61 Barb. 580; Mayor,

etc., v. Marriott, 9 Md. 160; City of Provi-

dence v. Clapp, 17 How. 161; Evans v. City

of Utica, 69 N. Y. 166; Darling v. Mayor.

etc., 18 Hun, 340; Evers v. Bridge Co., Id.

144; Blakeley v. City of Troy, Id. 167; Thoma|t

v. Mayor, etc., 28 Hun, 110. In all these

cases the test of liability is whether the

city is responsible for the slipperiness, either

in its formation by a structural defect in

the sidewalk, or by allowing it to remain

too long after it is formed. Smooth and

level ice may be dangerous as well as rough

ice, and the question simply is, was any

negligence of the city the cause of its forma-

tion or retention? The following cases are

a direct authority on this point: Cromarty

v. City of Boston, 127 Mass. 329; Spellman

v. Inhabitants of Chicopee, 131 Mass. 443;

Finch & Barber, for respondent.
For an ordinary, general, and transient
slipperiness, due to the ordinary action of
the elements only, and capable of being
removed by such ordinary action ot the elements, there ls no llablllty, but tor a local,
unusual, and permanent sllpperlness, caused
by a defect in the street, and which the ordinary action of the elements would not remove, the city Is liable. Oook v. Clty ot
Milwaukee, 24 Wis. 270, 27 Wis. 191; Perkln.s v. City of Fond du Lnc, 34 Wis. 435;
Hill v. City of Fond du Lac, 56 Wis. 242, 14
N. W. Rep. 25; Stllllng v. Town of Thorp,
54 Wls. 528, 11 N. W. Rep. 906; Grossenbnch
v. City of Milwaukee, 65 Wis. 31, 26 N. W.
Rep. 182; Paulson v. Town of Pelican, 79
Wls. 445, 48 N. W. Rep. 715; McDonald v.
City of Ashland, 78 Wis. 251, 47 N. W. Rep.
434; Cromarty v. City ot Boston, 127 Mnss.
329; Taylor v. City of Yonker8, 105 N. Y.
202, 11 N. E. Rep. 642; Todd v. City of Troy,
Gl N. Y. 506; Pomfrey v. Village of Saratoga Springs, 104 N. Y. 459, 11 N. E. Rep.
43; Klnney v. Clty of Troy, 108 N. Y. 567,
15 N. E. nep. 728; Kenney v. City of Cohoes,
(N. Y. Allp,) 3 N. E. Rep. 189; Spellman v.
Inhabitants of Chicopee, 131 Mase. 443;
Keith v. Clty ot Brockton, 136 :Mat!S. 119:
Cloughessey v. City of Waterbury, 51 Conn.
405; Congdon v. City of Norwich, 37 Conn.
414; Burr v. Town of Plymouth, 48 Conn.
460; Lam1olt v. City of Norwich, 37 Co~..
615; Dooley v. City of Meriden, 44 Conn. 117;
Hubbard v. City of Concord, 35 N. H. 52;
Darling v. Town of Westmoreland, 52 N. H.
4-01; Clark v. City of Chicago, 4 Biss. 48ll:
Mosey v. City of Troy, 61 Barb. 580; Mayor,
etc., v. Marriott, 9 Md. 160; City of Prov:dence v. Clapp, 17 How. 161; Evans v. City
ot Utica, 69 N. Y. 166; Darllng v. Mayor,
etc., 18 Hun, 340; Evers v. Bridge Co., Ill.
144; Blnkeley v. Clty of Troy, Id. 167; Thoma'.!
v. Mayor, etc., 28 Hun, 110. In all these
. cases the test ot llablllty ls whether the
city ls responsible for the sllpperlness, either
in its formation by a structural defect in
the sidewalk, or by allowing it to rematn
too long after it is formed. Smooth and
level lee mny be dangerous as well as rough
lee, nnd the question simply ls, was any
negligence of the city the cause of its formation or retention? The following cases are
n dlr!'<'t nuthorlty on this point: Cromarty

li5

v. Clty ot Boston, 127 Mass. 329; Spellman

v. Inhabitants of Chicopee, 131 Mass. 443;
Cloughessey v. Clty ot Waterbury, 51 Conn.
405; Paulson v. Town ot Pelican, 79 Wis. 445,
48 N. W. Rep. 715. It the condltlon is artlfi·
clal. instead ot natmiil, and ls caused by th!l
.11e&llgence of_ the cltz, the cl!f IA .J!WllA,
The case ofspellman v. Inhabitants of Chic·
opee, supra, ls almost ldentlcnl in the tacts
wlth the case at bar.

•

ORTON. 1. This action ts to recover dn.mages for & personal injury to the plaintiff, occasioned by the want of repair and d~fectlve
condition of a walk in Merritt street, in the
city of Oshkosh. The defect is thus descrlb '<l
in the complaint: ''The said street, known "II
'Merritt Street,' at & certa!n place 1'l s ld
street to wlt, on the south side of said Mer. ltt
street, on the southeast corner thereof whe e
said Merritt street Intersects with Ford str et
ot said city, was, (on the 21st day of Febru·
ary, 1889,) and for a period of four wee';:s or
more bad been, unsafe, lnsutncl n". defective,
and badly out of repair, in this, to wlt, that nt
the point ot junction between tl·e stone crossing on the south s'de of said M •rritt str rt,
where said Merritt street intersects wllh
Ford street, and the sldewnlk on the south
Bide of said Merritt street. where said stine
croeslng ends, the nuthorltl-s of the 'lty or
Oshkosh, to wlt, thls defendnnt, negllg ntly
permitted a large hole to exist w .t :11n the
usu:1l rne and course of travel ovPr said stu e
crossing and sldew ilk. and ne:dlge!ltly p ·rmitted and allowed said bole to rlt'S ' an l remain without placing anY guard over or
around the same, and negll;e'ltlv al!ow<d
said hole to become filled with wat ·I', and t >
become frozen over with a large surf tee of
smooth tee, and negligently failed to pl tee
any protection, guard, or cover over or around
snl<l surface of Ice, ard fnlled to take an,· pr ,~
caution to prevent or w rn t, avelers o~r .;;1 l
crossing or sidewalk from walkln~ upon urd
over sn.ld surface ot Ice. Thnt persons traveling over and upon sn.ld crossing and sidewalk were compelled to walk upon and over
said surface ot lee, and that the aforesaid
city authorities, to wlt, the defendant, ne~
Ugently failed to provide a safe and eutftclent
crossing or passage over or around SRld large
surface of smooth Ice." The p·a ntl!I's h.Jury, and the manner of It, are substllntinlly
described as follows: The plaintlft, w lie
traveling upon said Merritt str et and ov r
the said stone cros ing, ''did by necessitr a ti
in the ordinary course of travel, wulk u ., n
and over said large surface of lee, and wH--out any fault on her part Rhe fell upo 1 s · <l
sur ·ac£> of Ice wlth Jn"e 1t 1orce." ar.d ece·v -d
great bodily injuries therefrom. ArtPr the
plnlntltr was sworn as a witn· ss in her own
behalf, the defenifant clty interpose1l a demurrer ore tenus on he ground hat the complnint dld not state a cause of acfon, nnd tl·e
objection to any evidence un ·'er It was overruled, and ex. e,..ton t .tl.en. The pln.tntl!I te;..

•
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tiﬁ d that when she came to that point “hrr

feet came from under her, and she came

down on her back. She did not notice any

barriers or guards around this place, or any

ashes upon the sidewalk where she slipped."

According to the evidence, the depression in

the street, where the water had accumulated

which made the ice on which the plaintiff

slipped down and was injured, was made by

the junction of a sidewalk coming down

Ford street with the stone cross walk over

Merritt street. It‘ would seem that the slight

difference of the grade of the two streets

made the depression. The slopé of the plank

sidewalk down to its junction with the stone

cross walk was only four inches, and the de-

pre.<slon in the stone or. ss walk where the ice

accumulated was from an inch to an inch anl

a half. The plank walk was over the gutter
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on Merritt street . This defect, it any, ap-

pears to have been in the plan of the wo|k

and its construction. At the (onC1n ion of the

testimony the defendant's motion for a non-

suit was overruled. The jury found a special

verdict “that the cross walk was in a defect-

ive and dangerous condition," and “that such

condition caused the plaintiff's i jury," and

assessed her damages at $1,1(l0.1it will be

observed that the complaint does 1ot charge

that the plaintiff's injury was Oil.ns(d by a

hole or depression in the cross walk, but that

it was caused wholly by the- smooth surface

of the i e at that place, and such was th,

erid me. The plaintiff slip ed and ftll on the

smooth surface of the ice.‘ The ice was the

proximate cause of the injury.\ The depres-

sion in the walk where the _ice formed, it a

defect, and a cause of the injury in any sen=e

was a remote, and not the proximate, cause

of the injury. But at this time there was n)

hole, or even depression, at that place. It

was ﬁlled up by the ice. It is too plain for

argument that the cause of the pla‘ntiff‘s

injury, both by the comp‘aint and test rony,

was t e smooth smfIce of the ice on the (re s

walk._ The special verdict is careful not to

state the defect or dangerous condition. It

will be observed, also, thtt the neglirenre

of the city consists, "in failing to provide a

safe crossing or passage over and around sail

large surface of smooth ice. and allowal..and

permitted said crossing to remain in such in-

suﬂit-lent, unsafe, and defective conditl nfor

a p. riod of four weeks, and fa'led to take any

precaution to prevent or warn travelers over

said crossing or sidewalk from walking upon

and orersaid surface of ice." The existence

and continuance of said ice for four w(?‘.‘ks

was the presumptive notice to the city of tie

DIHECT AND

tifi d that whrn we came to that polnt "h£r
feet came from under her, and she came
do,,·u on her bnck. She did not notice any
bari-krs or guards around this place, or any
ruihes upon the sidewalk where she slipped."
According to the evidence, the depression In
the s'.reet, where the water had accumulated
which made the ice on which the plaintllT
slipped down and was injured, was made by
the junction ot a ~idewalk coming down
Ford strl'et with the stone cross walk over
Menltt street. It' would seem that the slig".; t
dltierence ot the grade of the two streets
mnde the depression. '!'he slop~ ot the plank
sidewalk down to Its junction with the stone
cross walk was only four iDches, and the depre:<ston In the ston~ er. ss walk where the lee
nccumulated WWI from an Inell to :m inch anl
a h:ilf. 'fhe plank walk wns over th~ gutter
on Jlerritt street. This defect, If any, appears to have been In the plan of the wo1k
and its construction. At the conclu ion of the
testimony the defendant's motion for a nonsuit was overruled. The jury found a special
verdict "that the cross walk was In a defective and dangerous oonditlon," and "that such
comllflon caused the plaintiff's ~ury," and
assessed her damages at $1,100. It will be
ollservPd that the complaint does ot charge
thnt the plaintiff's Injury was Cl\IL'l(d by a
h'.lle or depression In the cross walk, but that
It was cnused wholly by the-smooth surface
of the I~ at that plncl', and such wa;; th•
evid nee. ) The plninttrr slipprd and fdl on the
smooth surface of the lee., The Ice was the
pr.:>xlm:ite cause ot the Injury.\ The d··presston in the walk where the lee ·formed, it a
defect, and a cause of the injury in any ::en' e.
was a remote, and not the proximate, can-ie
of the injury. But at this time there wus n 1
hole, or even depressiou, 1 at that p!ac::-. It
wns filled up by the ice. ·u ls too plain for
argumt>nt that the cnus~. of the pla'ntiff's
injury, both by the comp'alnt and 'tes'i rony,
was tqe smooth sm f .:ce of the ice on the <ro 11
walk. 1The special verdict ls carel'ul not to
stat,, the defrct or dcW~<'rous condition. It
will be observed, also, th lt the negll ~c>me
of the city coni:ists. "In falling to provid ~ a
snfe crossing or passage over an·l around !'all
large sm·face of smooth ice. nod nllow;!<l an1
permitted s:ii1l crossing to remain in suC'h lnsuffkl<>nt, unsafe, and defe::-tlye condltl. n for
a p rtod of !our weeks, and fa'led to take any
pr1·c:mtion to prevent or warn travelers over
said cros~ln~ or sidewalk from walking upon
and o·.-er Raid surface of IC'e." The existenc~~
and continuance of said le~ for four we•·ks
wns the> presumptive qottcc to the city of t!·e
defect complalni'tl of. · 'fbe plalnti!T does not
compL'lln of being injllr<d lly the hole or depression, but by the "large sunnce of smooth
Ice." 'The dep:·cs'!ion wa5 the caus<~ of t'1e
water ucenmnlating· th<>re, nnd the wnt~·r,
combin,·d ~1th a low temperature. caused the
lee to form whleh injured the plaintiff. The
<l<•111·t·1><ion was n i·c>mot} emu~ .~ er Cat'.S } of
cn11:-1 s. Thl' proximate or direct cnu>e was

defect complained of. j The plaintit‘f does not

complain of being injurcd by the hole or de-

pression, but by the “large surface of smooth

ice." 1The depression was the cause of the

water acctunuiating' there, and the water,

combined with a low temperature, caused the

ice to form which injured the pinintiff. The

depression was a rcmot: cause cr cars} of

t-{lnsis. The proximate or direct cause was

CON~EQUENTIA.L

•

DAMAGES-IN TORT.

the lee, nnd this must be. the came of action.
"Causa proxima, non remotn, spectatur,"-the
proximate, and not the remote, cause, must be
considered. The cnu~e nea1·cst In order of
causation, which is adequate to produce the
result, is the direct cause. In law, only the
direct cause ls considered. These are. familiar maxims."/ "The proximate cause ls the
cause which leMs to, and is Instrumental In
producing, the result.'1 3 Amer. & Eng. E1io.
Law. 45; State v. Rali.rond Co., 52 X. H. u28.
In thls case the hole or depression ls not th ·
cause of the Injury for wWch an action m:iy
be brought. It is too remote. There is a direct cause ot the injury, and that Is the ice on
which she slipped down, and that ls the only
one which can be considered. The defect ln
the street or walk Is the Ice, and the negligence of the city consists In allowing It to re·
main. This was dangerous to the travellngpubllc, arid the cause of the plalntl!f's Injury
In the law and by the complalnt and testimony. This lee was 1!Illooth and level, and
accumulated through the sole agency of the
elements and Jn the order of nature. .No argi1.
ment, speculation, or c1U1ulstry can make this
case any ditferent from this. The mn.ln and
important question which first presents Itself
on the demm·rer to the compla1nt, and agnln
on the motion tor a nonsuit, ts. ls such a condition of the walk an actionable ddect? Tbls
question ls settled by this court In the negative ln many cases, after a very full examination of the authorities e:sewhere, which we
need not cite. "When the walk is slippery because of the smooth surface of the snow nod
lee which hnd accumulated upon it," such a
detect is not actionable. Cook v. City of Milwaukee, 24 ·Wis. 270, 27 Wis. 191. In
Perkins v. City of Fond du Lac, 34 Wis.
435, "the wnlk was entirely covered with
packed snow and lee, and the whole surface of the walk wns very smooth and
slippery." · It wns held that such a condition of the walk did not alone constitute
an nctlonnble defect; and so In Grossenbach v.
City of l\Iilwaukee, G5 'Vis. 31, 26 N. W. Rep.
182. This holding is most reasonable. Such 1~
detect In a walk or street is common and
natural everywhere in the winter season, and
such actions would be numberless, unreason,1)
ble, and oppressive. The munlcipalltles are
powerless to prevent or remove such a common end natural condition. The authoritiM
cited by the learned counsel of the responde:.:t
are not appllcnble to this case. They are
cases where other defects combine with
the ice to c:mse the Injury. Such defect;
must be pr<'sent with tile Ice, and they together constitute n cause of nct'. on; as,
where the lee ls formed on a steep d_'cllvlty or descending grade, 01· there ls some
other condition of the wnlk, which, tog-ether with the lee. makes the walk dangerous, as Jn Grossenbach v. City of ~Iilwaukee
and Perkins v. City ot Fond du Lac.
supra, and other cases In this court. Bnt
here the hole 01· depression does not com-
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bine with the ice, and is not present

with it. There is no hole at the time,

as it is ﬁlled with ice, and the surface

is made level as ice can be anywhere.

The plalntif f was not injured by stepping into

the hole, but by slipping on the ice. But I

have said enough of this. The hole was only

the remote cause, or cause of causes, which

LAW DAM.2d Ed.+12

produced the result, and was not the direct,

eﬂicient, or adequate cause, which alone is ac-

tionable. The court should have sustained

the demurrer ore tenus, or, failing in that,

ought to have ordered a nonsuit on the evi-

dence. The judgment of the circuit court is

reversed. and the cause is remanded for av
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new trial.

blne with the lee, and Is not present
with It. There Is no hole at the time,
u It is fllled with Ice, and the surface

Is made level as Ice can be anywhere.
The plaintl.tf was not lnjurrd by stepping Into
the hole, but by Blipping on the ice. But I
haYe said enough ot this. The hole was only
the remote cause, or cause ot causes, which
LAW DAM.2d Ed....,...12
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produced the result, and was not the direct,
efilclent, or adequate cause, which alone ls actionable. The court should have sustained
the demurrer ore tenus, or, tailln_; In that,
ought to have ordered a nonsuit on the evidence. The judgment ot the circuit co:.irt Ii
reversed. and the cause is remanded tor u v
new trial.
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BLYTHE et al. v. DENVER & R. G. RY.

co.
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(25 Pa.c. 702, 115 Colo. 333.)

DIRECT AND CONSEWNTIAL DAMAGES—IN TORT.

BLYTHE et al. v. DENVER & R. G. RY. CO.

Supreme Court of Colorado. Jan. 10, 1891.

(25 Pac. 702, 15 Colo. 333.)

Supreme Court of Colorado. Jan. 10, 1891.

Commissioners' decision. Error to dis-

trict court, Arapahoe county.

Plaintiffs in error brought suit against

the defendant as a common carrier for

the loss of a package of merchandise con-

sisting of gold and silver watches, watch-

cases and movements, of the alleged value

of $726.95, delivered to defendant at Ala-

mosa by one J. B. Moomaw, to be carried

as an express package, directed to and to

be delivered to plaintiffs at Denver. The

package was not valued, and was accept-

ed and receipted for as an ordinary pack-

age at a nominal valuation of $50, upon

which charges of 65 cents were paid in ad-

vance for its transportation. The de-
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fendant, after denying the material alle-

gations of the complaint, admitted the

receipt of the package, the payment of the

money forits transportation, the execu-

tion and delivery of its receipt for the

same, and specially alleged as defenses:

First, that the car in which such package

was being transported was blown from

the track by a furious wind. and the car

and contents destroyed by ﬁre, and that

the loss was by inevitable accident and

“the act of God:" second, that the ship-

per irauduently concealed the value of the

package, and it was received as being only

of the value of $50; that it was placed in

the body of the car, where ordinary puck-

ages were usually carried; that defend-

ant had a ﬁre-proof safe in the car, and

had the shipper given the true value, and

paid transportation for such value, the

goods would have been placed in the safe,

and would not have been lost; that, by

the terms of the receipt given, defendant

. wasexempted from anyliabilityexceeding

CommlRsloners' deciHlon. Error to district court, Arapahoe eonnty.
Plaintiffs in error brought suit agnlnRt
the deft>ndant as a common carrier for
the ]ORB or a oncka~e of merchandise consisting of golCl and 1111\·er watches, watchcases and movements, or the alle1Z"ed value
of $726.95, dell V<'red to dPfend1111 t u t Alamosa IJy one J.B. Moomaw, to be curded
as an express package, directed to and to
be clell\•ered to vlalntiffs at Denver. The
package was not valued, and was aceepted and receipted for as an ordinary package ut a nominal valuation of '50, upon
which chargl'S of 65 cents were paid in advance for its transportn.tlon. The defcndau t, after denying tbe materinl alle~a tlons of the complaint, ndmltted the
re<'elpt of the package, the pa:rment of the
money for its tram1portation, the execution and delivery of its receipt for th£1
same. and Rpecially alleged ai;i defenses:
First, that the car in which snch package
was being transported was blown from
the track by u furious wind. and the car
and content11 destroyed hy fire, and that
the losR was by inevitahlo accid1mt and
"tho act of God;" second, that the shipper frauduently concf'Hlec1 the value of the
package, and it was received as being only
of the value of $50; that it wuR plnced in
the body of the car, where ordinary packages were usually carried: that 11efendan t had a tire-proof safe In the car, and
hod the shipper given the trne value, and
paid transportation for such vnlue, the
goods woulll have been placed in the sure,
and would not have been lost; that, by
the terms of the receipt gl"l'en, defendant
wne exempted from any lln l>lllty exceeding
$50. A replication was filed putting in
Issue tho special matters pleaded In defen&e, an:i averring negligence In not l!C·
curing the (lllcknge In the 11afe, aud In not
making proper efforts to save thP. propertv at the time of the disaster. Tht> case
wits tried to a jury, resulting In a Y!'r•lict
for the defendant, and judgment upun the
verdict.
Lucim1 P. M11rsh, for plaintiffs In t>rror.
Jl'ulcott & Vaile, for defendant in error.

$50. A replication was ﬂied putting in

issue the special matters pleaded in de-

fense, and averring negligence in not se-

curing the package in the safe, and in not

making proper efforts to save the prop-

erty at the time of the disaster. The case

was tried to a jury, resulting in a verdict

for the defendant, and judgment upon the

verdict.

Lucius P. Marsh, for plaintiffs in error.

Wolcott & Vaile, for defendant in error.

REED, C., (after stating the facts as

above.) It is conceded that the wrecking

of a portion of the train, such portion con-

sisting of one engine and four cars, one

being the express-car in which the goods

were being carried, was by “the act of

God," and inevitable. It is also conceded

in argumentthathavingucoal ﬁre burning

in a stove, and a lighted lamp in the com-

partment, as testiﬁed to, was not negli-

gence on the part of the carrier. Counsel

for plaintiffs in error in reply say: “In the

brief of defendant in error, counsel have

assumed for us a claim which we havenot

REED, C., (n/'f,Er 'Itntlng the facts as
It 111 conceded that the wre<.>king
of a. portion of the train, 11uch portion conRl11t111g of one engine and four car11, one
being the express-car in which the goolls
were being carried, was b,v "the act of
4Jod," aoll inevitable. It is also conceded
in argument that having a coal fire burning
in a stove, and a lighted lamp In the compartment, as testified to, was not negll~ence on tbe part of the carrier. Counsel
for plaintiffs in error in reply say: "In the
brief of defendant In error, counsel have
assumed for us a claim which we have not
mnlle, and they then procee1l to demolish
such assumed t•lalm. They nssume for
us that we claim there wue negligence lo
carrying in the car a stove with tire in It.
• • • There wa11 uegligence,-we may
call it by tbat nawe,-IJut such negll11bon'.)

I

genee was In not making the requisite
efforts to eave the good11 after the peril
had been incurred. 'Ve make no claim
that there was nep:llgence In carrying a
stove in the car." By thesP concessions,
two Important que11tlons are eliminated,
and the i11sueH are narrowed, the only
questions remaining being: First. Was
"the act of God" the proximate anll dh-ect
cauRe of the loi;e sustained, so as to exonerate the carrier from llublllty, or was
it tt10 remote cause, and the tire against
which the carrier Is suppoRed to be an lneuror the proximate and direct cause?
Second. After tho wrecking and overturning of the train by" the act or God," was
the carrier guilty of negligence In fulling
to protect and secure the good11 in tbe
burning car?
Great ability and research have been exp<:>ndcd in attempting to arrive at and determine upon 11ome p;eueral l.leHnltlon of
the terms "proximate" and "remote"
canses nnll estaullsh a rule and a line of
<lemarkation !Jet ween the two. Such efforts appear to have been but partially
succei;sful. Both hu ve received varioua
detinltlonH, though differently worded,
nmountlng to practically the same thing.
But, in almost every instance where thl:'y
have been t\ttempted to be applied, their
up11lica hlllty Sl>elllH tu hn.,·e been determined b.v tht1 11cl'ullnr circumstances of the
case underconsideration: WebsterdPfinee
"proximate cause," "that which immediately prcccrles n.n produces the effect,
ns rli1:1tlnguishd from th~remote, mediate,
or prl:'dispoHlng cause." And. ))let. Law:
"The uenrt>et, the Imm late, the direct
cause; the etliclent cnusfl; the cause that
Bets anothPr or other cu uses In operation,
or dominant cause." But with thee!' d!'fl·
nltlone In view, when two causes unite
to produce the lose, the question still re·
mains, which was the proximate cause'!
In Insurunce Co. \'. 1'wecd, 7 Wall. 52, the
late I amen ted Mr. Justice MILLF:R said:
"We have had cited tu us a ireneral re\•lew
of the doctrine of proximate aud remote
causes, as It hns arh•en and been clecilled
In the courts In n great variety of cases.
· It would he an unprotitnhl!' lahor to enter Into an examlnntlon or these cases. If
we conld dednce from them the best possible expression of the rule, it would re·
main after all to llPcille each CUSP. largely
upon the spt:clal facts belonging to it, and
often upon tbe very nicest discrimlna·
tlons." In Hownrd Fire Ins. Co. v. Norwich & N . Y. 'l'ransp. Co., 12 Wall. 199, In
delivering the opinion o~ the court, Mr.
Justice STRONG said: ~And certainly,
that cause which set th~ other in motion,
amt gave to It Its efficlPhcy to do harm
at th·e time of ~he disaster, must rank as
predomlnan t." ; In Railroad Cu. v. Kellogg,
94 U.S. 475, It is said: "'l'he Inquiry 11.1ust
therefore alwayl!he whether there was any
intermediate ea use lllsconm-r.ted from tho
prlmury fnult, and self-operating, which
produced the Injury." In Insurance Co. v.
Boon, 95 U. 8. IaO, It le said: "The proximate C!illuse is the efficient cause; the one
that necessarily sets the other causes in
operation. The causes that are merely
Incidental or Instruments of n superior or
contrulllnJ!: nl!:t!ncy are not the J)roxlmate
causes uud the responslhle ones, tl10U&"h
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they may be nearer in time to the result.

Itis only when the causes are independ-

ent of each other that the nearest is, of

course. to be charged with the disaster."

Leaving out of consideration, as we

must, by concession of counsel, all ques-

tion of negligence in regard to the burning

lire in the stove. a lighted kerosene lamp,

and regarding each of them as securely

protected against damage as prudence

would require. and applying the rules

above laid down, it becomes apparent

that the overturning and wrecking of the

car by the violence of the wind was the

proximate, direct, and efficient cause of

the loss, and the ﬁre ioiiowing, ii not in-

stantaneously, immediately after, with-

out negligence or any wrongini act of th

carrier intervening to produce it, must be
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regarded as resulting and incidental. It is

ably contended in argument, and many

supposed authorities in support of the po-

sition are cited. that the negligence of the

carrier in iaiiing to use proper exertion to

save the contents of the car, after it was

overturned, rendered the deiendant liable

ior the loss. Ii, by proper diligence and

attention the goods could have been res-

cued. a iailure to secure them would have

ﬁxed the liability of the carrier. 'll‘here

can be no doubt of the correctness of this

conclusion. The questions, what was the

proximate cause of the 1O:-is, and of negli-

gence. were questions of iact to be deter-

mined by the jury irom the evidence, un-

der proper instructions irom the court.

There was not much coniiict of testhnony.

In Railroad Co. v. Kellogg, snpra,it is

said: “In the nature of things. there is in

every transaction a succession of events,

more or less dependent upon those preced-

ing, and it is the province of the jury to‘

look at this succession of events or facts,

and ascertain whether they are naturally

and probably connected with each other

by a continuous sequence, or are dissev-

ered by new and independent agencies;

and this must be determined in view of

the circumstances existing at the time."

The jury found as a fact that the “act of

God“ was the proximate cause. and also

found as a iact that there was no negli-

gence. Viewed in the light of all the evi-

dence, and of attendant circumstances,

the ﬁnding of the jury was inlly warrant-

ed. The iorce of the gale was such as to

blow the cars irom the track over the em-

bankment. It was shown to be almost

impossible ior men to stand or walk, and

they were compelled to prostrate them-

selves under the lee of the track or bank

to escape its inry. The air was so inll of

' cal than substantial.

dust and ﬂying material thatscarcely any-

thing could be seen. The car contained

inﬂammable material, and the ﬁre suc-

ceeded the overturning almosl: instantane-

ously. The messenger escaped with"great

they may be ne11rer In time to the result.
It ts only when the cnuses nre lntlepentlent of each oth~r that the nearest ls, or
<:OUI'Re, to be chargcrl with the dlsuster."
Lt-avlug out of con>1hleratlon, ns we
must, by concei;Rlon of cotmRel, all quest.Ion of uegligt'nce In regnrtl to the burnln~
fire In the ston~. a lighted kerosene lamp,
antl regnrtllng each of them as securely
protM:ted against damage as prudence
would require. and appl_ylng the rulf~e
lll>ove lalrt down, It bPconw11 apparent
that the overturulng and wrC'Cklng of the
car by the vlolenre of the wind wns the
proximate, tllrect, nnd efficient c11uHe of
the losR, and the fire following, If not Instantaneously, Immediately alter, without negligence or any wron1l:ful act of th
carrier inten·cnlng to procluce it, mm1t be
n>gnrded as reimlting and incideutal. It is
ably contended In urgunwnt, and many
811JIPOHed authorltif>R In SllIJPOl"t of tht• position llrl' cited, thut the Ill'gllgenc~ o( the
carrier in falling to m~c proper exert ion to
e11,·e the conte11ts or the car, 11rtcr it was
O\'erturned, remh're1l the fll'fe11dnnt Jiu ble
for the Josi!. Ir, h.r proper cJillgPnce nnd
attt'ntion the goo1l>1 could ha 'i'~· u1·t'n rl.'R«'Ut'<I, a failure to 11t•cure them would huvP
fixed the liability or the currier. Thne
cuu be no doubt of the corrcctm•Hs of this
conclusion. The qnl'stlo111o1, what wnH the
proximate rause of the loHs, und of 1wgligc11ce. were CJ 1Jt'11tlom1 of fuct to lw de !ermined by the jur.r from the evidence, un•ler proper Instruction!'! from the conrt.
l'l1ere was not muchconttlct or te11tim:my.
In Railroad Co. v. Kellogg, Rnpra, It 111
tmicl: "In the nature or thhi~s. therti is in
t•vcry trnnRnctlon a BUCCl'llt1ion t•f events,
more or lc11s dependt>nt upon thmie 11reccdlng-, anrl It i;i the province of the j nry tc)
look at thiR RllC<'es1ilon of event11 or (nets.
aml ascertain whether they are nnturnlly
and probably connected with e11ch other
hy a contlnuoDs seqnenee, or nre dl11sevl'red hy new and lndc11en1lent ng1•11ciP11;
11nd thlH m1111t be determined In \"icw of
the clrrum11tn11ces existing at the time."
The jury found as a fact that the" uct or
God .. waP the proximate cau11e, and nl110
found as a fact that there was no 111'gllgence. Viewed In the light of all thu e\·I·
1hmce, anrl of attendant circumstancl'I!,
the finding or the Jury Wall fully Wllrrant•
ed. The force of the gale waR such as to
blow the care from the track over tho emhankmen t. It was shown to be almu11t
lmpos11lble for WE'D to stand or walk, and
they were compelled to prostrate themselves under the lee of the track or bank
.to ese11pe it.a fury. The air was so full or
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dust and ftylng material that scarcely anything could be St!en. 'l'he ear contained
Inflammable materlul, and the tire succeeded the overturning almost iostantaneou11ly. The messenger ~caped with great
ditH1·ulty, 111111 not wl thou t injury from
the tla111e11. The position of the car wm1
such thn t all 1110\'11ble goods must hu ve
been hurlE'd Into the corner of the top of
tlw car. From the force of the wind, und
comhustll>le material of the car, it 111 olJvlous that the de11tr11ctlo11 of the car nnd
contents w11s inevltuhle in a very hriE'f
space of time. and thu t iuiy u ttem11t to
rt•iscue the goods woultl have been 1111avalling.
Considerable crltl<'lsm Is 1llrected to the
ln11tructlonR of the court. Some of thm;e
l'ritlclRed, and upon which errors are aeela;ned. are In l'('gard to negligence In the
t1He uf the sto,·e nncl lamp. As counsel
conce1les in his flnnl argunwnt that thert.>
wu11 nu ne11:lige11ce In thut re1<pect, a review of them hecomr11 unncceissury. l'onslllernble attention II'! gi\·en to the eigl1th
lm1tr11ctiun. 111 whkh the lrnrned jurlg-e
chu ri,:P1l: "Where one lf1 pursuing a lawful
n vm·n tlon, lu a lawful manner, und something occnrs which no human flkill or pr<.'caution could forei'f'f! or prevent, und HR n
con11t·q11cnce the ncci<ll•nt t11kee nluce. thi11
h1cullt'd 'inevitable accident' or the 'act of
God.'" 'l'he objection uri,:ed is more technical thnn suh10t1111tial. 'Vhllelth1,1io>1Hlhly,
not trchnicnlly correct, untl while there 111
a lt>gnl dl11tlnetlon between "lne,·itul.Jle uccidPnt" and the "act of GO!!," we can fire
nothing in It to the pr<'judice of the plain-·
tiff. or that could have mllde1l the Jury
'l'hu lmmedinte resulting c1rnRe producln~
the lois8 wus the fire, which might properly he termed an "lnevltnule nccld!int"
~rowin!r out of the former cllRaHtcr; while
the direct cauise or the ngt·~cy tl111t worketl
the lil'titructlon w a~ the "act of Joel.~I
1rntti11g the l'l'Rnltlng ngen ut work. \'i'.af
think the charge, tnkl'll as n whole, ' a!! a
fulr 11nll lmpnrtlal stutement of thp lu w,
and 1:1lw11l<l he am1tainecl. We utlvli;e that
the jutlgment Lie uftinned.
RICH~10ND
rln~.

&nd BISSEJ,L, CC., concur

PER CURI AM. For the reasons stated
in the foregoing 011inlon the Judjjtmeut j&f
the cuurt below is aftl1·med.

ELLIO'l'T, J., having tried thlM cao~f!
below,did nut participate lu this decl11loo •
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HAWERLY v. STATE LINE 8:. S. R. CO.

(19 Atl. 1013, 135 Pa. 50.)

Supreme Court of Pennsylvania. May 19,1890.

Appeal from court of common pleas, Brad-

ford county.

Action by Leroy Ilaverly against the State

Line & Sullivan Railroad Company for dam-

age caused by ﬁre. The testimony showed

that on May 11. 1880, about 4 or 5 o'clock P.

M. a train of defendant's passed over its road,

and near the tract of land where plaintiff was

lumbering; that soon afterwards smoke was

seen issuing from a stump in the line of the

defendant‘s right of way; that one of plain-

tiﬂ"s agents was sent to put out this ﬁre,

who, returning, reported he had done so;

that no further smoke was seen in or around

the stump until about 10 o'clock A. M. of‘ the

following day, when the plaintiff himself

Generated for facpubupdates (University of Michigan) on 2014-06-12 19:22 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/mdp.35112105421491
Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd-google

sent a servant, who, ﬁnding the stump on

ﬁre, poured water thereon until he supposed

it was entirely extinguished, and he re-

mained there half or three-quarters of an

hour, until he satisﬁed himself that no ﬁre

remained; that about noon of the same day,

the wind coming up and blowing lively, a

ﬁre broke out on said tract in the vicinity of

said stump, which could not, on account of

the wind. be controlled by the plaintiff or his

agents, and destroyed a quantity of logs in

which the plaintiff had an interest. Plaintifb

obtained judgment. Defendant appeals.

Edward Ooerton, John F. Sanderson, and

Rodney A. Mercur, for appellant. H. N.,

Williams, I. McPherson. E. J. Angle, and

R. H. Williams, for appellee.

MITCHELL, J. The test by which the line

is to be drawn between proximate and re-

mote cause, in reference to liability for the

consequences of negligence, has been ﬁrmly

established by the three cases of Railroad Co.

v. Kerr, 62 Pa. St. 353; Railroad Co. v. Hope,

>80 Pa. 517. 313; and Hoag v. Railroad Co., §._5_

Ea. St. 293. It is most elaborately expressed

by iief Justice AGNEw in Railr Co. v.

Hope, in the following languagelzaghe jury

must determine, therefore, wheth r the facts,

constitute a continuous succession of events.

so linked together that they become a natural

whole, or whether the chain of events is so

broken that they become independent, and

the ﬁnal result cannot be said to be the nat-

ural and probable consequence of the pri-

mary 'ause,—the negligence of the defend-

ants"? And the rule is again put somewhat

more ersely by the present chief justice in

Hoag v. Railroad Co., as follows: “The in-

jury must be the natural and probable conse-

quence of the negligence,—such a conse-

quence as * * * might and ought to

have been foreseen by the wrong-doer as

likely to flow from his act.'-' The three lead-

ing cases above referred to, though frequent-

ly cited on opposite sides of the same argu-

ment, are not at all in conﬂict in principle.

The different results which were reached in

them depended not on any different view of
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HAVERLY v. STATE LINE & S. R. CO.
(19 Atl. 1013, 135 Pa. 50.)
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania. May 19, 1890.
Appeal from court of common pleas, Brad·
ford county.
Action Ly Leroy Haverly against the State
Line & Sullivan Hailroad Company for damage caused by fire. The testimony showed
that on May 11. 1880, about 4 or 5 o'clock P.
M. a train of defendant's pa!!!!erl over its road,
and near the tract of land where plaintiff was
lumbering; that soon 11ftl'rwardii smoke was
seen issuing from a stump in the line of the
defendant's right of way: that one of plaintiff's agents was t1ent to put out this fire,
wllo, returning, reported he had done so;
that no further smoke was seen in or around
the stump until about 10 o'clock A. M. of the
following day, when the plaintiff himself
sent a servant, who, finding the stump on
fire, poured water thereon until he sup:·osed
it was entirely extiuguished, and he remained there half or three-quarters of an
hour, until he satisfied himself that no fire
remained; that about noon of the same day,
the wind coming up and blowing lively, a
fire broke out on said tract ln the vicinity of
said stump, which could not, on account of
the wind, be controlled by the plaintiff or his
agenls, and destroyed a quantity of logs in
which the plaintiff had an interest. Plaintiff.
obtained judgment. Defendant appeals.
Edward O"e1·ton, John F. Sanderao11, and
Rodney ..4.. Merc1tr, for appellant. H. N. ,
Williams, I. M<:Phe1·son, E. J • .Angle, and
R.H. Williama, for appellee.

MITCHELL, J. The test by which the line
ls to be drawn between pl'oximate and remote. cause, in reference to liability for the
consequences of negligence, has been firmly
establishf'd by the th re~ cast's of Railroad Co.
v. Kerr, 62 l'a. St. 353; Railro11d Co. v. Hope,
_80 £a. bt •. az3; and Hoag v. Railroad Co.,~
~ S_t. ?9~_. It is most elaborately expressed
by Chief Justice AGNEW in Raih~ Co. v.
Hopi', in the following langirnge: "The jury
must drtf'ru1ine. therefore, wheth r the facts
constitute a coulinuous succc:ssion of evc:nts.
so linked toizether that they become a natural
whole, or whcthel' the chain of events is so
brol<1•11 that they become indepenllent, and
the li nal result cannot be s1tid to be the natural and probable conse')uence of the primal'y use,- tile rn•i;:ligence of the defend·
ants." And the rnle is again put somewhat
more crsely by the pl'esent chief justice in
Hoag v. Railroad Co., as follows: "'l'he injury must be the natural and probable consequeuce of the negligtmce,-such a consequence as "' "' "' might and ought to
have been foreseen by the wrong-doe1· as
likely to flow from his act.'! Tl1e three leading cases :Lbove rf'fened to, though frequently cited on opposite sides of the same al'gument, are lll•t at all in ronflict in principle.
The difTNent results which were reached in
them depended nut on any rlitTerent view of

!'

1

the law, but of the facts, and on the appllcation of the familiar doctrine that, where a
plain inCerence is to be dmwn from undisputed facts, the court. will decide lt as a
matter of law. In Railroad Co. v. Kerr the
negligt>nce had been held by the court below
to be the proximate cause of the plaintiff''
loss. This court held that it was i·emote, and
dill not award a new renire, but said that it
woulll <lo so if plaintiff should desire it upon
grounds shown. Tile question was then
new; an j, from what was &1tid about the
venire, the court itself does not seem to have
been entirely clt>ar that it should be deciderl
as matter of law. It maybe doubted whether, on the same facts, the court would not
now send it to a jury. Certainly no subsequent case has assumed to decide where the
facts were so near the line. Hoag v. Railroad
Co. was a much clearer case, and so were
Railway Co. v. Taylor, 104 P11. St. 806;
West Mahonoy 'l'p. v. Watson, 116 Pa. St.
344, 9 AU. Hep. 430; Railway Co. v. Trich,
117 Pa. St. 390, 11 .A.ti. Rep. 627; and th~
other cases where the court has prnnounced
the negligence to be remote as matter of law.
But, whatever the result of the views taken
of the facts in these cases, the pl'inciples or
decision are the same in all.
In the present case the learned judge left
the question of proximate or remote cause tothe jury, in substantial conformity with th~
doctrine of Railroad Co. v. Hope. Appellant,
however, claims that the succession of events
was so broken as to bl'ing the case under
Hoag v. H.ailroad Co., and require the judgeto direct the jury in lls favor: I The break in ·
the cJtin of events was merely\ a gap In the·
time. llKd the fire extended from the stump
to pla ntitt's lumber without interval, on the
same afternoon, this case would have been ex-·
actly parallel with Railroad Co. v. Hope. But
the fact that the Hre smouldered awhile in
the stu'Dp, and, after it was supposed to have
been extinguished, hroke out »gain the nl'xt
day, while it makes the conclusion less.
ohvious that the damage Wa.'\ done by the
same Hre. does not interpose any new cause,
or enable the court to say as matter of law
that the casual connection was broken. The
sequt>nce from the original fire to the burning of plaintiff"s logs was interrupted by two·
apparent cessations of the fire, \but the jury
have found that the cessations 1\·ere only apparent, leaving i11t1·rvals of time in the visible progress of the fire, but making no.
real bre11k at all in the actual connection.)
In Uailrnad Co. v. K~r, (page at>ti,) it is said
by THOMPSON, C. ,J ., , that the rnle "is not to
be controlled by time~· distance, but by the
succession of events;" ,and in Hoi\g v. Hailroad Co., TRUNKEY, ~. J., in charging the
jury, had quoted the foregoing, and added:
"Whether the lirecommunic1tte.J to the plaintiff's properly within a few minutes, ur afler .
the lapse of hours, from the negligent act,
may be immaterial." It is said in this case
that the 11gents of plaintiff ori tl11'! gro1111cl did
not anticip;~te a further ic<pread of the lire aft-
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er the interval of time, and therefore it can-

not be assumed that the defendant should

have anticipated it.

ﬁre had been put out, not because they did

not see the danger of its spreading while it

was burning; and this was the danger that

appellant was bound to contemplate, to.wit,

the natural and probable consequence of the

original act, not the effect of sh supposed

extinguishment subsequently. ‘éhe pauses

‘ in the progress of the ﬁre, there re, and the

lapse of time, while matter for the considera-

tion of thejury in determining the continuity

of effect, do not of themselves make such a

Kchange as requires the court to say that they

|break the connection.

But it is argued th. it was not until the

next morning after the ﬁre started in the

stump, and during the time when it was ap-
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parently extinguished, that the wind rose,

and became a new cause of the spread of the

ﬁre to plaintiff's lumber. This, however,

was, like the point already considered. de-

pendent on the circumstances. In Railroad

Co. v. Hope, one of the facts was a strong

wind which carried the ﬁre, and so, also, it

was in Railroad Co. v. Lacey. 89 Pa. St. 458,

and in Railroad Co. v. McKeen, 90 Pa. St.

129; and in this last case, TRUNKEY, J., says

the jury “could also determine whether dry

weather and high winds in the spring-time

are extraordinary, and whether, under these

conditions, * " * the injury was within

the probable foresight of him whose negli-

gence ran through from the beginning to the

end." No doubta hurricane or a gale maybe

But the agents of plain- ,

tilt did not expect it because they thought the I

‘ rison v. Davis, 20 Pa. St. 171.

such as to be plainly out of the usual course

of nature, and therefore to be pronounced by

the court as the intervention of a new cause.

Such a wind would be like the ﬂood in Mor-

dinary danger of wind helping a tire to spread

is one of the things to be naturally anticipated.

The lapse of time before the wind rose, in this.

case, was therefore not clearly a new cause

to be so pronounced by the court, but a cir-

cumstance to be considered, with the others,

by the jury. On this branch of the case,

generally, the injury was not more remote

from the alleged cause than in Railroad Co. v.

Hope, supra, Railroad Co. v. Lacey, 89 Pa. St.

458, and Railroad Co. v. Mclieen, 90 Pa. St.

129, and not so much so as in Fairbanks v.

Kerr. 70 Pa. St. 86, and Pailroad Co. v. Keigh-

ron, 74 Pa. St. 316, in all of which the ques-

tion was held to have been properly submitted

to the jury.

There remains only the question of con-

tributory negligence, and we do not ﬁnd any

evidence that would have justilied taking

this from the jury. If plaintiff had not

known of the ﬁre in the stump, he would

have had no duty in regard to it; but, know-

ing of it, he was bound to take all reasonable

and practicable measures to prevent its

spreading to his lumber. He was not an

er the inten·al of time, and therefore it cannot be assumed that the defendant should
have anticipated it. llnt the agents of plaintiff did not expect it because they thought the
fire bad been put out, not; because they did
not see the danger of its spreading while it
was burning; and this was the danger that
appellant was bound to contemplate, to-wit,
the natural and probable consequence of the
original act, not the effect of t,1~ supposed
extinguishment sullseq ueotly. ), 'he pauses
I in the progress of the fire, there re, and the
l!!.pse of time, while matter for the consideration of the jury in determining the con tin ui ty
\ of +-ffect, do not of themselves make such a
change as requires th~ecourt to say that they
!break the connection.
But it is argued th. it was not until the
next morning after · he fire started in the
stump, and during the tlm~ when it was apparently extinguished, that the wind rose,
and became a new cause of the spread of the
fire to plaintiff's lumber. This, however,
was, like the point already considered, dependent on the circumstances. In Hail rnad
(Jo. v. Hope, one of the facts was a strong
wind which carried the fire, and so, also, it
was in Railroad Co. v. Lacey, 89 Pa. St. 458,
and in Hailroad Co. v. McKeen , 90 Pa. St.
129; and in this last case, TIWNKEY, .T ., says
the jury "could also determine whether dry
weather and high winds in the spring-time
are extraordinary, and whether, under these
conditions, • • • the injury was within
the probable foresight of him whose negligence ran through from the beginning to the
end." No doubt a hurricane or a gale may be
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sucn as to t>e plainly out of the usual course
of nature, and therefore to be pronounced by
the court as the intervention of a new cause.
Such a wind would be like the flood in Morrison v. Davis, 20 Pa. St. 171. But the or- ,
di nary danger of wind helping a fire to spreadJ
is one of tile things to be naturally anticip)1ted.
The lapse of time before the wind rose, in this.
case, was therefore not clearly a new cause
to be so pronounced Ly the court, but a circumstance to be considered, with the others,
by the jury. On this branch of the calle,
generally, the injury was not more remote
from the alleged cause than in Railroad Co. v.
Hope, supra, Hailroad Co. v. Lacey, 89 Pa. St.
458, anu Railroad Co. v. McKeen, 90 Pa. St.
129, and not so much so as in :Fairbanks v.
Kerr. 7tJ Pa. St. 86, and Hail road Co. v. Keigh·
ron, 74 Pa. St. 316, in all of wh ich the question was l1eld to have been properly submitted
to the jury.
There remains only the question of contributory negligence, and we do not find any
evidence that would have justified taking
this from the jury. If plaintiff had not
known of the fire in the stump, be would
ha\'e had no duty in regard to it: but, knowing of it, he was bound to take all reasonable
and prat'ticable rneasu res to prevent its
spreading to his lumber. He was not an
insurer. The measure of his duty in this
regard was reasonable care and diligence,
an<l whether he used these was fairly anti ac·
curately submitted to the jury. That they
found against the defendant's view wa~ no
fault of their instruction aa to the law. Ju<lgment affirmed.
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LEWIS v. FLINT & P. M. RY. CO.

(19 N. W. 744, 54 Mich. 55.)

Supreme Court of Michigan. June 11, 1884.

Error to Wayne. Plaintiff brings error.

Blodget & Patchin and C. I. Walker, for

DIRECT AND CONSE'rNTIAL DAMAGES-IN TOliT.

LEWIS v. FLINT & P. M. RY. CO.
(19 N. W. 744, 54 Mich. 55.)
Supreme Court of Michigan. June 11, 1884.
Erl'Or to Wayne. Plaintiff brings error.
Bloclget & Patchin and C. I. Walker, for
appellant W. L. Webber and 0. F. Wisner, for :tppellee.

appellant. W. L. Webber and O. F. Wis-

ner, for appellee.

COOLEY, C. J. Action to recover dam-

ages for a personal injury. The facts as

they appeared on the trial were as follows:

The plaintiff resides in the township of

Huron, a few miles east of Belden station,

on the road of defendant. He was at

Wayne station on the evening of January

12, 1883, awaiting the train which was to go

south past Belden in the night. The train

left Wayne at 3:05 in the morning of the

13th, and he,proenred his ticket and took

passage for Belden, where the train was
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due at 3:30. The night was dark, cold, and

wet. The train stopped when “Belden"

was called, and plaintiff got off. Belden

was only a ﬂag station for this train, and

there was no one in charge of the station-

house, and no light there. When plaintiff

got off the train he was told by the brake-

man or conductor that they had run by the

station about two car lengths, and he re-

plied that if that was all, it was no matter,

as he had to go that way. An east and

west highway crosses the railroad about 24

rods south of the station-house,' which the

plaintiff would take in going to his home.

If he was two car lengths beyond the sta-

tion-house, he would still be north of the

highway; and, supposing that to be the

case, he followed the track along south, in

preference to going back to the‘ station-

house, from which a passage east of the

track would have led him to the highway.

The plaintiff knew the place well, and knew

that on the track he must cross an open

cattle-guard to reach the highway. He had

crossed this before, and sometimes found a

plank laid over it. Passing on he soon came

to trees which he knew were some distance

south of the highway, and he then knew the

information given him as to where he was

when he alighted from the train was erro-

neous. He turned about to retrace his

steps, and followed the track in the direc-

tion of the highway. This he did carefully,

because it was very dark, and he knew

there was an open cattle-guard on the south

side of the highway, as well as on the north

side. He was looking for this cattle-guard

constantly and carefully. There were burn-

ing kiins near to the track on his right, and

the smoke from these affected his eyes, but

he saw a switch light, which he knew was

near the crossing, but‘which at the time

was too dim to aid him. He continued to

approach the cattleguard carefully, intend-

ing, if there was a timber or plank over it, to

cross upon that; and if not, then to pass

down into it and climb out. In the dim

light he saw what he believed to be the cat-

tle-guard, which seemed to be several paces

COOLEY, C. J. Action to recover damages for a personal Injury. The facts as
they appeared on the trial were as follows:
The plaintiff resides in the township of
Huron, a few miles enst of Belden station,
on the rood of defendant. He was at
\Yayne station on the evening of January
lZ 1883, awaiting the tmln which was to go
south past .tlelden In the night. The train
left Wayne at 3:05 in the morning of the
13th, and he procured bis ticket and took
passage for Belden, where the train was
due at 3:30. The night was dark, cold, and
wet. 'l'he train stopped when "Belden"
was called, and plalntUf got off. Belden
was only a flag station for this train, and
there was no one in charge of the statlonllouse, and no light there. When plaintiff
got off the train he was told by the brakeman or conductor that they had run by the
station about two car lengths, and he replied that If that was all, it was no matter,
as he had to go that way. An east and
west highway crosses the railroad ahout 24
rods .Outh of the station-house; which the
plaintiff would take In going to his home.
If he was two car lengths beyond the i;otatlon-house, he would stlll be north of the
highway; and, supposing that to be the
case, he followed the track along south, In
preference to going back to the· stationhouse, from which a passage east of the
track would have led him to the highway.
The plaintiff knew the .place well, and knew
that on the track he must cross an open
cattle-guard to reach the highway. He had
crossed this before, and sometimes found a
plank laid over It. Passing on he soon came
to trees which he knew were some distance
south of the highway, and he then knew the
Information given him as to where he was
when he alighted from the train was erroneous. He turned about to retrace his
steps, and followed the track in the dlrec·
tion of the highway. This he did carefully,
because it was very dark, and he knew
there was an open cattle-guard on the south
slde of the highway, as well 1U1 on the north
side. He was looking for this cattle-guard
constantly and carefully. The1·e were burning kilns near to the trnrk on his right, and
the smoke from these aliccte<l his eyes, but
he saw a switch light, which he knew was
near the crossing, but · which at the time
was too dim to aid him. He continued to
approac>h the mttle-guard carefully, Intending, If there was a timber or plank over it, to
c1·oss upon that; and if not, then to pass
down Into It and climb out. In the dim

light he saw what he believed to be the cattle-guard, which seemed to be se'l"eral paces
ofl', but at the very next step one foot slipped, and as he attempted to save himself by
springing upon the other, the other foot
caught, and he was precipitated Into the
cattle-guard, and he received an injury of a
very serious and permanent nature. He
was for a time senseless, but then succeeded In drawing hhnself out by his elbows.not being able to use his lower lhnbs,-and
with great difficulty he reached a neighboring tavern, where he was cared for.
On the trial a claim was ma<le on the part
of the defense that the plnintllf was negligent in following the railroad track back to
the cattle-guar<l, and In attempting to cross
It, when he might ha'\""e left the track to the
right and passed along the field until he
came to the highway; and evidence was
given to show that he would have encountered no impediments. But, In such a night
as this was, It Is not clear that the field
would have afforded a safer passage than
the high way, and his failure to talte It
would at most only raise a question of negligence on his part which would necessarlly
go to the jury. Railroad Co. v. Van Steinburg, 17 l\lich. 118; Billlngs v. B1·einig, 45
l\llch. 72, 7 N. W. 722; Railroad Co. v. Miller, 46 Mich. 537, 9 N. W. 841; Marcott v.
Hailroad Co., 47 Mich. 7, 10 N. W. 3. Io
this case the court took the case from the
jury, and directed a ve1·dict for the defendant. This direction ls understood to have 1
been given on the ground that the injury ·
which the. plaintiff suffered was not proxi-J
mate to the wrong attributable to the defendant, and for that reason would not support an action. The wrong of the defendant consisted in carrying the plaintiff past
the station, and then giving him erroneous
Information as to where he was. If the Injury sutfered wns not a proximate consequence of this wrong, the Instruction of the
court was right; otherwise, not. 'fhe difficulty here Is In determining whnt ls and
whnt Is not a proximate consequence in contemplation of lnw.
1•'01· tile plnlntiff, the cases are cited In
which it has been held that one whose negligence causes a tire by the spreading of
which the property of another Is destroyed,
ls Hable for the damages, though the property for which the compensation was claimed was only reached by the fire after it had
passed through Intervening fields or buildings. Kellogg v. Rallroad Co., 26 Wis. 223;
Fent v. Railroad Co., 59 Ill. 349; Wiley v.
Railroad Co., 44 N. J. Law, 248; Railrond Co.
v. Kellogg, W U. S. 460. But these cases,
we think, are not analogous to the one before us. The negligent fire wns the direct
and sole cause of the Injury in each instance, and there wns 110 Intervening cause
whatever. The cases are In hnrmony with
Hoyt v. Jcft'ers, 30 Mich. 181. The ease (•f
Pennsylvania Co. v. H onglarn1, 78~;;,
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seems, at ﬁrst view, to be more in point.

The action in that case was brought by a

woman, who, in consequence of misinforma-

tion on the part of the person in charge

of a railroad train, left the car in the night-

time at the wrong stopping place, and wan-

dered about for an hour or more before

she could ﬁnd shelter, taking cold from ex-

posure. But here, as in the other cases cit-

ed, there was no cause intervening the

wrong complained of and the resulting m-

jury, and the question of proximate cause

does not appear to have been raised in the

case. Smith v. Packet Co., 86 N. Y. 408, is

also relied upon, but it is unlike this in the

important particular that the intervening

cause, which, after the ﬁrst wrong on the

part of the defendant, operated to bring in-

jury to the plaintiff, was a neglect of proper
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care, which the court held was due from the

defendant to the plaintiff under the circum-

stances, so that all the injury received was a

proximate result of the defendant's neglect

of duty.

The case of Brown v. Chicago, etc., R. Co.,

5'i Wis. 342, 11 N. W. 356, more nearly re-

sembles the present case than any other to

which our attention has been called by coun-

sel for the plaintiff. The facts, as stated in

the prevailing opinion, are the following:

The plaintiffs, with their child, 7 years old,

were being carried on defendant's cars, with

Mauston for their destination. and when they

arrived at a station three miles east of Maus-

ton they left the train, under the direction of

the brakeman, who told them they were at

Mauston. It was in the night; it was cloudy

and wet; there was a freight train standing

on a side track where they were put off the

train; there was no platform, and no lights

visible, except on the freight train. Plain-

tiffs soon ascertained they were not at Maus-

ton, but did not know where they were.

They did not see the station-house, though

there was one, hidden from their view by

the freight train. Tney supposed they were

at a place two miles east, where the train

sometimes stopped, but where there was no

station-house. They started west on the

track towards Mauston, expecting to ﬁnd a

house where they might stop, but did not ﬁnd

one until they came to a bridge, within a

mile of Mauston, and then they thought it

easier to go on to that place than to seek

shelter at the house, which was a considera-

ble distance from the track. Mrs. Brown

was pregnant at the time, and when she ar-

rived at Mauston was quite exhausted. She

had, during the night, severe pains, which

continued from time to time, and were fol-

lowed by ﬂowing, and at length by a miscar-

riage, inﬂammation, and serious iliness.

The plaintiffs claimed that the miscarriage

and subsequent sickness were all caused by

the walk .\Irs. Brown was compelled to take

to get from the place where they were left

by the train to \Iauston, and the question

in Ihe ca.-e was whet her the defeinlant was

CO:NSEQUE~TIA.L

seems, at first ¥1ew, to be more in point.
The action in that case was brought by n
woman, who, In consequence of rolslnforma·
tlon on the part ot the person in charge
of a rnllroad train, left the car In the night·
time at the wrong stopping place, and wan·
dered about for an hour or more before
she could find shelter, taking cold from ex·
posure. But bern, as In the other cases cit·
ed, there was no cause Intervening the
wrong complalued of and the resulting lD·
jury, and the question of proximate cause
does not appear to ha¥e been ral11cd ln tbe
ca11e. Smith v. Packet Co., 8G N. Y. 40S, Is
also relied upon, but it Is unlike tl!is ln the
lmportnnt particular that the intervening
cause, which, after the first wrong on the
part of the defendant, operated to bring ln·
jury to the plaintiff, was a neglect of proper
care, which the tourt held was due from the
defendant to the plaintllf under the d1·cum·
stances, so that nil the Injury recd,·ed was a
proximate result of tbe defc>111lant"s neglect
of duty.
The case of Brown v. Chlcngo, <>!<'., R. Co.,
5-i Wis. 342, 11 N. W. 35H, more nearly resembles the present cue than any other to
which our attention bas been called by counsel tor the plalntlt!'. Tbe facts, as stated In
the pre,·alllng opinion, are the following:
The plalntUfs, with their chihl, 7 years old,
were being carried on de!emlnnt's cars, with
!\lauston for their destination. and when they
arrived at a station three miles east of Mauston they left the train, under the dh·ectlon of
the bniKeman, who told them they were at
!\laus ton. It was ln the night; It was cloudy
and wet; there was a fre:ght train standing
on a side track where they were put olT tl!e
train; there was no platform, and no lights
visible, except on the freight train. Plalntllfs soon ascertained they were not nt Mauston, but did not know where they were.
They did not see the stntlon-houae, though
there was one, hi<lclen from their view by
the freight train. Tney supposed they were
at a place two miles east, where the train
sometimes stopped, but whe1·e there was no
station-house. They started west on the
track towards Mauston, expecting to find a
house where they might stop, but did not find
one until they came to a bridge, within n
mile of Mauston, and then they thought it
easier to go on to that pince than to seek
shelter at the house, which was a considerable distance from the truck. Mrs. Brnwn
was pregnant at the time, ancl when she nrrlved at Mauston was quite exhnusted. She
had, during the night, se¥ere pains, whtch
(·ontlnued from time to time, nnd were followed by flowing, and at leni,.rth by a miscarriage, inftammation, and serious lllneRs.
Tl!e plaintiffs claimed that the miscarringe
and subsequent sickness were all cnused by
the walk :\Irs. Brown was compelled to take
to g(•t from the pince where they we1·e left
by th<' train to :\fn11f<ton, nnd the 1111c!-!tlon
In tile c:asc wus whl'1hc1· the dcfrmlant wmi
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liable for the Injury to :\Irs. Brown,
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ting It to Imm been caused by he1· wnlk.

The majority of the court finding that
"there was no Intervening Independent
cause of the injury other than the act of the
defendant," and that "all the nets done by
the plalutitrs, and from which the Injury
!lowed, were rightful on their part, and
compelled by the act of the defendant," held
that "the Injury to Mrs. Brown was the direct l"l'8Ult of the defendant's negligen<'e,
and that such negligence was the proximate,
and n'Ut the remote, cause of the Injury,"'
quoting Lord Ellenbo1·ough In Jones v. Boyce,
1 Starkie, 493, that ''if I place a man tu such
a situation that he must adopt a perilous al-\
ternatiYe, I am responsible for the coll8e· ·1
quences."
The case ot' Car Co. v. Barker, 4 Colo. 844,
ls opposed to the case in Wisconsin, as are
also llol1bs v. Rallroad Co., L. R. 10 Q. B.
111, and Francis v. Trnn11fer Co., ::> !\Io. App.
7. But It ls not neces"'ary to express any
opinion upon the conflict which these cast•s
disclose, because ln the case before us there
was an Independent cause Intervening the
fault of the defendant and the Injury the
11laintltf sustained, and from which the Injury resulted as a direct and Immediate consequence. To show what ls understood by
lnten-cning cause, 1t may be useful to refer
to a few cases:
Llvie v. Janson, 12 East, 64S, was a ('.\Se
of insurance on a ship warranted frit! of
American condemnation. In sailing out of
New York she \Vas damaged by perils of the·
sea, stranded, and wrecked on Governor's
island, and then seized and condemned. It
was the peril of the sea that caused the Yes·
sel to be seized and condemned; but as th()
condemnation was the proximate cause of.
the loss, the Insurers were held not liable.
A similar case ls Delano v. Insurance Co.,
10 l\fass. 3:;4, where a like result was l'Ctlched.
In Tisdale v. Norton, 8 Mete. (lla~s.) 388,
the t'acts were that a highway was defective
anu the plalntltr, who was using it, went
out of lt Into the adjoining field, where he
sustained an Injury. He brought suit
ngnlnst the town, whose duty lt was to keep
the highway in repair. But the court held
that only as a remote cause could the Injury of the plalntllT be said to be due to the
defect In the highway. The proximate, not
the remote, cause is that which ls referred
to In the statute which giyes an a ction
ngninst the town; nod the proximate cam~e
in this case was outside the highway, not
within it.
In Anthony v. Slald, 11 :\Ictc. (:\lass.) ::!00,
the plalntifl', who was contractor with a
town to suppnrt for a specified time and fol"
a fixed sum nll the town paupers ln sickness
and In health, brought suit against one who,
It was alleged, had as1multed nntl benten 011•J
of the paupers, as a con,,;c>qu~>nre of whil'!1
the 11lnintltI wns put to iucn•asccl cxpeL ~
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for care and support, but the action was held

not maintainable.

In Silver v. Frazier, 3 Allen, 382, it was

decided that a principal whose agent has

disobeyed his instructions, induced to do

so by the false representations of a third

party, cannot maintain an action against

such third party for the damage sustained.

Said Bigelow, C. J.: “The alleged loss or

injury suffered by the plaintiff is not the

direct and immediate result of the defend-

ant's wrongful act. Stripped of its teclmi-

cal language, the declaration charges only

that the agent employed by the plaintiﬁ‘.I to

do a certain piece of work disobeyed the

orders of his principal, and was induced to

do so by the false statement of the defend-

ant. In other words, the plaintiff alleges

that his agent violated his duty, and thereby
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did him an injury, and seeks to recover dam-

ages therefor by an action against a third

person, on the ground that he induced the

agent, by false statements, to go contrary to

the orders of his principal. Such an action

is, we believe, without precedent. The im-

mediate cause of injury and loss to the plain-

tif f is the breach of duty of his agent. This

is the proximate cause of damage. The

motives or inducements which operated to

cause the agent to do an unauthorized act

are too remote to furnish a good cause of

action to the plaintiff."

In Dubuque Wood & Coal Ass‘n v. Du-

buque, 30 Iowa, 176, the facts were that the

plaintiff had a quantity of wood deposited

at one end of a bridge, which was to be tak-

en over the bridge into the city of Dubuque.

The bridge was out of repair, and, while

awaiting repair by the city, whose duty it

was, the wood was carried away by a ﬂood.

The plaintif f sued the city for the value of

his wood; but it was held he could not re-

cover. Beck, J., in deciding the case, il-

lustrates the principle as follows: “An own-

er of lumber deposited upon the levee of the

city of Dubuque. exposed to the ﬂoods of the

river, starts with his team to remove it.

A bridge built by the city, which he at-

tempts to cross, from defects therein, falls,

and his horses are killed. By the breaking

of the bridge and the loss of his team he

is delayed in removing his property. On

account of this delay his lumber is carried

away by the ﬂood and lost. The proximate

consequence of the negligence of the city is

the loss of his horses; the secondary conse-

quence, resulting from the ﬁrst consequence,

is the delay in removing the lumber, which

ﬁnally caused its loss. Damage on account

of the ﬁrst ls recoverable, but for the second

is denied." Similar to this are Daniels v.

Ballantine, 23 Ohio St. 532; and McClary

v. Railroad Co., 3 Neb. 44. In each of these

cases the negligence of the defendant left

the property of the plaintiff where, by an act

of God,—in one case a ﬂood, and in the other

a tornado,—it was lost or injured, and in

each the act of God, and not the negligence,

I_>IRECT AND CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES-IN TORT.

for care and support, but the action was held was held to be the proximate cause (}f Injury.
not maintainable.
'
In Silver v. Frazier, 3 Allen, 382, It was
In Scheffer v. Railroad Co., 105 U. S. 249,
decided that a principal whose agent baa It appeared that, by a colllslon of railroad
disobeyed his Instructions, Induced to l;lo trains, a passenger was Injured, and, beso by the false representations of a third coming thereby disordered in mind and body,
party, cannot maintain an action against he, some eight months thereafter, committed
such third party for the damage sustained. suicide. Action was brought against the
Said Bigelow, C. J.: "The alleged loss or railroad company as the negligent cause of
Injury suffered by the plaintiff ls not the his death. Miller, J., speaking for the court,
direct and Immediate result of the defend- and referring to Insurance Co. v. Tweed,
ant's wrongful act. Stripped of Its techni- 7 Wall. 44, and Railroad Co. v. Kellogg,· 94
cal lunguage, the declarutlon charges only U. S. 469, said: "The proximate cause or
that the agent employed by the plaintiff to the death of Scheffer was his own act of self•
do a certain piece of work disobeyed the destruction. It was, within the rule in both
orders of his prlnclpal, and wo.s Induced to these cases, a new cause, and a. sufficient
do so by the false statement of the defend- cause of death. The argument Is not sound
ant. In other words, the plaintiff alleges which seeks to trace this Immediate cause.
that his agent violated his duty, and thereby of the death through the previous stages
did him an Injury, and seeks to recover dam- of mental aberration, physical BUfl'erlng, and
ages tberef<>r by an action against a third eight months' disease and medical treatment,
person, on the ground that be induced the to the original accident on the railroad."
agent, by false statements, to go contrary to
In Bosch v. Raih-oad Co., 44 Iowa, 402,
the orders of his principal. ·such an action the plaintiff's house took fire, and the fire
ls, we believe, without precedent. The im- department, because, as was alleged, of the
mediate cause of Injury and loss to the plaln- wrongful occupation and expansion of the
tltr ls the breach of duty <>f his agent. This river bank, were unable to get to the river
ls the proximate cause of damage. The to obtain water for putting out the fire.
motives or Inducements which operated to Plalntlt'f sued the defendant for the loss of
cause the agent to do an unauthorized act his property, but the court said the acts of
are too remote to !urnisb a good cause of defendant complained of "have no connection
action to the plaintiff."
with the fire, nor with the hose or other
In Dubuque Wood & Coal Ass'n v. Du- apparatus of the fire companies. They are
buque, 30 Iowa, 176, the facts were that the Independent acts, and their Influence In the
plaintiff had a quantity of wood deposited destruction of plaintiff's property ls too reat one end ot a bridge, which was to be tak- mote to be made the basis of recovery."
en over the bridge Into the city of Dubuque.
In this last case, Metalllc Compression Co.
The bridge was out of repair, and, while '"· Railroad Co., 109 Mass. 277, was referred
awaiting repair by the city, whose duty it to and distinguished. The facts there were
was, the wood was carried away by a flood. that the plaintiff's building was on fire, and
The plaintiff sued the city for the value of water was being thrown upon it through
his wood; but It was held he could not re- hose, when an engine of defendant was
cover. Beck, J., In decil11ng the case, il- recklessly run upon the hose and severed it,
lustrates the principle as follows: "An own- thereby defeating the efforts to distinguish
er of lumber deposited upon the levee of the the fire, which otherwise were likely to
city of Dubuque, exposed to the floods of the succeed. In that case the relation of the
river, starts with bis team to remove it. plaintit'f's lnjul'Y to the defendant's act was
A bridge built by the city, which he at- . direct and immediate. So it was also In
tempts to cross, from defects therein, falls, Billman v. Railroad Co., 76 Ind. 166; Lane v.
and his horses are killed. By the breaking Atlantic Works, 111 Mass. 136; and Ricker
of the bridge and the loss of his team be v. l<'reeman, 50 N. H. 420,-all ot which are
ls delayed In removing his property. On ruled by the Squib Case, (Scott v. Shepherd,
account of this delay his lumber Is carried 2 W. Bl. 892;) and so, perhaps, are Fairaway by the flood and lost. The proximate banks v. Kerr, 70 Pa. St. 00; and Lake v.
consequence of the negligence of the city ls Milliken, 62 Me. 240.
the loss of bis horses; the secondary conseIn Henry v. Railroad Co., 76 Mo. 288, lt
quence, resulting from the first consequence, appeared that the plaintllf was wrongfully
ls the dcl:iy In removing the lumber, which commanded to get olf a caboose of the definally caused Its loss. Damage on account fendant, where he bad a right to be. He
ot the first Is recoverable, but for the second obeyed the command, and, while upon the
ls denied." Similar to tbls are Dunlels v. ground, stepped upon a track, where he was
Ballantine, 23 Ohio St. 532; and McClary run upon and Injured by a train. Hough,
v. Railroad Co., 3 Neb. 44. In each of these J., speaking for the court, said: "It Is percases the negligence of the defendant left haps prouable that if the plaintiff had not
the property of the plaintirr where, by an act been ordered out of the caboose he would
of God,-in one ease a flood, and in the othe1· not have been injured. But this hypothesis
a tornndo,-it was Jost or ln.1ure<l, and In does not establish the legal relation of cituse
each the act of God, nnll not the negligence, nnd etrect between tbe exrmtsiou and the
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injury. If the plaintid had not left home

he certainly would not have been injured

as he was, but his leaving home could not

therefore be declared to be the cause of his

injury. As the plaintiffs injury was neith-

er the ordinary, natural, nor probable conse-

quence of his expulsion from the caboose,

such expulsion, however it might excite our

indignation, in the absence of any regulation

of defendant to justify it, cannot be con-

sidered in this action, and the legal aspect of

the case is precisely the same that it would

have been if no such expulsion had taken

place. It is to be regarded as if the plain-

tiff had gone to the caboose and could not

get in because it was locked. or, being able

to get in, chose to remain outside."

Further reference to authorities is need-

less.
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proximate, not the remote cause is to be re-

garded, is obscure and difﬁcult in many

cases, but not in this. By the wrong of the

defendant the plaintiff was can-ied past the

station where he had a right to be left, and

beyond where he had a right, from the in-

formation received from defendant's serv-

ants, to suppose he was when he left the car.

For any injury or inconvenience naturally

resulting from the wrong, and traceable to

it as the proximate cause, the defendant‘E

But before any in- ,

jury had been sustained the plaintiff dis- ‘

may be held responsible.

covered where he was, and started back for

the road which he had intended to take. -,

Whatever danger there was to be encounter-

ed in the way was to be found in the cattle-

guard, and this he understood and calculated

upon. Evidently it did not appear to him

of a formidable nature; for, on the supposi-

tion that he was north of the highway when

he left the train, he had voluntarily started

south with the expectation of crossing the

cattle-guard on that side, over which he

might or might not ﬁnd a plank laid, when

by stepping back a few rods, where he sup-

posed the station-house to be, he might pass

from thence out to the highway by the pas-

sage-way for persons and vehicles leading

from the station-house to it, and thereby avoid

the cattle-guard altogether. It is very clear

that he did not anticipate danger. Neither,

probably, would any other person have an-

ticipated it. The crossing was a simple

matter; it was only to ascertain ﬁrst wheth-

er a plank or timber was laid across, and if

so to cross upon it; and if not, to step down in-

to the excavation and out on the other side.

Where was he to look for danger? The night

was dark, it is true, but even by the sense

of feeling, when he knew he was within a

few feet of the cattle-guard, one would ex-

pect him to be able to determine its exact

location. But then something happened

which it is evident that the plaintiff, with

full knowledge of all the facts, did not at

all expect and had not feared. Misled ap-

parently by visual deception, he moved for-
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Injury. It the plalntllT had not left home ward under a supposition that the cattlebe certainly would not have been Injured guard, upuu the brink of which he already
as he was, but bis leaviug home could not stood, was some paces oil', and his deceptherefore be declared to be the cause of bis tion, with the slipping of Ws foot, concurred
injury. As tbe plalntlll''s injury was neith- to produce the Injury. What was this but
er the ordinary, natural, nor probable conse- pure accident? It was an event which hapquence of bis expulsion from the caboose, pened unexpectedly and without faulL The
such expulsion, however It might excite our defendant or Its agents had not produced the
Indignation, In the absence of any regulation deception or caused the foot to slip; and such
of defendant to justify It, cannot be con- wrong as the defendant had been guilty of
sidered In this action, and the legal aspect of was In no manner connected with or related
the case ls precisely the same that It would to the injury except as It was the occasion
have been It no such expulsion bad taken for bringing the platntur where the accident
place. It is to be regarded as it the plaln- occurred. It was after the plalntltr had
ti.lr bad gone to the caboose and could .not been brought there that the cause of Injury
get In because It was locked, or, being able unexpectedly ar08e. If Hghtnlng had chanto get in, chose to remain outside."
ced to strike the plaintlfr at that place, the
Further reference to authorities Is need- fault of the defendant and Its relation to
less. The application of the rule that the the Injury would have been the same as
proximate, not the remote cause Is to be~ now, and the Injury could have been charged
garded, la obscure and dlftlcult In many to the defendant with precisely the same
cases, but not In this. By the wrong of tbe reason as now. If the accidental discharge
defendant the plaintur was ca.N"ied past the of a gun In the hands of some third person
station where he hacl a right to be left, and bad wounded the plalntUr as he approached
beyond where he had a right, from the In· the cattle-guard, the connection of defendformation received from defendant's serv- ant's wrong with the Injury would have
ants, to suppose be was when he left the car. been precisely the same which appea1·s here.
For any injury or Inconvenience naturally But the proximate cause of Injury In the
resulting from the wrong, and traceable to one case would have been the act of God;
lt as the proximate cause, the defendant In the other, Inevitable accident; but not
may be held responsible. But before any In- more plainly accident than was the proxijury had been sustained the plalntlll' dis- mate cause here. Back of that cause In thl11o
covered where he was, and started back for case were many othel'S, all conducing to
the road which be had Intended to take. bring the plalntlll' to the place of the danger
'Vhatever danger there was to be encounter- and the Injury; the act of the defendant
ed in the way was to be found In the cattle- was the last ot a long sequence; but, as beguard, and this he understood and calculated tween the causes which precede the proxiupon. Evidently It did not appear to him mate cause, the law cannot select one rather
<>f a formidable nature; for, on the supposi- than any other as that to which the final
tion that be was nortb of the highway when consequence shall be attributed, and It stops
he left the train, be had voluntarily startM at the proximate cause, because to go back
south with the expectation ot crossing the of It would be to enter upon an Investigation
<:attle-guard on that side, over which he which would be both endless and useless.
might or might not find a plank laid, when
The Injury being the result of pure acciby stepping back a few rods, where he sup- dent, the party upon whom It has chanced to
posed the station-house to be, he might pass fall Is necessarily left to bear It. No compenfrom thence out to the highway by the pas- sation can be given by law In such cases.
1111ge-way for persons and vehicles leading Weaver v. Ward, Hob. 134; Gibbons v. Pepper,
from the station-house to It, and thereby avoid 1 Ld. Raym. 3:); Losee v. Buchanan, 51 N. Y. ,
the cattle-guard altogether. It ls very clear 476; Vincent v. Stinehour, 7 Vt. 62; Morris
that be did not anticipate danger. Neither, v. Platt, 32 Conn. 75; Brown v. Collins, 53
probably, would any other person ha~e an- N. H. 442; Bizzell v. Booker, 16 Ark. 303;
ticipated It. The crossing was a simple Marshall v. Welwood, 38 N. J. Law, 339;
matter; It was only to ascertain first wheth- Paxton v. Beyer, 67 Ill. 132; Express Co. v.
-er a plank or timber was laid across, and If Smith, 33 Ohio St. 511; Plummer v. State,
so to cross upon It; and If not, to step down In- 4 Tex. App. 310; Parrot v. Wells, 15 Wall.
to the excavation and out on the other side. 524; Holmes v. Mather, L. R. 10 Exch. 2Gl.
Where was he to look for danger? The night .A. cnse like this appeals strongly to the
was dark, It Is true, but even by the sense sympathies, but sympathy cannot rule the
of feeling, when he knew he was within a decision.
Upon the undisputed facts or the case the
few feet of the cattle-guard, one would expect him to be able to determine Its exact plaintltr has no right of action for the Injury
location. But then something happened which has befallen him, and the circuit court
which It ts evident that the plalntilT, with was correct In so holding. The question
full knowledge of all the facts, did not at what judgment shall be rendered In the case
all expect and bad not feared. Misled ap- Is for the present reserved.
parently by visual deception, he moved forThe other justices concurred.
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YVOOD v. PE\'.\'$YL"A\'IA R.

(35 Atl. 699. 177 Pa. St. 306.)

Supreme Court of Pennsylvania. Oct. 5, 1896.

Appeal from court of common pleas, Phila-

delphia county.

Action by Joseph Wood against the Penn-

sylvania Railroad Company. Judgment for

defendant. Plaintiff appeals. Atiirmed.

li‘rederi('k J. Knaus and Thomas Leaming,

for appellant. John Hampton Barnes and

Geo. Tucker Bispham, for appellee.

DEAN, J. We take the facts as stated by

the court below, as follows: “On the 26th of

October, 1893, the plaintiff, having bought a

return ticket, went as a passenger upon the

railroad of the defendant company t'rom

Frankford to Holmesburg. After spending

the day there, attending to some matters of

business, he concluded to come back upon a

way train, due at Holmesburg at 5 minutes
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after 6 in the evening. While waiting for

this train, the plaintiff stood on the platform

of the station, which was on the north side

of the tracks, at the eastern end of the plat-

form, with his back against the wall at the

corner. To the eastward of the station, a

street crosses the railroad at grade. How

far this crossing is from the station does not

appear from the evidence. It was not so

far away, however, but that persons on the

platform could see objects at the crossing.

For at least 150 yards to the eastward of the

crossing the railroad is straight, and then

curves to the right. About 6 o'clock an

express train coming from the east up-

on the north track passed the station, and

the plaintiff, while standing in the position

described, was struck upon the leg by what

proved to be the dead body of a woman. and

was injured. The headlight of the approach-

ing locomotive disclosed to one of the wit-

nesses who stood on the platfrom two wo-

men in front of the train at the street cross-

ing, going from the south to the north side ,

1
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St. 293, to these facts, the question on which

the case turns ls: “Was the injury the natu-

rnl and probable consequence of the negli-

gence,—such a consequence as, under the sur-

rounding circumstances, might and ought to-

have been foreseen by the wrongdoer as

likely to ﬂow from his act?" As concerns

the situation of plaintiff at the time of his

injury, and the relation of that fact to the

cause, whether near or remote, we do not

consider it important. He was where he

had a right to be,—ou the platform of the

station. That he had purchased a ticket for

passage on defendant's road, and was wait-

- ing on its platform for his train, has no par_

ticular bearing on the question. The duty

of defendant to him at that time was to pro-

vide a platform and station, safe structures,

for him and others who desired to travel. In

this particular its duty was performed. The,

injury is not in the remotest degree attribu- .

table to the platform or the station. It is

CO'.'\SE.?"E~TL.\L D..-DL\C;E:-;-1~

PE:'\'.'\!'o:YLYA~IA
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St. 2!l3, to these fncts, the qu1•st!on on whleb
the case turns Is: "Wns the injury the nntu·
(35 Atl. 000. 177 Pn. St. 306.)
ral and probable cousequence or the negll·
Suiircllle Court o! l'enn~ylrnnia. Oct. 5, 18Dli. genee.-such 11 conseqm•nce as, unrlPr the t1111·roundlng circumstances, might nud ought to
Appeal from court of common pleas, Phlla· ha ,.e lleen !oreseeu by the wrongdoe1· as
1lelpltitl l'OUllty.
lilwly to flow from his net r
As concerns
..-\etion by JosPph ·wood against the Penn· the situation of plaintiff nt the time of his
sylnrnia Hailroad Company. JU<lgment for Injury, and the relation of that faet to the
dt>fl•111J11nt. Plaintiff appeals. AUirtued.
cau:o;c, whether near or remote, we do not
consider It important. He was whl•rc he
Fn•tleril·k J. Knaus und Thomas Lca111i11g, had a right to be,-on the platform of Hie
fur np1wll1111t. John Hampton Bai·nes and fltatlon. That he had purehnsed a tiekE•t for
Geo. Tucker Bispham, for appellee.
pnssnge on 1lefeJl(la11t's road, und was waiting on Its pllltform for his train, has no par,_
DEAN', J. We take the facts as stated by tieulnr bcnt·ing on the question. 'l'he duty
the court bf'low, as follows: "On the !!lith of of 11Pfendant to him at that time was to prolktoher, 18!13, the plaintiff, having bought a vide a platform nn<l station, safe strnctureR,
return ticket, went as a pass(•ngPr u11ou the fur him and others who dei;ired to travel. In
raifroad of the defendaut company from thi!! pnrticulnr Its cluty was performed. The
Frnnkford to Holml•Hhurg. After spending In.Jury Is not In the remotest th•grPe attributhe tiny there, attendiug to !!ome matters of tnhlt> to the platform or the station. It Is
businPl'S, hc eonclude1l to come back upon a suttiei<>nt to &ay, when there, he was not a
wny train, due at Holmesbm·g at ;; minutl'S tr!'sp::sser on defenclunt's property, and
ufter 6 in the evening. \\ hile waiting for tlwrPfore his action does not fall for that
this tmln, tltc plaintiff stood on the platform n·nson; 1.Jut he Is In no more favorable situof the station, which wns on the north sl<le ntion as a suitor than If he had been walking
of the tracks, at the em;tern end of the plat- nlongslcle the rnllroad, on the public highform, with his back against the wall at the way, or at any other place wlwre he had a
eorner. 'l'o the eastward of the Htatlon, ~ right to be. 'l'he rule quoted In Hong v.
11treet crosses the railroad at grade. How Hallroad Co.• supra, Is, In substance, the confur this crossing is from the station dol's not clusion of Lord Bacon, and the one given In
:ippear from the cvid1•11<:e. It w11s not so Brown's Legal ::.\Inxlms. It Is not only the
far aw·ay, however, but that persons on the well-l~ettletl rule of this state, but Is, gen·
platform eould see objects at tlte crossiug. erally, that of the United States. Prof. JagFo1· nt leoRt UiO yards to the eastwm·d of the ; gnnl, In his valuable work ou Torts, after a
erosi;lng the railroad ls i;;trnight, and then rt>ference to very many of the cases deelcled
cun·es to the right. A bout 6 o'cloC'k an In n large number of the states, among them
expn•:.is trnln eoming from the east up- Hong v. Ilallrond C-0., comes to this conclu·
on the north track 1111ssed the station, :ind slon: "It is admitted thnt the rule is <lltttthe plaintiff, while stamling In the position cult of application. But It Is gcnPrally held
descrlbe<l, was i;;truck upon the leg by what that, In order to warrant a finding that negpron~d to be the dead bod~· o( a womnn. and
ligence, or an net not amounting to wanton
was injured. The headliglit of the aJ111rnaclt- wrong, Is a proximate cause of an Injury, It
lng locomotive disclosed to one of the wit- must appear that the Injury was the natnesses who stood on the platfrom two wo- ural and prnbnhle consl'<JUence of the negli·
men In front of the train at the i;;trPet cross- gence or wron:>ful act, and thn t It ought to
ing, going from the south to the north side have been foreseen In the light of the atof the traeks. One sueceeded In getting tending circumstances." Jag. Torts, c. 5.
across In safety, an<l the other was struck Judge Cooley states the rule tlms: "If the
just about as she ren<'he<l the north rail. original act was wrongful. and would nnt·
How the womnn came to be upon the tra1·k urall~., according to the ordinary course of
thPn• it! nothing in the cYitlence to show. events. prove Injurious to some others, and
'l'ltert> was cvhlence that no bell was rung or result, nncl does actually result, In lujnry,
whistle hlown upon the trnln which struck throu.ch the l!ltcrventlon of other causes not
tlu• wom:i n hPfore It eame to the crm~1;1lng, wrongful, the injury Rlmll be rcft'rred to the
nml some evi1l!'ttce that it was running at wrongful en nsp, pnssing through those
the rnte of from 50 to 60 miles an hour. which were innoe(•nt." Cooley, Tort;., Hll.
1·11011 this state of fn(•ts, till' trial jullge en- Thi!", n lso, Is In suhM:uice the rule of Hon1~
t,•r<•d a nonsuit." The C'ourt In !Jane hn,·lng v. Hnilro:ul Co. All the speculations :rnrl
aft!'rwnnls rPflli<Pd tu take off the nonsuit, r efinPmcnts of the phllosophl'l'R on the cxn<'t
Wl' hll\"C thl!i npp!'ni.
n·lntions of <'ause aml eft'p1·t hPlp us Yl'J'.v
\Vns the 11P;.:li;.:t>t1<'P of dc>fen1lant tlw p1·ox- lltth• in the 1lP!l'l'll1inntio11 of ruil'S of soda!
lmatr <·nuse of plni111i1T"-1 injm~..! .Jrnlgl' l'l'n· conduet. '!'he jurillieal causr, in surh a
nypac krr, <lP!in·rin;.: the opinion of a major· , casr. as we ha ,·e held ovf'r nnrl ovt>r, Is ht•st
lty of thP <'ourt hr low. c-ondt11ll•<l It wns not, · as<·t'rtn itH'd in the prnetical afl'nlrs of lire
and reft1sl•1l to t11k<• olf the 1to11s11it. Apply· h~· till' applkatlon to the f:J<·ts or the rule In
Ing the rule In Hong v. Hnilroatl Co., s;; Pa. Hong v. Hailroad Co. A<lopting that rnlc 11s
0
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the test of defendnni‘s liability, how do we '

determine the natural and probable conse-

quences, which must be foreseen, of this '

the t.•st or <lPfentlant'!! liahility, how do we '
cll'ft'l·minl' the natural and prohahle conse•
quencPi::. whlrh must he forNi<'en, ot' this
aC't? \Ye 11nswl'r in this and nil like ca~ws:
trom common experlen('e and obser,·atlon.
The probable conse11Ul'n< e of croHslng a 1·allroad In front of a near nml approaehlng
train Is death, or serious Injury. Tlwr('fore,
nettng ft'om an Impulse to self-1n·es1•rv11tion,
or on the reflection thn t pro1upts to s1•lt'pr1•st·1·\·a tlon, we are 11L•terrl'd from crossiug.
Onr <"onduct is eontrol11•1l by the naturnl :rnd
prohal.lle conseqnem·e of what our eiqwrlenee ena I.lies us to fores1.oe. Trm>, a sma II
lllllllher Of' thOSP WhO hll\'{' 01'1'l18ion to l'l'OSS
railroads are reekless, and, either blinc.1 to or
disregardful or consPl}Ul'nees, eross, and are
injured, kllled, or harl'ly l'!!ettpe." But this
re(·klessness ot the very few In no tl1•gn•e
dh;proves the torPSPPablenl'ss or the consequences by mankind gPnemlly. Ag11ln. the
competent railroad l'!lglneer knows from hi!!
own experlPnee and thn t ot' otlwrs In 11ke
employment that to approneh a grmlt• highway crossing with a rn11ldly moving train
without warning Is dangerous to tltt' lives
and llmb11 of the public using the ero11sl11g.
He knows de11th and Injury are the prohable
consequences or his neglect of duty; therefore he gives warning. But dot>s any one
believe the natural and probable eonsequence ot standing ;;o feet trom a crossing,
to the one 11!de of a railroad, when a train Is
approaching, either with or without warning, Is death or lujnry? Do not th<' most
prudent, as well as the public generally, nil
over the land, do just this thing every uny,
without rear of danger'! The crowded platforms nnll grounds or r111Jroad stations, gPnerally located at rro11sing11, alongside of approaehlng, departing. and 11wlftly passing
trains, prove that the 11uhllc, from experlen<:'e and observation. do not, In that situation, foresee any d11nger from trains. Tht>y
are there bP<'11ust>, In their judgment, although It Is possible a train may strikt> 11n
ohjert, animate or Inanimate, on tlw trul'k,
and hurl It ag"nlnst thPm, sueh a eonsr1111cnre
Is so hhrhly Improbable that It s11g;.:est11 no
11ensP ot 1l11nger. Th1•y fppJ as sP1.·11n• ns tr·
In their homl'S. To them lt Is no more p!'llhable than that n train at that point will jump
the traPk and run over tlll'm. It' such a
eonsequence as here n•sulled was not natural, probable, or foresPP:thle to anybody
else, should defendant. under the rule la id
1lown In Hoag v. Railroad Co.. be ehargeable with the conseqnenPe? Cll'arly, It was
not the nnturnl and prohnble cons1>q1wnee
of Its nPgleet to give waruiug, a111l tht•rdore
wns not one whieh It wal! bound to for1>s1><>.
'I'ht> injurr. at most, wns rf'rnotl'I~· po,;,.;ihlP. m1
distinguish(•d from the ruttmal and prohnhle
l'OllSC'Qlll'lll't'S of the 111',l!'ll'd to gi \'!' W:l l'lli 11g.
· AS is said In Railroad ('o. v. Tril'h, 117 Pa.
!'r. :t..<¥.1, 11 Atl. u'.!7: "H1.,,1... 11si1111tty 1Jops
not l'XtE>nd to evE>ry <'ons1•q11l'n<·e whkh may
.possilily re.suit from negligPnce." \\'hat we
0

act? We answer in this and all like cases:

from common experience and observation.

The probable consequence of crossing a rail-

road in front of a near and approaching

train is death. or serious injury. Therefore,

acting from an impulse to self-preservation,

or on the reﬂection that prompts to self-

preservation, we are deterred from ci'ossing.

Our conduct is controlled by the natural and

probable consequence of what our experi- ‘

ence enables us to foresee. True, a small

number of those who have occasion to cross

railroads are reckless, and, either blind to or

disregardful of consequences, cross, and are

injured, killed, or barely escape.‘ But this

recklessness of the very few in no degrce
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disproves the forcsccableness of the conse- ‘

quences by mankind generally. Again, the

competent railroad engineer knows from his

ownexperience and that of others in like

employment that to approach a grade high-

way crossing with a rapidly moving train

without warning is dangerous to the lives

and limbs of the public using the crossing.

He knows death and injury are the probable .

consequences of his neglect of duty; there-

fore he gives warning. But does any one

believe the natural and probable conse-

quence of standing 50 feet from a crossing,

to the one side of a railroad, when a train is

approaching. either with or without warn-

ing, is death or injury? Do not the most

prudent, as well as the public generally, all

over the land, do just this thing every day,

without fear of danger? The crowded plat- I

forms and grounds of railroad stations, gen-

erally located at crossings. alongside of ap-

proaching, departing, and swiftly passing‘

trains, prove that the public, from experi-

ence and observation, do not, in that situa- ,

tion, foresee any danger from trains. They

are there because, in their judgment, ai- ‘

though it is possible a train may strike an 1

object. animate or inanimate, on the truck, ‘

and hurl it against them, such a consequence

is so highly improbable that it suggests no

sense of danger. They feel as secure as if‘

in their homes. To them it is no more prob-

able than that a train at that point will jump

the track and run over them. If such a ‘

consequence as here resulted was not nat-

ural, probable, or foreseeable to anybody

else, should defendant. under the rule laid .

down in Hoag v. Railroad Co., be charge- -

able with the consequence? Clearly, it was ‘

not the natural and probable consequence

of its neglect to give warning, and therefore

was not one which it was bound to foresee.

The injury. at most, was remotely possible, as

distinguished from the natural and probable

consequences of the neglect to give warning. ‘

-As is said in Railroad Co. v. Trich, 117 Pa.

St. 399, 11 Atl. 627: “llesponsibili'ty does

not extend to every consequence which may '

-possibly result from negligence." What we .
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hn""e said thus far Is on the assumption the
aechlent was causE>d solely by thE' negligence of defendant, or by the concurring negligence of defendant and tbE' om• killed going upon the track with a loc<Hnotln! in full
view. 'l'hls being an action by an lnnor-Pnt third person. he cannot be depri\·p1J of
his remedy been use his injury resulted from
the com·UITl'llt negligl'l1ce of two others. He
fails becnuse his Injury was a conse11uence
so remote that dl•fendant could not reasonably forPsl•e it.
But tlll're Is another view whil•h ma~· be·
taken ot this evldenee. Assuming defPndant was nPgllgPnt, did that nPgligPnce <·ontribute In any degree to the result? The
uueoutradlcted evidence showed the train
eould br S<'en from 150 to 200 yards distant.
Plnlntift'. himself tl'1:1tilles he hl>arll It coming,
although he he>ard no whlstlP or bl'll; and
all his wituei,:ses had notice of It. Even
those sitting In the wniting room got up to
go out, supposing It was their train. Some
heard the n1111hling; some !law the hPllU·
light. Assume, then, the fact to be that ne>
wnrnlng was gh·en by bell or whistle, and in
thnt p:irtl<'ltlar ilPff'lulnnt, In Its genl:'rnl duty
to the puhllc, was ne!!'ligent, was this the
cause of the injury? 'l'o so find, we must
prPsume the deee1uwd and hl:'r companion
failecl to hear or see what all the others s11w
or lleard. There Is no renio10n for such presumption. "'hill', In the absence of any evldenee on the quest Ion, the preRumptlon
would he that tlu~ two wonwn, before crossing, stopped, looked, and listened, and then,
beeause no warning was given. they, without apprehension or danger, attempted to
cross. still, when 1111 the other wltnel"ises with
like opportunity either saw the hC'11dllght orhenrd the rumbling or the approaching train,
the n•a1o1onable prNmmptlon Is they saw ancl
!ward It too. lt this be so, thl'y attemptt>d
to cross with the same knowlPdge ot the
same prril th Py woulrl have hail If the bell
had bPPn rung and whistle blown. 'l'h<'refore the sole cause of the Injury was not the
n<'gligPnee or defendant, but the negligence
of decpased. In such ease there could have
be!'u no rN•overy by the rC>11r<'sentatives ot
the d('(·ensed woman . . for, whatever might
hn,-e bl'l'll the negllgenee of 1ll'fl'nclant. It
was no more the pause or the ael'i1!Pnt than
If it hnd 1wgleeted to give warning at some
othPr l'rossing. 'fhe ease could not have
reaC'l11•d the jury unlPss tlwy had been permitted to Infer shP hnd IH'itlwr. !!Pen nor
hrard the imme warning!:! that all plalntitt•s
witnesses saw and heard. If the comp11nlon
of lll•1·1~1s<'d, or other witnes8<'S, had tei;tili('(l
tht>y neith!'r saw nor lward the approal'l1iny
train, the ensP would hnve h<'Pn altogether
differ('nt; but, as it stood. thPre wns no proof
lhllt tllf' allp;~ed JIPgli,!.(Pill'I' Of dl'fPJHJllrt
contrihutpd to the de11th of the woman. In
this view the nPgllg1•111·p wa>< nnt <'Ven conC'nrrPnt. Tru<'. thPrP wns nPg"l\el•nce, but
tile same result roflowed as if dPfr11llant bad
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exercised care. Therefore the injury was such warning if the public be apprised of

attributable to her sole negligence. While the danger by other sounds or signals. The

the proper warning on approaching a cross- injury -then is caused solely by the neglect of

lug is the sound of a whistle or the ringing the injured person to heed the danger.

of a hell, no accident can be properly said to On both grounds we think the nonsuit was
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be the consequence of the neglect to give Properly entet‘ed- The judgment is ﬂﬂirmed-

DIUECT AND CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES-IN TORT.

exer<'lsed care. Therefore the Injury ·was
attributable to her sole negligence. While
the proper warning on approaching a crossing is the sound or a whistle or the ringing
-0f a bell, no accident can be properly said to
be the consequence of the neglect to g1ve

such warning If the public be apprised of'
the danger by other sounds or signals. The
Injury then Is caused solely by the neglect or
the Injured person to heed the danger.
On both grounds we think the nonsuit was
properly entered. The judgment is amrmed.

DIRECT AND CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES-IN TORT.
GILSO:S v. DELA
DIRECT AND CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES—lN TORT.

WAR~ CANAL CO.

(26 Atl. 70, 65 Vt. 213.)
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.

GILSON v. DELAVVARI~ CANAL CO.

(26 Atl. 70, 65 Vt. 213.)

Supreme Court of Vermont, General Term.

Dec. 22, 1892.

Exceptions LT0ID Rutland county court;

Thompson, Judge.

‘Action by E. P. Gllson, receiver, against the

Delaware & Hudson Canal Company, to re-

cover damages for the diversion of a water

course. whereby plaintiffs quarry was ﬂood-

ed. Judgment was entered in favor of plain-

tiff, and defendant excepts. Judgment af-

ﬁrmed.

The plaintiff brought suit as the receiver

of the Dorset Marble Company. His evi-

dence tended to prove that the defendant had,

by the construction of its railroad embank-

ment, diverted an ancient water course from
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its accustomed channel into his quarry, and

had also collected and discharged surface

water into said quarry. The railroad of the

defendant, at the point complained of, was

constructed in 1884, along a steep hillside. At

one point there had been for many years a

water course which drained at certain seasons

of the year a considerable territory, but which

during a considerable portion of the year was

entirely dry. From the point where this

water course crossed the line of the defend-

ant's railroad the land gradually descended

towards the quarry of the plaintiff. In con-

structing its railroad the defendant made no

provision for the passage of the water running

in this water course underneath its track. and

the complaint of the plaintiff was that the de-

fendant had thereby diverted this water

course, and discharged it, together with the

surface water which was collected by this

embankment, into his quarry. The land, at

the point where the water course crossed the

line of the defendant's railroad, belonged to

the Vermont Marble Company, as did the

land between that point and the plaintiff's

quarry. Upon this land of the Vermont Mar-

ble Company, and in close proximity to the

defendant's quarry, were two abandoned

quarries, owned by said Vermont Marble

Company, and these abandoned quarries were

partially ﬁlled with water at all times. The

effcct of the defendants embankment, as

constructed, was to deﬂect whatever water

ran in the water course and whatever sur-

face water ran down the sidehill, and to con-

duct it along the side and into the ﬁrst of

these abandoned quarries. When this quar-

ry became ﬁlled with water the water would

overﬂow into the second abandoned quarry,

which lay adjacent to the quarry of the

plaintiff. This quarry was separated from

the plaintiffs quarry by what appeared to be

a solid wall of rock, and this dividing wall

rose to such a height upon the surface that

the water would ﬂow over the track of the

defendant before passing into the quarry of

the plaintiff. From the depression around

the ﬁrst abandoned quarry a culvert was

constructed underneath the defendants track.

Supl'('roe Court of Vermont, General Tenn.
Dec. 22, 1892.
Exceptions lrom Rutland county court;
Thompson, Judge.
action by E. P. Gilson, receiver, against the
Delaw;ue & Hudson Canal Company, to reCO>er dama~es for the diversion of a water
course. whereby plaintUJ's quarry was flooded. Judgment was entered in favor of plaintiff, nnd defendant excepts. Judgment affirmed.
The plaintiff brought suit as the receiver
of the Dorset Marble Cowp;my. His evldenc.-e tended to prove that the deft!ndnnt had,
hy the construction of Its rallrond eruhankment, dh·erted an ancient water course from
Its nccustomeil channel Into his quarry, nnd
bad also collected and dlsl'hnrged surface
water into snid quarry. Tiie railroad of the
defendant, at the point complained of, was
constructed tn 1884, along n steep blllslde. :At
one point there had beeu for runny yenrs a
water course which drained at certain seasons
of the year a considerable territory, but which
during a considerable portion of the year was
entirely dry. From the point where this
water course crossed the llne of the defendant's railroad the land gradually descended
towards the quarry of the plalntlfl'. In constructing Its railroad the defendant made no
provision for the passage of the water running
In this water course underneath Its trnck, and
the complaint of the plalntltr was that the defendant had thereby diverted this water
course, and discharged It, together with the
surface water which was collected by this
embankment, Into his quarry. The land, at
the point where the water course crossed the
line of the defendant's rallroad, belonjo!ed to
the Vermont Marble Compnny, as did the
land between that point and the plalntlll's
quarry. Upon this lnnd of the Vermont :\Iarble Company, and In close proximity to the
defendant's quarry, were two abandoned
quarries, owned by said Vermont :\Iarble
Company, and these abandoned quarries were
partially filled with water at all times. The
effect of the de~endant's embankment, as
constructed, was to deflect who tever water
ran In the wnter course and whatever surface water ran down the slllPhlll, and to conduct It along the side and Into the first of
these abandonecl quarries. 'Vben this quarry bec:iwe filled with wntC'r the w:iter would
overflow luto the second abandoned quarry,
which lay adjacent to the quarry of the
plalntllT. This quarry wn11 separated from
the plalntlfl''s quarry by what appeared to be
a solid wall of rock. and this dividing wall
rose to such a height upon the surfnce that
the water would flow over the track of the
defendant before 1msl'li11g Into the quarry of
the pin Intl fl'. From the depression nround
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the first abandoned quarry a culvert was
constructed underneath the defendant's track.
The elalm of the defendant was that this
cull'ert was sutllclent to carry olf the water
which was conducted as above described into the first abandoned quarry, and there was
no que11tlon but what It had proved sufficient
from 1884, when the embankment was constructed, down to the time of the Injury. In
Januar~·. 1888, occurred a freshet which the
witnesses described as the most serious e;er
known In that locality. In the course of this
freshet large quantities of water rnn down
the hillside, were turned by the defendant's
embankment, and discharged Into the first
abandoned quarry. This quarry was tilled
up uy the unusual flood of water, and thereupon the water overflowed Into the second
nbandoned quarry, rising In that quarry
to a point consldernhly above that at which
it ordinarily stood. From this quarry it
burst through the dividing wall which separated It from the plaintiff's quarry, whereby
the damage complnlned of was done. The
evidence of the defendant tended to show
that the ancestors of the plalntllf, at some
time previous to the construction of the defendant's rallroad, had, in the excavation of
the plalntltf's quarry. encroached some 8
or 10 feet upon the lands of the Ye1mont
:\Iarble Company, and thereby so weakened
the dividing wall that It bad burst through
under the pressure of the water. The defendant claimed that If the ancestors of the
plaintU! bad trespassed upon the lands of
the Vermont Marble Company, and In so doing so weakened the dividing wall ns to oceaslon the Injury In question, the plalntitr
could not recover, and requested the court
to so Instruct the jury. This the court declined to do, and Instructed the jury tbnt,
In determining the Issue Involved, lt was Immaterial whether the plalntll'r's ancestors.
had or hnd not worked over onto the land of
the Vermont :\larble Company, and that, If
they had, It would be no defense to this action, to which the defendant excepted.
F. G. Swlnlngton, for plaintiff.
Prouty, for defendant.

C. A..

ROWELi,, J. It ls a maxim of the lnw
that the Immediate, not the remote, catise
of an event Is regarded. In the application
of this maxim, the law rejects, as not constituting ground for an action, damage not
flowing proximately from the net complained
of. In other words, the law always refers
the dnmage to tile proximate, not the remote,
cnnsP. It is laid down In many rases and by
lending text writers that, in order to warrant a finding that negllgeuce or an act not
amounting to wanton wrong ls the proximate euui<e of an Injury, It must appear that
the injury was the nntnral and probahle sequence of the nE>gllge111·e or the wrongful net,
and thnt It wns s11d1 ns might or onght to
have been foreseen In the ligllt of the attend-
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ing circumstances; but this rule is no test

in cases where no intervening eiiicient cause

is found between the original wrongful act

and the injurious consequences complained

of, and in which such consequences, although

not probable. have actually ﬂowed in un-

broken sequence from the original wrongful

act. This is well illustrated by Stevens v.

Dudley, 56 Vt. 158, which was this: Defend-

ant was a marshal at the fair, and, in chain-

ing the track for a race, he turned off a

man's team so negligently that the man was

thrown from his wagon. his horse broke

loose, and ran against plaintiff's wagon. and

injured him. The court below charged that

defendant was not liable unless he might

reasonably have expected plaintiff's injury

to result from his act. Held error, and that

the court should have charged that if the de-
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fendant negligently turned the team oilf the

track, and thereby the team was deprived of

the control of a driver, and became fright-

ened, and ran over plaintiff's team, and cans-

ed the injury, without any superior, uncon-

trollable force, or without the negligence of

. a responsible agent, having intervened. the

defendant would be liable, although he did

not anticipate, and might not have anticipat-

ed. such consequences from his negligent act;

in other words, that the court should have

charged that if defendant's act was negli-

gent. and in the natural order of cause and

ffcct the plaintiff was injured thereby, the

defendant was liable. Smith v. Railway Co.,

L. R. G C. P. 14, in the excheqner chamber,

is to the same eﬁ‘ect. There the company's

workmen, after cutting the grass and trim-

ming the hedges‘ bordering the railway,

placed the trimmings in heaps between the

hedge and the line, and allowed them to re-

main there for several days during very dry

weather. which had continued for some

weeks. A ﬁre broke out between the hedge

and the rails, and burned some of the heaps

of trimmings and the hedge, and spread to a

stubble ﬁeld beyond, and was thence car-

ried by a high wind across the stubble ﬁeld

and over a road, and burned plaintiffs cot-

tage. 200 yards away from where the ﬁre

began. There was evidence that an engine

had passed the spot shortly before the ﬁre

was ﬁrst seen, but no evidence that it bad

emitted sparks. nor any further evidence

that the ﬁre originated from the engine: nor

was there any evidence that the ﬁre began

a the heaps of trimmings, and not on the

parched ground around them. The court

below held that the plaintiff could not re-

cover, because no reasonable man would

have foreseen that the ﬁre would consume

the hedge. and pass across a stubble ﬁeld.

and so get to plaintiff's cottage, at a dis-

tance of 200 yards from the railway. cross-

ing a road in its passage. In the exchequer

‘chamber, Chief Baron Kelly said that he

felt pressed, at ﬁrst. by this view, because

he then and still thought that any reasonable

man might well have failed to anticipate

DIHECT AND CUN8EQUEXTIAL DAMAGES-IN TORT.

Ing circumstances; but this rule Is no test such a concurrence of circumstances as the
in cases where no inten-ening etllcient cause ease presented; but that, on consideration,
Is found bE>tween the original wrongful act he thought that was not the true test of dennd the Injurious consequences complained ( fendant's liability; that it might be tilat deof, and in which such consequences, although fendant did not anticipate. and was not
not prohable, have actually flowed In un- bonnd to anticipate, that plaintit'f"s cottage
l1rokPn sequence from the original wrongful would be burned ns the result of Its neglinet. This Is well illustrated by Stevens v. gence; but yet, If It was aware that the
Dudley, fJ(i Yt. Ui8, which was this: Defend- heaps were lying by the side of the rails,
nnt wns a marshal at the fair, and, in chain- and that It was a dry season, and that, therPlug the tr:wk for a race, he tumed off a fore, by being left there, the heaps were lilH'man's team so nt•gligently that the man was ly to c,ateh fire, defendant WflS bound to prothrown from his wagon. his horio:e hroke Yicle against all circumstances that might
loose, and ran against plaintiff's wa~on. and result from this, and was responsible for
Injured him. The court below charged that nil nntm·al consequences of it; and with
defentl:111t was not liable unless he might this agreed all the judges. Channell, B., said
l'l'!ISOnnhly have ex11ectecl plaintiff's injury thnt, where there Is no direct eYldence of
to I"t'sult from his act. Helcl error, and that neglii;\'ence, the question what a reasonable
the court should h~n· d1argt>l1 that If the de- man might foresee is of importance in confcmlant negligently turnl'cl the tenm off the sidering whrther there is evidence for the
track, aml tlwreby the team was de11rin'd of jury of negllgrnce or not; and ~Ii"..Justice
the control of a driver, nnd h1>e:rn11.• frii.rht- Hl:H'khum s!lid that what the defendant
enecl. and rnn oYer plaintiff's team, :rnd caus- might reasonably anticipate was matninl
e1l the injury, without any superior. uncon- only with referruee to the question wlwthtrollahle force>, or without the negligence of er it was negligent or not. but could not nln responsible agent, ha,·ing intern•nc><I. the tPr !ti; liahllit)· if It wns negligent. Iu n~·
ch•fendnnt would be llable, althoui:h hP did lamls v. FletchPr, L. n. 3 H. L. 332, fin the
not nntlcipute, and might not have anti<'ipat- housf' of lords.) Lord Cranworth sa~·;.;. that,
ed, such consequences from his negligent net; iu c·o11siclcri11g- whetht>r a defendant is liahle
in other words, that the comt should have to n plaintill' for dnmage tbat the JaitPr hns
charged that If defendant's net wns negli- sustained, the question in general is not
g<•nt. and in the natural order of rause nnd whrtlwr the defendant hnR ncted with \h!P
ffpc·t the plaintiff' was injured thereb)·, the cHre aIHl caution, hut whether his aPts occ·adPfemhrnt was liable. Smith v. Railway Co., Rlonecl the damage; that this is nil well exL. IL II C. P. H. in the c>xehN1uer ehamhn, plninE>d in the old case of Lambert v. Bessey,
I!'! to the snme cffN·t. Th1>re the c·om1mny's T. Raym. 421, reported by Sir Thomas Ra~··
wot·kmen, after cnttini:r the grnsR and trim- mond; that the doctrine Is foundert in good
ming the hedges· bordering the railway, srnse. for where one, in managing his own
plt1t·ed the trimmlngR in hen11s ht•IW\'en the affairs, causes. how!'Yer Innocenti~·. dnrnnge
h•••lge and the line, and allowe1l them to rE>- to another. it is olwiously only just that he
rnnin thl're for seYernl tlnys during \'l'ry dry Rilould be the 11arty to suft'er; that he Is
wc>:lther. which had c·ontinne1l for some bound so to use his own as not to injure anweeks. A tire broke out l>etween tbe lwllge other. In Smith Y. FletC'lwr. L . R. 7 Exeh.
and the mils. and burned some of the henps 305, defendants' mines adjoined nnd comot trimmlni.rR and the hedge, and sprc>ad to a munka ted with plalntill''s minl's, and on the
stubble field beyond, and was H1ence cnr- surface of defendants' land were certHin holried hy a high wind acroi<s the stubble field lows and openings, partlr c·nusPd hy dPfPndfind over a rond, and burned plaintiff's cot- nnts' workings, and partly made to f11cilitate
tagr. 200 ynrds awny from where tbe fire them. Across the surface of clefPnclants'
hrgnn. There waR eYidP1we that an <'ngine land there ran a brook, which they hnd dihad paso;ed the i<pot !:'hortly before the fire '\"erted from Its original course into an artiwas first seen, hut 110 evidence that it hail ficial c·hnnnel thry had urnclP, nnd. which. by
emitte\I sparks. nor any further eYiden('e reason of exceptionally hea'\"y rains, overthat the fire originated from the eughw: nor fto,n1l its bunks, ancl qunntitles of water
was thPre any evillence that the fire hegnn poured from it into said hollows and openn the hPRps of trimmings, and not on the ings, where already the rains had cnusecl nn
llllrehecl ground around them. The court unusual a mount of water to collect, and
below held that the plalntitT could not re- thence, through fissure!! and craeks, water
<·oYer, bPPnuse no reasonable man would passed Into defendants' mine, an1l so into
have rorPSP\'n that the fire would consume plaintiff's mine. If the IHnd had been in
the hedge, and pass across R stubble field. its natural condition, the water would have
11nd so get to plaintiff's cottage, at a dis- Rpread oYer the surfnce, and done no harm.
tance of 200 yards from the railway, cross- The defendnnts tendered evidence to show
ing 11 road In Its passage. In thr exchequer that they hnd taken every reasonable precau(,hamber, ChiPf Baron Kelly said that he tion to gunrd against ordinary emergencies,
ff'it pressed, at first. by this Yiew, hcf't111se and .that they hail, by clf\·ertlng and Improvhe thrn nnd still thought th:it any rea1;on11hle ing the wnt!'r eours!'. and othPrwlse, greatly
mnn might well h11Ye fulled to anticipate le,,:~e1wd the chance o! water escaping from
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the surface of the land into their own mines,

and thence into the plaintiff's mine; and con-

tended that they were not liable for the con-

sequences of an exceptional ﬂood. It was

conceded that they had not been guilty of

any personal negligence; but the court ruled

that they were absolutely liable for the con-

sequences, and rejected the evidence, and

a verdict was taken for the plaintiff, which

was allowed to stand. Baron Bramwell, in

disposing of the case in banc, said that the

defendants, for their own purposes, and with-

out providing the means of its getting away

without hurt, brought the water to the place

whence it escaped, and did the mischief. and

that that made a case against them calling

for an answer, and that they answered:

“We brought the water there, indeed, and

did not provide a sutiicient outlet for it; but,
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had we not altered the original course of the

stream, it would have escaped in greater

quantities, and done more mischief,"—which,

he said. was no answer. See Cahill v. East-

man. 18 \Iinn. 32-l. (Gil. 292.)

In the case at bar the defendant, for pur-

poses of its own. wrongfully turned the

brook from its natural channel, and let it

ﬂow towards plaintiff's quarry, not know-

ing what would happen, whereby large and

unusual quantities of water were brought

to and accumulated in the marble company's

abandoned quarries, and it was the duty of

the defendants to see that no damage was

thereby done; and the fact that it did not

know, and had no reason to suspect, that

the plaintiff's predecessors had worked their

quarry out of bounds, and thereby weakened

the wall between it and the adjacent quarry,

makes no difference, unless such fact consti-

tutes contributory negligence imputable to

the plaintiff. Now, an act or omission of a

party injured, or of those for whose acts

and omissions he is responsible, in order to

constitute contributory negligence, must have

related to something in respect of which he

or they owed to the defendant, or to those in

whose shoes he stands, the duty of being

careful, and have been negligent, and, in

the production of the injury, haw operated

as a proximate cause, or as one of the proxi-

mate causes, and not have been merely a

condition. It follows, therefore, that when

there is no duty there can be no negligence.

In working their quarry, the plaintiffs prede-

cessors 'did not know, and could not possibly

anticipate, the then nonexistent circumstan-

ces,—that years afterwards the defendant

would build a new road where it did in 1584,

and wrongfully turn the brook into the quar-

ries above, whereby their quarry would be

endangered if they weakened the wall by

working out of bounds. Their act in this

respect was not wrongful as to the defend-

ant. and they owed the defendant no duty

concerning it. and therefore negligence is not

predicable of it, even though it was wrong-

ful as to the marble company, with the rights

of which the defendant in no way connects

1 he snrfn<"e of tlie land Into their own mines,
JiUd thence Into the plulntltl"s mine; and contendrd. that they were not llnble for the conseqnpm·e!? or an exception:1l tlood. It was
<·ouc{'(]ec.l that they h:td not been gullty of
any personal nl'gligeul'e; but the court mled
that they were absolntely liable for the consequences, and rejected tlle evhll'IH't'. and
a Yerdlct was taken for the plalnti!T. whiC'h
was allowed to stand. Baron Hrum\n•ll, in
disposing of the ('Ilse In hanc, s:il'l that the
dt•feml:rnts, for their own purpos('S, and without proYiding the means of Its getting away
without hurt, brought th!' wat!'r to the pince
whence It Pscnped, and did the mlschl<'f. and
that that made a ease against them calling
for an nuswrr. a111l thnt tht•y answerell :
"We brought the water th!'re, Indeed, nod
did not pro,·lde a suttldcnt outlet for It; lmt,
had we not altPr!'1l the ori1dnal C'ourse of the
sh'<•am, It wouhl have PS•·ap('(} In i:rt>ater
qn:1111ities. and done more misehief.''-which,
he sahl. was no answPr. S<'c Cah!ll Y. Eastman. lS ~Ilnn. :t.!-l. (Gil. 2!l2.)
In the case at har the defPn<lnnt. tor purposes of It!'.' own. wrongfully turrn'1l the
hrook from its natural channel, a111J l('t It
flow towards plalntlft''s quarry. not knowing what would hnppt•n, wherehy lnr;.:f' nml
unusual quantitif's of wnter were hron~ht
to and accumulated In the marble eou1pa11~"s
nhnndoue<l quarries, anrl It wa8 thP ,Juty of
the defendants to St'!' thnt no lh11uaA'C wns
thereby done; and the fuel that It did not
know. and bad no reason to suspect, that
the plalntlll"s predec!'Ssors had workell their

rn1

quarry out of bounds, and the1·eby weakened
the wall between it and the 11dj:1cent quarry,
makes no difference, unless such fact constitutes contributory negligPnce Imputable to
the plalutlfT. !\ow, an· act or omission of a
party Injured, or of tho8c for whose acts
nnd omissions he Is responsible, In order to
constitute c<>ntrihutory n!'gligence, must haYe
related to something In r!'spect of which he
or they owed to the defendant, or to those in
whose shoes be stands, the duty of beh1g
careful. and have been negligent. and, In
the Ill'Olluctlon of the Injury, haYe operateu
as a JH'oximate C'anse, or as one of the proximate cause~. and not have b('en 1nerf'ly a
condition. It follows, therefore, that when
thL·1·e Is no duty thL·re can be no negllgence.
In working their quarry, the plalntllT' s predecessors dld not know, and could not possibly
anticipate, the then nonexistent eit'eurnstnnees.- that yenrs afterwards the llefendnnt
would build n new road where It did in 188-!,
and wrongfully turn the brook Into the quarril'>< ahon>, whereby thPlr quarry would be
endangered If they wenkenNl the wall by
wo1·ki11g ont of hounds. Theh· act In this
r!'spP<·t wa11 not wrongful as to the defendant. and thE>y owed the defendant no duty
PorwPrnlng It. and thert'fore nei;:l!gence Is not
J\J'C'nl«ahle of It, e\·en though it was wrou~
ful as to (]I(' marble company, with the rights
of whil·h thP <IPfl'IHlnnt In no way eonnePts
iH•elf. 'l'he state of the wall, leg-ally consi,lered. was not a Jlroximate cause of. the lujury, hut was ruprely a condition · that made
the Injury possible. .Tudgment affirmed.
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KEEBLE v. KEEBLE.

(5 South. 149, 85 Ala. 552.)

Dec. 8, 1888.

Appeal from city court, Dallas county; John

Haralson, Judge.

This was an action brought by the appel-

lant, Henry C. Keeble, against the appellee,

Julia P. Keeble, as the executrix of R. C.

Keeble, deceased, for the recovery of money

alleged to be due the plaintiff by the de-

fendant's testator. The defendant pleaded

the general issue, payment, accord and satis-

faction, and set-off. The only question in the

case arose on the instruction given the jury

by the court, founded on the facts set out

in the eventh plea. The demurrer to this

plea was overruled by the court. It was, in

substance, that plaintiff and defendant's tes-

tator had been in partnership in the mercan-
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tile business. Plaintiff sold out to defend-

ant's testator, but was employed by the lat-

ter as business manager. The terms of the

employment imposed on plaintiff the obliga-

tion to wholly abstain from the use of in-

toxicating liquors, and, in the event he should

become intoxicated, that he should pay, “as

liquidated damages," the sum of $1,000. The

plea alleged that plaintiff violated his promise

to keep sober, and thereby became bound to

pay to defendant's testator said sum of $1,000,

(5 South. 149, 85 Ala. 552.)

Supreme Court of Alabama.

Dec. 8, 1888.

Appeal from city court, Dallas county; John
Haralson, Judge.
'l'his was an action brought by the appellant, Henry C. Keeble, against the ap)lellee,
Julla P. Keeble, as the executrix of R. 0.
Keeble, deceased, for the recovery of money
allPged to be due the plalntll'I'. by the defendant's testator. The defendant pleulied
the general Issue, payment, accord and satisfaction, and set-oft'.. The only question In the
case arose on the Instruction given the jury
by the court, founded on the facts set out
ln the seventh plea. The demurrer to this
plea was overruled by the court. It was, in
suhstance, that plalntltf and defendant's testator had been in partnership In the mercantile business. Plaintiff sold out to defendant's testator, but was employed by the latter as business manager. '£he terms of the
employment Imposed on plaintiff the obligation to wholly abstain from the use of Intoxicating liquors, and, In the event he should
be<.'Ome Intoxicated, that he should pay, "as
liquidated damages," the sum of $1,000. The
plea alleged that plalntll'I'. violated his promise
to keep sober, and thereby became bound to
pay to defendant's testator said sum of $1,000,
which sum was olfered as a set-off to plain-·
tiff's demand.
Mr. Uoy and White & White, for appellant.
Pettus & Pettus, for appellee.

which sum was offered as a set-of f to plain-

titl"s demand.

Mr. Roy and White & White, for appellant.

Pettus & Pettus, for appellee.

Supreme Court of Alabama.

SOMERVILLE, J. The only question in

this case is whether the sum of $1,000, agreed

to be paid by the appellant, Henry C. Keeble,

to Richard C. Keeble, the testator of the ap-

pellee, as mentioned in the written contract

of employment between the parties, is to be

regarded by the court as a penalty or as

liquidated damages. The city court held it,

in effect, to be liquidated damages, by char-

ging the jury to ﬁnd for the defendant, if

the facts set out in the seventh plea were

satisfactorily proved. The solution of this

question is one which the courts have often

confessed embarrassment in determining. No

one rule can be announced which will fur-

nish a single test or criterion for all cases,

but, in most cases, a multitude oi! considera-

tions are to be regarded in seeking to reach

the real intention of the parties. The follow-

ing general rules may be deduced from the

authorities, each having more or. less weight,

according to the peculiar circumstances of

each case, and the nature of the contract

sought to be construed: (1) The court will

always seek to ascertain the true and real in_-

tention of the contracting parties, giving due

weight to the language or words used in the

contract, but not always being absolutely con-

trolled by them, when the enforcement of

such contract operates with unconscionable

hardship, or otherwise works an injustice.

(2) The mere denomination of the sum to be

paid as “liquidated damages," .or as “a pen-

SOllERVILLE, J. The only question In
this case is whether the sum of $1,000, agreed
to be paid by the appellant, Henry C. Keeble,
to Richard C. Keeble, the testator of the appellee, as mentioned In the written contract
of employment between the parties, le to be
regarded by the court as a penalty or as
liquidated damages. The city court held It,
in effect, to be liquidated damagi:>s, by charging the jury to find for the defendant, l!
the facts set out In the seventh plea were
satisfactorily proved. The solution of this
question ls one which the courts have often
confessed embarrnssment In determining. No
one rule can be announced which will furnish a single test or criterion for all cases,
but, In most easPs, a multitude of considerations are to be regarded In seeking to reach
the real Intention of the parties. The followh:g genrral rules may be deduced from the
autilorltito>s, each having more- or. less weight,
according to the peculiar clrcumstancto>s of
each case, and the nature of the contract
sought to be construed: (1) The court will
always seek to ascertain the true and real ID~
tentlon of the contracting parties, giving due
w<>lght to the language or words used In the
contract, but not always being absolutely controlled by tht'm, when the enforcement of
sueh contrnd operates with unconsclouable
hardship, or otherwise works an Injustice.

(2) The mere denomination of the sum to be
pnld as "liquidated damages," .or as "a penalty," Is not conclusive on the court as to
Its real character. .Although designated as
"liquidated damages" It may be construeli as
a penalty, and often when called a "penalty"
It may be held to be liquidated damages,
where the Intention to the contrary Is plain.
(3) The courts are disposed to lean against
any Interpretation of a contract which will
make 1t liquidated damages; and, In all cases
of doubtful Intention, will pronounce the stlp1liated sum a penalty. (4) Where the payment of a smaller sum Is secured by an obligation to pay a larger sum, It will be held
a penalty, and not liquidated damages. (5)
Where the agreement Is for the performance
or non-performance of a single act, or of several nets, or of several things which are but
n1lnor parts of a single complex act, and the
precise damage resulting from the violation
of each eo\·enant Is wholly uncertain or Incapable of being ascertalne<l save by conjecture, the parties may agree on a fixed sum
as liquidated damages, and the courts will
so construe it, unless It ls clear on other
grounds that a penalty was really Intended.
(6) 'When the contract pro\"ldes for the performance of several acts of different degrees
of Importance, and the damages resulting
from the violation of some, although not all,
of the provisions are of easy ascertainment,
and one large gross sum ls stipulated to be
paid for the breach of any, It will be construed a penalty, and not as liquidated damages. (7) When the agreement provides for
the performance of one or more acts, and the
stipulation ls to pay the same gross sum for
a partial as for a total or complete breach of
performance, the sum will be construed to
be a penalty. (8) Whether the· sum agreed
to be paid ls out of proportion to the actual
damages, which will probably be sustained
by a breach, Is a fact lnt(I which tbe .court
will not enter on lnqmry, If the Intent ls otherwise made clear that liquidated damages, and
not a penalty, are In contemplation. (9) Where
the agreement Is In tile alternntive, to do one
of two acts, but is to pay a larger sunr of
money In the one event than In the other,
the obllgor having his election to do either,
the amount thus agreed to be paid wlll be
held liquidated damages, and not a penalty.
(10) In applying these rules, the controlling
purpose of which Is to ascertain the real Inten tlon of the parties, the court will consider
the nature of the contract, the terms of the
whole Instrument, the consequences naturally
l't-snltlng from a breach of Its stlpulntions,
and the peculiar circumstances surrounding
the transaction; thus permitting each case to
stand, as far as possll>le, on Its own mnits
and peeuliurlties. These rules are belle\"ed
to be sustained by the preponderance of judicial decisions. Graham v. Bickham, 1 Am.
Dec. 328, and note, pp. 331- 340; Wllll:nns ~
Vnnce, 30 Am. Ht>p. 2fi. und notl>, pp. 28-36;
1 Pum. Eq. JUl'. ~~ 441J - -Hu; Mcl'hersou v.
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Robertson, 82 Ala. 459. 2 South. 333; Hooper

v. Railroad Co., 69 Ala. 52!): Watts v. Shep-

pard, 2 Ala. 4‘.25; Bish. Cont. § 1452; Curry

v. Larer, 7 Pa. St. 470; Foley v. McKeegan,

4 Iowa, 1; Nash v. Hermosilla, 9 Cal. 584;

Muse v. Swayne, 2 Lea, 251; 2 Greenl. Ev.

RohertAAn. 82 Aln. 45fl. 2 South. ii~~: Hooper
v. Railroad Co.. 69 Ala. :i:!!I: \\"ntts 'I". Sheppard. 2 Ala. 4:.!lj; Bish. L"ont. § 14;-,2: Cuny
Y . J.nrer, i Pa. St. 470; Foll'r '"· :\leKeegnn,
4 Iowa, 1; Xash v. Heruwsllla, V Cal. fi84;
Mrnw Y. Swayne, 2 Lea, 2::'11; 2 Greenl. Ev.
§ :!!:i8.

Th!' appellant wns In the i>mploi;vnH'nt of the
nppl'lle!' S testator as n businl· ~s 111annge1-, at
very llberul wages, hn vlng h<'Pll a part ne1·
with him In the mE'rrnntile b11si11t>ss, muler
the firm name of R. C. Keeble & Co. Although he was but nu employ(', having sohl
to H. C. KPehh' his entirl' iuterrst in thl' p:lrtnershlp buslnrss. h!' remained ostensihly a
partlwr. The terms or the employment, redueell to writing. imposPt1 on the a11pellnnt,
H~·nrv Keeble, the ohligntion, limong other
dutil'~, "to wholly abstniu from tile USl~ of
lntoxl<'ntlng liquor,.;."' nm! ··tn C'ontlnue and remain sober," giving his lliligeut attention to
the husiness of his emplu~·pr, uud promising,
In the evl'llt he shnuht hP<'ome h1toxlcatelf,
that he would pay, "as llCJ11idated damagl's,"
the sum of $1.000, which the tl'state>r, IHchard I\:eeblt'. was anthorizt'd to retain out of
a certain debt he owed the apppilant. The
appellant violated his promise by becoming
Intoxicated, and remained so for a long time,
and acted rudely noel Insultingly towa1·Js the
customers and employlis of tile testator, and
otherwise deported himself, by reason of Intoxication, In such m11nner as to do Injury to
the business. It Is not denied by appellant's
counsel that this Is a total breach of the promise to keep sober; nor Is It argued that tbe
damage resulting from the violation of sn<'b a
promise can be ascertained with any degree of
cel'talnty; nor even that the amount agreed
to be paid as llqnldnted damages, In the event
of n breach; Is disproportionate to the damages which may have been actually sustained
In this case. But the contention seems to be
that, Inasmuch as It was poss ible for a breach
to occur with no actual 1lamages other than
nominnl, the amoant agrePd to be paid should
be eonstrued to be a penalty. rnless this
view Is correC't, the application of the foregoing rules to the construction of the agreement manifestly stamps It as n stipulation
for liquidated dnma~es, amt not a penalty.
It Is nrgm•d, In other words, that becoming
lntoxientert In private. while off duty, would
be a violation of the contract. but would be
attended with no actual dnmnge to the business of R. C. Keeble & Co. This fnet would,
In our opinion, exce11t the c11se from the operation of the rules above enuncintl'<'I. There
are hut few agrt'l'meuts of this kind wlu~re
the stipulation Is to do or not do n pnrticnlar
act, In which the damages may not, aC'cordlug to circmnstances. Yary, on n sli(tin~ scale,
from n ominal damages to a consltlernhle sum.
One may sell out thl' gornl-will of his hm!fness in 11 giv{"n locality, anrl agrel' to ab;;tnin
from its furthPr 111·oi<P<'l1tio11. 01·. In the e vent
ot his brl'11d1 of hii; a grePment, to pay a cerLAW DA:\I.2d l!:d.-13
0

§ 258.

The appellant was in the employment of the

appellee‘s testntor as a business manager, at

very liberal wages, having been a partner

with him in the mercantile business, under

the ﬁrm name of R. C. Keebie & Co. Al-

though he was but an employe. having sold

to R. C. Keeble his entire interest in the part-

nership business. he remained ostcusibly a

partner. The terms of the employment, re-

duced to writing, imposed on the appellant,

Henry Keeble, the obligation, among other

duties, “to wholly abstain from the use of

intoxicating liquors." and "to continue and re-
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main sober," giving his diligent attention to

the business of his employer, and promising,

in the event he should become intoxicated,

that he would pay, “as liquidated damages,"

the sum of $1,000, which the testator, Rich-

ard Keeble, was authorized to retain out of

a certain debt he owed the appellant. The

appellant violated his promise by becoming

intoxicated, and remained so for a long time,

and acted rudely and insuitingly towards the

customers and employes of the testator, and

otherwise deported himself, by reason of in-

toxication, in such manner as'to do injury to

the business. it is not denied by appellant's

counsel that this is a total breach of the prom-

ise to keep sober; nor is it argued that the

damage resulting from the violation of such a

promise can be ascertained with any degree of

certainty; nor even that the amount agreed

to be paid as liquidated damages, in the event

of a breach,' is disproportionate to the dam-

ages which may have been actually sustained

in this case. But the contention seems to be

that, inasmuch as it was possible for a breach

to occur with no actual damages other than

nominal, the amount agreed to be paid should

be construed to be a penalty. Unless this

view is correct, the application of the fore-

going rnles to the construction of the agree-

ment manifestly stamps it as a stipulation

for liquidated damages, and not a penalty.

It is argued, in other words, that becoming

intoxicated in private, while off duty, would

be a violation of the contract. but would be

attended with no actual damage to the busi-

ness of R. C. Keebie & Uo. This fact would,

in our opinion, except the case from the oper-

ation of the rules above enunciated. There

are but few agreements of this kind where

the stipulation is to do or not do a particular

act, in which the damages may not. accord-

ing to circumstances. vary, on a sliding scale,

from nominal damages to a considerable sum.

One may sell out the good-will of his busi-

ness in a given locality, and agree to abstain

from its further prosecution. or. in the event

of his breach of his agreement, to pay a cer-

LAW DA\I.2d Ed.—13

tain sum as liquidated damages; as, for ex-

l!l3

taln sum as llquldated damages; as, for example. not to praC'tice one's profession as :1
ph~·sldan 01· lawyer. not to run a stenm-lloal
on a Ct'rtaln rh·er or to eany on the hotPI
business in n particular town, not to re-esta l,..
llsh a newspaper for a gh·cn ppriotl, or to
enrry on n particular bran\"h of bu!'! inPss within a certain distance from a n11med city. Jn
nil such cases, as often decidetl, It Is competl'nt for the partll's to stipulate for the pa~·
ment of a gross snru by way of li<]uldnt<•tl.
damages for the violation of the agreement,
and for the vt:'ry reason that such dawages
are unC'ertain, fluctuating, and ineapahlc of
ensy ascertainment. 'Vllliams v. Y,a nfe, 30
Am. Ht:>p. 2U-31, note; Grnhnm v. Bickham, 1
Am. Dec. 336-3.18, note; 1 Pom. E•J . .Tur.
§ 442, note 1. It ls clrnr that eaeb of thl'se
' 'arious agreements mar be ,.iolatl'll by a substnuti:tl 1Jn•nd1, a111l yl't no tluma;.rt's mhd1t
accrue exct>pt sneh as nre nominal. 'J'h(;
obligor may practice medldne, and possibly
ne,·er Interfere with the pr11l't ice of the other
cofltraetlng party; or law, without having a
paying client; or he may run a steam-boat
without a pnssenger ; or an hotel without a
g1wst: or cnrry on a newspa!let· without the
lenst Injury to any competitor. But the law
will not enter upon an inYl'Stigntlon as to the·
<]uantnm of damages Jn such cuses. This is
the very matter settled by the agreement of
the parties. U the act agreetl not to be doue
ls one from which, In the ordinary course of
events, damages, Incapable of nsf't>t·talnmt•nt
saYe by conjecture, are liable naturally to follow, sometimes more and sometimes less, according to the aggravation or the eet, tht.>
court will not stop to Investigate the extent or
the grievance complained of as a total breach,
but will accept the sum agreed on as a prope1
and just measurement, by way of li<]uldateC.
damages, unless the real Intention of the parties, un<ler the rules above announeed, designed It as n penalty. We may adrl, more·
over, that no one ean accumtl'ly estimate the
physiologlc11l relation between private and
public drunkenness. nor the causal eonneetlon between Intoxication one time and a scoreof times. The latter, In each lnstuuel', rnny
follow from the former, and the one may
naturally lead to the other. There would
seem to be nothing hari;h or unreasonable in
stipulntlng agninst the •ery souree and beginning of the more aggravated evil sought t<>
be avoided. The duty resting on the court.
In all these cases, Is to so apply the Sl~ttlPtl
rules of constru<'tion as to ns<'t>t·tnh1 the leg-ally expres8Pll anti real lntl'Utiou of the partiPs.
Courts nre unck•r no ohligntiuns, nor ha,·e thPy
the power, to make u wiser or better contral't
for either or the pnrties than he ma y be suppo~ed to have rnnde for himself.
The comt
below, In our judgment, did not err In holding, as It diil, by its rulings, that the snm
ngrerd to he paid the nppellt><''s testator wns
liquhla ted damages, and not a penalty. Affirmed.
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MONMOUTH PARK ASS-‘N v. WALLIS

IRON WORKS.

(26 Atl. 140; '55 N. J. Law, 132.)

Court of Errors and Appeals of New Jersey.

March 6, 1893.

Error to supreme court.

Action on a contract by the Monmouth

Park Association against the Wallis Iron

Works. Plaintiff had judgment, and defend-

ant brings error. Reversed.

The other facts fully appear in the follow-

ing statement by DIXON, J.:

The plaintiff brought an action in the su-

preme court against the defendant to re-

cover $6,384.66, and interest, as a ﬁnal bal-

ance for work done, chieﬂy, under a sealed

contract between them. providing for the

construction of a grand stand at the Mon-

mouth Park race course. The present writ
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of error is prosecuted by the defendant to

review questions of law raised at the trial in

the Hudson circuit. The following is a copy

of the contract: -

“Articles of agreement made and concluded

this ﬁrst day of October, A. D. 1889, by and

between the Wallis Iron Works, a corpora-

tion of New Jersey, of the ﬁrst part, and the

Monmouth Park Association, of the second

part, witnesseth, that for and in considera-

tion of the covenants and payments herein-

after mentioned, to be made and performed

by the said party of the second part, the said

party of the ﬁrst part doth hereby covenant

and agree to furnish all the labor and ma-

terials, and perform the work, necessary to

complete, in the most substantial and work-

manlike manner, to the satisfaction and ac-

ceptance of the chief engineer of the said

party of the second part, a grand stand at

the race course of said party of the second

part, at Monmouth Park, Monmouth Co., New

Jersey, excepting the necessary excavation,

incidental thereto; the said ‘work to be ﬁn-

ished as described in the approved plans and

following speciﬁcations, and agreeably to

the directions received from the said chief en-

gineer, on or before the ﬁrst day of March,

1890 case the said party of the ﬁrst part

shall ully and entirely, and in conformity

to the provisions and conditions of this agree-

ment, perform and complete the said work,

and each and every part and appurtenance

thereto, within the time hereinbefore limited

for such performance and completion, or

within such further time as, in accordance

with the provisions of this agreement, shall

be ﬁxed or allowed for such performance and

completion, the said party of the ﬁrst part

shall and will pay to the said party of the

second part the sum of one hundred dollars

for each and every day that they, the said

party of the ﬁrst part, shall be in default,

which said sum of one hundred dollars per

day is hereby agreed upon. ﬁxed, and deter-

mined by the parties hereto as the dam-

ages which the party of the second part will

suffer by reason of such default, and not by

way of penalty. And the said party of the
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MONMOUTH PARK ASS'N v. WALLIS
IRON WORKS.
(26 Atl. 140; 55 N. J. Law, 132.)
Court of Errors and Appenls of New Jersey.
March 6, 1893.

Error to supreme court.
Action on a contract by the Monmouth
Park Association against the Wallis Iron
Works. Plaiutitr had judgment, and det'endaut brings error. Reversed. .
The other facts fully appear In the follow·
ing statement by DIXON, J.:
The pla!ntltr brought an action In the supreme court against the defendant to recover $6,384.66, and interest, as a final balance for work done, chiefly, under a sealed
\!ontract between them, providing for the
construction of a grand stand at the Monmouth Park race course. The present writ
of error Is prosecuted by the defendant to
review questions of law raised at the trial In
the Hudson circuit. The following is a copy
of the contract:
"Articles of agreement made and concluded
this first day of October, A. D. 1889, by and
between the ·wams Iron Works, a corporation of New Jersey, of the first part, and the
Monmouth Park Association, of the second
part, witnesseth, that for and in consideration of the covenants and payments hereinafter mentioned, to be made Rnll performed
by the said party of the second part, the said
party of the first part doth hereby covenant
and agree to furnish all the labor and materials, and perform the work, necessary to
complete, in the most substantial and workmanlike manner, to the satisfaction and acceptance of the chief engineer of the said
party of the second part, a grand stand at
the race course of eald party of the second
part, at Monmouth Park, Monmouth Co., New
Jersey, excepting the necessary excavation,
Incidental thereto; the said ·work to be fin·
lshed as described in the approved plans and
:following specifications, and agree.ably to
the directions received from the said chief engineer, on or before the first day of March,
1890:'t£ case the said party of the first part
shallJ~-~lly and entirely, and In conformity
to the provisions and conditions of this agreemen t, perform and complete the said work,
and ench and every part and appurtenance
thereto, within the time hereinbefore limited
for such performance and completion, or
within such further time as, in accordance
with the provisions of thls agreement, shall
be fixed or allowed for such performance and
completion, the said party of the first part
shall and will pay to the said party of the
second part the sum of one hundred dollars
for each and every day that they, the said
party of the first part, shall be In default,
which said sum of one hundred dollars per
day ls hereby agreed upon, fixed, and determined by the parties hereto as the damages which the party of the second part will
sutrer by reason of such default, and not by

way of penalty. And the snld party (\f the
second part may and shall deduct and retain
the same out of any moneys which may be
due or become due to the party of the first
part under this agreement.
"Specification. The entire work to be constructed and finished, in every part, In a
good, substantial, and workmanlike manner,
according to the accompanying drn wings and
specifications, to the full extent and meaning of the same, and to the entire satisfaction,
approval, and acceptance of the chief engineer and owners of the said party of the
second part, and under the supervision and
direction of such agent or agents as they
may appoint.. Additional detail and working
drawings will be furnished, ln exemplification
of the foregoing, from time to time, as may
be required; and it is distinctly understood,
that all such additional drawings are to be
considered as virtually embraced within, and
forming a part of, these specifications. Figured dimensions shall in all cases he taken
in preference to scale measurements. The
said engineer shall have the right to make
any alterations, additions, or omissions of
work or materials herein specified, or shown
on the drawings, during the progress of the
stl'llcture, that he may find to be necessary,
and the same shall be acceded to by the said
party of the first part, and carried into effect, without in any way violating or vitiating the contract. If any additions, alterations, or omissions are made ln the structure during the progress of the work, the
value of such shall be decided by the said
chief engineer, who shall make an equitable
allowance for the same, and shall ad<l the
amount of said allowance to the contract
price of the work, If the cost has been In·
creased, or shall deduct the amount, If the
cost has been lessened, as he, the said chief
engineer, may deem just a.nd equltablt.>. 'fhe
said party of the second part will pay for no
extra work or material unless ordered in
writing by them, through their treasurer.
Any disagreement or difference between the
parties to this contract, upon any matter or
thing arising from these specifications, or the
drawings to which they refer, or to the contract for the work, or the kind or quality of
the work, required the:cby, shall be dec!rl~d
by the said chief engineer of the pa1·ty of
the second part, whose decision and interpretation of the same shall be considered
final, conclusive, and binding upon both parties. All materials and labor used throughout the structure must be of the best of their·
several kinds, a.nd subject to the approval of
the chief engineer. The eald chief en~loeer
shall have full power, at any time during the
progress of the work, to reject any materials
that be may deem unsuitable for the purpose
for which they were Intended, or which are
not In strict conformity with the spirit of
these specifl.catlons. He shall also have the
power to cause any inferior or unsafe work
to be taken down and altered at the cost
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of the said party of the ﬁrst part. Partic-

ular care must be taken of all the ﬁnished

work, which work must be covered up and

thoroughly protected from injury or deface-

ment, during the erection and completion of

the structure. All refuse material and rub-

bish that may accumulate during the prog-

ress of the work shad be removed from

time to time as may be directed by the chief

engineer, and, on the completion of the work,

the structure, grounds, and streets be thor-

oughly cleaned up, and the surplus material

and rubbish removed. The said party of the

second part will not transport free any of the

workmen or materials for this work, but all

materials must be shipped in the name of the '

party of the ﬁrst part, and in no case shall

it be shipped in care of, or in the name of,

the company, or any of its otiicers or em-
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ployes, and said party of the tirst part must

pay the regular freight rates arranged for

with the freight department.

“And the said party of the second part

doth promise and agree to pay to the said

party of the ﬁrst part, for the work to be

done under this contract, the following prices,

to wit: One hundred and thirty-three thou-

sand ($133,000) dollars. On or about the last

day of each month, during the progress of

this work, an estimate shall be made of the

relative value of the work done and deliver-

ed, to be judged by the engineer; and ninety

per cent. of the amount of said estimate shall

be paid to the party of the ﬁrst part on or

about the ﬁfteenth day of the following

month. And when all the work embraced in

this contract is completed, agreeably to the

speciﬁcations, and in accordance with the

directions, and to the satisfaction and ac-

ceptance, of the engineer, there shall be a

ﬁnal estimate made of said work according

to the terms of this agreement, when the bal-

ance appearing due to the said party of the

ﬁrst part shall be paid to them, within thirty

days thereafter, upon their giving a release,

under seal, to the party of the second part,

from all claims and demands whatsoever

growing in any manner out of this agreement,

and upon their procuring and delivering to

the parties of the second part full releases. in

proper form, and duly executed, from me-

chanics and material men, of all liens, claims,

and demands for materials furnished and

provided, and work and labor done and per-

formed, upon or about the work herein con-

tracted for under this contract. It is fur-

ther covenanted and agreed between the said

parties that the said party of the ﬁrst part

will at all times give personal attention, by

competent representative, who shall superin-

tend the work. It is further agreed that the

contractors are not to interfere in any way

with the construction of the bookmakers‘

stand, members' stand or the paddocks, or

other work. It is further agreed and under-

stood that the work embraced in this con-

tract shall be commenced within ten days

from this date, and prosecuted with such

<>! the ea.Id party or the first part. Particular care must be taken of all the finished
work, which work must be covered up and

thoroughly protected from Injury or defncement, during the erection and completion of
the structure. All refuse material and rubbish that mny accumulate durlng the progr~ss or the work sbn.l be removed from
time to time as may be directed by the chief
engineer, and, on the completion of the work,
the structure, grounds, and streets be thor<>ughly cleaned up, and the surplus material
.and rubbish removed. The said party of the
second part will not transport free any of the
workmen or materials for this work, but nil
materials mm;t be shipped In the name of the
party of the first part, and In no case shall
1t 'be shipped In care of, or In the name ot,
the comp.'lny, or any ot its olficer11 or employes, and said party or the first part must
pay the regular freight rates arranged for
with the freight department.
"And the said party of the second part
doth promise and agree to pay to the enld
party or the first part. tor the work to be
done under this contract, the following prices,
to wit: One hundred and thirty-three thousand ($133,000) dollars. On or about the Inst
day or each month, during the progress ot
this work. an estimate shall he made of the
relative value ot the work done and delivered, to be judged by the engineer; and ninety
per cent. of the amount of said estimate shall
be paid to the party of the first part on or
about the fifteenth day ot the following
month. And when all the work embraced In
this contract ls completed, agreeably to the
speclficatlons, and In accordance with the
directions, and to the entisfnctlon and acceptance, ot the engineer, there shall be a
final estimate made or enld work according
to the terms of this agreement, when the balance appearing due to the said party of the
first part shall be paid to them, within tlllrty
days thereafter, upon their giving a release,
under seal, to the party of the second part,
from all claims and demands whatsoever
growing in any manner out of this agreement,
and upon their procuring and delivering to
the parties ot the second part full releases. In
proper form, and duly executed, from mechanics and material men, of all liens, claims,
and demands for materials furnished and
provided, and work and labor done and pel"fonned, upon or about the work herein contracted for under this contract. It ls rurther CO\"enantcd and agreed between the said
parties that the eald party of the first part
will at all tlmee give personal attention, by
rompetent representative, who shall superintend the work. It ls further agreed that the
contractors are not to Interfere in any way
with the construction of the bookmakers'
stand, members' stand or the paddocks, or
other work. It ls further agreed and understood that the work embraced In this contl"llct shall be commenced within ten days
from this date, and pru8ecutcd with such
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fo1·ce as the engineer shall deem adequate
to its completion within the time specified;
and ft at any time the said party of the tll"st
part shall re.fuse or neglect to pl'osecute the
work with a rorce suttlclent, In the opinion
of the said engineer, for Its completion within the time specified In this agreement, then,
In that case, the said engineer In charge, or
such agents ns the engmeer shall designate,
mny proceed to employ such a number of
workmen, Inborers, and overseel's as mny,
in the opinion of the said engineer, be necessary to Insure the completion or the work
within the time herelnbe!ore limited, at such
wages as he may find necessary or expedient
I to give, pay all persons so employed, and
charge over the amount so paid to the prirty
ot the first part as tor so much money paid
' to them on said contmct, or for the fallme
t() pl"Osecute the work with an adequate
force, tor noncorupllnnce with his dirc<"tions In regnrd to the manner of coustructing it, or, tor a.ny other omission or
neglect ot the requirements ot this agreement and spcclfications on the pnrt of the
party of the first pa1·t, the snld engineer
may, at his discretion, declare this contract,
or any portion or section embraced In It,
void. And the i:nld party of the tlrst pnrt hnth
further covennnted and agreed to take", use,
provide, aml make all proper, necessary, nnd
sufficient precautions, safeguards, and protections 11.1minst the occurrence or bnppen!ng
of any accident, Injuries, damages, or hurt to
any person or property during the progress
ot the construction o.f the work herein coni tracted for, and to be responsible for, and to
Indemnify and save hnrmle~s. the said parties of the second part, and the snl<l engineer,
from the pnyments of all sums of money by
rcngon of nil or any such accidents, Injuries,
damages, or hurt thnt may ha))pen or occur
upon or about said work, and from nll fines,
penaltll'!'l. and loss Incurred for or by reason
or the violntlon of any city or borough ordlnnnce or regulation or law of the stnte, while
the said work Is In progress of construction.
And It Is mutnnlly agreed and distinctly understoaj that the decision of the chief engineer shall be finnl and conclusive In any
dispute which may arise between the pnrtles to this agreement, relative to or touching
the sam('.
"In witness whereof, the parties herein
named have hereunto set their seals, and
cnused their presents to be signed by their
secretnry, the day and year herein first
above named. As to Wallis Iron Works,
James I. Taylor. Wallis Iron Works. [Seal.]
Wm. T. Wallis, Sec'y. The Monmouth Park
Ass'n. [Seal.] By A. J. Cassatt, President.
Witness to signature of A. J. Cassatt: T.
M. Croft.
"It ls hereby rurther agreed that, In addition to the work herelnbetore described and
provided for, the said party of the first part
shall provide as bearing pieces to receive
ends of purllns, and In lleu of the angle irnns
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already provided for, 3x6 angle irons, 10 8-10

lbs. per foot, and 7 feet long, well bolted to

roof truss and to puriin ends. The party o}

the ﬁrst part will also construct, complete, the

front steps to grand stand, as per revised

sheet No. 26. In consideration of the fore-

going changes, the party of the second part

agrees to pay the additional sum of nineteen

hundred and seventy-one ($1,971.61) dollars.

Wallis Iron Works. [Seal.] Wm. T. Wallis,

Treas. [Seal.] The Monmouth Park Ass‘n.

By A. J. Cassatt, President. Witness this

11th day of December, 1889||: T. M. Croft."

Added to this are “Revised Speciﬁcations,"

the last clause of which is: “Payments. On

or about the ﬁrst day of each month, the en-

gineer will make an approximate estimate

of the amount of work erected and delivered

under these speciﬁcations during the preced-
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ing month, and the contractor will be paid

ninety per cent. of the amount of these esti-

mates. Thirty days after the acceptance of

the completed work by the owner, the retain-

ed ten per cent. will be paid the contractor,

upon his furnishing satisfactory evidence that

no liens or unsatisﬁed claims exist on the

work, or any part of it." These speciﬁcations

were also signed and sealed by the parties.

I.lQl ' IDATED

A~D

L":XLIQUlDA TED D.-UL\<:ES.

already provided for, 3xG angle Irons, 10 8-10
lbs. per foot, and 7 feet long, well bolted to
root truss and to purlln ends. The party oJ.
the first pnrt will nlso construct. complete, the
front steps to grand stand, as per revised
sheet No. 26. In consideration of the f01·egoing changes, the party of the second part
agrees to pay the additional sum of nineteen
hundred and seventy-one ($1,97Ul1) dollars.
Wnllis Iron Works. [Seal.] Wm. T. Wallis,
Treas. [Seal.] The Monmouth Park Ass·n.
By A. J. Cassatt, President. Witness this
lltll day of December, 1889: T . .M. Croft."
Added to this are "Hcvised Spccificntlons,"
tlle last clause of which is: "Payments. On
or about the first day of each month, the engineer will make an approximate estimate
of the amount of work ereeted and delivered
under these specltlcations dw·ing the preceding month, and the contractor will be paid
ninety per cent. of the amount of these estimates. Thirty days after the acceptance of
the completed work l>y the owner, the retained ten per cent. wlll be paid tile contractor,
upon his furnishing satisfactory evident.-e that
no liens or unsatisfied clnims exist .. on the
work, or any part of It." These specifications
were also signed and sealed by the parties.
The pleadings are sufliclent to warrant the
questions Involved In the exceptions taken
at the trial.
Jos. D. Bcdle, for plalntltr In error. Gilbert Colllns, for defendant In error.

The pleadings are suﬂicient to warrant the

questions involved in the exceptions taken

at the trial.

Jos. D. Bedle, for plaintiff in error. Gil-

bert Collins, for defendant in error.

DIXON, J. (after stating the facts). The

ﬁrst exception to be considered took its rise

from the fact that the structure was not com-

pleted within the time limited by the con-

tract, nor until 94 days after the expira-

tion of a month's extension of that time.

The defendant claimed a deduction or set

off of $100 for each day's delay. The plain-

tid met this claim by insisting that the

clause in the contract mentioning the $100

per day is unintelligible, and therefore nuga-

tory, because in its opening line it reads:

“In case the said party of the ﬁrst part shall

' ‘ ' to fully and entirely," etc., omitting

any effective verb. We agree, however, with

the trial judge, in thinking that the context

shows the verb which should be supplied.

It makes the $100 payable for each day that

“the party of the ﬁrst part shall be in de-

fault." This plainly indicates the verb “fall"

as the omitted word, to be supplied as an

equivalent for the expression, “be in default."

The right of a court of law to read an in-

strument according to the obvious intention

of the parties, in spite of clerical errors or

omissions which can be corrected by perusing

the instrument, is sufficiently vindicated by

the decision of this court in Sisson v. Don-

neily, 36 N. J . Law, 432. See, also, Burcheil

v. Clark, 2 C. P. Div. 88.

Taking the clause thus perfected, the plain-

tif f urged that the $100 a day was a penalty;

and so the trial judge ruled. requiring that

the defendant should prove the actual dam-

ages, and be allowed only for what was

DIXON, J. (after stating the facts). The
first exception to be considered took Its rise
from the fact that the structure was not completed within the time limited by the contmct, nor until IH: days atter the expiration ot a month's extension ot that time.
The defendant claimed a deduction or set
otr ot $100 for each day's delay. The plaintlfl' met this claim by Insisting that the
clause In the contract mentioning the $100
pe1· day Is unintelligible, and therefore nugatory, because In its opening line It reads:
"In case the said par·ty of the first part shall
• • • to fully and entirely," etc., omitting
any eft'ective verb. We agree, however, with
the trial judge, in thinking that the context
shows the verb which should be supplied.
It makes the $100 payable for each day that
"the party of the first part shall be In default." This plainly Indicates the verb "fall"
as the omitted word, to be supplied as an
equivalent for the expression, "be in default."
The right of a court of law to rend an instrmnent nccordlng to the obvious Intention
or the IJ'al'ties, In spite of cle1·ical errors or
omi1<::;lons which can be corrected by perusing
tlle instrument, ls sufficiently vindicated by
the decision of this court in Sisson v. Donnelly, 36 N. J. Law, 4:{2. See, also, Burchell
v. Clark, 2 C. P. Div. 88.
'raking the clause thus perfected, the plaintttr urged that the $100 a day was a penalty;
and so tbe trial judge ruled. requiring that
the defendant should prove the actual dam-

ages, an<l be alfowed only for what was
proved. To this ruling the <lefendant excepted. In determining whether a sum which
contracting parties haYe declared payable on
default in performance of their contract ls
to be deemed a penalty, or liquidated damnges, the general rule is that the agreement
of the parties will be etrectuated. Their
agTeernent will, howeve!", be ascertained by
considering, not only particular words in
their contrnct, but the whole scope ot their
bargain, Including the subject to which it
relates. If, on such consideration, It appears
that they have provided f.or larger damages
than the law permits, c. g. more thnn the
legal rate for the nonpayment of money, or
that they hnve provided tor the same damages on the brea<'h of :my one of several
stipulations, when the loss resultlng f1·om
such brE!aC'hes clearly must dltrer in amount,
or that they have named an excessive sum
In a case where the real damages are cc1·taln, or readily reducible to certainty by
proof l>et'ore a jury, or a sum which it would
be unconscional>le to award, under any of
these conditions the sum designated Is deemed a penalty. And If It be doul>tful, on the
whole agreement, whether the sum Is Intended as a penalty or as liquidated damages,
It will be construed as a penalty, because the
law favors mere indemnity. But when damages are to be sustained by the breach ot a
single stipulation, and they are uncertain In
nruount, and not readily susceptible of proof
under the rules of evidence, then, If the parties have agreed upon a sum as the measure
ot compensation for the breach, and that sum
ls not disproportionate to the presumable
loss, It may be recovered as liquidated damages. These are the general principles laid
down In the text books, and recognized In the
judicial Reports of this state. Cheddick's
Ex'r v. Marsh, 21 N. J. I.aw, 4~; Whitfield
v. Levy, 35 N. J. Law, 140; Hoagland v.
Segur, 38 N. J. Law, 230; Lansing v. Dodd,
45 N. J. Law, 525. In the present case the
default co°'siste of the breach of a single
covenant, to complete the grand stand as described In the approved plans and specifications within the time limited. It ls plain that
the loss to result from such a breach la not
easily ascertainable. The magnitude and Importance of the grand stand may be inferred
from Its cost,~133,000. It formed a necessary part of a very expensive enterprise.
The structure was not one that could be said
to have a definable rental value. Its worth
depended upon the success of the entire ven·
ture. How far the noncompletlon of this
edifice might affect that success, and what
the profits or losses of the scheme would be,
were topics for conjecture only. The conditions, therefore, seem to have been such ns to
justify the pnrties in settling for themselves
the measure of compen~ution. The stipulations of parties for spedfied damages on the
breach of a contract to build within a limited
time ha¥e frequently b('Cn enforced by tlle
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courts. In Fletcher v. Dyche, 2 Term R. 32,

£10 per week for delay in ﬁnishing the parish

church; in Duckworth v. Alison, 1 Mees. &

W. 412, £5 per week for delay in completing

repairs of a warehouse; in Legge v. Har-

lock, 12 Q. B. 1015, £1 per day for delay in

erecting a barn, wagon shed, and granary;

in Law v. Local Board (1892) 1 Q. B. 127,

£100 and £5 per week for delay in const1uct-

ing sewerage works; in Ward v. Building

Co., 125 N. Y. 230, 26 N. E. 256, $10 a

day for delay in erecting dwelling houses;

-and in Malone v. City of Philadelphia (Pa.

.

Sup.) 23 Atl. 628, $30 a day for delay in com-

pleting a municipal bridge,—were all deemed

liquidated damages. Counsel has referred

us to two cases of building contracts, where

a different conclusion was reached: Mul-
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-doon v. Lynch, 66 Cal. 536, 6 Pac. 417, and

Clements v. Railroad Co., 132 Pa. St. 445, 19

Atl. 274, 276. In the former case a statutory

rule prevailed. and in the latter the real dam-

age was easily ascertainable, and the stipu-

lated sum was unconscionable. In the case

at bar we have no data for saying that $100

a day was unconscionable. The sole ques-

tion remaining on this exception, therefore, is

whether the parties have agreed upon the

sum named as liquidated damages. Their lan-

guage seems, indisputably. to have this mean-

ing. They expressly declare the sum to be

agreed upon as the damages which the de-

fendant will snffer, they expressly deny that

they mean it as a penalty, and they provide

for its deduction and retention by the de-

fendant in a mode which could be applied

only if the sum be considered liquidated dam-

ages. Bnt it is argued that as the contract

authorized the engineer of the defendant to

make any alterations or additions that he

might ﬁnd necessary during the progress of

the structure, and required the plaintiff to

accede thereto, it is unreasonable to suppose

that the plaintiff could have intended to bind

itself, in liquidated damages, for delay in

completing such a changeable contract. But

this argument seems to be aside from the

present inquiry, which is, not whether the

plaintiff became responsible for damages by

reason of the noncompletion of the grand

stand on the day named, but whether, it it

did become so responsible, those damages

are liquidated by the contract. On the ques-

tion ﬁrst stated, changes ordered by the en-

gineer may afford matter for consideration;

on the second question, they are irrelevant.

Certainly the bills of exceptions do not indi-

cate any alterations or additions which, as

matter of law, would relieve the plaintiff

courts. In Fletcher v. Dyche, 2 Term R. 32, rette to the plalntiiT, was lllegnlly received In
£10 per week tor delay In finishing the pnrlsh 1 e\•ldence. It was offered and admitted as a.
.:hurch; In Duckworth v. Alison, 1 Mees. & . decision by the chief engineer of the defendW. 412, £5 per week. tor delay In completing ant under the contract. Since It was writrepairs of a warehouse; In Legge v. Hnr- ten after the completion of the work, and
lock, 12 Q. B. 1015, £1 per day for delay In 11fter the writer had ceased to be the engierecting a bnrn, wagon shed, and grnnary; neer of the defendant, and without notice to
in Law v. Local Board (18'J2) 1 Q. B. 127, the defendant, It could not possess the char£100 nml £5 ller week tor delny in conl'-"tl"Uct- aeter attributed to It.
lng sewerage works; In ·ward v. Building
The only other exception which It appears
Co., 125 N. Y. 230, 26 .S. E. 2;JG, $10 a useful to notice Is that relating to the existdny tor delay In erecting dwelling houses; ence of claims by outside pnrtles. 'l'he agree· nud In Malone v. City of Phihulelphln (Pa. ment contains two clauses on this subject.Sup.) 23 Atl. G28, $j0 a day for deluy ln com- one under the bead, "Specification;" the othpleting a municipal brldge,-were all deemed er, under the head, "Revised Specification."
liquidated damages. Counsel has referred It seems proper to hold thnt the latter clause
us to two cases of building contracts, where Is substituted in the contract for the former,
a different conclusion was reached: Mul- 11nd therefore it only need be considered. It
doon v. Lyn<'h, 6G Cal. ri3G, II Pac. 417, and roods: "Tlllrty days after the acceptnuce of
Clements v. Railroad Co.. 132 Pa. St. 4·15, 1V the completed work by the owner, the reAtl. 274, 276. In the former case a statutory tained ten per cent. wlll be paid the contractrule prevailed, and In tbe latter the real dam- or, upon his furnishing satisfactory evidence
age was easily nscertninahle, and the stipu- that no liens or unsatisfied claims exist on
lated sum was unconscionable. In the case the work, or any part of It." The expresat bar we hnve no data for saying that $100 sion, "liens or unsa tlstted claims on the work,"
a day was unconscionable. The sole ques- must mean claims which can be enforced
tion remaining on this exception, therefore, Is against the work, nod such claims could exist
whether the parties have agreed upon the only under our mechanic's lien law. By
sum named as liquidated damages. Their lan- "liens" the parties intended claims filed unguage seems, indisputably, to have this mean- der that Inw; by "unsatisfied claims," they
ing. They expressly declare the sum to be Intended claims which were not, but might
agreed upon as the damages which the de- be, flied under that law. The statute (Rt.~
fendant will suffer, they expressly deny that vision, p. 668, § 2) provides "that when any
they mean It ns a penalty, and they provide building shall be erected, in whole or lu purr,
tor Its deduction and retention by the de- by contract In writing, such building, and
fendant ln 11 mode which could be 11pplled the land whereon it stnuds, shall be liable to
-0nly If the sum be consltlered llquidnted dam- the contractor alone for work done or ma·
ages. But it is argued thnt as the contract terials furnished In pursuance of such conauthorized the engineer ot the defendant to tract: provided such contract, or a duplimake any alterations or additions that be cate thereof, be filed in the office of the clerk
might find necessary during the progTess ot of the county In which sueh bulldiug is sitthe structure, and required the plalntltr to uate before such work done or materials fur.accede thereto, It ls unreasonable to suppose nished;" and (section 13) "tbnt no detJt ·suall
that the plillnti!T could have Intended to bind be 11 lien by virtue of tlils act unless a claim
Itself, In liquidated damages, for delny In is filed as herelnbefore providP.d within one
-eomt>letlng such a cbnngen.ble contract. Hut year from the furnishing the materials or
this argument seems to be aside from the pe1·formlug the labor for which such debt is
present Inquiry, which Is, not whether the due." The contract between these parue11
plaintiff became responsible for damages by was filed January 2, 1890. Hence no liN1s
reason of the noncomplctlon of the grand could arise In favor ot outside parties for
11tand on the day named, but whether, it it work done or materials furnished after that
<lid become so responsible, those tlamnges date. For wo1·k done or materials furnished
are llquldatetl by the contrnct. On the ques- before that date, no debt would be a lien untion first stated, C'hanges ordered by the en- less a claim were filed within a yenr, I. e.
gineer may afford matter for consideration; before Jauuary 2, 1801. At the date last
on the second question, they are frrelcvant. named, no such claim was filed, and, so fnr
Certainly the bills of ex<'rptions do not Indi- ai:i appears, no such claim was ever filed.
cate any alterations or additions which, as The suit was commenced March 12, 18Hl.
matter of law, would relieve the plaintiff We think these facts furnished satisfactory
from responsibility for the admitted delay, evidence that there were no lieus or unb~ tisand conse't1uently there may Im ve been fied claims on the work when the nction was
ground for C'onslderlng the defendant's dam- brought, and that on this point there was no·
ages. It there was, the amount of the dam- en'Or at the trlal.
ages was adjusted by the contmct at $100
The other exceptions adverted to by counsel
per day. "'e think the ruling at the circuit for the defendant are either untenable, or on
.on this point was erroneom!.
questions not likely to ari,;c upon a new trial.
We think, also, that the lett<>r, Exhibit P Let the judgment he ren>1·setl, aud n n•nire
.8, \\Titteu September 10, 1800, by F. Latou- de novo be awarded.

i

from responsibility for the admitted delay,

and consetmently there may have been

ground for considering the defendant's dam-

ages. If there was, the amount of the dam-

ages was adjusted by the contract at $100

per day. We think the ruling at the circuit

on this point was erroneous.

We think, also, that the letter, Exhibit P
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(24 Atl. 170, 148 Pa. 645.)

KECK v. manna.

(24 Atl. 170, 148 Pa. 645.)

May 2, 1892.

Appeal from court of common pleas, Le

high county; ‘Edwin Albright, Judge.

Assumpsit by Emeline C. Keck against Syl-

vester Bieber on a bond whereby he prom-

ised to pay her $2,000 upon the non-perform-

ance of certain conditions. There was no

dispute as to the breach of condition, and

a verdict was directed for plaintiff for the

full amount of the bond. From a judgment

entered thereon, defendant appeals. Re-

versed.

Jas. S. Biery and Edward Harvey, for ap-

Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.

May 2, 1892.

Appeal from court of common pleas, Lehigh county; ·Edwin Albright, Judge.
Assumpslt by Emeline C. Keck ngnlnst Sylvester Bieber on a bond whereby he promised to pay her $2,000 upon the non-performs.nee of certain conditions. There was no
dispute as to the breach of condition, and
a verdict was directed for plaintiff for the
full amount of the bond. From a judgment
entered thereon, deft!ndnnt appeals. Reversed.
Jas. S. Biery and E<IJ.vfrd Harvey, for appellant. C. J. Erdman,, and R. E. Wright's
Sons, !or appellee.

pellant. C. J. Erdman and R. E. Wright's

'
Sons, for appellee.

Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.

MITCHELL, J. The general principle up-
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on which the law awards damages is com-

pensation for theloss suffered. The amount

may be ﬁxed by the parties in advance, but,

where a lump sum is named by them, the

court will always look into the question

whether this is really liquidated damages or

only a penalty, the presumption being that

it is the latter. The name by which it is‘

called is but of slight weight, the controlling

elements being the intent of the parties and

the special circumstances of the case. The

subject has always presented diﬁiculties in

the formulation of a general rule, and es-

pecially in its application. The books are

full of inharmonious decisions. In no state,

however, have the dlﬂlculties been more suc-

cessfully minimized than in Pennsylvania,

and in no case that I have seen is there a

better gene1alization than that by Agnew,

J., in Streeper v. Williams, 48 Pa. St. 450:

"In each case we must look at the language

of the contract, the intention of the parties

as gathered from all its provisions, the sub-

ject of the cont1act and its surroundings, the

ease or difﬁculty of measuring the breach in

damages, and the sum stipulated, and from

the whole gather the view which good con-

science and equity ought to take of the case."

The only criticism to which this would seem

to be fairly open is that it does not perhaps

give suﬂlcient prominence to the intention

of the parties as the controlling element, and

it should therefore be read in connection

with the restatement of it by our late Broth-

er Clark, in March v. Allabough, 103 Pa. St.

335: “The question ‘ ' ‘ is to be de-

termined by the intention of the parties,

drawn from the words of the whole contract,

examined in the light of its subject-matter

and its surroundings; and in this examina-

tion we must consider the relation which the

sum stipulated bears to the extent of the in-

jury which may be caused by the several

breaches provided against, the ease or diﬂi-

culty of measuring a breach in damages, and

such other matters as are legally or neces-

sarily inherent in the transaction." The in-

tent of the parties being, therefore, the prin-

cipal object of ascertainment, Greenleaf lays

l\IITCHELL, J. The general principle upon which the law awards damages Is compensatlon for the loss suffered. The amount
rnay be fixed by the parties In advance, but,
where a lump sum Is named by them, the
court will always look Into the question
whether this is really liquidated damages or
ouly a penalty, the presumption being that
It is the latter. The name by which It Is
called Is but o! slight weight, the controlling
elements being the intent of the parties and
the special circumstances of the case. The
subject has always presented diflcultles in
the formulation ot a general rule, and especlally In Its application. The books are
full of Inharmonious decisions. In no state,
however, have the dltficultles been more suecessfully minimized than in Pennsylvania,
and In no case that I have seen Is there a
better g1:-nerallzatlon than that by Agnew,
J., In Streeper v. Williams, 48 Pa. St. 450:
"In each case we must look at the language
of the contract, the intention of the parties
as gathered from all Its provisions, the subject of the contract and Its surroundings, the
ense or difficulty of measuring the breach In
damages, and the sum stipulated, and from
the whole gather the view which good conscience and equity ought to take ot the case."
The only criticism to which this would seem
to be fairly open Is that It does not perhaps
give sufficient prominence to the Intention
of the plLrtles as the controlling element, and
It s hould tl1e1·efore be re:td In connection
with the restatement of It by our late Brother Clark, In March v. Allnbough, 103 Pa. St.
3:Xi: "T'he Qut'lltinn • • • Is to be determined by the Intention o! the parties,
drawn from the words of the whole contract,
examined In the light of Its subject-matter
and Its surroundings; and In this examinatlon we must consider the relation which the
sum stipulated bears to the extent of the Injury which may be caused by the several
breaches provided against, the ease or dlttl·
culty of measuring a br<'!lch in damages, and
such other matters as urc legally 01· ncces-

sarlly Inherent In the transaction." The Intent of the parties being, therefore, the ptinclpal object of ascertainment, Greenleaf lays .
down certain mies as the result of the cases,i'.
and, among them, that the sum ls to be
taken as a penalty "where the agreement·:
contains several matters of d11ferent degrees
o! Importance, and yet the sum named Is
payable for the breach of ·any, even the
least." 2 Green!. Ev. § 258. This rule Is
approved In Shreve v. Brereton, 51 Pa. St.
175, and the present case falls exactly wlthhr
It. The conditions of the appellant's bond
are two-First, he Is to "save, defend, keep
harmless, and Indemnify the said Emelina
c. Keck" from llablllty by renson of the as- ·
slgnment to him over the head of Neiser,
and the termination o! the latter's mining
rights. This Is clearly a covenant for lndemnlty only, and, as no breach was assigned.
need not be further discussed. But, secondly, he is to pay the royalty accruing In the
future, and "keep and perform all the covenants, conditions, and stipulations of the said
lease and assignment." Turning now to the
lease, we find that plaintiff's covenants with
Kemmerer, which appellant thus bound himself to keep and perform, were to save harmless and Indemnify him against all costs and
damages to his neighbors from the washing
of the ore, to run the water In such places as
the lessor should order, to pay a stipulated
royalty, to fill up holes made and left In the
search for ore, to produce or pay royalty upon a minimum o! one thousai;id tons a year.
"to use the old wagon road for hauling said
Iron ore, and, In case there a.re gates or bars
on said l'Ofld, • • • to keep said gates
and bars In repair, • • • and keep them
shut when through," etc. The assignment
adds to these a covenant to pay plaintiff,
the assignor, an additional royalty upon a
sliding scale of the price of ore per ton. N<>
better Illustration of the propriety o! the rulereferred to could be stated. Here are numerous covenants of the most varied kinds
aud Importance. The covenants to lndemnify against claims by Nelser, and against
damages to the neighbors by the operation
o! washing, are undertakings which may b&
of serious magnitude; and under Dick v. Gasklll, 2 Whart. 184; Shreve v. Brereton, 51
Pa. St. 175; Moore v. Colt, 127 Pa. St. 289, lS
AU. 8,-and similar cases, the recovery for a
breach would probably not be limited by the
sum named in the bond. On t'he other hand,
the covenants. to fill up the holes made In
prospecting !or ore, and to keep the gates on
the old wagon road in repair and shut, ar&
against such trivial Inconveniences that It
would savor of absurdity to suppose that the
parties meant to stipulate for *2.000 damages
for the breach of any one of them. We are
therefore of opinion tlmt defendant's fourth
point, that the contract of the parties was
for a penalty, should have been amrmed.
It will uot follow, howevc1·, as appcllee seems
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to fear, that her recovery must be limited to

the loss of the royalty due her at the time

of bringing suit, and that she must bring re

peated suits for future failures to pay. The

to f'eer, tha.t her recovery must be llmlted to
the loss of' the royalty due her at the time
of' bringing suit, and that she must bring repeated suits f'or future failures to pay. The
defendant bas, by his acts, disabled himself'
absolutely and permanently from performance of' his covenants. Under such clrcum-

stances, the plalntlff may sue on the contract from time to time for the royalties due,
and for such other dn.mnges as she may suffer, or she may, at her election, treat the
contract as rescinded, and claim damages
In one action for the entire breach. Judgment reversed, a.nd venlre de novo awarded.

defendant has, by his acts, disabled himself

absolutely and permanently from perform-

ance of his covenants. Under such circum-

stances, the piaintiil‘! may sue on the con-

tract from time to time for the royalties due,

and for such other damages as she may sut-

fer, or she may, at her election, treat the

contract as rescinded, and claim damages

i.v-o xO~·j 3t?,
~ ~ [,ctl. (" ~

in one action for the entire breach. Judg-

ment reversed, and venire de novo awarded.

1.0“) pﬂ.‘\33?'

W1 pi-7/W
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(18 S. W. 262, 91 'l'enn. Ui4.)
Supreme Court of Tennessee. Jan. 26, 1892.

TENNESSEE MANUF'G CO. v. JAMES.

(18 S. W. 262, 91 Tenn. 154.)

Supreme Court of Tennessee. Jan. 26, 1892.

Error to circuit court. Davidson coun-

ty; W. K. McAI.t.is'r|,IR, Judge.

Action by Minnie Jame,a minor, by

her next friend, against the Tennessee

Manufacturing Company, to recover on a

quantum meruit; for work and labor per-

formed by her for defendant. Judgment

Error to circuit court, Davidson county; W. K. McALLISTER, Judge.
Action by Mtunle James, a minor, by
btlr uex t frieud, against tba Tennessee
.Manufacturing Company, to reco·rnr on a
.(Jtlll.ntum meruit for work and IBbor per1ormed by her for defen1lunt. Judgment
for plaintiff, and dtilendant brings error.
Reversed.
· ·
Dlckln1o111n & Frazer, for plaintiff In error.
E. J. Wickware, for deft'udant In error.

for plaintiff, and defendant brings error.

Reversed. ‘ '

Dickinson &Frazer, for plaintiff in error.

E. J. Wickware, for defendant in error.

LURTON, J. \Iinnie James, a minor, was

an employe of the appel1ant. n corpora-

tion engaxzed in the manufacture of cotton

goods. The contract of employment was
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in writing, and was with the minor and

her father. By one ofthe provisions of the

contract it was stipulated that the em- ‘

ploye should give two weeks‘ notice of her ‘ '

intention to quit. Itis further provided

that, in caseshe should leave without giv-

ing two weeks‘ notice, “or tail or refuse

to faithfully work during a period of two

weeks after giving notice of an intention

to leave, ' * ' then it is herebyagrced

that the amount stated below for the

class to which I may belong is agreed

upon as liquidated damages due said Ten-

nessee Manufacturing Company at the

time of my failure to comply with the

terms of this contract, to compensate it

for all danmges, both actual and exem-

plary, and all loss, arisingfrom my failure

[O carry out the terms of this agreement:

and it is further agreed upon that said

amount, applicable to the class of em-

ployee to which I may belong, shall be de-

ducted from any sum which may be due

me by said company, whether on account

of services rendered or otherwise." The

class to which appeilee belonged was that

of those receiving 50 cents per day and un-

der $l. The damages stipulated for this

class was $10. At the foot of this agree-

ment, which was signed by appeilee, was

this further agreement signed by her fa-

ther: “The foregoing agreement has been

read by me, and, fully understanding the

same, it is also agreed to by me, asbinding

both me and my daughter, Minnie James,

who is legally disqualiﬁed from making

this contract, to all its terms and con-

ditions. I agree, further, that said Minnie

James is hereby authorized to receive the

wages of said work, and that all sums

paid to said employe are to be accepted

as fully discharging all liability, to the full

amount so paid; and said wages are to

be subject to all the conditions of this con-

tract, as though said employe was legally

empowered to act in person." Appeiiee

grave notice of her intention to leave, and

thereafter worked 10 days, but at the end

of that time quit without any excuse. At

LURTON, J. lllnnie .Jaml.'f1, a min•>r, WflR
.1n PtnployP of thP> a111wl111nt. u <•n1·1u1rutlon engaired In the ruenufacture of cotton
guodM. The contract of employment was
in writing, and was with the ruinm· and
her rather. By oneofthtl provisions or the
contract It was stipulated that the emJ>loye i,ihould give two weeks" notice of her
intention to quit. It le further pro\•lded
that, in cneeshe should leave without giving two weeks' notice, "or tall or 1·efuse
to faithfully work during 8 period or two
weeks ttfte1· giving notice of an lntt>ntlon
~o leav11, •
• • then it Is herehy agreed
that the amount 11tated below for the
class to which I may lwlom1 is agreed
upon a.;; liquldatPd damages due salt! TenrteHsee Manufact urlng Com puny at the
time of my failure to comply with the
terms of this contract, to compe11i,i1:1te It
[or all dun11.1~es, IJoth a<•tuul and exemplary, and nil los11, nrlslogfrom my failure
co carry out the terms or this agreemtlnt;
encl it is f11rther agrcecl upon that suid
amount, oppllcable to the closs of employee to which I muy IJeloog, ehull be deducted from any sum which may be dne
me by said company, whether on account
of services render<.'cl or otherwii;e." 'l'he
t:laHti to wlllr.h appellee helon1red wati that
~f those recl!ivlng 50 cents p<:r day and unde1· $1. The dn muges stlpulut<.'cl for this
class was $10. At the foot of this agreemeni, which was siltnild by appellee, WIHI
this further agreement Higne!l by her fa1hp1·: "'l'he foregoing agl't•ement baH bP.cn
reud by me, and, fully u11de1·stunding the
su me, it is also 11greed to by me, as binding
both me and my daughter, Minniti James,
-who ltt legall.v cllsquallftcd from making
thlH contract, to all its terms ancl conditions. I agree, further, thnt said Minnie
Jumes ls bereby uuthorized to receive the
wages of said worl<, and that nil sums
f1aid to suicl employt> are to be accepttid
~s fully dischnrµ;iug all liubllity, to the full
Hmonnt HO paid; and euid walol:'eB are to
be 11uhject tu nil the coudl tlons or thll! contrnct, as though said employe was legally
empowered to net In person." Appellee
J!U \"e notice of her Intention to leuve, and
thei·eufter worked 10 duys, but at tbe end
of thut time quit witho11t nny excuse. At
the time she quit there waH due her 2Q
days' wnges, includinK the llJ days after
h<·r notice. If the stipulation as to damllJ!PH ii,i inYallcl, then the company Is clue
lwr $10 ; If vnlld, then nothlu~ Is due her.
i · floll quitting t1he hruught suit, lJy her

fatber ae next friend, upon a quantum
mer11it. The contract bus been set up aa
a defeniJe to her t111it.
'l'be circuit Judge being of opinion that
the contract wu11 Invalid, ae beln& one
with a miuor who had a ltigal rlgbt to
repudiate samo, gave Juditmtiot for the
plaintiff. In this we think hie llonor ened.
Jf the contract had been alone wltb the
minor, she might undoubtedly •repudiate
It, and recover U[>On a qu:111t11m merult•
The law would give the iufnnt the privilege or judging wh1>ther such a con tract
waR beoeHclal· or not, and of avoiding It
if she elected to do so, and recovering the
value of her ser\•lces as If she worked
without any contra1·t. JU Amer. & Eng.
Enc. Law, tit." Infnnt." But t.hlsrontract
was in la.w with the hither, who agref'd
that the wages In law due tu blm wight
be paid over to hlP t'hitd, "subject to all
·the conditions of tbls contract." 'fhe
wugr.s of a minor, peculiar circumstnnces
out or the wuy, are 1lue to the father.
'!'his sprinll:il from hitt ltigul duty to sup, ·port and educate his child. He may permlt the nilnor to tuke and use his own
earnings. This is culled "emuncipution,"
I and emanclpa ti on wlll lJe a defense to the
fath .. r's snit for the minor's wag('S. It
moy be express or lm11lled; entire or par·
tlal. It way he con di ti on al. It muy be
in writing or oral; for the whole minority
or f<ir a shorter tl'rm; as tu a part of the
child's wages or as to the whole. Emancipation will not enlarge the minor's capacity to 1·ontract; it simply predudes
the father from nssertlng his ctalm to the
wages of his !!hlld. Birsh. Cent.§ 898. If
ontl employ a minor with notice of tbe
non-emancipation or the infant, it will b0
110 defeuse to tilt> father's suit for the
wages that the child has rel'ei\'ed them.
On the other band, payment to the father
will be no derense to the minor's suit, If
the employer knew of the fact of emancipation. 'l'hese p1lnclplet1 of the common
law a1·e well settled, and have not l>een
affected by statute. Cloud \". Hamilton,
11 Humph. 105. The <'aRes In America are
collected in a note to Wilson v. Mc}llllan,
3:J Amer. Rel'· 117.
In view of these principles, we must construe the contract of the fnthl'r as an
emunclpa tlon, subject to the cuudltiuns us
to damagei,i in c1111e his child shall quit
without cause ancJ without the stipulated
notice. It ii,i as much as tf he had said:
"My child Is lt minor. As such, I am t>ntltled to her wages. I am willing that she
shall work in your mill, and tlutt the
wages she may earn shall be palci to ber.
I a~ree thut she shall comply with this
contrac t, und, i£ she does not, then the
wage11 legally due me shall be detained by
ynu to tho extent pro\·ided In the contract
I make for her, and only 11uch wages fH1ld
to her as I would be entitled to r<'<'eive If
the contract were exclusively with me."
'l' hls was ll conditional emancipation, under a specinl contract made lJy and with
the father fur himt1elf and his child. Her
e111ancl1,atlo11 was purtial. The father,
having a legal right to her entire wages.
hus fltlpulate<l that none shall be paid lier
beyond the Rum tlue 1111der this agreement
with him. If tllh1 cuutract Is binding on
1
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him, the minor cannot recover beyond its

limits. it the contract is invalid as to

him, as stipulating for a penalty, then il:

will not be in the way of plaintifi's suit.

We agree with the circuit judge in holding

that this contract does not iall within the

case of Schrimpi v. Manufacturing Co., 86

Tenn. 219, 6 S. W. Rep. 131. 'l‘hat case

concerned a contract construed as stipu-

lating for a penaltyin case of a breach. It

was held not to he an agreement for liqui-

dated damages, because the iorieiturecov-

ered all the wages due at time of breach,

regardless of amount due, and rega1dless

as to whether the arrcarages were the

consequence ofthe deiault ofthecompany.

It wasa contract harsh and unconscion-

able. It preserved noproportion bet ween

the sum iorielted and the actual damages,

Generated for facpubupdates (University of Michigan) on 2014-06-12 19:22 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/mdp.35112105421491
Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd-google

and put all employes upon same looting, .

whether much or little was earned. much

or little due, when breach occurred. 'l‘he

damages were to be all that was due. in

any case. To one, this might have been

the wages of months: to another, the

earnings of but a day. But in that case

Chiei Justice 'l‘Unsr:r quoted and indorsed

the language of CA1\u'nhJl.i., J., in Richard-

son v. Woenler, 26 Mich.9U, where he said:

“ We have no diiiiculty in holding that the

injury caused by the sudden breaking of!

of a contract of service by either party in-

volves such diiiiculties concerning the act-

ual loss as to render a reasonable agree-

ment ior stipulated damages appropriate. .

Ii 0. ﬁxed sum. or a maximum within

Which wages unpaid and accruing since

the last pay-day might be iorieited,should

be agreed on. and shall not be unreason-

able oran oppressiveexaction, there would

seem to be no legal objection to the stip-

ulation,ii both parties are equally and

justly protected." Applying these prin-

ciples to the case for judgment, we have

no diﬁicuity in holding that the stipula-

tion here is ior liquidated damages, and

not for a penalty, and that thecontract is

neither unreasonable nor oppressive.

“The tendency and preierence of the law is

to regard stated sums as a penalty, be- ‘

cause actual damages can then be 1ecov-

ered, and the recovery limited tosuchdam-

ages. This tendency and preierence, how-

ever, do not exist when the actual dam-

ages cannot be ascertained by any stand-

ard. A stipulation to liquidate damages

in such cases is considered favorably." 1

Snth. Dam. 490. This contract of employ-

ment on its iace aiiords no data by which

the actual damages likely to result from

its non-observance can with any certainty

be ascertained. Such a circumstance has

been regarded as justilying the courts in

,/

holding the sum stipulated as liquidated

I damages.

The plaintiff in error was a cotton-mill,

having in its employment hundreds of

bim, tbe minor cannot recover beyond its
limits. If tbe contract le Invalid as to
llim, as iitlpulatluir; for a pcnulty, then it
will not be In the way of plalutlff'e suit.
We BJ.?ree with the circuit Judge In holding
that this contrttct dne11 not fall within the
<'ase of Schrimpf v . .Manufacturing Co.,~
'l'er1n. ~19, 6 ::;. W. Uep. 131. That caHe
concerned a contract construed as etlrrnlu ting for a 11enalty In cuse or a breach. It
was heltt not tu be 1rn agreenll'nt for llquid!ltt':d damugfltl, hecam1e the forfelturecovert-d all the wages due at time uf brt-ach,
1·egardleee of amount due, and regurdle11e
'\B to whether the arrenroges were the
conse~uence of.the default ofthecouq1auy.
11 Wllit u coutruct hnn1h anll 11m·1111Hcio11able. lt prrservcd no 11roporti<rn het wel'n
the earn forfeited und thP 11ctu11l d1111111~P.M,
and 11ut all emplose11 upon 11u111c fouti11g,
whether much or little was earned. much
or little due, when brtuch occurrt'd. 'l'he
da111ag1•s were to he nil that wuR dm·. In
any cmm. '.ro one, th it~ might bu H" lll'tm
the wages of months: to another, the
-eRrnlng11 of but a d11y. But iu thnt Cllfie
Chief Jm1tlce 'flIH~t:Y quoted and lndurHt•tl
the lauguuge of CA1111•1n:1:1., J., In Hichard ·
1100 v . WoeUIPr, 26 Mkh. IJU, where he 1rnld:
••WP. have no difficulty In holdiau~ thut the
Injury cRuf!ed by the sud1J~11 l.1rl•11kinu: oil
of a coutrRct or Hervlce by either pu1·ty lnYol vefl !iUcb clifHcul ties cunl'l'l'llinu: the actual lusH llH to 1e11iler a reusonn Lie 11u:1·remcn t for 11tipulutPtl dunrni.teH appl'Opriatc.
lf a fixed sum. or u maximum within
·wh~ch wni.tes unpaid 11nd accruing since
the last pay-day might be forfeited, should
bl' a~reP•J on. and shall not bt> unre111mn·
u ble or an opp1·esslve exn!'tlon, there would
1:1ee111 to be uo legal objection to the stipulation, if hotb pnrtle11 are equnlly uud
justly proterted." Applying these prln-clple:t to tbe c11He for judgment, we have
no dilllculty in holding that the sllpuldtion here 111 for liqui<lutP.d damal{Pll, und
not for 8 JJ'!nolty, and that the1'.011traet. l11
ueltber unreaHonable nor oppre11sh·e.
.. 'rl1e t~ndency u nil prererence of the law Is
to regor<l stu ted smus a11 a penalty, be~a uRe actual <lamageH can then be recov.
ere<l, 11nd the recovery llmltl"d tosuchdamuges. 'l'hls tem.lency and preference, howt-ver, do not t-xi11t whl·n the uctunl dnmRltf'S cnnnot be llRt·ertHlned by any standard. A Htlpalation to liquidnte du111uges
In such CH11es is con!ilderctl favorably.·· 1
Su th. I>um. 400. This contract uf employment on its fuce afforrls no d11tn ll.v which
tlw actual i1amuges likely to result from
its 11on-observau1.·e cun with any certainty
he a~certalncd. Such n ci1·1:11111stuuce hns
been regarded as j11t1tlfylng the courts in
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holding the sum stipulated us liqu\;;lted
damageR.
The plaintiff in erl'or was a cotton-mill,
having In Ht1 employment hundreds uf
bends. 'l'he work le divided Into manv
de11Hrtnw11t><.
'L'hP rnw mntPrl11I i.;
h11nille1l by one set or bnnds, and put In
condition for unothP.r, und the second department iitlll furtllP.r Rd\•ances its manufocture; aud so on, through succe11sive
stuges of progret1s. The evldt>nce shows
that each department Is dependent 111>on
tbRt Immediately below It. Now, lf the
operatives of one department q nit, or their
work ls dr.layeli, its effect Is felt in ull to a
i;trl:'ater or lt>ss degrer.. It is nhw shown
that it le not alwuys easy to replace an
operuth·e at once, and thnt the uuexpecied
quitting of C\'t-n one hand will to eu111e ex·
tent uflect che re1mlts throughout the mill.
YPt the evidence f!hows that it would he
l111pm1sihle to t•nlculatewlth any certainty
the prcrllie, nctuul loHI! due to an unex.
pected brcnch of on enqJiuyc·s en~age
m1.>nt; thou~h It is HIJOwn that tl1l:'re nre
some dr.vartments uf work where the quit·
ting of n small nu111bn oi hnnds, without
11oticl', wuul<l stop the Pntire mill, 1111d
throw other huullredH out ulemploy111ent.
Jn this day ur itreHt ruetories. 111111 the
l"OnHeqnent dlvhdon of lubor Into Heparute
cJepart tnt'nti:;, R liegree of lnterdepcndeawe
among emtJloyee exiHtl!I, which I.hey oui.tht
unli do i·ccognize, uuli which mukci:; the
obligation of each to the whole, and to
the common employer, all the more Important. 'fhA c1111e Is one, tlwn, where the
ecrtninty of 110111e damage, and the uncert11lnty of meuns unu st11111l11r1ls by which
the actu11l damage can he a11certuined, r_,_
quire the courtH to uphold the rontr11rt
·a11 one for llquldatPd damnges, end not a.s
providing for a pPnalty. The sum flxcd 111
certain. lt is 11roportioneli to the earning
en puclty uf theemployt>, an<l hence presum·
ahly with regurd to the pnrtlcular results
or u hrt•uch in each department. There ls
no hnrtll!hip In thA agreeriwnt requiring
2 wcl•ks' notice. Jf the 011erath·e leaves
for guod cunsc, the contract wonld not
apply. II n lite to work, the pay continues
until notice haH bef'n workl'd out.
'fhut 11he returawd the next day after
quitting, und orfered to work out her uO·
1 tice, Is 110 t•omplianre. 'l'he mi1:1chler bud
been cJone. l':\lw hncl voluntarily, and without pretcni:;e or ex•;nse, or asking tu be re! leus(~d. gone off, und left her work stantl.
ing, nnd cndea\•o.red to get others to go
with her. Thl"damngeH hail uccr11e1l, and,
under the fnct11 of this case, appella11t was
not bound to rei,itore Jw1·. He\'l'rse. Jud~
ment here for pl a.in tiff in error.
J
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TODE et al. v. GROSS.

(28 N. E. 469, 1W N. Y. 480.)

Court of Appeals of New York, Second Divi-

sion. Oct. 6, 1891.

Appeal by defendant from ajudgment

of the general term of the supreme court

in the second judicial department, afﬁrm-

ing a judgment entered upon the decision

of the court after a trial without a jury.

Afﬁrmed.

Action for breach of covenant to recov-

er the sum of $5,000 as stipulated dam-

ages. On the 15th of October, “$4, the de-

fendant owned a cheese factory situate in

the town of Monroe, Orange county, com-

prising two parcels of land, with the

buildings thereon, and a quantity of ﬁxt-

ures, machinery, and tools connected

therewith. For some time prior, with
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the assistance of her husband, Conrad

Gross, her brother-in-law, August Gross,

and her father, John Hoffman,she had

been engaged in the business of manufact-

uring cheeses at said factory known as

“ From,nge de Brie." “Fromage d'Isigny,"

and “Nenichatel." Such cheeses were

made by a secret process known only to

herself and her said agents. On the day

last named, she entered into a sealed

agreement with the plaintiffs, whereby she

agreed to sell and transfer to them the

said factory and all its belongings, togeth-

er with the “good-will, custom, trade-

marks, and names used in and belonging

to the said business," for the sum of $25,-

000, to be paid and secured March 1, 1885,

when possession was to be given. Said

instrumentcontained a covenant on her

part that she would "communicate after

the ﬁrst day of March, 1885, or cause to be

communicated, to" said plaintiffs, “ by

Conrad Hross,John Hoffman, and August

Gross, or one or other of them, the secret

of the manufacture of the cheeses known

as ‘Fromage de Brie,' ‘Nenichatel,' and

‘D'Isigny,' and the recipe therefor, and

for each of them, and will instruct or

cause to be instructed them, and each of

them, in the manufacture thereof. And

that she and the said Conrad Gross, John

Hoffman, and August Gross will refrain

from communicating the secret recipe and

instructions for the manufacture of said

cheeses, or either of them. to any and all

persons other than the above-named par-

ties of the second part, [plaintiffs,] and

will also, after the ﬁrst day of April, 1885.

refrain from engaging in the business of

manufacturing, or vending of

said cheeses, or either of them, and from

the use of the trade-marks ornames, or ei-

ther of them, hereby agreed to be trans-

ierred in connection with said cheeses, or

either of them, or with any similar prod-

uct, under the penalty of ﬁve thousand

dollars, which is hereby named as stipu-

lated damages to be paid by the party of

the ﬁrst part, [defendant,] or her heirs,

•

LIQUIDATED AND UNLIQUIDATED DAMAGES.

TODE et al. v. GROSS.
(28 N. E. 469, 127 N. Y. 480.)
Court of Appeals of New York, Second Division. Oct. 6, 1891.
Appeal by defendant from a judgment
of the general term or the supreme court
In the 1teco11cl judicial llepartmen t, affirming n judgment entered U(Hrn the dt>eision
of the court after a trial without a jury.
Affirmed.
Action for breach of co\•emrnt to recover tbe sum of $5,000 a11 Htipulated clamages. On the 16th of October, 11'84, the lle-felll.lan t owned a chei>se factory sitna ta In
the town of Monroe, Orange county, comprising two parcels of land, with the
buildings thereon, and a quantity of fixture!!, machinery, and tool11 connected
therewith. For some time prior, with
the assistance of her husband, Conrod
Grose, her hrother-111-law, August Gross,
and her father, John Hoffman, she had
been engaged in the business of manufacturing cheeeee at said factory known ae
"From.Rge de Brie,"" From age d'lsigny,"
and "Neufchatel." Su<·h cheeses were
made hy a secret procet1e known only to
ht-r1:1elf and lier said agents. On the day
last named, 11he entererl Into a sealed
agreement with the plaintiffs, whereby she
agreed to sell and tranl!fl'r to them the
said factory and all ite belongings, togt.>tber with the "good-will, custom, trademarks, and names used In and belonging
tu the 1mid bmdnel!s," for the sum of $25,000, to be paid and secured March 1, 11'8.5,
when posl!esslon was to be given. ~aid
Instrument contained n covenant 011 her
part thllt 11he would "communicate arter
the first day or March, 1885, or cause to bl'
communicated, to" said plaintiffs, "by
Conrad Hrose,Jobn Hoffman, and August
Gross, or one or other or them, the secret
of the manufacture of the cheeses known
flB •From age di' Brie,' 'Neufchatel,' and
• D'!Higny,' and the recipe therefor, and
for each of them, and will lnstrnct or
cause to be Instructed them, end each of
them, in the manufacture thereof. And
tha.t Rile and the said Conrad Grol!e, John
Hoffman, and August Gross will .rerraln
from communicating the secret 1·eclpe and
Instructions for the manufacture of said
chees~e, or either of them. to any and all
pe111ons other th11n the above-named vnrtiPB of the second purt, [plalutiffs,] aud
will also, ofter the first day of April, 188!),
refrnin from engHglng In the business of
ma king, manufact urlng, or \'end lug or
said cheeses, or either of them, 1md from
the uee of the tra<le-marks ornamee, or either of them, hereby agreed to be transferred In connection with said cheeses, or
either of them, or with any similar product, under the penalty of five thousand
dollars, which Is hereby named ae l!tipulated dumuges to he paid by the party of
the first part, [1lefen1lnnt,] or her heirs,
executor!!, 1Hlmi11istrators, or assigns, in
caHe of a violation by the party of the
first pert [defendant] of this covenant,
of this contrnct, or ony ptlrt thereof. within five rears from the du te hereof." She
further covenunterl that she herRelf. 1111
well as "snlil Conru<l <iros>!. John Hoffman, uud August Gro::;11, during und up to

a111l un tlI the first day or Muy' 1885, Ahalt
continue nnfl remain In said couu ty of
Orauge, and from time to time, and at all
reesonHble tiwe11 during said period, hy
herself, or by said Conrad Gross, .John
Hottman, and August GroAs, whenever so
rt.>quested by the ea id parties of the ttecond
purt, [plaintiffs,) Impart to them, or either of them, the secret of making such
cheeses, and euch of them, anll insh·uct
them, and each of them, In the process of
manufactnrlng the aame, 1rnd each of
them, as fully as she or the said Conrad
Grose, John Hoffman, or August Bross,
or either of them, are informed concerning the sume." Both parties appear to
have duly kept and performed the agreement, except that, ae the trial court found,
"euht1E'QUt'llt1y to the 1Ht day or May, 1885,
Conrad Grose, the hnHbaud of defendant,
went to New York city, and engaged in
the busmeBI! of selling •foreign and domestic fruits, and all kinda of cheese and saot1·
ages, &c.,' • • • 11nd while so engaged
• • • sold and personally delivered
from hie piece of business to one John
Wassung three .boxes of cheese marked
an<l numed 'Fromage d'Ieigny,' and having suhstantla lly the se ml' trade--ma1·ks
thereon as thnt sold hy defendant to
plaintiffs, find ha vlng et amped tbtreon
the nu me •From age <l'lslgny,' and that
!!aid cheese eo sole! by him to said Wassung was a similar product to that formerly manufactured by defendant." Aleo,
that "sail.I August Grose, the brother-Inlaw of rlefendant, subsequent ti) the l11t
day of May, 1885, f.'ngaged In the business
of retailing fancy groceries In the city of
New York. and In and during ~he fall of
1887, and prior to the commencement of
this action, kept for sale at his vlace of
business in New York city boxes of cheese
marked or stamped 'Fronrnge d'lsigny."'
'l'he court further found that th(l cheese
so sold by Conrad Gro11H 'Jnder the nam~
of "Fromuged'l11igny, ""wat1never11ohl by
plalntlHe, nor made or manufaccured by
them, or either of them, but thu t the
same was a similar product." The court
round nH conclufillone of law thut 11ald
a~reement was a reaHonable one, and
w11e founded upon 1.1 good and sufficient
conslderu tlou; that eald Elale by Conr11d
and said keepln~ fur !!ale b:v August
Grose wus a direct violation of the covenan tin question; that the restriction hnposed wae no more than th" tntere11te or
the parties required, and the t It wae not
In restraint of trnde or against public
poliry, Judgment wns ordered for the
JJlulntiffe fo1· the eum of $5,000 as stlpulat·
ed dam n.g es.
John Fennel, for appellant. Henry Bacon, for respondents.
VANN, J. (after stating the facts).
'rhe bu11ineHe cnrriell on IJy the defendant Wilt! founded 011 a 11et:rl:lt process
known only to herself fl.nd her agents.
8he had the ri!(ht to continue the business, an<l by keeping her secret to enjoy
its benefits to any practicable extent.
8be also had the right to ttell the bnsine11R,
Including II!! an esst>utlal part thereof the
secret 11roces<!, and, In order to place the
purchui;e1·s In the sume position that she
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occupied, to promise to divulge the secret

to them alone, and to keep it from every

one else. In no other way could she sell

what she had, and get what it was worth.

Having the right to make this promise,

she also had the right to make it good to

her vendees, and to protect them by cove-

nants with proper safeguards against the

consequences of any violation. Such a

contract simply left matters substantially

as they were before the sale, except_ that

the seller of the secret had agreed that she

would not destroy its value after she had

received full value for it. The covenant

was not in general restraint of trade, but

was a reasonable measure of mutual pro-

tection to the parties, as it enabled the

one to sell at the highest price, and the

other to get what they paid for. It im-
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posed no restriction upon either that was

not beneﬁcial to the other, by enhancing

the price to the seller. or protecting the

purchaser. Recent cases make it very

clear that such an agreement is not op-

posed to public policy. even if the restric-

tion was unlimited as to both time and

territory. Match Co. v. Roeber, 106 N. Y.

473, 13 N. E. Rep. 419; Hodge v. Sloan, 107

N. Y. 2‘14, 17 N. E. Rep. 335; Leslie v.Lorii-

lard,l1l) N. Y. 519, 534. 18 N. E. Rep. 363;

Thermometer Co. v. Pool, (Sup.) 4 N. Y.

Supp. 861. The restriction under consider-

ation, however, was not unlimited as to

time.

The chief reliance of the defendant in

this court, where the pofnt seems to have

been raised for the ﬁrst time. is that the

covenant, so far as stipulated damages

are concerned, is conﬁned to the personal

acts of Mrs. Gross. and does not embrace

the acts of her agents. A careful reading

of the agreement, however, in the light of

the circumstances surrounding the parties

when it was made, shows that no such re-

suit was intended. What was the object

of the covenant? It was to keep secret,

at all hazards, the process upon which the

success of the business depended. On no

other basis could the plaintiffs safely buy,

orthe deiendantsell, for what her property

was worth. Who had the power to keep

the process secret? Clearly the defendant,

if any one, as she had conﬁded it to no one

except her trusted agents, who were near-

ly related to her by blood or marriage.

But could she covenant against the acts of

those over whom she had no control? She

had the right to so covenant, by assum-

ing the risk of their actions; and, unless

she had done so, presumptively she could

(){'copied, to promise to divulge the secret
to them alone, an1l to keep It from e\"ery
one else. In no other way could she sell
what she bad, and get what it wu11 worth.
Having the right to make thlH pro111IHe,
she nlso had thfl right to make it gooll to
ber venclees, and to prute<·t them by covenants with proper safegu11rds aguiuet the
consequences of any violation. 8uch a
contract simply left matters flUbstantlally
as they were before the eale, except. that
the sellt>r of th1> secret bad agreed that she
would nut destroy tte value after she h1ul
received full value for it. The covenant
wu11 not in general restraint of trade, but
wue a reasonnble meW1ure of mutual protection to the parties, as it enabled the
one to sell at the highest p1·lcc, nnd the
other to get what they paid for. Jt Im·
pm1t-d no restriction upon clthE'r that was
not beneficial to the other, by enhuncing
the prke to the seller, or protecting tbe
purchHsPr. Recent caRe./! make It \"ery
clear that such an n~reem~11t is not op.
pm;ed to public policy, even lf the restriction wn11 unlimited as to both tiuie und
territory. Match Co. v. Roeber, 106 N. Y.
473, 13 N. E. Hep. 41!); Hodge v. Sloan, 107
N. Y. 2M, 17 N. E. Rf'p. 335; Leslie v. LoriJ.
lard, 110 N. Y. li19, 0::14, 18 N. E. Rep. 363;
Thl'rmometer Co. '"· Pool, (8up.) 4 N. Y.
Sup11. k61. The restrlctiou under coui1ideratiun, however, was not unlimited as to
time.
The chief rellunce of the derendant In
this court, where the point seems to ho\·e
been raised for the first time, IH that the
covenant, so far all stipulated dumuges
are concerned, IH confined to the personal
acts of Mrs. GrosH, and doee not eml>ruce
the acts of her agents. A careful rea1llng
of the agreement, howe,·er, in the light of
the circumstances 1mrroundl11g the p11rties
when it was made, HhowR thnt no such result was Intended. Whnt was the object
of the covenant? 1t was to keep secret,
at a.II hazards, the proceRs upon which the
success of the business depended. On no
other basis could the plaintiffs Parely buy,
or the <Jerendan t sell, fo1· what her property
was worth. Who had the power to keep
the process secret? Clearly the defendant,
If any one, as she had con tided it to no one
excPpt Iler trusted agents. who were nearly relatell to her hy blood or tDfll'riage.
But could shP covenHnt against the acts of
tho11e ov~r whom Rhe had no control? She
had the right to so ruvennnt, lJy a11sumlng the risk of their actions; and, unless
she had done so, presumptively she could
not have sold her fnctory for so large a
sum. It was safer for her to sell with
such a covenant than It was for the plnlntiff1:1 to buy without it. She could exercise
some power over her own hnHlJnnd unrl
her father and her husband's l>rother, all
or whom bod been aRsocla tell wl th her in
carrying on the huslness, and whose nctlom1 In certuln other respects she assumed
to control for a limited time, whereas the
plaintiffs were powerle11s. unleH11 they had
her promise to keep the process seert't at
the peril of paying heavily If she <lid not.
It Is not eurpri11ing, therdore, to find that
the restrictive pa rt of the connan tappliC's w Ith the s1:111H• force to her agents
tllu t It ll'Jrs to herselr; ror she unde1·tukes
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that nelth.or she nor they wl11 dlsclo11e the
secret, or engage In muklng or Sl'lllng ti·
tiler kln<1 of cheese, or use the trade-marks
or names connected with the lJusin<•Rs.
We do riot think that n personal act or thP.
defenduntis essential to a violation of thi~
covenant by her: for if she permits, or
e\·en doett not prevent, her agents from
doing the prohillite1l ucts, the promise !fl.
broken. While It is her exclu11ive co\•enant, it l'elntes to the action of others~
and, ltthey do what she agreed that they
would not do, It Is a breach by her. although not bn own act. i5he violated her
a~ree111ent, not by 11elling h1~rself, but by
not preventing others from selling. This
construction of the restrictive part of the
covenant would hardly lJe open to question, were It not that In the same sentence
occurs the reparatlve or compensatory
part de11lgned to mnke thl:' plaintiffs whole
If the defendant either could not ot• did
not kee1> her Hgreement. While this pro\'ldes thnt any violation Involves the penalty of $5,UOO, It adds," which surn 111 hereby named n11 stipulated dumages to be·
paid" by the defendant in case of a violn·
tlon by ht-r or the CO\'enant in question.
What kln<l ofviolHtlon Is thm1referred to?"
'l'he defendant say11 a personal violation
b.v her only, but we think, for the reasons
ulready i.tiven, that the spirit of the agreement inC:u<les lJoth a \"iolntlon by herown act and by the act of those whom
she did not prevent from selling, although
she had agreed that they wonld not sell.
As no one not a party to a contrnct can
violate It, every act or defen!l;mt's formerugf'nts contrary to her co,·enunt was a vi·
olation thereof by her, whether she knew
of It or aHRented to it or not. Whenever
that was done which she agreed should
not b!l done, It was ll breach uf a covennnt
by her, even tr the act was cont1·ary to her
wishes, and in spite of her effortR to prt'vent it. Her co,·enant wee against acertain act by any one of folll' per1mns, lnclncllng lter11elf. Two of tho11e persons
sepurately did the act which she hod
agreed that neither of them 11hould do,.
and thus tlwre WRR a violation of the covenant hy her, the sume as If Hhe had clone
the act in person. The argument of the·
learned counsel for the defendant that the
contract ftxert a sum to be pHld In case uf
ll vlolHtion by the ddendunt, but not In
CaRe of 11 \"loJatlon "by the other parties,"
while plunslble, le unsound, for there were
no "other purties" who could break the
covenant. She was the sole coYenan tor,
nnd unless Bhfl kept the covenant 11he lJroke
it: and ehe did not keep It. As the actual
damages fur a breach of the rovenunt
would uecessarlly he "wholly 1111certnln,
and Incapable of being a11cercuined except
by conjecture," we think thut the purtles Intended to liquidate them when they provided that tbe sum named 11hould be" a11
stipulated damages." Theu110 of the word
"penalty" under the clrcumRtances is not
controlling. Bagley v Peddle, 16 N. Y.
4H!l; Dakin v. Williams. 17 Wend. 448,
ntfirmed 22 Wend . 201; Wooster v. Kisch,
26 Hnn, 61. As there is no other queHtion
that requires discussion, the Juu~men t
should be nltlrmetl. with ruHtfl. All concur, except IluowN J., nut sitting.

not have sold her factory for so largea

sum. It was safer for her to sell with

such a covenant than it was for the plain-

tiffs to buy without it. She could exercise

some power over her own husband and

her father and her husband's brother, all

of whom had been associated with her in

carrying on the business, and whose ac-

.. I ,,
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CONDON v. KE.\-IPER.

(27 Pac. 829, 47 Kan. 126.)

Supreme Court of Kansas. Oct. 10, 1891.

Error from disiricf court. Lnbette coun-

'ty; Guonuu Ca.uvn1.s.n, Judge.

This was an action brought in the dis-

trict court of Labette county by L. H.

Kemper against C. M. Condon to recover

$500 as liquidated damages for the alleged

breach of the following written contract,

to-wit: "This agreement between‘ L. H.

Kcmper and (7. M. Condon witnesseth,

that whereas, the said Kemper has sold

to said Condon lot 7. block 38, in Oswego,

Kansas. said Condon, as a part ofthe con-

sideration therefor. agrees to erect thereon

a two-story stone or brick building. not

less than 100 feet deep. within six months,

-and to give use of the north wall thereo!
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to said Kemper; or else remove the house

now on lot 6, in said block 38, three feet

north of where it now stands, as said

Condon shall elect to do. and put said

building in as good condition asit is in its

present location. It is mutually agreed

between said parties that a failure on the

part of said ('ondon to perform these ob-

ligations shall entitle said Kemper to re-

-cover from him the sum ofﬁve hundred

dollars as liquidated" and ascertained

damages for the breach of this contract.

~C.i\1. CUNDON. Oswego, Kansas. March

11, 1887. " The defendant answered as fol-

lows: “Said defendant admits the execu-

tion and delivery of the writing marked

‘Exhibit A.' attached to and made part

-of plaintiff's petition. but he alleges the

fact to be that said writing was executed

and delivered under a misapprehension

and a mistake of the facts in reference to

the subject-matter of the transaction

therein referred to as they actually exist-

ed. and that but for such mistake such

writing would not have been executed.

Defendant alleges that plaintiff was the

owner of lots 6 and 7, in block 38, in the

city of Oswego, Kansas. That the frame

house mentioned in said writing belonged

to plaintiff. and was appurtenant to said

lot 6. That defendant negotiated for and

purchased from plaintiff said ioi. 7 with a

view of erecting thereon a stone or brick

building. That at the time of purchasing

said lot 7. and of executing and delivering

said writing, both plaintiff and defendant

understood and believed that said frame

house, mentioned in said writing, and

which belonged on and was appurtenant

to said lot li,stood on theline between

said lots 6 and 7; the main part of it be-

ing. as said parties supposed, on lot 6,

and about two or three feet in width of it

standing on said lot 7. Thai; to permit

defendant to build on his said lot 7 would

necessitate the removal of said house, as

said parties believed, some three feet to

the north. That plaintiff sold. and de-

fendant bought, said lot under such belief.

LIQUIDATED

A~D
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CONDON v. KEMPER.
(27 Pac. 829, 47 Kan. 126.)
Supreme Court of Kansas. Oct. 10, 1891.
Error from district court, Labette coun·ty; GEoRG_E CHANDI.~:R, .Judge.
'l'h!s was an action brouJP;ht In the district court or Lohette county by L. H.
Kemper oiralm1t C. M. Cmulou to recover
$;jUO as lil]uidated dama1,tet1 for the alleged
breach or the following written contract,
to-wit: "This agreement between· I~. H.
Kemper and C. .M. Conrlon wltnessetb,
that whPreas, the said Kemper hat1 sold
to ;mid Condon Jot 7, block&!, lu Oswego,
Knnsas. Haid Condon, as a part oftbe consldt•ra ti on therefor, agrees to erect thereon
a two-story stone or brick building, not
kF<s thun 100 feet deep, wlthlu six months,
and to p;h•e use of the north wall thereo!
to suid Kemper; or l'h1e remove the J1ouse
now on lot fi, lo snld block a~. three feet
north or where it now st1rnds, as said
~ondon 11hall elect to 110, and 1mt said
building in as good condition aslt Is in Its
present location. It is mutually n~reed
between i;ould partlel! that u failure 011 the
part of said ('ondon to perform these obJi~utiu11A !!hall entitle said Kemper to re-~onr from him the HUlll of five hundred
dollars nfl llquldaterl · oud ascertained
d11mageH for the brPach ur this contract.
-C. M. CuNDON. Oswego, Kan11as. Murch
11. 1S8i." The defendant am1wered RS follows: "Said dt•rerulant a1lmltt1 the execution and delivery of the writing markl'd
• Exhlhit A.' attul'lwd to anrl made part
-of 11lui11tiff's 1)etltion, but he allegeti the
fact tu he that suld writing was executed
-and dl'li'iered under a mlsnp1>rehenslon
81,Jd n mil:ltnke of the farts in reference to
the sulJject-matter or the transaction
therein referred to as they uctuully existed, und that but for su<.>h mistal•e s11cb
wrltlug would not hnve brl'n executed.
Defl'nllant alleges that pl!llntltf was the
-owner or lots 6 and 7, In block 38, in the
dty of Oswego, Kansas. That the frame
hon!le mentioned In said writing helunged
tu pluintiff. and waH nppurtennn t to suid
lot 6. 'fhat !hifendant negotiated for and
purd11tsed from plaintiff snld Jot 7 with a
vh•w ur erecting thereon a stqne or IJrlck
building. That at the time of pu'tcha1>ing
tmid lot 7, and or executinJ?; anll delh·erlng
snld writing, both plaintiff and defendunt
11nrlerstood nnd IJelleved that said frame
house, mentioned In snhl writing, and
which belon1.1;ed on anrl was appurtenuut
tu 11ald lot U, Rtood on the line between
sal<l lots 6 and i; thl' main part or it being, 111:1 Haid partied RllJJ[JOserl, on lot 6,
.and about two or three feet In witlth or It
iltuudin~ on sni<I lot 7. 'l'hat to permit
defcndunt to builll on his saicl lot 7 would
lll'N'HSitnte tlrn 1·e1110\'0.I of suld hoUHt', se
1rni1I pnrtles helleved, Emme threo feet tu
the north. That plnlutiff i;oold, and deJe11«111nt b•rni;rht, Hlllll Jut under such belief.
'fhnr plaintiff, In negotiating for the snle
uf i;ouid lot 7, ohject<'d to being put to the
"XIH'ntie of removing said hou1>e so that It
woul<I ull stv111J on blR own lot 6, or insist<>d. if he were IJUt to such expe1111e, he
l'liould he com11ensated therefor; a11<1 tu
ti.ii; tlefendunt 11H11t·nt(>d, and agree<l that
Jic would, at hll:l own cx11ense, remu\·e

said frame house so that It should entirely
liltnnd on said lot 6, and far enough acroas
the lint> between s11ld JotR 6 and 7 not to
interfere with the P.rectlon of a wall on
said line, nnd put It In as good condition
as It then was, whe1·e it then stood; or If
he should so elect, Instead or removing
nnd repalrln~ said house as aforetiald, he
might erect on sal<l lot 7 a hrlck or stone
huflcllng not leMB than 100 feet deep, and
Jrlve plaintiff the Ut!e or the north wall
thereof as compensation for bis moving
and replliring said house ns aforesaid.
That it was tu meet Ruch contlugeuey,
and se<.>uro snch end, that said writing
was executed und delivered. l'hat thereafter this delendnnt elected not to en't:t
said 11tone or brick building on said lot 7,
and nut to furnish plaintiff the use 'lf the
north wall thereof. That, by Rgreemen t
between said plaintiff and defen1lunt, said
block was ofterwardH 1mrveyed, and the
fact W"OS then aHcertalned tbu t 1-mid frame
lrnilding did not stantl, as both of Ra.Id
pa1·ties had 11uppm1ed It did, across the
line between suld lots 6 ·nn'1 7,-n part un
6 and a part on 7,-but that it all then
stood on enld lot 6, and l!U fnr from t11e
line between lots 6 and 7 att not to lnh'rfere with the er~ction of a waJJ thereon,
and thererorea removal of Hahl frame building wos unnecesMury, and would ·he uf nu
ad\·antuge whatever to plulntlff. Defendant 111legP.11 that the only pnr110Rc un
the: part or plaintiff or defendant in the
execution and deli ve1·y or said writing
wal! to inde1J1nlfy plaintiff agalntit cost
ancl expeni;e In tbl1 removal und repair of
Hald house as aforesaid, unrl thut, had
plulntlff deHlred Its removal after the fact
In refert-uce to Its true loc~tion wut1 uscertuined, he could lrnve hacl It removed
three feet north of where It tlwu l!tood,
nnd put in as good condition as It wnl!,
w·here It then stood,ut a cost und expense
or not to exceed u11e hundrell dollars.
'l'hat tiaid house could, at the time of the
execution or 11uld writinir, or at any time
since then, have been remo\•ed three fret
north of where it then stood and now
Htands. and put In ns good condition as
It then was, In itH tlwn location, at a eost
of nut to exceed one hundred dollars.
'!'hat in no event could plaintiff's damage, had he desired to bave had said houHe
removed, exceed one hundred dollars.
That to Indemnify agnb1st l!Uch 11dssible
11amage was the only object In gl vlng 11aid
writl11~.
l>t•fendant allege1> that plaintiff
haH not removed snid house, and haR In
no way been to any cost or expense on account of the removal of Rnid house, or for
any other pnrposc referred to in any way
In saill writing. nerendnnt 11cnies that
plaintiff haR snfferl:'d any 1lama~e on his
account, and denies any llnbillty to him
In any rl:'Rpect. WherPfore dt•fem1nnt o~ks
that this cnuse be dismiRHed, nnd that he
recover 11ia costs herein." 'l'he plaintiff
replied, denying every nllt>gation or the
anRwn h1consiF1tent with the Allegations
of hf.1 petition. At the l<'ebruar,r te1·m,
18'\9, when the caHe was culled for trial,
the pluin1iff move1J for judgment upon the
plt>R•llnge; And the court sustained the
motion, and ren1hwell j111l~ment nccordlni;i:ly in fnvnr of thP plnintur a111J 11gnln!lt
the defen<11111l fu1· $JOO, with interest uad
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costs; the defendant excepted, and alter-

wnrds, as plaintiff in error, brought the

case to this court for review.

Case & Glssse, for plaintiff in error. J.

H. Morrison, for defendant in error.

VALEN'l'INE,J. (after stating the facts

as above). The substantial question in-

volved in this controversy is whether the

plaintiff below, L. H. Kemper, ma,v re-

cover from the defendant below. 0. M.

Condon, the sum of $500 as agreed and liq-

uidated damages, or whether he can re-

cover only the amount of his actual loss

or damage resulting from the breach of

the contract sued on, which amount, ac-

cording to the facts of the case as pre-

sented to us, cannot exceed $100. The

contract upon which Kemper seeks to re-

cover contains the following among other
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stipulations: “It is mutually agreed be-

tween said parties that ainiinre on the

part of said Condon to periorm these ob-

ligations shall entitle said Kemper to re-

cover irom him the sum of live hundred

dollars as liquidated and

damages for the breach of this contract. "

it will be seen that the parties themselves

have used the words “liquidated and as-

certained damages;" but nearly all the

authorities agree that neither these

words, nor any other words of similar

import. are conclusive, but that the

amount named, notwithstanding the use

of such words, may nevertheless be noth-

ing more than a penalty. Some of such

authorities are the following: Lampman

v. Cochran. 16 N. Y. 275: Ayres v. Pease,

12 Wend. 393; Hoag v. McGinnis, 22 Wend.

163; Beale v. Hayes. 5 Sandi. 640; Gray v.

Crosby, 18 Johns. 219; Jackson v. Baker,

2 Edw. Ch. 47l: Shreve v. Brercton, 51 Pa.

St. I75: Fitzpatrick v. Cottingham, 14

Wis. 219; Fisk v Gray, 11 Allen, 132; Wal-

lis v. Cut-penter,l3 Allen, 19; Ex parte Pol-

lard, 2Low. 411; iiasyc v. Ambrose. 23

Mo. 89: Carter v. Strom, 41 Minn. 522, 43

.\'.'W. Rep. 394: Schrimpf v. Manufactur-

ing Co., $6 Tenn. 219. 6 S. W. Rep. 13];

Haldeman v. Jennings, 14 Ark. 329; Davis

v. Freeman, l0 Mich. 188; Hahn v. Horst-

man, 12 Bush, 249; Low v. Nolte, 16 Ill.

475; Kemble v. Furren, 6 Bing. l4l ; Davies

v. Pt'nton.6 Barn. & C. 216; Horner v.

Flintoﬂ, 9 Mees. & W. 678; Newman v.

Copper, 4 Ch. Div. 724. Of course. the

words of the parties with respect to dam-

ages, losses, penalties, foricitures, or any

sum of money to be paid, received, or re-

covered, must be gi\en due consideration,

and, in the absence of anythingto the con-

trary. must be held to have controlling

force; but when it may be seen from the

entire contract, and the circumstances un-

der which the contract was made. that

the parties did not have in contemplation

actual damages or actual compensation,

and did not attempt to stipulate with

reierence to the payment or recovery of

U~LIQt.:IDATF.D
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lowing text .hooks upon thlR subject mny
be exnmine1: with much profit: 1 Sedg.
Dam. (!\th E1J. J c. J:?, §§ 3"9--4:..'7; 1 !:'uth.
Dnm . pp. 471>-&aO. c. 7, §ti; 13 Amer.&: Em:.
Enc. Luw, pp. 857-SliS; 1 Pom. Eq. Jur.
§~ 440-447; 3 Pars. Cont . pp. 156-lti,1, § 2.
The text-books upon thi>1 sulJject unite In
YALESTJNE,J. (ttfter Htatlng the furt!'I su.\·inir that the tl'nd<'ncy and prefer<'nec ·
as nbove). Tue subetantinl question in- of the luw le to regard u stuted Rum nis a
,.oh·ecJ in thlH controvcr"y iH whetlwr tlw
pe1111lty, Instead of liquidated 1lumuireH,
plnintHr below, L. H. Kt'lll[ll'r, mn.v re- bt>cauHe actual damap;f's cnn then he reco,·er from the defe111lnnt hl'low, C. l\I. eovf'rt•d, and tbe recovery IJe llmitl'd to ·
Con1lon, the sum of $:JOO ns ngret•cl und liq- Hurh tlnmagcs. 1 Suth. Dam.490: 13Amf'r.
nhlnted clnrnageR, or whcthi>r he c1111 re- & Eng. Enc·. {,aw, pp. 85:!, 8li0. 'l'he 1lt•d1:1con~r only tht' umount of hlH uetunJ loss
lons of thi11 court ure also in thiH • .1111e
or do mnge resulting from the br1mcb of line. 'l'he ohly dt•cislonR of this court upthe 1·ontrnct sued on, which amount, uc- on the subject of liquitluted rlnmages ure
cor1ling to the farts of the case RI! 11re- the following: Kurtz v. 8ponnble, 6 Knn.
1;e11tt'd to U8, cnnuot exceed ~JOO. 'l'he 3!15; Foote v. i.-;prngui>, 13 Kun. 155; Railcontruct u1>0n which Kemper 1wekH to reway Co. v. Shoemnker, 27 Kan. 617; Heatcover contuh1R the following among other
wole v. Gorrell, 35 Knn. 692, 12 Puc. Rep.
i;tipulatlont1: "It Is mutually agreeu be- 135. We are satislie<.l with the furrgulnp;
tween said parties that. a failure on the dc1:itdo1111 of this court, but they do nut go
vart of said Condon to pf'r!orm tlwi;e olJ- to the t'xtent or controlling the tlecl11lun
liga tlons i;J111ll entitle said Kem11cr to re- In the pre1wnt cnNe. The lust caHe clte1J
cover from him the sum of tlve h1111drell
Is snppurterl by the following adtlitlonnl
dollars as liquidated anrl n11certalned · cnses: Davis v. fliilt•tt. 5:! N. H. 126:
damRges for the brf'llCb or thll'I COIJtruct." Caswell v ..lohusi;n, 5~ Me. JM; Burrill
1t will be seen that the parties them1wlves
v. Dag11:ett, 77 Me. 5-l:i, I A ti. RPp. 6i7.
ha ,.e ut1ed the wor1ls ''liq nllla ted and n11In 1 Sedgwick on Damages (8th Ed. l the ·
certa lne1l damages;" but neurly all the followinll among other langu11ge Is ut1ecl:
authorities agree that neither theHc "From the foregoing we derive the folword11, nor any other wurcJs of similar lowing as a gen1>ral rule governing the
Import, nre conclusive, bnt thnt the whole Rnbject: Whenever the claff,agPH
amount named, notwithstanding the nse
were evidently the subject of calculation
of such worus, mny nevertheless bt> noth- and adj11Rtment bPtween the pnrtbs, ar.•1·
ing more than a pP.nalty. Somfl of such a certain sum woe agreed upon nnd In-·
tPncted ascompenRatlun, and is In fact reuauthoritle11 are the followi'1g: Lompmon
v. Cochran. 16 .N. Y, 275: Ayres v. Pense, sonable In amount. It will be nllowed by
12 Wend. 393; Hoag v. McGinnis, 22 Wend. the court as liquidated damages " St'c163; Ueale v. Hayes, o 8andf. li40; Gray v.
tlon 405. "Antl here we are brought bul'k
Crosby, 18 .JohnR. 219; Jackson v. Baker,
hy a somewhat circuitous vuth to the
2 Edw. Ch. 471: ShNlve v. Brereton, 51 Pa. great fundamental principle which underSt.. 175; Fitzpatrick v. Cottingham, 14 lies our whole syl!tem,-that of cumpeusuWis. 219: Fl11k v <fray, 11 Allen, 13:!; Wal- tlon. 'rhe great object of this 11ystem IA.
lie v. Carpenter, 13 Allen, 19; Ex parte Pol- to place thti pialntlrf In us good a position
lard, 2 Low. 411; Ba11.vc v. Ambrose, l!S 011 he would huve hall If his contract had
Mo. 39; Carter"· Strom, 41 Minn. 522, 43 not been broken. So long as parties themN. W. Rep. 394; Schrimpf v. Manufactur- selvca keep this principle in view, they will
ing Co., ~6 Tenn. 219, 6 S. W. He1>. Ja) ; be allowed to aicree upon sut•h a sum as
Hnldeman ''· .JennlngR, 14 Ark. 32!J; 1>11\·ls Wiii prohall)y be n fair equivalent or a
v. 1''reemnn, 10 ~llch. !SS; Huhn v. Horst- breuch of contract. But when they go heman, 12 llush, :!49: Low v. Nolte, ]Ii Ill. yond thiR, and undertu.ke to istipulute, not
470; Kemble v. Farren, 6 Bing. 141; Du vies for compensation. hut for u sum out of all
proportion to the measure of linbility
v. Pl'nton, 6 Burn. & C. :!lG; Horner v.
which the law rt>gards us compen1:1n tor.v,
Flintoff, 9 Met>11. & W. 678; Newm1111 v.
Cnpper. 4 Ch. Div. 7:!4. or COllrflt', the then the law will nut allow thea;:rPement
wordR of the partlt's with rt>llpt•ct to <la111- tu stand. In all agreements, therefore,
age11, loesei., 1rn1111ltie11, rorfL•lllJrt's, or any fixing u11on a sum In advance as tlie llll'HS·
sum of money tu be paid, received, or re- ore or limit of llaMllty, the tlnal quel:!tion
covered, mnst be gh·en due r.onslderatlon, Is whether the subject of the contract Is
and. In the ubsence of nnytblng to the ron- such that It violates this fundumentai rule ·
trary, must be held to have controlling of compem1atiun. If It d0e11 so, the sum
force; but when it may l>e l!een from the ftxt'd le neces11urily a penalty. Ir it doe11
t'ntlre contract, and the circun11~tnnees un- not do so, the queRtlon uri11es, ns in uny
der whkh the contract wns matle. that other contruct, ns to whut Agreement the
the pnrti~ did not have In contemplution
purtles hllve actually murle; und he1'0, us
actuul llnmuges or actual compemiation, in all. other cases, their intention, as llt1unit tlld nut attempt to stipulate with certul11erl from the lnngnnge en;plnyetl, le
reference to the payment 01· recovery of a guide." :::)ectlon 406. "Where the stipuactual damaF:es or actual compensatiO!:, lated sum le wholly coll a tern I to the oltject
thi>n the anwunt stlpulateu to be paid on
of tbtl con tract, ltei ng evi<len tly ini;erted
the one side, or t'l be received or recov- merely as security for pt'rformunce, It will
ered on the other slcJe, cannot he 1·onsld- not be allowed us llquitlatell d11ma11;i's."
ered as liquidated damugel!, but muHt be Section 410. "Whenever nu amount stip-·
considered in the nuture of a penalty; and
ulated Is to be paid 011 the non·pa.vthis, P.ven If the partle11 should name such ment of a less amount, or on llefault In tieamount" llquldu ted damages." The fol- llverlug a. thing of less value, the 11um will
costR; the dt'fl'nilnnt excer1ted, RncJ nftl'rW>1r1Js, &ff plaintift in error, hrouJ:;ht the
cuse to this court !or review.
Cu11e & G!Ri!Bl', fur pin In ttrf in error. J.
H. Morril1on, fur defendant in error.
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generally be treated as a penalty." Sec-

tion 4l1. “Whenever thestipulated sum is

to be paid on breach of a contract of such

»a nature that the loss maybe much grca t-

er or much les than the sum, it will not

he allowed as liquidated damages." Sec-

tion 4l2. “A sum ﬁxed as security for

the performance of a contract containing

a number of stipulations of widely differ-

ent importance, breaches ol' some of which

are capable of accurate valuation, for any

of which the stipulated sum is an excess-

ive compensation, is a penalty." Section

413. “ii the contract is one in which the

measure of damages for part performance

is ascertainable. and a sum is stipulated

for breach of it, this sum will not be al-

lowed as liquidated damages, in case of a

partial breach." Section 415.
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in 1 Pomeroy on Equity Jurisprudence

the following language is used: “Where

an agreement contains provisions for the

‘ performance or non-performance of several

acts of diﬂerent degrees ofimportance, and

then a certain sum is stipulated to be paid

upon a violation of any or all of such pro-

visions, and the sum will be in somein-

tances too large, and in others too small,

a compensation for the injury thereby oc-

casioned, that sum is to be treated as a

penalty, and not as liquidated damages.

This rule has been laid down in a some-

what different form, as follows: Where

-the agreement contains provisions for the

performance or non-performance of acts

which are not measurable by any exact

pecuniary standard, and also of one or

more other acts in respect of which the

damages are easily ascertainable by a

jury, and a certain sum is stipulated to be

paid upon a violation of any or of all

these provisions. such sum must be taken

to be a penalty." Section 443. “ Whether

-an agreement provides for the performance

or non-performance of one single act, or of

several distinct and separate acts, if the

stipulation to pay a certain sum of money

upon a default is so framed, is of such a

nature and effect, that it necessarily ren-

ders thedefaulting party liable in the same

amount at all events, both when his fail-

ure to perform is complete and when it is

only partial, the sum must be regarded

as a penalty, and not as liquidated dam-

ages." Section 444.

In Sutherland on Damages the following

among other language is used: “ While no

onecan fail to discover a very great amount

of apparent conﬂict, still it will be found

on examination that most of the cases,

however conﬂicting in appearance. have

yet been decided according to the justice

and equity of the particular case." Page

478. “ To be potential and controlling

that a stated sum is liquidated damage,

that sum must be ﬂxed as the basis of

compensation, and substantially limited

to it; for just compensation is recognized
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generally be treated aR a penalty,• Section 411. "Whenever theetlpulnted sum is
to be paid on breach or a contract or such
.a nature that the loss may be much greater or much le1:1e than the sum, It will not
be allowed as liquidated damages." Section 412. "A sum fixed ae 11ecurity for
the performance or a contract cout:i.inlng
a number of stipulations of wltJely diHl!rent importance, breaches of some of which
are capable of accurate valuation, for any
of which the stipulated sum Is an exceRB·
Ive compensation, le a penalty." Section
413. "JI the contract 1" one In which the
measure ol damages for part performance
.le ascertainable, and a sum Is stipulated
for breach of it, this llum will not be allowed as liquidated damages, In case of a
partial breach." 8ectlon 415.
In I Pomeroy on Equity .1 urlaprmlence
the folio wing languuµ;e la used: "Where
an agreement contains provisions for the
performance or nun·ptn•formance or l!evera\
actl!uf lliffereut degrees oflmportnucc,und
then a certain sum Is etipula ted to he paid
upon a violation of any or all or such proviRions, and the su111 will be In some intance11 too )urge, Rnd in other!! too Rmnll,
a compensation for the injury thereby OC··
·ca1<ioneu, that sum is to be treated as ll
penalty, and not 11s Jiquicluted damages.
This rule hHt1 been lnill clown In a somewhat different form, as follows: Where
thl:l agreement co11tui11s provisions fur t11e
performance or non-performance of acts
whkh are not measurable by any exact
pecuniary standard, and ulso of one or
more other nct11 In respect or which the
llanrnges are euRily ascertuinltllle by a
jury, aud a certain sum Is stipulatPd to be
pnid upon 11 violation of any or of all
thcsl:l provisions. <1uc11 sum 1111111t he taken
to be a penalt.v." Section 443. "Whether
.an agreement providt's for the performance
or non-perlonuance ol one single act, or of
several distinct and separate acts, H the
Htipulu tion to pa,v a certain 1111m of money
upon R default Is so frumed, ii! of such a
nature and effect, that it ne('essarily ren-ders the deruui ting party liable In the same
amount at all events, both when his failure to perform Is complete and when It is
-only partial, the sum must he rt~gurded
us a penalty, and not as liquidated damages." Section 444.
In Sutherland on DamageRthe following
11mong other language h m,;ed: .. While no
onecnu fail to discover a very gren t amount
-0f apparent confllrt, still it will be foun~
on examination that must or the cases,
however conflicting In appearance. have
set been decided ac·cordlng to the juRtlce
and equity of the particular caHe." Pnge
4iS. "To l.Je potential and controlling
that a stated sum lt1 liquidated damage,
that Hum mu11t be fixed as the bueis of
·compensation, and euhstantially limited
to it; for Just compemmtlou Is recognized
as the unlverFml measure of damages not
pnnitory.
Pnrtles may liquidate the
amount by previom1 agreement. But,
when a 11tipuluted sum Is evl!lent.Jy nut
bu11ed ou thut principle, the intention to
liquidate domu~el! will either he found not
to exist, or will be dlsregnrde<I, and the
fltated sum treated us a ptnulty. Contracts ore not made to he brok1m; and
hence, when pnrtles p1·ovide forcousequen-

ces of a breach, they proceed with less caution thou If that event was certain, and
they were fixing a sum absolutely to be
paid. T.he Intention In all such cases la
material; but, to prevent a stated sum
from beln~ tre11ted llR a penalty, the Intention should be n11parent to liquidate
damages in the sense of making Just compensation. It is not enough thut the parties express the Intention that the stated
sum shall be paid In cuse ol a violation of
the contract. A penalty IR not converted
Into liquidated damages by the Intention
that It be paid. It Is intrinsically a differ.
ent thing, and theinteution tl11\tit he paid
cannot alter Its nature. A bond, literally
co118trued, Imports an Intention that the
penalty shall be paid if there be clefault In
the performnnce of the condition; and
formerly that was the lei:cal effect. Court11
of law now, however,11d1ninister thesame
e1luity to relie\'e from penalties in other
forms of contract as from those in bonos.
The evidence of an Intention to measure
the dnnrnge, therefore, Is seldom satiHfactory wlieu the amount stated varies
materially from a just estimate of the netual Joss finally sustained.·· Poges 480, 481.
See altm, eHpecially, 3 Par1mns on Contracts (16th Ed., p. 156 et seq.)
Muuy com·ts hold that tne Intention of
the parties must govern, but RUY that If
the damage!! 1Hlpuln.tell tu be l'aid, received, or recoverAd on the breach of the
coutract are out of proportion to the actual damnges that might beeustalued, then
the parties could uotin fact ha\·e intenoed
liq ul<la te<I du 111uges, bnt merely a penalty,
whatever their hrnguage might IJe. Other
courts hold that it makes no difft'rence
what the Intention of the parties might
be; thnt the nature of the contract Itself
must govern, and if the amounti,;tlpulated
to be paid, receiveo, or recovered it1 out of
all proportion to thettctual damages that
might be sustained; then that 11uch u mount
mu8t be tr1;uted us a penalty, whatever
may ha\'e l>een the intention of the parties; that lu fact, un1J In thE' very nuture
of things, such Hmuunt would be a penalty, and could not be anything else: that
the parties coulrl not by misnaming the
amount, and call In~ It liquidated damngeR,
mnke it 1111cb. In this connection, the
following IRnguage of Judge CHRISTIA:SCY,
who deli\"erecJ the opinion of the conrt In
the CnRe or Jaquith v. Hudson,5 Mich. I2a,
lil6, l:l7, ls lnRtructh' e: "Again , the attempt
to place thiR queation u1wn the Intention
of the parties. 11ncl ttJ make this thE' governing co1111ideration, necessnrlly Implies
tl1t1 t, if the Intention to make the 11um
11tlpulated damages should clearly appear,
the court would enforce the coutract according to that Intention. To test this,
let It be a11ked whether, In such a case, If
it were admitted that the parties actually
Intended the sum to be considered as 11tlpuiated damageM, and not as 11 penalty,
would a court ol law enforce it for the
amount st.lpulated '? Clearly, they could
not, without going back to the technical
and long-exploded doctrine which ~ave
the whole penalty of the bond, without
refPrence to the damageH actually sust:.iinecl. They would thus be simply chang.
11111; the names uf thlngA, and enforcing,
under the nuwe of stipulated damages,
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what in its own nature is but a penalty.

The real question in this class of cases will

befound to be, not what the parties in-

tended, but whether the sum is in fact in

the nature of a penalty; and this is to be

determined by the magnitude of the sum,

in connection with the subject-matter. and

not at all by the words or the understand-

ing of the part‘es. The intention of the

parties cannot alter it. While courts of

law gave the penalty of the bond.the par-

ties intended the payment of the penalty

as much as they now intend the payment

of stipulated damages. Itmust therefore,

we think, be very obvious that the actual

intention of the parties in this class of

cases, and relating to this point,is wholly

immaterial; and, though the courts have

very generally professed to base their de-

cisions upon the intention of the parties,
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that intentionis not,aud cannot be made,

the real basis of these decisions. In en-

deavoring to reconcile their decisions with

the actual intention of the parties, the

courts have sometimes been compelled to

use language wholly at war with any idea

of interpretation, and to say ‘that the

parties must beconsidered as notmeaning

exactly what they say.' Horner v. Flint-

oti, 9 Mees. & W. 678, per PARKI:. B. May

it not be said. with at least equal proprie-

ty, that the courts have sometimes said

what they did not exactly mean?" And

in the case of Myer v. Hart, 40 Mich. 517,

523, the supreme court of Michigan held as

follows: “Just compensation lor the in-

jury sustained is the principle at which

the law aims, and the parties will not be

permitted, by express stipulation, to set

this principle aside."

We might quote further from the text- 1

books and thereported cases, but we think ‘

the ioregoingis sufﬁcient; and from the ‘

foregoing it certainly follows that the

plaintiff below. Kempcr,cannot “recover"

“ the sum of $500 as liquidated and ascer-

tained damazes for the breach of this con-

tract,"notwithstanding such is the lan-

guage of the contract. If the defendant,

(‘ondon, had removed the building situat-

ed on lot 6 three feet north, and had then

put the same in as good condition as it

was before, he would have so completed

his contract that not one cent of damage

could be recovered from him: and to so

remove such building, and to put it in as

good condition as it was before, would

not have cost to exceed $100. But sup-

pose that Condou had removed the build-

ing, and then have failed to put the same

in as good condition as it was before; he

would have committed a breach of the

contract, but the actual damages might

not have been $25. Then, should the

plaintiff. Kemper, recover the said sum of

$500? Or suppose that Condou had re-

moved the house, and attempted to put it

in as good condition as it was before, but

have failed to repair a lock, or a small por-

what In Its own nature la but a penalty.
The real question in this class of cat1ei; wlll
be found to be, not what the parties lntt>nded, but whether the sum la in fact In
the nature of a penalty; and this la to lie
determined by the mugnltude of the sum,
in <"Onneetlon with thesubject-matter, and
not at all by the wordK or the underi;tauding of the part'es. '!'he in ten tlon or the
parties cannot alter it. While courts of
law gave the penalty or the llontl, the partieH Intended the payment of the penalty
ae much aR they now intend the payment
of etlpulotP.d damages. It muMt tht.'refore,
we think, be very ob\·ioua that the actual
Intention of the parties In this clas11 of
<"ases, and relating to this poln t, ls whnlly
immaterial; unu, though the courts ha \'e
very generally professed to base their declelon·s upon the Intention of the parties,
that intention la not, nud l'aunot be made,
tile real bMls of these deehdons. In endeavoring to reconcile their decisions with
the nctuul Intention of the parties, the
i!onrb1 have sometimes been r.ompelled to
use language wholly at war with any Idea
<>f lntt-rpretutlon, and to suy 'that the
p1trtlee must beconsidered ae not meaning
exactly what they say.' Horner v. I•'llntoff, 9 MeeR. 8c W. 678, pPr PA11K1;;, B. May
It not be said. with at tenet equal propriety, that the courts have sometimes said
what they dill uot exectly mean'!" And
in the case of Myer\'. Hurt, 40 Mich . 517,
523, the supreme court of :\lichlgan hehl as
followtt: "Just compemmtlon for the injury 1mstalned is the prlnclplll at which
the law alma, and the pa rtleH will not be
permitted, by express stipulation, to 11at
this prini:lple aside."
We might quote further from the textbooks and the reported cMCH, but we think
the foregoing la anmcient; and from the
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forPgolng It certnlnly follows that the
plaintiff below. Kempcr,cunnot "rc>cover"
"the sum of $500 as liquidated and ascertained damages for the breach of this contract," notwltl111tandlng 1rnch Is the Ianitunge of the contrhct. If the defendant,
Condon, hacl remov~d th~ buil<ling situated on lot 6 three feet north, aml had then
put the same lu as good condition as It
was before, be would have MO completed
his contract that not one cent of damage
could be recovered from him; and to so
remove euch building, and to put it In as
good condition as it waFJ before, would
not have cost to exceed $100. But enppose that Condon bad removed the building, and then ha ,·e failed to put th11 same
in as good condition as it was before; he
would have committed a breach of the
contract, bot the actual damages might
not have been $25. Then, should the
plttlntlff, Kemper, recover the sttid enm of
$500? Or suppo<Je that Condon had removed the hou11P, and attem1•ted to put It
In as good cou11itlon as it was before, bllt
have failed to rep11 h· a lock, or a email portion of the plastering, or a broken window, which repairing might not have cost
$1; then, should Kemper have the right
to recover the 1mld sum of $5110? All this
ebowe that the- µurtles did not ha v1! in
contemplation the matter of actuul r.omPl'n11atory dumages when they stipulated
that Kemper might re<"over $500 from
Condon as Jlqnllln ted and ascertained dumagel!, In ca11eor a breach of the contract, but
show11 tba t In fact, though not in words,
tht>y fixed the aom of $500 as a penalty to
cover all or any damages which ml~ht re11ult from a breacb of the contrBct. The
judgment of the court below IVill be reversecl, and cause remanded for further
proceedings. All the justices concurring.
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SMITH v. BERGENGREN.

(26 N. E. 690, 153 Mass. 236.)

(26 N. E. GOO, 153 l\lnss. 236.)
Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts.
Essex. Feb. 24, 1891.

Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts.

Essex. Feb. 24, 1891.

Exceptions from superior court, Essex

county; Evan: J. Surzmuss, Judge.

Action by J. Rank-ttt Smith against

Frederick W. A. Bergengren for breach of

an agreement not to practice medicine in

Gloucester. The court ruled that the

sum of $2.000, named in the agreement.

was liquidated damages, and defendant

Exceptions from snperlor court, F.ssex
county; EDGAR J. 81U:l!MAN, Judge.
Action by J. Ranlt'tt Smith ugulnst
Frederkk W. A. Rergengren for breuch of
an agreement not to pructlce mccllclne In
Gloucester. The court 1·uled thnt the
sum of $2,000, named In the agreement,
wnH liquidated damages, and deft'ndunt
excepts.
F. L. Ei•ans and H. P. Moulton, for
plaintiff. Ira B. Kietli and W. H. Niles,
for defen<lant.

excepts.

11‘. L. Evans and H. P. llloulton, for

plaintiff. Ira B. Kieth and W. H. Niles,

for defendant.

l-lOLl\iES,J. Thedefendnntcovennnted

never to practice his profession in Glou-

cester so long as the plaintiff should be
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in practice there, provided, however, that

he should have the right to do so at any

time after ﬁve years by paying the plain-

tiff $2,0il0, “but not otherwise. " This sum

of $2.000 was not liquidated damages;

still less was it a penalty. It was not a

sum to he paid in case thedefendant broke

his contract and did what he had agreed

not to do. It was a price ﬁxed for what

the contract permitted him to do if he

paid.

The defendant expressly covenanted

not to return to practice in Gloucester -

unless he paid this price. It would be

against common sense to say that he

could avofd the effect of time having

named the sum by simply returning to

practice without paying,end could escape

for a less sum if the jury thought the dam-

age done the plaintiff by his competition

was less than $2,000. The express cove-

nant imported theinrther agreement that

if the defendant did return to practice he

would pay the price. No technical words

are necessary if the intent is fairly to be

gathered from the instrmnent. St. Al-

hans v. Ellis, l6 East, 352; Stevinson‘s

Case. 1 Leon. 324; Burik v. Murshali,40 Ch.

Div. 112.

If the sum had been ﬂxed as liqui-

dated damuges, the defendant would have

been bound to pay it. Cashing v. Drew,

97 Mass. 445; Lynde v. Thompson, 2 Al-

len, 456: Hoibrook v. Tobey, 66 Me.

410. But this case falls within the lan-

guage of Lord 1\IANsFlF.l.D in Lowe v.

Peers, 4 Burrows, 2225, 2229, that if there

is a covenant notto plough, with a penal-

ty, in a lease, a court of equity will relieve

against the penalty; "but if it is worded

‘to pay £5 an acre for every acre ploughed

up,' there is no alternative; no room for

any relief against it; no compensation.

It is the substance of the agreement."

See, also, Ropes v. Upton, 125 Mass. 25“,

260. The ruling excepted to did the de-

fendant no wrong. In the opinion of a

majority of the court, the exceptions must

be overruled.

HOLME8. J. ThP clefenclnnt ccn·pnnnted
never to practice his profesfllon In Glouce8ter so long us the plaintHf should be
In pructlce there, provided, however, tbnt
he tihould have the right to do so at any
ti me nrter fl ve yeu rs by paying the plaintiff f2,fl00, "but not otherwh1e." '.rhlK sum
of $:!.1100 waH not liquidated damnges;
still less was It a penalty. It was not a.
sum to he pnid In c11se tbec1efPndant broke
his contract uud did what he had agreed
not to do. It was a price fixed for what
the contract permitted him to do tr be
pultl.
'l'hc defendant expressly covenanted
not to return to pructlce In Gloucester

I
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unless he paid this price. It would bEJ
against common sense to sny that he
could &\'"old the effect of tl111e having
nam('d the sum by !limply returnlnir to
practke without paying, end could e11capefor a Iese sum If the jury thoui;r;ht the dumage done the plaintiff by his competlfiou
wus Iese than ,2,000. The exprei-;e covenant Imported the further agreement that
if the defendant 11id return to practice he
would pay the price. No tl'Chnkal words
are neeei,;i,;nry If the Intent Is fnlrly to be
gathered from the lnstrnment. St. Albuns v. Ellie, 16 EaKt, 35:!; Htevinson'e
CaKe, I Leon. 324; Burik >. Murshull,40 Ch.
Div. 112.
lf the sum hnd bren ftxed as liquidated clamnge11, the defendant would have
been hound to pay It. Cushing v. Drew,
97 MaRH. 44il; Lynde v. Thompson, 2 AllPn, 45(i; Holbrook \'". Tohey, 66 Me.
410. But this culle falls within the lnni;rnage of Lord MA~SFIF.l.D In Lowe v.
Peers, 4 Burrows, 2225, 22~9. that If thero
Is a covenant not to plough, with a penalty, In u lease, ll court of equity wlll reliern
ugalnet the penalty; "but if it is worded
'to pay £5 an acre for every acrP ploughed
up,' there is no alternnth·e; no room fur
nuy relief against It; no compensation.
It Is the substance of the agreement.,.
See, also, nopes v. Upton, 125 Mase. 258.
260. The ruling except<.'<l to did the defendant no wrong. In the opinion o! a
majority or the court, the exceptions must
be overruled.
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BI-YPHEL et ai. v. SALEM IMP. CO.

(25 S. E. 304, 03 Va. 3334.)

Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia. July 9,

1896.

Error to circuit court, Roanoke county;

Henry E. Blair, Judge.

Action by George W. Bethel 6: 0o. against

the Salem Improvement Company. 'l.‘here

was a judgment for plaintiffs, and they bring

error. Afﬁrmed. -

G. W. & L. O. Hansbrou".h and Scott &

Staples. for plaintiffs in error. R. H. Logan,

A. B. Pugh, and Phiegar & Johnson, for de-

fendant in error.

KEITH, P. On the 20th of January, 1891,

the Salem Improvement Company entered in-

to a contract. under seal, with George W.

Bethel & Co., by which the latter agreed to .

‘ pensive preparation to manufacture the resi-
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. due of the 1,500,000 aforesaid, and were pro-

make and burn for the former 1,500,000 bricks

during the summer of 1891; the Salem Im-

provement Company agreeing to pay $0.50

per 1,000 for the bricks in the kiin, provided

“the brick should not run less than two- ‘

thirds well-burned, hard bricks; that the

bricks are to be examined when the kiin is

burned, and, if approved by the Salem Im-

provement Company, it is to pay Geo. W.

Bethel & ()o. for three-fourths of their value,

at the price aforesaid, but it, upon opening

the kiin and hauling the bricks, they are

found to be imperfect, and not equal to the

standard above named, the Salem Improve-

ment Company shall have the power of re-

jecting them." George W. Bethel & Co.,

and received therefor $3,212.31. A disagree-

per thousand for 1,500,000 bricks above men-

tioned, nor any part of said sum, except the

sum of $3,212.31, whereby the l1laintiffs have

been damaged on account of the failure to

pay for the bricks actually manufactured as

aforesaid, by the outlay necessarily incurred

by them in the preparation for the manufac-

ture of the residue of the said bricks, and the

failure of the defendant to allow the plain-

tiffs to continue the manufacture of the resi-

due of the said 1,500,000 bricks, or to pay the

piaintiffs their reasonable proﬁt, to wit, the

sum of $3 per thousand for the same to be

manufactured." The second count, after set-

ting out the contract, states the breach as

follows: "In this: that the said defendant,

as soon as the said plaintiffs had manufac-

tured the 803,491 bricks mentioned in the ﬁrst

count, and when they had gone to the ex-

ceeding with the manufacturebf the same,

the said defendant notiﬁed the said plaintiffs

not to manufacture any more bricks than they

had already manufactured, and that it would

not purchase ,nor pay for any bricks there-

after manufactured; and the said defendant.

although the said plaintiffs had manufac-

tured and kiined the said 803,491 bricks.

which were not less than two-thirds well-

burned, hard bricks, and had in every way

complied with the said contract on their part

to be performed, except as aforesaid, hath not
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403.04, with legal interest thereon from Jan- '

nary 1, 1892, till paid, and their costs therein

expended. The plaintiffs again excepted, and

tendered their bill of exceptions, which was

allowed by the court, wherenpon the plain-

tiffs applied to one of the judges of this court

for a writ of error, which was granted.

The errors assigned here are—First, to the

action of the court in setting aside the ver-

dict rendered in behalf of the plaintiffs, their ‘

dontentlon being that there was no error in

the instructions given by the court, and that

it should have given judgment in their favor

upon the verdict as rendered by the jury;

and, secondly, that it was error in the court

to give its ﬁnal judgment for $1,403.04, but

that it should have been for the sum of $3,-

74(3.07, with interest from January 1, 1892,

till paid.
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The instruction given by the court, and

which it afterwards decided was erroneous,

is as follows: “The court instructs the jury

that if they believe from the evidence that

the plaintiffs, up to the time they stopped

the manufacture of bricks, had been manu- ‘

facturing them according to the requirement

of the contract, or that the bricks so manu-

factured had been accepted by the defendant,

and that the defendant refused and failed

to pay the plaintiffs the sums of money, if

any, due them under said contract, as the

said sums became due, and by reason of

such failure the plaintiffs were forced to

stop, and did stop, the manufacture of

bricks, then the plaintiffs are entitled to

recover for the price of the bricks manu-

factured by them, according to the said con-

tract, and for the proﬁt on the difference

between the number of the bricks so manu- ‘

fat-tured by them, and 1,500,000 bricks, man-

ufactured according to the terms of the con- |

tract; and in estimating such proﬁt the

jury shall place the bricks at the price ﬁxed

in the said contract, and deduct therefrom

the cost of said bricks, as they shall believe

such cost to be from the evidence." This ‘

instruction is predicated upon the perform-

ance on the part of the plaintiffs of the con-

ditions set out in their covenant, and upon

the failure of the defendant to pay to the

plaintiffs the sums of money due them un- |

der the contract, as the same became paya-

ble. It is claimed by the defendant in er- t

ror that this instruction was erroneous, for

two reasons: First,-that there was no such

issue presented by the pleadings; the breach

, is relied upon.

laid in the declaration being that the defend- ,

ant had failed to perform the covenants in L

the said contract on its part to be performed, 1

in this: “That the said defendant notiﬁed

the plaintiffs that it would not purchase any

more of the said bricks than had already ‘

been made, and to discontinue the manufac- ,

ture of the same." The theory upon which i,

this action was brought, as appears from the ‘

declaration. was that the plaintiffs were

entitled to recover because‘ the defendant
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403.M, with legal Interest thereon from January 1, 1892, till paid, and their costs therein
expended. Tbe plalnturs again excepted, and
tendered their bill of exceptions, which wu
allowed by the court, whereupon the plalntitrs applied to one ot the judges of this rourt
for a writ of error, which was granted.
The errors assigned here are-First, to the
action ot the court In setting aside the verdict rendered In behalf of the plalntltrs, their
oontenllon being that there was no error in
the Instructions given by the court, and that
It should have given judgment In their favor
upon the verdict as rendered by the jury;
and, secondly, that It was error In the court
to give Its final judgment for $1,403.M, but
that it should have been for the sum pf $3,i4H.07, with Interest from Janu8.1'1 1, 1892,
till pa.id.
The Instruction given by the court, and
which It aftei:wards decided was erroneous,
Is as follows: "The court Instructs the jury
that ff they believe from the evidence that
the plalntltl'e, up to the time they stopped
the manufacture of bricks, had been manufacturing them according to the requh·ement
ot the contract, or that the bricks so manufactured had been accepted by the defendant,
and that the defendant refused and failed
to pay the plalntlft's the sums of money, If
any, due them under said contract, as the
said sums became due, and by reason ot
such failure the plaintiffs were forced to
stop, and did stop, the manufacture of
bricks, then the plaintiffs are entitled to
recover for the price of the bricks manufactured by them, according to the said contract, and tor the profit on the dltr.erence
between the number of the bricks so manufactured by them, and 1,500,000 bricks, manufactnred according to the terms of the contract; and in estimating such profit the
jury shall place the bricks at the price fixed
In the said contract, and deduct therefrom
the cost of said bricks, as they shall believe
such cost to be from the evidence." Thie
Instruction Is predicated upon the performance on the part of the plalntltre of the conditions set out In their covenant, and upon
the failure of the defendant to pay to the
plnlntlffH the sums ot money due them under the c-ontract, as the same bPcame pnyablt•. It Is claimed by the defendant In error that this Instruction was erroneous, for
two reasons: First,. that there was no such
h•111w pret1ented by the pleadings; the breach
laid In the declaration being that the defendant had failed to perform the covenants In
the ionhl contract on Its part to be performed,
In this: "That the said defendant notified
the plnlntUfH that It would not pul'('base any
morP of tht> said bricks than had already
been mallt'. nnd to discontinue the manufncturt> of the same." The thl'Ory upon which
thlti action was brought, as appears from the
df'<·laratlon. was that the 11lalntltrt1 were
entltlt'd to rt>cover because the defendant
had broken lts contract, not by failure to

pay for the bricks manufactured, but by its
notification to the plafntllfs that It would
not purchase ·a ny more of the bricks than
had already been made, and to discontinue
the manufacture of the same. Had thls
breach been established by the evidence,
there Is abundant authority to warrant the
verdict and Judgment for the plalntllfs, upon
proper instructions; but, as has already been
observed, the Instruction under consideration
Is predicated solely upon the performance
by the plaintllfs of the covenants and conditions to be performed on their part, and
the refusal and failure of the defendant to
pay to the plalntilfs such sums of money
as were due them under the contract, aa
the same became payable. · The failure to
pay the money Is the cause alleged in the ·--...
Instruction, that forced the plalntltrs to stop
the manufacture of the bricks, and which
entitles the plalntltrs to recover, not only
for the bricks manufactured by them according to said contract, but for the profit on
the dltrerence between the number of the ___,..
bricks so manufactured by them, and the
1,500,000 bricks manufactured according to
the terms ot the contract, to be ascertained
by placing the bricks at the price fixed In
the contract, and deducting therefrom the
cost of the bricks as shown by the evidence.
For the breach of contract to pay money,l
no matter what the amount of Inconvenience
sustained by the plalntur~ the measure of
damages ls the Interest of the money only.
Wood's Mayne, Dam. (1st .Am. Ed.) p. 15.
That this is the rule IS admitted. That there
are exceptions to It may also be conceded,
and It Is earnt>stly contended on behalf of
plalntltrs In error that the case before us
comes within the exception, and not within
the rule. In support of this contention the
case of Masterton v. .Mayor, etc., 7 Hill, 61,
ls relied upon. That was an action of covenant, on an agreement whereby the plaintiffs
undertook to furnish. cut, flt. and deliver 1111
the marble to build the city hall of Brooklyn,
to be or the best kind of white marble, from
Kain & Morgnn'ti quarry, tor which the defendants agreed to pay a certain sum In Installments, payable at different stages In the
erection or the bulldlng. The defendants
suspended work on the building, for the
want of funds, and refused to receive or pay
for any more marble. This was the breach
complained of. Part of the marble had at
that time been delivered and paid for, :mother part wnR re11dy for delivery, but the great' er part had not yet been prorured and pre' pared for dellvt>ry. The plalutltrs, as a 11art
· of their case, put In evidt>nce articles of
agreement betwet>n them and Kain & Morgan, made on the faith of the agreement bet wt>en the plnlntilTR and the defendant,
wht>reby Kain & ~forgan covenanted to furnish, In blocks prepared for cutting, all the
marble required to fulfill the plalntllfs' contract, and tht> plalntltrR agreed to pay them
& certain sum therefor, out of the sum agreed
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to be paid by the defendants, and in similar

installments. but expressly stipulated that

the said Kain & Morgan should not look to

the plaintiffs. except to the funds as supplied

by the defendants. The circuit judge in-

structed the jury that the plaintiffs were en-

titled to recover the proﬁts which would have

accrued to them from the actual perform-

ance of the contract. and that, as the rough

marble was to be procured from Kain & \Ior-

gan's quarry, the contract was to be deemed

a lart of the performance of the plaintiffs'

contract, and the plaintiffs were entitled to

recover from the defendants the damages

for which they would be liable to Kain & Mor-

gan on that contract. There was a verdict

for the plaintiffs for a large amount, greatly

exceeding the loss of the marble actually

on hand. The defendants appealed. It is

obvious that the ground of complaint here
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was not the failure to pay for the marble

already cut and delivered, but the ground of

complaint, and the breach alleged, were that

the defendants refused to receive or pay for

any more marble, want of funds being al-

leged as the cause. The only item of dam-

age in which the failure on the part of the

defendants to pay money cuts any ﬁgure was

the damage growing out of the contract with

Kain & Morgan, with whom plaintiffs had

contracted, and whom they were to pay in

installments similar to the installments due

the plaintiffs from the defendants; but the

circuit court was reversed in the court of

appeals for having allowed this damage to

be computed in the verdict, Chief Justice

.\'elson <a_ving. "I am unable to comprehend

how these can be taken into the account,

or become the subject-matter of considera-

tion at all, in settling the amount of dam-

ages to be recovered for a breach of the

principal contract." So this may be laid out

of the case altogether. Said the chief jus-

tice: "The damages for the marble on hand,

ready to be delivered, was not a matter in

dispute on the argument. ' ' ' The con-

test arises out of the claim for damages in

respect to the remainder of the marble which

the plaintiffs had agreed to furnish, but

which they were prevented from furnishing

by the suspension of the work in July. 1837.

This portion was not ready to be delivered

at the time the defenda‘nts broke up the con-

tract, but the plaintiffs were then willing

and offered to perform, in all things, on

their part, and the case assumes that they

were possessed of suﬂicient means and abil-

ity to have done so." Not that the means

and ability were to be obtained from the de-

fendants in the form of the payment of the

installments as the work became due, as pro-

vided in the contract, but that the plaintiffs

were possessed of suﬂlcient means and abil-

ity, independent of what they were to re-

ceive from the defendants, to perform all

things on their part to be performed, had

they been permitted to do so, but they were

not allowed to perform the contract, the do ,

fendants refusing to receive or pay for any
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be given, but we have seen no case which

will sustain the instruction under considera-

tion. It is the ordinary case of a failure to

comply with a contract to pay money at a

stipulated time. In such cases the measure

of damages for the Breach of me contract i_s_

t-hie principal sum due, and legal interest

‘tIieTéoii. To make a defendant responsible

DAMAGES l?OR NONPAYMENT OF MONEY-INTERlllST.

be given, but we have seen no case which
will sustain the Instruction under consideration. It ls the orlllnary case ot a failure to
comply with a contract to pay money at a
stipulated time. In sueh cases the measure
or damages tor the breach ot tlie c01itr~ct Is
flie principal sum due,· and lepl lnter~t
, tfieieoii. - To make a defendant responsible
furtiie profits which might have accrued to
t ht• )llalntlff by the use ot the money In addition to the Interest would be banh and dp-

for the proﬁts which might have accrued to

the plaintiff by the use of the money in ad-

dition to the interest would be harsh and 6p-

pressive, and should not be sanctioned by the

court, unless the plaintiff can bring his case

within some well-recognized exception to the

rule.

For the foregoing reasons, we are of opinion

that the circuit court did not err in setting

aside the verdict and granting a new trial.

We are also of opinion that there was no er-
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ror in the judgment rendered by the court,

which is fully supported by the facts shown

in evidence, and it is nﬂirmed.

•

presslve, and should not be sanctioned by the
court, unless the plalntltr can bring his CMe
within some well-recognized exception to tbe
rule.

For the foregoing reasons, we are of opinion
that the circuit court did not err In setting
aside the verdict and granting a new trial.
We are also of opinion that there was· no error In the judgment rendered by the court,
which Is fully supportc<l by the facts shown
ln evidence, and it ls atHrmed.

l
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LOWE v. TURPIE et al.t

(44 N. E. 25. 147 Ind. 652.)

Supreme Court of Ii1diann. \Iay 15. iSiiti.

Appeal from circuit court. Cass county; J.

S. Frazer. Special Judge.

Action by James H. 'l‘urpie and others .

against Hugh Lowe for breach of contract.

From the judgment rendered, defendant ap-

peals. Reversed.

lidwin P. Hammond. Charles B. Stuart. Wil- ‘

iiam V. Stuart. S. P. Thompson, and it. I‘.

Davidson, for appellant. Walker & McClintic,

.i. H. Gould, and Elliott & Elliott, for appel-

lees.

MONKS, J. On February 18, 1886, appel-

lees James H. and William Turpie com-

menced an action against appellant in the

“bite circuit court. The complaint was in
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three paragraphs, to each of which the court

sustained a demurrer for want of facts.

Judgment was therenpon rendered in favor

of this appellant, which on appeal in this

court was reversed, and the court below di-

rected to overrule the demurrer to the com-

plaint. Turpie v. Lowe, 114 Ind. 37, 15 N.

E. 834. After the return of said cause to the

court below the demurrer was overruled as

directed. About the time of the commence-

ment of said action by the Turpies in the

White circuit court, in February, 1886, two

other actions were commenced in the said

court against appellant, growing out of the

same alleged transactions set up in the ac-

tion of the Turpies,—one by appellce Cor-

nelins M. Horner, and one by appellees

Emma J. and Mary F. Turplc. wives of the

said James H. and William Turpie. These

three suits were pending in 1889, and were

sent, on change of venue. to the Cass circuit

court. In January, 1890, by agreement, the

three causes were consolidated, and the court

ordered that George T. Jones and others be

made parties defendant. Afterwards, in

April, 1890, James H. and William Turpie

ﬁlml an amended complaint, in live para-

graphs. The second paragraph wns stricken

out on motion. Appellant demurred to each

of the remaining paragraphs of the com-

plaint, for want of facts, which demurrer was

overruled. To this complaint appellant ﬂied

an answer. Appellees Emma J. and Mary F.

Tut-pie in July, 1890, ﬁled their amended

complaint, asking damages against appellant,

which he answered by general denial. George

T. Jones also ﬁled a counterclaim asking

judgment against appellant, on which issue

was joined. The cause was submitted to the

court, land at request of appellant a special

ﬁnding was made, and conclusions of law

stated thereon against appellant, to each of

which he at the time saved an exception.

Upon the ﬁndings and conclusions of law, the

court on February 5, 1891, rendered judg-

ment against appellant, in favor of James H.

t Rehearing denied.
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and William Turpie, for $19,775; in favor
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as necessary to the determination of this

cause, are as follows:

Appellces James H. and William Turpie

were on December 3, 1885, and still are, part-

ners in business as traders in real estate, and

were, as such partners, the owners, as ten-

ants in common, of real estate in the counties

of White. Jasper, and Starke, in Indiana, and

in the counties of Franklin, Union, and Dela-

ware, in the state of Ohio, all of which is

described in the ﬁnding, and the value of each

tract stated. A part of said real estate was

held by said Turpies in fee simple.

Astoa,

part, they held the equitable title, under con- 1

tracts of purchase. Part of said real estate

was held in the names of others, as trustees

for the Turpies. On said day there were ex-

isting and valid judgments against the Tur-
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pies, in favor of divers persons, rendered by

the White circuit court, the Carroll circuit

court, of Indiana, and other courts in said

state, taxes due and unpaid, ditch assess-

ments, and mortgages, amounting in the ag-

gregate to about $15,000. That on or before

December 3, 1885, the Turpies owned in fee

simple the undivided four-ﬁfths of a farm of

324 acres in Delaware county, Ohio, known

as the Starke or Wagner farm, which farm

was of the value of $17. 2 . That the other

one-ﬁfth of said farm was owned by George

T. Jones, one of the appellees. That there

were two mortgages on said farm,—one in

favor of the Michigan Mutual Insurance Com-

pany, upon 283 acres of said farm, for $10,-

000, and one upon the remaining 41 acres of

said farm, to one Starke, which, with accrued

interest, amounted at said date to about $1,-

160. That on the same day appellant was the

owner in fee of two one-acre lots in J. C.

Reynolds‘ Third addition to the town of Mon-

ticello, lnd., equivalent in size to 10 ordinary

town lots, and was also the owner in fee of

the N. E. t,4 of the N. W. 5'4, of section 16,

township 28 N., of range 4 W., in said county,

known as the “Nutter Forty Acres," which

said lots in Monticello were worth $500, and

which said 40-acre tract was worth $600.

That said Turpies were ﬁnancially embar-

rassed, and wholly unable to raise the money

to meet their matured and maturing liabili-

ties. That the property held by them as

aforesaid was of great ‘value, but so heavily

int-umbered by liens, some of which were

overdue. and others soon to mature, that all

said property was in great danger of being sac-

riﬁced for less than its real value. And said

appellant was a man of large ﬁnancial ability

and credit, and the owner of a large amount

of unincumhered real estate and personal

property. That he had a large amount of

ready money and other assets. and was abun-

dantly able to fullill the contract hereinafter

named. That on said 3d day of December,

1885, said Turpies, in the name of said Wil-

liam Turpie, entered into an agreement'wlth

said appellant, in writing, respecting the said

Starke farm, as follows:

DAMAGES I<'OR
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real estate of the Turpies in Indiana; and it I

was also agreed with the Turples and Horner ‘‘

to pay said Horner the amount of the Turples‘

indebtedness tohim.—about $1,:%35,—and topay

the John H. Miller note, upon which Horner

was sunety, amounting to about $1,000. In

consideration of which the Turples were to

execute to appellant their note for their indebt- '

edness to him, except the note of $580.91, and

from time to time. as the Turples‘ outstanding

obligations should be paid by appellant. to ex-

ecute to him other notes for amounts so paid,

all to hear interest at 8 per cent. per annum;

and to secure the amount they then owed ap-

pellant, and the advances so to be made by

him. t‘ “y were to convey, or cause to be con-

veyed, to him, their real estate in Indiana, in-

cluding the four lots in Monon held in the

name of Horner, and the undivided one-half
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of the Ohio real estate, except nine lots in R.

P. Woodruf f Agricultural College addition to

Columbus. Ohio, which they reserved for their

wives. The Turples, in consideration of the

sum of $20,000 to be paid by appellant upon

liens and incumbrances then upon the Ohio »

real estate, sold to appellant the other undi-

vided one-half of said Ohio real estate, which

they were to convey, or cause to be conveyed,

to hi1n, in fee simple, except that said nine

lots reserved for the Turples‘ wives were to be

conveyed by one Woodruff, who held the le-

gal title thereto, to appellant, and he was to

reconvey the same to the Turples‘ wives free

from all incumhrances. That, when the con-

veyance should be made to appellant for said

Ohio property so sold to him, the undivided

one-half thereof should be included in the con-

veyance, but to be held by appellant as se-

curity to him for the payment of said Indiana

debts, and security for any amount in excess

of said $20,000 which appellant might pay to

relieve said Ohio real estate from incum-

brances; all of which incumbrances on the

Ohio real estate appellant, in pursuance of the

agreement, was to pay. The Turples con-

veyed, or caused to be conveyed, all of said

Ohio real estate, except a tract known as the

"Mt. Vernon Hotel Property." That the full

cmt<‘aler.-ition was paid by the Turples and

their wives for the conveyance by appellant

to the Turpies‘ wives of said nine lots. and

that said lots were of the value of $10,000.

That the Turples‘ wives took immediate pos-

session about January 1, 1886, of said nine

lots, with appellant's consent, under his agree-

ment to convey the same to them. That in

December, 1885, the Turples conveyed, and

caused to be conveyed, to appellant, all the

said real estate in the counties of Jasper,

Starker, and White, in Indiana, except four

lots in Monon held by them in the name of

Homer; and on December 10, 1885, said

Horner and wife executed a deed to appellant

for said Monon lots held in Horner's name as

security for the Turples‘ indebtedness to

Horner, and to indemnify him from loss as

their surety, who accepted said deed, and

ler note. That on December 7, 1885, the Tur-

~O~P.\.YYE~T

real estate ot the Turpies In Indiana; and It
was also agreed with the Turples and Horner
to pay Bii.id HornE>r the amount ot the Turples'
lndebtt>dness to blm,-nbout $1,:~m.-and to pay
the John H. !\filler notE>, upon which Horner
was 11urety, amounting to about $1,000. In
consideration ot which the Turplee were to
execute to appellant their note tor their indebtl'dnE>es to him, except the note ot $5'10.91, and
from time to time, as the Turples' outstanding
oblli:atlons should be paid by appellant, to execute to him other notes tor amounts i;o puhl,
all to beor lntnest at 8 per cE>nt. pt>r annum;
and to secure the amount they then owed appellant, and the advances so to be mnde by
him. r ··y were to convey, or eause to be conveyed, to him, their real estate In Indiana, including the four lots In Monon held In the
name ot Horner, and the undivhfod one-halt
ot the Ohio real estate, except nine lots In R.
P. Woodrutr Agricultural College addition to
Columbus, Ohio, which lht>y reserved tor their
wives. The Turples, In consideration of the
mm or •20.000 to be paid by appellant upon
llena and lncumbrancee then upon the Ohio
real estate, sold to appellant the other undlYlded one-halt ot said Ohio real estate, which
they W!'rt• to convey, or cause to be conveyed,
to hi111, In fee simple, except that said nlnl!
lots rt-i<t>n·ed for th!' Turples' wives were to be
con,·eyPd by one Woodrutr, who held the legal title thereto, to appellant, and he was to
reconvey the same to the Turples' wives tree
trom all lncumbrances. That, when the conveya.oce should be made to appellant tor said
Ohio property so sold to him, the undivided
one-halt thereof should be Included In the conveyance, but to be held by appellant as security to him for the payment of said Indiana
debts, and security for any amount In excess
of said $20,000 which appellant might pay to
relieve llald Ohio real estate from lncurubrances; all of which lncumbrances on the
Ohio real estate appellant, In pursuance of the
agreement, was to puy. The Turplcs conveyed, or caused to be conveyed, all of said
Ohio real estate, exct>pt a tract known as the
"Mt. Vernon Hotel Property." That the full
•·nn~l<ll'r:ttlon wall pitld by the 'l'urph·s and
their wives for the conveyance by ap1iellant
to the Turplee' wives ot said nine lots, and
that said lots were of the value of $10.000.
That the Tu11lles' wives took imruecllute pos-lon about January 1, 1886, of said nine
lots, with appellant's consent, under his agreement to convey the same to them. That In
December, 1885, the Turples conveyed, and
caused to be conveyed, to appellant, all the
Mid real PBtatP In the counties of Jasper,
Starke-, and 'W hite, In Indiana, except four
lot,; In ~louon lwld by them In the name or
Homer; and on December 10, 1885, said
Homer and wife executed a deed to appellant
for said Monon lots held in Homer's name as
security for the Turpies' Indebtedness to
Horner, and to Indemnify him from loss IUI
their surety, who accepted said deed, and
prowi!IE'd Horner that be would pay KRld '.\Ill-
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ter note. That on December 1, 1885, the Turpies and appellant executed the following
agreement In wrttlni:: "Monon, Indiana, Dc(·ember itb, 1885. Thi;; memorandum Is to
show that all real estate in Indiana and Ohio
that James H. Turple and Wiiiiam Turple and
wives lu\'l""e conveyed to me, Hugh Lowe, in
the year 188ri, is to be held In trust for them,
ancl to be held by said Lowe as security for
all cllllms coming to him from said Turples,
which le evidenced by prorui~sory notes; and,
when said claims are paid by said Turples,
said Lowe Is to convey to the Turplt>R, or any
one tht'y suggt'st, except one-bait (lf.z) iutereKl
In the Wagner farm, In Ohio, whleh ls c:splained by another contract. [Signed] Hui:h
Lowe. James Turpie. William Turple."
That about the 1st day ot. March, 1886, said
Lowe took exclusive possession of all Jive
stock and personal property on said Starke
farm belonging to himself and said plaiutl1T11,
and converted the same to his own use. 'l'he
same was of the value of '4,000. That, soon
arter the deeds for all the property aforesaid
Wl're delivered to said appl'llaut, he, without
camie, refused to carry out or 1'11rtht>r 1:1erturm
his coutruds aforesahJ; and he rerus~d to p:iy
any more of the debts, liens, or inc-umbl'lllK'Cll
, on any of said p1·operty, and has fulled to p:1y
bis said note given to Horner, or l!Bid l\llllt>r
note, which last note Horner has been compelled to pay, to wit, $9i5, on the 18th of Fch·
ruary, 1886. That, when said a1111cllaut r!'fllfY
e<l, be was finllnclally able to c·~m11lete lltHl
perform tbe same. That said Turples lrn.d
, placed In bis hands all their pro11erty and
means that could In any way be used to pay
said debts, and were therefore wholly i..m:tble
to pay or discharge the same, or auy pllrt
thereof., all of which was well known to appellant when he recel'l""ed the same, and whim he
made, and also when be refused .to perform,
the said contT&cts. That, before the commencement of this suit by the said 'l'w:ples,
they made demand of appellant that he pert.orm, all and singular, the said several contracts, and each specltlcatlon thereof; and
said appellant refused, and has ever 1:1lnce refused and neglected, to perform the ;mnie, or
any part thereof, except as herein stute(l.
That bi>t<>1·e the comme1wement of thl;, Knit
the said Emma J. Turple and .Mary F. 'furpie.
by their a"ent, James H. 'furple, demandt-11
from app<>llant the conveyance to them of ~aid
lol11 Nos. 244 to 2;;2,. iucluslve, In \Voodrufl"11
Agricultural College addition to tl1e city of
Columbus, Ohio, free of lncumbrnnces, llS
specified In the agreement aforesaid made
with npp<>llant by said James ond Wlllintu
'.l'urpie; and said appellant refused to make
such conveyance, and has ever since nej!lected
and refused to perform said contract. but, in
violation of bis agreement aforesaid to pay
lncumbrances thereon, bas permitted t:.ie i.ume
to he sold to pay the lncumbr~nees thnt ht!
agreed to remove therefrom, and tl1e title to
salt! lots has pmised to lnDOCPllt purchaser>' al
sberitl'.'e sale. That, before the commPllCt'-

:!16
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meat ‘of any proceedings against or in favor I

of said defendant George T. Jones, he demand-

ed of said appellant the performance of his 1

contract to convey to him the undivided one-

half of said two acres, equal to ten lots, in

Reynolds' addition to Monticello, Ind., and to >

convey to him the undivided one-half of the

land described herein as the "Nutter Forty

Acres"; and said appellant has refused and

wholly failed to make such conveyance, or

in any way to make compensation to said -

Jones for the execution by him and wife of

the deed of the Starke farm, in Delaware

county, Ohio, executed on the 22d day of De-

cember, 1885. That Lowe failed to pay. sat-

isfy, or discharge the liens upon the property

in Ohio deeded to him as hereinbefore found,

except as otherwise stated herein, to wit, $4,-

185.86. That after the 4th day of January,
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1886, the several holders of the liens upon

said Ohio property brought suits in the courts

of said states having jurisdiction, and obtain-

ed decrees and orders of sale for the greater

part of said property in said Franklin and

Union counties, and the same was sold upon

execution, and at judicial sale, to satisfy the

liens thereon which said appellant had agreed

to pay, and therenpon the legal title to all of

said real estate in Ohio so sold was lost to

the plaintiffs. That the real estate in the

state of Ohio conveyed to appellant, and held

by him as security as aforesaid, to wit, the un-

divided one-half of all the real estate in Ohio

hereinbefore described (except the certain ,

speciﬁed tracts), sold at judicial sales, was so

sacriﬁced and consumed by costs and ex-

penses that it paid only the sum of $22,756.56

of the debts of said Turpies which said Lowe

had agreed to pay. That on the 3d of De-

cember, 1885, the 283 acres of the Starke farm,

in Delaware county, Ohio, under mortgage to

the Michigan Mutual Insurance Company, was

of the value of $15,565, and that since that

time, by reason of the failure of said Lowe

to pay said incumbrance remaining unpaid

after the 22d day of ‘December, 1883, to wit,

$10,300. the whole of said %3 acres has since

been sold on a decree of foreclosure to satisfy ‘

said mortgage, whereby the title to said real i

estate has been wholly lost to said Turpies. i

That the Turpies are indebted to said appel-

lant, on notes held by him. and for moneys

paid by him for their use in pursuance of said

contracts, and on account, in the sum of $14,-

332.75, which is al proper set-off against any

amount due said plaintiffs from him. That t

prior to the commencement of this suit said

Turpies offered to deliver to the defendant

Lowe a deed, duly signed and acknowledged ‘

by their wives and themselves, conveying the

real estate in Knox county, Ohio. known as

the “Mount Vernon Hotel Property," to him, i

and demanded of him, then and there, to

carry out and perform his several contracts.

That the rental value of certain lands of the

Turpies in White county, of which appellant

had possession, was $1,120. That appellant

received $35, the proceeds of the sale of one
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meut of any proceedings against or In favor
of said defendant George T. Jones, l::e demanded of said appellant the pertonnance of his
contract to convey to him the undivided onehalt of said two acres, equal to ten lots, In
Reynolda' addition to Monticello, Ind., and to
<·onvey to him the undivided one-half of the
land dMCrlbed herein as the "Nutter Forty
Acrps''; and said appellant has refused and
whollv failed to make such conveyunce, or
In au"y way to make compensation to said
Jones tor the e:!:ecutlon by him and wife of
the deed or the Starke farm, In Delaware
cotmty, Ohio, executed an the 22d day of December, 18.~5. That Lowe failed to pay, satlsfy, or discharge the liens upon the property
lo Ohio deeded to him as herelnbefore fotmd,
l•xcept as otherwise stated herein, to wit, $4,185.86. That after the 4th day of January,
1886, the several holders of the liens upon
said Ohio property brought suits in the courts
of said states having jurisdiction, and obtained decrees and orders of sale for the greater
part of said property In said Franklin and
Union counties, and the same was sold upon
execution, and at judicial sale, to satisfy the
liens thereon which said appellant had agreed
to pay, and thereupon the legal title to all of
said reel estate In Ohio so sold was lost to
the plainti1Ts. That the real estate In the
11tate of Ohio conveyed to appellant, and held
lly him as security as aforesaid, to wit, the unrlh·idP<l one-halt of all the real estate in Ohio
bereinhefore described (except the certain
1>peclfied tracts), sold at judicial sales, was so
sncrificed and consumed by costs and expPnscs that It paid only the sum of $22,756.56
of the debts of said Turpies which snld Lowe
had agreed to pay. That on the 3d of December, 1885, the 283 acres of the Starke farm,
lo Delaware county, Ohio, under mortgage to
the Mlchiimn Mutual Insurance Company, was
of the value of '15,565, and that since that
time, by reason of the failure of 81lld Lowe
to puy said lncumbrance remaining unpaid
after the 22d day of 'December, 1885, to wit,
$10,300. the whole of said 283 acres bas since
been sold on a decree of foreclosure to satisfy
said mortgage, whereby the title to said rPnl
estate has been wholly lost to said Turples.
1.'hat the Turples are Indebted to said appel·
!ant, on notes held by him, and tor money11
paid by him for their use In pursuance of said
contrncts, and on account, In the sum of $14,aa2.7a. which Is a proper set-oft' against any
amount due said plalntlft's from him. That
prior to the commencement of this suit said
'l'nrples oft'ered to deliver to the defendant
Lowe a deed, duly signed and acknowled~e<l
by their wives and themselves, conveying the
real estate In Knox county, Ohio, known as
the "l\fount VPrnon Hotel PropPrty," to him,
and demanded of him, then and there, to
carry out and perform his several contracts.
'!'hat the rental value of certain lands of the
'l'urples In White county, or which appellant
had possession, was $1,120. That appellant
receiYed ,35, the proceeds of the sale of one

01" }10.:'\EY-lNTEUEST.

[ horse, the property of the Turples. That by
. reason of the failure of said appellant to p!.'l'! form his said ugreements, and the sale of
snld renl estute by \"lrtue of judicial 11roces>1
resulting in consequence thereof, there wa.i
large loss and damage to said James H. and
William Turpie; that ls to say, their n>al estate, of the value ot $32,695, satisfied only
'13,765.07 of their Indebtedness. But the samP
salPs of said Lowe's undivldedone-halfof some
of the snrue real estate, and of the nine lots
to be conveyed to the wives of said Turplel'l,
realized a sum, which was applied In payment
of said dl'bts, enough to make up the loss, e.llCl'pt the sum of $6,008.70. That the value of •
81lld one-fifth of said Starke farm, conveyetl
by said Jones and wife to Lowe, subject to
the lnC"Umbrance thereon, was at the time of
said conveyance, December 22, 1885, $~.
'l'hat the value of attorney"s services In the
collection of said note from Lowe to Horner,
described In said Horner'& complaint, Is $300.
"And the court now stuteH iti,; conclusions
of law upon the foregoing facts to be as follows: (1) • • • l2) That said Homer ls
entitled to recover from said Lowe, upon said
, p1·omissory note gl\"en by him to Horner, the
sum of two thousand and thirty-three ($2,033) dollars, and, on account of the failure
of said Lowe to pay said Miller note, the
sum of twelve hundred and sixty-four ($1,264) dollars. (3) Thnt said James H. Tul'pie and William Turpie are eutltled to re, cover from the said Lowe the sum of nineteen thouRand seven hundred and sev!'ntytlve ($19,775) dollars, which is due to the 1n
afte1• deducting all set-offs. (4) '!' hat said
Mary F. Turple and Emma J. Turple are <'ntitled to recover from said appellant the l'Ulll
of ten thousand ($10,000) dol\11.rs. (5) • • •
(G) That said Lowe be required to convPy to
said James H. and WilliaID Turple the nmlivlded one-halt (lh) of the northeast quOl'ter
00 of the northwest quarter (14) of section sixteen (lU), township twenty-eight (28}
north, range four (4) west, and the uudlvided one-half (lf.i) of the two (2) one-acre
lots In J. C. RPynolds' addition to 1\Iontl< ~Pllo,
In said county of White, owned by Lowe on
the 3d day or December, 18'i:i, anrl nlso the
whole of the Bradford and Braxton landA,
and also said lands In Starke county autl In
Jasper count~·. Indiana, c•onveyed to said nppellant, and also said lots In Monon, in fintling numbered 60 specified, by proper deeds
of release and quitclaim. (7) That said Jones
ls entitled to a judgment against said Lowe
for the sum of $800."
The correctness of each of the conclusions
of law ls called in question by the a11signment ot errors. It is earnestly inslsH•tl by
appellant that the faets do not sustain the
third conclusion of law,-that the Turples are
entitled to recover from appellant $19,775.
.The correctnPAs of thl11 conclusion of law depends upon what ls the proper mea1mre of
damages undt'r the factfil set forth In thl' iopP.
, clal findlnc. Ou the fol'mer appeal or this
1
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cause ('l‘urpie v. Lowe, supra), the deeds con-

veying to appellant the Indiana and Ohio real

estate to secure an existing indebtedness, and

future advances to pay liens set out in the

special ﬁnding, were held to be mortgages.

In that case the Turpies claimed that they

were entitled to recover either the full

amount which the appellant, Lowe, agreed to

advance as a loan in the way of discharging

liens and debts, or the value of the lands

conveyed by the deeds. In response to such

contention the court, on pages 53, 54, 114

Ind., and page 834. 15 N. E., said: "If we

are correct in our construction of the con-

tract set up in the complaint, Lowe's agree-

ment to pay liens, etc., was nothing more

than a contract to advance money for the

beneﬁt of appellant [the Turpies], and is the

same, in effect, as if he had agreed to ad-
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vance money direc( to them as a loan. What-

ever damages, therefore, they might recover

from Lowe for the refusal to make such a

direct loan after having taken security for

the same, they may recover here nothing

more." The covenant in a deed absolute on

its face, but intended as a mortgage, or I.

parol contract made at the time of the execu-

tion of the deed, whereby the grantee agrees ‘

to pay a debt of the grantor due another per-

son, cannot be enforced by such person

against the grantee. Such an agreement is

nothing more, in effect, than an agreement

to advance the amount of the debt or incum-

brance as a loan upon the security of the

land conveyed. Root v. Wright, 84 N. Y.

72; Garnsey v. Rogers, 47 N. Y. 233; Pardee

v. Treat, 82 N. Y. 385. It is clear. we think,

V‘ that the measure of damages for the breach ‘

by appellant of his agreement to advance

money to pay liens, etc., set forth in the ﬁnd- ‘

ing, is the same as for breach of a contract

to loan money direct. This court also held

in that case that the complaint, so far as it

rested upon the agreement of this appellant ‘

to advance money, and the deeds to secure

the same, only made a case for nominal dam-

ages, as no special damages were shown.

When the case was returned to the court be-

low, the Turples ﬁled their amended and sup-

plemental complaint, in ﬁve paragraphs, as

heretofore state i. in which they declared up-

on the same oral contracts, and also, for the

ﬁrst time, brought in the written agreements ‘

set out in the special ﬁndings, they not hav-

ing been mentioned in the original complaint.

In the amended complaint which was ﬂied

in April. lRDO, it was alleged that the several

holders of the liens on said real estate, to

pay which appellant had agreed to advance

money. brought suit in the courts having ju-

risdiction, and procured decrees and orders ‘

of sale, upon which said real estatc was

in the year 1887, and the latter part of the

year 1886, sold at sheriff's sale. and the

money received applied on said liens, and

sought thereby to recover, as special dam-

ages, the difference between the value of

said real estate and the amount for which
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ble for the value of the land at the time it

was lost." See Fontaine v. Lumber Co. (Mo.

Sup.) 18 S. W. 1147. In Blood v. Wilkins, 43

Iowa, 565, Blood was the owner of certain

land in Jones county, and conveyed the same

to Wilkins as security for money advanced

and to be advanced by Wilkins, and applied

in payment of certain mortgages and tax

liens upon the property. Part of the money

was paid out directly by Wilkins in discharge

0! liens, and a part was retained by him. ' At

the time of the loan the land had been sold

for taxes, but the period for redemption had

not yet expired. The amount borrowed was

enough to discharge all liens, and to redeem

from said sales. Wilkins, after the execu-

tion_of said deed given as security, retained

in his hands the money necessary to redeem,

under an agreement with Blood that he would
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redeem. Wilkins failed to redeem, and tax

titles accrued against the land, whereby it

was lost to Blood, except 40 acres. The

court, in speaking of the measure of dam-

ages, said: “There only remains to be con-

_sidered what is the measure of liability.

When one person furnishes the money to an-

other to discharge an incnmbrance from the

land of the person furnishing the money, and

the person undertaking to discharge the in-

cumbrance neglects to do it, and the land is

lost to the owner by reason of the incum-

brance, the measure of damages may be the

money furnished, with interest, or the value

of the land lost, according to circumstances.

If the landowner has knowledge of his agent's

failure in time to redeem the land himself,

this damages will be the money furnished,

with interest. But if the landowner justly

relies upon his agent, to whom he has fur-

nished money to discharge the incumbrances,

and the land is lost without his knowledge.

and solely through the fault of the agent,

then the agent will be liable for the value of

the land lost." This language was adopted

by the author of Sutherland on Damages, in

stating the rule. See 1 Suth. Dam. p. 164, §

77. The cases of Bank v. Cook, 49 Law T.

(N. S.) 674, and Manahan v. Smith, 19 Ohio

St. 384, cited by appellees, are not in conﬂict

with Blood v. Wilkins, supra, but support the

rule therein adopted. In the case of Bank v.

Cook, supra, the bank made an agreement to

loan Cook a large sum of money to purchase

a vendor's lien upon the real estate of a cor-

poration, and 11 number of shares in said cor-

poration. Cook relied upon the bank to pro-

vide the money, and did not make, or at-

tempt to make, arrangements with any other

person or company to provide the money.

The bank did not provide the money, and

Cook was not informed that it would not do

so until too late to procure the money else-

where before the time expired within which

it was necessary to complete the purchase.

The court held that in case of breach of con-

tracts to lend money the damages usually

given were merely nominal, for the reason

that. usually, it a man could not get money
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than nominal damages for a breach of con- T

‘ is a mortgage, and conveys no title.

tract to loan money to pay incumbrances, it

is necessary not only to allege and prove the

contract to loan the money, and its breach,

and that the person who agreed to make the

loan knew the purpose for which it was to

be used, and the necessity therefor, but also ‘

‘ E. 944, and cases cited; Fletcher v. Holmes,

that the land was lost to the owner by reason

of such liens or incumbrances, and without

his knowledge, and solely through the fault

of the person who was to loan the money, or,

if the landowner had notice of the neglect or

refusal to loan the money, that it was at such

a time as to deprive him of the opportunity

to procure the money elsewhere, and pay said

liens or incumbrances, or redeem the land,

if sold. The facts found in the special ﬁnd-
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ing show that appellant had refused to pay

any more of said liens or incumbrances, or

carry out or further perform his contracts;

but they do not show that such knowledge

was acquired by the Turpies too late to give

them an opportunity to procure from other

parties the money, and pay said liens or in-

cumbrances. On the contrary, it appears

from the ﬁnding of facts that appellant, be-

tween January 4, 1886, and February 18, 1886,

refused to pay any more of the debts. liens,

or incumbrances on any of said property

which he had agreed to pay, and refused to

carry out or further perform his said con-

tracts, and said he would not further exe-

cute the same; that the real estate in Indi-

ana was sold in 1886 and 1887, the statute

giving one year from the date of each sale to

redeem the real estate. The suits to recover

the judgments and decrees upon which we

Ohio real estate was sold were not commen-

ced until after January 4, 1886. It is shown,

therefore, by the special ﬁnding, not that the

Turpies did not know of the refusal of appel-

lant to pay said liens and incumbrances in

time to give them an opportunity to procure

the money, but that they had such knowledge

in ample time to give them the opportunity

to procure the money and pay said liens and

incumbrances, and thus prevent the loss of

their land. Under this state of facts, only

nominal damages could be allowed the Tur-

pies on account of the loss of the lands held

by appellant as mortgagee.

it is insisted by the Turpies that the spe-

cial ﬁnding “that the Turpies had placed in

appellant's hands all of their property and

means that could in any way be used to pay

said debts, and were therefore wholly una-

ble to pay or discharge the same or any

part thereof/V' shows that it was impossible

for them to procure the money. in view of

the other ﬁnding that all the lndiana land,

and an undivided one-half of the Ohio land,

conveyed by deeds to appellant, were held I

by him as security for money advanced and t

to be advanced, the part of the special ﬁnd-

ing last quoted is a mere conclusion. These

conveyances, as to the real estate mentioned,

~20

220

‘DAMAGES FOR NONl'.\YMENT OF MONEY—h\"l‘EREST.

determine whether or not the same are void

for uncertainty.

It is shown by the special ﬁnding that ap-

pellant, in consideration of the sale and con-

veyance to him of the undivided one-half of

the Starke farm, was to assume and pay $6,-

150 of the incumbrance on said farm, and

also that in consideration of the sale and

conveyance to him of the undivided one-half

of the remaining Ohio real estate, with the

exception of the nine lots to be conveyed to ‘

the Turpies‘ wives, he has to pay $20,000 on ‘

the liens and incumbrances on the Ohio real

estate. The law is settled in this state that,

for breaches of said agreements to pay said

purchase money when due, the Turpies were

entitled to sue and recover the amount

thereof unpaid, without ﬁrst having paid

said incumbrances, or any of them. W(-ddle
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v. Stone, 12 Ind. 625, and cases cited; John- ‘

son v. Britton, 23 Ind. 106; Devol v. McIn-

tosh, Id. 529; Scobey v. Finton, 39 Ind. 275:

Muiiendore v. Scott, 45 Ind. 115; Turpie Y.

Lowe, on page 60, 114 Ind., and page 834, 15

N. E. Two hundred and eighty-three acres ‘

of the Starke farm were afterwards sold

upon a decree of foreclosure to satisfy the

mortgage, part of which appellant had as-

sumed. The amount for which the same

was sold is not stated with absolute certain-

ty, but it is set forth that the same was sold

to satisfy the mortgage thereon, upon which

there was due $10,300. Appellant, if char-

ged with said $6,150, was entitled to a credit

of one-half of the amount said land paid of

said mortgage, in any accounting with the

Turpies, for the reason that the sale of his

half of said land paid that sum on the mort-

gage, a part of which he had assumed, as a

part of the purchase money therefor. Ap-

pellant was to pay $20,000 on liens and in-

cumbrances on the Ohio property. That

part of this real estate, the undivided one-

half of which was owned by the 'I\trples

subject to the mortgage of appellant, was

sold for such sum that, after deducting costs

and expenses, the Turpies‘ one-half of the

land paid $22,756.56 of the liens and incum-

brances thereon. Whatever amount appel-

lant's half of the land so sold paid, he is

entitled to credit for in an accounting with

the Turpies, if he is charged with the $20,-

000, or any part thereof. It should be re-

membered that the Turpies‘ wives were en-

titled to recover that part of the $20,000

which was to have been paid by appellant

on the incumbrances on the nine lots he

agreed to convey to them. The Turpies

therefore were only entitled to charge appel-

lant with the remainder of the $20,000 after

deducting that amount. Applying these

rules, it is evident that the Turpies were not,

upon the facts found, entitled to recover the

sum of $l9,775. The ﬁnding of facts is so

ambiguous, uncertain, and defective that the

amount which either the Turpies or appel-

lant are entitled to in an accounting one

against the other cannot be stated.
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dl'lt>rmine whether or not the same nre void
for uncertainty.
It is i;hown by the speelal finding that appellant, In consideration of the sale and conveyance to him of the undivided one-half of
the Starke farm, was to assume and pay $6,·
lriO of the lncumbrnnce on said farm, and
also that In consideration of the sale and
conveyance to him of the undivided one-half
of the remaining Ohio real estate, with the
exception of the nine lots to bf' conveyed to
the Turpies' wives, he has to pay $20,000 on
the liPns and lncumbrances on the <Jhlo real
estate. The law is settled in this state that,
for breaches of said agreements to pay said
purchnse money when due, the Turples were
entitled to sue and recover the amount
thereof unpaid, without first having paid
said lncmnbrances, or any of them. Weddle
T. Stone, 12 Ind. 625, and cases cited; Johnson v. Britton, 23 Ind. 105; De'\"ol v. Mcintosh, Id. 529; Scobey v. l<'lnton, 39 Ind. 275:
Mullendore v. Scott, 45 Ind. 115; Turple v.
J.,owe, on page 60, 114 Ind., and page 834, 15
N. E. Two hundred and eighty-three acre~
<>f the Starke farm were afterwards sold
upon a decree of foreclosure to satisfy the
mortg-age, part of which appellant bad assumed. The amount for which the same
was sold is not stated with absolute certainty, but It Is set forth that the same was sold
to satisfy the mortgage thereon, upon which
there was due $10,300. Appellant, If charged with said $6,150, was entitled to a credit
of one-half of the amount said land paid of
snld mortgage, In any accounting with the
Turples, for the reason that the sale of his
half of said land paid that sum on the mortgnge, a part of which he had assumed, as a
part of the purchase money therefor. Appellant was to pay $20,000 on liens and incumbrances on the Ohio property. That
part of thiR real estate, the undiYided onehnlf of which was owned by the Turples
subject to the mortgage of appellant, was
sold for Ruch sum that, after deducting costs
and expenses, the Turpies' one-half of' the
land paid $22,756.56 of the liens and lncumbrances thereon. Whatever amount appellant's half of the land so sold paid, he Is
entitled to credit for in an accounting with
the Turpies, If he Is charged with the $20,ooo, or any part there0f. It should be remembered that the Turples' wiYes were entitlt'd to recover that part of the $20.000
whieh was to have been paid by appellant
on the lncumbrances on the nine lots he
agreed to convey to them. The Turpies
therefore were only entitled to charge appellant with the remainder of the $20,000 after
deducting that amount. Applying thesP
rull'M, It Is evident that the Turples were not,
upon the facts found, entitled to recover the
sum of $19,775. The finding of facts Is so
ambiguous, uncertain, and defective that the
amount which either the Turpies or appellant nre entitled to In an accounting one
against the other cannot be stated.

It is claimed that the imrt of the sixth conclusion of law which states that appellant
should be required to convey to the Turple11
the undivided one-halt of the N. E. % of the
N. E. % of section 16, township 28 N., range
4 W., and the undivided one-half of the two
one-acre lots In J. C. Reynolds' Third addition to Monticello, White county, Ind., depends upon the written contract of December
a, 1885, between the Turples and appellant.
which ls set out In the special finding, and
provides that appellant shall "deed, or cause
to be deeded, to William Turple, 10 lots in J.
C. Reynolds' addition to the town of Monticello, White county, Indiana; 40 acres, more
or less, known as the 'Nutter Land,' near the
town of Monon, White county, Indiana."
There Is nothing In the special finding which
Identifies the real estate described ID that
part of the sixth conclusion above set out as
being the same as that set out In the written
contract. It ls evident that the description
of the lots In Reynolds' addition, both In the
written contract and In the sixth conclusion
ot law, Is so Indefinite that the same could
not be l<lentified or located by a surveyor_
Sueh a ckscrlptlon in a deed would not convey title. Glgos v. Cochran, 54 Ind. 593;
Shoemaker v. McMonlgle, 86 Ind. 421; Armstrong v. Short, 95 Ind. 326, and cases cited;
Baker v. Pyatt, 108 Ind. 61, 9 N. E. 112. Besides, the contract provides tor the conveyance ot 10 lots in J. C. Reynolds' addition,
while the sixth conclusion ot law requires
the conveyance of the undlvld<!d one·half of
2 one-acre lots In J. C. Reynolds' Third addition, etc. The lots are not even In the same
addition. It Is true that It Is stated In the
finding that the 40 acres described in the
sixth conclusion of law are generally known
as the "Nutter Forty Acres,'' but the 40 acres
mentioned In the contract are described
therein as being known as the "Nutter Land."
This does not show that the 40 acres men·
tloned in the sixth conclusion of law are the
same as the 40 acres Intended by the contract. It will be observed that the contract
provides for the conveyance of all the real
estatl!' described therein, while the conclusions of law only require the conveyance of
the undivided one-half of the lots, and the
40 acres described In said conclusion of law.
If this conduslon was pre<licated upon the
finding that said written contract had been
modified u11on the parol agreenwnt made between appellant and JoneR, with the consent
of the Turples, that the undlvidrtl one-half of
the real estate, as described in the contract,
should be conveyed by appellant to Jones, It
would seem that such modification woul<l
bring the contract, as modified, within thl'
statute of frauds, and the contract, as modified, could not, therefore, be enforced. Carpenter v. Galloway, 73 Ind. 418; Browne, 8t.
Frauds, §§ 411, 414; Wood, St. Frauds, § 403.
It follows that the sixth conclusion of law Is
erroneous.
It ls urged by the appellant that tbe part of
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the second conclusion of law which states

that Horner is entitled to recover from ap- ,

pellant $1,204 on,account of his failure to pay f

the John H. Miller note is not sustained by

the facts found; that the promise was, in ef- <

feet, only to loan the Turples the money to l

pay said note; that, if the facts found show

a promise to pay said note, the same was a

promise to answer for the debt of another,

and, not being in writing, could not be en-

forced. It is shown by the special ﬁnding

that John H. Miller held the note of the Tur-

ples, upon which Horner was a surety, for

about $1.000; that this was one of the liabili-

ties of the Turples which appellant had on

December 7, 1885, agreed to advance the

money, by way of a loan, and pay, and to se- ‘

cure which the Turples conveyed. or caused

to be conveyed, to appellant, real estate in ‘
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Ohio and Indiana. The language of the spe-

cial ﬁnding concerning the agreement to pay

the note is: “Appellant agreed with said

Horner and Turples to pay said Horner the

amount due from them to Horner, to wit, ‘

thirteen hundred thirty-ﬁve dollars, and to

pay to John H. Miller a note of said Tur-

ples, upon which said Horner was surety, |

amounting to about one thousand dollars," i

etc. That “certain lots in Monon were own-

ed by the Turples, in the name of Horner, ‘

and these lots were a part of the real es-

tate to be conveyed to appellant as securi-

ty for money advanced and to be advanced i

by appellant to pay Turples‘ debts." That ‘

“when appellant received the deed for the .

Monon lots held in Horner's name as se- ‘

curlty for Turples‘ indebtedness to Horner, '

and to indemnify him from loss as their sure-

ty, he promised said Horner that he would

pay said Miller note." This conveyance from

Horner to appellant, made in pursuance to

the agreement with the Turples, was the only

one executed to appellant by any one for said

lots. The money so to be paid by appellant

was a loan to the Turples, as held by this

court on the former appeal, to secure which

they conveyed, and caused to be conveyed,

real estate. The facts found do not show

that appellant became the debtor of the Tur-

ples, or the debtor of Horner. He purchas-

ed nothing of them, and did not agree to pay

his own debt, but the debt of the Turples and

Horner, by promising to pay the Miller note. I

It was, in effect, a mere contract to advance

money by way of a loan to pay said note,

and Miller could not have maintained any ‘

action thereon against appellant. Root v. t

Wright, supra; Garnsey v. Rogers, supra;

Pardee v. Treat, supra. It is settled law in '

this state that a contract to answer for the

debt of another must not only be in writing,

but must be supported by a suﬂlcient consid- .

eration. Such a promise may have suﬂicient 1

onsideration to support it, and yet not fur- t

sh ground for action, unless reduced to ‘

writing. Berkshire v. Young, 45 Ind. 461;

Langford v. Freeman. (30 Ind. 46; Krutz v.

Stewart, 54 Ind. 178; Hassinger v. Newman.
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the promise must be made to, and the lien be

1 that appellant failed to pay the incumbrances

abandoned by, the creditor, and not by one of i on said lots, and permitted the same to be

the debtors. Luark v. Malone, 34 Ind. 444;

Browne, St. Frauds, § 201; Wood, St. Frauds,

in the interest of equity and fair dealing,

cffort to take the cases out of the statute re-

quiring a promise to pay the debt of another

to be in writing, and we do not think the

doctrines which are the result of such efforts

should be turther extended. That part of the

conclusion of law, therefore, that Horner

was entitled to recover from appellant $1,264

on account of his failure to pay the Miller

note, is not sustained by the facts found.

For the same reason the court erred in over-

ruling appellant's demurrer to the second

and third paragraphs of Horner's complaint.

It is earnestly insisted by appellant that the
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facts found do not sustain the fourth conclu-

sion of law,—that Mary F. and Emma J. Tur-

pie are entitled to recover $10,000. The spe-

cial ﬁnding upon this part of the case is of

much wider scope than the amended com-

plaint of the Turpies‘ wives, which contains

no averment that they took immediate pos'ses-

sion of said nine lots with appelinnt's consent,

under his agreement to convey the same to

them, or that said lots had been sold at sher-

iff's sale to satisfy the incumbrancc thereon, ‘

and conveyed to innocent purchasers. Nei-

ther is it alleged that there was any lien or

incumbrance on said real estate. It appears

from the special ﬁnding that appellant promis-

ed to pay all liens and incumbrances on the

Ohio real estate; that he was to pay $20,000,

in consideration for the conveyance to him of

the undivided one-half of a part of said Ohio

real estate, upon said liens and incumbrances.

and the excess, if any was required. was to

be advanced and paid by him as a loan to the

Turpies (this included the nine lots to be con-

veyed to the Turpies‘ wives, and any liens or

lncumbrances thereon were to be paid under

this agreement); that these lots were convey-

ed to appellant under the agreement that he

would convey them to the Tulpies' wivcs;

and that they took immediate possession

thereof, with appellant's consent, under his

agreement to convey the same to them. It

is not directly stated in the special ﬁnding

that there was any incumbrance on the nine

lots. The ﬁnding, however, sets out that ap-

pellant permitted said lots to be sold to pay

the incumbrances that he had agreed to re-

move therefrom; but the amount of these in-

cumbrances, or when they became due, is not

stated. Under the agreement, and the pos-

session taken therennder by the Turpies'

wives, as stated in the special ﬁnding, they

were the real owners of said nine lots. Ap-

pellant had no right of possession or control,

except to convey said real estate to the Tur-

pies‘ wives. His title was a naked or nominal

trust. Teague v. Fowler, 56 1nd. 569; Myers

v. Jackson, 135 Ind. 136. 34 N. E. 810, and

authorities cited. It is stated in the ﬁnding

1 sold to pay the incumbrances that he agreed

OF' MOKl<;Y-DiTEHEST.

the proml:,;e must be made to, and the lien be that appellant failed to pay the lncumbrances
abandoned by, the credltt>r, and not by one of on said lots, and permitted the same to be
the debtors. Luark v. }falone, 34 Ind. 444; sold to pay the lncumbrancee that be agreed
Browne, St. Frauds, § 201; "\Vood, St. Frauds, i to remove therefrom, and that the title there§ 150. The courts, under the claim of acting ' to had passed to Innocent purchasers at sberln the Interest of equity and fair deallng, 111'.'e sale. It Is not, however, found what
have already gone quite far enough 1n their part of said $2o,ooo was to have been paid on
eft'ort to take the cases out of the statute re- the lncumbrances on the nine lots, nor that
quiring a promise to pay the debt of another such part would have satisfied the lncumbrnnto be Jn writing, and we do not think the ces thereon. Tbe Turples' wives knew before
doctrines which are the result of such etrorts February 18, 1886, when they commenced
should be further extended. That part of the their action against appellant, that he had
conclusion of law, therefore, that Homer refused to romply with his contract and pay
was entitled to recover from appellant $1,264 any more of the $20,000 on lncumbrances.
on account of his failure to pay the Miller The loss by the Turpies' wives of the nine
note, Is not sustained by the facts found. lots by sherur•s sale, as shown, was caused
For the same reason the court erred In over- by the lncumbrances not being paid, and not
ruling appellant's demurrer to the serond by the refusal of appellant to convey the same
and third paragraphs of Homer's complaint. to them. The fact that appellant refused to
It ls Parnestly insisted by appellant that the
pay the said incumbrances,-<>f which they
facts found do not sustain the fourth conclu- had knowledge,-and permitted the lots to be
sion of law,--that Mary F. and Emma .J. Tur· sold to pay the same, as stated In the finding,
pie are entitled to recover $10,000. The spe- did not give the Turples' wives the right to reclal flndlng upon this part of the case Is of cover of appellant the value of said lots, but
much wider scope than the amended com- only the amount he was to have paid thereplaint of the Turples' wives, which contains on. The role concerning the measure of damno averment that they took Immediate poSst>s· ages is the same as If appellant had conveyed
sion of said nine lots with appellant's consent, the lots to them when they took possession,
under his agreement to convey the same to or the same had not been conveyed by Woodthem, or that said lots had been sold at sher- mlr to appellant, but had been conveyed diilr's sale to satisfy the lncumbrance tht'rt>Ou, rectly to them. They were the real ownenJ
and conveyed to Innocent purchasers. Ne!- of the nine lots, and could have paid otr the·
th<'r Is It alleged that there was any lien or lncumbrances thereon, thus protecting their tllncumbrance on said real estate. It appears tie, and, when the same became due, recover~
from the special finding that appellant promls- ed from appellant whatever part ot the $20,ed to pay all liens and lncumbrances on the 000 was to have been paid thereon under the
Ohio real estate; that be was to pay $W,OOO, agreement, or, whenever said lncumbrances
In consideration for the conveyance to him of became due without paying the same, till'
the undivided one-half of a part of said OWo had a right to recover against appellant for
real estate, upon said liens and lncumbrnnc-es, whatever part of sald $20,000 was to have
and the excess, If any was required. was to been paid thereon. Turpie v. Lowe, on page
be advanced and paid by him as a loan to the 60, 114 Ind., and page SM, 15 N. E., and
Turples (this Included the nine lots to be con- cases cited. The finding upon which the right
ve.ved to the Turples' wives, and any lieus or of the Turpies' wives to recover is predlcatf'd
_lncmnbrances thereon were to be paid under Is very ambiguous, Indefinite. and uncertain,
this agreement); that these lots were com·ey- and contains many conclusions. There Is
ed to appellant under the agreement that hl• nothing In the finding showing bow It was
would eonvey them to the Tu1pies' w:vcs; possible for the nine lots to be sold and conand that they took Immediate possession veyed by the sherltr to Innocent purchai;wrs.
thereof, with appellant's consent, under his They, as shown by the finding, were In p:sagreement to convey the same to them. It session of said Iota, and were necessary paris not directly stated lo the special flnding ties to any action to enforce any lncumbrance
that there was nny lncumbrance on the nine thereon. Their posses.'lion was notice of their
lols. The finding, however, sets out that np- title. Under such circumstances, that part
pellant permitted said lots to be sold to pay of the finding which sets out that the title of
the lncumbrances that he had agreed to re· said lots had passed into the bands of Innocent
move therefrom; but the amount of these in- purchasers states only a conclusion. The fac ·s,
cmubran<'t's. or when they became due, 111 not If any, from which such conclusion Wll.s
stated. Under the agreement, and the pos- drawn, should have been stated. For all that
i<ession taken thereunder by the Turpfns• appears, the Turpies' w!Ves are still In poswh·es, as stated In the special finding, they session of said real estate. They could not
were the real owners of said nine lots. Ap- be deprived of their title unless made parties
pellant had no right of possession or control, to the proceeding under which the same waa
except to convey said real estate to the Tur- sold. There ls nothing set forth In the speples' wives. His title was a naked or nominal clal finding which would entitle them, under
tn1st. Teague v. Fowler, 56 Ind. 500; Myers the rule stated concerning the measure of
v. Jackson, 135 Ind. 136, 34 N. E. 810, and damages, to recover from appellant the value
nuthorltJe11 cited. It 1B stated ID the finding of 11&ld Iota. It follows that, under the facta
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found, the only amount which the Turpies‘

wives were entitled to recover was such part

of the $20000 as was to have been paid on the

incumbrances on said lots, with interest from

the time the same became due. This sum not

being shown by the special ﬁnding, there is

nothing upon which a conclusion of law show-

ing the amount they are entitled to recover

can be stated.

The seventh conclusion of law—that Jones

is entitled to recover $800 from appellant—is

based upon the theory that Jones, by his coun-

terclalm, sought to recover the value of the

undivided one-ﬁfth of the Starke farm con-

veyed by him to appellant. Appellant urges

that the conclusion of law is erroneous be-

cause the counterclaim of Jones, upon which

the ﬁnding in his favor and the seventh con-

clusion of law rest, does not state facts suﬂl-
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cient to constitute a cause of action, and for

the further reason that the counterclaim seeks

to recover damages for the breach by appel-

lant of a contract to convey real estate to

Jones, and not upon the quantum valebat for

the real estate conveyed by Jones to appel-

lant. It is alleged in the counterclaim of

Jones that he sold and conveyed the undivid-

ed one-ﬁfth of the Starke farm, containing

about 324 acres, in consideration of which

appellant agreed “to convey or cause to be

conveyed to him the undivided one-half of

ten lots in Reynolds‘ addition to Monticello,

White county, Indiana, which appellant rep-

resented to be worth two hundred dollars

each, and the undivided one-half of forty

acres of land near Monon, Indiana, by him

found, the only amount which the Turples'
wives were entitled to rerovPr was such part
ot the $20.000 as was to have been paid on the
lncumbrances on said lots. with Interest from
the time the same became due. This sum not
being shown by the special finding, there Ill
nothing upon which a conclusion of law showing the amount they are entitled to recover
can be stated.
The seventh conclusion ot law-that Jones
ls entitled to recover $800 from appellant-ls
based upon the theory that Jones, by his counterclaim, sought to recover the value of the
undivided one-fifth of the Starke farm conveyed by him to appellant. Appellant urges
that the conclusion of law Is erroneous because the countPrclalm of Jones, upon which
the finding In bis favor and the seventh conchL'!ion ot law rest, does not state facts suftl.
cient to constitute a cause of action, and for
the further reason that the counterclaim seeks
to recover damages for the breach by appellant of a contract to convey real estate to
.Tones, and not upon the quantum valebat for
the real estate conveyed by Jones to appellant. It Is alleged In the counterclaim of
.Jones that he !!Old and conveyed the undlvlded one-fifth of the Stnrke farm, containing
about 3".M a<"res, In consideration of which
appellant agreed "to convey or cause to be
eonveyed to him the undivided one-half ot
ten lots In ReynoldR' addition to Month•ello,
White county, Indiana, which appellant represented to be worth two hundred dollars
each, and the undivided one-halt of forty
acres ot land near Monon, Indiana, by him
represented to be worth one thousand dollars;
that he relied upon the l"l'presentat'ons of
value, and believed he was contracting for
property of the Yalue of fifteen hundred dollars." The counterdalm proceeds upon the
throry that Jones was entitled to recover

represented to be worth one thousand dollars:

that he relied upon the representat'ons of

value, and believed he was contracting for

property of the value of ﬁfteen hundred dol-

lars." The counterclaim proceeds upon the

theory that Jones was entitled to recover

damages for a breach by appellant of the

contract to convey the undivided one-half of

the 10 lots, and the undivided one-half of

the 40 acres of land near Monon, Ind., and

that the measure of damages was the value

of the real estate appellant had agreed to

convey. The agreement of appellant to con-

vey said real estate is not alleged to be in

writing, and will therefore be presumed to

have been by parol. Wolke v. Fleming, 103

Ind. 105, 106. 2 N. E. 325; Jarboe v. Severin,

85 Ind. 496, 498; Budd v. Kraus, 79 Ind.

137. As the agreement was for the convey-

ance of real estate of which Jones was not

put in possession, the same was within the

statute of frauds, and was incapable of being

enforced, or of supporting an action for dam-

ages for its breach by appellant. Schoon-

over v. Vachon, 121 Ind. 3, 22

Rochl v. Haumesser, 114 Ind. 311, 15 N. E.

345; Burns v. Fox, 113 Ind. 205, 14 N. E.

541; Wallace v. Long, 105 Ind. 522, 5 N. E.

666. Jones‘ action being to recover damages

for the nonperformance of the contract, the

counterclaim did not state facts suﬂiclent to

constitute a cause of action, and there is

•

:
'

1

:

i

damages for a breach by a1lpellant of the
contract to convey the undivided one-bait of
the 10 lots, and the undivided one-half of
the 40 acres of land near Monon, Ind., and
that the measure of damages was the value
of the real estate appellant had agreed to
convey. The agreement of appellant to convey said real estate is not allt'ged to be In
writing, and will therefore be presumed to
have been by parol. Wolke,v. Fleming, 103
Ind. 105, 100. 2 N. E. 325; Jarboe v. Severin,
85 Ind. 496, 408; Budd v. Kraus, 79 Ind.
137. As the agreement was for the conveyance of real estate of which Jones was not
put In possession, the same was within the
statute of frauds, and was Incapable of being
enforced, or of supporting an action for damages for Its breach by appellant. ScboonOYer v. Vachon, 121 Ind. 3, 22 N.' E. 777;.
Roehl v. Haumesser, 114 Ind. 311, 15 N. E.
345; Bums v. Fox, 113 Ind. 200, 14 N. E.
541; Wallace v. Long, 105 Ind. 522, 5 N. E.
666. Jone11' action being to recover damages
for the nonperformance of the contract, the
counterclaim did not state fncts sufficient to
constitute a cause of action, and there Is
nothing, therefore, tor the seventh conclusion
of law to rest upon. Beshles, the special findIng shows that the right of .Jones to recoyer
was predicated upon the theory that the actlon was to recover the value ot one-fifth of
the Starke farm. So that, even If the facts
alleged In the counterclaim constituted a
cause of action, the conclusions of law would
be erroneous, because the same rest upon
a different theory from the one ~et forth In
the counterclaim. Judy v. Gilbert, 77 Ind.
96; Mescall v. Tully, 91 Ind. 00; Trentman v.
Neff, 124 Ind. 503, 24 N. E. 895. For the reneons given the cause Is revel'l!ed, with lnstruc·
tlons to the court below to sustain appellant's motion tor a venlre de oovo.
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WHITE et al. v. l\IILLI‘ZR et al.

(78 N. Y. 393.)

Court of Appeals of New York. 1879.

Action by Lewis White and others against

Chauncy Miller and others for danmges for

breach of warranty of goods sold. From a

judgment of the general term afiirming 8.

judgment for plaintiffs, defendants appeal.

Judgment of general term reversed, and that

entered on the verdict modiﬁed.

R. W. Peckham. for appellants. Esek Cow-

en, for respondents.

EARL, J. This is an action to recover

damages for a breach of warranty in the

sale of cabbage seeds. The warranty. as

alleged and found, is that the seeds were

Bristol cabbage seeds; and it was found that

they were not, and that they did not pro-

duce Bristol cabbages. The rule of damages,
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as laid down by the trial judge in his charge

to the jury, was in conformity with the de-

cision of this court when the case was here

upon a prior appeal (71 N. Y. 118), the dif-

ference in value between the crop actually

raised from the seed sown and a crop of

Bristol cabbage, such as would ordinarily

ave been produced that year. The judge

also charged the jury that if they found for

the plaintiffs, they should also allow them

interest upon the amount of damage from

the commencement of the suit, April 15, 1869,

to the day of their verdict. May 30. 1878.,

The jury found the damage to be $2,000, and

the interest upon this sum to be $1,277.49, and

gave plaintiffs a verdict for the amount of the

two sums. The defendants excepted to the

charge as to interest. and this exception pre-

senls the only question for our consideration.

The law in this state as‘ to the allowance

of interest in common-law actions is in a,

very unsatisfactory condition. The decisions

upon the subject are so contradictory and

irreconcilable that no certain rule for guid-

ance in all cases can be deduced from them.

The common-law rule. as expounded in

England, allowed interest only upon mercan-

tile securities, or in those cases whcrc there '

had been an express promise to pay interest.

or where such promise was to be implied

from the usage of trade. Mayne, Dam. (2d

Ed.) 105'‘; Higgins v. Sargent, 2 Barn. & C.

349. in the absence of these conditions, in-

terest was not allowed in an action for money

lent, or for money had and received, or for

money paid, or on an account stated, or

for goods sold. even though to be paid for

on a particular day, or for work and labor.

(iordon v. Swan, 12 East, 419; Calton v.

Bragg. 15 East, 223; Walker v. Constable.

l Hos. & P. 306; Carr v. Edwards, 3 Starkic.

132; Nichol v. Thompson, 1 Camp. 52. note;

'l‘relawney v. Thomas. 1 H. Bl. 303.

Thus the law remained in England until

the statute of third and fourth William

IV., which provides that upon all debts or

sums certain, and in actions of trover and

trespass de bonls 3s1lort;ltlh;. and in actions

upon policies of insurance. the jury may in
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allowance was based upon the curious

ground that the debtor was in default for

not having taken the requisite steps to as-

certain the amount of the debt. in this

case, Judge Selden, speaking of the case of

Van Rensselaer v. Jewett, said that that case

went a step further in the allowance of in-

terest than the prior cases, “and allowed in-

terest upon an unliquidatcd demand. the

amount of which could be ascertained by

computation, together with a reference to

well-established market-values; because such

values in many cases are so nearly certain

that is would be possible for the debtor to ob-

tain some proximate knowledge of how much

he was to pay." In Adams v. Bank, 36 N. Y.

%, and Mygatt v. Wilcox, 45 N. Y. 306, it

was held that interest could be recovered in

an action by an attorney upon his account
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for services. The value of the services does

not seem in either case to have been disputed.

In the iirst case, it was held that interest

could be recovered from the time payment

for the services was due; and in the latter

case it was held that it could be recovered

from the time the account was rendered by

the attorney to his client. The right of re-

covery was based upon the theory that there

was default in paying money due. In both

cases the account appears to have been sub-

stantially liquidated, the liability to pay alone

being litigated. in Smith v. Velle, 60 N. Y.

10f‘. the action was to recover for services as

housekeeper for defendant's intestate during

many years. The plaintiff had from time to

time received money and goods to apply upon

her account. There was no agreement as to

the measure of compensation, and it was held

that the account was unliquidnted. and that

interest was not recoverable, even from the

death of the intestate, as there was not a

ﬁxed market-value by which the rate of wages

could be determined. In McCollum v. Sew-

ard. 62 X. Y. 316. the action was upon an un-

liquidated disputed claim for work and labor.

and the referee allowed interest from the com-

mencement of the action; and this upon the

appeal of the defendant, was held not to be

erroneous. In Mercer v. Vose, 67 N. Y. 56,

the action was to recover for services ren-

dered by the plaintiff to the defend.-tnt. The

claim was unliqnidated and contested. The

referee allowed interest upon the balance

found by him from the time plaintiff left de-

fendant's service and demanded his pay.

The action was commenced in about a month

after such demand was made. and it was

held that plaintlff was entitled to recover in-

terest at least from the conunencement of

the action, and that if there was any error

in allowing interest from an earlier date, it

was too tritiing to require correction. Upon

the prior trial of this action, interest was

allowed from the time a crop could have been

harvested and sold, if the seed had been as

warranted. This was held by this court to

have been erroneous. on the ground thnl "the

demand was nnll\lnl‘|alP(l and the anmunt
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and also it may be given as damages for the

detention of a debt after the time when due

by the terms of the agreement, or for neg-

lect to pay a debt after a special demand."

In Amee v. Wilson, 22 Me. 116, the action

was upon an account for goods sold and de-

livered; and it was held that the plaintiff

would be entitled to interest prior to the

commencement of the suit, “by proof of an

agreement to pay it, or by proof of a de-

mand of payment, anterior to the date of the

writ."

The cases last cited tend to show that

where an account for services, or for goods

sold and delivered, which has become due

and is payable in money, although not

strictly liquidated, is presented to the debtor

and payment demanded, the debtor is put

in default and interest is set running; and
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that if not demanded before, the commence-

ment of suit is a suﬂicient demand to set the

interest running from that date. But there

is no authority ‘for holding in a case like

this, where the claim sounds purely in dam-

ages, is unliquidated and contested, and the

amount so uncertain that a demand cannot

set the interest running, that it can be set

running by the commencement of the ac-

tion. Why should the commencement of

an action have such effect? The claim is

no less unliquidated, contested and uncer-

tain. The debtor is no more able to ascer-

tain how much he is to pay. No new ele-

ment is added. The conditions are not

changed, except that the disputed claim has

been put in suit; and there is no more rea-

son or equity in allowing interest from that

than from an earlier date. If interest as a

legal right can be allowed in this case from

the commencement of the action, then it must

be allowed from the same date in all actions

ex contractu, and logically it would be im-

possible to refuse it in actions ex deiicto.

Therefore when this court, upon the prior

appeal, decided that the nature of this claim

was such that interest could not be allowed

thereon from a time anterior to the com-

mencement of the action, it really decided the

question now presented.

The judgment of the general term must

therefore be reversed. and the judgment en-

tered upon the verdict must be modiﬁed

by striking therefrom the sum of $1,277.49:

and as thus modiﬁed it must be aﬂirmed.

without costs to either party as against the

other upon the appeal to the general term

and to this court. All concur.

Judgment accordingly.
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and also It may be given as damages for the
detention of a debt after the time when due
by the terms ot the agreement, or for neglect fo pay a debt after a special demand."
In Amee v. Wilson, 22 Me. 116, the action
was upon an account for goods sold and delivered; and 1t was· held that the plaintiff
would be entitled to Interest prior to the
commencement of the suit, "by proof of an
agreement to pay It, or by proof of a demand of payment, anterior to the date of the
writ."
The cases last cited tend to show that
where an account for services, or for goods
sold and delivered, which bas become due
and ls payable In money, although not
strictly liquidated, ls presented to the debtor
and payment demanded, the debtor ls put
in default and interest Is set running; and
that It not demanded before, the commencement of suit is a sufficient demand to set the
Interest running from that date. But there
( Is no authority ·tor holding In a case like
this, where the claim sounds purely In damages, bi unllquldated and contested, and the
amount so uncerWn that a demand cannot
set the Interest running, that it can be set
running by the commencement of the action. Why should the commencement of

an action have such effect? The claim la
no less unllquldated, contested and uncertain. The debtor 18 no more able to ascertain how much he Is to pay. No new element ls added. The conditions are not
changed, except that the disputed claim has
been put In suit; and there Js no more reason or equity in allowing Interest from that
than from an earlier date. If Interest as a
legal right can be allowed in this case from
the commencement of the action, then It must
be alJowed from the same date In all actions
ex contractu, and logically It would be Impossible to refuse It In actions ex dellcto.
Therefore when this court, upon the prior
appeal, decided that the nature of this claim
was such that interest could not be allowed
thereon from a time anterior to the commencement or the action, It really decided the
question now presented.
The judgment of the general term must
therefore be reversed, and the Judgment entered upon the verdict must be modlfted
by striking therefrom the sum of $1,277.40;
and as thus mod16.ed It mUBt be affirmed,
without costs to either Plll17 u against the
other upon the appeal to the general term
and to this court. All concur.
Judgment accordlnglJ".

V

‘ -' DAMAGES FOR .\'().\'l'.\Y\Il-Z.\"l‘ OF MO.\'EY—lN'l'la‘Rl~1ST.

'1

\IA.\'SFIELD v. .\'EVt' YORK CENT. & H.

- B. R. CO.1

(21 N. E. 735, 114 N. Y. 331.)2

(‘onrt of Appeals of New York, Second Division.

June 4, 1889.

Appeal from supreme court, general term,

Second department.

Action for breach of contract by Luther

E. Mansﬁeld against the New York Central

& Hudson River Railroad Company. A judg-

ment for plaintiff was allirmed by the gen-

eral term of the supreme court and defend-

ant appeals.

John E. Barrows, for appellant.

JllcFa1-land, for respondent.

WW.

2237

after reviewing many prior cases on the sub-
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ject, the court, by EARL, J ., remarked that

. some of those cited “tend to show that where

l

BRADLEY, J. I think the defendant's ex- ‘

ception was well taken to the submission to

the jury of the question of interest upon the

amount of damages they should lind against

the defendant. The action was to recover

for breach of contract. In such cases,

whether interest is recoverable does not rest ‘

in the discretion of the jury, but is a ques-

tion of law for the court, while in actions

sounding in tort, when the recovery of in-

terest is permissible, it is with some excep-

tions a question for the jury. Duryee v. ,

Mayor, etc., 96 N. Y. 478. The rule upon the

subject may appear to have been involved in

some uncertainty, but now it seems to be

reasonably well detined iii this state. In

Mc.\laster v. State, 108 N. Y. 542. 15 N. E.

Rep. 417, the claim was for damages found-

ed upon a breach of contract for the supply

of materials for the services in the construc-

tion of a public building. The damages re-

sulted from the refusal of the state to permit

the contractor to proceed with the work to

its completion, as provided by the contract,

and such damages consisted of a loss of prof-

its, which would have been realized by per-

formance of the work at the contract price.

The court held that interest was not al-

lowable even from the time of the commence-

ment of the action or proceeding, because the

claim was unliquidated, and “there was no

possible way for the state to adjust the same

and ascertain the amount which it was liable

topay." And reference was made to White

v. Miller. 71 N. Y. 118, 78 N. Y. 393.

was an action to recover damages resulting

from breach of warranty upon sale of a

quantity of cabbage seed. The referee on the

lirst trial allowed interest upon the damages

from the time the crop would have been har-

vested. The court held that was an error,

for the reason that “the demand was unl'n|ui-

dated, and that the amount could not be de-

termined by computation simply or reference

to marltet values."

next trial the plaintiffs were allowed to re-

228

DAMAGES FOR NONPAYME.\'T OF MONEY—I.\'1‘lﬁRES'l‘.

tract, and it was no less nnliquidated for the

purpose of the question now under consider-

ation than it would have been if there had

been no stipulated pm-diem allowance pro-

vided by the contract for the diligence of the

contractors in doing the work. The amount

of such claim for damages was entirely un-

certain. and was closely contested by the de-

fendant; so much so that a verdict for the de-

fendant upon that branch of the case would

have been supported by the evidence. This

question of interest seems clearly to come

within the doctrine of the case before cited,

and should have been excluded from consid-

eration on the trial; and in view of the rea-

son for the rule, and the rule itself, so an-

nounced, the cases cited by the plaintiff's ‘

counsel do not support his proposition in this

respect. In Parrottyv. Ice Co., 46 N. Y. 361;
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Mairs v. Association, 89 N. Y. 498; Walrath

v. ltedlield, 18 N. Y. 457; Duryee v. Mayor,

etc., 96 N. Y. 477,—the actions were in tort,

and the question of interest was for the jury.

In Van liensselaer v. Jewett, 2 N. Y. 135,

the action was for rent payable in speciﬁed

articles with no sum mentioned, and Dana v.

Fiedler, 12 N. Y. 41, was brought to recover

damages for non-delivery of a quantity of

madder pursuant to contract.

cases the market values of the property at

the time stipulated for delivery the defend-

ants had the means of ascertaining, and there-

fore when in default and required to perform

they were able to ascertain by computation

the amounts to which the plaintiffs were en-

titled. l‘he'court~ held that they were enti-

lied to recover interest. In Mclilahon v.

Railroad Co., 20 N. Y. 463, the action was to

recover for work performed and materials

furnished"by the plaintiff in construction of

the del‘endant's road. The defendant had

refused,to have nieasurements made by its

engineer, which was a condition precedent

to payment. The court referred to the doc-

trine of Van Rensselaer v. Jewett, and by

In both these \

SELDEN, J ., said that the court there went

as far as was reasonable to go, and held that

interest was allowable upon the ground that

defendant was in default for not having taken

the requisite steps to ascertain the amount of

the debt. In McCollum v. Seward, 62 N. Y.

316, and Mercer v. Vose, 67 N. Y. 56, the

actions were to recover the amount due for

services upon the quantum meruit. The

claims were unliquidated, and the recovery

of interest from the time of the com mencc-

ment of the action was sustained. The for-

mer of the last two cases was decided upon

authorities there cited, and was followed by

the other. The doctrine of that line of cases

is that in actions for services rendered or

goods sold, etc., when the debtor is in default

for not paying pursuant to his contract, the

creditor is entitled to interest by way of dam-

ages. Nowell v. Wheeler, 36 N. Y. 244;

Mygatt v. Wilcox, 45 N. Y. 306. And that

‘ is upon the theory that the amount may be
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SULLIVAN et al. v. Mc.\IILLA.\' et I\l.

(19 South. 340, 37 Pin. 134.)

Supreme Court of Florida. Feb. l8. 1896.

Appeal from circuit court, Escnmbia coun-

ty; W. D. Barnes, Judge.

Action by A. M. McMillan and C. L. Wig-

gins, copartners under the name of Mt'\Iiilan

& Wiggins, against M. H. Sullivan and Emily

S. Sullivan, executor and executrix of D. F.

Sullivan, deceased. Judgment for plaintiffs,

and defendants appeal. Aﬁirmed.

R. L. Campbell, for appellants. W. A.

Blount, for appellees.

LIDDON, J. This is the second appeal in

this case. On the ﬁrst appeal all questions of

law presented by the case have been settled,

except two matters now controverted be-

tween the parties. The nature of the case

will fully appear by reference to the report-
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ed opinion and the statements of fact accom-

panying the same. 26 Fla. 543, 8 South; 450. '

The suit was brought by appellees, hereafter

called the plaintiffs, against appellants, here-

after called the defendants, for the breach of ‘

a contract, whereby appellees agreed to de

liver to the testator of appellants all the logs

of certain speciﬁed dimensions, and free from

certain speciﬁed defects. growing upon cer-

tain described lands of said testator. The

breach alleged to have been made by the de- '

fendants after the death of said testator was

in refusing to receive the remainder of said

logs after a portion of the same had been de-

livered. From the evidence it appears that

it would have taken appellees two years, or

thereabouts, from the time the contract was

broken by appellants, to have completed the

contract on their part by delivery of the oth-

er logs embraced within the provisions of the

same. After the appellants broke the con-

tract by refusing to receive any more logs

under the same, the appellees, with some of

the same teams that had been engaged in

the work required for the performance of

such contract, engaged in other work of de-

livering logs under other contracts to other

parties. The appellants sought to prove what

gain and proﬁts were made by the appellees

by their own labor and the use of such teams

in such other work and contracts during the

time that it would have taken them to per-

form the contract with the appellants‘ testa-

tor, and for the breach of which the suit

was brought. The circuit court excluded such

evidence. The proof upon the trial did show

the value of the use of these teams, and what

other teams could have been engaged for, and

were taken into consideration in estimating

the plaintiffs' proﬁts upon which the verdict

was based. The appellants claim that such

evidence should have been admitted;

they were entitled to prove the amount of ‘

such gains and proﬁts; and that such amount

should have been deducted by the jury from

the amount found to be due the appellees, un-

der the rule for the measure of damages es-

that '

tablished by this court. 26 Fla. 343, 8 Soutln

DA1\I.\(,a;s FOH

13‘)

proper opportunities to obtain another cargo;

and if he neglect to perform this duty the

owners cannot hold the charterer liable for

.the increased damages resulting from such

neglect." Murrell v. Whiting, 32 Ala. 54. A

very similar case, and a very similar holding,

is Shannon v. Comstock, 21 Wend. 457. In

Hodges v. Fries, 34 Flu. 63, 15 South. 682,-

a suit for violation of a contract for rent of

a store building by refusing to put plaintiff

in possession of same,—it was held to be the

duty of the plaintiff to mitigate the damages

by accepting another store in the same vicin-

ity, andequally well suited for her purposes,

which was tendered to her.

The contract which was broken in the pres-

ent case was not one for personal services, nor

one which the parties contemplated should be

performed with any special means or instru-

mentality. It was simply a contract for the
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delivery of certain logs at a certain place, and

might have been performed by the plaintiffs

with their own teams and personal labor. or

by any other means or agency to which they

might have seen ﬁt to intrust the performance

of the same. There is nothing in the contract

to show that the execution of the same re-

quired all or any great portion of the time or

vpersonal attention of both or either of the

‘.plaintiffs; or that it was impracticable for

plaintiffs to be engaged in other business and

the performance of other contracts contempo-

raneously with the performance of the contract

in controversy. We do not think the rule in-

voked as to mitigation of damages by subse-

quent earnings and proﬁts applies to this case.

A distinction is recognized between a case of

the character of that now before us, and those

to which we have alluded. 2 Greenl. Ev. §

261; Watson v. Brick Co., 3 Wash. 283, 28

Pac. 527; 1 Sedg. Dam. § 2%; Wolf v. Stude-

baker, 65 Pa. St. 459; Crescent Manuf'g Co. v.

N. O. Nelson Manufg Co., 100 Mo. 327, 13 S.

W. 503; Nilson v. Morse, 52 Wis. 240 (text,

255) 9 N. W. 1; Cameron v. White, 74 Wis.

425, 43 N. W. 155; Field, Dam. § 339.

There was no legal obligation upon the plain-

tiffs in this case to enter upon the perform-

ance of other contracts for the beneﬁt of the

defendants. The supreme court of Wisconsin,

in Cameron v. White, supra, where a conten-

tion like that of appellants in this case was

made, as we think properly said: “As the

plaintiffs could not enhance the damages

against the defendant by their neglect to make

the best of what they had on their hands, so

they are not bound to lessen the damages by

making other contracts, and performing them,

and giving the beneﬁt of the performance of

such contracts to the defendant." A very full

exposition of this subject, showing the differ-

ence in the rules applicable to contracts for

personal service and those for the doing of a

speciﬁc act, can be found in Watson v. Brick

Co., sup1a. This discussion is too lengthy to

insert entire in this opinion. The gist of the

whole matter, the conclusion of the court, cit-

ing Wolf v. Studebaker, 65 Pa. St. 459, is thus

I
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proper opportunities to obtain another cargo; stated: "The duty to seek employment 18 deand If he neglect to perform this duty the pendent upon the original contract being one
owners cannot hold the charterer llable for of employment or hire. It Is not applicable to
,the Increased damage11 resulting from such every <-ootract. • • • Ordinary contracts of
neglect." :Murrell v. Whiting, 32 Ala. M. A hh•p and contracts for the pe1·formanee of some
very similar case, and a very similar holding, spedtled undertHklng cannot be governed hy
ls :Shannon v. Com11toek, 21 Wend. 45i. In the so.me rule. That in one case the party cnn
Hodges v. l•'Iies, 34 Fla. ll3, 15 South. 68:t,- eam no more than the wages, and If he gets
n suit for vloln ti on of n cont1·act for rent of that his loss will be but nominal; whereas, In
n store building by refusing to put plnintlff . the other case, the loss of the party Is the loss-·
In possession of !Ill me,-lt was l1eld to be the of the ~ ot the rontract. The damages
duty or the plaintiff to mitigate the damages may be said to be fixed by the law ot the conby accepting another store In the same vicintract the moment ft Is broken, and cannot be
ity, and equally well suited for her purposes, altered by <--olluteral circumstances Independwhich was tendered to her.
ent of and totall~· disconnected from It, amt
The contract which was broken In the pres- from the party nPC'm<lonlng it. To plead the
ent case was not one for personal services, nor doctrine of a\"olduhle <-"OnS<'quences to such
one which the parties contemplated should be case, • • • 'would nf'C'essarlly Involve proof
performed with any special means or lDBtl"U· ot everything, great and small, no matter ho'v
mentality. It was simply a contract for the various the Items done by the plalntltr during
delivery of certain logs at a certain place, and the period of the contract might be, and bow
might have been performed by the plalntllrs much he made in the meantime.' • • • It
with their own teams and personal labor, or the rule was to be observed that the damages
by any other means or agency to which they , proven must be direct and approximate, the
might have seen fit to lntrust the performance same rule must be Invoked In the reduction ot
of the same. The~ ls nothing In the contract damagrs." In Crescent Manuf'g Co. v. N. 0.
to show that the cxt>cutlon of the snmc re- Nelson Manuf'g Co., supra, where ,an attempt
quired all or any great portion of the time or was mndE' to olfe1 evidence similar to that excluded In the present case, It was said: "Where
~rsonal attention of both or either of the
'-plalntllfe; or that It was Impracticable for a servant Is wrongfully discharged during his
plaintllfe to be engaged In other business and term, and lays his damages at the contmct
the performance of other contracts contempo- wnges ror the balance of the term, tt ls generrnnrously with the 11erformance of the contract ally hE>ld that evidence may be Introduced In
In controversy. We do not think the rule In- mitigation of damages of what be might have
voked as to mitigation of damages by subse- earned In the Interim by using reasonable efquent earnings and profits applles to this ease. forts to procure other employment. So, In genA distinction is recognized between a case ot eral, where a party bas been Injured or damthe character of that now before us, and those aged by a breach ot a contract, he should do
to which we have alluded. 2 Green). Ev. I whatever be can to l«'ssen the Injury. Many
261; Watson v. Brick Co., 3 Wnsh. 283, 28 cases asserting these principles of law are citPac. 527; 1 Sedg. Dam. I~; Wolf v. Stude- ed by the defendant, but they have no applibaker, G5 Pa. St. 459; Crescent Manut'g Co. v. cation to the case In hand. The plaintiff ownN. O. Nelson Manuf'g Co., 100 Mo. 3~1. 13 S. ed Its factory and the machinery, and the <'OnW. 503; Nilson v. Morse, 52 Wis. 240 (text, trnct constituted no such relation as that of
25ii) 9 N. W. 1; Cameron v. White, 74 WI& master and servant. It bad the right to make
42[;, 43 N. W. 155; Field, Dam. A S::l9.
as few or as many other contracts as it saw
There was no legal obligation upon the plaln- flt while executing the contract with defendtllrs In this case to enter upon the perform- ant, and It ls entitled to the profits which it
an<'e of other contracts for the benefit of the might hm·e made on this particular contract.
defendants. The suprPme court of Wisconsin, The evidence olfered In mitigation of damagPs
In Cameron v. White, supra, where a conten- was properly excluded."
tion like that ot appellants In this case was
From what has been 111ld by us and quoted
made, as we think properly said: "As the with approval "from the decisions ot other
plalntllfs could not enhance the damages courts It follows that we are of the opinion
against the defendant by their neglect to make that the circuit court did not err In excluding
the best ot what they had on their hands, so the testimony offered, and that the doctrin<'
they are not bound to lessen the damages by that one who has been Injured by the breach
making other contracts, and performing them, of a contract must do all that le n•asonabl~· ·
and giving the brnetlt of the performance of within his power to mitigate the damagei;
such contracts to the defendant." A very full cauSt.>d thereby does not prevail to the extent
exposition of this subject, showing the differ- that one who Is injured by a violation of an
ence In the rules applicable to contracts for ag1·eement to do a spedfl.c net not necessarily
personal service and those for the doing of a Involving personal services must seek and per·
l'(JN'ltlc act, can be found In Watson v. Brick form other eontmets for the benefit of mu·
Co., supru. This discussion Is too lengthy to who, by breaking faith with him, has eaus•~I
Insert Pntlre In this opinion. The gist of the the Injury.
whole matter, the conclusion of the court, citThe second matter. as already stated. lit
ing Wolf v. Studebaker, a.; Pa. St. 459, ls thua whether any Interest ls recovernble upon the
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' as to the allowance of

1

amount of damages found by the jury I

against the defendants. The court instruct-

ed the jury that, if they found a verdict for

the plaintiffs, they should assess the dam-

ages. with 5 per cent. interest. from what-

ever date the evidence showed the contract

would have been completed. The jury, in ‘

its verdict, stated separately the amount of '

the damages assessed and the interest there-

on, and judgment was entered for the aggre-

gate amount. These proceedings are claim-

ed to be erroneous, for the reasons alleged:

(1) That no interest can be allowed in a re-

covery of unliquidated damages, and (2) that

the evidence does not show any date from

which the jury might calculate the interest.

It cannot be doubted that the ancient rule is

adverse to the assessment of Jntcrest upon
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unliquidated demands. More liberal ideas

interest prevail in

modern, especially in American, authorities;

and in the allowance of interest the distinﬁ

i

tion is practically obliterated between liqui- .

dated and unliquidated demands.

ard author upon the subject says: "The de-

termination of the question whether interest

can or canno( be allowed is by no means

free from diﬂiculty. The most general clas-

sitication of causes of action with reference

to interest is into liquidated and unliquidat-

ed demands. And it was formerly attempt-

ed to lay down the rule that interest could be

recovered only on liquidated demands. But

it will be perceived that, not only is the dis-

tinction itseif not by any means easy to keep

in view, but, besides this, there is no reason,

in the nature of things, why the fact of a

demand being unliquidated should debar the

plaintiff from receiving or exempt the de-

fendant from paying interest.

we do not ﬁnd as a matter of fact that the

A stand- 1

And, ﬁnally, ‘

line between cases in which interest is allow- .

ed and cases in which it is refused corre

sponds with the line between liquidated and

unliquidated demands. ' ' ' The objec-

tion to this classiﬁcation lies not only in its

difﬁculty of application, which might per- '

haps be surmounted; but in the fact of its

unfairness. There is no reason why a per-

son injured should have a smaller measure

of recovery in one case than the other. ' ' ' '

On general principles, once admit that inter-

est is the natural fruit of money, it would

seem that, wherever a verdict iiquidates a

claim. and ﬁxes it as of a prior date, interest

should follow from that date. ' ' ' There

are two tests which are constantly applied

by the courts, having been found by them

more useful than the attempted division into

liquidated and unliquidated demands. Of

these the ﬁrst is whether the demand is of

such a nature that its exact pecuniary

(amount was either ascertained or ascertain-

able by simple computation, or by reference
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Without setting forth even a brief sum- -

mary of the evidence in the case, we think

it suiiicient to say that it was so exact and

deﬁnite as to the amount of damage sustain-

ed by the plaintiffs, and the elements of the

same, that it only required a simple compu-

tation by the jury to ﬁx the amount. We

think the case falls within the rule stated,

that the damages could be readily liquidated

and ascertained by the jury by simple com-

putation, and that the plaintiffs were enti-

tled to interest thereon.

We do not think the objection well taken

that the evidence shows no date from which

the jury could calculate the interest. The

evidence shows suﬂiciently a date within

which the plaintiffs could have completed

their contract, viz. two years from the time

the defendants made a breach of it. This
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time was long after the action was brought.

The amount of interest allowed shows that

it was calculated from such date. The court

told the jury to allow the interest “from

whatever date the evidence shows the con-

tract would have been completed," and we

think the proof suﬂiciently deﬁnite as to

such a date. There was no reversible error

in the instruction or the ﬁnding of the jury.

By this holding we do not intend to deter-

mine whether the interest could have been

calculated only from the date suﬂicient for

the completion of the contract, or whether

it should have been estimated from the

breach of the same, or from the ﬁling of the

writ in the suit. We only determine that

there was no prejudicial error to the defend-

ants in the record. If the rule varied at all

from the true! rule for calculation of interest.

such variance was in defendants' favor, and

lessened the amount of the recovery against

them.

Let the judgment of the circuit court be af-

ﬁrmed.

f.\'O'l‘E. Jacksonville, T. & K. VV. Ry. Co. v.

Peninsular Land, Transp. & Mfg. Co., post, 4-16.

D.\\I.\(ili.\‘ F()R NO.\'PAY\I1':.\"1' Oi-‘ \It).\'iC\'—IN'l‘EltES'l‘;

ILOUISVILLE & N. R. (‘U, r. ‘\‘i'.-\l.l..\(.‘lC.

(17 S. W. 882, 91 Tenn. 35.)

Supreme Court of Tennessee. Dec. 12, 1891.

Appeal from circuit court, Sumner cOun- -

ty; H. C. CARTER, .iudge.

Action by W. L. Wallace against the

Louisville & Nashville itailroad Company

for personal injuries. Judgment for plain- ,

tiff. and defendant appeals. Reversed.

J. J. Turner, for plaintiff. S. F. Wilson,

R. K. Gillespie, and Geo. W. Boddfe, for de-

fendant.

SNODGRASS,J. Tlmdefendantin error,

while in the service ofthe Louisvilie& Nash-

ville Railroad Company as brakemun, sus-

tained severe personal injury, resulting in

the loss of a leg, which he alleged was '

occasioned by the negligence of the com-

pany. 1-ie sued for $15,000 damages and

recovered judgment for $9,940. The rail-
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road company appealed, and assigned nu. ;

merous errors. It is not deemed mnte- l

rial tonoticebut one of them,as theothers 1

are not well taken, and involve nothing

new, so as to make their consideration in .

a written opinion necessary. The one ma-

terial to be considered relates to the ques-

tion of interest. The court told the jury

it couhi assess plaintiff's damages with or .

withoutinterest. as the jury should see

proper, in connection with instructions

as to the measure of damages not other- ‘

wise complained of. The verdict assessed

the damages at $7,000 with 7 years‘ inter- ,

est $2,940. aggegating $9,940. it is oh-

jected in the assignment of errors that the

charge on this question. and verdict. with

judgment thereon,are erroneous. This in- I

voives a consideration of the question, .

what is the true measure of damages for

such personal injury? The rule for deter. '

mining damages for injuries not resulting '

in death, (where the statute ﬁxes the

measure.) and not calling for exemplary

punishment, deducibie from the decisions

of this court since its organization in this

state, is that of compensation for mental

suffering and physical pain. loss of time,

and expenses incident to the injury, and,

if it be permanent, the loss resulting from

complete or partial disability in health,

mind, or person thereby occasioned. And

this is the rule most consonant to reason

adopted in other states. 3 Sedg. Dam.

(8th Ed.) 5 481 et seq.; 5Amer.& Eng. Enc.

Law, pp. 40-44, and notes; Railroad Co.

v. Read, 87 Amer. Dec. 260. As this sum

in gross includes all the compensation

which is requisite to cover pain, suffering,

and disability to date of judgment, and

prospectively beyond. it is intended to be

and is the full measure of recovery, and 1

cannot be supplemented by the new ele- l

ment of damages for the detention of this

sum from the date of the injury. The

measure of damages being thus ﬁxed, it is

expected that in determining it juries and

courts will make the sum given in gross a

fair and just compensation, and one in full
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and discussed those actions sounding in

tort in which interest may be given as

damages. The distinction is there taken,

as taken here, and actions for personal in-

juries excluded, because of the existence of

a wholly different measure of damages re-

specting them. In this connection we

quote section 320 in the volume and chap-

ter referred to: “It sufﬁciently appears,

from what has already been said, that

there is no general principle which pre-

vents the recovery of interest in actions of

tort. The fact that the demand is unliq-

uidated has been shown to be insufficient

to exclude interest, and there is nothing in

the mere form of the action which renders

it unreasonable that interest should be

given. Nevertheless it is in the region of

tort that we ﬁnd the clearest cases fordis-
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ailowance of interest. There are many

cases which are not brought to recover a

sum of money representing a property loss

of the plaintiff, and it is frequently said

broadly that interest is not allowed in

such actions. It is certainly not allowed

in such actions as assault and battery, or

for personal injury by negligence, libel,

slander. seduction," etc. The measure of

damage in such case seems nowhere to in-

clude thisor be based upon thisidea. Even

in respect to injury or destruction of prop-

erty, w here the supreme court Of the United

States has adopted fully the prevailing

rule ailo wing damages in the form of in-

terest on value of the property, the rule

hasbeen limited to such injury of property

‘or property right as had a ﬁxed or cer-

tain value; and it is accordingly held in

that court that indeﬁnite damages, as

that resulting from infringement of a pat-

ent, could not bear interest until after the

amount had been judicially ascertained.

'l‘ilghman v. Proctor, 125 U. S. 161, 8 Sup.

Ct. Rep. 894.

The direct question we are considering

also came before the supreme judicial

court of Maine. and it was there held that

the rule permitting damages equal to in-

terest on value of property in cases of tres-

pass and trover did not apply, and that

interest could not be allowed upon a re-

covery for personal injury, and that, too,

under a statute authorizing a recovery

“to the amount of the damage sustained. "

(This is not material, however. as their

statute gave no morenorless right than ex-

ists here.) Sargent v. Humpden,38 Me.5Nl.

The cases cited by the editors of the last

edition of Sedgwick on Damages sustaining

the proposition that interest cannot be in-

cluded in a recovery of damages for per-

sonal injuries are from Georgia and Penn-

sylvania.

4 S. E. Rep. 054: Railroad Co. v. Young, 81

Ga. 397, 7 S. E. Rcp.912: Railway Uo. v.

Taylor, 104 Pa. St. 306. These cases have

all been examined, and fully sustain the

text. One of the cases cited to the proposi-

and dlscuRRed those actions eounrtlng tn
tort In which Interest may he ghen as
damuitel!. The distinction Is there taken,
as taken here, and nctlom1 for persunal InJuries exduded, because of the existence of
a wholly 1ttnerent meusure of l'lttmagee re1111ectlng them. In this connection we
quote Hectloo 320 lu the volume and chapter referred to: "It sufficiently appeal'8,
from whut has already been enld, that
there i~ no genernl principle which pre\'en ts the recovery of Interest In actions of
tort. The fuct that the demand le unllqul<lated hue been shown to be Insufficient
to P~clude Interest, and there Is nothing In
the mt>re form of the action which renders
It unreaHonable that Interest shouhl be
given. Nevertheless It h1 In the region of
tort that we find the clearest caef'8 fordleallowance of l!1terest. There are many
caH~ which are not brought to recover a
sum of money representing a prop1:rty loHB
of the plalntlU, an<.I It Is frequently eald
broadl.v that Interest Is not allowed In
such actions. It Is ct>rtnlnly not allowed
In 1mch actions a11 assttult and battery, or
for personal Injury by negligence, libel,
slander, seduction," etc. The mea1mre of
durnuice In 11uch ctt11e see•ns no\vhere to Include this or be based upon tbb1 lilt!&. Even
111 respect to Injury or de11tructlo11 of propPrt.v, w uere the supreme rourt 01 the U111ted
St11tt'll bas adopttm fully the prevalllng
rule allo\\'lng damages In the form of Interest on valne of the property, the rule
ba11 hPen limited to encb Injury or property
·or property right as had a fixed or certain value; encl It Is accordingly held In
th11 t court that Indefinite <.la magea, ae
thut 1'ef'11ltlog from Infringement or a patent, could not bear lotere11t until after the
amount bad been Judicially aecf.'rtalned.
Tilghman v. Proctor, 125 U.S. 161, 8 Sup.
Ct. Rep. 894.
The direct question we are considering
also come before the snpreme jucllclal
court of M1:1lne. and It was there held that
the rule permitting damttge11 equal to in·
tel'f.'llt on value of property In ca11t's of treepa113 and trover did not apply, and that
lntere11t could not be allowed upon u recovery for per!'lonal Injury, 1rnd tba t, too,
undt>r a statute ttuthorlzlng a recorery
"to the amount of the dnmage eu11talned."
(This le not material, however, as their
statute gnve no more nor less rl~ht than exists here.) Sargent v. HatlJpdeu,38 Me. 581.
The ca9es cltecl by the editors or the last
edition ofSt•dgwlck on Dum11gessustalntng
the proposition that lntere11t cannot be lnch1u~d In a recovery of dumngeR for personal Injuries are from Georgia and Pcnn11yl \'uoln. Itatteree v. Chapman, WGa. 574.
4 S. E. Rep. 684: Railroad Co. v. Young, 81
Gu. 397, 7 S. E. Hep. 912: Railway Co. v.
'.l'uylor, 104 Pa. St. 306. Thesf' caHe!! have
nll het'n exnmlnt>d, and fully 1111etalo th11
text. One of the cases cited to theproposi·
tlon In Amer. & Eng. Enc. Luw wuH a
Penns.vlvanla case, enrller than either of
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those to which we have referred. The caee
there cited, (Fa11holt v. Reed, 16 Serg. &
R. 266,) which we have not been able to
find lo llbrarlee here, wae evidently not
one of pen!onal Injury, or elMe not comlleteot with later holdings of that com't. Indeed, the Penney I vanla court seems hardly to have gone as far on that question In
l't'fereuce to allowance of Interest as damage11 lo other actions ex dt>llcto as othPr
courts. In sultH for the d<!Rtructlon of
property that court bas held that, while
lapse of time mtty he looked to, It Is error
to Instruct the Jury that plalntlft ls entitled to Interest on such damage from th&
time It occurred. Township of Plymouth
v. Grttver, 125 l'a. ~t. 24, 17 Atl. Rep. :.i.;!I~
Emerson v. Schoonmaker, 135 Pa. St. 437,
ID Atl. Rep. 102:i. or the other cases clt~d
In Amer. & Eng. Enc. Law, we have ex.
amlne<l those In 13 Wis. 81, (Hinckley v.
Beckwith,) a6 N. Y. 639, (Vandevoort v.
Gould,) and 30Tex.349, (\Volfev. Lal'y.)
They all sustain the text as It ls lnteude1l
to be understood, and as we have herein
explained, and doubtless the other caeC8
do so. To the same enect are the cases of
Lincoln v. Claflin, 7 Wall. Jll~ Dyer v.
Na,·lgntlon Co., 118 r. S. 507, 6 Sup. ('t.
Rep. lli-1: ll. S. v . .North Carolina, 136 U.
S. 211, 10 Sup. Ct. RPp. 920; C'IPment v.
Spear, 5U Vt. 'lol; and cases from A nwrlcnn
decisions an<.I report11clted In Rupulje's lllgest, volume I, pp. 10.'!9-1041, under hea<111
"Trover," aml .. Wilen Interest may IJ~
Added," and volume 2, p.1991, under beitd of
"Interest." See, nlso, 1 Se<.lg. Dem. §§ 432403, (8th Ed.) The eHl!Ct and meanlnll of
etatementM quoted from Amer. cl: Eng.
Enc. Luw and Its reference to Sedg. Dam.
are ma<le perfectly clear when the11e cns1•H
and authorities herein added are examined.
and the generality of expre88lons llmltell lo
the purpose of their 011e and the cl11ss of
cases being considered. They were not
dealing at all, nor Intended to be uncle1 stood 11e deallnit. with the question of recovery for personal injuries, which le Itself
a recovery of daruegt>s pure and simple,
and measured by a rule wlllcb needs no
BUPI>lement that would add damngeK to
damngee. The chorge and verdict WPre
therefore erroneous on this point, unrJ
prt•Judlclel to defendant to ,the extent RIHJ
only to the extent of the Injury. The circuit jndge might have rt>fueed to receh•&
the verdict ae to lote~t. am1 the earn&
ettect mny now follow a remitting or the
interest by l'lalntlft, If he elects to do 110.
In that event the plalntlrr Is entitled to a
JudgmPot for $7,000, with Interest from
dnte of ltR rendition, and coet11, and with
this modlflcation the Judgment wlll be
atttrmed. This was the practice adopted
fn the .Moine case on this point, as well a11
In one of t11e Pennsyl\·unla CllHe11, (135 P11.
St. 4:17, 19 Ati. Rep. 10:.!5,) citing SHernl
othl•rR, 11nd Is clearly the correct rnle. In
default of such remission, a new trial wlll
be granted.
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VVILSON v. CITY OF TROY.

(32 N. E. 44, 135 N. Y. 96.)

Court of Appeals of New York. Oct. 4, 1892.

Appeal from supreme court, general term,

third department. ,

Action by Walter V. Wilson against the

city of Troy to recover damages for an in-

jury to a horse resulting from a defective

street. Plaintiff had judgment, which was

aﬂirmed at general term (14 N. Y. Supp. 721),

and defendant appeals. Aﬂlrmed.

WILSON "· CITY OF TROY.
(32 N. E. 44, 135 N. Y. 96.)
Court of Appeal• of New York. Oct. 4, 1892.
Appeal from supreme court, general term,
third department.
Action by Walter V. Wilson· against the
city ot Troy to recover damages tor an Injury to a horse resulting from a detective
street. Plalntur had Judgment, which waa
attlrmed at general term (14 N. Y. Supp. 721),
and defendant appeals. AJllrmed.
Wm. J. Roche, for appellant. Chas. E.
Patterson, for respondent.

Wm. J. Roche, for appellant. Chas. E.

Patterson, for respondent.

O'BRIEN, J. The record in this case pre-

sents two questions: First, whether the ﬁnd-

ing of the jury that the damage was the re-

sult of the defendant's negligence is sustained

by any evidence; and, secondly, whether in-

terest could legally be allowed by the jury in
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estimating the amount of the damages. On

the night of the 13th of November, 1879, a

valuable horse belonging to one Learned,

plaintiffs assignor, while being driven

through South street in the city of Troy, fell

into an open ditch or unguarded excavation.

made during that day. and was permanently

injured. There is little, if any, controversy

with respect to the value of the horse, the ex-

tent of the injury, or the amount of damages.

The night was dark, and it is not denied that

there was evidence for the jury suﬂicient to

sustain a ﬁnding of negligence on the part of

some one by reason of the failure to protect

a place of danger in a public street, by proper

guards and lights. It was not shown that the

city had any actual notice of the existence

of the excavation, if made by private parties

without its permission; and a suiiicient pe-

riod had not elapsed between the time of open-

ing it and the accident to render the city lia-

ble on the ground of implied notice. The ex-

cavation was made for the purpose of con-

ducting the water from the principal main in

the street, through lateral pipes, into a pri-

vate house. The owner of the house em-

played a ﬁrm of plumbers to do the work,

which included the digging of the trench as

well as laying and connecting the lateral

pipes with the main in the street. The ﬁrm

applied to the superintendent of the water-

works for men to open the trench in the

street, and that oﬂicer directed laborers in

the employ of the city to do so. The open-

ing in the street was made by them, and they

were paid for the work by the city, the plumb-

ers refunding to it the sum so paid. The

question is whether the men who dug the

ditch were under the control and direction of

the defendant, or subject to the orders of the

plumbers engaged in performing a piece of

work for the owner of the house.

The system of waterworks in Troy is the

property of the municipality, and is under the

management and control of a board of water

commissioners, which may be regarded as a

department of the city government. The

commissioners are by law required to nom-

inate, and the common council of the city to

O'BRIEN, J. The record In this case presents two questions: First, whether the finding ot the jury that the damage was the result of the defendant's negligence is sustauicd
by any evidence; and, secondly, whether Interest could legally be allowed by the jury In
estimating the amount of the damages. On
the night ot the 13th ot November, 1879, a
T"aluable horse belonging to one I,l•amed,
plalnt11l"s assignor, while being driven
through South street In the city of Troy, tell
Into an open ditch or unguarded excavation,
made during that dny. and was permanently
injured. There is little, It any, controversy
with respect to the value f)f the horse, the extent of the injury, or the amount of damages.
The night was dark, and It Is not denied thnt
there was evidence for the jury sufficient to
sustain a ftndlng of negllgence on the part ot
some one by reason of the failure to protect
a place of danger in a public street, by proper
guards and lights. It was not shown that the
city had any actual notice of the existence
of the excavation, It made by private parties
without Its permission; and a sufficient period had not elapecd between the time of opening It and the accident to render the city liable on the ground of Implied notice. The excavation was made for tbe purpose of conducting the water trom the principal main In
the street, through lateral pipes, into a private house. The owner of the house employed a firm of plumbers to do the work,
which Included the digging of the trench 118
well as laying and connecting the lateml
pipes with the main In the street. The flrm
applied to the superintendent ot the waterworks for men to open the trench In the
street, and that officer directed laborers In
the employ of the city to do so. The openlD&' ln the sh'eet was made by them, and they
were paid for the work by the city, the plumbers refunding to It the sum so paid. The
question is whethe1· the men who dug the
ditch were under the control and dl1·ectlon or
the defendant, or subject to the orders of the
plumbers engaged In performing a piece of
work for the owner of the house.
The system of waterworks In Troy Is the
pro~rty of the municipality, nnd is under the
management and control of a board of water
commlssloners, which may be regarded as a
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department ot the city government. The
commissioners are by law required to nominate, and the common council of the city to
appoint, a superintendent of the waterworks,
who ls the executive officer ln that department, and who, in tllis case, directed the men
In the employ and pay of the city to mah.·~
the excavation In the street. The boara is
authorized by law to extend the distributing
pipes of the waterworks wherever they might
think proper, aud to make such alterations
and improvements in the works, and ln the
manng-ement nod preservation thereof, as
they wight deem necessary and expedient,
and to employ such persons and assistunts us.
they might require, to execute any of these
purposes, whieh employ~s were to be paid for
their scn·lces from the city treasury. The
commissioners were also empowered to enact
such by-laws, regulations, and ordinances as
they should deem necessary for the protecUon of hydrants and water pipes, and the
preservation, protection, and management of
the waterworks. These by-laws, unless disapproved by a vote of two-thirds of all the
members of the common council of the city,
were to have all the force and eikct of law.
In pursuance of the power tbus conferred by
the statute, the board of water commissioners enacted by-laws and ordinances on the
r subject which were ln force at the time the
excavntion In question was made. They, lu
effect, prohibited any person except the superintendent, and those employed by hlm or l>y
the commissioners, to tap or make any connection with the main or distributing pipe,
or to permit the same to be done, unless by
the permission and under the direction of the
superintendent. The learned counsel for the
defendant contends that this regulation simply forbids the act of connecting the lateral
pipes from the house with the main, and dl<l
not prohibit private persons from digging
the necessary trenches and uncovering the
main or dlstrilmting plpe, and hence that
part of the wo1·k was done by the contractor11
who were employl'd by the owner or the
house to make the connection, and not by
the city. But a printe Individual bad no
right to dig In the street for this or any other
purpose without the permission ot the proper
municipal authorities, and the object, as well
as the lauguage, of the ordinance indicates
that it was intended to prevent the uncovPrlng of the main, or any Interference with the
street In which It was placed, by private parties. At all events, the water board and Its
chief executive officer, the superintendent, In
the discharge of the duties Imposed upon
them by the statute, might very properly
give to lt that construction, :rnd act accordingly. To hold that such a by-law did not
embrace within lts object and purview the
evils that might result from unguarded and
unregulated interference with the bed of the
street by private parties In onler to reach the
main, would be giving to It a construction al-
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together too narrow. The evidence tends to

show that the water board gave to it the

broader and more comprehensive meaning,

as it was the custom and practice for years

before the accident in question to make appli-

cation to the superintendent for men to do the

digging, and they were always furnished, as

in this case. As between the owner of the

house and the plumbers employed by her to

introduce the water into her house, the dig-

ging was undoubtedly a part of the contract

or work of the latter. If no main had been

placed in the street at that time, they could

also have contracted with her to procure its

extension, but that part of the work would be

subject to the action and regulations of the

water board, and, while the contractors might

be obliged to pay the city for the whole or

some part of the expense, it would be none
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the less the work of the city. One of the

plumbers testiﬁed that while he agreed with

the owner of the house to do all the work,

yet he knew then that it was the practice and

custom to apply to the superintendent of the

waterworks for men to do the digging and to

make the connection, and acted upon the as-

sumption that he had no right to do it. He

also says that the men who made the exca-

vation were not employed by him, but by the

city. We think that, upon the proof, it

could not be held, as matter of law, that the

men who dug the trench and left it unguard-

ed ceased for the time being to be the serv-

ants of the city, and subject to the directions

of the superintendent, and became, while do-

ing this job of work, the servants of the par-

ty employed to put in the lateral pipes into

the house, as is urged by the learned counsel

for the defendant What party sustained the

relation of master to the men who dug the

trench, and had the control and direction of

them, and was charged with the duty of di-

recting them to properly guard the ditch,-

whether the plumbers on the one hand, or the

city, through the superintendent of the water-

works, on the other,—was the important ques-

tion to be determined, and the trial court sub-

mitted it to the jury. Under all the circum-

stances, the question became one of fact, and

this disposition of it was not error. Ward v.

Fibre Co., 154 Mass. 420, 28 N. E. Rep. 299.

This ﬁnding of the jury is conclusive upon

us, and imports that the city itself, through

one of its oﬂicers or departments, caused the

trench to be dug, and left it unguarded, re-

sulting in the damage complained of. In

such a case the negligent act is imputable

to the city, and the doctrine of actual or im-

plied notice has no application, or, at least,

is unnecessary, where one injured by the neg-

lect of the city to properly guard a place

made dangerous by its own act brings the ac-

tion. Pettenglll v. City of Yonkers, 116 N.

Y. 558, 22 N. E. 1005; Walsh v. Mayor, etc.,

107 N. Y. 220, 13 N. E. 911; Turner v. City

of Newburgh, 109 N. Y. 301, 16 N. E. 344;

Brusso v. City of Buffalo, 90 N. Y. 679; Rus-

sell v. Village of Canastota, 98 N. Y. 496;
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sounding in tort and actions upon contract.

In the latter class of actions there is not

much diﬂiculty in ascertaining the rule as to

interest until we come to unliquidated de-

mands. The rule in such cases has quite re-

cently been examined in this court, and prin-

ciples stated that will furnish a guide in

most cases. White v. Miller, '78 N. Y. 393.

We are concerned now only with the rule

applicable in actions of tort. The right to

interest, as a part of the damages, in actions ‘

of trover and trespass de bonls asportatis,

was given ﬁrst in England by St. 3 & 4 Wm.

IT. The recovery was not, however, allow-

ed by that statute as matter of right, but in

the discretion of the jury. The earlier cases

in this state followed the rule thus establish-

ed in England, and permitted the jury, in

their discretion, to allow interest in such
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cases. Beais v. Guernsey, 8 Johns. 446; Hyde

v. Stone, 7 Wend. 354; Bissell v. Hopkins, 4

Cow. 53; Rowley v. Gibbs, 14 Johns. 385.

The principle that the right to interest in

such cases was in the discretion of the jury,

was, however, gradually abandoned, and now

the rule is that the plaintif f is entitled to in-

terest on the value of the property converted

or lost to the owner by a trespass as matter

of law. The reason given for this rule is

that interest is as necessary a part of a com-

plete indemnity to the owner of the property

as the value itself, and in ﬁxing the damages

is not any more in the discretion of the jury

than the value. Andrews v. Durant, 18 N.

Y. 496; McCormick v. Railroad Co., 49 N. Y.

315; Turnpike Co. v. City of Buffalo, 58 N.

Y. 639; Parrott v. Ice Co., 46 N. Y. 369. It

is diﬂicult to perceive any sound distinction

between a case where the defendant converts

or carries away the plaintit‘.f's horse and a

case where, through negligence on his part,

the horse is injured so as to be vaineless.

There is no reason apparent for a different

rule of damages in the one case than in the

other. In an early case in this state the

principle was recognized that interest might

be allowed, by way of damages, upon the

sum lost by the plaintiff in consequence of

det'endant's negligence. Thomas v. Weed, 14

Johns. 255. We think the rule is now set-

tled in this state that, where the value of

property is diminished by an injury wrong-

fully inﬂicted, the jury may, in their discre-

tion, give interest on the amount by which

the value is diminished from the time of the

injury. That is the rule laid down in the

elementary books and sustained by the ad-

judged cases. 1 Sedg. Dam. (8th Ed.) §§

317, 320; Walrath v. Redﬂeld, 18 N. Y. 457,

462; Mairs v. Association, 89 N. Y. 498; Dur-

yee v. Mayor, etc., 96 N. Y. 477, 499; Home

Ins. Co. v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 11 Hun, 182,

188; Moore v. Railroad Co., 126 N. Y. 671, 27

N. E. 791; Railroad Co. v. Ziemer, 124 Pa.

St. 560, 17 Ati. 187.

There is a class of actions sounding in tort,

in which interest is not allowable at all, such

as assault and battery, slander, libel, seduc-
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must be remembered that the court was not

reviewing any question decided below in re-

gard to interest, but seeking to make up

for itself a new award from the items of the

claim appearing in the record, and whatever

was said by way of argument, and as the

reason for throwing out an item of interest

on a sum claimed to have been expended in

restoring or reclaiming the land, cannot be

considered as the judgment of the court on

the question now under consideration. That

question was not noticed in the argument,

and was not involved in the case, except, per-

haps, as a matter of discretion. For these

reasons the judgment should be aﬂirmed. All

concur, except EARL, C. J., and FINOH and

GRAY, JJ., dissenting.
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Judgment aﬂlrmed.

DAMAGES l<'OR NONPAYMENT OF

must be remembered that the court was not
reviewing any question decided below In regard to lnternst, but seeking to make up
for Itself a new award from the Items of the
claim appearing In the record, and whatever
was 1111ld by way of argument, and as the
reason for throwing out an Item of Interest
on Ii sum claimed to have been expended In
restoring or reclaiming the land, cannot be

MONEY-1:\'Tl<}lt~ST.

considered as the judgment of the court on
the question now under consideration. That
question was not noticed In the argument.
and was not Involved In the case, except, perhaps, as a matter of discretion. For these
reasons the judgment should be affirmed. All
concur, except EARL, 0. J., and FINCH and
GRAY, JJ., dissenting.
Judgment affirmed.

'1 BREACH OF U0.\"l‘ltACTS RESl'l-lC'‘l.\'G PEIQS()NAL PROPERTY.

239

TRIGG et al. v. CLAY et ai.

(13 S. E. 434, 88 Va. 330.)

Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia. July I

23, 1891.

Appeal from decree of circuit court of

Scott county rendered March 27, 1890, in a

suit wherein T. P. Tﬁgg, A. M(Bradley,

and H. Fuga te, snrvivingpariners of them-

selves and James C. Greenway, deceased,

partners dofng business in the ﬁrm name

Trigg, Fugate & Co., were complainants,

and H. B. Clay, Jr., and W. D. Kenner,

partners in the ﬁrm name of H. B. Clay,

Jr., & Co., were defendants. The decree

being adverse to the complainants, they

appealed. Opinion states the case.

Dani. 'l'rlgg, for appellants. Holdman

& Ewing and J..i. A.Powell, for appellecs.

LACY, J. 'l‘he suit is a foreign attach-
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ment in equity, brought to attach the

property situated within theinrisdicfion of

thecourt belonging to non-residentdefend-

ants, and to subject the same to the satis-

faction of the debt of the plaintiffs. The

case is brieﬂy as follows: The appellants,

a ﬁrm of lumber merchants resident at

Abingdon, in Virginia, made a contract by

which they agreed to buy, at a stated

price, lumber of agreed dimensions from

the appellees, a firm of lumber gettcrs,

resident at Rogersville, in the state of

Tennessee; the lumber to be delivered t

Ciinchport, in Scott county, in Virginﬁz.

from 500,000 feet to 709.000 feet thereof;

and the plaintiffs agreed to accept the

drafts of the said appeiiees to the amount

of $3,000. And on the 28th day of Novem-

. her, 1888, the date of the contract. the ap-

peilee H. B. (‘iay, Jr., of the said ﬁrm. rep-

resented to the appellants that 300.000 to

400,000 feet were already cut and dry or

drying: and that the residue, necessary to

compensate for the $3,000 in drafts to be

accepted at 60days, should he delivered

at Clinchport at the maturity of the

drafts. The drafts were all made in the

ﬁrst week in December, 1888, a few days

after the contract was made, which was

on the 28th day of November, as has been

stated. The lumber was not deiivered,—

not a foot of it,—and the drafts were neg-

lected and allowed to fall upon the hands

of the plaintiffs, when the lumber had not

yet been delivered, and the drafts had

been paid. So the plaintiffs, as had been

agreed between the pariiesin case the said

contingency should arise that the drafts

should have to be paid before the lumber ~

in sufﬂcient quantity had arrived, draft-

cd back upon the defendants for the money ;

thus paid out; but this action was treated

with derision by the appellee, and the

draft dishonored. Upon the hearing, the

circuit court decreed in favor of the plain-

tiffs for the $3,000 paid on the draft and

the costs of protest, etc., and referred it

to a commission to ascertain what dam-

ages the plaintiffs had sustained. It was

240'

BREACH OF OO.\"l‘RAC'l‘S RESPECTING PERSONAL PROi.'ERl‘Y.

'“ Where there is no market at the

honored their bank obligation, rather

than deliver this lumber at the agreed

price. which they declared had been bar-

gained at too low a price. In Wood's

Mayne on Damages. § 22, it is said: “But,

if they [thegoods] cannot be purchased for

want of a market, they must be estimated

in some other way. If there had been a

contract to resell them, the price at which

such contract was made will be evidence

of their value." In the American and En-

glish Encyclopaedia of Law it is said:

place O!

delivery,the price of thegoods in the near-

est market, with the cost of transporta-

tion added, determines their value. " Ice

Co. v. Webster, 68 Me. 463; Griiiin v. (‘ol-

ver, 16 N. Y. 489. In the case of Colin v.
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Glass-Works, 108 Pa. St. 220, it is said:

“Upon the breach of a contract to furnish

goods, when similar goods cannot be pur-

chased in the market,the measure of dam-

ages is the actual loss sustained by the

purchaser by reason of the non-delivery. "

A distinction is drawn in some of the cases

between a resale made at an advance sub-

sequent to a contract of purchase and a

resale made at an advance before the con-,

tract of purchase, which was known to

the seller of the goods. Carpenter v.

Bank, 119 Ill. 354,10 N. E. Rep. i8. This is

rather a iauciinl distinction. It is not in

accord with the ordinary usages of trade

that a dealer, a man buying to sell again,

should disclose his dealings with the same

goods at a profit to his vendor. But. ii

there were any sound principle upon which

this could rest, if the seller could be sup.

posed to enter into his contract upon the

basis of a resale in which he had no inter-

est, still, in this case, it is reasonable to

suppose that a inm bcrgetter selling 700,000

feet of lumber to adealcr in lumber should

know (1) that it was for a resale, (2) that

this resale was to be on a proﬁt, and (iii

thatheshould know that his vendee would

be damaged to the amount of his proﬁt, if

the vendor should prove iaithless. But

the true basis of the general rule is that

when there is a market, the vendee cannot

be damaged, except in the difference be-

tween what the lumber did actually cost

him and what he had purchased it at from

-the seller to him. But this rule can have,

upon reason, no application whatever to

a case where there is no market. (1) be-

cause the disappointed purchaser cannot

buy in that market when there is no mar-

ket to buy in, and (2) because the market

price cannot be ascertained when there is

no market.

Under the cirenmstancesof.' this case, the

commissioner ascertained the true and

just amount of the damages. It has been

often held that profits which are the direct

and immediate fruits of the contract are

recoverable. There are many cases in
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decree of the circuit court appealed from

here is therefore erroneous, and the same

decree of the clrc11lt court appealed fl'om
here ta therefore erroneous, and the same
will be ret>ersed and annulled, and this
court will rendel' such llecrPe as the sa!d
circuit court ought to have rendered.

will he reversed and annulled, and this

HINTON, J., cllssents.
court will render such decree as the said

circuit court ought to have rendered.

HINTON, J., dlesents.

LEWIS, P., ((llssentingx) In this case I

dissent from the opinion of the court and

am tor aﬂlrming the decree of the circuit

court The case is narrowed down by the

exception to the commlssloner's report to

the slmplequestion of the measure of dnm-

ages. The rule adopted by this court is,

in my opinion, not only unjust, but con-

LAW DMI.2d Ed.—16

trary to the long.settled rule which gov-

erns in such cases. Here the measure of

damages is held to be the loss sustained

by the appellants by reason of their ina-
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bility, on account of the default of the ap-

pcllees, to fulﬁll certain contracts made by

them for the sale and delivery of lumber

to other parties. But those contracts

were c‘-llateral to the contract between

the parties to this appeal, and were. in

point of time, subsequent thereto. They

could not, therefore, have been in the con—

templation of the parties when the con-

tract was made, the breach oi which is

the subject of this controversy.

Decree reversed.

LEWIS, P., (illeeenttng.) In this case I
dl11eer.t from the opinion of the court and
am for affirming the decree or the circuit
court The case Is narrowed down by the
exception to the commli.sloner's report to
the slmpleque11tlon of the measure of dnmages. The role adopted by this court ls,
In my opinion, not only unjust, but conLAW DAM.2d Ed.-16
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trary to the long-settled rule which go\"ern11 in such cases. Here the measure or
damages ls held to be the loss emitalnecl
by the appellants by reuson or their iuablllty, on uccount of the default of the appellees, to fulHll certain contracts made by
them fur the sale and dell very of Ium ller
to other parties. But those contracts
were cullateral to the l'ontract betwePn
the parties to this appeal, ancl were. In
point of time, subsequent thPreto. They
could not, therefore, have bet-n In the conte11111latlon or the parties when the contract was ma:'le, the brea<'h uf which 18
the subject of this controversy.
Decree reversed.
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JORDAN et al. v. PATTERSON et al.

(35 Atl. 521, 67 Conn. 473.)

Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut.

15, 18,96.

Appeal from superior court, Falrﬂeld coun-

ty; Robinson, Judge.

Action by Jordan, Marsh & O0. against

James T. Patterson and others, doing busi-

ness as the Patterson Bros. Knitting Com-

pany. Judgment for_ plaintiffs, and they ap-

peal. Reversed. '

John H. Perry and George E. Hill. for ap-

pellants. Morris W. Seymour, John C. Cham-

berlain, and Howard H. Knapp, for appel-

lees.

April

ANDREWS, O. J. This action was brought

, to recover damages for the nonperformance

of a contract. The plaintiffs are large deal-
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ers in dry goods at wholesale and by retail.

The defendants are manufacturers of knit

underwear. The complaint alleged general-

ly that on the 16th day of March, 1892, the

defendants agreed to manufacture for the

plaintiffs a large number of knit undergar-

ments, of various styles and at agreed prices,

amounting in the whole to nearly 12,000 doz-

en, and to deliver the same at various times,

but all before the 1st day of December, 1592,

for which the plaintiffs were to pay; that

the plaintiffs contracted for these goods with

the intent, as the defendants knew, to resell

the same to other parties; that at the date

of said contract they had bargained to sell a

part of said garments to other persons at a

proﬁt; that afterwards, and before the time

when said goods were to be delivered, they

bargained to sell the balance of the same to

certain other persons at a proﬁt; that the

defendants delivered to the plaintiffs, in pur-

suance of the said agreement, 160 dozen of

the said goods, but neglected and refused to

deliver the remaining part,—and claimed

damages to the amount of $10,000. The de-

fendants‘ answer denied the making of the

said contract alleged by the plaintiffs, and

set up a different one,—a conditional one;

and they said. that in performance of the

contract so alleged by them, they furnished

the said 160 dozen of said garments, but that

the plaintiffs neglected to perform the condi-

tions of said last-mentioned contract on their

part to be performed, and therefore they (the

defendants) did not furnish any more of said

goods. The answer also demanded pay for

the goods the defendants had so furnished,

and damages for the nonperformance by the

plaintiffs.

The ﬁnding of the court shows that there

was evidence that the parties had bad deal-

ings with each other prior to the 10th day of

February, 1892; that the plaintiffs had phr-

chased of the defendants garments of their

manufacture, some of which were then man-

ufactured, and some of which were to be

thereafter manufactured and delivered, and

which were in fact so manufactured and de-

livered, but that on said day there was no

BREA.CH OF AGREEMENT TO SUPPLY GOODS.
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be the facts), could fairly be said to have f would have been in if the contract had been

had no intention to speak the language of

acceptance and promise in that paper, or

had no intention, by the language used, to

accept, and promise to ﬁll, the orders he

named. These are matters for you to deter-

mine after a careful and serious examina-

tion of the evidence and claims on both

sides." The substance of this instruction

was repeated by the judge twice or three

times in the course of his charge, and at one

time with language which apparently im-

plied that the jury might select one of the

separate orders, and, if that was broken,

render a verdict for damages only as to such

particular contract. This was error. There

was no ambiguity or doubt as to the terms

of the orders, or of the letter of March 16th,

and there was no suggestion of any fraud.
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Under such circumstances, it was for the

judge, and not for the jury, to say what

these writings meant. It was a question of

law, and not of fact. Gibbs v. Society, 38

Conn. 153, 167; Ilotchkiss v. Higgins, 52

Conn. 205, 213; 1 Starkie, Ev. 429; 1 Greenl.

Ev. § 277.- The orders and the letter were

offered as proof of a contract between the

parties. If a contract at all, it was a con-

tract in writing. As such, its interpretation

—its legal eftcct—was a question of law, for

the judge. Nor was such interpretation the

less a question of law because the construc-

tion might have been aided by the use of ~

extrinsic evidence, such as the business of

the parties, their knowledge each of the

business of the other, and their previous

dealings. including as well what may be

called the practical construction put upon

the contract by the conduct and acts of the I,

parties. The judge, by the aid of all the

undisputed facts in the case, could put him-

self into the situation of the parties, and

look at the contract from their standpoint.

But, from whatever source light was thrown

upon the contract, what its meaning was,

what promises it made, what duties or obli-

gations it imposed, was a question of law,

for the judge. It was, after all, the legal

reading and interpretation of what was writ-

ten. See Smith v. Faulkner, 12 Gray, 251,

25-i; Brady v. Cassldy, 104 N. Y. 147, 155,

10 N. E. 131; Nellson v. Harford, 8 Mees. &

/W. 805, 823. In the light ofthe undisputed

‘facts in this case, the trial judge should

‘ have instructed the jury that the letter of

' March 16, 1892, was an acceptance of all the

orders named in it. And, as there was but

' one contract claimed to exist between these

parties, such instruction would, in effect,

have directed them to exclude from their

‘consideration the conditional contract claim-

ed by the defendants.

The general intention of the law giving

damages in an action for the breach of a con-

tract like the one here in question is to put

the injured party, so far as it can be done

by money, in the same position that he

performed. In carrying out this general in-

243

be the tacts), could fairly be said to have would have been In It the contract had been
bad no Intention to speak the language of performed. In carrying out this general In.acceptance and promise In that paper, or tention In any given case, It must be rehad no Intention, by the language used, to membered that the altered position to be l'eaccept, and promise to fill, the orders he dressed must be one directly resulting trom
named. These are matters tor you to deter- the breach. Any act or omission ot the commine after a careful and serious examina- plaining party subsequent to the breach of
tion of the evidence and claims on both the contract, and not directly attributable to
sides." The substance of this Instruction it, although 1t ls an act or an omission which,
was repeated by the judge twice or three except tor the breach, would not have taken
times In the course ot his charge, and at one place, Is not a ground tor damages. In an
time with language which apparently Im- action like the present one, to recover damplied that the jury might select one of the ages against the vendo1· of goods tor their
separate orders, and, If that was broken, nondelivery to the vendee, the general rule
render a verdict tor damnge:,i only as to such Is that the plnintltr is entitled to recover in\
particular contract. Thls was error. There damages the dUfe1·cnce at the time and place
was no ambiguity or doubt as to the terms of delivery between the price he bad agreed
of the orders, or of the letter of '.\larch lfith, to pay, aud the market price, If greater than
and there was no suggestion of any fraud. the agreed price. Such ditrereuce Is the norUn<ler such clrcumstanceR, It was for the mal damage which a vendee suffers In such
judge, and not for the jury, to say what a case. And, It there are no special circumthese writings mf:>nnt. It was a qul•stion of stances In the case, a plalntltr would, by the
law, and not of fnct. Gibhs v. Rodety, 38 recon~ry of such difference, be put in the
Conn. 153, 167; Hotchkiss v. Higgius, 52 same position that he would have been In
C'onn. 20.>, 21:1; 1 St:ukle, Bv. 4::W; 1 Greenl. If the contract had been perfom1ed. This, of
E\•. § 277. • The orders and the letter were course, Implies that there IR a m:u-ket for
offered as proof ot a contract between the such goods, where the plaintiff could have
parties. If a contract at all, It was a con- supplied himself. It there Is no such martract In writing. As such, it;i lnte1·11t·etation ket, then the plaintitl' should recover th!' ac-Its legal eft'Pet-wns a question of law, for tual damages which he has sutl'Prcd. There
the judge. Nor was such interpretation the may be, and often there arc, special clreumJpss n qut.>i:<tlon of law be<'ausc the construc- stances, other thnn the want of a market,
tion might lmvc been aided by the use of surrounding a contract for the Rale nnd purextrinsic eYldi>nce, such as the business ot ehmie of goods, by reason of which, in ense
the parties, their knowledge ench ot the of a brraeh, the loss to a Yendee t'o1· thl'lr
business of the other, and their previous nondelivery Is Increased. In such a rase
dealings. lndudlng as well what may be the d1unaJ:eS to the vendee which he may
called the practical construction put upon recover must, speaking generally, be conthe contract by the conduct and acts of the fined to sud1 as result from those circumparties. The judge, by the aid of all the stances which may reaRonably be suppose(}
undisputed facts In the case, could put him- to have been in the contemplation of the parself Into the situation of the parties. and ties nt the time thf:>y made the contract. It
look at the contract from thf:>lt' standpoint. must be remPmbrred, also, ln attempting to
But, from whatever source light was thrown carry out this general Intention of the law
upon the contract, what Its meaning was, In any giveu case. that any llamages which
what promises It made, what duties or obU- the plalntilI by reasonable diligence on bis
gatlons It lmpost>d, was a question of law, part might have avoided are not to be retor the judge. It was, after all, the legal garded as the proximate result of the dereading and interpretation ot what was writ- fendant's acts. In the present case the plainten. See Smith v. Faulkner, 12 Gray, 251, tiffs claimed that at the time or delivery
2:tt; B1·ady v. Cassidy, 104 N. Y. 147, 15ri, there was no market In which they could
10 N. E. 131; Neilson v. Harford, 8 Mees. & procure such goods as the defendants were
I W. 805, 823. In the light of. the undisputed to deliver to them. This was a tact which
t tacts In this case, the trial judge should might be proved by the testimony of any
: have Instructed the jury that the letter ot person who had knowledge on the subject.
\ March 16, 1892, was an acceptance of all the ' And It It was true the plaintiffs could not,
orders named In It. And, as there was but by any diligence on their part, have rellev· one contract claimed to exist between these ed themselves by such purchase trom any
. parties, such Instruction would, lo etrect, portion ot the damages which they suffered.
, have directed them to exclude from their
There were various special circumstances by
·-consideration the conditional contract claim· reason of which the plaintiffs claimed to reed by the defendants.
cover damages. One was that they contract-\
The general Intention ot the law giving ed for the said goods for the purpose of reselldamages In an action tor the breach of a con- ing them. It Is averred In the eomplalnttract like the one here In question Is to put and there appears to have been evldenre on
the injured party, so tar as It can be done the trial tending to prove ·such avermentsb7 money, In the same position that he that at the time the goods were contracted for
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the plaintiffs had bargained to sell a portion

of the said garments to other parties at a

proﬁt, and that the defendants had knowl-

edge of the subcontracts. As to the proﬁts

on these subsales, the judge charged the jury

that the plaintiffs were entitled to recover

these as a part of their damages, because, as

the judge correctly said, the existence of these

subsales was known to the defendants at the

time they contracted to furnish the goods, and

the proﬁts that were to be made must be con-

sidered as having been contemplated by them

at that time.

It is also averred in the complaint that,

soon after the time the contract was made,

the plaintiffs, relying on the same, began to

sell the balance of said garments to other par-

ties at a proﬁt, of which subcontracts they

gave notice to the defendants a reasonable
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time before the date at which the goods were

to be delivered. The judge charged the jury

that these proﬁts should not be allowed, be-

cause, as he said, these sales cannot be con-

sidered to have been in the contemplation

of the parties at the time they made their

contract. As the judge stated it, this ruling

was correct. Notice to the defendants after

their contract was entered into would not in-

crease their liability. If these subsales could

not reasonably be considered to have been in

the contemplation of the parties at the time

they made the contract, then the defendants

could not be made liable for the special prof-

its to be derived therefrom.

But there is an aspect of the question of the

proﬁts on these latter subsales—which seems

not to have been very clearly presented—up-

on which the evidence of their terms might

have been admissible. The defendants had

knowledge that the plaintiffs contracted for

these garments in order to resell them to oth-

ers. They were chargeable with knowledge

that the plaintiffs would make such proﬁts as

the market price of such goods would give

them. If proof of the terms of these last-

mentioned subsales was offered for the pur-

pose of showing what the market price of

such goods wa‘s at the time they were to be

delivered, then the evidence should have been

received. The market value of any goods

may be shown by actual sales in the way of

ordinary business.

It was alleged in the complaint that by rea-

son of the default of the defendants the plain-

tiffs hnd been obliged to pay large damages to

their vendees for their failure to deliver to

them the goods so bargained to them, and

they offered evidence to prove such a pay-

ment to one of their vendees, which evidence

was, on objection by the defendants, exclud-

ed. In respect to this item of damage, the

rule above stated furnished the proper tet.

In restoring an injured party to the same po-

sition he would have been in if the contract

had not been broken, it is necessary to take

into the account losses suffered, as much as

proﬁts prevented. And whenever the loss

suffered, or the gain prevented, results direct-
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the goods which the defendants had contract-

ed to deliver to the plaintiffs, “At what price

would these have been retailed?" On ob-

jection, he was not permitted to answer. As-

suming that Deland had knowledy:e of the

market price at which such goods would have

been sold, it is very obvious that his answer

would have been relevant, and should have

been received.

The other questions made in the case, so

far as they are material, would not be likely

to arise on another trial. There is error, and

a new trial is granted. The other judges con-
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curred.

would these have been retailed?" On objection. he was not permitted to answer. Assuming that Deland had knowledge ot the
market price at which such goods would have
been sold, It le very obvious that h.le answer

245

would have been relevant, and should have
been received.
The other questions made In the case, so
tar as they are material, would not be likely
to arise on another trial. There ts error, and
a new trial Is granted. The other judges concurred.
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LAWRE.\'CE et al. v. PORTER et al.

(11 C. O. A. 27, 63 Fed. 62, and 22 U. S. App.

483.)

Circuit Court of Appeals, Sixth Circuit.

28, 189.1.

No. 122.

In error to the circuit court of the United

States for the Western district of Michigan.

This was an action by Ida A. Lawrence

and Frank Lawrence, administrators of the

estate of Lorenzo J. Bovee, deceased, against

William T. Porter, Charles L. Ames, and

Abel H. Frost. At the trial the court di-

rected the jury to ﬁnd for defendants. Judg-

ment for defendants was entered on the ver-

dict. Plaintiffs brought error.

Bundy & Travis, for plaintiffs in error.

May

Walpole Wood and Taggart, Knappen & '
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Denison, for defendants in error.

Before TAFT and LURTON, Circuit

Judges.

LURTON, Circuit Judge. This is an action

for breach of a contract of sale brought by

the buyers against the sellers for failure to

deliver a large quantity of lumber according

to the terms of the agreement. The lum-

ber was to be delivered by the defendants

at their mill, on vessels to be furnished by

the plaintiffs, during the shipping season of

18i10. As each cargo was received, the buy-

er was to give acceptances, payable in 90

days.

defendants refused, for no suﬂicient reason,

to deliver the remainder upon the terms of

the bargain, but offered to supply the lum-

ber needed to complete the bill at a reduc-

tion of 50 cents on each 1,000 feet, for cash

on delivery over the rail of plaintiffs' vessels

and at the time when delivery was required ‘

‘ tiffs‘ declaration contains the usual common-

by the broken agreement. The buyers stood

upon their contract, and demanded delivery

upon the credit therein stipulated, and re-

fued to take the lumber offcred by the de- '

linquent sellers on any other terms than

those contained in the agreement. There

was evidence tending to show that the quan-

tity and quality of lumber contracted for,

and of the dimensionsdesignated, could not

be procured at the place of delivery from

others than the defendants, or at any other

available market in time for shipment ac-

cording to the terms of the contract; that

the lumber was intended for resale at Tona-

wanda, N. Y.; that defendants were so in-

formed; and that the market value of such

lumber at Tonawanda, after deducting

freight and hauling, was considerably above

the contract price.

The evidence of the plaintiffs established

that the defendants were able to comply with

their proposal to deliver the lumber required

by the agreement during the period ﬁxed

for delivery in the agreement. 'l‘hi< makes

it unnecessary to consider the plaintiffs' us-

After the delivery of one cargo, the ,

signment of error to the ruling of the court
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izes any special damages sustained by plain-

tiffs. They are therefore limited to “gen-

eral damages," which, for such a breach as

the one declared on, are measured by the

difference between what they had agreed

to pay and the sum for which they could.

have supplied themselves with lumber of the

same character at the place of delivery, or,

if not obtainable there, then at the nearest

available market, plus any additional freight

resulting from the breach. In case of such

breach, the plaintiffs are entitled only to

indemnity in a sum equal to the loss they

have sustained as a consequence. Hence it

results that if the plaintiffs are able to re-

place the goods by others. bought at a less

or equal price at the place of dellverv. or

other near and available market, they have

sustained no loss, and are entitled at best
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to nothing more than nominal damages.

Neither the declaration nor bill of particul-

ars alleges any inability to pay cash, as de-

manded by the defendants. We do not,

therefore, consider whether special damages

might not, under some circumstances, be re-

covered, which were sustained by reason of

the inability of plaintiffs to pay cash for lum-

ber to replace that which defendants had

contracted to sell them on credit. It fol-

lows that if plaintiffs were able to buy, and

did not, they cannot throw upon the defend-

ants any special losses incident to their own

failure to mitigate the injury as far as they

reasonably could. Sedg. Meas. Dam. (8th

ICd.) § 741; Marsh v. McPherson, 105 U. S.

709; Warren v. Stoddart, Id. 224.

The ground upon which the defendants re-

fused to carry out the sale was ostensibly

their unwillingness to extend to the plain-

tiffs the credit of 90 days provided for in

the agreement of sale. They have not en-

deavored to show that there were any cir-

cumstances which justiﬁed this breach of

the agreement. Credit is often a material

element in a contract of sale, whereby the

buyer is enabled to operate upon the cap-

ital of the seller. Credit extended without

interest is. in effect, a sale at the stipulated

price less the interest for the period of credit.

The damage for a breach of contract to pay

money at a particular date is the lawful rate

of interest for the period of default, unless

some other penalty is imposed by the agree- ‘

ment. So it would seem that if the buyer,

in order to supply himself with the articles

which the seller was obligated to sell, is

compelled to buy from another, and to pay

cash, one element of rccovery for the breach

would be interest upon his purchase for the

period of credit. It is the well-settled duty

of the buyer, when the sclier refuses to de-

liver the goods contracted for, to do nothing

to aggravate his injury. Indeed, he must

do all that be reasonably can to mitigate

the loss. If the buyer could have supplied

himself with goods of like kind. at the place

of delivery or other available market, at the

time the contract was broken, and neglected

izes any special dawnges sustaiue<l by plaintiffs. '!'hey are thl•rdore limited to "general damages," which, for such a brench as
the one declared on, are measured by the
difrerence between what they bad agreed
to pay and the sum for which tht•y could
have supplied themseln•s with luwlwr of the
same character at the pl:tl'e of dl'iivery, or,
if not obtainable tlH't·e, then nt the m·:11'l· ~t
available market, plus any additional freight
resulting from the breach. In case of such
breach, the plaiutifTs are entitlt•d only to
indemnity In a sum equal to the Joss they
have sustained as a cousl'quence. lfruce It
results that If the pialntllfs are nble to replace the goods by otlwrs. bought at a less
or equal pri<'e at the pl:we of tll'll\·erY. or
other nenr anti a\·niiahlc market. they have
l"Ustalned uo loss, and ure entitled at best
to nothing more than nominnl 1lnmagcs.
XPithl'r the (}p1·lamtl1111 uor bill of pnrtlculars alleges any ina hility tu pay en sit, as de·
manded by the defendants. We do not,
therefore, consider whl'ther special damages
might not, under some circumstances, be !:e<.'O\·ered, which were sustained by r.-nsou or
the Inability of plalntltfs to pay c-ash for lumber to replace that whlch defentlants had
eontrnrtetl to sell them on credit It follows that If plalnti!Ts were able to buy, anrl
did not, thl'y cannot throw upon the defendants nny spl'cial losst>s lndileut to their own
failure to mltlgate the Injury as far as th,•y
reasonably could. Sedg. )leas. Dam. (8th
Ed.) § 141; )Jnrsh v. '.\lrl'herson, lO'::i U. 8.
700; Warren v. ::::totldart., Id. ~.!4.
The ground upon which the defendants refused to carry out the sale was ostensibly
their unwilllng-np;;~ to extend to the pbthitltTs the cretlit of 90 da>·i; provided for In
the ag1·eement of sale. They have not endeavored to show that there were any circumstances which justified this breach of
the agn•ewent. Credit Is often a material
element In a contract or sale, whereby the
buyer Is enabled to operate upon the cap\ ital of. the seller. .Credit extentletl without
intrrest Is. In etTect. a sale at the stipulated
price less the interest for the period or credit.
The damage for a breach of contract to pay
money at a particular <lnte Is the lawful rate
of lntrrpst for the pt>riutl of d efault, unless
some other penalty is Imposed by the agreement So It would s.-.-m thnt If the hnyPr,
in order to supply hlmsl'lf with the artidrs
which the selle1· was ohlii:ated to sell, Is
compelled to buy from anothl'r, and to pay
cash, one element of r•·<·o\·rry for the hreaeh
would be lute1·t·st upon his purchase for the
period of credit. It is tlw well-iwttll'tl duty
of the buyer, when the seller refuses to deliver the goods contrnctt>d for, to do nothing
to al{J{l'llVate his Injury. Indeed, he must
do all that be rrnsonal>ly Pan to mltiirnte
the los s. If the hn~·t· r l'onhl haYP supplied
himNelf with J!ooll:,; of lik1· ld11d. at the 111:11'. e
of delivery or otlwr UYailahle lll:tl'IH•t. at th e
time the cuntrat:t wuii broken, and nl'gh·ctetl
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to do so, whereby Ile suffered s1weinl dnmnges l>y rt>ason of the b1·each, he will not
be suffered to recompense himself for such
siiednl <l:unng-1\ for the reason that to that
extent he has needlessly aggravated the loss.
The contention of the plaintiffs Is that they
could not supply themselves at the time the
contract was broken with lumber of the qualities and sizes mentioned In their contraet,
either at the place of delivery or at any other
available market; that they we1·e not required to buy from the defendnnts, who
were already In default; that to have bought
from them would operate both to encourage
breaches or contracts, llnd would have been
a waiver of all other right of recovery for
the breach of their agreement; that to have
acceplt>d the proposal of the deft>rnlants to
supply tllem fo1· cash at the redueetl p1·1ce
would simply have beell to substitute oue
contrac t for another, thereby enabling de·
fendants to escape all llab,dty for a delib·
erate and Indefensible violation of the bargnln. They therefore Insist that the measure of damage was the difference between
the contract price and the market value at
'l'onnwanda, N. Y., less freights to thnt point:
the evidence showing that the lumber was
bought fo1· resale at Tonawanda, and that
defl'ndants were Informed of that purpose.
. For a breach of contract of sale, the law .,
lr11posl's no damages by way of punishmi·nt.
The Innocent party Is simply entitlt>tl to recover his real loss. If the market Vlllue is
less than the contract pri<'e, the l>urer has
sustained no loss. This Is axiom a tic, aml
needs no cltntlon of authority. If the plniutifrs could have bought at East Jordan, or
at any other convenient and available market, at the time of the breach, lumber ot
like kinds, at the same price or a less price.
It would be clear that they would have sustained no general damages. If they refused
to avail themsel\'es of such opportunity, and
thereby sustained special an<l unusual loss,
by reason of not having lumber of the kinds
called for by the contract, or by being deprlwd of a profit resulting from a resale at
'.l'onawandn, they could not recover sm·h
s1welnl damnge, for such dnmnge might hnYe
lt('eu a voided by replacing tile uudeliYered
lumber by other of like kinds. The fa<'t
that they could only buy from the defendants does not alfect the duty of plaintiffs
to minimize tllPir loss a s far ns they r ensonahly could. '111e offe1· to sell for cash at 11.
n•duePd prlee more thnn equaliiwd the interest for UO days, whit-h was the Ynl11e or
credit. There s1·<•111s to h e no lwrnn11011ut·
able ohj1•.. t11m In thus fJl'r111ittl11g a dl'iinqueut contractor to minimize his loss. Thi:!
obli~atiou on the buyer to mitigate his loss,
by reason of the SPllPr·s rPfusai to earry out
such a sale, Is not rl'laxed l>L'<':lllS<' the dP·
linquent sellf'r alfc nls the only opportunit>·
for !<Ueh reduction of tht:> hnyi>1"s 1111 nrn.iw.
Warren v. Stotltltu·t, 10;:; U. S. 2:.!4; Deere
v. Lewis, 51 Ill. 2:;4.

.
I

248

BREACH OF C0.\"l‘RACTS RESPECTING PERSONAL PROPERTY.

In Warren v. Stoddart, above cited, the

essential facts were these: Stoddart & Co.

were publishers of an edition of the En-

cyclop(bdia Britannica. It was a book sold

only by subscription. Certain territory was

assigned to the plaintiff, in which he was

to have the exclusive right to sell the book

on subscription. He was to have the book

on a credit of 30 days, thus enabling him to

deliver it to his subscribers, and obtain the

means to make his own payments. Warren

obtained a large number of subscriptions to

Stoddart‘s publication. After delivering a

few numbers, he ceased to canvass for the

Stoddart publication, and became a can-

vasser for a rival edition. Therenpon Stod-

dart refused to extend further credit to

Warren, and demanded cash on all his or-

ders to supply his subscribers for the Stod-
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dart edition. Warren demanded credit, and

refused to pay cash. Being unable to get

the Stoddart edition from any other ource,

he, at great expense to himself, substituted

the Scotch, or rival edition, with which be

furnished his subscribers for Stoddart's edi-

tion. For the loss thus sustained be sued.

After discussing the effect upon Warren's

contract, because of his ceasing to canvass

for Stoddart and taking up a rival work, the

court proceeded to decide the case upon the

second ground of defense presented, saying:

“But, even conceding that the provision re-

ferred to remained in force after Warren

had declined to go on under the contract, it

does not follow that, upon the refusal of

Stoddart to give Warren a credit of thirty

days upon. the books, the latter could obtain

a cancellation of the orders he had taken

for Stoddartis reprint, and substitute orders-

for the Scotch edition, and charge the ex-

pense of so doing to Stoddart. The claim

that, upon a simple refusal of Stoddart to

allow him a thirty-days credit upon the books

as he ordered them, he could go on and sub-

stitute other orders for another book, and

charge Stoddart with the expense of substi-

tution, amounting to $30,000, is, to say the

least, a remarkable one. The damage sus-

tained by Warren because he did not get the

thirty-days credit which he thinks he was

entitled to is not to be measured in that

way. The rule is that where a party is

entitled to the beneﬁt of a contract, and

can save himself from a loss arising from

a breach of it at a triﬂing expense or with

reasonable exertions, it is his duty to do it,

and he can charge the delinquent with such

damages only as with reasonable endeavors

and expense he could not prevent. Wicker

v. Hoppock, 6 Wall. 9-i; Miller v. Mariner's

Church, 7 Mo. 51; Russell v. Butteriield, 21

Wend. 300; U. S. v. Burnham, 1 Mason. 57,

Fed. Cas. .\o. 1-i,ll9il; Taylor v. Read, 4

Paige, 561. The course pursued by Warren

was not necessary to his own protection.

He might have paid Stoddart cash for the

books required to ﬁll his oi'd|‘rs, or have al-

lowed Stoddart to ﬁll the orders and divide
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Y. Stoddart is controlling. The offer after

the breach by the defendants to sell the

lumber necessary to complete tlfe contract

was not coupled with any condition operat-

v. Stoddart ls controlling. The offer after
the breach by the defendants to sell the
lumber necessary to complete t~ contract
was not coupled with any condition operating as an abandonment of the contract, nor
.as a waiver of any right of action for dam.ages for the breach.

ing as an abandonment of the contract, nor

as a waiver of any right of action for dam-

ages for the breach.

The question as to whether there was er-

ror in not directing a verdict for nominal

damages was not presented by any excep-

tion in the circuit court, nor raised by any

assignment of error here. We do not, there-

fore, consider it.
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Judgment aﬂirmed.

•
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The question as to whether there was error In not directing a verdict for nominal
damages was not presented by any exception In the circuit court, nor raised by any
assignment of error here. We do not, therefore, consider It.
Judgment amrmed.
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HOFFMAN v. CHAMBERLAIN.

(5 Atl. 150, 40 N. J. Eq. 663.)

Court of Errors and Appeals of New Jersey.

November Term, 1885.

On appeal from a decree of the chancellor,

whose opinion is reported in Chamberlain v.

Hoffman, 68 N. J. Eq. 40.

P. S. Scovel, for appellant.

O. A. Bergen, for respondent.

REED, J. Sarah Chamberlain, the com-

plainant below, together with one Amelia B.

Ellis, sold to Mary W. Miller, now Hoffman,

certain household furniture for the sum of

$1,800. A part of the property sold belonged

to Mrs. Chamberlain, and a part to Mrs. El-

lis. It was paid for in the following manner:

$500 in cash were paid to 'Mrs. Ellis, and to

her were given, also, two notes of $150 each,
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and one note of $100; to Mrs. Chamberlain

were given nine $100 notes. All of Mrs. El-

lis' notes are paid. Three of the Chamber-

lain notes are paid, leaving still unpaid six

of the notes given to her. At the time these

notes were given a chattel mortgage was exe-

cuted to Mrs. Chamberlairi, to secure all

these notes, to the amount of $1,300. Mrs.

Chamberlain ﬁled her bill to foreclose this

mortgage. The defense to it is that some of

the articles sold did not belong to either Mrs.

Ellis or Mrs. Chamberlain. All the articles

to which title is alleged to have failed were

sold as the property of Mrs. Ellis, and all

the notes given to her have been paid. Only

the remaining six notes given to Mrs. Cham-

berlain are outstanding, and it is as security

for the payment of these that the chattel

mortgage is being foreclosed. If this trans-

action is to be treated as involving two sales,

with a distinct consideration for each, then

there is no defense to the present suit.

The failure of title to Mrs. Ellis' goods

could not affect the consideration paid to

Mrs. Chamberlain under a distinct contract.

Upon a consideration of all the circumstan-

ces surrounding the sale, I think the affair

was understood to be a single transaction, in

which all these household goods were sold

for a single price. The two ladies who sold

were relatives, and had been intimately con-

nected in business. They desired to sell all

the furniture in the house to one person.

The values which they'ﬁxed to the separate

articles were for the purpose of determining

their separate interests in the consideration.

The notes were made in part to one and in

part to the other vendor, for the purpose of

convenience. The chattel mortgage was giv-

en to secure all the notes, without regard to

whom they were payable. So far as the pur-

chaser felt concerned in the affair, all she

wished was to get all the furniture as it

stood in the house. She was not concerned

in the proportion of interest in the entire

stock, so long as she got the title to it all.

The price was agreed upon, not in view of

any part, but of the whole lot. The consid-

eration was single, in which both vendors
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v. Posey, 1 Head, 311; Ellis v. Gosney, 7 J. J.

Marsh. 111; Arthur v. Moss, 1 Or. 193; Goss

v. Dysant, 31 Tex. 186.

A perusal of the opinions in those cases,

and the reasons given for the adoption of this

rule in the sale of chattels, is not calculated

to vindicate the wisdom of the rule. The

doctrine, so far as it is applicable to breaches

of the covenants in real conveyances, rests

upon grounds which appertain to the charne-

ter of real estate. The reason for the adop-

tion of this rule in this class of actions is set

forth at length by Kent, in the leading case

of Staats v. Ten Eyck, 3 Caines, Cas. 111.

The rule is an exception to the general prin-

ciple which underlies the measure of dam-

ages for breaches of contract; namely, the

standard of compensation. This latter rule

applies to actions for breaches of warranties
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of quality in the sale of chattels to its full

extent. In what respect the loss resulting

from a breach of the warranty of title differs

from that resulting from a breach of the war-

ranty of quality in dealing with personal

property is diiiicult to conceive. Outside of

the vice of extending an exception to a gen-

eral rule in any event, there appears to be

no reason why the rule of recovery should

not be uniform in actions upon both kinds

of warranties. Nor do the cases in which

the exceptional rule applicable to damages

for breaches of real covenants has been ex-

tended to warranties of title to chattels, in

my judgment, present any reaon for such

prejudicial action. In nearly all of these

cases the question arose in states when and

where slavery prevailed, and was in respect

to breaches of a warranty of title to slaves.

The reason stated in many of the cases for

the adoption oi! the rule was the precarious

and ﬂuctuating character of that kind of

property. In other cases the court is con-

tent with the citation oi.' the early case of

Armstrong v. Percy, 5 Wend. 536, as the au-

thority for the rule.

In regard to the latter case. it may be re-

marked that the rule is drawn from a remark

of the judge who delivered the opinion in

that case, in a single sentence, unsupported

by authority or reason. And this remark

was made in the face of the result in the pre-

vious case of Blasdale v. Babcock, 1_Johns.

517, in which there was a recovery of the

value of a horse, and costs, upon a warranty

of title. The matter actually decided in the

case of Armstrong v. Percy was that, where

an action had been brought against the pur-

chaser by the real owner, who was not the

vendor, the purchaser could recover from the

vendor the money paid, besides the costs of‘

the suit which he was obliged to defend.

There was no suggestion that the rule con-

trolling, in this respect, an action for breach

of this kind of warranty, differed from the

rule in actions upon other kinds of warran-

ties. The cases cited—namely, Curtis v. Han-

nay, 3 Esp. 82; Caswell v. Coare, 1 Taunt.

566; Lewis v. Peake, 7 Taunt. 153—were all

v. Posey, 1 Head, 311; Ellis v. Gosney, 7 J. J.
:Marsh. 111; Arthur v. l\Ioss, 1Or.193; Goss
v. Dys:mt, 31 Tex. 186.
A perusnl ot the opinions in tht>se cases,
and the reasons given tor the adoption of this
rule In the sale ot chattels, is not calculated
to vindicate the wisdom ot the rule. The
doctrine, so tar as it is applicable to breaches
ot the covenants in real conveyances, rests
upon grounds which appertain to the character ot real estate. The reason tor the adoption ot this rule In this clnsa ot actions Is set
torth at length by Kent, In the leading case
o! Staats v. Ten Eyck, 3 Caines, Cas. 111.
The rule Is an exception to the general principle which underlies the measure ot damages tor breaches ot contract; namely, the
standard of compensation. This latter rule
applies to actions tor breaches of warranties
of quality In the sale ot chattels to Its tun
extent. In what rcsp1..>ct the loss resulting
trom a breach ot the warranty of title differs
trom that resulting trom a breach of the warranty of quality In dealing with personal
property Is difficult to conceive. Outside of
the vice of extending an exception to a general rule In any event, there appears to be
no reason why the rule of recovery should
not be uniform in actions upon both kinds
of warranties. Nor do the cases In which
the exceptional rule applicable to damages
for breaches of real covenants has been extended to warranties of title to chattels, In
my judgment, present any reason for such
prejudicial action. In nearly all of these
cases the question arose In states when and
wher~ slavery prevailed, and was In respect
tu breaches of a warrnnty of title to sin ves.
The IUlson stated In many of the cases for
the adoption of the rule was the precarious
and tluctuatlng character of that kind of
property. In other cases the court ls content with the citation of the early case of
Armstrong v. Percy, 5 Wend. 536, as the authority for the rule.
In regard to the latter case, It may be remarked that the rule is drawn from a remark
of the judge who delivered the opinion In
that cnse, In a. single sentence, unsupported
by aut.l10rlty or reason. And this rewark
was made In the face ot the result In the previous case of Blasdale v. Babcock, 1 Johns.
517, in which there was a recovery· of the
value of a horse, and costs, upon a warranty
of title. The matter actually decided in the
case of Armstrong v. Percy was that, where
an action had been brought against the purchaser by the real owner, who was not the
vendor, the purchaser could recover from the
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'\"endor the money paid, besides the costs ot
the suit which he was obliged to defend.
There wns no suggestion thnt the rule controlling, In this respect, an action for brnach
of this kind of warranty, differed trom the
rule In actions upon other kinds of warranties. The cases cited-namely, Curtis v. Hannay, 3 Esp. 82; Caswell v. Con.re, 1 •.raunt.
566; Lewis v. Peake, 7 Taunt. 153-were all
actions for breach of warranty of quality,
and the measure of damages in these cases
was shown to have been dependent upon the
pleadings. In the first two of these cases no
special damages were set out In the declaration, and there was nothing but the amount
of the consideration to show what was lost,
so that was ruled to be the measure of damages. In the last case, the claim tor damages having been broader, It was permitted
to the plalntur to-recover, In addition to this,
the costs of a suit against him by his vendee,
to whom he had sold with a slmllar warranty.
'l'h~ro Is nothing In the matters decided in
the case of Armstrong v. Percy which fixes,
as a rule, that for the present kind of warranties the measure of damages Is limited to
the consldera tlon paid, and Interest. The
rule, I think, In all actions of this kind, is
compensation. Where no special damages
are set forth, the measure of the loss Is the
value of the property purchased; and, where
there ls no evidence of value but the consideration paid, that will be taken as the standard of value. Where there le a failure ot \
title to a part, or an Inferior title only ls sold,
the loss ls the dl1rerence between the property as conveyed and Its value had the title
been as warranted,
In support of the '\"lew that this general
rule, applicable to damages, appertains to actions up(ltl breaches of warranties of title to
chattels, are the cases of Grose v. Hennessey, 13 Allen, 380; Howland v. Shelton, 25
Ala. 217; and the text of Mr. Sedgwick, on
Measure of Damages, 294. My opinion ls
that there should be a deduction, In this case,
of the dlfrerence between the value of the
entire lot of chattels sold and the '\"nlue of
the lot without the beaters. The only evidence of the value of the entire lot Is what
It was sold for, namely, $1,800. The evidence
In regard to the value of the heaters fixes
their value at about $200. Adopting these
values, there should be a deduction for the
latter sum from the notes, as of the date of
the sale, leaving due $400 and Interest.
The decree should be reversed.
Decree unanimously reversed.
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BERKEY & GAY FURNITURE CO. v. HAS-

CALL.

(24 N. E. 336, 123 Ind. 502.)

Supreme Court of Indiana. May 1, 1890.

Appeal from circuit court. Elkhart coun-

ty; JAMEs D. Osnosss, Judge.

Action by the Berkey & Gay Furniture

Company against Milo S. Hascall. Judg-

ment was rendered for defendant, and

plaintiff appealed.

J. M. Vanﬂeet, W. H. Vesey, and C. W.

Miller, for appellant. H. D. Wilson and W.

J. Davis, for appellee.

OLDS, J. This was an action by lheap-

pellant against the appellee to recover a

balance of $374.62iorgoods sold and deliv-

cred. The answer is in three paragraphs,

setting up acounter-claim. It is alleged in
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the ﬁrst paragraph that on August 26,

1881, the appellee had just completed his

hotel, with 50 rooms, and was in need of

new furniture therefor, without which he

could not carry on his business, as appel-

lant well knew; that on said day, for the

purpose of furnishing said hotel in all its

parts with suitable furniture, the appel-

lant agreed with him to furnish said fur-

niture and every part thereof complete,

and setitup inpropershape and condition

in his hotel rooms, ready for use, by Sep-

tember i5, 1881; that said rooms were ir-

regular and different in size. dimensions.

and construction, and for the purpose of

making said furniture suitable for said

rooms, appellant measured said rooms,

and a list of goods was agreed upon, and

at the foot thereof appellant executed a '

memorandum in writing as follows: “ We

agreeto putthese goods all in good order,

(set up in hotel, without charge, except

freight and cartage,) castored, with brack-

et wood-wheels on all beds. All bureaus and

washstands to have good wood-wheels

on rubber castors. Goods to be ready the

15th of September. Any goods not accord-

ing to order, or not satisfactory, may be

returned free of charge. Goshen, Aug. 26th,

1881. BERKEY & GAY FUR.\‘l'i‘UItE 00. T.

M. Mosaucv. " The paragraph then al-

leges that he was ready, able, and willing

to comply with his part of said contract,

but that appellant, with full knowledge of

all the facts, violated said agreement, in

this, to-wit: It failed to deliver any of

said goods prior to September 30, 1881,

whereby he lost the daily use of 29 rooms,

of the rental value of $2 per day for each

room from September 15th to September

30th; that appellant failed to deliver said

goods prior to January 18, 1852, except as

set forth in the complaint; that said fur-

niture was purchased to be delivered in

sets and suits forspeciﬁc rooms and places,

as set forth in said foregoing memoran-

dum, but the articles so delivered were not

in sets or suits, but in disjofnted and mis-

matched pieces, and were not and could
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and built his hotel building in the city of

Goshen, lnd.. at a cost of $40,000, and de-

fendant was proprietor and manager there-

of, and had within said hotel thirty (30)

rooms that were unfurnished, and when

so unfurnished were of no use or value to

thedefendant;that allsaid rooms remained

vacant, and of no use or value to de-

fendant, from the 15th day of September,

1&1, to the 30th day of September, 1881,

on account and by reason of the failure of

plaintiff to comply with its agreement

aforesaid; that twenty-three (23) of said

rooms remained vacant. and of no use to

defendant, from the 30th day of Septem-

ber, lﬁﬂl, until the 19th day of October,

1881, because of the failure of plaintiff to

comply with said contract; that seven (7)

of said rooms remained vacant and of no
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use from the 19th day of October, 1»-til, to

the 5th day of November, 1581, because of

the failure of plaintiff to comply with said

contract; thatfrom the 5th day of Novem-

ber, 1881, until December 15, 1s~\l, six (6)

rooms of said hotel remained vacant, and

of no use to defendant, because of the non-

fuliiiimentof said contract by the plaintiff;

that the use of each one of said rooms to

the defendant was nothim:. when unfur-

nished. (5) We further ﬁnd that the rent-

al value and use of each of said rooms,

when furnished with the furniture desig-

nated for same in said contract, would

have been to the defendant 75-100 dollars

per day during said time. (6) If, upon the

foregoing facts. the law be with the plain-

tiff, then we ﬁnd for the plaintiff; but, if

the law be with the defendant, then we

ﬁnd for the defendant. Jons A. isarra,

Foreman." The appellant moved for

judgment on the special verdict, which

motion was overruled,-and an exception

reserved. The appellee moved for judg-

ment on the special verdict, and the court

su'stained said motion, to which the ap-

pellant excepted. Final judgment was then

entered in favor of appeilee for $554.63,

and costs.

Appellant ﬁled a motion for new trial,

which was overruled, and exceptions re-

served. The appellant assigns as error:

(1) That the court erred in overruling ap-

pellant's motion for judgment in its favor

upon the special verdict. (2) That the

court erred in sustaining appellee's mo-

tlon for judgment in hisfavor on the spe-

cial verdict. (3) That the court erred in

oven-ulingappellant's motion ioranew tri-

al. It is'contended that. under the facts

found, the appellce is only entitled to com-

pensatory or generaldamages, and not for

the special damages set up as a counter

claim.

We think the facts found in the special

verdict entitled the appcllee to recover the

special damages claimed. In Vickery v.

Mc(‘ormick, 117 Ind. 594-597, 20 N. E. liep.

495, the court says: “The general rule is

au.i built bis hotel building In the city uf
Goshen, Ind .. at a cost of $40.000, and de-fendant was proprietor a.nrl mannp:er thert'of, anli had within said hotel thirty (:30)
rooms that were unrnrnlshe<l, und whPn
so unfurnished were or no use or value to
the defendant; that1dl1mid rooms remained
vacant, and of no use or value to defcmlant, from the 15th day of SC'ptembPr,
1s.-,1, to the 30th day of SC'ptember, 1881,
on a~count and by reason of the failure or
plaintiff to comply with ltR agreement
afon'l'lnhl: that twenty-thrre (2:.l) of sahl
rooms remained vacant. and of no use to
defenrlant, from the 30th day of S<•ptember, lS~l. until the 19th day of October,
ISSI, because of the failure of plnlntlff to
comply with said contract; that f!(•\·en (7)
of said rooruR renrnlned vacnnt anli of no
use from the 19th day of October. l>-1.<;l, to
the 5th day of November, lbSl, b<"CnnHe of
the failure of plaintiff to comply with Haid
COOtrRCt; thotfrom the 5th dlly of .N°ovember, 1&~1. until December 15, l~... 1. Rix (6)
rooms of said hotel remained vacant, and
of no use to defendant, bC'Causc of the nonfu!Hllmentof said contract by the platntlH;
that the use of each one or said rooms tu
the defendant was nothinit, when unfurnlshe<l. (5) We further find that the rental \•alue oml use of each or said rooms,
when furnished with the furniture deslgnate<l for same In said contract, wouhl
hat'e l>een to the defendant 75-100 dollars
per day during said time. (6) If, upon the
foregoing fucts. the law be with thP plalnttlf, then we find for the plnintUf; but, If
the Ju w be with the defl'ndant, then we
1lnd for the defendant. Jon:-i A. ~~llTH,
Foreman." The appellant moved for
_ Judgment on the special verdict, which
motion was overruled,. and an exception
reserved. The tippellee moved for judgment on the speC'lal verdict, and the court
su·stnlued said motion, to whkb tbe appellantexcepted. Final judgment wns then
entered lo favor of appellee for t554.63,
and costA.
Appellant ftled & motion for new trial,
which was overrule<l, and eJ.ceptlon11 reserved. The appellant a.sslg1111 1u1 error:
(1) That the court erred In overruling appellant's motion for judgment in Its favor
upon the special verdict. (2) 'l'hot the
court erred In eustalnlna; appellef''B motion for judgment ln hie favor on the spech1l \·er11lct. (3) Thnt tlw cnnrt errpd In
overrultn11: appellan t'e mo tloo for a new trial. It 111-contcnde<l tb11t, under the fnctl!
found, the appellee is only ~ntltled to compen1mtory or general damages, and not for
the special danu,iges set up as a counter
claim.
We think the facts fonnd In the special
verdict entitled the a11pellee to recover the
special dama,1?es claimed. In Vickery v.
McCormick, 117 Ind. 59t-597, 20 N. E. Hep.
495, the court 1mys: "The general rull' Is
that a party who fall11 to comply with his
contract to furnish goodR Is liable for the
value of the goods ln the open market at
the time of the failure. But, when similar
goods cannot be purchm1ccl In the market,
the me111mre of llumnges is the actunl loss
suRtained by the purc h1u;erin not receiving
the goods arco1·dl111( to the contract. "
See Hahm v. Deig. :!:l ;:>;, E. RPp.141, Hn<l authorities there cited. 111 Hadley v. Baxen-
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dale, 9 Exch. 341, Sedg. Lencl . Cas. 1~136,
the court states what we deem to be the
truerulegoyernlngthe as11es ... ment of damages In such crui!'8 as this. ln that case It
ls said: "Where two parties have rnttrle a.
contract, which one of them hue bruktm,
the damages which thE> otlll'r party uught
to reccl rn in respect to such breach of contract should be such RB may fairly and
reaaonably be conslderC'd clthn arhling
naturally-/. e., according to the u1;1111J
courl!e of thlngs-ll'om such breach of contract Itself, or such as may re111wnably lie
sup1>011ed to have been In the contcm)liatlon or both parties at the tlmethey mude
the contt·nct as the probable result of the
breach of It." 'l'be facts found hy the jury
show that the 1tppellee, at and Jui.it prior·
to August 26, 18S1. hnd reconstructed and
built hie hotel building In the city of Goshen, Ind., at a cost of $40.000, and that
appellee wn11 proprietor and man ager thereof, anrl bud within Hnld hotel au rooms
that were unfurnished, und when so unfurnished were of no use or value to the
appellre: thnt upou snld day he contracted with the a1lpellant to sell and delivertohim the severttl itenui of property mPntloned ln the uppellnnt's complaint, whlc:h
conslHtcd of the 11eces1mry furniture to furnli!h euld rooms, at and for the p1·lce of
each article a11 stated In the complaint,
and agreed to ddlverthe same and set the.
same up In op1>ellee's hoteJ, and hove the
same rendy for use In Hald hotel by or on
the 15th day of September, 1881; that the
appellant, at the time of the making of snicl
contract, knew the pur110He for which sal«l
furniture was to be used. The contract
wa11 to furnish the furniture for 30 rooms .
In an hotel, and set It up In the rooms, an«l
have it ready for use and occupancy by a
dny named. Frum these facts It necessari-·
ly follows, as a. conclusion, that the party
contractinp: to furnish the Mame knew that
the rooms were valueleee 81! hotl'l apartments when unfurulshe<l; that the furniture was necessary to enable the purchuser
to use and o<·cupy the same, ft.nd operate
his hotel; and that the llppellee would be
deprived of the use of such rooms for !'Inch
pu1·po11e1mtll ltcomplled with lti.icontract.
'l'he facts found further show thut the appellant commPnced furnishing the furniture soon after the date when It w11e all to·
have been furnit1he<l and put up Int he room>i,
furnishing pa.rt at onetime and part at an
other. The facts ehow the apr>ellee ha<l
reconstructed and rebuilt a valuable hotel,
and wRs operating it himself, dlld the
dam11ge1:1 nuturully r<>1mltlng from the
hrench or the contract, accor1llng to the
facts found, WPre what the rooms woul<I
have been worth to appellPe furnish ed according to the contract more than the.\•
were worth to-him unfurnished, rlurlng the
delay in complying with the cont met. Appellee built the house for a particular purpose, and w1111 having It furniHhe<I for such
purpmm. He was not bound to rent out
the rooms for another purpose, even If he
coul1l ha vc done so . If there had heen IL
breach nnd a total failure of the appellant
to have furnished the whole or any part
of the fnruiturr, and tlw app<>llee had h('('ll
qotltted tlrnt he waR not lnte1111lng to furTliHh It, th<>n the Appellant would h1we been
llahle for the uifference in \"alnc Ill the fur-
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nlture between its price in the open mar-

ket and the contract price, as wfll as the

loss of the use of the rooms for the time

necessary to have procured the furniture

elsewhere; but in this case the appellant

furnished the furniture, and appeilee ac-

cepted it, so that the damage was the loss

sustained by reason of the delay. We think

the loss of the use of the rooms as they

were to be furnished might fairly be con-

sidered to have been contemplated by the

parties at the time of the making of the

con tract. In Richardson v. L‘hynOweth,

26 Wis. 656, it was held that a defendant

failing to deliver an article, knowing the

purpose for which it was purchased, was

liable for the proﬁts the purchaser would

have made. See 1 Sedg. Dam. (7th Ed.)

218-239; Field, Dam.§ 250; City of Terre

686.
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Haute v. Hudnut. 112 Ind. 542, 13 N. E. Rep.

It is contended that the facts found do

not state the damages correctly; that, if

the plaintiff is entitled to recover, the

amount he is entitled to recover would be

the difference between the rental value of

the rooms, unfurnished and furnished.

This objection we do not think available

for a reversal of the judgment. When spe-

cial damages of this character are recover-

able, it is the damagethe party himself has

sustained that heis entitled to recover. If

A. purchase grain of B., and at thetimeA.

has a previous contract to sell and deliver

grain to C., and A. purchases the grain of

B. with a view of ﬁlling his previous con-

tract with 0.. and C. is advised ofthat fact,

and the contract is such that on failure

to deliver B. becomes liable to A. for the

proﬁt he would have made, thedamage re-

coverable is the proﬁt A. would have

made; and that amount might be deter-

mined byaﬁndingof the facts showing the

amount A. was to pay B.for the grain, and

the amount he would have received from

' (Liorthesame. So,inthisca-se.theamount

of damage that the appellee was entitled

to recover was the difference in value to

the appellee in the rooms, furnished and

unfurnished, for the time they remained

unfurnished by reason of appellant's fail-

ure to furnish the furniture; and that

umount is determined by ﬁnding what

the rooms were worth to the appellee un-

furnished, and what they were worth fur-

nished, for the time he was deprived of the

use of them for the purpose for which they

were to be used. The jury has found as

facts that the use of the rooms unfurnished

was worth nothing to the appellee during

that time. and furnished they would have

been worth 75 cents per day, and the num-

ber of days each room was unfurnished

from the date appellant contracted to set

up the furniturein therooms is also stated

and found in the verdict, and the gross

amount maybe determined by a merecom-

putation. The facts found in the special
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BARNES v. BROWN et aL
BREACH OF AGREEMENT TO SUPPLY GOODS.

(29 N. E. 760, 130 N. Y. 372.)
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BARNES v. BROWN et al.

(29 N. E. 760, 130 N. Y. 372.)

Court of Appeals of New York, Seeontl Division. Jan. 20, 1892.

Court of Appeals of New York, Second Divi-

sion. Jan. 20, 1892.

Appeal from supreme court, general term,

ﬁrst department.

Action by Oliver W. Barnes against George

H. Brown, and James Seligman, Jesse Selig-

man, and David Seligman, as executors of

Joseph Seligman. The general term dismiss-

ed the complaint as to the executors, and re-

versed the referee's decision, which awarded

only nominal damages against Brown. Plain-

tif! and Brown appeal. Aﬂirmed as to the

executors, and reversed as to Brown.

The other facts fully appear in the follow-

ing statement by Bradley, J.:

The action was brought to recover dam-

ages for the alleged breach of contract of
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which the following is a copy, to-wit: “Oli-

ver W. Barnes having, by instruments bear-

ing even date herewith, assigned and trans-

ferred to as, George H. Brown and Joseph

Seligman, all claims and demands against the

New York City Central Underground Rail-

way Company, and his title to certain sub-

scriptions to the capital stock of said com-

pany, and also any interest he may have in

I certain alleged contract made with the

said company by Francis P. Byrne, and hav-

ing also transferred ixty shares of stock in

said company: Now, we, George H. Brown

and Joseph Seligman, do hereby, in consid-

eration of the premises and of one dollar to

us paid by the said Oliver W. Barnes, agree

that we will. upon certain amendments to the

charter of the said New York City Central

Underground Railway Company, now pend-

ing before the legislature of the state of New

York, becoming a law, pay. or cause to be

paid. to the said Oliver W. Barnes, his rep-

resentatives and assigns, the sum of twen-

ty-seven thousand ﬁve hundred dollars in cur-

rency of the United States, being the amount

of certain advances made and services ren-

dered by the said Barnes to the said railway

company; and also that we will cause to be

delivered to the said Barnes or his assigns

at the time of the payment of the said mon-

ey two thousand shares of the capital stock

of the said railway company, which said

stock is to be full-paid stock. And we fur-

ther agree with the said Oliver W. Barnes,

his representatives and assigns, that, in the

event of the said amendments not becoming

a law at the present session of the legislature,

we will either cause said money to be paid,

and said two thousand shares of stock deliv-

ered to the said Barnes or his assigns. or

have reassigned to the said Barnes or his as-

signs the claims, demands, and rights so as-

signed to us, and transfer to him or his as-

signs the said sixty shares of stock so trans-

ferred to us the next day after the close

of the present session of the legislature of

New York. And we further agree that not

more than one hundred additional shares of

the stock of said company shall be issued

Appeal from supreme court, general term,
first department.
Action by Oliver W. Bnrnes against George
H. Brown, nnd James Seligman, Jesse Seligman, and Dav.Id Seligman, as executors of
Joseph Seligman. The general term dismissed the complaint as to the executors, and reversed the referee's decision, which awarded
only nominal damages against Brown. Plaintiff and Brown appeal. Aflirmed as to the
executors, and reversed as to Brown.
The other !nets fully appear In the following statement by Bradley, J.:
The action was brought to recover damages for the alleged breach of contract of
which the following Is a copy, to-wit: "Oliver
Barnes having, by Instruments bearing even date herewith. assigned and trans·
ferred to us, George H. D1·own and Joseph
Seligman, nll claims and demands ngalnst the
~ew York City Central Underground Rnilway Company, and bis title to certain subscriptbns to the capital stock of said com·
pany, and also any Interest he may have In
' certain alleged contrnct made with tile
said company by Francis P. Byrne, and having also transferred sixty shares of stock In
said company: Now, we, George H. Brown
and Joseph Seligman, do llereby, lo consideration of the premises and of one dollar to
us paid by the said Oliver ,V. Barnes, agree
that we will, upon certain amendments to the
charter of the said New York City Central
Underground Railway Company, now pending before the legislature of the state of New
York, becoming a law, par. or cause to be
paid, to the said Oliver W. Barnes, his reprei;entntlves and assigns, tbe sum of twenty-seven thousand five hundred dollars In currency of the United States, being the amount
of certain advances made and services rendered by the said Barnes to the said railway
company; and also that we will cause to be
delivered to the said Harnes or his assigns
at the time of the payment ot the said money two thousand shares ot the capital stock
ot the said rnilwll'Y company, which said
stock Is to be full-paid stock. And we further agree with the said Oliver W. Barnes,
his representatives and assigns, that, In the
event ot the said amendments not becoming
a law at the present session or the legislature,
we will either cause said money to be paid,
and said two thousand shares of stock delivered to the said Barnes or his assigns, or
have reassigned to the imid Barnes or his assigns the claims, demands, and rights so assigned to us, and transfer to him or his assigns the said sixty shares of stock so transferred to us the next day after the close
-0! the present se:o~ion of the legislature ot
:Xew York. And we further agree that not
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more than one hundred additional shares of
the stock of said cc.mpany shall be issued
until the said payment be made and stock
delivered without the consent of the said
Barnes, and that so much of said one hundred shares as shall be Issued shall be transferred to the said Barnes, if we do not exercise our option or paying said twenty-seven thousand five hundred dollars, and deliver
Ing said two thousand shares on the failure
of the said alllendments to become a Jr.w
at the present session. And we further ato. :ee
that no· contract for the construction oi the
railway of the company shall be entered lnto
without the eonsent of the said Barnes until
the said money shall be paid and the stock
delivered. In witness whereof we have hereunto set our hands and seals this twentysixth day of March, In the year one thousand
eight hundred and seventy-two. George H.
Brown. [L. S.J Joseph Seligman. [L~ S.J"
'Vhen, In 1882, this action was commenced,
Joseph Seligman bad dled, and executors of
his will were joined as defendants with
Brown. 'l'he alleged default was in the fallm-e or refusal to deliver to tke plalutitr the
2,000 shares of the stock of the railway company, as Brown and Seligman had undertaken by the contract. The plaintiff sought
to recover $200,000 nod interest. The referee found that the stock had no value, and
directed jmlgment against Brown for nominal or six cents damages; and as to the defendants (executo1·s) the referee directed judgnwnt of dismissal of complaint. JudgmenU.
wtre entered accordingly. The general tern.
affirmed the latter, and reversed t h!' judgment for nominal damages, and as to \be defendant Brown granted a new trial.
Edward C. James and Ira Leo Bamberger,
for plnlntitr. Hamilton Odell and John E.
Parsons, for defendants.
BRADLEY, J., (after stating the facts.)
The main controversy has relation to the
rule or measure or damages applicable to the
breach of the contrnct upon which this action was founded. While the plaintiff claim'l
that damages cannot be Jess than $200,000
and Interest, It Is Insisted on the part of the
defense that they were only nominal. Before
proceeding to the consideration of the question in that respect, reference may properly
be made to the facts out of which the alleged claim arose. The New York City Central Underground Railway Company was organized under an act Incorporating It, and
authorizing the company to construct and
operate an underground railway In the city
ot New York, passed in 1868, and amended
in 1869. The authorized .capital stock of the
company was $10,000,000. At the time the
contract of March 26, 1872. was made, the
plaintiff was president o! the company. He
then had some claims against it, and only
117 shares or capital stock had been Issued,
of which be held 63 shares. By the trans-
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fer of the 60 shares to Brown and Seligman,

they took the control of the organization of

the company. The amendments to the char-

ter then pending in the legislature did not

become a law, and consequently it was op-

tional with them to either retain their pur-

chase and pay, or surrender what they had

received, and put an end to the contract.

They, however. concluded to treat it as ef-

fectual, and assumed the undertaking to per-

form, and afterwards did pay to the plain-

tiff the $27,500, and did deliver to the plain-

tiff certiﬁcates of 2,000 shares of the capital

stock of the company. This was apparently

full performance. but in fact was not, be-

cause that so delivered was not paid stock;

and when this was discovered by the plaintiff

he offered to return the certiﬁcates, and de-

manded such as he was entitled to. Further
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performance was refused, and this action fol-

lowed. The only question as against the

defendant Brown was one of damages; and

the referee found that at the time when he

and Seligman undertook to deliver the stock

to plaintiff it had no actual or market value,

and determined that he was entitled to re-

cover nominal damages only. The stock cer-

tainly had no market value. None was in

the market. This ﬁnding and conclusion

were challenged by the plaintiff's exceptions.

By reference to the condition of the company,

it is seen that the total amount of money re-

ceived by it on account of subscriptions to its

stock was $5,700, and that was received in

1860 and 1871. , The other credits to the cap-

ital stock account were in demand loans and

special services rendered the company. The

various efforts prior to 1872 were unsucces-

fully made to raise money for the purpose of

construction of the railway, and the reason

why the bonds of the company could not be

negotiated was that it had been unable to

obtain subscriptions to its capital stock to

pay for right of way. The land and conse-

quential damages incident to the construction

of the railway were estimated at 5,000,000;

and the expenditures by the company for

work done towards construction and for land ,

and land damagm did not exceed $4,000.

The indebtedness of the company was about

$350,000. This was, in general terms, the

situation of the company when the contract

of March 26, 1872, was made; and it was

known as well to Brown and Seligman as

to the plaintiff. Whatever of value they took

by the contract was in the franchise of the

company, and was dependent upon the use

which could be made of it by way of the

construction and operation of an underground

railway. While the futility of the enter-

prise tended to show that it never had any

actual value, there evidently was hope and

expectation of success entertained by Brown

and Seligman when they elected to retain the

beneﬁt of the contract, and it is in that view

insisted by the plaintiff that the stock then

had a value which to him may at that time

have been available, although later it turn-
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vance in the market price of the stock from

the time of the sale up to a reasonable time

to replace it after the plaintiff received no-

tice of the sale would afford a complete

indemnity." The principle upon which the

determination of Baker v. Drake rested was

that the measure of the plaintiff' damages

was governed by the opportunity which was

afforded by the market for him within _a

reasonable time to replace the stock or the

refusal of the defendant to do so. 66 N. Y.

518; Colt v. Owens, 90 N. Y. 368. And in

“'right v. Bank, 110 N. Y. 237. 18 N. E.

70, the same rule was held in like manner

applicable where stock fully paid for by the

owner is, through the honest mistake of the

pledgee. converted by him, and he refuses

to replace it. Therenpon the owner may do

so within a reasonable time, and the highest

market price within that time is the proper
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measure of damages. This is the recognized

rule in this state, and it is applicable alike

to actions upon contract as in tort.

In the present case there was no market

to resort to for the plaintiff to supply him-

self with the stock, nor any market value to

furnish the measure of damages. The rule

applied in the cases last cited was not, there-

fore, in that sense applicable to the situa-

tion in the case at bar. A subscription, how-

ever, to 2,000 shares of the capital stock of

the railway company, and payment of the

full amount to the company, would have

produced the stock, and it may be assumed

that it could not otherwise have been pro-

cured. It is upon that ground that the

plaintif f insists that the liability of the de-

fendant is measured by that amount. This

would have been so if the agreement of

Brown and Seligman had been to pay the

plaintiff $200,000 in the stock of the company.

Then their indebtedness or liability would

not have been controlled by the value of the

stock, but would have been ﬁxed by the con-

tract; but when the speciﬁc quantum of the

stock was made the consideration in that re-

spect for the plaintiffs sale to them, on

their failure to deliver it he was entitled in

daniages to the equivalent of that which they

had undertaken to render. In the absence

of special circumstances, in an action for

conversion of personal property, as well as

one for failure to deliver it in performance

of a contract, where consideration has been

received, the value of the property at the

time of such conversion or default, with in-

terest, is the measure of compensation.

Ormsby v. Mining Co., 56 N. Y. 623; Parsons

v. Sutton, 66 N. Y. 92. No special circum-

stances were alleged in the-complaint to take

this case out of the general rule. Nor was

there any ﬂuctuation in the value of the stock

succeeding the time for its delivery, under

' the contract to qualify the application of such

rule.

The damages which a party ordinarily may

recover for breach of contract are those which

naturally ﬂow from the default; and, if the

LAW DAM.2d Ed.—17

Tance In the market price of the stock from
the time of the Bllle up to a reasonable time
to replace It after the plnlntur received notice of the sale would atrord a complete
ln<lemnlty." The principle upon which the
determination of Baker v. Drake rested was
that the measure of the plalntilr's damag-cs
was governed by the opportunity which was
afforded by the market for him within a
reasonable time to replace the stock or tlie
refusal of the defendant to do so. liG N. Y.
518; Colt v. Owens, 90 N. Y. :ms. And In
Wright v. Bank, 110 N. Y. 237. 18 N. E . .
79, the !'amc rule was held In like manner 1
applicable where stock fully paid for by tbe
owner ls, through the honest mistake of the
ple<lgee, converted by him, and he refuses
to replace It. Thereupon the owner may do
so within a reasonable time, and the highest
market price within that time ls the proper
measure of damages. Th:s ls the recognized
rule In this state, and it ls applicable alike
to actions upon contract as In tort.
In the present case there was no market
to resort to for the plalntltr to supply himself with the stock, nor any market value to
furnish the measure of damages. The rule
applied in the cases last cited was not, therefore, In that sense applicable to the situation In the case at bar. A subscription, however, to 2,000 shares of the capital stock of
the railway ~ompnny, and payment of the
full amount to the company, would have
produced the stock, and it may be assumed
that It could not otherwise have been procured. It ls upon that ground that the
plalntifr Insists that the liability of the defendant Is measured by that amount. This
would have been so If the agreement of
Brown and Seligman had been to pay the
plalntll't $200,000 In the stock of the company.
Then th<>lr Indebtedness or liability would
not have been controlled by the value of the
stock, but would have been fixed by the contt·act; but when the specific quantum of the
stock was made the consideration In tlmt respect for the plalntll't's sale to them, on
their failure to deliver It he was entitled In
dan\ages to the equivalent of that which they
had undertaken to render. In the absence
of special circumstances, In an action for
conversion of personal property, as well as
one for failure to <leliver It In performance
of a contract, where comdderntlon has been
received, the value of the property at the
tlme of sud1 conversion or <lef:rnlt, with Interest, is the 111t•nsnre of compensation.
Ormshy v. '.\lining Co., !JG N. Y. G:.!3; Parsons
v. Sutton, Uli N. Y. !l~. No special circumstances were nllege<l In the·complaint to take
this case out of the general rule. Nor was
there any fluctuation In the value of the stock
succeeding the time for its <lelivery, under
the contract to qualify the application of such
rule.
The damages which a party ordinarily may
recover for lJrE>ach of contract nre those which
naturally fiow from the <lefault; and, if the
LAW DA:M:.2d Ed.-17

257

contract Is made In reference to special circumstances al'tectlng the measure ot compen·
satton, such circumstances may be treated as<
within the contemplation of the parties, and
constitute a basis for the assessment of damages. Booth v. Mill Co., 60 N. Y. 487. They
come within the meaning of special damages,
nnd must be the subject of allegation In
pleading to Gntltle the party to make proof
of them, unless objection In that i·cspect be
walv<"<l. In the present case, no facts of
spednl character relating to damages were
allcg<'d, nor were any established by the
evidence further than the mere fact that the
stock of the compan' had no market value.
It, notwithstanding that fact, the stock n1ay
have had an ac.:tnnl Yalue a dift'erent question
would have been presented; for the plaintitf
could not be subjt><·ted to loss, nor could the
defendant be permitted to profit, by the tact
that the stock bad no mm·ket value at the
stipulated time for delivery. 'l'hen oilier
means than those atior<lcd by the market
would be resorted to uu<ler the contract, as·
within t11e contemplation of the parties tonscertaln the amount requisite to full Indemnity to the plalntll't. Sternfels T. Clark. 2
Hun, 122, 70 N. Y. 608. There mny be cases
In which damages have no support In market
values, where the value 18 peculiar to the
party entitled to performance, and relief will
be given accordingly. Scattergood v. 'Vood,
14 Hun, 2G9, 79 N. Y. 2G3; Parsons T. Sutton, 66 N. Y. 92. And when the remedy at
law for compensation Is Inadequate or impracticable, lt may be found In equity by
way of specific performance. Porn. Eq. Jur.
t 1401. Those are supposed cases to which
the principles of law adapt remedies when
they arise. But In the case at bar the stock
not only bad no market value; It also had no
actual value. Nor does It appear that lt
would bnve been of any value to the plalntll't, or of any substantial benefit to him, for
any purpose, If he had received It. The defendant Brown, and his associate, Seligman,
did not, by the contract, undertake to do
anytlllng to give any future value to the
stock of the company. Thus we have the
simple cnse of a contrart to deliver 11. certificate for a certain quantity of capital stock
then haying no existence, and when due nnd
thereafter having no value. The claim that,
because the creation or issue of this worthless stock would cost Its par value, the pluintitr ls entitled to recover that sum, does not
seem to have the support of any well·dcfinecl
principle of lnw. But It ls said thnt, with
knowle<lge of the situation, Brown and his
associate absolutely agreed to deliver the
stock, nod therefore they were bound to pny
the amount requisite to accompllsh it without regard to the value of the stock, or o!
its beneficial use to the plalntll't. In an action at law to recover <lamages for bretH.h
of contract, the question of damages Is one
of indemnity; and In that respect the remedy founded upon this contract does not dll'l'er
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from that upon any other contract for de-

fault in the delivery of property which a

party has unqualiﬂedly undertaken to deliv-

er for a consideration received. In Dana v.

Fiedler, 12 N. Y. 40, the measure of dam-

ages for failure to deliver madder pursuant

to contract was founded upon the market

value at the time of the default. The ques-

tion there arose upon the exclusion of evi-

dence speculative in character, and which

for that reason was held inadmissible upon

the question of such value. Nor does Scat-

tergood v. Wood have any essential applica-

tion in principle to the case at bar. In that

case there was an element of exemplary dam-

ages against the defendhnt, who had willful-

ly deprived the plaintif f of the use of a test

machine designed by him for a special pur-

pose, in consequence of which he was put
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to the expense of constructing another for

such purpose. Of this intended use the de-

fendant was advised when he appropriated

and withheld the machine from the plaintiff.

The recovery of the expense of constructing

the second one as damage for the detention

of the other was sustained, although, by rea-

son (as it turned out) of its insufﬁciency,

the value of the latter was much less than

such cost.

founded solely upon the failure to deliver to

the plaintiff the stock without any supported

claim of special circumstances for any dam-

ages other than such as ﬂow naturally and

reasonably from such default of Brown and

Seligman. While the performance of their

contract in that respect may have required

them to pay to the company $200,000, the en-

tire value of its performance to the plain-

tiff was in the stock which they undertook

to deliver to him, and this was the only ben-

eﬁt he was entitled to take under that pro-

vision of the contract. The value of the

stock or its pecuniary equivalent was the

measure of his injury by the default; and,

as it had no value, the plaintiff was award-

ed complete indemnity by the conclusion of

the referee that he was entitled to recover

nominal damages only.

'l‘here was no error in the ruling of the

referee by which evidence of value of the

stock was received. The complaint alleg-

ed that on January 22, 1873. when the plain-

tiff accepted the certiﬁcate before mentioned

of stock in performance of the contract, the

stock of the company was worth and salable

in the market at its full par or face value,

and demanded judgment for that amount and

interest from January 23, 1873. This was

the situation of the complaint when the evi-

dence upon the question of value was given;

In the present case the action is .

and the plaintiff, upon a state of facts em-

braced in an hypothetical question, called up-

on the witnesses to state the value of the

stock in January, 1873. This was the time

when, by the issue tendered in the complaint

and taken by the answer, the value of the

stock wa by the pleadings brought in ques-
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BEEMAN v. BANTA.

(23 N. E. 887, 118 N. Y. 538.)

Court of Appeals of New York, Second Divi-

sion. Feb. 25, 1800.

Appeal from supreme court, general

term, fourth department.

Action by Marcus M. Beeman against

George A. Bantu. There was a verdict and

judgment for plaintiff, which was afﬁrmed

by the general term, and defendant again

appeals.

Rhodes, Coons & Higgins and John H.

Baldwin & Ken-

Parsons, for appellant.

nedy, for respondent.

PARKER,J. The recovery in fhisaction

was for damages claimed to have been sus-

tained because of a breach of an express

warranty on the part of the defendant to
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so construct a freezer for the plaintiff as

that chickens could be kept therein in per-

fect condition. The jury have found the

making ofthe warranty,its brcach.and the

amount of damages resulting therefrom.

The general term have afﬁrmed these ﬁnd-

ings, and. as there is some evidence to sup-

port each proposition, we have butto con-

sider the exceptions taken.

excepted to the charge of thecou rt respect-

ing the measure of damages. Upon the

trial he insisted, and still urges, that the

proper measure of damages is the cost of

so changing the freezer as to obviate the

defect, and make it conform to the war-

ranty. And Milk Pan Co. v. Remington,

109 N. Y. 143, 16 N. E. Rep. 48. is cited in

support of such contention. That decision

was not intended to, nor does it, modify

the rule as recognized and enforced in Pas-

singer v. Thorburn, 34 N. Y. 634; White v.

Miller,71 N. YJ33; Wakcman v. Manufact-

uring Co., 101 N. Y. 205, 4 N. E. Rep. 264;

Reed v. McConnell,101 N.Y. 276,4 N. E.Rep.

718; and kindred cases. In that case the

argument of the court demonstrates-

Firsf, that improper evidence was received ;

and, second, that the ﬁnding of the referee

was without evidence to support it. No

other proposition was decided, and the

(23 !ii. E. 887, 118 N. Y. 538.)
Court of Appeals of New York, Second Dlvl·
11ion. Feb. ~. 1890.
Appeal from supreme court, general
term, fourth department.
Action by Marcus M. Beeman against
George A. Banta. 'l'h!'re was a verdict and
Judgment for plaintiff, whlr.b was affirmed
by the general term, and defendant again
llppeal11.
Rhodf>I!, Coone & HIA"ginM end John H.
Parsons, for apprllunt. Baldwin & Kennedy, for re11pondent.

PARKER,J. The rreoveryln thlRactlon
was fordamagesclelme<l to hove been sustained because of a breach of an exprf'l!s
warranty on the part of the defl•ndnnt to
80 construct a h'l>t•zer for the plulntirr as
that chickens could be kept therein In perfect condition. The Jm·y have Joag<l the
making of the warranty, I t11 breud1. nnrl tho
amount of damages resulting there!rom.
The general term have alfirmerl tlwse tlndings, mul.us there Is some evidence to support each proposition, we have but to consider the exceptions takE'n. The appellant
excepted to the charge of the court roipccting the measure of danrn,2'e.s. Upon the
t1·ial he lnelste<l, a.nd etllL urges, that the
proper rn!'aeure of <lamug{~s h1 the cost of
so changing the freezer a.e to ob date the
defect, and make It couform to the wu.rrantv. And Milk Pan Co. \".Remington,
109 N. Y. U3, 16 N. E. Rep. 48. Is cited In
support of such contention. That decli;lon
was not Intended to, nor does It, modify
theruleae recognized anrl enforced in Paatalnger v. Thorburn, 34 N. Y. !):14; White v.
Miller, 71 N. Y.133; Wakeman v. l\lanufn.ct11rlng Co., 101 N.Y.205,4 N.E.Rep.2G4;
Reed v. McConnell, 101 N. Y. 27(i, 4 N. E. Uep.
718; an<l kln<lre<l cases. In that case the
argumE>nt of the court demoni;trateel''lrst, tha.tlmproperevldencewB.Kreceived;
an<l, second, that the finding of the i·eferee
was without evidence to Rapport It. No
-0ther proposition was decided, and the
discussion le not applicable to the facts hefore ue. The plaintiff was largelytmgaged
In preparing poultry for mnrket. which he
bad either raised or purchased. Before
meeting the defendant. be had attempted
to keep chickens for the earl,v spring market fn a freezer or cooler which he hall constructed forthepurpose. Theattemptwas
uneucceseful, and reenlted In a lose. The
Jury have found, In effect, that the defend!l.nt, with knowle<lge of this Intention of
the plaintiff to at once. muke use of It in
the freezlnl{ and pre8l'rvation or chickens
Ior the May market following, expressly

OF QUALITY.

represrnted nnd warranted that for about
$r.OO he woul!l constn1ct a frepzer which
slwul<l ke<'p thPm. In perfect condition for
Ruch market; that he failed to keep hie
contract in such respect, r~ttltlng In a lose
to the plaintiff of muny hundred pounds of
chickens. Tbecourtcharged the jury that,
tr they should find for the plain tiff, he wue
entitled to recover as one of the elem!'nte
of damage the rlifference between the value
of the refrigerator as constrncterl, and its
l"alueae it would have been if made according to contrnct. The correctness of thll'
IDF!truction docR not aclmltof questioning.
Had the defendant made no \lie of tbe
freezer, such rule wouhl have embraced 11.ll
the dnmagl'R recoverable. But hl' did make
URe of it, und such uRe as was cont<'mplated by the contrnct of the parties. '.rhE'
result was the total lose or hnn,lrede of
pounrlH of chickens. The fact that the defendant well knew the uAe to which the
fl'CE'zer was to be lmme<liately put, and hie
rcprceen ta t.fon and warranty thn t It would
kei~p chickens to perfect con<lltlon, bur<len
him with the damage i;ustaln~l because of
hie failure to make goo<l the warranty.
Upon that 11n<'stio11 the court lnRtructed
the Jury that the plaintiff waR entllle<l to
recover the volue or the chickens, lcEis cost
or getting them to market, incl11dlugf1~iicht
anrl fee11 of commission merchant. 'fhe
que11tlon or vu.Jue wlli! left to the Jury, but
they were permitted to consillcr the evidence tenrllnJr;to show that frozen chickens
were worth 40 cents a pound In the market
during the month or May. Such Instruction we consider authorlze<l. The object
or the freezer was to preserve chickens for
the !\fay market. The expense of construction and trouble. as well ue expense of operu tlon, was Incurred and un<lertuken in
order to secure the enhance<l prices of the
month of l\fuy. It was the extra. proflt
which the plaintiff was contracting to secure, an<l, In eo far us the protlte contemplaterl by the parties can be proven, they
may be conHldered. G.lliJl!LPre\·ented, a11(
well aR loHKl'B sustained, are proper elerifonts of <lamnge. Wakeman \•. 1\fanufacturng Co., 101 N. Y. 205, 4 N. E. Rep. 264. We
have carefully examined the other exceptionli to the charge as made, a.nd to the
refusalR to charge as requested, and also
the exeeptione taken to the admiseibUity
of testimony, hut find no error Justifying
a revE>real. The insistence of the appellant thnt the Judgment be reversed, because against the weight of evidence, may
ha~e been entitled to some conelrleration
by the general term, but it cannot be regarded here. 'l'he ludgment Rhoulcl hP afHrme!l. All concur, except FOLLET'l', C.
J., and VANN, J., not sitting,
Judgment affirmed.

discussion is not applicable to the facts be-

J

fore us. The plaintiff was largely engaged

in preparing poultry for market. which he

had either raised or purchased. Before

meeting the defendant. he had attempted

to keep chickens for the early spring mar-

ket in a freezer or cooler which he had con-

structed for the purpose. The attempt was

unsuccessful, and resulted in a loss. The

jury have found. in effect, that the defend-

ant. with knowledge of this intention of

the plaintiff to at once make use of it in

the freezing and preservation of chickens

for the May market following, expressly

The appellant

represented and warranted that for about

$500 he would construct a freezer which

should keep them. in perfect condition for

such market: that he failed to keep his
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SHAW v. JONES.

PERSONAL PROPERTY.

(25 Pac. 886, 887, 46 Kan. 834.)
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Supreme Court of Kansas. Feb. 7, 1891.

SHATV et al. v. SMITH et al.

Error from district court, Cowley coun·

SHAW v. JONES.

(25 Pac. 886, 887, 45 Kan. 334.)

Supreme Court of Kansas. Feb. 7, 1891.

Error from district court, Cowley coun-

ty; M. G. TuoUP, Judge.

Samuel Dalton and Samuel J. Day. for

plaintiffs in error. S. E. Fink, for defend-

ants in error.

VALEN'l‘INE. J. This was an action

brought before a justice of the peace of

Cowley county on January 31, 1887, by G.

B. Shaw & Co. against Yates Smith and

James W. McClellen, for the recovery of

$12. and interest, upon the following in-

strument in writing, to-wit: “Cambridge,

April 30. 1886. On or before the ﬁrst day
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of October, 1886, we promise to pay to the

order of G. B. Shaw & Co., at their oﬁice

in Cambridge. twelve dollars. for value re-

ceived. with interest after maturity,at the

rate of ten per cent. per annum until paid.

This note is given in part consideration of

the sale to Y. Smith of eight bushels ﬂax-

seed, by said G. B. Shaw & Co.; and, as a

further consideration therefor, we agree to

plant 14 acres with said seed. to cultivate,

harvest. and clean the same in proper and

careful manner. and deliver to G. B. Shaw

& Co. at Cambridge, Kansas. on or before

the 1st day of December. 1886. the whole

crop raised therefrom. at a price men-

tioned below, per bushel of 56 lbs.. for

pure and primeﬁaxseed; ﬂaxseed notpure

and prime to beinspected and graded sub-

ject to the rules of the St. Louis Merchants'

Exchange. And should we sell or trade,

or attempt to offer to sell or trade. such

crop to any other person or persons than

said G. B. Shaw & Co., or order. then the

note hereto attached shall immediately

become due and payable; and the said G.

B. Shaw & Co., or their assigns, are here-

by authorized to enter any buildi,g or

premises without any legal process what-

ever, aud seize and remove such crop

whatsoever (and in whosesoever posses-

sion the same may be found), and to pay

me the balance on demand, after the

amount due upon said note has been de-

ducted, together with all costs and ex-

pense incurred. where seizure is necessary;

price tobe paid perbushel,on basis of pure,

to be 35 cents less than St. Louis market

price on day of delivery. Yarns Smrru.

JAMl-ZR W. .\l(tCl.ELL|-..\'." Afterwards the

case was taken on appeal to the district

court. where the case was tried before the

court and a jury. with the result hereafter

stated. The plaiutiﬁ's‘ bill of particulars

simply set up the foregoing instrument.

and asked judgment thereon for $12. and

interest at the rate of 10 per cent. per an-

nnm from October 1, 18:.‘6. The deiend-

ants' amended answer thereto and cross-

petition alleged that the ﬁaxsced for which

ty; M. G. TnouP, Judge.
SumnPI Dnlton 11nrt Samuel J. Day, for
plnlntlff>1 In error. S. E. Fink, for defend·
nn ttt In error.
VALENTINE, .J. This was an action
hefore a juHtiCl' of the Jlt'ltce o(
Cowley county on Jnnuary :n, 1887, by G.
B. 8huw & Co. ugni111st Yates Hmitb and
Janu~s W. McClcllen, for the recornry ol
$12. and Interest, upon the following In·
1:1trument in writiniz, to-wit: "Cambridge,
A iu·ll 80, l!<SG. On or before the first day
of Octoher, 11:186, we promise to puy to the
order of G. B. Shaw & Co., at their office
in Cambridge, twel\"e dollars, for value received. with intereMt after maturity.at the
rate of ten per cent. per annum until paid.
'!'his note Is given In purt con1:1ideration of
the sale to Y. Smith of eight bushels ftaxeeect, by said G. B. 8haw & Co.; and, a11 a
fur thei· considertt tlon therefor, we nJ,tree to
plant 14 ac1·es .vlth said seed, to cultivate,
barveRt, and clean the 1mme in proper and
cureful ru1rnne1·, and 1leliver to G. B. Shuw
& Co. at Cambridge, Kansus, on or before
the 1st day of Dt>cember, 181:16, the whole
erop raised therefrom, at a price mentioned below, per b1111hel of 56 lbs., for
pure u nrl prime flaxseerl; ftaxRectl not pure
and prime to be Inspected and graded subject to the rulCI!! of the St. Louie Merchants'
Exchange. And f!hm1ld we· sell or trttde,
or attempt to offer to sell or trade. 1mch
crop to any other person or pcrsone than
eu.id G. B. Strnw & Co., or order. tht>n the
note hereto attar.lied 11hall hnmedlately
become due nnd p1tyul>le; and the suill <J.
B. Shaw & Co., or their asslgnf!, 1:1.re hereby uuthori:i:crl to enter any bulldlug or
premises without an'y legal p1·ocl'SS whatever, und seize nnd remoYe Ruch crop
whRtR<w\·er ( nnll in whosesoeYer fJO!ilses"'ion the same may be found), and to pay
me the butmu·e 011 demund, uftcl' the
nmount due upon said note hns been deducted, togl'tht!r with all costs anl) PX·
pense incurred, wht-re Sl'izure is necei-;sary;
prier to be pu.ld pe1· bushel, on bu sis of pure,
to lw 3:1 cPnts l!>Mf:I than St. LoulH market
price on duy of delivery. YATEH SMITH.
JAM1·:R ,V. :\Ji:Cr.Ec.L~.N." Afterwards the
cuse wnH t11ken on nppenl to tlw district
court, whe1·e the l'l.lRe was tried l>l'fore the
court unrl a jury. with the result hereafter
11tatell. The pluiutiffli' bill of particulars
Rimply set 1111 the foregoing instrnmeut,
111111 11skt'd Jurlgment thereou for $12, an1l
intert'st ut the rate of 10 per cent. per nn1111111 from October 1, l8~G. 'l'hc deft>ndunh1' 11mP1HlPd 1111swer thereto and <'rosspl'tition 1tllt'g1•d thn t the flnx1:1eed for w 11 lch
the h111trunwut ~med on WHs gi\•pn was
11urchusf.'d by Smith, for the purpose of
l!O\Ylng it a ud raising a crop; that it wns
wurruut.•d by the plalntlHH to bP good,
hut that It waR worthless; tbnt he
(Smith) so\\·ed It, lrut thnt It did not ger111inutl•; null thu t he lost hi11 time, lutior,
brou~ht

I

and mm of bis ground; and that be was·
uamnp;ed thereby In the sum of $150. And
he asked judgment for that amount, and
costs of suit. '!'he trial resulted In a verdict In favor of the defendants and against
the plaintiffs for the sum of $00, and Judgment was rendered accordingly; and tl.Jeplaintiffs. ae plaintiffs In error, bring tbecuse to this court for review.
It nvpeartt from the evidence that tbefacts of the case arc substantinlly as follows: The plulntlffs, G. B. ~hnw & Co .•
were dealers In ftux11eed at Cambridge, In
said Cowley county. 8mith went to their
place of buttlnesf! 11bout April 20, 1~6. aud
found Joseph Fraley, their agent, In
chargP. Shaw & Co.did not have auyftnxseed on hand, but they were about to order some. Smith told Fruley to order
eight bnshels for him, for the purpose of
i,;owing lt aucl raising a crop. Frnley told
Hmlth that they would furnish the flaxseed upon the conditions substantially as.
set forth In the foregoing instrument.
Aftenvnrds the flaxseed arrived, and :F1·aJey J!:ave notice to 8mith. 8mlth then. on
April 30. 1886, went to Cambridge and receh•ed thesePd,abo11t8 buHhels In amount,
inclosed in sul·ks, from Fraley, and took
it home and sowed it upon ahout 12 ac1·es
of ground. The seed appeared to be good,
und Fraley and Smith believed it to be
good, but In fact it was not J1;ood, and it
did not germinate; and Smith lost all his
time and labor in procuring It, and in preparing the ground fol' sowing it, nnd In
Rowing it, and he J?;ot no crop, nnd lost
tbe use of his ground. And upon these
facts the jury found in favor of the defendants and ai;tnlnElt thP. plaintiffs, and as;iessed the defendants' dumaices at $90, as.
aforesnid. The only questions now in\' Ol\"1.ifl- -In the case are as follows: (1)
Under the con tract between the purtif'I!,
and under the clrc111m1tirnces of the case, .''>
woe there any f!uch lmpllecl wurrunty on
the part of Shaw &Cu., respecting the11uffidency of ti.le flaxseed for the purposes or
11owing it and raising tt crop, that the
plain tiffs muy be defeated In their action
1111 the aforPHBid written lnl!trument? (2)
If so, tht'n under sud1 contract and warranty and circumstances, may the clef1.>ndants, 8mlth and Mc('lellPn, or rather·
Smith, recoverdamageH for 8ruith'e lmises,
necessarily ocL·aslonPd by J"\'neon of the
worthlessnefile of the tlaxseecl? (3) And,
If 110, then whnt Is the measure of Smltb'A
damages'? 'rhe muxim of the <'ommon
lnw, <"JIVellt emptor. i11 the general rule applicable to purchnst'r1:1 and sales of pe!'sonal property so far as the quality of the
property is coucE:rnecl: and, uudPr sueh
maxim, the buyer, in the absence of fruud.
purchas~ at his own risk, unless the 11eller--giveR him an expref!s warranty, or unll'RS,
from the l'ircumHt11ncee of the sale, a warranty may he lmplierl. Jn the present Pni;e
no exp!'e1:111 warranty wn~ gh•en, and the
question then arh;es, W\Lf.i.. th~1:.: 1rny implied warrunty 'l At the time Whl'II tlae
contract for the pnrchnsfl aud 1mle of the
tlnxtiel'd wns entered In to, such Ml'l'll wnR
not present 110 thnt it coultl be inflpecte<l
!Jy the purehaser, and, when It nrrlve<.l
and was clcll\·pred to him, th~ <tefloct lu
thP set>d wns not upparent, and wmq1robably not dlscovernble by any u1·thm~ry ·
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means of inspection, and it was not dis-

covered until after it was sOwed.and when

it iailed to germinate. When the original

contract for the purchase and sale of the

ﬂaxseed was made, the ﬂaxseed was pur-

chased and sold for the particular pur-

pose, known to both the buyer and the

seller, of sowing it in a ﬂeld, and of rais-

ing a crop from it; and therefore this pur-

pose was a part of the contract, and de-

- manded that the seed should be suﬂicient

for such purpose. It, in effect, constitut-

ed awarranty on the part of the seller

that the seed should be the kind of seed

had in contemplation by -both the parties

when the contract was made. The pur-

chaser had to rely upon the seiler's inr-

nishing to him the kind ol seed agreed up-

on, and the seller.in efiect.asreed that the
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seed furnished should be the kind of seed

agreed upon. The entire contract when

made was exeeu tory. and it was to be ex-

ecuted and performed aiterwards, and to

be performed in parts and at different

times. The seller was ﬁrst to furnish the

seed, and he did so in about 10 days after

the contract was made, and of course the

seed was to be a kind of seed that would

grow. The purchaser was afterwards to

sow it and to raise a crop,and afterwards

the purchaser was to sellI and the seller

was to buy. the crop. upon certain terms

and conditions expressed in the contract.

We think there was an implied warranty

on the part of the seller that the seed

A1

should be suﬂicient for the purpose for

which it was bought and sold. Wolcott

v. Mount, 36 N. J. Law, 262, 38 N. J. Law,

496; Van Wyck v. Allen, 69 N. Y.61; White

v. Miller, 7 Hun. 427, 71 N. Y. 118: Whit-

aker v. McCormick, 6 Mo. App. 114. We

also think that the purchaser may re-

cover damages from the seller for all the

losses necessarily sustained by the pur-

chaser, by reason of the worthlessuess of

the ﬂaxseed inrnished by the seller. See

the authorities above cited. and also the

following: Passinger v. Thorburn, 34 N.

Y. 634; Flick v. Wetherbee, 20 Wis. 3913;

Ferris v. Comstock, 33 Conn. 513; Randall

v. Raper, El., Bl. & El. 84. And it is not

claimed that the purchaser in the pres-

ent case recovered for more than the fore-

going losses. The claim is that the pur-

chaser had no rlght to recover at all, and

that the seller had the right to recover on

the instrument sued on. No other ques-

tions are presented. We think no materi-

al error was committed in the case, and.

the judgment ol' the court below will be

aiiirmed. All the justices concurring.

PER CURIAM. It is understood that

the same questions of law and fact are in-

volved in the case of G. B. Shaw & Co. v.

T. L. Jones, irom Cowley district court,

that are involved in the case of Shaw v.

Smith, just decided, and the judgment of

means of Inspection, and It was not dleeoven>d until after It was sowed.and when
tt failed to germinate. When the original
eontract for the purchuee and sale of the
flaxseed was made, the fiax11eecl was pur.chaeed and sold for the partkular purpose, known to both the buyer and the
~C'ller, of sowing It In a tleld, nod of r1tlsing a crop from it; and therefore this p11rpo11e was a part of the cont.rnct, and de. man<1e<1 that. the see•l should be sufficient
for 11ucb purpm1e. It, In erfl'ct, constltut\ 9<1 a wurranty on the part of the seller
that the seed should be the kind or set>cl
had In contt.>mplatlon by both tile parties
when the contract was macle. The pilr-chaser had to rely upon the seller's furnishing to him the kind of ered agreed upon, and the seller, in effect, airreed that the
.seed furnh;ihed 11hould be the kind of seed
agrt.>ed upon. '!'be entire contract when
made wue exccutory. aud it was to be ex«ute<l and performed afterwards, aud to
be performed in 1>arte and at different
times. The seller WRH flrst to furnish the
seed, and he did eo In about lO days ufter
the contract wns made, nl)(l of courHe the
seed WliB to be a kind or seed that would
grow. 'l'he purchaser was afterwords to
sow It and to ral11e a crop, and afterwnrcle
the pul't'haser w1111 to sell, and the seller
was to bny, tlle crop, upon certain terms
.and conditions expret1sed in thfl contract.
We think there wa.e an implied warranty
-00 the part of the seller that the seed
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should be sufficlPnt for the purpose for
\\"hlch It was bon~ht anci sold. Wolcott
,•. Mount, 36 N. J. Law, 262, 38 N. J. Law,
491i; Van Wyck v. Allen, 69 N. 'i.61; White
'"· Miller, 7 Hun, 427, 71 N. Y. 118: Whltake1· v. McCormick, 6 !\Jo. App. 114. We
also think that the purchaser may recover damages from the seller for nil the
losses nect>ssurily sustained hy the purchaser, by reason of the worthles1mess of
the flnxAeerl furnished by the spller. Hee
thf'! authorities above cited, nnd also the
following: Pns1d11p;er v. 'rhorburn, 34 N.
Y. 6:J4; .Flick v. Wet11er1.>ee, ~o Wis. 392;
Ferrie v. Comstock, 33 Conn . iila; Hnndull
v. Rn per, El., Bl. & El. 84. Aud it is not
claimed that the purchaser In the present case recovered for more th on the foregoing lussee. 'l'be clulm Is that the purcho1wr hn<l no right to recover at all, and
thnt the Heller h1id the right to recov-er on
the lm1tru111ent 1med on. No other questions are prt>r1ented. \Ve think no mnterinl error wus committed in the car.ie, and
the judgment of the court below will be
affirmed. All the justices concurring.
PER CURIAM. It fe understood that
the .. nme q neHtl<>nl! of law ftnd feet are lnvol\"ed In the l'ai<e of G.D. Shaw & Co. v.
T. L. Jones, from CowlPy district court,
that are Involved in thecn11e of ~hew v .
Smith, Just dectlled, and the Judgment of
the court below In thl!! caee wlll be affirmed upon the authority of that ease.
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BREACH OF CONTRACTS RESPECTING PERSONAL PROPERTY.

-and the actual

SHAWHAN v. VAN NEST.

(25 onto St. 400.)

Supreme Court of Ohio. December Term. 1874.

Motion for leave to ﬁle a petition in

error.

Action by Peter Van Nestagainst Reasin

W. Nhawhan to recover on a contract by

which he agreed to make for Shawhan a

carriage in accordance with his directions

for $700, and have the same ready for da-

livery at his shop October 1, lsfi. in con-

sideration whereof Shawhan agreed to ac-

cept the carriage at the shop and pay the

agreed price. He alleged the tender of the

carria;i;e October 1st, and the refusal of

Shawhau to accept or pay for it. The ev-

idence established the allcgations of the-

complaint. The court instructed the jury
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that. if they found the issues for the

plaintiff, they should give him a verdict

for the contract price of the carriage, with

interest from the time the money should

have been paid. Shawhan requested the

court to give to the jury the following

special instructions: (1) “If, in this case,

the evidence shows that the defendant or-

dered the plaintiff to make for him a car-

riage, and agreed to take or receive it,

when ﬁnished. at the plaintiff's shop, and

to pay a reasonable price therefor, and

the plaintiff did, in pursuance of such or-

der and agreement, make such carriage, of

the value of seven hundred dollars, and

have the same in readiness for delivery at

his shop. of which the defendant had no-

tice, and the defendant then failed. neg-

lected, and refused to take. receive, or pay

for said ca rriage. though requested so to

do by the plaintiff, these will not author-

ize you to render a verdict for the plain-

tiff for the price or value of the carriage. "

(2) “if the plaintiff has proved the mak-

ing of the carriage for the defendant, and

the refusal of the latter to receive and pay

for it, as alleged in the petition, then he

can only recover for the damages or

losses he has actually sustained by reason

of this refusal of the defendant, which is

the difference between the agreed price

value.“ These instruc-

tions the court refused to give. and Shaw-

hnn excepted. ‘l‘he jury found for Van

Nest, and gave him the contract price of

the carriage, with interest.

W. P. Noble, for plaintiff in error.

Seney. for defendant in error.

G. E.

GILMORE, J. The only question to be

determined in this case is: Did the court

err in refusing to give to the jury the spe-

cial instructions reqnested by the defend-

ant on the trial below? The authorities

cited by counsel for the parties respective-

ly. are not in harmony with each other on

this question. Some of those cited by the

plaintiff in error (defendant below) show

clearly that under the pleadings and prac-

BnEACII OF AGREmIBNT TO TAKE OR BUY GOODS.
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carriage was substantially a fulﬁllment of

the contract on the part of the plaintiff,

and that he was entitled to sustain his

action for the price agreed upon between

the parties. The defendant's counsel re-

quested the court to charge the jury that

the measure of damages was not the

sulky, but only the expense of taking it to

the residence of the defendant, delay, loss

of sale, etc. The judge declined to so

charge,and reiterated the instruction that

the value of the article was the measure of

damages. The jury found for the plain-

tiff, with eighty-three dollars and twenty-

six cents damages, being the contract

price with interest. The charge to the

jury was sustained by the supreme court

of New York.

In Balientine et al. v. Robinson et al.,
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46 Penn. St. 177, an agreement was made

between the plaintiffs and defendants,

whereby the plaintiffs were to provide

materials, and construct for the defend-

ants a six-inch steam-engine, with boiler

and Gifford injector and heater. in consid-

eration whereof the defendants were to

pay plaintiffs ﬁve hundred and thirty-ﬁve

dollars in cash on the completion thereof.

'The plaintiffs complied with and complet-

ed the contract in all respects on their

part, but the defendants refused to pay

according to contract. On the trial, the

plaintiffs proved the contract,and the per-

formance of it on their part, and that the

engine was still in their hands.

The defendants' counsel asked the court

to instructthe jury "that the proper meas-

ure of damages in this case is thedifference

between the price contracted to be paid

for the engine and the market price at the

time the contract was broken." 'll‘he

court declined to charge as requested, and

instructed the jury that the measure of

damages was the contract price of the

engine, with interest. There was a ver-

diet ‘for the plaintiffs for the contract

price. The case was taken to the supreme

court, and the error assigned was the re-

fusal of the court to give the instructions

requested by the defendant.

The supreme court afﬁrmed the judg-

ment in the case below. it will be seen

that these cases are very similar, and pre-

sented the same question, and in the same

manner that the question is presented in

this case. Graham v. Jackson, 14 East,

498, decides the point in the same way.

Mr. Sedgwick,in his work on Damages.

side page 280, in speaking on this subject,

says: "Where a vendee is sued for non-

performance of the contract on his part,

in not paying the contract price. if the

goods have been‘delivered. the measure of

damages is of course the price named in

the agreement; but if their possession has

not been changed,it has been doubted

whether the rule of damages is the price

itself, or only the difference between the
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carrini;:e was subatnnttall.f a fulfillment of to 11how that th<" propc·rty v.-as sold for n
the contract on the part of tht> plulntif!, fair priet•. nut If else \'t•n<lor duel! not puran<l that be w1111 entitlecl to sustain big sne thlr; course, 1rn!l, without reselling the
nctlon for thll price ugreed upon lletween goods, l!Ul'I! the veudee for hb1 h1·eut•h of
the parties. '!'he derentlant's counsr:l re- contruct, the question ari11es which \Ve
queRted th~ court to charge the jury that have nlready stated, whether the n•nd11r
the measure or dunu1gc;,i wa!! not the cun recover cha contract price, 1n· only
sulky, but only the expc11!!e of taking it to the diffo1·ence between that priee and the
the reHidence or the derendnut, deluy, loss value of th!' goods whkh remain In the
of self', etc. The judi:P declined to so vendor'11 hnn1l11; anll the rule appears to
chnrge,nnrt reiterate<) the instruction that he thut the vendo1· can reco\•er the conthe value of the urtll'le wnH the 1111,•111mrt: of tract price Ju full.··
damuge11. Thu jur.\· to11111l ror the plain·
Jn fJu1lly v. Pugh et ol., Wrl~ht, 554, the
tin, With eip:hty-t!Jree <lollllrR and tWl!Uty- a(' ti On WllS" aRSUlllpSit OU 0 written ngr~
AiX rentH tlllmng..s, lwing the run tract ment between the parth•H, for the defendprice with intert-l"t. The charge to the ant11 to take all the Hnlt the plaintiff manjury wa11 HllHtalned by the suprl.'me conrt 11facture1l hl.-'tWel'11 the 2d of .JunP, lSlll,
of New York.
and thu let of Jnnuar:v, 1832, to be dellvIn Ballentine et al. v . Robinson et al., cred at the lan•Jlng In Cincinnati, from
4fi Peon. St. 177, an agreement was made time to time, HR the navil(utiou of the
betwt'l•n the pl11h1tlff8 nud defendant11, Musklni:um and Ohio should 11ermlt, and
wherehy the plnintlffs were to provh.ltJ to pay forty-ttve ci:nts a bni;;hel." ThE>
rnnterlal11, and ronHtrnct for the defen11. plaintiff pro\'Ccl the agretiment, and the
ante a six-inch stettm-Pnglne, with boiler , offt•r to deliver to the dl'fendantR three
und Gifford Injector and heater. In consid-. hun1lred and fifty b>1nels of salt, which
urutlon whereof tho 1lefendants were to the <lefenduntH refu11e1l to receivr.. There
pay plalntiff111i\•e hu111lrt>~l and thirty.five was an Issue In thec'l.11e,as to whether the
dollars In ctu•h on the rompletlon thereof. , contract bud been prevlo111o1ly fulfilletl an<l
· The plaintiffs complle1I with and complet· abandoned by the parties. Tlta court
ed the contract In all respects on their (L1rne, J.) charged the Jury that If the
part, lmt the delen<lnnt~ refueed to pay contract hacl not been .. fulHllPrl or abanac<'ntrllng to contrnct. On the trial, the doned, and the plaintiff tendered the salt
plalutlff;i proved the contrnct, and the per- unde1· the contract, which wt1s refused, he
fonuance of it on their part, anrl that the hud a right to le11ve It for thl' defendants
engine waR etill In their han1111.
and recover the value."
1~he dP.fen<lants' r.onnsel aHkerl the court
'!'he only citse I have ~xamined ln which
to instruct the jury .. tho t the propt-r mPae- the autliorlties on this point are rPvlcwed,
ure of damageH In this casA i11 the<lifferenc11 ill that of Oordon v. ~orrh1, 4!) N. H. 37li.
between the price contracted to be )'alt! The case h1 too lengthy anll compllcuted
for the engine and thP mttrket price at the to att .. mpt to give un ahstro<·t of It here,
time thl.' cnnJ:rnct wtte brokf'n." 'l'hc hnt the point under conshleretlon wa11 incoort declined to charge as requeste1l, and vnlvc•I; and although the leornerl jmlge
instructed the Jury th11 t the meusure of critlrlscH the law us laid down h;1· Mr.
d1unages wa11 the contract price of the ' Hedgwlrk, und even Rhow11 that the auen~lue, with lntereHt. There wua a ver- thorltle11 ho quote11 In sup1wrt of his pmddlct "for !he pl11lntifft1 for the contract tlun do not sustain him, for the reason
price. The case waM tnken to the supreme pointed out, yet he sttys that thf'1"0 Is a
court, aml the error at111igned wat1 the re- distinction between thll t•ase of Bement
fue11l of the court to give the instruct101111 v. Smith, und the ordinary cases of goorls
reqne'!ted hy the tlefondant.
sold trnd delivered-vb;., "the distluctlon
'l'he 11upreme court affirmed th!! Judg. bet ween a contract to Bl.'11 goods then lo
ment lo the case below. It will be Reen t•xlRtence, and nn agreement to fnroisb
that these cases are ver,v simllur, and pre- materials und munuf11cture an artlde In a
sented the same questiun, und In the 11ame particular way uod according to order,
manner that thP queMtlon is presented In which is not yet In existence." He recogthlt1 case. Graham v. Jacki;ion, 14 Eost, nizes llemPnt•srase a111I others of thesume
498, dP.<'ldes the point In the 1111mn way. clns11 a11 exceptions to the g'eneral rule
Mr. Sedgwick, in his work on Dn1nnites, which Is to he npplled In the sale of ordieide paice 280, In spPaklng on this 11ubjP-ct. nury gooclH an() merchnndise which have
soys: .. Where a venclee iH Rued for non- a Hxed market value; nnd In the Hyllabm1
performance of the contract •Ill hl;i part, or the Clllile, the dl8tlnctlon Is kept up and
ln not paying thP t•ontrnct price, if the Htutr.11 dH follr>WH:
J1,oods have been'<klivered, the measure of
"Wheu tl111 vendee refuRc11 to receive and
damages ls of cuurHe tlll' price named In pny for ordinary ~oodtoi, wares. mul merthe agreement; but If their pos1wsi;io11 hnR chunrllse, which he hnH contrnctecl to purnot been chnn11:ed, It hns he<'n <louhtecl chnfie. the meH1111re of tla11111grR whkh the
whether the rult• of 1lanll\11:es Is the price vendor ht entitled to r1•co\·pr b1 not orclllhu~lf, or only the llifferruee between the nurlly the c1111trnd 11rkc for the µ;ooclt<.
contract price ond the value of tlw nrtlcle but the difference hetween the co11tr11ct
at the time fixed for its clellvery. It 11eerns price and the market prke or value of the
to be well settle1I in such cases that the 1:111me good11 at the time when the contract
Vf'ndor cun re11ell them, if he Hee" tit, ond was broken.
charge the ven<lee with the cllfference be"But when an artist prepares a statue
tween tlw contract prlee aud thut realized or picture of a particular per1mn to order,
nt the eale. 'fhongh perhnns more prn: or a mechanic makes n specific article In
dent It is not n1•ce11;inry that the «ale his line to orller, anrl after a particular
should be at a1ll'tion; it Is only requh1ite measure, pattern, or style, or for a partlc'i
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ular use or purpose—when he has fully

performed his part of the contract, and

tendered or offered 0 deliver the article

thus manufactured according to contract,

and the vendee refuses to receive and pay

for the same, he may recover as dama;xes.

in an action against the vendee for breach

of the contract, the full contract price of

the manufactured article. "

As has been said, we are not called upon

now to determine whether the distinction

as drawn in the clauses quoted, is sound

on principleor not: but bethat as it may,

we recognize the law applicable to the

case before us as being correctly stated in

the clause last quoted.

Judge Swan, in his excellent “Trea tise,“

(10th ed. 780), in speaking of the effects of

a tender upon the ri;.:hts of the buyer and

seller, and of the damages in such case.
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says . “The general rule in relation to the

rights of a seller, under a contract of sale,

where he has tendered the property, and

the buyer refuses to receive it, is this: The

seller may leave the property at some se-

cure place, at or near the place where the

tender ought to be and is made. and re-

cover the contract price: or he may keep

it at the buyer's risk, using reasonable dil-

fgence to preserve it. and recover the con-

tract price and expenses of preserving and

keeping it; or he may sell it, and recover

from the buyer the difference between the

contract price and the price at which it

fairly sold." The rule as thus laid down

was ﬁrst published in N36. two years after

the decision in Hadly's Case, above re-

ferred to, which was substantially fol-

lowed by Judge Swan in laying it down.

It does not appear that either the decision

or the rule as laid down has ever been

questioned in Ohio. It will be perceived

that Judge Swan lays down the rule gen-

erally as applicable to all sales of chattels

in the ordinary course of trade, without

intimating any such distinction as that

drawn in Gordon \'. Norris. We sanction

and apply the rule in the determination of

the partfcularrasc before us. When the

plaintiff below had completed and ten-

dered the carriage in strict performance of

the con tract on his part, if the defendant

below had accepted it, as he agreed to do,

there is no question but that he would

have been liable to pay the full contract

price forit, and he can not be permitted

to place the plaintiff in a worse condition

by breaking than by performing the con-

tract accordinp; to its terms on his part.

\\ hen the plaintiff had completed and ten-

dered the carriage in full performance of

the contract on his part, and the defend-

ant refused to accept it, he had the right

to keep it at the defendant's risk, using

reasonable diligence to preserve it. and

recover the contract price, with interest,

as damages for the breach of the contract

by the defendant. Or, at his election, he

could have sold the carriage for what it
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KADISH ct al. v. YOUNG et all

Supreme Court of lllioois.

Nov. 20, 1883.

(108 Ill. 170.)

Appeal from appellate court, First district.
This was nn aetion of assumpslt, by A. N.
Young nnd George Bullen against L. ;r. Ka-dish and Charlt'S Fleischman. Judgment for
plaintiffs for $:.!U,000. Defeml11nts 11ppc11l.
.Affirmed.
·

Nov. 20, 1883.

Appeal from appellate court, First district.

This was an action of assumpsit, by A. N.

Young and George Bnllen against L. J. Ka-

dish and Charles Fleischman. Judgment for

plaintiffs for $20,000. Defendants appeal.

John Woodbrlcli:f' and Mr. Francis Lackner,
for appellant Katli:;h. Hoadley, Johnson &
Colson, for ap1wll:rnt Fll'l11thmnu. '\'lllirun
A. Montgomery, for appcllees.

Afﬁrmed. '

John Woodbrldge and Mr. Francis Lackner,

for appellant Kn1llsll. Hoadley, Johnson &

(Jolson, for appellant Fieischman. “'illiam

A. Montgomery, for appellees.

Supreme Court of Illinois.

SCHOLFIELD, J. This was assumpsit,

by appellees, against appellants. to recover

damages sustained by the breach of an al-

leged contract, whereby, on the 15th of De-

cember, 1880, appellees sold to appellants 100,-
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000 bushels of No. 2 barley, at one dollar and

twenty cents per bushel, to be delivered to ap-

pellants, and paid for by them, at such time

during the month of January, 1881, as appel-

lees should elect. Appellees tendered to ap-

pellants warehouse receipts for 100,000 bush-

els of No. 2 baricy on the 12th of January,

1881, but appellants refused to receive the

receipts and pay for the barley. Within a

reasonable time thereafter appellees sold the

barley upon the market, and having credited

appellants with the proceeds thereof, they

brought this suit, and on the trial in the cir-

cuit court they recovered the difference be-

tween the contract price and the value of the

barley in the market on the day it was to

Ihave been delivered by the terms of the con-

tract. Upon the trial. appellants denied the

aklng of the alleged contract, that they were

partners. or that any purchase of the barley

was made for their joint account; and they

also contended, if a contract was shown, then

that on the next day after it was made they

gave notice to appellees that they did not

consider themselves bound by the contract,

and they would not comply with its terms,

and evidence was given tending to sustain

this contention.

00000000

The questions of law to which our attention

has been directed by the arguments of coun-

sel, arise upon the rulings of the circuit judge

in giving and refusing instructions. He thus

ruled, among other things, that appellants,

by giving notice to appellees on the next day

after the making of the contract that they

would not receive the barley and comply with

the terms of the contract, did not create a

breach of such contract which appellees were

SCHOLFIELD, J. 'fhls wns assumpslt,
by appellees, against appellants. to recover
damages sm!talned by the breach of an alleged contrai:t, wlwreby, on the Uith of De-cember, 1880, appellees sold to appellants 100,000 bushels of No. 2 barley, at one dollar and
twenty cents per bushel, to be delivered to appellants, and pal1l for by them, nt such time
<luring the month of January, 1881, ns appellees should eleet. ApPt'llces tl•Hdt>n•d to appellants warehouse recdpts for 100,000 bush-els of No. 2 barl<'Y on the 12th of January,
1881, but appella~ts refused to reet>lve the
receipts and pay !or the barley. Within a
reasonable time thereafter appellees sold the
barley upon the market, and having credited
appellants with the proceeds thereof, they
brought this suit, and on the trlot In the circult court they recovered the difference between the contract price and the value of the
barley in the market on the day it was to
have been delivered by the terms of the conlt;act. UPon the trial. appellants denied the
k"iaklng of the alleged contract, that they were
partners, or that any purchase of the barley
was mode for their joint account; and they
.also contendt>d, If a contract was shown, then
that on the next day arter It was made they
gave notice to nppelfoes that they did not
~onslder themselves bound by the contract,
and they would not comply with Its tenns,
.and evidence WILi given tending to sustain
.this contention.

1
1

•

•

•

•

•

bound to regard, or impose upon them the

'legal obligation to resell the barley on the

market, or make a- forward contract for the

purchase of other barley of like amount and

time of delivery, within a reasonable time

1 Portion of opinion omitted.

thereafter, and credit appellants with the

amount of such sale, or give them the beneﬁt

of such forward contract, but that appellees

had the legal right, notwithstanding such no-

•

•

•

The questions of law to which our attention
bas been directed by the arguments of counsel, arise upon the rulings of the circuit judge
in giving and refusing Instructions. He thus
ruled, among other things, that appellants,
by giving notice to np11ellees on the next day
.after the making of the contract thnt they
would not receive the barley and comply with
the terms of the contract, did not create a
breach of such contract which appellees Wl're
bound to regard, or Impose upon them the
, legal obligation to resell the barley on the
market, or make a · forwarrl contract for the
purchase of other barlt>y of like amount and
time of delivery, within a reasonable time
1

Portion of opinion omitted.
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thereafter, and credit appellants with the
amount of such sale, or give them the benefit
of such forward contract, but that appellees
hod the legal right, notwithstanding such notice, to wait until the day for the delivery of
the barley by the terms of the coutract,
and then, upon appellants' failure to receive
and pay tor It on its being tendered, to respll
It on the market, and recover from appellants
the diffen•uce between the contract price of
the barley and Its mnrket value on the dny
it was to have been delivered.
That In ordinary casl's of contract of snle
of pCl'sonul property for future delivery, and
failure to i·eceive and pay for It at the stipulatl'd timl', the lll(•asure of damages Is the
dilfNence between the contract price and the
market or current value of the propl'rty at
the time and pince of delivery, has ix~en settled by previous decisions of this court (see
Mc!l\au~ht v. Dodson, 49 Ill. 446; Larrabee
v. BaclgPr, 4!i Jll. 440, and Saladin v. l\lltchell, Id. 79), and is not contPsted by appellant's
counsel. But their contention Is, that In case
of such contract of sale for future delivery,
where, before the time of delivery, the buyer
gives the seller notice that he wUl not rel>eive
the property and comply with the terms of
the contract, thli;, whether the seller assents
thereto or not, c1·eates a breach of the contract, or, at all events, Imposes the legal
duty on the seller to thereafter toke such
steps with reference to the subject of the contract, as, by at once reselling the property
on the market on account of the buyer, or
making a forward contract for the purchase
of other property of like amount and time of
delivery, shall most effectually mitigate the
damages to be paid by the buyer In consequence of the breach, without Imposing loss
upon the seller. It the buyer may thus create
a breach of the contract without the consent
ot the seller, we doubt not the duty to sell,
(where the property Is In the J:!ossesslon of the
seller at the time,) at least within a reason
able time after such breach, will result as a
necessary consequence of the breach. When
the breach occurs by a failure to accept and
pay for property tendered pursuant to the
terms of a contract at the day specified for Its
delivery, this Is doubtless the duty of the
seller, and no reason Is now perceived why It
should not equally result from any breach of
the contract upon which the seller ls legally
bound to net.
But the well settled doctrine of the English
courts Is. that a buyer can not thus create a
brea(·h of contract upon which the seller ls
bound to net. In Leigh v. Paterson, 8 '£aunt.
540, Phlllpotts v. Evans, l'i Mees. & W. 475,
Ripley v. llcClure, 4 Exch. 35!), and, It may
be, also in other early cases, It was held a
party to a contract to be performed In the
future can not, by merely giving notice to
the opposite party that he wlll not perform
bis part of the contract, cr('ate a breach of
the contract. Subsequently, however, In
Cort v. Railway Co., 6 Eng. Law & Eq. 230,
1
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and more explicitly in Hochster v. De Latour,

20 Eng. Law & Eq. 157, the doctrine was an-

nounced as not in conﬂict with previous de-

cisions, that the party to whom notice is giv-

en in such cases will be justiﬁed in acting

upon the notice, provided it is not withdrawn

before he acts. Lord Campbell, C. J., in de-

livering his opinion in the latter case, and

speaking for the court, used this language:

"The man who wrongfully renounces a con-

tract into which he has deliberately entered,

can not justly complain if he is immediately

sued for a compensation in damages by the

man whom he has injured, and it seems rea-

sonable to allow an option to the injured

party either to sue immediately or to wait till

the time when the act was to be done, still

holding it as prospectively binding for the

exercise of this option, which may be adran.‘
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tageous to the innocent party, and can not be

prejudicial to the wrong-doer."

The leading text-writers who treat of this

question follow the authority of these cases,

and the rule they announce is thus expressed

in Sedg. Meas. Dam. (6th Ed.) 340, ‘284:

“An effort has been made in many cases by

the purchaser to relieve himself from the

contract of sale before the time ﬁxed for per-

formance by giving notice that he would not

be ready to complete the agreement, and in

these cases it has been insisted that the dam-

ages should be estimated as at the time of

giving notice; but the English courts have

justly denied the right of either party to re-

scind the agreement, and have adhered to the

day of the breach as the period for estimat-

ing damages." To like effect, see Chit. Cont.

(11th Am. Ed.) 1079; 2 Pars. Cont. (6th Ed.)

676; Ben]. Sales (1st Ed.) 559; Id. (4th Am.

Ed.) 973; Add. Cont. "952; Wood, Mayne,

Dam. 250, "150.

The question came before this court in Fox

v. Kitton, 19 I11. 519, whether, when a party

agrees to do an act at a future day, and be-

fore the day arrives he declares he will not

keep his contract or do the act, the other

party may act on such declaration, and bring

an action before the day arrives; and it was

held, on the authority of Phillpotts v. Evans,

and Hochster v. De Latour, supra. that he

may; and in that case it is said, in the opin-

ion of the court, that there is no conﬂict in

the cases referred to by counsel in the dis-

cussion thereof, and to prove it. this language

from the opinion of Parke, Baron. in Phili-

potts v. Evans, is quoted: “The notice (that

he will not receive the wheat) amounts to

nothing until the time when the buyer ought

to receive the goods. unless the seller acts on

it in the meantime, and resrimls the con-

tract." And it is then added: “This is in

strict accordance with the principles recog-

nized in the leading case relied on by the

piaintiff.—Hm-hster v. De Latour."

In \Icl'herson v. Waiker, 40 Ill. 371, the

question before the court was. whether it was

error to say in an instruction that where there

is a contract for the sale of property to be

BUE.\.Cll OF AGHEKMEXT TO T ..H~E OR BUY GOODS.
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before us. In the other case, Trustees v.

Shaffer, the time for the performance of the

contract had arrived. There was no ques-

tion in that respect. If the plaintiff was im-

properly discharged, there was a clear breach

of the contract. There was no controversy

in regard to the question whether one party

to a contract to be performed in the future,

can, by a mere notice in advance of the time

of performance that he does not intend to

perform. create a breach of the contract; nor

was there any question as to what acts a

party may be required to do in advance of a

breach of contract to mitigate the damages

of the adverse party, because of notice that

there would be a breach by him. After

breach of a contract, as before herein inti-

mated, we do not, at present. question that it

is the duty of the party entitled to damages

to do what he reasonably may, without prej-
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udice to his rights. to lighten the burden fall-

ing on his adrersary.

There is nothing in the more recent English

cases, as we understand them, repugnant to

those to which we have referred upon this

question.

In Frost v. Knight, L. R. 7 EX('il. 111, 1

Moak, Eng. R. 218, decided in the exchequer

chamber in February, 1972. the suit was for

breach of a marriage contract, whereby the

defendant had promised to marry the plain-

tiff upon the death of his father, but the

father still living. the defendant had an-

nounced his intention of not fulﬁlling his

promise on his father's death, and broke off

the engagement. Cockburn, C. J., in deliv-

ering the opinion of the court, thus states

the law, after referring to the previous deci-

sions: “The promisce. if he pleases, may

treat the notice of intention [i. e., not to per-

form the contract] as inoperative, and await

the time when the contract is to be executed,

and then hold the other party responsible for

ail the consequences of non-performance; but

in that case he keeps the contract alive for

the beneﬁt of the other party as well as his

own. He remains subject to all his own ob-

ligations and liabilities under it, and enables

the other party not only to complete the con-

tract, if so advised, notwithstanding his pre-

vious repudiation of it, but also to take ad-

vantage of any supervening circumstances

which would justify him in declining to com-

plete it. On the other hand, the promisce

may, if he thinks proper,trcat the repudiation

of the other party as a wrongful putting an

end to the contract. and may at once bring

his action as on a breach of it. and in such

action he will be entitled to such damages

as would have arisen from the non-perform-

ance of the contract at the proper time, sub-

ject, however, to abatement in respect of any

circumstance which may have afforded him

the means of mitigating his loss." This was

followed, and its doctrine reiterated, in

Brown v. Muller. L. R. 7 Exch. 319, 3 Monk,

Eng. R. 429, decided in the court of excheqner,

in June, 1872, and itoper v. Johnson, L. R. 8

C. P. 167, 4 Moak, Eng. R. 397, decided in

before us. In the other case, Trnstees v.
Shatter, the time tor the performance of the
contract had an-lved. There wns no question In that respect. It the plaintiff was Improperly discharged. tht•re was a clear breach
ot the contract. There was no controversy
In regard to the question whetl1er one party
to a contract to be performed In the future,
can, by a mere 110ti<:e In advance or the time
of performance that he cloes not Intend to
perform. crente a breach of the contract; nor
was thL•re auy question as to what nets a
party may be r!'quirl'd to do In ad'f"nuce of a
breach of contract to mitigate the damages
of the iulw•rs!' party, hPeaUl<<' or notice that
there would be a breach hy him. After
breach of a eontruet, as bPfore herein lntlmatl•cl, we do not, at prp,:1•11t. q11Pstion that it
Is the duty of the p:ll'ty cutitletl to damages
to do what ht> rPa~onnhl~· mny, without prejudir·l' to his right,:. to Jightl'n the burden !alllu:r on his alln•rsnry.
There Is nothing in the more rP,·ent Englisll
cnsrs. ns we unrlerstnnd them. r!'pugnant to
tbose to which we hnve refen·ed upon tllls
question.
In I~rost v. l{nl~ht. L. R. 7 K~l"l1. 111. 1
Moak, Eng. R. 218, deehlt'll In the exd1Pl!Uer
ch:unhPr In Fl'hruary. 1~7:!. tlw snit was for
breael1 o! a marriage contraet, whereby the
defendant had promisl'd to marry the plnintltf upon the denth of his fntlwr. but the
f:ither stlll living. the defl'nrlnnt hnd announced bis lntt'ntlon of not tulftlllng his
promise on bis father"s death. and liroke off
the en1:rngement. Cockburn. C..J .. In dell'f"erlng the opinion of the court, thus st:ites
the Jaw, after referring to the previous decll!lons: "Thi' promise!'. It ht' pleast'S, may
treat the notice of Intention [I. e., not to perform the eontract] ns lnoperntlve, and await
the time when th!' contract I!! to be ex<>entl'd,
and thrn hold the other pnrty rrsvonslhle for
all the consequences o! non-11erformanee; but
In that case he keeps the contract alive for
the benefit of the other party as well as his
own. Ile rem a In~ snhject to nil his own ohJl~atlons nml liah!litit';; u11der It, and ennbles
the otlll'r part>· not ouly to complet<> the contrart, if so 111h·ls<'1I. notwit1Jsta111llng his previous repudiation of It. hut also to tnke nd'f"nntnge of any suprrvenlng c·h·r·mnstanees
which woulrl justify him in cleclinlng to com)llt•te It. On the other hnnd, the promlsee
111:1y. If he thinks proper, trl.'at the r1•1m11iatlon
of the oth!.'r pnrty as a wrongful 1mttlng nn
end to the contraet. nud mar nt om·«' hringhls adion as on n. brl.'a('h of It. anti In such
action he will he entitlrd to such damag-es
as would llave arisen from the non-performance of the contrn..t nt the proper tlnw, subject, however, to nhatement In re ..;JH•d of a11y
clrcumstnnce whleh mny have a ffonlt•d him
the means of mitigating bis loss." This was
followed, and Its doctrine reitf'l·ated, In
nrown v. Muller. L. R. 7 Exd1. :no. 3 Moak,
En;:. R. 429, del'ldl.'d In the court of exchequel'.
in June, 1~72, and Hoper v. John~un, L. It 8

C. P. 167, 4 Moak, Eng. R. 397, decided in
the common pleas In February, 1873.
Connsl'I for appellants refer to the fact that
Renting, J., In Roper Y. Johnson, says: "If
then' llflll heen any fall In the market, or any
otlwr cireumstances calculnted to tlimiui~h
the loss, It would be for defendant to show
lt."-and then cites with apprm·aJ from the
OJ•lnlon or Cockburn. c. J., In Frost Y. Knight,
snprn, to the eff<>ct that "the clnma~PS are
suhje<'t to abatement in rer,;pt>et of any cireumstarll'es whicll would entitle !Jim to a
mlthrntion," etc., and ln!"ist they recognize
the duty, here, of appPltees, upon recei\·ing
notk<', etc., to ha'f"e solrl 1·pon the market or
have entered Into another contract for January dell'f"ery, etc. It Is enough to obsL•rve
In nnswer to this, that In huth Frost v.
l~nl;:ht ancl Hoper 'I" ••Johnson. suprn, the notice that dl'fendant would not comply with
the contrnl.'t wns nccPptl'•I and ncted upon
by the plaintiff as a breach of the contract;
and so what was said In res)lect of the duty
or the plaintiff to mitigate damnges wns said
with rl'ference to a ease wherein be recognlZC'll the contrnct ns havit1g heen brokrn lly
the notice of the a<lvPrsc pa1·ty, and with
rPfPn•nee to what was to be done hy him
upon nn<I nfter the reeog11ltlon of that hre:l<'h,
and hence can have no nr.pllcntion here. If
a party ls not com)lellerl to accept the dcclnr:ttlons of the other pnrty ton <·ontract that he
will not perfo1·m It, as a breach, It must
logically follow that he 111 unclrr no ohllgatlon
to regn.1·d that dccla1·ntlon for any purpose,
tor, as we have sc<'n. the tht>ory In such case,
as laid down by Coekhurn. C. J., In Frost \".
Knight. supra, Is: "lit> kee1:s the contract
nli'f"c for the bl.'nefit or thl' othPr party as
well as his own. lie remnlnR suhject to nil
his own ohllgntions and llahilltles under It,
and ennhles the other 1111rty not only to complete the contract, If so ntlvlsed, notwlthst:rntllng his preYlous repudiation of It, hut
nlso to take n!lvnntngr of an:r supervening
clrcumstnnee whil"h 1\"oultl justify him in declining to complete it."
Nothing would seem to be plnlnPr than that
wlllle the contrnct Is still subsisting and unhrok<>n, the parties can only he compPlled to
do that whlc-h its terms require. 'l'hls eontrnet Imposed no duty upon nppellees to
make other contracts for Janunry deli'f"ery,
or to sell barley in DecPmber, to protect opJl<'ll:111t;i frbm lo!'<s. It did not en•n enntf'111plate that 11pppllf'f'S should have the barll·~·
n~ady for delivery untll such time in .T:inuary ns th!.'~' should elect. Ir 11p1wll1•ps h:ul
then the barley on hand, nnd had nctP!I upon
ll)JlJl'ilants' notic-f', nnct accepted nnd tn•ated
tlw eoutr:ict ns then hrokPn. it wonlrl. 1lonhtJr,-s, tlwn have b(•en tlwil- duty to han• r<'soltl
tlw harJ,·y upon the mnrket, prPl·isPIJ· as they
did in .Tanuary, and n:ive given appellnnts
credit for the proceeds of the sale: hut It is
obviously absurd to assume thnt It rould
ha'f"e lw<>n appellecs' !lnty to ha\·p sold barley
In Ht•eL•mher to other parties wllich it was
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their duty to deliver to appellants, and which

appellants had a legal right to accept in Jan-

uary.

We have been referred to Dillon v. Ander-

son, 43 N. Y. 232, Danforth v. Walker, 37

Vt. 240, and same case again in 40 Vt. 357,

and Collins v. Delaporte, 115 Mass. 159, as

recognizing the right of either party to a con-

tract to create a breach of it obligatory upon

the other party, by giving notice, in advance

of the time for the commencement of the per-

formance of the contract, that he will not

comply with its terms. An examination of

the cases will disclose that they do not go so

far, but that they are entirely in harmony

with what we have heretofore indicated is

-our opinion in respect of the law applicable

to the present question.

In Dillon v. Anderson, the action was for a
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breach of contract for the construction of a

pair of boilers for a steamboat. After work

had been commenced under the contract, and

a certain amount of material had been pur-

chased therefor by the plaintiff, notice was

given by the defendant to stop work, that the

contract was rescinded by the defendant, and

that he would make the plaintiff whole for

any loss he might suffer. The court held

that it was the duty of the plaintiff, as soon

as he received the notice, to have so acted as

to save the defendant from further damage,

so far as it was in his power.‘

In Danforth v. Walker, 37 and 40 Vt., the

-defendant made a contract with the plain-

tiffs to purchase of them ﬁve car loads of

potatoes, being ﬁfteen hundred bushels, to be

delivered at a designated place as soon as the

defendant should call for them, and as soon

. as he could get them away, some time dur-

ing the winter. Soon after the ﬁrst car load

was taken, potatoes fell in the market, and

the defendant therenpon wrote the plaintiffs

not to purchase any more potatoes until they

should hear from him. The court held this

created a breach of the contract, and that

plaintiffs were not authorized to purchase

-any more potatoes on account of the defend-

ant after they received the notice. The court,

in the case in 37 Vt., on page 244, use this

language: “While a contract is executory a

party has the power to stop performance on

the other side by an explicit direction to that

effect, by subjecting himself to such dam-

ages as will compensate the other party for

being stopped in the performance on his part

at that point or stage in the execution of the

contract. The party thus forbidden can not

afterwards go on, and thereby increase the

damages, and then recover such increased

damages of the other party." And this same

rule, upox?t‘he authority of these cases, is

laid down in 2 Suth. Dam. 361.

The points in issue in Collins v. Deiaporte,

are not pertinent to the present question, but

in the opinion the court quotes the rule as

above laid down, upon the authority of Dan-

forth v. Walker, and other cases.

It will be observed that in each of these
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HOSMER et nl. v. WILSON.

(7 Mich. 294.)

Supreme Court of Michigan. Oct. 17, 1859.

Assumpsit by John B. Wilson against,

Rufus Hosmer and another “for work and ;

labour done, and services rendered, and.

materials furnished, by plaintiff and his

servants for defendants, all at request of

said defendants. " Judgment for plaintiff,

and defendants bring error. Reversed.

It appeared that one of defendants had

called at plaintiff's foundry, and there

signed a witten order for an engine, to be

paid for when taken out of the shop, and

that plaintiff's clerk accepted the order;.

that plaintiff then proceeded to make such

engine, and only stopped when he received

a letter from defendants countermanding

the order.
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Jerome & Swift_for plaintiffs in error.

Towle, Hunt & l\'ewberry, for defendant.

in error.

(IHRISTIANCY, J. Whether the writ-

ten memorandnm signed by the defend-

ants helow, when taken in connection

with the whole transaction between the

parties, was understood by all of them as

a contract, might have been a fair ques-

tion of fact for thejnry. lint admitting

the contract to have been proved in all re-

spects as claimed by the plaintiff,and that

defendants below wrongfully counter-I

manded the order for the engine. after the

plaintiff had, in good faith, made most of

the castings, and done a large part of the

work; the ﬁrst question which arises is,

whether the plaintiff was entitled tore-

cover upon the common counts for work

and labor, as upon a quantum meruit?

As to the materials it is admitted he could

not, though contained in the same count;

as they still belonged to plaintiff, and

were never delivered to defendants.

in the case of a contract for a certain

amount of labor, or for work fora speciﬁed

period—when the labor is to be performed

on the materials or property, orin carrying

on the business. of the defendant, or when

the defendant has otherwise accepted or1

appropriated the labor performed, if the de-

iendant prevent the plaintiff from per-

forming the whole, or wrongfully dis-

charge him from his employment,or order

him to stop the work, or refuse to pay

as he has agreed (when payments become

due in the progress of the work), or disa-

ble himself from performing, or unquali-

ﬁcdly refuse to perform his part of the

contract, the plaintiff may, without fur-

ther performance, elect to sue upon the

contract and recover damages for the

breach, or treat the contract as at an

end, and sue in general assumpsit for the

work and labor actually performed: Hall

v. Ruplcy. i0 Barr, :.'Ill; Moulton v.'ll‘rask,

9 Metc., 579; llerhy v. Johrson, 2i \'t., 2i;

(‘anada v. Canada. 6 (‘nsh., I5; lirnper v.

Randolph, 4 Harrington, 454; Webster v.

WILSO~.

2G!J

whether It con be 110 apportioned or not,
he moy nnder the queutnrn merult recover
whHt It h1 reasonahl.Y worth. Hut lo iill
Sll<'h \"oses, the deffon1lnnt, hn\' ln!? appropriated nnd recC'h'Pd the heneHt of the
Asirnmpslt by John B. Wll8oo ogalni;t, lobor (or, what is Pqulvelent, b1n·lng InRufus Hosmer and another "for work nn'1 : dUt~ed the plelntlff to exptmd his lutiur for
labour done, ff.lid servleei! rendered, ODlJ him, anr!, if properly per!orme1l accordlug
materials furnh1he1l, hy plaintiff t1n<I his to nl11 desire, the defendant being esto11pe1t
servant11 for defenclnnts, all at request of to deny tlrn henPHt), a clut.v 18 impuHe1.t
sal<l de!..ndants." Juil~mi>nt for plulntlff, n11on the defendant to poy fur the lahur
and defendonts bring error. Rever11e•I.
thus pPrformed. This duty the law enIt appeare1I that, 01111 of defendants hail forces under the fiction of on ln1plit>d conenlled ot plaintiffs foundry, 11nd tht're truct, A"rowlng out of the reception or op11lir;-ne1l a wltteu order fur an enu;lne, ~u l>e, pr •• prlatlon of the plnlntlH'& labor.
pal<l r111· whe~ taken out or the HhO)J, and
It 1!1 therefore e\'ldent, lilt, thot In all
that plaintiffs clerk nccPpte<I the orfler;, the ct1 11e11 8 uppoeed on Implied <·ontroct
tht1t plt1ln1Irr thl'n flroccpded to make f!llCh ! would hove arlHt:n.~ud the l'lolntlff might
eosclne, au!l only Hto1>ped when he received 1have recovered u11on a qu11n1um nt!'rnlt, I!
a letter from defendouts cuuntermau<Jlng ·no s 11eelal contract hail evPr bt>en ma1le;
the ordt'r.
[' 2d, that In the like <'lllll'H (where thP vnluo
.lerome & Hwlft, for plalntlffe In error. of the work dune coul<I not, al! It probably
Towle, Hunt. & !'/ewbPrry, for defendant , c1mlcl not In the ca11e hefore us, he npporin error.
I tione<I hy tho cuntrnct 11l'lce) thP vahw or
·
, fit Ir price of t be work dune, would necesCH HISTl ANCY, J. Whether tltl' writ- ' 1mrily ronHtltute the true mt>asure of domtPn memor111Hlu111 Hl11:nel1 by the defen1l- ngt•s. And In all such cn11es, R8 first su11a11t11 helow, when token In connection poHe<l, !'ither the 1•011truct 11r1t•e, or the
with the wnole tran11aetlo11 hetwet>n tnc re118011nhleworth of the labor dorw, would
parties, wa11 understood by nil or them ns mea11ure the d1un11gee.
ft contrart, mlJ,\'h.t hnve het'n u !nlr QUt'I!·
Slmll11r con11lderati111111 And Ilk., rult'11
tlon of fP.ct for the Jury. But odmlttlng would, doubtleHI!, equally apply to contbe coo tract to have been pro\·e1I In Hll re. traell! !or furnh1blng mRterhtlK, and !or the
MJ1ects e11 clahnPd by the plulutlff, sud that snle an1l dt>llvery uf perPonal projJerty,
l1P.fen1lnntH below wrongfully eounter- when, nfl<!r 11art or the mnterlflll! or pro11
maolled the order for the engine, ofter the erty has been 1't'1°elved and flfJl'ropriale<I
11lalntlff had, In 11:00<1 faith, made mo8t of by, or .-eHted In thP defend1rnt, he hus 11rPthe C"RRtlnJLH, and done a large pnrt of the vented tht> plaintiff from performinJ,\', or
work; tht. Hl'llt queRtlon which nrlees 111, authorizing him to trP11t the contract us
whethPr tilt> plolntttt wa11 entitled to re- nt nn en1I, on any or the grouull11 above
cover upon the commou countR for work mentioned.
and labor, 11& upon a quantum merult?
But the coHe liclure us stHnds upon
A11 to the materials it 11'1 allmltled he could very dtrferent izrounds.
Here the connot, though contat11ell ln the 11amecount; tract, as l'lulmcd to have Leen prove!l.
as they still lJelonged to plAlntlff, and wn11 In no Just sen11e a contract for work
wer~ neVt'r delivered tu <left>nflsntM.
onll lolwr, nor eou]I) the pl11lntiff, while
In the case of a contraet for a certain flt work upon the engine, he 11roperly said
amount of l1tt1or, or for work fortt Mperltil-11 to he engaged In the hu11tnekH of the 1leperl111i-when the l11hor Is to be performPd fendonts. It woH suhsteutiolly a contruc•t
on themuterl11!;1 orproperty,orlnl·arr.rlug for the snle of 811 en11.tm•, lo he m11d1• unit
no the husillt'SH, uf tile deft'nllnnt, or when furnhlhe<I hy th~ plaintiff, to thl' <Jpfpn1lthe clefendunt hflll othl.'rwlse accepted or 11nh1, from thl'I shop, and, of conrHe, fru111
approprlah'<I till' ]fthorper·formell, II the<le- the mntPrlals nf the rlslntlff. 'J'he defendlendant 11revent the plalrittrf from per· ants had no lntne11t In the muteriulH, uor
formin~ the whol<', or wrongfully <1111. uny concPrn with the amount uf tlwlahor.
chorge him from hiH employment.or order Th(•y were to pay a certain price for the
him to stof1 the work, or relu11e to pay engine when completed. En11.ine11, it 111
011 he has 11i:,rre1>1I (when po,v111111ts li<•come true. are not co1111tructe<1 without lnhor;
due In the prof.!:rPMS u! the work), or 1llsa- tlJP lul:ur, therpfore, cm1HtltutPH pnrt CJf
Ille hllllH<'lf from p<'rformlng, or unqunll· thl' vnhrt' or the engine. But thlH would
ficdly refuHe to pnform hid 11art of the : hnve hePn e1rnully true lf thP. cuntrnc·t in
contract, thP plointi!f llJRJ, without fnr- ' thlHCllHC h111I h<'l'D for an eni:lne nlreod,v
t11cr 1'l'l'f<1r111am·e, eJp1•t to RUt' upon th<' conoplt•tecl.
contrw·t 1111.1 reco~er d11ruuge11 for tht' • 1'he luhor of the plaintiff wne upon hiR
hre11ch, or treat the t:Olltl'lll'l nH at 1111 '.11\Vll 111n1Pri11l"', to iu1·re1tHt' tl11•ir vnluP. for
end, and l!llt' in general llHMUlllJIMlt ~or the 1tl1e1rnr1.m•e of t'fft•cilng h Hlllt' t11 dd.,11dwork ond l11hor1tctuE1lly 1•nfurmt'd: llall 111ntH whl•n tomplrtf'<I. No tit Ir in 1111y
v. Rnph•y. JO l.I o rr, :!:ll ; Moulton ,., Troi,;k, part of thP n.a teria IR w1111 to vet<t in dt•9 l\letc .. f179; Jlc-rhy v. ,loh1~11011, :!1 \'t . , :!I; I frndnnts 1111 the \~holt' Hhould he tomC'anmlR v. C1111111la. 6 ('111111 .• 15; llrnper v. , pleted hJ plnlntiff.and clP1ivere1l to fiefendHun1lol11h, 4 Harrlni:,rton, 4ii.J; \\eh11h'l' v. : 1111tH. 'l'hl• pli1intlff mi~ht hove f'iold uuy
Eufielcl. 5 Gilm .• 2!1~.
of the m1tterlolH, art..r the work wn.i 1wrAnd In snchcuse11 he nin~·.It woul1l MePm, formed, or the wholP Puglnc Whf'n comun1ler the comnaon lnrlebltatns l'Ollllt, re- plete<l, ut any time lJPforn delivl'ry tu, or
co\•er the contract prlc•'. where the caHe 111 al'CPptonce by dt'fend1t11tr<.
eueh that the lah'lr dorw cnn be 1ul'flHllred
\Vht>ther, thf'rPfore, thl' lnhor nrtunlly
or apportiooel1 by the contract rate; or performed 110 tbeise materlulK, when the
(7 'M' h "'-!)
• •c · :;" ·
Supreme Court of Michigan. Oct. 17, 1859.
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defendants refused to go on with the con-

tract, or prevented the further perform-

ance, had enhanced or diminished the

value of the materials. and how much,

would be a necessary question of fact, in

arriving at an_y proper measure of dam-

ages. The value of the work and labor

does not, therefore, in such a case. consti-

tute the proper criterion or measure of

) damages. If the value of the materials

has been enhanced by the labor. the plain-

tiff,still owning the materials, has already

received compensation to the extent of

the increased value; and to give him dam-

ages to the full value of the labor, would

give him more than a compensation. if

the value of the materials has been dimin-

ished, the value of the labor would not

make the comp..'nsation adequate to the
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loss. it would be only in the single case

where the materials have neither been in-

creased nor diminished by the labor, that

the value of the labor would measure the

damages. Such a case could seldom oc-

cur, and whether it could or not, it must

always bea question of fact in the case,

whether the value of the materials does

remain the same, or whether it has been

increased, or diminished, and to what ex-

tent.

Again, as the defendants never received

the engine, nor any of the materials, the

title and possession still remained in the

plaintiff, and the defendants never having

received or appropriated the labor of the

plaintiff, if the same work had been per-

formed under the like circumstances. with-

out any actual or special contract, the

law would have imposed no duty upon

the defendants, and therefore implies no

contract on their part to pay for the

work done: 1 Chit. Pl., 3\‘2; Atkinson v.

Bell,8 B. &C., 277; Allen v. Jarvis,20 (‘onn.,

38.

The only contract, therefore, upon which

,the plaintiff can rely to pay him for the

' labor, is the special contract.

than by this. This contract, therefore,

must form the basis of theplaintiff‘s ac-

tion. He must declare upon it, and claim

his damages. for the breach ofit, or for

being wrongfully prevented from perform-

ing it. His damages will then be the ac-

tual damages which he has suffered from

the refusal of the defendants to accept the

articles, or in consequence of being pre-

vented from its performance; and these

damages may he more or less than the

value of the labor. This case, therefore,

in this respect, comes directly within the

principle recognized in the case of Atkin-

son v. Bell, above cited.and in Allen v.

Jarvis, 20 Conn.. 38 (a well reasoned case,

which we entirely approve). And see

Moody v. Brown,31 liie., I07, where the

same principle is recognized.

But it was claimed by plaintiff's counsel

that no action could have been main-
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Bing., 14, upon which much reliance was

placed by the counsel for the defendant in

error, there was a special count upon the

contract. as well as the common counts,

and it may be inferred from the opinion

Blog., 14, upon which much rtillance was
placed by the co1111ael for the defendant In
error, there was a 11pel'lal count upon the
contrdct, AB well as the common counts,
und It ma.v bf' inferred from the opln!on
that the plalntlft wuB allowf!d to retain
hill verdict upon the special count. An()
we hove the blgt. authority ol LurdCampbell that such wa11 the case. :See Hoch·
.eterv. De Latour, 20 E.I•. & Eq.163,above

that the plaintiff was allowed to retain

his verdict upon the special count. And

we hovethe high authority of Lord Camp-

hell that such was the case. See Hoch-

sterv. De Latour, 20 EL. & Eq. 163,above

cited. As the conclusion at which we

have arrived upon this pofnt disposes of

the whole case, it becomes unnecessary,

and even improper to discuss the other

questions raised in the case.

And, as we do not conceive that under

a writ of error we have any power to

amend the declaration in this respect, the

judgment must be reversed.
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The other iustices concurred.
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cited. As the conclu11loo at which we
have arrived upon this point disposes or
the whole case, It become11 1111necese11ry,
and even Improper to dl11cuss the other
queHtluns raised In the ca11e.
And, as we do not conceive that under
a writ ol error we have any power to
amend the declaration In this respect, the
Judgment mu.it be reversed.
The other Justices concurred •
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HINCKLEY v. PITTSBURGH’ BESSE.\IER.

STEEL CO., Limited.1

(7 Sup. Ct. 875, 121 U. S. 264.)

Supreme Court of the United States. April 18,

1887.

In error to the circuit court of the United

States for the Northern district of Illinois.

Thos. S. McClelland, for plaintiff in error.

John N. Jewett, for defendant in error.

BLATCHFORD, J. This is an action at

law, brought in the circuit court of the Unit-

ed States for the Northern district of Illinois.

by the Pittsburgh Bessemer Steel Company,

Limited, a Pennsylvania corporation, again-st

Francis E. Hincklcy, to recover damages for

the breach by Hinckley of a written contract

for the purchase by him from the company

of 6,000 tons of steel rails. The contract was

as follows:
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“Memorandum of Sale.

“The Pittsburgh Bessemer Steel Company,

Limited, have sold and hereby agree to make

and deliver to the order of F. E. Hinckley,

Esq., 204 Dearborn St., Chicago, 1lls., and the

said Hinckley has purchased and agrees to

pay for, six thousand gross tons of ﬁrst-qual-

ity steel rails, to weigh ﬁfty-two (52) pounds

to the yard, and to be rolled true and smooth

to the pattern to be furnished by the said

Pittsburgh Bessemer Steel Company, Lim-

ited, pattern No. 5. Said rails are to be made

of the best quality of Bessemer steel, and to

be subject to inspection as made and ship-

ped. and to be well straightened and free

from ﬁaws, and to be drilled as may be di-

rected. At least ninety per cent. shall be in

thirty (30) feet lengths, with not over ten

(10) per cent. of shorter lengths, diminishing

by one foot differences, none to be less than

twenty-four (24) feet. All second-quality

rails, or excess of'shorts which may be made.

not exceeding ﬁve (5) per cent. of each

month's shipments to be taken at the usual

reduction of ten (10) per cent. in price, and to

be piled and shipped separately, (painted

white on both ends,) as may be ordered by

the inspector. Deliveries to begin in May,

1882, in which month one thousand tons shall

be delivered, and to continue at the rate of

twenty-ﬁve hundred tons per month after

July 1, 1882, until ﬁnished, strikes and acci-

dents beyond ordinary control of said steel

company, and acts of Providence,-preventing

or suspending deliveries, alone excepted, in

which case deliveries are to be delayed for a

corresponding length of time only. Price to

be ﬁfty-eight dollars net, per ton of 2.240

pounds of ﬁnished steel rails, ex. ship or

f. o. b. cars at Chicago, Ills., selier's option.

Terms of payment, cash on delivery of in-

spector's certiﬁcate for each ﬁve hundred

tons as fast as delivered. If shipment is de-

t Aiiirming 17 Fed. 584.

-__4-~

layed without fault of said steel company,

payment is to be made in cash upon comple-

tion and delivery ot‘ each ﬁve hundred tons

at Chicago and inspector's certiﬁcate. Rails
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not only neglected to comply with such re-

quest and furnish such directions, but de-

fendant aiso notiﬁed plaintiff, in reply to such

request, that he, defendant, was not then pre-

pared to receive the rails which were to be

delivered under said contract in the month of

May. Again, about the ﬁfteenth of June, de-

fendant informed plaintiff that he was be-

coming discouraged about being able to take

the rails. That, about June 23d, plaintiff

notiﬁed defendant that it was ready to com-

mence rolling the rails for the July deliveries,

as well as to cover the thousand tons speci-

ﬁed in the contract for delivery in May, of

which plaintiff had postponed delivery at de-

fendant's request, and asked for drilling di-

rections from the defendant; but defendant

wholly neglected to give such drilling direc-

tions. That about the twenty-si.\'th of July,
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defendant. in substance. informed plaintiffs

agents that his ﬁnancial arrangements for

money to pay for said rails. pursuant to said

contract, had failed, and that he could not

take said rails unless plaintiff would sell them

to him on six and twelve months‘ credit, for

which the notes of the railroad company for

which defendant was acting would be given,

which defendant would indorse, and also fur-

ther secure with ﬁrst-mortgage bonds. as col-

lateral, at ﬁfty cents on the dollar, but, un-

less he could secure the rails on such terms,

he could not take them, and that plaintlf f de-

clined to accept said proposition for the pur-

chase of said rails on credit; and I further

ﬁnd that, on the thirtieth of August, 1882,

plaintiff notiﬁed defendant that the time for

the completion of his contract for the pur-

chase of said rails had expired, and request-

ed defendant to advise it whether he would

accept the rails or not. To this request de-

fendant made no reply.

“I further ﬁnd that. while plaintiff did not

expressly agree with defendant to postpone

the time for the delivery of the rails to be

made and delivered under said contract, yet

plaintif f did in fact delay the rolling and de-

livery of the rail to be delivered in May,

and that, by reason of the repeated state-

ments of defendant that he was not ready to

give drilling directions, not ready to use said

rails. and not ready to accept them, plaintiff

did postpone rolling said rails, and in fact

never rolled any rails to be delivered on said

contract. but that plaintiff was at all times

during the months of May, July, and August

ready and able, in all respects, to fulﬁll said

contract and make said rails, and the same

would have been ready for delivery, as call-

ed for by said contract, if defendant had fur-

nished drilling directions, and had not stated

to plaintiff's agents that he was not ready

to furnish said drilling directions, and not

ready to accept said rails. I further ﬁnd

that on or about the ﬂftcenth day of Septem-

ber. 1882. defendant was formally requested

to furnish drilling directions and to accept

said rails, and that he replied to such request

that he should decline to take any rails un-
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not only neglected to comply with such request and furnish such directions, but defendant also notitled plalntlft', In n•11ly to such
n>quest, that he, defoudant, was not then prepa1·ed to receive the rails which were to be
rlelh·ered under said contract in the month of
May. Again, about the fiftel'nth of .Tum>, Ill'·
fendnnt informed plaintlft' tllat he wns becoming discouraged ahout beiug able to take
the rnil~. That, about June :?:Jd. plaiutitl'
notitietl tll'femlant that It was re111J~- to com·
mence rolllng the rails for the July delinril'S,
as well as to cover the thunsaml tons fl[lN'I·
tied In the contract for delivery in ::\Ia~·. of
which plulntitl' had postponed delivery at defemlant's request, arnl askl.'d for drilling directions from the defentluut; !mt 1lefendant
wholly neglettl-11 to give sudt dr!lliug directions. That ahout the twenty-sixth of July,
th'fPndnnt. In suh~ta111•1·. informed plnintlfl's
aj:'<'Uts that his finandnl arrungements for
money to pay for said rnlls. Jllll'8Uant to said
eontrnct. had fulled. and that h<' eould not
take said rails unless plnlntifl' would sell them
to him on six and tw1·h·e months' credit, for
which the notes of the railroad company for
which dl'fen1laut was acting would he given,
which dC'!eodant would lndor!ll', and also further secure with fi1·st-u10rtgnge bonds, as collateral, at fifty cents on the dollar. but, unless he could secure the rails on sueh tl.'rms,
be couhl not tnke them. nnd that plnlntlfl' declined to accept said proposition for the pur<~has!' of !mid rnlls on crf'dlt; and I turthf'r
tlnd that, on the thirtieth of August, 1882,
plnlntllf notified defendant that the time for
the completion of his contract for the purchaHe of said rails had expired, and requested dl.'fendaot to 1ulvlse It whether he would
aceept the rails or not. To this request defendant made no reply.
"I further find that. while plalntlfl' did not
expressly agree with defendant to postpone
the time for the d<'llvery of the rails to be
made nod dPllvered under said contract, yet
11lni11tllf did to tuet delay the rolling and delivery of the rails to be dellvl'l·ed In May,
and that, by reason of the repeated stah~
ments of defendant that he was not ready to
give drilling directions, not ready to use said
rails. amt not ready to accept them, pla!ntlft'
did postpone rolllng said rails, and In faet
never rolled any rnils to be delh·ered on said
contract. but that plalntifl' was at all times
during the months of May, July, and August
ready and able, lo all respects, to fulfill said
contract and make said rails, and the same
would hn\·e hei>n rPady for delivery, as cnlled for by said contract, if defendant had furnl><hed drilling dirt•<"! ions, and hnd nut stated
to plaintiff's ai,:ents that he was not ready
to furnish i;ald tlrllling directions. and not
r1•ady to ae1·<•pt sa hi rails. I furtlwr find
that on or ahout the fiftePnth day af 8ept<'lll·
b<'r. 181'!~. deCPndaot was formally requested
to furnish rlrllling 1lirC'etions nod to accC'pt
tinld rails, and that he repll<'•I to such request
that he i<houhl tlt'dinl' to take any rails unL.\. W 1J.UI.2d E<l.-18
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der said contract, and that he bad made ar- .
rangPml•nts to purchase mils of others at a
good deal lower prlee. I therefore find, from
the testimony In this case. that defendant, by
requesting plnlntlft'. to postpone the deliYeQ'
of !'aid rails, and by notifying the plaintitr
that he was not ready to accept and pay for
said rails, excused tbe plaintlft'. from the
actual manufacture of said rails and a tendPr
th£>n•of to defendant. And I further finrl
that defendant"s stntto>ment to plaintiff, ou
the twenty-i>ixtb of July, tliat he could not
pay cash for said .rails. as ealled for by the
contract, and that be wished to buy them on
credit, was In fact a ootjce that he would
not be ahle to pay for said rails If rolled and
tendered to him uy plaintltT. I therefore conclude, and so fl 1111 as a mat t ...r of fact, from
the evidence lo the case, that said plalotltr
In apt time requestt•d defendant to furnish
dlreC'tioos for the drilling of snld rails, and
that defendant neglected and rl'fm11•d to do
so. nml tliat, although plalntitl' was ready nnd
able to fully perform said cuntraet, and make
nod dellve1· said rails to defl.'111laut as required by said cootra<;t. defenclant refused to ·
ac·1·t•Jit and pay for snld rails.
"(;;1 That plnlntlft'. manufactured and sold
to other persons 4,000 tons of steel rails, fl'om
the mnterlnls so purchased, with wlllC'h t()l
p('rform said contract with defendant, for
whldt said rails plaintltl' rl.'1·eh·ecl $54.HO per
ton, delivered at a port on Luke Huron, and
thnt plnlntltl' mntle a profit of $Ui0 1wr ton
on said 4,000 tons; that, by reason of defendant's refusal to accept said rails, the pl::tlotltf had no employment for Its mill for a time.
and was obliged to stop Its mlll for about
tbrl'e weeks lo the month of AuguHt, 1882.
"!U) 'l'bat it would have cost plulotlfl' $ii0
p{'r ton to have manufartured nnd dellve1·ed
the rails called for by said eontract to deft>mlant, ac·<·or1llng to the terms of said con·
trnl't; so that plalntltf's prottts, if It had
not lleeo prewntetl from fulfilling said l'ODtrnet hy the conduct or defendant, woulll
have been $8 per ton on each ton of mils .
ealled for lly said eontract. And, because of
i<airl faets, I find that defendant was guilt:r
of a llreaeli of said contract. and that i1lalntit1' hath sustained dnmnge. hy reason of
sueh breach, In the sum of :f-12.·WO."
On the;;e findings, a judgment was entere1I
for the plaintiff for $42,400 damages, and fur
costs. 17 Fell. 584. 'l'o review that judgment the defendant has b1·ought this writ or
error. Afte1· tue reco1·d was tiled in this court~
it bPing diseovered that there was nn errur la
computation in eutering tlie judgment fol"
$42,400, lu::itead of !HI.HOO, the circuit court
allow('d the plaintiff to remit the differem·P,
~SUO, and an order was entered ncco1·11ingly, us ·
of the date of the judgment.
On the special findings, the only question
open for review is whether the fucts found
are sufficient to support the judgment. There·
can be no <1uestiou that. on those facts, the
defcmlaut ls liaule lo d:111111ges for a llrench.

•
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of the contract. It is provided in the contract

that the rails are “to be drilled as may be

directed." The circuit court ﬁnds that it ap-

pears from the proof, aside from the provision

in the written contract in regard to drilling

directions. "that it was usual and customary

for the purchaser of steel rails to give direc- .

tlons as to the drilling thereof ;" that each rail-

road has its own special rules for drilling;

that the drilling of the rails is considered in

the trade as a part of the work of manufac-

ture, and a part of the duty of the manufac-

turer, in order to fully complete the rails for

use; that. by four letters, written in April.

1882. by the agents of the plaintiff to the de-

fendant, and which letters were duly received

by the defendant before May, 1882, he was

requested to furnish drilling directions for the

1,000 tons of rails to be delivered in May, un-
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der the contract; that he neglected to comply

with that request, and also notiﬁed the plain-

tif f that he was not then prepared to receive

the rails which, by the contract, were to be

delivered in May; that in June the plaintiff

again asked for drilling directions from the

defendant, in respect both to the 1,000 tons,

and to the 2.500 tons to be delivered in July,

but the defendant neglected to give such drill-

ing directions; and that, in the latter part of

July, he notiﬁed the plaintiff, in substance,

that he would not perform the contract. The

curcuit court further ﬁnds that, by reason of

the repeated statements of the defendant that

he was not ready to give drilling directions,

not ready to use the rails, and not ready to

accept them, the plaintiff postponed the roll-

ing of them, and never rolled any rails to be

delivered on the contract, but was at all times

during May, July, and August, 1882. ready and

able to fulﬁll the contract and make the rails,

and the same would have been ready for de-

livery as called for by the contract, if the de

fendant had furnished drilling directions, and

had not stated to the agents of the plaintiff

that he was not ready to furnish the drilling

directions, and not ready to accept the rails;

and that, on or about the ﬁfteenth of Septem-

ber, 1882. he was formally requested to fur-

nish drilling directions and to accept the rails,

and replied to such request that he should

decline to take any rails under the contract,

and had made arrangements to purchase rails

of others at a lower price. The circuit court

also ﬁnds that the defendant, by requesting

the plaintiff to postpone the delivery of the

rails, and by notifying the plaintiff that he

was not ready to accept and pay for them,

excused the plaintiff from actually manufac-

turing them and tendering them to the de-

fendant. This conclusion is entirely warrant-

ed by the facts found, and, on those facts,

the defendant must be held liable in damages.

The only other question open on the ﬁndings

is as to the proper rule of damages.

The circuit court ﬁnds that it would have

cost the plaintiff $50 per ton to have manu-

factured and delivered the rails called for by

the contract, according to its terms; that the
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'down by this court in Railroad Co. v. Howard,

13 How. 307. In that case a contractor for

the building of a railroad sued the company

for its breach. On the question of damages

this court said, (page 344:) “It must be ad-

mitted that actual damages were all that

could lawfully be given in an action of cove-

nant, even if the company had been guilty of

fraud. But it by no means follows that the

proﬁts are not to be allowed, understanding,

as we must, the term ‘proﬁts.' in this instruc-

tion. as meaning the gain which the plaintiff

would have made if he had been permitted

to complete his contract. Actual damages

clearly mclude the direct and actual loss which

the plaintiff sustains propter rem ipsam non

habitam. And, in case of a contract like

this, that loss is, among other things, the dif-

kference between the cost of doing the work
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and the price to be paid for it. This dif-

ference is the inducement and real considera-

tion which causes the contractor to enter into

the contract. For this he expends his time,

exerts his skill. uses his capital, and assumes

the risks which attend the enterprise. And

to deprive him of it. when the party has

broken the contract and unlawfully put an

end to the work, would be unjust. There is

no rule of law which requires us to indict this

injustice. Wherever proﬁts are spoken of as

not a subject of damages, it will be found that

something contingent upon future bargains or

speculations or states of the market are re-

ferred to, and not the difference between the

agreed price of something contracted for and

its ascertainable value or cost. See Masterton

v. Mayor, etc., 7 Hill, 61, and cases there re-

ferred to. We hold it to be a clear rule that

the gain or proﬁt of which the contractor was

deprived by the refusal of the company to

allow him to proceed with and complete the

work. was a proper subject of damages."

In U. S. v. Speed, 8 Wall. 77, where the

defendant agreed to pack a speciﬁed number

of hogs for the plaintiff, and made all his

preparations to do so, and was ready to do

so, but the defendant refused to furnish the

hogs to be packed, this court, citing with ap-

proval \Iastcrton v. Mayor, etc., held that

the measure of damages was the difference

between the cost of doing the work and the

price agreed to be paid for it, “making rea-

sonable deduction for the less time engaged,

and for release from the care, trouble, risk,

and responsibility attending a full execution

of the contract." These views were again

approved by this court in U. S. v. Bchan,

110 U. S. 338. 4 Sup. Ct. 81.

In the present case the ability of the plain-

tiff to fulﬁll the contradt at all times is found

as a fact by the circuit court. as also the

fact that, by reason of the defendant's re-

fnsal to accept the rails. the plaintiff was

obliged to stop its mill for about three weeks,

in August, 1882. The defendant received

the beneﬁt of all the mitigation of damages

which, upon the facts found. he was entitled

to claim, and the beneﬁt of all the proﬁts

by this court In Rnllroad Co. v. Howard,
13 How. 307. In that case a contractor for

·the building of a railroad sued the company
for Its breach. On the question of damngee
-this court said, (page 344:) "It must be admitted that nctual damages were all that
could lawfully be given in an action of covenant, en•n if the company had been guilty of
fraud. But It by no means follows that the
profits are not to be allowed, understanding,
as we must, the term 'profits.' In this Instruction. as mNmin11: the ~aln which the plalntll!
would have made It be bad been permitted
to complete his conU'Sct. Actual damages
dearly mclmle me direct autl actual loss which
the plaintil'J' sustnins propter rem lpsam non
habiram. Antl, In case of a contract like
this, that loss is, among other things, the dif1 ferenc.-e between the cost or doing the work
land the price to be paid for It. This dlf·
ference Is the Inducement and real consldera·
tion which causes the contractor to enter Into
the contract. I•'or this he expends his time,
exerts his skill, uses his cnpltal, and assumes
the risks which attend the enterprise. And
w deprive him of it, when the party hns
broken the contract and unlawfully put an
end to the work, would be unjust. The>re Is
no rule of law which requires us to lntlkt this
Injustice. 'Wherever prolits are spoken of as
not a subject of damages, it will be found that
something contingent upon future bargains or
speculations or states or the market are referred to, and not the ditTerence between the
agreed price of something contracted for and
Its ascertainable 'v alue or cost. See Mnsterton
v. :Mayor, etc., 7 Hill, 61, 11.nd cases there referred to. We bold It to be a clear rnle that
the gain or profit of which the contractor was
deprived by the relusal of the company to
allow him to proceed with and complete the
work. was a proper subject of damages."
In U. S. v. Speed, 8 Wall. 77, where the
defendant agreed to pack a speclfied number
ot hogs for the plaintiff, and made all bis
preparations to do 80, and was ready to do
so, but the defendant refused to furnish the
bogs to be packed, this court, citing with appro\·111 :\lnstcrton Y. Mayor, etc., hC'i<l that
the mensure of damages was the difference
between the cost of doing the work and the
price agreed to be paid for It, "making reasonable deduction for the less time engaged,
and for release from the care, trouble, risk,
and responsibility 11.ttentllng a full execution
of the contrnct." These views were 11.galn
appro'l"e<l by this court In U. S. v. B<'han,
110 U. S. 3.38, 4 Sup. Ct. 81.
In the present l'U~ the nhility of the plain·
tltr to fulfill the con tra~t n t a II t Imes Is found
as a fact by the circuit eourt, as nlso the
fact that, by reason of the dPfendant's refusal to accept the mils, the plaintitr was
-obliged to stop Its mill for about three weeks,
in August, 1882. The defendant received
the benefit of all the mitigation of damages
which, upon the facts found, he was entitled
to claim, and the benefit of all the profits
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made by the plalnti1f which could properly
be regarded as a substitute for the pro!lts It
would have received had its contract with
the defendant been carried out. The defendant objects that, within the statement of the
rule In U. S. v. Speed, there was no deduction made In this case for the time saved,
and the care, trouble, risk, and responsibility
avoided by the plaintiff by not fuily executing the contract; but there are no findings
of fact which raise any such question. '.l'he
finding Is that It would have cost the plaintltr $50 per ton to have manufnctured and
delh·ered the rails called for by the contract,
according to Its terms. Under this finding,
It must be held thnt every proper element
of cost entered Into the $GO; and It was for
the defendant to have requested findings
which would authorize an Increase of that
sum as cost.
'.l'here Is a bill of exceptions In the case,
on which two questions are raised by the
defendant as to the admission of testimony.
The contract between the parties wns negotiated by C. H. Odell. who signed It as
broker, between whom and the defendant the
correspondence thereafter, down to and . Including the first of May, 1882. was cnrried
on, Odell acting for the plaintllT. He made
the contract under special Instructions, his
authority being limited to that of a sales
agent. On bis examination as a witness nt
the trial, he testified thnt all of his communications with the plaintltr In regard to the
buslne8s with the defendant Wl're In writing
or by telegram. He also !('stilled, without
ohjectlon, that be kept the plnlntift' fully advised of bis correspondence with th<' defendant concerning the rails. II. I'. Smith, the
business manager of the plaintiff, was then
called as a witness for the plalntlfl', and was
asked If Ille plaintll'J' was advlsed of the correspond<'n<'c betwl:'cn Odell and the defendant, which bad heen read In evidence, and
If Odell's actions were ap11roved by the witness as manager of the plaintiff. To this
the defendant objected, on the ground that
the communications between Odell and the
plaintiff consisted of letters l\Dd telegrams,
which were the only competent evidence of
the contents thereof. '.l'he court overruled
the objection, and the witness stated that the
compnny was advised of the correspondence
and actions of Odell, and fully approved and
ratified the some. The defendant excepted
to the decision admitting the evidence. We
see no ohjection to the admission of this
evidence, Independently of the fact that Odell
bad, without objection, testified to sub1tantlally the same thing. The defendant, In bis
correspondence with 0dPf1, all of which Is
set forth In the bill of exceptions, treated
Odell as representing the plaintil'r. and cannot now be heard to question bis authority
to do 80, or to demand further evidence of
such an authority, or of the adoption by the
plalntltr of what Odell wns doing, saying,
and asking on behalf of the plaintltr. The
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question asked of Smith, as to whether he,

as manager of the plaintiff, approved of

Odeil‘s actions, and the answer he made,

were therefore, unnecessary, and could not

affect the merits of the case.

Smith was further asked to state in detail

the elements of the cost of rolling the rails

in question. He produced a memorandum

showing items taken from the plaintiff's

books, which, added together, exhibited the

cost, in August, 1882, of manufacturing one

ton of such rails as those described in the

contract; and, on being asked by the plain-

tilfs attorney to testify to those items, the

court, under the defendant's objection, al-

lowed him to read the items from the memo-

randum. He further testiﬁed, under an ob-

jection and exception by the defendant, that

the actual cost to the plaintiff of making and
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delivering the rails in Chicago would have

been $48.25; that he stated the elements of

such cost from a memorandum prepared by

himself, the elements being taken from the

books of the plaintiff; that he knew the pur-

chase price of all material which went into

the manufacture, because he purchased all

of it himself; that the statement was pre-

pared by him from his personal knowledge

of the cost; that he called off the items from

a penciled memorandum to the book-keeper,

who wrote them down; that he (the witness)

knew the items to be correctly stated; and

that the information as to the items was

made up from records running through a

series of four or ﬁve months, and represent-

ing an average as to the cost per ton. The

defendant contends that this evidence was

inadmissible, in the absence of an oppor-

tunity for him to examine the plaintiffs

books, with a view to a cross-examination

of the witness as to the mode of computation

adopted by him, the memorandum being, as

contended, the result of the conclusions of

the witness from the examination of a large

number of entries in the books of the plain-

tiff. It is a suﬂicient answer to this ob-

jection, that the cost of the rails was not

taken by the court at the sum of $48.25, the

sum ﬁxed by Smith, but the bill of excep-

tions shows that the cost was taken at $50

a ton. from the testimony of Richard C.

Hannah, another witness; so that, even if

the testimony was erroneously admitted,

(which it is not necessary to decide,) the de-

fendant suffered no prejudice from its ad-

mission.

The judgment of the circuit court is af-

ﬁrmed.
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(35 Pac. 899, 1 Wash. 595.)
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HOGAN v. KYLE.

(35 Pac. 399, 7 Wash. 595.)

Supreme Court of Washington. Jan. 6, 1894.

Appeal from superior court, King county;

Mason Irwin, Judge.

Action by F. V. Hogan against George F.

Kyle for breach of contract to buy real

estate. From a judgment for plaintiff, de-

fendant appeals. Reversed.

Supreme Court of Waablngton. .Jan. 6, 1894.
Appeal from llllperlor court, King county;
Mason Irwin, .Judge.
Action by F. V. Hogan against George ~.
Kyle for: breach of contract to buy real
estate. From a jud~ent for plalntil'l', defendant appeals. Re\"ersed.
Preston, Albertson & Donworth, for appellant. H. B. Slauson, for respondent.

Preston, Albertson & Donworth, for appel-

lant. H. B. Slauson, for respondent.

DUNBAR, O. J. On the 27th day of Feb-

ruary, 1890, respondent and appellant entered

into a written contract wherein respondent

agreed to sell the appellant certain real estate

for the sum of $2,500, one-third of which was

paid at the time of the execution of the con-

tract; appellant to pay the balance of the pur- I

chase price in two equal installments, the ﬁrst
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of which was to be paid on the 27th day of

May, 1890, and the second on the 27th day

)of August, 1890. Time was expressly made

the essence of the contract. The appellant

paid no part of the purchase price, except the

sum which was paid at the time the con-

tract was executed. It does not appear that

defendant entered into possession of the

property, or exercised any control over it.

On November 14, 1892, suit was commenced

by the respondent to recover a money judg-

ment ngainst the appellant for the amount

of the two unpaid installments, with in-

terest. The complaint simply alleged the

making of the contract, failure to pay, the

ownership of the property, and the tender

of a good and suﬂicient deed prior to the

commencenu'nt of the action. A demurrer

was interposed to the complaint on the

ground that it did not state facts suﬂlcient

to constitute a cause of action. The de-

murrer was overruled, -and the defendant

answered, alleging possession in the re-

spondent, but denying his power to give

good title. Allcging that respondent had

never demanded of appellant the contract

price of the land at any time prior to Novem-

ber 14, 1892, the date of the commencement of

the action, and never tendered to appellant

any deed or conveyance purporting to con-

vey said land until said 14th day of Novem-

ber, 1892, and never at any time conveyed

said premises; that, long prior to said last-

named date, appellant had informed and

notiﬁed respondent that he did not have or

claim any further interest in said property.

and that he would not pay any further in-

stallment provided for by said contract, and

that the plaintiff did not, up to said Novem-

ber 14, 1892, assert any further right to the

balance of said contract price, nor dissent

to nor deny said claim of defendant that he

was no longer bound by said contract; and

that long prior to said last-named date the

plaintiff had exercised said option reserved

to him under said contract, and had elected

to rescind said contract, and to retain as a

forfeit the ﬁrst payment that had been

made to him by the defendant thereunder,

DUNBAR, 0. J. On the 27th day of Feb1·11ary, l&JO, respondent and appellant entered
Into a written contract wherein respondent
v.greed to sell tbe appellant certain real estate
tor the sum of $2,500, one-third of which was
paid at the time of the execution of the contract; appellant to pay the balance of the purchase price in two equal Installments, the first
-0t whl~h was to be paid on the 27th day of
May, 1800, and the second on the 27th day
) of August, 1800. Time wns expressly made
the essence of the contract. Tbe appellant
paid no part of the purchase price, except the
sum which was paid at the time the con·
tract wDB executed. It does not appear that
-Oefembnt entered into possl.'ssion of th'?
property, or exerclsro any control over It.
Qn November 14, 1892, suit was commenceo
by the respondent to recover n. money judgment ngn.inst the appellant for the amount
of the two unpaid lnstnlhnents, with h1terest. The complaint simply alleged th<~
making of the contract, failure to pny, the
<>wnershlp of the propc1·ty, and the temler
-0f a good and sufficient deed prior to the
commencem<>nt of the action. A demurrer
was Interposed to the complaint on the
icround tbat It did not state facts sutllclcnt
to constitute a cause ot nction. The demurrer was overruled, .and the def<>ndant
answered, alleging possession In the re'8pondent, but d('nylng his power t<> give
good title. Alleging that respondent had
never demanded of appellant the contract
price of the lnnd at nny time prior to November 14, 1892, the dnte of the commencement of
the action, nnd never tendered to appellant
any deed or conv<'y:mce purporting to conTey said land until said 14th day of Novem·
ber, 1892, and never at any time conveyed
said premises; that, long prior to said lastnamed date, appellant had Informed and
notified respondent that he did not have or
-claim any further Interest In said property,
and that he would not pay any further In.
stnllment provided for by said contract, and
that the plnlntl!r did not, up to said November 14, 1892, assert any further right to the
balance of said contract price, nor dissent
to nor deny said claim ot defendant that he
was no longer bound by said contract; and
that long prior t<> said Inst-named date the
plaintiff had exercls<'d said option res<•rved
to him under said contract, and had electe4
tQ rescind said contract, and to retain as a
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forfeit the first paymf'nt that had been
made to him by the dPfendant thereunder,
aforesaid At the outset of the trial, appellant objected to the lntrodurtlon of any
testimony In behalf of the plaintiff on the
ground that no cause of action was stnted
in the complaint. This objection was overruled. At the conclusion of respondent's
testimony, appellant moved for a nonsuit,
which motion was o¥errulcd. '!'hereupon,
he rested upon his motion, and did not o!rer
any testimony; and the judge Instructed the
jury to bring In a verdict n1rnlnst the appellant for the balance of the contract price.
with Interest; which being done, judgment
was entered thereon, from which judgment
appellant hns nppealed. At the commencement of the action the appellant moved to
have the case transferred to the equity calendar, which motion was denied. The demurrer and the motion for a nonsuit raised substantially the same questions.
The judgment In this case will·have to be
r€versed, In any event, for under Its tern:ts the
respondent recovers the full purchase price,
and ls allowed to retain the land which represented the purchase price. In this case
these are dependent obllgntlons upon which
the respondent Is suing. When the first Installment became due, he could have' recovered the amount then due as upon an Independent contract; but having elected to watt
until the Inst Installment became due, and
upon the payment of which defendant would
be entitled to a deed, the obllgntloDB become
dependent. They all relate back to the contmct, and respondent cannot sustain an action
tor either Installment without proof of performance or readiness to perform on hie part.
Mccroskey v. Ladd, (Cal.) 31 Pac. 558, and
cases cited. In thnt case the court llllld:
"There Is but one single cause of action.one and Indivisible. The defendant, If he
would maintain bis deed, must pay all; and
the plnlntl!T, If he would recover, must show
such a pe1·formance on his part as would entitle him to all the unpaid consideration." It
Is not enough that the deed was tendered
nt any particular time, but the tender must
be kept good so that lt may be taken into consideration In the enti·y of ·the judgment.
Plaintiff here simply !!hows tbat the tl.'nder
bad been made prior to the commencement
of the action, and It Is therefore Insufficient
excepting on the th<>ory that the judgment
could be rendered Independently of the performance of his part of the cont,.act by the
vendor, which would result in allowing the
vPndor to keep both the money and the l:md.
On that proposition we quote from '\Vat'\"elle
on Vendors, (page 961:) "There are cnses,
both In England and the United States,
where, on the vendee's default, the vendor,
having offered to perform, has bPen permitted to recover as damages the whole purchase
price. The Injustice of sucb a measure, however, Is apparent on Its tnce, for It gh•es the
vendor his land, OB well as its value, and Is

278

BREAOH OF CONTRACTS RESPECTING REAL ES'l‘A'l'E.

not now regarded as a correct rule in either

country." The rule in such cases is that the

vendor has a right to the fruits of his bar-

gain, and is entitled to compensation for any

less he may suffer by reason of its noncon-

smnmation. What his damages are, in such

circumstances, must be alleged and proven,

like am; other fact in the case. Under one

set of circumstances, the measure of dam-

ages might be one thing, and under other cir-

cumstances the measure might be governed

by an entirely different rule. The land may

have deteriorated in value, and his damages ,

-would be great, or it might have increased in

value, and the damages would be nominal.

As is well argued by the appellant in this

case, so far as the complaint reveals, the land

may be worth as much or more than it was

when the agreement was executed; and the
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respondent, having received an advance pay-

ment, which is forfeited, may actually be

beneﬁted. The cases cited in VVarvel1e fully

sustain the announcement in the text, both as

to the unfairness of allowing the vendor to

retain the land and the money, and as to the

measure of damages. In Railroad Co. v.

Evans, 6 Gray, 25, it was held that, in an

action at law by the vendor to recover dam-

ages for the breach of a contract for the sale

of land, the measure of damages is not the

contract price, but the diﬂerence between

that price and the price for which the land

could have been sold at the time of the

breach., Under this rule, which seems to us

to be an equitable one, and one which is

adopted by many courts, the complaint is

plainly deﬁcient. The case last above cited

also holds that a vendor may enforce in equi-

ty the speciﬁc performance of a written con-

tract for the sale of land. In fact, the pre-

vailing modern authority is that in a case

of this kind the vendor can either sue at law

for damages, or resort to equity for speciﬁc

performance. Mr. Pomcroy, in his work on

Contracts, (page 6,) bases his adherence to this

doctrine on the ground of mutuality. The

remedy which is enjoyed by one party to a

contract must be enjoyed by the other, and

as an example he gives the simplest form of

contract for the sale of land, when the vendor

agrees to convey, and the purchaser merely

promises to pay a certain sum as the price.

Since the latter may, by a suit at equity, cm»-

pel the execution and delivery of the deed,

the former may also, by a similar suit, en-

force the undertaking of the vendee, although

the substantial part of his relief is the re-

covery of money. “A suit in equity against

the vendee, to compel a speciﬁc execution of

0. contract of sale, while in effect an actio'n

for the purchase money, has nevertheless al-

ways been sustained as a part of the appro-

priate and acknowledged jurisdiction of such

court, although the vendor has in most cases

another remedy by an action at law upon the

agreement." Warv. Vend. pp. 779, 780, and

cases cited. So that, considering it either

as u legal or equitable action, and consider-

BREA.CS: BY YENDEE OF AGREEMENT TO BUY.
BREACH BY VENDEE OF AGREEMENT TO BUY.

279

are the averments of the complaint strength-

ened by the proofs, for the proofs show that

no demand, of any kind whatever, had been

made, on the part of respondent, until the

day the suit was brought. The respondent

should not be allowed to speculate in values,

so far as this contract is concerned; to wait

and see whether the value of the land would

enhance or depreciate before he made his

election either to enforce the performance

or accept the forfeiture. We think the pro-

vision of this contract, th\t, “if the said

party of the second part, his heirs, adminis-

trators, or assigns, shall fail to pay the full

amount of either of the abovespeciﬁed in-

stallments and interest when the same shall

become due, as above speciiied, the said party

of the ﬁrst part shall have the right, at their

option, to rescind and cancel this agreement,
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and in case of such rescission and cancellation

all rights of the said party of the second part.

his heirs and assigns, shall be terminated,

and all payments heretofore inade on this

contract shall be forfeited," fairly construed,

guaranties to the respondent a right which

it must exercise at the maturity of the con-

tract,—the time when he would have a right

to make the election; and, as he did not pro-

ceed to enforce the contract, the appellant had

a right to presume that, inasmuch as he had

taken no afﬁrmative action, by tendering the

deed, he had elected the remedy which was

consistent with silence, namely, the accept-

ance of the forfeiture; and, considering the

rapid changes in value of the real estate in

this country, we think an unexplained delay

of two and a quarter years ought to prevent-

the respondent from asserting his claim in a

court of equity.

The complaint, therefore, being insuﬂlcient,

either at law or equity, appellant's demurrer

should have been sustained. This conclusion

renders unnecessary the discussion of the oth-

er errors assigned. For the reasons given,

the judgment will ‘be reversed, with instruc-

tions to sustain appellant's demurrer to the

complaint.

STILES, HOYT, SCOTT, and ANDERS,

JJ., concur.

are the averml'nts of the complaint strengthened by the proofs, for the proofs show that
no demand, of any kind whatever, hnd been
made, on the part of respondent, until the
day the suit was brought. The respondent
should not be allowed to !tpeculate In values,
so f .1r as this contract le concerned; to wait
and see whether the value of the land would
enhance or depreciate before he made his
election either to enforce the performance
or accept the forfeiture. We think the provision of this contract, ~t. "It the eald
party of the second part, his heirs, admlnletr.ltore, or assigns, shall fall to pay the full
amount of either of the nbove-spceifled Installments and Interest when the same shall
become due, ae above specified, the said party
of the &-st part shall have the right, at their
option, to rescind and cancel this agreement,
and In case of such rescission and cancellation
all rights of the said party of the second part,
his heirs and assigns, shall be terminated,
and all payments heretofore made on this
contract shall be forfeited," fairly construed,
JrWl.?antlee to the respondent a right which
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It must exercise at the maturity of the con·
tract,-the time when he would have a right
to make the election; and, as he did not proceed to enforce the contract, the appellant had
a right to presume that, Inasmuch as he had
taken no affirmative action, by tendering the
deed, he had elected the remedy which was
consistent with silence, namely, the acceptance of the forfeiture; and, considering the
rapid ch:mges In value of the real estate in
this country, we think an unexplained delay
of two and a quarter years ought to prevent·
the respondent from asserting his claim In a
court of equity.
The complalnt, therefore, being Insufficient,
either at law or equity, appellant's demurrer
should have been sustained. This conclusion
renders unnecessary the discussion of the oth·
er errors 8.881,rned. For the reasons given,
the judgment will ·be reversed, with Instructions to sustain appellant's demurrer to the
complaint..
STILES, HOYT, SCOTT, and ANDERS,

1J., concur.
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McGUIN.\ESS v. WHALEN.

(18 Atl. 158, 16 R. I. 558.)

Supreme Court of Rhode Island. July 13, 1889.

Assumpsit. On demurrer to the declara-

tion.

Edwin D. McGuinness and John D01-an.

for plaintiff. Edward D. Bassett, for de-

fendant.

DURFEE, C. J . The declaration sets forth

_that at an administrator's sale at auction, held

February 28, A. D. 1885, by William W.

Nichols, administrator de bonis non on the

estate of John Charlton, deceased, all the

right, title, and interest of the decedent in

certain land described was struck off to the

defendant for $3,100 bid by him, said sum

being the highest bid therefor; that the de-

fendant paid $150 down as earnest money;

that afterwards, at a time appointed. the ad-

Generated for facpubupdates (University of Michigan) on 2014-06-12 19:22 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/mdp.35112105421491
Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd-google

ministrator was ready with his deed to con-

vey the land in pursuance of the sale, but the

defendant refused to accept it, and pay over

the residue of sahl$3,100; that subs--quently,

on May 26, A. D. 1885, the property was

again put up at auction by said administra-

tor, and struck ol! to William H. Washburn

for $2,150, the highest bid therefor, and con-

veyed to him for that sum. The declaration

then proceeds as follows, to-wit: “And the

plaintiff avers that on the 21st day of Novem-

ber, 1887, he was appointed administrator

do bonis non of the estate of John Charl-

ton, deceased, in the place and stead of said

Nichols, removed, whereby the defendant

became liable and promised to pay to the

plaintiff the difference between said sum of

$3,100 and the costs of said second auction

sale, viz., $40.17, and the sum of 32,150,

amounting to the sum of $990.17." The

declaration also contains the common money

count. The defendant has demurred to the

declaration generally, but both parties have

.treated the demurrer as if it were simply a de-

murrer to the special count. We will so treat

.it. The question, as it has been argued to us,

is whether the count is good as a count upon

.a promise to be implied from the facts alleged.

We think not. The contract which the de

fendant entered into when he made his bid

was a contract to pay the price bid by him for

the premises upon receiving a deed thereof,

and, if on tender of the deed he refused

to complete the payment, he committed a

breach of said contract, and laid himself

liable to an action upon it. for damages.

In such action the measure of damage is

the loss to the vendor from the default

of the vendee, and it may be that the

jury, upon proof of the second sale, would

ﬁnd the damages to be the difference between

the two bids and the expense of the second

sale; but the question would be purely one of

damages, and they would not be shut up to

thatamount. Mc(‘ombs v. Mv.-Kennan. 2 Watts

& S. 216. In order to make the vendee liable

in as.>umpsit for such difference and expense,

in case of his default, it should be made a

condition of the sale that in such case the

(18 At!. 158, 16 R. L 558.)

Supreme Court of Rhode T.sland. July 13, 1889.
Asmmpsit. On demurl'er to the declaration.
Edwin D. Mc<luinness and John Do1'an,
for plaintilf. Edwa1·d D. Bassett, for defendant.
I>UBFEE, C. J. Thetleclaratlon sets forth
• that l\t an administrator's sale at auction, ht>ld
February 28, A. D. 188i, by William W.
Nichols, administrator de bonis no11 on the
.estate of John Charlton, deceased, all the
right, title, and interest of the deeedent in
certain land described was strnc:k off to the
defondant for $3,100 bid bv him, said sum
being the highest bid therefor; that the defendant paid $150 down as earnest money;
that afterwards, at a time appointt>d, the administrator was re11dv with his deed to convey the lund in purs1iance of the sale, but the
defendant refused to a<·cept it, and pay over
the residue ofsa!tl~a.100; thatsubs ..quently,
on May 26, A. D. 1885, the property wtts
•1gain pnt up at auction by 11aid adminisLrator, and struck off to William H. Washburn
for $2,150, the highest bid therefor, 11nd conveyed to him for that sum. The declaration
then prnceeds as follows, to-wit: "An<l the
plaintiff avns that on tlle 21st day of November, 1887, he was appointed administrator
de bouis nun of the estate of John Chariton, deceased, in the place itnd stead of said
Nichols, removed, whereby the defendant
became liable and promised to pay to the
plaintiff the difference between said sum of
$~,100 and the costs of said second auction
sale, viz., $40.17, and the sum of 82, 156,
amounting to the sum of $990.17." The
declaration also contains the common money
<'onnt. The defendant has demurrerl to the
declaration generally, but both parties have
,treated the demurrer as if it were simply a demurrer to the special count. We will so treat
jt. The question, a., it has been argued to us,
js whether the count is good as a count upon
a promise to be implied from the facts alleged.
We think not. The contract which the defendant entered into when he ma<le his bid
was a contrart to pay the price bid by him for
the premises upon receiving a deed thereof,
and, if on tender of the deed he refused
to complete the payment, he committed a
brrach of said contract, and laid himself
liable to an action upon it. for damages.
In such action the measure of damage is

the IGse to the venrlor from the rlefault
of the vendee, and it may be that I he
jury, upon proof of the second sale, would
find the damages to be the difference bt>tween
the two bids and the expense of the second
sale; but the question wot.Id be purely one ot
damages, and they would not be shut up to
thatmnount. Mccombs v. :\kKennan, 2 Watts
& 8. 216. In order to make Lhe vendee liable
in as~-umpsit for such difference am! expense,
in case of his default, it should be made a
condition of the sale that in such case the
properLyshouhl be resold, and the vendee held
to p;iy such difference and expense. Adams
v. McMillan, 7 Port. (Ala.) 7;), was a case of
real estate sole! at auction. and aftnwards resold on default by the nndee. The declaration contained a count like the s11ecial count
The con rt held that whPre a declara1 here.
' tion does not aver, a~ part or the contract of
£ale, a condition that the land shall be resold in case of such default, but only allegt>s the <lilference in price of the two ~ales,
and as a consequence of the vendee's breach
of his rontract a liability on his part to pay
that difference, being frameJ on the supposi·
tion that the clitforence is recoverable HS on a
contract, and not as unliquid11ted damages,
the . declaration will be liad on demurrer.
Hobinson v. Garth, 6 Ala. 2(14. The plaintiff
contends that the motle of declaring here
used is proper, because Lhe sale was judicial,
and In such sales the defaulting venctee is Jiable for the deficifmcv on resale, whether the
terms of sale so provide or not. .An administrator's sale, however, under our statutes, is
not a judicial sale, as was decided by Judge
8TOUY in Smith v. Arnold, 5 Mason, 414, 420.
It has been held in Al;tbama that purchasers at
official sales who make default are liable by
imolied contract for the delicit on resale.
Lainkin v. Urawford, 8 Ala. lf13; Hutton v.
Williams, 35 Ala. 503. 513. We do not find
the doctrine rflCOgnize<l elsewhere, (2 Freem.
Ex'ns, 2d Ed., § 31!j ;) nor, in our opinion,
can an administrator's sale be regurded as an
official sale. In some states the defaulting
purchaser is liable for "the deficiency arising
on resale" by statute. .Alexander v. Herri11g,
54 CTa. 200. We have no such statute. ThA
subject of the sale under which the question
here arises was real estate, the title to which
could not pass to the purcha.<1er without dePd.
Whether, if the subject had been goods and
chattels, the same mode of declaring would
have been bad, is a question on which we express no opinion. Demurrer, regarded as a
demuner to the special count, sustained.

BHEACll BY VE:\'DEE OF
Al.LEN v. MOHN.
BREACH BY VENDEE OF AGREEMENT TO BUY.

(49 N. W. 52, 86 Mich. 3'>..8.)
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ALLEN v. MOHN.

(49 N. W. 52, 86 Mich. 328.)

Supreme Court of Michigan. June 5, 1891.

Error to circuit court, Branch county;

No as P. Lovsmnou, Judge.

Supreme Oourt of Michigan. June 5, 1891.
Error to circuit com·t, Branch county;

No\B P. Lov1rnmm·:, Judge.
F. A. Lyon, for appellunt.
~rby,

R'. 11.Lock-

for llppellee.

F. A. Lyon, ior appellant. W. H.Lock-

erby, ior appeilee.

GRANT, J. Plaintiff and defendant

made a contract. by which piaintiifiagreed

to sell to defendant certain real estate.

The contract was made in November, I886.

In September, 1890, delendant informed

plaintlii that he could not go on with the

contract, refused to pay the interest

which was then due. and said that he

would give up the contract. While the tes-

timony is not clear as to the circum-

stances under which piaintiii took posses-.

slon of the land, it appears to be conced-
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ed by both parties that deiendant aban-

doned the premises, and plaintlii there-

upon took possession. The contract con-

tained the ioliowing clause: “it is mutu-

ally agreed between the parties that the

said party of the second part shall have

possession of said premises on and alter

date hereof, and he shall keep the same in

as good condition as they are at the date

hereol, until the said sum shall be paid as

aioresaid; and, if said party of the second

part shall iail to perform this contract.

or any part of the same, said party of the

ﬁrst part shall, immediately after such fail-

ure, have a right to declare thesame void,

and retain whatever may have been paid

on such contract, and all improvements

that may have been made on said prem-

ises,and may consider and treat the party

of the second part as his tenant holding

over without permission. and may take

lm mediate possession of the premises, and

remove the party of the second part there-

from." Upon the abandonment of the

contract and of the premises by deiend-

ant plaintiff had his choice of three reme-

dies: (1) Bill ior speciﬁc performance; (2)

suit at law to recover the purchase price;_

and (3) a repossession of the premises

and a suit to recover damagesiora breach

of the contract. The latter remedy is sup-

ported by theioliowing authorities: Rail-

road v. Evaus,6 Gray, 25; Griswold v.Sa-

bin, 51 N. H. 170: Meason v. Kaine.67 Pa.

St. 126, 63 Pa. St. 335; Porter v. Travis,

40 Ind. 556; Wasson v. Palmer, 17 Neb.

330. 22 N. W. Rep. 773. In such case the

measure of dama,':,es is the diiicrence be-

tween the contract price and the ,vaine

oi the land at the time ‘of abandonment

and re-entry, less what has been paid.

This rule is jIT§t, and places vendor and

vendee upon a footing of equality and

mutuality. In order to deprive the ven-

dor of this remedy it must either be ex-

cluded by the terms of the contract, or

waived by his acts and conduct. In this

case the contract does not exclude it, nor'

has the plaintiii waived it. The circuit

GRANT, J. Plaintiff and defendant
made a contract. by whleh plnlntirragreed
to sell to deremlunt certain real e~tate.
'l'hl' contract waH muut> In No,·emher, l~li.
In September, 1:-<911, defemlnnt Informed
plaintiff that he coullt not go on with the
<'ontrnct, refmwd to pay the Interest
which wus then cine. an1l Raid that he
would give up the contr11ct. While the testimony Is not cle11r llR to tho cirrumstances uutfor \\'hich plaintiff took posses-.
slon or the land, It appenrs to he conce•led by both parties that delenrlunt almndoned the premlHeA, &Dfl plain ti(( thereupon took J)ORl!t'RHion. The contrnct contained the following clause: "It is mutually agreed bet ween the parties that the
said party of the tiecond part shall have
poR8f.'Hslon of said premises on and after
date hereof, and he shall keep the Ra rue In
as good conrlltlon as they are at thu <late
hereof, until the said Hum Rhall bP p11t<l a1-1
aforesaid; and, II said party of the second
part ebull fall to perform thh1 contrai:t,
or any part of the same. said pttrtr of the
first part 11ball, lmmedlately after such full·
u1·e, have a right to dt..'Clure thesnme vol•],
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and retain whatever may ba\•e been paid
on such contract, and all improvements
that may have been made on said premises, and mayconshler a.nd treat the party
or the 8t•cond part 88 his tenant holding
over without permlsHlnn. and mny take
Immediate po1111e11slon ul the pre111l1:1c11, uni.I
rPmove the party of the sPCond pnrt therefrom." Upon the abandonment or the
contract and of the premises hy defendant pl11lntlff had his choice of three remedle11: (1) Bill for specific performance; (2)
suit nt Ju w to recover tlie purl'husc price;_
and (3) a reposAesslon of the premises
uni! a suit to reco,'er dama11:e1lfora hreuch
of the con trart. The !utter remedy Is supported by the following t111thorltles: Unil·
road v. E\"1t11s,6 Brn,\', 25; Gri1:1wt•ld \'.~U
bln, 51 N. H. 170; ~lea1mn v. Kalne.67 Ptt.
8t. 126, 63 Pa. 8t. 33~; PortPr v. Travis,
40 Ind. 006; Was1mn v. Palmer, 17 Nt·b.
3:10. 22 N. W. Hep. 773. In such caHe the
meaRure of dmnu~cH Is the cliffPrence be·
twc1m the contruct 11ricc and the _Taine
ol the 1111111 ut the time 'of abun1lo11111Pnt
nncl re-Pntry, lt>i;s what hnR hePn 11aid.
ThlH rul11 is JiIBt; anti phices ventlor and
veudeP urion a footing of equality nud
mutnallt,v. In order to deprive the vendor of this renwdy It must either be cxrlt11lcd by the tC'rmR of the contrnct. or
waived by his actM and conduct. In this
caRc the contrttct lloeR not exclude it, nor.
hns the plujntift waived It. The clrc•uit
court wne In error in dlrectlnp; a verdict
ror the defendant. Judgment Is revcr11erl,
wl th cm1tH, and a new trla.1 ordered, The
other justices concurred.
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BREAQH OF CONTRACTS RESPEUDING REAL ESTATE.

(2 W. Bl. 1078.)

FLUREAU v. THORNIIILL.

(2 w. B1. 1078.)

Easter Term, 16 Geo. III. C. P.

The plaintif f bought at an auction a rent

of £26 1s. per ann. for a term of thirty-two

years, issuing out of a leasehold house, which

let for £31 6s. Thesale was on the 10th of

October, 1775. The price at which it was

knocked down to him was £270, and he paid a

deposit of 20 per cent., or £54. On looking

into the title, the defendant could not make

it out; but offered the plaintiff his election,

either to take the title with all its faults, or

to receive back his deposit with interest and

costs. But the plaintiff insisted on a farther

sum for damages in the loss of so good a

bargain; and his attorney swore, he believed

the plaintiff had been a loser by selling out

of the stocks to pay the purchase money, and
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their subsequent rise between the 3d and the

10th of November; but named no particular

sum. Evidence was given by the defendant,

that the bargain was by no means advanta-

geous, all circumstances considered; and the

auctioneer proved that he had orders to let

the lot go for £250. The defendant had paid

the deposit and interest, being £54 155. 6d.

into court: But the jury gave a verdict, con-

trary to the directions of DE GREY, C. J., for

£74 15s. 6d., allowing £20 for damages.

Davy moved for a new trial, against which

Glyn shewed cause; and by—

DE GREY, C. J. I think the verdict wrong

in point of law. Upon a contract for a pur-

chase, if the title proves bad, and the vendor

is (without fraud) incapable of making a good

one, I do not think that the purchaser can

be entitled to any damages for the fancied

goodness of the bargain, which he supposes

he has lost. '

GOULD, J., of the same opinion.

BLACKSTONE, J., of the same opinion.

These contracts are merely upon condition,

frequently expressed, but always implied, that

the vendor has a good title. If he has not,

the return of the deposit, with interest and

costs, is all that can be expected. For curios-

ity, I have examined the prints for the price

of stock on the last 3d of November, when

three per cent.'s sold for 87%. About £310

must therefore have been sold to raise £270.

And if it costs £20 to replacethis stock a

week afterwards (as the verdict supposes),

the stocks must have risen near seven-per

cent. in that period, whereas in fact there

was no difference in the price. Not that it is

material; for the plaintiff had a chance of

gaining as well as losing by a ﬂuctuation of

the price.

NARES, J., hesitated at granting a new

trial; but next morning declared that he con-

curred with the other judges.

Rule absolute for a new trial, paying the

costs.

Easter Term, 16 Geo. III.· C. P.

RESPECTING REAL ESTATE.
DE GREY, C. J. I think the verdict wrong
in point of law. Upon a contract for a purchase, If the title proves bad, and the vendor
ls (without fraud) Incapable of making a good·
one, I ·ao not think that the purchaser can
be entitled to any damages for the fancied
goodness of the bargain, whl.ch he supposes
he has lost.
·

The plaintiff bought at an auction a rent
of £26 ls. per ann. for a term of thirty-two
years, Issuing out of a leasehold house, which
let tor £31 6s. The .sale was on the 10th of
GOULD, J., of the same opinion.
October, 1775. The price at which It was
knocked down to hlrn was £270, and he paid a
BLACKSTONE, J., of the same opinion.
deposit of 20 per cent., or £5-1. On looking These contracts are merely upon condition,
Into the title, the defendant could not make frequently expressed, but always Implied, that
it out; but offered the plaintiff his election, the vendor has a good title. If he has not,
either to take the title with all its faults, or the return of the deposit, with Interest and
to receive back his deposit with interest and costs, ls all that can be expected. For curioscosts. But the plaintiff Insisted on a farther ity, I have examined the prints for the price
sum for damages In the loss of so good a of stock on the last 3d of November, when
bargain; and his attorney swore, he believed three per cent.'s sold for 87J,2. About £31<>
the pla1ntl1f bad been a loser by selling out must therefore have been sold to raise £270.
of the stocks to pay the purchase money, and And If It costs £20 to replace , this stock a:
their subsequent rise between the 3d and the week afterwards (as the verdict supposes),
10th of November; but named no particular the stocks must have risen near seven · per
sum. Evidence was given by the defendant, · cent. in that period, whereas In fact there
that the bargain was by no means advanta- was no difference In the price. Not that it Is
geous, all circumstances considered; and the material; for the plalntUr had a cha.nee of
auctioneer proved that he had orders to let gaining as well as losing by a fluctuation of
the lot go for £250. The defendant had paid the price.
the deposit and Interest, being £54 15e. 6d.
NARES, J., hesitated at granting a new
Into court: But the jury gave a verdict, contrary to the directions of DE GREY, C. J ., for trial; but next morning declared that he concurred with the other judges.
£74 15s. 6d., allowing £20 for damages.
Rule absolute for a new trial, paying th&
Davy moved for a new trial, against which
Glyn shewed cause; and bycosts.
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59

if - HOPKINS v. gas.

I

0 (6 Wheat./109.)

Supreme Court of the United States. Feb.

Term, 1821.

Error to the circuit court for the District

of Columbia.

This was an action of covenant, brought by

the defendant in error Lee against the plain-

tif f in error, Ho kins, to t‘t'cover dam_ages_fo_r_

not conveyinf certain tracts 6? m ary ands,

which tTi'c‘[ﬂ.nn t rror . t 'agi1-c‘1 to con-

vey, upon the (l'efl7ﬂdant in error relieving a

certain incumbrance held by one Rawleigh

Colston, upon an estate called Hill and Dale,

and which Lee had previously granted and

sold to Hopkins, and for which the military
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lands in question were to be received in part

payment: The declaration set forth the cove-

nant, and averred that Lee had completely

removed the incumbrance from Hill and Dale.

The defendant below pleaded: (1) That he‘

had not completely removed the incumbrance;

and (2) that he (the defendant below) had

never been required by Lee to convey the

military lands to him; and on these pleas is-

sues were joined. Upon the trial, Lee, in or-

der to prove the incumbrance in question was

removed, offered in evidence to the jury a

record of the proceeding tn chancery, on a

bill ﬁled against him in the circuit court, by

Hopkins. The bill stated that on the 23d

of January, 1807, the date of the agreement

on which the present action at law was

brought, Hopkins purchased of Lee the estate

of Hill and Dale, for which he agreed to pay

$18,000, namely, $10,000 in military lands, at

settled prices, and to give his bond for the

residue, payable in April, 1800. That Lee, in

pursuance of this agreement, selected certain

military lands in the bill mentioned. That at

the time of the purchase of Hill and Dale, it

was mortgaged to Colston for a large sum,

which Lee had promised to discharge, but

had failed so to do, in consequence of which

Hopkins had paid off the mortgage himself.

The bill then claimed a large sum of money

from Lee, for having removed this incum-

brance, and prayed that the defendant might

be decreed to pay it, or in default thereof that

the claimant might be authorized, by a de-

cree of chancery, to sell the military lands,

which he considered as a pledge remaining in

his hands, and out of the proceeds thereof

to pay himself. On the coming in of Lee's

answer, denying several of the allegations of

the bill, the cause was referred to a master,

who made a report, stating a balance of,

$427.77, due from Hopkins to Lee. This re-

port was not excepted to, and the court, after

referring to it, proceeded to decree the pay-

ment of the balance. To this testimony the

defendant in the present action objected, so

far as respected the reading of the master's

'report, and the decretal order thereon; but the

objection was overruled by the court below,
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tion of covenant, was precisely the same, if

not exclusively so, (although that was not

necessary.) as the one which had already been

directly decided by the court ,of chancery.

The bill, which was ﬂied by the present plain-

tiff in error, states that on the 23d of Jan-

uary, 1807, which is the date of the agree-

ment on which the action at law is brought,

Iiopkins purchased of Lee the estate of Hill

and Dale, for which he was to pay $18,000;

that is, $10,000 in military lands, at settled

prices. and the remainder in bonds, payable

in April, ISU9. That Lee, in pursuance of

this agreement, selected certain military lands

in the bill mentioned. That at the time of

the purchase of Hill and Dale, it was mort-

gaged to ltawieigh Coiston for a large sum,

which Lee had promised to discharge, but

that he had failed so to do, in consequence of
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which Hopkins had paid the mortgage himself.

The complainant then claims a large sum from

Lee, for having removed this incumbrance,

and prays that the defendant may be decreed

to pay it, or in default thereof that the com-

plainant may be authorized,by a decree of the

court, to sell the military lands. which he con-

sidered as a pledge in his hands, and out of

the proceeds to pay himself. Not a single de-

mand is stated in the bill. except the one aris-

ing out of the complainant's extinguislnnent

of the incumbrancc, which Lee had taken

upon himself to remove.

On Lee's answer coming in. denying several

of the allegations of the bill. the cause is

referred to a master commissioner, who, after

a long investigation, in the presence of both

parties, and the examination of many wit-

nesses, makes a report by which Hopkins is

made a debtor of Lee in the sum of $427.77.

On inspection of this report, it will be seen

that the chief if not the only controversy be-

tween the parties was, whether Hill and Dale

had been relieved from its incumbrance to

Colston, by funds furnished by Lee to Hop-

kins for that purpose. and that. unless that

fact had been found afﬁrmatively, a report

could not have been made in Lee's favor.

The court, after referring to this report, and

stating that it had not been excepted to, pro-

ceeds to decree the payment of this balance

by the complainant to the defendant.

this summary review of the proceedings in

chancery, the conclusion seems inevitable

that the chief if not sole matter in litigation

in that suit. was whether Hill and Dale had

been freed of the incumbrance to Colston, by

Lee or by Hopkins. and that the report and

subsequent decree proceeded on the ground

and established the fact that Lee had dis- .

charged it, which was also the only point

put in issue by the ﬁrst plea of the defendant,

in the action of covenant. No rule of evi-

dence, thercfore, is violated in saying that

this decree was properly admitted by the cir-

cuit court. But if the decree were admissible,

it is supposed that the report of the master

ought not to have been submitted to the jury.

— __._._. ___. __..- .-,____—-——_.
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tlon ot covenant, was precisely the same, If The court entertains a dltrerent opinion. No
not exclusively so, (although that was not reason has been assigned why a decision by a
necessary,) as the one which had already been proper and sworn otticer of a court of chandirectly decided by the court ,of chancery. cery, iu the presence and hearing of both
The bill, whleh was fllt'd by the present plain- parties. according to the acknowledged prnctiff in error, states that on the 2:ld of Jan- tice and usage of the court on the very runtuary. 1807, which Is the date of the agree- ters In controversy, not ex<'epted to by either
ment on which the action at law Is brought, pat·ty and confirmed bY. the court, should not
Hopkins purchased of Lee the estate of Hill be as sn tis.factory evidence of any fact found
awl l>alP, for which he was to pay $18,000; by it, as the verdict of a jury on which a
that Is, $10,0UO In military lands, at settled judgment ls nftet·wnrds rendered. The adpricc~s. am! the remainder in bonds. payable
vantage whleh a verdict mny be supposed to
in April, 18U9. That Lee, in pursuance of pos>:t>ss over a report, from Its being the dethis ugreement, selected certain military lands cision of twelve Instead of the opinion of a
in the hill mentioned. 'I'hnt at the time of s1ngle man, ls perhaps more than counterbalthe purehase of Hil1 and Dale, it was mort- ancl'cl by the time which Is ullowpd to a masgagt•d to Hawlelgh Colston for a large sum, ter for deliberation and n more thorough Inveswhich Lee had promised to dls<'harge, but tigation of the matters in controversy. But a
thnt he had fnlled so to do, In consequence of better and more satisfactory answer ls, that It
which Ilopkius had paid the mortgage himself. Is the usual, knO"wn, nnd approved pt·actlce of
The complainant tlJPn elalms a large snm from the court to whose jurisdiction the parties had
Lee, for having ri>moved this inc·umbrance, submltt!'cl themselves. But If this document
and prnys that the tlefP11<lnnt ma~· he decreed · he withheld from a jury, how are they or the
to pay it, or in default thereof that the com- court to arri'l"e at the grounds of the decree
plainant may be authorized. b~· a decree of the or n knowlt>d~e of the points or matters which
<'flllrt. to s1'li the militar~· lnlllls. whk•h he con- have been <h•1·lclecl in the cause? Without it,
sidered :1s a pledge in his hands, and out of the decree may be Intelligible; but the
the proceeus to pay himself. ~ot a single de- grounds on wbich It proceeds, or the facts
mand Is statl'cl in the bill. except the one nrls- whh•h it menns to clecille, mny be liable to
iug out of the complainant's extinguishment much uncPrtalnty and conjecture. 'I'he reof the lncumbranec, which Lee had taken
port. thereforP, as well as the deeree was
upon himself to remo\·e.
proper evidenee, not only of the fact that
On Lee's nnswer coming In. den)·ing severnl such report anti decree had heen made, but ot
of the allegations of the bill. thP 1·ausc Is the muttet· which they professed directly to
refern'<l to a master con1111lssloner. wllo, after clt>d1le. '\\'c are not now called upon to say
a long investigation, in the presence of both whether, In those respects, they were concluparties, and the examination of many wlt- sive, as they do not appear to have been ofnesst•s, makes a report by which Hopkins Is fered with that view; but without nwanlug
made n debtor of Lee In the sum of $4:!7.77. to deny to them such etTect, we only say,
On Inspection of this report, It will be seen whleh Is all that the presPnt case requires,
thnt the chief if not the only controversy be- that they were competent ond proper. In the
tween the parties was, whether Hill and Dale absence of other testimony, to establish the
hall been rellen>tl from Its incumbrauce to fact of the rt>moval of the incumbmnce by the
Colston, by funds furnished by Lee to Hop- dPfPudant Lee, from the estate or Hill and
kins for that purpose. and that, unless that Dale.
fact had been found attirmati\"ely, a report
In the asseRsment of clumuges, the counsel
-eould not have been made in Lee's favor. for the plaintiff In error prayed the court to
The court, after referring to this report, and Instruct the jury that they should take the
stntlng that it had not been excepted to, pro- price of the land, as agreed upon by the par<·Peds to decree the payment of this balance ties ln the articles of agreement upon which
It)' the 1·om11la lnant to the defomlant. From the suit was brought, for their government.
this s11111mary review of the proceedings in Hut the court refused to give this Instruction.
dmueery. the conclusion seems inevitable and dlrPcted the jury to tnke the_E_t:!c~ Qf
that the d1iPf if not sole matter in litigation the lumls. at the time tlwy ought to ha \"C
in that suit. was wlwthPr Hill nnd Dale hnd Tif>1>ii eom·-1·)'M. 1is flt(• 1111;:1;;\1~c~..0Ld1.1.ma1:!:S::
hct•n freed of the iueum!Jrance to Colston, by To this Tfflifrtidiori the plalutitf In error exLt>c or by Hopkins. an<l that the n•port and cPptPll. 'l'he mle is setth•il In this court. that
i;11hsN11wnt decree procel'dl:'d on the ground In nn aetlon lw the Yendee for a breach ot
:mt.I e1;;tabllshed the fnct that Lee h:icl dls- contruct. on the part of the vendor, for not
diargc1l it, which was also the only point (lellvering the artkle, the measure of dnmput in Issue by the first plea of the defemlnut, ai.;es Mo..lta price at ti!\' time of t!Je hreaeh.
in the action of covenant. Xo rule of evl- The pric·e heing 8P!tlPll by the contract, ";iifcil
deni:e. then•fore, Is violntPd in snying that Is gt•uerally the cnse. makes no difference, nor
this di>eree was properly r.dmitted b)" the cir- ought it to makP any: otherwise the vendor,
·cnit court. But if the dec·rpp were admissible, if the article ha\·e rbPn In value. would alit Is supposed thnt the ri>port of tlw master wa~·s han~ It in his power to discharge him•mght not to have been submitted to the jury. self f1·om his contract, and put the enhanced
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value in his own pocket. Nor can it make

any difference in principle whether the con-

tract be for the sale of real or personal prop-

erty, if the lands, as is the case here, have

not been improved or built on. In both cases

the vendee is entitled to have the thing agreed

for at the contract price, and to sell it himself

at its increased value. If it be withheld, the

vendor ought to make good to him the differ-

ence. This is not an action for eviction, nor

is the court now prescribing the proper rule of
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damages in such a case. Judgment aﬂirmed.
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(40 N. Y. 64.)
BREACH OF CONTRACTS RESPECTING REAL ESTATE.

PUMPELLY v. PHELPS.

(40 N. Y. 64.)

Court of Appeals of New York. March, 1869.

Action for speciﬁc performance of a con-

tract to convey land, or in the alternative,

damages for the breach. The plaintiff had

judgment below for damages, and defend-

ant appeals.

Court of Appeals of New York. March, 1869.
Action for specific performance of a contract to convey land, or In the alternative,
damages for the breach. The plalntltr bad
judgment below for damages, and defendant appeals.
John H. Reynolds, for appellant. Samuel
Hand, for respondents.

John H. Reynolds, for appellant.

Hand, for respondents.

Samuel

MASON, J. There has never seemed to

me to have been any very good foundation

for the rule, which excused a party from the

performance of his contract, to sell and con-

vey lands, because he had not the title which

he had agreed to convey. There seems to

have been considerable diversity of opinion

in the courts as to the grounds upon which
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the rule itself is based.

In England, the rule seems to have been

sustained upon the ground of an implied

outstanding of the parties, that the parties

must have contemplated the diﬂienltles at-

tendant upon the conveyance. In the lead-

ing case on this subject, of Flureau v. Thorn-

hill, 2 W. Bl. 1078, Blackstone, J., said:

“These contracts are merely upon condition,

frequently expressed, but always implied,

that the vendor has a good title."

While in this country the rule is based up-

-on the analogy between this class of cases

and actions for breach of covenant of war-

ranty of title. Baldwin v. Mann, 2 Wend.

399; Peters v. Mclieon, 4 Denio, 546. The

rule of damages, in an action for a breach

of covenant of warranty of title, is settled to

be the consideration paid, and the interest;

and yet this is an arbitrary rule, and works

great injustice many times; and the courts

met with the greatest embarrassment in set-

tling it. These diﬂiculties were considered,

and well expressed, in the leading case in

this state, of Staats v. Ten Eyck‘s Ex'rs, 3

Caines, 115, in which the court said: "To

ﬁnd a rule of damages, in a case like this, is

a work of diﬁienlty; none will be entirely

free from objection, or will not, at times,

work injustice.

“To refund the consideration, even with the

interest, may be a very inadequate compen-

sation, when the property is greatly enhan-

ced in value, and when the money might

have been laid out to equal advantage else-

where. Yet to make this increased value the

criterion, where there has been no fraud,

may also be attended with injustice, if not

ruin.

“A piece of land is bought solely for the

purpose of agriculture, and by some unfore-

seen turn of fortune, it becomes the site of

a populous city; after which an eviction

takes place. Every one must perceive the

injustice of calling on a bona ﬁde vendor to

refund its value, and that few fortunes could

bear the demand. Who for the sake of one

hundred pounds would assume the hazard

of repaying as many thousands, to which

MASON, J. There bas never seemed to
me to have been any very good foundation
for the rule, which excused a party from the
performance of his contract, to sell and convey lands, because be had not the tltle whlch
he had agreed to convey. There seems to
have been considerable diversity of oplnlon
In the courts ns to the grounds upon which
the rule Itself le based.
In England, the rule seems to have been
sustained upon the ground of an Implied
outstanding of the parties, that the parties
must have contemplated the difllcultiee attendant upon the conveyance. In the leading case on this subject, of Flureau v. Thornhlll, 2 W. Bl. 1078,. Blackstone, J., said:
"These contracts are merely upon condition,
frequently expressed, but always lmplled,
that the vendor has a good title."
Whlle In this country the rule ls based up·on the analogy between this clnss of cases
and actions for breach of covenant of w11rrnnty of title. Baldwin v. Munn, 2 Wend.
81.19; Peters v. McKeon, 4 Denio, frill. The
rule of damages, In an action for a breach
-Of covenant of warranty of title, Is settled to
be the consideration paid, and the Interest;
and yet this is an arbitrary rule, :rnd works
great Injustice many times: and the eourts
met with the greatest embarrassment in settling It. These dlfllcultles were considered,
nnd well expressed, In the leading case in
this state, of Staats v. Ten Eyck"s E:x:'re, 3
Caines, 115, In which the court said: "To
find a rule of damages, In a case like this, le
a work of difllculty; none will be entirely
frro from objection, or will not, at times,
work injustice.
"To refund the consideration, even with the
Interest, may be a very lnndequnte compensation, when the property le greatly enllanced In value, and when the money might
have been laid out to equal advantage else·
where. Yet to mnke this increased value the
criterion, where there has been no fraud,
may also be attended with Injustice, It not
ruin.
"A piece ot land is bought solely for the
purpose ot agriculture, and by some untoreseen turn of fortune, It becomes the site of
a populous city; after which an eviction
takes place. Every one must perceive the
Injustice of calling on a bona fide ;endor to
refund Its •alue, and that few to11unes could
bear tltt> demand. '\\·ho for the sake of one

hundred pounds would assume the hazard
of repaying as many thousands, to which
value the property might rise, by causes
unforeseen by either party, and which In·
crease in worth would confer no right on the
grantor to demand a further sum of the
grantee?" There ls stlll another class of
cases where the rule of simply refunding
the purchase-money and the Interest operates with great hardship and Injustice upon
the purchaser. A. purchnses of B. a city lot
for the purpose of building himself a dwelling or buildings upon It, and takes from B.
a full covenant deed of the premises, covenanting to assure, warrant and defend the
title. The buildings are constructed at the
cost of thousands of dollars, and then B. is
evicted by a paramount tltle ascertained to
be In some one else. The recovery of tile
money and six years' Interest le not a very
just or reasonable return In damages for the
law to give to one who holds a covenant to
make good and defend the title.
The reasons assigned for this rule in actions for a breach of covenant of warranty
of title can scnrcely apply to these prelimlIiDry contracts to sell and convey title at a
future time. • In the latter case the vendee
knows he bas not got the title, and that perhaps be may never get It; and If he will go
on and make expenditures under such circumstances it ls his own fault; and besides,
these preliminary contracts to convey generally have but a short time to run, and
there ls seldom any such opportunity tor the
growth ot towns, or a large Increase tn the
value of the property as there ls In these
covenants in deeds, which run with the land
through all time.
The supreme court of the United States
has refused to yield Its sanction to this
rule when applied to contracts for the sale
of lands, and affirms ~he doctrine that the
reason of the rule us to contracts fot· the sale
of goods and chattels applies with equal
force to these executory contracts for the
sale of lands. Hopkins v. Lee, 6 Wheat. !00.
That rule Is where a party sustains a loss by
reason of a breach of contract, he le, so far
as money can do It, to be placed In the same
situation with respect to damages as If the
contract had been performed. Robinson v.
Harman, 1 Exch. 850. This case of Hopkins
v. Lee, 6 Wheat. 109, ls cited with approbation In some of the American cases, and the
rule there laid down affirmed.
These views are not presented t.o Induce
the court to overrule or repudiate the adjudged cases In our own courts upon this
subject. They reach back over a period of
more than forty years, and have been too
long sanctioned to be now repudiated.
I have referred to this matter simply as
furnishing an argument against In any degree extending the rule, and as a reason for
limiting It strictly where the already ad·
judged cases ln our own courts have placed
lt. It becomes Important In this connection
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to inquire what that limit is. The general

Y rule certainly is that where the vendor has

i

L

the title and for any reason refuses to con-

vey it, as required by the contract, he shall

respond in law for the damages in which he

shall make good to the plaintiff, whom he

has lost by his bargain not being lived up to.

This gives the-_v,endee the diﬁerence between

the contract? price and the value at the time

of th'e"‘DrezTch, as prolit'§"6xTadvantages whi_cla

a_ne*_the.di_r_ect1a_nd_’imItt'e'(IlE‘_re_' fruits of the

contr_act. Gritiin v. Colver, 16 N. Y. 489;

Dﬁrkee v. Mott, 8 Barb. 423; Underhill v.

Gas-light Co., 31 How. 37; Masterson v.

Mayor, etc., of Brooklyn, 7 Hill, 61, 69.

Where however the vendor contracts to sell
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and convey in good faith, believing he has

good title, and afterward discovers his title

is defective, and for that reason without any

fraud on his part, refuses to fulﬁll his con-

tract, he is only liable to nominal damages

for a breach of his contract. Baldwin v.

Mann, 2 Wend. 309; Peters v. McKeon, 4

Denio, 546; Conger v. Weaver, 20 N. Y. 140.

The rule is otherwise however where a par.\

ty contracts to sell lands which he knows at

the time he has not the power to sell and

convey; and if he violates his contract in‘;

the latter case, he should be held to make;

good to the vendee the loss of his bargain,;\

and it does not excuse the vendor, that he

may have acted in good faith and believed,‘

when he entered into the contract, that hei

should be able to procure a good title for hili

purchaser. 2 Pars. Cont. 503, 504, 505; Hop-

kins v. Grazebrook, 6 Barn. & O. 31; Driggs ,

7. Dwight, 17 Wend. 74; Bush v. Cole, 28 N.

Y. 261; Lock v. Furze, L. R. 1 C. P. 441;

Robinson v. Harman, 1 Exch. 849; Hill v.

Hobart, 16 Me. 164; Fletcher v. Button, 6

Barb. 650; Trull v. Granger, 8 N. Y. 115;

Hopkins v. Lee, 6 Wheat. 109; Burwell v.

Jackson, 9 N. Y. 535; White v. Madison, 26

N. Y. 124; Lewis v. Lee, 15 Ind. 499; Dean

v. Raseler, 1 Hilt. 420; Bitner v. Brough, 11

Pa. St. 127; MeNair v. Crompton, 35 Pa. St.

23; Wilson v. Spencer, 11 Leigh, 261; Gra-

ham v. Hackwlth, 1 A. K. Marsh. 429; Dart,

Vendors, 447. This rule, applied to the case

at bar, sustains the judgment of the supreme

court.

The defendant must be held personally lia-

ble on this contract. It is essentially his

contract. In order to exempt the contract-

ing party from personal liability, he must so

contract as to bind those he claims to repre-

sent. Moss v. Livingston, 4 N. Y. 208; De-

witt v. Walton, 9 N. Y. 571; Bay v. Gunn, 1

Denio, 108; Bush v. Cole, supra.

The fact that the party describes himself

as trustee, without stating for whom, does

not relieve him from personal liability, or

change the effect of his engagement. Taft

v. Brewster, 9 Johns. 334; White v. Skinner,

13 Johns. 307; Dewitt v. Walton, supra;
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PITCHER v. LIVLNGSTON.

(4 Johns. [N. Y.] 1.)

Supreme Court of New York. Feb. Term, 1809.

Supreme Court of New York. Feb. Term, 1809.
Mr. Foot, for plaintitl'. Mr. Slosson, for
defendanL
4

Mr. Foot, for plaintiff. .\Ir.

defendant . 4

Slosson, for

VAN NESS, J. Although it is not express-

ly stated in the case, I shall assume the fact

to be, that the declaration contains an aver-

ment that the plaintiff had been evicted, in

consequence of a total failure of the title de-

rived to him under the deed from the defend-

ant. This fact being assumed, there is no

difference between the present case and that

of Staats v. Ten Eyck's Ex‘rs, 3 Caines, lllf,

except, that,' in this case. beneﬁcial improve-

ments have been made by the plaintiff upon

the property, the value of which he contends

he is entitled to recover. The case just men-
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tioned is among the most important and inter-

esting, of any that have ever been brought

before this court for decision; and. accord-

ingly. it appears to have received the most

deliberate consideration. I not only submit

to the authority of that case. but I take this

occasion to express my perfect acquiescence

in the reasons, upon which the determination

of it appears to have proceeded. The cove-

nants upon which the breaches were assign-

ed in that case, were the same as in the pres-

ent. viz. the covenant of seisin, and for quiet

enjoyment. The court decided, that the dam-

ages. which the plaintiff was entitled to re-

cover, were to be limited to the consideration

expressed in the deed, with the interest there-

on, and the costs of suit7att,ending the evic-

tion. But in addition to the sum which the

plaintiff, according to this rule. would recov-

er, he contends that the defendant is bound

to indemnify him for the loss of his im-

provements. These are estimated at 925 doi-

lars; and the only point left open to discus-

sion. is. whether he has a legal right to de-

mand this sum?

In Ftaats v. Ten Eyck's Ex‘rs, the court de-

termined that the plaintif f was not entitled

to recover any damages on account of any

increased value of the land. Here a distinc-

tion is attempted to be made between an ap-

preciation of the land itself. and that appre-

ciation of it which is produced by the erec-

tion of buildings. or the labour bestowed up-

on it in clearing and cultivating: a very

son, why the increased value of the land

itself cannot be recovered; is because the cov-

enant cannot be construed to extend to any

thing beyond the subject matter -of it, that

is, the land, and not to the increased value of "

it, subsequently arising from causes not ex-

isting when the covenant was entered into.

For the same reason, the covenantor ought

not to recover for the improvements; fort

these are no more the subject matter of the‘

contract between the parties, than the in-

creased value of the land. The doctrine con-

tended for by the plaintiff's counsel, is. that

the damages sustained by the covenantee at

the time of the eviction, ought to be the meas-

VAX XESS, J. Although It Is not expressly stated In the case, I shall assume the fact
to be, that the declaration contains an averment that the plalntllT had been evicted, In
consequence of a total failure of the title derived to him under the deed from the defendant. This fact being assumed, there Is no
difference between the pi·esent case and that
of Staats v. Ten Eyck's Ex'rs, 3 Caines, lllf,
except, that,' In this case, benetlclal Improvements have been made by the pluintift' upon
the property, the value of which he contends
he Is entitled to recover. The case Jm;t mentioned Is among the most Important and Interesting, of any that have ever been brought
before this court for decision: and, accordlugl)-, It appears to have received the most
(\elibprate consideration. I not only submit
to the authority of that case, but I take thls
oecaslon to express my perfect acquiescence
In the reasons, upon which the determination
of It appears to have proceeded. The cov.inants upon which the breaches were assigned iu that case, were the same us In the l>resent. viz. the covenant of seisin, and for quiet
enjo~·ment. 'fhe court decldro, that the damages. which the plaintiff was entitled to recon'r, we1·e to be llmltecl to the consideration
t'XJ'l"l'8St'd In the deed. with the lntere8t thereon, and the costs of suit_nttpnulng tbe e.vlctlou. But In addition to the sum which the
plnintilf, according to this rule. would recover, he contends that the defendant is bound
to Indemnify him for the loss of his iruproYNnent8. The~e are estimated at 925 dollars; ancl the only point left open to discussion. Is, whether he has n legal right to demand this sum?
In ~tnnts Y. Ten Eyck's Ex"rs, the court determluecl that the plnlnti!T was not entitled
to n•eoYer any dnnrnges on account of any
i11<·reased vah1t> of the land. Here a distinction Is attt>mpted to be made b('tweeu an apJH'P<"iat ion of the land itsL>lf. and that appr1!dn t ion of it which is produced by tlw erection of lmilclings. or the labour bestowed upon It in (·it·arin).!' 111111 cultivating: a very
11il'e. and. ns I apprt>heml. a spef·11l11tive distirwtion, to whieh It would be cliftteult, If not.
in most cas1's. lmposslhl1•. to gh·e any pr:IC'tical f'fft>et, without danger of the most ttainant
lnjnsti!'e. The reasoning of the judge><.
whol'<e opinions are reported In the case allmlrcl to, goes Yl'ry far, if not conclusively,
to proYe, thnt such n distinction Is utterly
without foundation. The admission that It
might possibly exist. has prohahl~· given rise
to this netion. whlc-h, otht>rwlse, I belie,·e,
would not. afte1· that del'islon. have hceu
brought. One, and perhaps the principal rea-

son, why the Increased value of the lane!
ltselt cannot be recovered; is because the covenant cannot be construed to extend to any
thing beyond the subject matter ·of It, that ,
Is, the land, and not to the Increased value of :
It, subsequently a.rising from causes not existing when the covenant was entered Into.
Fo1· the same reason, the covenantor ough~
not to recover for the Improvements; foli
these are no more the subject matter of the'
contract between the parties, thun the Increased value of the land. The doctrine contended for by the plaintiff's counsel, is. that
the damages sustainro by the covenantee at
the time of the eviction, ought to be the measure of compensation. l\Iost clearly, then, the
increased value of the land Is as mueh within the reason of this rule, as the improvements; and upon the SllllH~ principle that the
covenautee Is entitled to the one, he Is to the
other.
But If the value at the time of eviction Is
to be the measure of dnmuges, upon what
principle Is the consideration and Interest, as
such, recoverable in addition to the Improvements? These must be laid out of view;
and the then value be ascertained without
referen('e to them. Besides. If, In determining the rule of damages. the Increase of valm'
Is to be taken Into view, by parity of reasoning, it would be proper. :md what would be
required by a just reciprocity, to take Into
consideration any contingent diminution of
value. Ersk. Inst. 206. But this has never
been heard of nor pretended. No euch vrinciple Is to be found In the common law, notwithstanding these covenants have been ln
use upwards of two hundred years. I think
this circumstance aft'ords an argument
against the measure of damages Insisted up·
ou hy the plaintiff, and which. of Itself. Is
nearly declsh·e. that the rule is without legal
foundation.
In lllustrntlon of my opinion on this part or
the m·gument, I will stnte a case. A. gives
a conveyance, containing covenants of seisin
antl for quiet enjoyment, of a house and lot.
The h<-.use constitutes two-thlrcls of the wholl.'
value. The house> Is nftcrwartls burnt. Then
~
the grantee Is evicted for a failure of the 0 ,
grantor's title. He then resorts to both his \ VI.
\'OYeuantl'l, whll'h, of course. nre \Jrol\en, for .P.1:;/
Indemnity. What would be the measure ot' l ~...
damages? the value of the lot, nt tire time or
/'
e\·letlon, being one-third of whnt the whole 1_,1. 1fi
cost him; or the \'aluP. as asc·Prtuined anti r . f'
ngrPPcl npon hy tht> clePd ltsl'lf'! !'\o doubt,
, ,~
the latter. " ' hPnP\'Pr t111' g1·antee's title ha~·.
pron•d to llP 1•ntin•IJ· defective, and there Is ·
an eY Id ion const>q nen t thereon, the grnn tee
has a rii:ht to rPscind the contract, and thPn.
as In other cases 1!Ppendlng ou the same prln·
clple. he rcco\'Prs haek. upon his covennnH.
what he has pnltl. with the Interest. Flt>illl'r
v. Rtarkin. 1 H. Bl. 17; Flureau v. Thornhill. 2 W. Bl. 1078.
la the easp jul'<t put, I haYe supposed. that
both the covenants of seisin and for quiet
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i for quiet enjoyment;

enjoyment were broken, and that breaches

for both were duly assigned; and I have

shown that, if the value of the property at

the time of eviction is to be the measure of

damages, it necessarily follows, that such ,

diminished value is all which ought to be re-

covered. It is conceded, that, upon the cove-

nant of seisin only, the recovery is to be con-

ﬁned to the consideration and interest. On

the covenant for quiet cujoyment, therefore,

the plaintiff must rely, to recover compensa-

tion for his improvements. Let us then ex-

amine whether, consistently with certain

ﬁxed legal principles, the covenantee can re-

cover a greater sum of damages in any case

under the covenant for quiet enjoyment, than

under the covenant of seisin?
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An eviction must be shown before a suit

can be maintained on the former covenant.

Not so, however. as to the latter; for that is

broken, if the grantor has no title. the mo-

ment the deed is delivered; and the grantee

has an immediate right of action. Whenever

the eviction is occasioned by a total want of

title in the grantor, then both the covenants

of seisin and for quiet enjoyment are equally

broken; and the grantee has his remedy on

both. if he proceeds upon the ﬁrst, he shall

recover the consideration expressed in the

deed, and the interest. But if he proceeds

upon the last, it is said he shall recover ac-

cording to the value at the time of eviction;

and, as I have before remarked, he must be

content to recover according to the then

value, even though it amounts to one half

only of the consideration expressed in the

deed.

The case would then stand thus. When the

deed contains both these' covenants, if the

property at the time of eviction be worth

one hallI of the consideration and interest,

the grantee may, notwithstanding, upon the

covenant of seisin, recover the whole con-

sideration and interest. But if the property

happen to be worth double the consideration

money and interest, by reason of the im-

provements made thereon, he may ‘waive the

covenant of seisin, and resort to the covenant

and thus recover the

whole amount. Can this be possible? It

appears to me, that to give such an effect to

these covenants, is not reconcilable with any

principle of law or justice.

My understanding of the nature of these

covenants. when both are contained in the

same deed, is this: That the covenant of

seisin, which relates to the title, is the prin-

cipal and superior covenant, to which the

covenant for quiet enjoyment, which goes to

the possession, is inferior and subordinate.

And I am not aware that a case can possibly

occur, where the grantor can recover a great-

er amount in damages for the breach of the

latter than of the former; though there are

many cases where he may recover less. The

suit here is brought upon both covenants;

enjoyment were broken, :nul that breaches
tor both were duly »st:l~nPll; and I have
shown that, It the value of the property at
the time of eviction ls to be the measure of
dan111gt>s, It necessarily follo\vs, that such
diminished n1lue Is all which ought to ~e recon•rt'fl. It Is l'onceth'tl, that, upon the covenant ot seisin only, th!' rrcovery Is to be COD·
fined to the consi1IPrntiou and Interest. On
the coYeuant tor Qniet enjoyment, thcn•tore,
the plnlntllf must rely, to n•covt>r compensation for his Improvements. Let us tlwn examine whether, conslstrntly with ct•rtaln
fixed legal principles, the covenantee can 1·ec0Yer a greater sum ot damages In any case
under the covenant tor quiet enjoyment, than
under the covenant ot seisin?
An eviction must be shown before a suit
can be maintained on the former covenant.
::-.;ot so, however. a11 to the latter; for that .s
brokt•n, If the grantor bas no title. the momt•nt the deed Is del!Yered; and the grantee
has an Immediate right ot action. Whenever
the eviction ls occasioned by a total want of
title In the grantor, then beth the covenants
of selsh:; and for quiet enjoyment. are equally
broken; and the grantee has bis remedy on
hoth. If he proceeds upon the first, he shall
re<'Over the conslcleratlon expressed in the
deed, and the Interest. But It be proceeds
upon the last, It Is said he shall recover according to the value at the time of eviction;
and, as I have before remarked, he must be
content to recover according to the then
value. even though It amounts to one half
only of the consideration expressed In the
tleed.
The case would then stand thus. When the
deed contains both these· covenant11, It the
property at the time of eviction be worth
one halt of the consideration and Interest,
the granteE' may, notwithstanding, upon the
covenant ot seisin. recover the whole conl'ldemtlon and Interest. But It the property
happen to be worth double the consl<lrratlon
money and Interest, by reason of tl!e Improvements made thereon, he may ·waive the
covenant of seisin, and resort to the co,·enant
: for quiet enjoyment; and thus recover the
whole amount. Can this be pos11lhle? It
appears to me, that to gl-:e such an effect to
these covenants, Is not r~oncllable with any
principle ot law or justice.
:\ly understanding of the nature of these
covenants. when both are contalm•d In the
same deed, ls this: That the covenant ot
l!elsln. which r!!lates to the title, Is the prlnelpnl and superior covenant, to which the
covt>nunt for quiet enjoyment, which goes to
the possession, ls Inferior and subordinate.
And I am not aware that a cns<' can possibly
occur, where the grantor can rPcover a greater amount In damages for the breach of the
latter lhan or the former; though there are
many c11ses where he may recover less. The
suit here ls brought upon both covenants;
and both, In consequence of the total failure
of the clPfendant's title and the eviction,
J..\ "" D.Df.:!11 F..d.-19
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haYe bem broken. The plalntltr, accordingly, bas a right to recovPr on both; but as tht·
nmount of thP recovery would, acco1·<1l11g to
my i!IP:i~. i.Je the same on cnt'h, he must t•IP1·t
on whil'h of them he means to rely, and tak1•
nomi1:nl damages on the other. The plaintiff
Is entltlPtl to but one satisfaction, 11n1l be hai;
Ws remedy on either of the covenants, at hlH
electlo•, to obtnln it. It will hnnlly be 11nld.
that he can have judgment tor the same sum
on both the eo,·cnant11.
The covPnnnt against lncumbrancl'S stnrnls
upon a different footing, and Is governed by
dlffcrl'nt principles. That 11 strictly a con•nant of Indemnity; and the grantee may recover to the tun extent ot any lncnmbranCt>S
upon the land, which he shall have been compelled to discharge. But even there It wlll
be found, that the same rule prevails, In fixing the amount ot damages, as In actions upon the covenants of seisin and for quiet enjoyment: that Is, the party recovers what he
has paid, w!th the Interest. and no more.
But I consider the question arising In this
cnuse as settled by authority; and that, according to estnbllsbed rules of law, the plalntUr ls not entitled to any thing more than
the value of the land, as settled by the consideration In the deed.
In suits upon the ancient COYenant of warranty, beyond all dispute, the reeovery was
restricted to the value ot the land at the time
ot making the covenant. Cases have oceurred, In which the value of the land has been
enhanced by subsequent beneficial Improvements; but the rule as to the extent of satisfaction, has continued lnfiexlbly the same,
without regard to the Increased value, by
whatever cause It may have been .prodneNl.
A. personal action will not lie, on the covenant
ot warranty, upon the eviction of the freehold (Bae. Abr. tit. Cov. C.); and tor which
reason, upon the Introduction ot allenatlonEi
by bargain and sale, new covenants .were de·
vised, but solely for the purpose ot securlni.r
to the bargalnee the pcrson!ll responslbllit~
of the bargalnor, In ca11e of a failure of hli;
title. I think I am warranted In saying, that
It never was designed, by the Insertion of
tbesl' covenants, to establish any other rull•
of d11mnges than what previously existed:
because there 1s nothing In the terms of thP
eovenants, from which an Intention to ex!ellfl
the liability of the covenantor can be ln!Prred; but the contrary Is to be presumed, as
not a slngl~ case Is to be tonnd where sueh
a construetlon of these covenants, which werP
In a great measure substituted tor the cov1·nant ot warranty, has ever obtained. TbP
covenant tor quiet enjoyment, as I have bPfore remarked, ls ·that upon which ·compensation tor the lmprovemPnts Is to be recovered, If at all. This covenant bas a mon•
strict analogy to the ancient covenant of
warranty. than any of the other modern coYenants. If, then, on the covenant of wn rranty, the satlstnctlon recoYt>red In land w111<
to be equivalent to thP Y:thw of the !antis.
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granted, as it existed at the time when the

covenant was made, I do conceive, that we

are bound to adopt a correspondent rule,

when satisfaction is sought to be recovered

in money, in a personal action, on the cove-

nant for quiet enjoyment.

Such a rule, moreover, 1 consider to be con-

formable to the intention of the parties. I

question if one grantor out of ten thousand

enters into these covenants with the remotest

belief, that he is exposing himself and his

posterity to the ruinous consequences, which

would result from the doctrine contended for

by the counsel for the plaintiff. By giving

this doctrine our sanction. we should. in my

apprehension, create a most unexpected and

oppressive responsibility, never contemplated

by the parties, and inﬂict an equally unmer-

ited punishment upon grantors acting with
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good faith. and having a perfect conﬁdence

in the validity of their title to the land, which

they have transferred for what it is reason-

ably worth.

If any imposition is practiced by the gran-

tor, by the fraudulent suppression of truth,

or suggestion of falsehood, in relation to his

title, the grantee may have an action on the

case, in the nature of a writ of deceit; and

in such action he would recover to the full

extent of his loss. Har. & But. Notes to Co.

Litt. 38-ta, tit. "Warranty"; 1 Fonb. Eq. 366;

1 Com. Dig. 236, A, 8.

I am aware that it is diﬂlcult to lay down

any general rule on this subject, wholly free

from objection. This is a diﬂlculty which

has been felt by the profoundest jurists in

all ages. I think, however, that the rule of

the common law, which obliges the grantor,

when he believes he has a valid title, and

acts without fraud, to refund what he has

received, with the interest, is as equitable as

any that has ever been established; and that

this is all which, upon principles of the most
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grantetl, as It existed at the time when the
covennnt was made, 1 do conceive, that we
are bound to adopt a. correspondent rule,
when satisfaction ls sought to be recovered
in money, In a personal action, on the covenant for quiet enjoyment.
8ueh a rule, moreol"er, I consider tO be conformn hle to the intention of the parties. I
qttestion If one grnntor out of ten tpousapd
enters into these covenants wifh the remotest
belief, that he Is exposing himself and hie
})OSterlty to the ruinous consequences, which
would result from the doctrine contendetl for
by the counsel for the plaintiff. By giving
.this doctrine our sanction, we should. in my
npprehension, create a Dlost unexpected and
oppressive responsibility, never contemplated
11y the parties, and inflict an equally unmerited punishment upon grantors acting with
good faith. and having a perfect confidence
In the validity of their title to the land, which
they have transferred for what It ls reasonably worth.
It any Imposition Is practiced by the grantor, by the fraudulent suppression of truth,
or suggestion of falsehood, In relation to his
title, the grantee may have an action on the
<'ase, In the nature of a writ of deceit; and
In such action be would recover to the full
extent of bis loss. Har. & But. Notes to Co.
Litt. 384a, tit. "Warranty"; 1 Fonb. Eq. 366;
1 Com. Dig. 230, A, 8.
I nm aware that It is difficult to lay down
uny general rule on this subject, wholly tree
fl'Om objection. This Is a difficulty which
hns been felt by the profoundest jurists In
all ages. I think, however, that the rule of
the common law, which obliges the grantor,
when he believes be bas a l"alid title, and
nets without fraud, to refund what he bas
received, with the Interest, ls as equitable as
any that bas ever been estuhllsbed; and that
this Is all which, upon principles of the most
rigorous justice, ought to be exacted from
him.
My opinion, therefore, Is, that, In this case,
the plaintiff Is entitled to recover the consideration money expressed In the deed, with
the Interest, and the costs of suit following
the eviction, and no more.

rigorous justice, ought to be exacted from

him.

My opinion, therefore, is, that, in this case,

the plaintiff is entitled to recover the consid-

eration money expressed in the deed, with

the interest, and the costs of suit following

the eviction, and no more.

SPENCER, J. It is submitted to the court,

by the case made and argued in this cause,

what is the correct rule of damages, upon

covenants of seisin and for quiet enjoyment,

contained in a deed conveying lands. in a

case where the grantee has made improve-

ments, and where the value of the land has

appreciated. It is also made a question,

\\-hether the plaintiff is entitled to recover in-

ten'st on the consideration money paid for

the lands.

It is to be regretted, that the case is so loose

in several respects. It is fair, however, to

infer, from the case as it stands, and as it

was argued, that. in point of fact, both cove-

nants were broken; that the plaintiff was

evicted for defect of title in the defendant,

I

SPEXCER, J.

It ls submitted to the court,

hy the case made and arguetl in this cause,

what Is tlw co1Tect rule of dama~es, upon
covenants of seisin and for quiet enjoyment,
contained In a deed conve.ving lands. In a
<·nse where the grantee bas made improvements, and where the value of the land has
apprPl'iatrd. It ls also made a question,
whether the plaintiff Is entitled to recover lnter<•st on the conslderatl~n money paid for
the lands.
It is to he regretted, that the case ls so loose
In several respects. It Is fair, however, to
infer, from the case as it stands, and as it
was argued, that, In point of fact, hoth covenants were broken; that the plalntltr was
evicted for detect of title In the defendant,

and tbnt the plaintiff bad made Improvements, in the usual course of agriculture, on
the lands conveyed by the def{'ndant to him,
ot a substantial kind, to the vnlnc of $92r>.
The case of Staats v. Ten Eyck's Ex'rs. 3
Caines, 112, decides two of the questions
which arise out of this case. In that case,
though the value of the land had Increased
by extrinsic causes, the plaintiff was allowed
to recover only the consideration paid, with
the Interest, costs. and coftnsel fees. 'l'he Interest was allowed, because the purchaser J
was subject to an action for the mesne
profits; and In the presf'nt case It is to be (
lntentled, that the plnlntltr Is liable to pn)·
them to the person who has the title, and
consequently It ls to be allowed. It will be
seen, that these two questions have received
a similar determination In the supreme judicial court of Massachusetts. Marston v.
Hobbs, 2 ~lass. 433. In the case, before
cited, of Staats v. Ten Eyck's Ex' rs, the court
expressly reserved Its opinion, upon a case
like the present, where beneficial Improvements hnve been made on the premises after
the purchase. It was then considered, that
there might be a difference between the C'nse
of the rise In value by the natural 11pprecl11tlon of lands, depending ln a great measure
on Ideal worth, and the case of Improvements
of a beneficial kind.
This question I do not think has been settled In the English courts. It bas never been
decided In our own, and consequently It 1111pears to me, that we are at full liberty to tb:
a rule, which shall bear analogy to othl'r
cases, and attain complete justice between
the parties. I cannot pretend to say, thnt
the rule which I shall lay down will be free
'rom objection, when applied to all ca11es:
and I all) not sensible that any general rule.
In almost any given case, will Invariably be
free from exception. It Is the very nahm·
of general rules, sometimes to operate harsh·
ly; but the necessity of a fixed standar1l of
justice Is of more lmporta11ce to the intC'rP1c1ts
of men, than one that Is capricious and thw·
tuatlng.
It has I think been erroneously said, that
the defect of title Is a case of mutual error;
on the contl'ary, from my obserl"atlon and
knowledge of the sale of lands, I think the
defect of title Is a mattel" generally and almost universally In the peculiar knowledge
of the vendor. It Is a rare cusp tor a pnrch:iser to investigate the seller"s title; an<l in
most cases, It Is Impossible. The buyer relies on the allegations of the 'l"endor, on his
apparent responsibility to reimburse In case
of .eviction, upon bis possession of the property, and emplmtlrnlly on bis covenants of
title nnd for quiet enjoyment. These covl'mrnts, whenever they occur In a deed, seem
to me to Indicate. beyond all question, thnt
the purcb:iser did not mean to rely on tlw
title of the vendor alone. but that he meant
to have his personnl llahillty, as his guaranty.
The language of the vendor ce>rresponds with

I
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that of the purchaser, and holds out the idea

that he had sold the land at his own peril,

and that he would warrant it to be his. Ex-

travagant cases have been put hypothetical-

ly, to shew the enormous injustice of the rule,

that the vendor must be answerable for im-

provements. It has been asked, if a piece

of land thus sold, with covenants, should be-

come the site of a ﬂourishing city, what for-

tune could, under a rule allowing for im-

provements, withstand ruin? It may be re-

torted to such a question, what is to become

of the industrious citizen or mechanic, who

has spent his hard earnings in erecting his

little house or workshop, relying on the cove-

nant in his deed, if he can only get back his

purchase-money and interest? It is not fair,

however, to test a rule by extreme cases.

To settle a general rule wisely and equitably,
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we should have an eye to cases which gen-

erally occur, and not be startled, on the one

hand or the othtr, by those occurrences which

are rare and t'ew. In general, the defect of

title happens in sales between man and man,

where the improvements are of the ordinary

and beneﬁcial kind. If the improvements are

merely to gratify the eye of the individual,

and to pamper his vanity and pride, a jury

would be warranted to take those things into

consideration in their assessment of damages.

I lay it down as a rule, which cannot re-

quire much illustration to enforce it, on the

core of analogy and justice, that in actions

for a breach of covenant, the damages are to

be estimated according to the value of the

thing, when the covenant was broken. Thus,

in a covenant for the delivery of speciﬁc prop-

erty at a given day, in case of a failure, the

rule invariably is, to allow in damages the

value of the thing on the day it ought to

have been delivered, and when the covenant

was broken. So, also, on contracts for the

delivery of stock, the value at the time it

ought to have been delivered, and even at the

time of trial, has been the criterion of dam-

ages. 2 Burrows, 1010; 1 Strange, 406; 2

East, 211. In the present case, the defendant

(.'ovenanted that the plaintiff should quietly

enjoy the land sold. This covenant was vio-

lated, when the piaintiff was evicted; and he

has lost, by the breach of the covenant, not

only the quiet enjoyment of the land, but the

usufruct of those erections and improvements,

without which, it is fair to say, that the

land itself could not have been enjoyed, agree-

ably to the intention of the parties. It neces-

sarily follows, that had the defendant kept

his covenant and allowed the plaintiff to en-

joy the premises old, he would not have been

deprived of those improvements made on the

ti1ing itself, the making of which was an

inducement to the purchase. How it can be

called a severe doctrine to compel the vendor

to respond in damages for ordinary and neces-

sary improvements, I confess myself incapa-

ble of perceiving, when he has undertaken,

for a price paid, to assure to the vendee the

validity of his title. Very often, and perhaps

that of the purchaser, and holds out the Idea
that he had sold the Jand at his own peril,
and that he would warrant It to be his. Extravagant cases have beai put hypothetically, to shew the enormous Injustice of the rule,
that the vendor must be answerable for Im·
prol"ements. It has been asked, If a piece
of land thus sold, with covenants, should beaime the site of a fiourlshlng city, what fortune could, under a rule allowing tor Im·
provements, withstand ruin'/ It may be retorted to such a question, what Is to become
-0f the Industrious citizen or mechanic, who
has spent his hard earnings In erecting his
little house or workshop, relying on the covenant In his deed, If he can only get back bis
purchase-money and Interest? It Is not fair,
however, to test a rule by extreme cnscs.
To settle a general rule wisely and equitably,
we should have an eye to cases which generally occur, and not be startled, on the one
band or the other, by those occurrences which
are rare and few. In general, the defect of
title happens In sales between man and man,
where the Improvements are of the ordinary
and beneficial kind. U the Improvements are
merely to gratify the eye of the Individual,
and to pamper bis vanity and pride, a jury
would be warranted to take those things Into
-ainslderatlon In their assessment of damages.
I Jay It down as a rule, which cannot require much Illustration to enforce It, on the
core of analogy and justice, that In actions
or a breach of covenant, the damages are to
be estimated according to the value of the
bing, when the covenant was broken. Thus,
n a covenant for the delivery of specific property at a given day, In case of a failure, the
i"llle Invariably Is, to allow In damages the
value of the thing on the day It ought to
have been delivered, and when the covenant
was broken. So, also, on contracts for the
delivery of stock, the value at the time It
ought to have been delh·ered, and el"en at the
time of trial, has been the c1·1tcrion of damages. 2 Burrows, 1010; 1 Strange, 406; 2
East, 211. In the present case, the defendant
~~o,·ennnted that the plnlntltf should quietly
l'11joy the land sold. This col"enant was violated, when the plnintlf'l' was evicted; and be
bas lost, by the IJr<!ach or the co,·ennnt, not
-0nly the quiet enjoyment of the land, but the
usufruet of those erections and Improvements,
without which, It Is fair to say, that the
l.nnd itself could not bu \'e been t>njoyed, agreeably to the Intention of the parties. It necessarlly follows, that hail the defendant kept
bis covenant and nllowc(l the plaintiff to enjoy the premises sold, he would not have been
deprl•ed of those lmpro•ements made on the
thing ltselt, the making of which was an
inducement to the purchase. How It can be
<'ailed a severe doctrine to compel the vendor
to r cs1xmd in damages for ordinary and necessary Improvements, I confess myself lncapahle of perceiving, when be has undertaken,
for a price palJ, to assure to the vemlee the
,·nlldlty of bis title. Very often, and perhaps
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generally, there ls a want ot due caution on
the part of a vendor, who sells without title;
and not unfrequently there fa a mixture of
fraud, which sets detection at defiance. The
rule I have advanced, whilst It will restore
to the Innocent vendee no more than be has
actually lost, will Induce greater caution In
sellers, who, It resPonsllJle only for the principal and Interest, will find the selling of
land without title an easy and excellent meth·
od ot rnlslng money, Instead of resorting to
bon-owlng.
It follows, from tile view I have taken or
this question, that the plalntll'f, under the
covenant tor quiet enjoyment, may recover
the Improvements; and that under the covenant of seisin be could not, unless the grantee
WllB selsed by virtue of the deed, and hall
been el"lcted under a title paramount. I have
not entered Into any examination or the ancient method of proceeding under the warrnntla chartie, and the rule which obtained
in such case, under the writ of cape ad vnlentlam; because the covenants of warranty
were then considered as real covenants binding only on the grantor and bis heirs. It
has, however, been urged that the Introduction of the covenants of seisin and for quiet
enjoyment, were substitutes for the covenant
or warranty, and that the same rule ought
to follow the substituted covenants. It appears to me much more proper to consider the
Introduction or personal covenants In the
alienation of real property, as Immediately
assimilating themselves to other personal
covenants and contracts, and as subject to th<!
same rules of construction, and the same rul<!
of damages, whenever they are broken. If
so, the covenant for quiet enjoyment wns not
broken until the eviction, and the rule of daruagcs would be the property lost at that tl!nc,
which would Include the price paid for the
land, and the value or those erections and Improvements which bad been added at the
plalntlft'.'s expense. It Is suppo!!ed, that
though the covenants of seisin and for quiet
enjoyment are distinct, and regard different
objects, yet that where the first falls, the latter Is merged In It. This principle strikes
me as llloglcal, and unfounded In authority.
There are authorities (Freem. 4:JO. pl. U12:
6 Vin. Abr. 426, pl. 20; Id. 476. pl. 4) which
show, that where, In a de!'d, a man covenants
that be hath a good right to convey, &c. nn1l
that the party shall quietly enjoy, one covemmt goes to the title and the other to the possession. And why n person who has IJrolwn
two distinct agreements. should protect himself from a rei;;ponsll.Jlllty on both, and be
liable only on the least extensive one, sm·passes my powers of comprPhenslon. .A cnse
has been mentioned as declclPd In the supreme
court or Pennsylvania (Bender v. Frombergl'r.
4 Dall. 436), as hearing on the present; it will
be found to have been on the mere covennnt
of seisin, and power, &c. to convey In fee.
The rule I hnve ndoptt>d meets that case. anti
la reconcilable wlth it, for there tile covenant
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was broken as soon us 1t was made, and the
dll.IDages then sustained were the consideration money and Interest.
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was broken as soon as it was made, and the

damages then sustained were the considera-

tion money and interest. ,

KENT, C. J. The declaration in this case

is upon two distinct covenants in the deed,

to wit, the covenant of seisin,‘ and the cove-

nant for quiet enjoyment; and the verdict

was taken for the piaintiii, subject to the

opinion of the court, as to the rule of dam-

ages. We must take it for granted upon this

case, and so it seems to have been understood

and admitted upon the,argnment, that both

covenants were broken, and the question,

then, is, what is the measure of damages,

when the two covenants are the subject of

one action, and a breach of each has been

duly assigned and proved?

The case of Staats v. Ten Eyck's Ex'rs goes

very far towards a decision of this question.
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That was a suit upon the same covenants,

and a breach of both was admitted. The

point submitted was the rule of damages,

“under the covenants mentioned in the deed."

The court adjudged that the rule of damages

was the consideration money and interest;

and I observed, in giving my opinion in that

case, that the covenant for quiet enjoyment

could have no greater operation, as to dam-

ages, than the covenant of seisin. Mr. Justice

Livingston, who also gave his opinion, was

silent upon that point; but it was a neces-

sary consequence of the judgment of the court,

that the increased value of the land could not

be recovered under either of those covenants.

The doctrine that the measure of damages,

under the covenant for quiet enjoyment, is to

be computed from the time of eviction, and to

include the then value, even when the title

has totally failed, and the covenant of seisin

broken, cannot possibly be reconciled with

that decision. I do not wish, however, to

rest my opinion in this case solely upon that

authority. As the question is of great im-

portance, I am content to re-examine it at

large.

What would be the rule of damages under

a covenant for quiet enjoyment, if a breach

of that covenant was shown which did not

amount to a breach of the covenant of seisin,

or if that covenant stood alone in a deed, un-

accompanied with the covenant of seisin, is

not a point at present before us.‘ If, how-

ever, it stood alone in a deed, I should think,

as at present advised, that upon a total fail-

ure of title, the damages would be the same

as in the covenant of seisin, and no more, for

the analogy is very close between that cove-

nant and the ancient warranty. But when

the covenant for quiet enjoyment follows a

covenant of seisin in the same deed, the in-

tent of the instrument. taken together, ap-

pears manifestly to be, that the one covenant

is merely auxiliary to the other, as the one

covenant relates to the title, and the other

refers to the future enjoyment of that title.

The covenant for quiet enjoyment respects

the possession merely, and it would seem to

be unreasonable and very inconsistent, for the
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!{ENT, C. J. The declaration In this case
is upon two distinct covenants In the cleed,
to wit, the covenant of st>isin. and the coven:mt tor quiet enjoyment; and the verdict
was tnken fo1· the pln.lnt!O', subject to the
opinion of the court, as to the rule ot damages. We must take it for granted upon this
case, and so It seems to have been understood
and admitted upon the, a1·gument, that both
covenants were broken, and the question,
then, Is, what Is the measure of damages,
when the two covenants are the subject of
one action, and a breach of each has been
duly assigned and proved?
The case of Staats v. Ten Eyck's Ex'rs goes
very tar towards a decision of this question.
That was a suit upon the same covenants,
and a breach of both was admitted. The
point submitted was the rule of damages,
"under the covenants mentioned In the deed."
The court adjudged that the rule of damages
was the consideration money and Interest:
and I observed, In giving my opinion In that
case, that the covenant for quiet enjoyment
could have no greater operation, as to damages, than the covenant of seisin. Mr. Justice
IAvlngston, who also gave his opinion, was
silent upon that point; but, It was a necessary consequence ot the judgment of the court,
that the Increased value ot the land could not
be recovered under either of those covenants.
The doctrine that the measure of damages,
under the covenant for quiet enjoyment, Is to
be computed from the time of eviction, and to
Include the then value, even when the title
has t«>tally failed, and the covenant of seisin
broken, cannot possibly be reconciled with
that decision. I do not wish, however, to
rest my opinion In this case i.-olely upon that
authority. As the question Is of great Importance, I am content to re-examine It at
large.
What would be the rule of damages under
a covenant tor quiet enjoyment, If a breach
of that covenant was shown which did not
amount to a breach of the covenant of seisin,
or If that covenant stood alone In a deed, un·
accompanied with the covenant of seisin, Is
not a point at present before us.• It, however, It stood alone In a deed, I should think,
us at present advised, that upon a total failure of title, the damages would be the snme
:t!'l In the coveoont of seisin, and no more, for
1he annlogy is very close between that cove11;111t and the ancient warranty. But when
11w eovcnant for quiet enjoyment follows a
,,ovenant of seisin in the same deed, the Intent of the Instrument. taken together, apIK>ars manifestly to be, that the one covennnt
18 merely auxiliary to the other, as the one
<'ovenant relates to the title, and the other
refers to the future t>njoyment of that title.
The covenant for qulPt enjoyment rPspects
1he posspsslou 111cr..1y, and It would seem to

be unreasonable and very inconsistent, for the
plaintiff to recover under one covenant the
whole value of the estate, as It was lntendetl
to be conveyed, and under another covenant
in the same deed, distinct and Increased damages, because he was not permitted to enjoy
that estate. These covenants must be taken
in connection, to ascertaJn their Import. The
covenant tor further assurance Is one of these
secondary covenants, and If the grantor had
no title, and the value of the land was recovered back by the grantee, he could not be
called upon In damnges for further assurance.
This would be very Idle when It bad been ascertained by the recovery under the principal
covenant that he had nothing to assure. Ir
the grantee recovers what Is to be deemed,
upon established principles, the value of the
ln.nd, under the covenant of title, it amounts,
in effect, to a sntlstnctlon and extlngulshment
of the covenants relative to the possession,
and the grantee cannot receive anything more .
than nominal damages under those covenants.
There Is no precedent to authorize any greater
recovery, under the covenant tor quiet enjoyment than under the covenant of seisin; and
the universal silence in the books on a point
which so frequently gives occasion tor litigation, ls a strong argument to prove that
no such rule exists as that contended for by
the plaJntll'I'. I believe It has never been the
received opinion with us, that In a deed con·
talning the usual covenants, viz. the covenant of title or seisin, and the covenant relative to the possession, the latter covenants,
In a case of no title, and consequently of 11.
breach of the covenant of title, would becorneparamount covenants and afford a larger
claim tor damages. The latter construction
would not only Introduce a rule hitherto undiscovered In the common law of England,
but a rule of great moment In Its Immediate
consequences to the community; and I must
be thoroughly persuaded ot tbe soundness of
the construction, either upon authority or
principle, before I can consent to adopt It.
When, therefore, there ls no authorlt~· tor
such a. construction to be met with In thf' rlPclslons at Westminster-Hall. and It ap1w11r'4
to be repugnant to the natural and reasonablr
Interpretation of the covenants, as found In
connection In the same df'ed, I must adher(~
to the opinion which I gave In the case of
Staats v. Ten Eyck's Ex'rs, nrnl which rnnst.
from a view of that cnse, have been also the
unanimous opinion of the court.
·
The case before us. then, resolves Itself
Into this question, What Is the extent of the
rule of damages on a breach of the covenant of seisin?
Three points are submitted by the case:
(1) Whethe1· the plaintiff can recover lnt<>r·
est on the consldPration pald '! (2) \\'hctht>r
he can recover for the Increased value of
the land? And (3) whether he cnn recoYer
for his beneflclnl lmprovemPnts?
'
1'he two first points wPrf' !ll'ttlPd In thl'
cuse oC Stunts '" 'f(' ll Eyi·k's Ex'1·s, und llct.'(l
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not again be examined.’ Nothing has been

shown which affects the accuracy of that de-

cision on those points, and it deserves no-

tiee as being of great weight in support of

that decision, that in the states of Massa-

chusetts and Pennsylvania, the same rule

of damages is established in an action for

the breach of the covenant of eisin. The

third point was reserved in the considera-

tion of the former case, and no opinion ex-

pressed upon it. It, therefore, remains open

for discussion.

I must own that I never perceived any

ground for a distinction as to the damages,

between the rise in the value of the land,

and the improvements. There is no reason

for such a distinction. deducible from the

nature of the covenant of selsin. improve-

ments made upon the land were never the
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subject-matter of the contract of sale, any

more than its gradual increase or diminution

ID value. The subject ot‘ the contract was

the land as it existed. and was worth when

the contract was made. The purchaser may

have made the purchase under the expecta-

tion of a great rise in the value of the land,

or of great improvements to be made by

the application of his wealth, or his labor.

But such expectations must have been con-

ﬁned to one party only, and not have en-

tered as an ingredient into the bargain. It

was the land and its price; at the time of

the sale, which the parties had in view,

and to that subject the operation of the con-

tract ought to be coniined. The argument

in favor of the value of the land, and the

improvements as they exist at the time of

eviction. has generally excepted cases of ex-

traordinary increase, and of very expensive

improve,ments. It seems to have been ad-

mitted. that, without such a limitation to

the doctrine, it could not be endured. But

this destroys every thing like a ﬁxed rule

on the subject, and places the question of

damages in a most inconvenient and danger-

ous uncertainty. We have a striking illus-

tration of this in the French law. The rule

in France, upon bona tide sales, according

to Pothler, Traite du Contrat de Vente, No.

132 to No. 141, is to make the seller, on

eviction of the buyer, refund not only the

original price, but the increased value of the

land, and the expense of the mellorations

made. He admits, however, that the in-

tention of the parties is to be the rule in the

assessment of damages, and that, in the

case of an immense augmentation in the

price of the land, or in the value of the im-

provements, the seller is to answer only for

the moderate damages which the parties

could be supposed to have anticipated when

the contract was made. it is plainly to be

perceived, that there is no certainty in such

a loose application of the rule. and that it

leaves the damages to an arbitrary and un-

deﬁned discretion, and so it appears to have

been understood; for in the "institution an

Droit Francois," by M. Argon (livre 3. c. 23),

\"EXDOH'~
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not again he examined..· Nothing bas been It Is laid down, that "the q1wstlon ot damshown wl.lleh alfects the accuracy of that de- ages, beyond the price paid, Is with them
cision on those points, and It deserves no- very arbitrary." This Is not consonant to
tice as being of great weight In support of the genius or our law, nor does It recomthat decision, that In the states of .Massa- mend itself well for our adoption. On a
ebusetts and Pennsylvania, the same rule subject of such general concern, and of such
-of damages Is established In an action for momentous Interest, as the usual covenants
the breach of the covenant of seisin. The In a conveyance of land, the standard for
third point was reserved In the considera- the computation of damages, upon a failure
tion of the former case, and no opinion ex- of title (whatever that standard may he},
pressed upon It. It, therefore, remains open ought, at least, to be certain and notorious.
' The seller and the purchaser are equally
for discussion.
I must own that I never pe1·celved any Interested In having the rule fixed. I ngrl't~,
ground for a distinction as to the damages, that the contract Is to be constn1ed, acbetween the rise In the vnlue of the land, cording to the Intention of the parties; but
and the lmprovenlPnts. There Is no reason I consider, that the Intention of the covefor such a dlstinl'tlnn, de!luelble from the nant of seisin, as uniformly ex11011111IPd lu
nature of the covenant of s1•isln. lrupro·ve- the English law, Is only tu ludt>mnlfy the
ments ma<ll' upon the land \\'(•re never the grantee tor the consideration paid. This
subjt>d-matte1· of the contract of salt•, any was the settled rule at common la'I\'., upon tlw
mo1·e than Its gr11d11nl lncrP:tSt> or diminution ancient warranty, of which this covenant
m value. The suhJt•C't of tlw contract was of seisin Is one of the substltntPB; nntl all
the land as It existed, and was wortn when the reasons of policy which prevent the exthe contract was mn<le. '.l'he purchaser may tension of the covenant to the lncreast>d valhave made tne purchast• under tbe expectn- ue of the land, apply equally, If not more
tlon of a great rise In the value of the !ant.I, strongly, to prevent Its <'Xtenslon to improveor of gren t lruproveu11'U I!! to be made by mt•nts made by the purchaser. A selh~t· mny
the application of his wealth, or his labor. be pr<'immed, at all thnf's, nhle to return
But such expectations must have been con- the consideration which be actually received;
tin!'d to one party only, and not have en- but to compel him to pay for exp!'nslve lmtered as an ingrecllent Into the bargain. It proveru!'nts, of the extent of which he
was the lnnd und its price; at the time of could have made no calculation, and for
the sale, whl<'h the llUl'tles had In view, which be received no consideration, may
and to that suhject the opl'ratlon of the con- sud<lenly overwhelm him and his family In
tract ought to be C•lllllned. 'fhe 11rg11tlll'llt lrretrievuble ruin. Tlw common l11w nevPr
in favor of the value of the lanrl, and the left the vendor In such a state of uncertain·
Improvements as they exist at tht- time of ty; and It made no distinction between the
t>vlction, has generally excepted eases of ex- natural rise of the land, and Its Increased
truortllnat·y Increase, and of very expensive value, by buildings, or other improvements.
impro,·PmPnts. It seems to ha\•e been ad- The feoffor was stlll to answer only for
mittf'd, that, without such a limitation to the value of the land, as It was worth when
the doctrine, It could not be enduret.l. But the feofl'rnent was made. This was the
this destroys every thing like a fixed rule amount of the decision In Yearbook 30 Ed.
on the subject, and places the question of III. p. 14b. A man had a warship, and
clamaires In a most Inconvenient and dnnger- granted It over, with warranty, and, after-0us uncertainty. We bave a striking Illus- wards, the grantee was lmpleadecl, and
tration of this In the French law. The rule vouched the grantor. Now the wardship
in France, upon bona fide sales, according was of more value at the time of the vouchto Pothier, Tralt<i du Contrat de Vente, No. er, than it was at the time of the grant,
132 to No. Hl, la to make the seller, on with warranty, by reason of other lands
.eviction of the buyer, refund not only the descending, afterwards, or by bullcllngs or
.original price, but tbe Increased value of the otherwise, and 1t was held, that the vouchec
land, and the expense of the meliorations could take protestation of this matt!'r when
made. He admits, however, that the In- he entered Into the warranty; I. e. when 1!1•
tention of the parties Is to be the rule In the was admitted to defend, Instead of the origassessment of damages, and that, In the inal tenant. And Burton laid this down
case of an Immense augmentation In the for law, that If land be better after the
price of the land, or In the value of the Im- footrment made by buildings or otherwise.
provements, the seller Is to answer only for he who receives In value, receives but nrthe moderate damages which the parties cordlng as the land was worth at the time
-could be supposed to have anticipated when of the feoffment, and not more. The same
the contract was made. It Is plainly to be rule was laid down for law by Newton, J.,
perceived, that there Is no certainty in such In Yearbook 19 H. VI. p. 46a; and again, In
a loose application of the rule, and that It 61a. and he says that It had been so adlea ,·es the damages to an arblt rary and un- judged, and be refers to the decision In 30
defined discretion, and so It appears to have Ed. III. which be said was not controverted.
heE>n undE>rstood; for In the •·111stltutlon au This rule, upon the sanction of these authorDrolt li'ran!,!ols," by M. Argou (llvre 3. c. 23), ities, has been lncorpomted, as good law,
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‘

into the Abridgments of Fitzherbert, Brooke,

and Rolle. But the case of Ballet v. Ballet,

Godb. 151, in the time of Jae. 1., is a much

more modern determination upon the same

point. That was a case of a writ of war-

mntia chartrc, and, upon demurrer, the

court held, that if there be new buildings,

of which the warranty was demanded, which

were not at the time of the warranty made,

and the deed is shown, the defendant ought

not to demur, but to show the special matter,

and enter into the warranty for so much as

was at the time of the making of the deed,

and not for the residue. Indeed, the point

is too clear to admit of doubt, that the in-

creased value of the land by buildings or

other improvements, made no alteration, at

I.—-————- — M 1-.--.-5--1-n-__,’ -___‘ __-m
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common law, in the rule of damages; and.

for the reasons given in the-former case

of Staats v. Ten Eyck's Ex'rs, it can make

no alteration in the covenant of seisin,

which, as to the rule of compensation, is

commensurate only with the ancient war-

ranty.

I am, therefore, of opinion, in this case.

that the sum allowed for the increased value

of the land, and the sum allowed for im-

provements, be deducted from the verdict,

and that judgment be entered for the resi-

due only.

THOMPSON and YATES, JJ., concurred,

Judgment accordingly.

BREACH OF CONTRACTS RESPECTIXG REAL ESTATE.

Into the Abridgments of Fitzherbert, Brooke,
and Rolle. But the case of Ballet v. Ballet,
Godb. 151, In the time of Jae. 1., Is a much
more modern determination upon the same
point. That was a case of a writ ot warl'autla chartre, lllld, upon demurrer, the
court held, that It there be new buildings,
of which the warranty was demanded, which
'vere not at the time of' the warranty made,
and the deed Is shown, the def'endant ought
not to demur, but to show the special matter,
ttnd eLter fnto the warranty for so much ns
was at the time of the making ot .the deed,
and not for the residue. Indeed, the point
Is too clear to admit of doubt, that the Increased value of the land by bulldlngs or
other Improvements, made no alteration, at

common law, In the' rule of damages; and.
for the reasons given In the· former case
of Staats v. Ten Eyck's Ex'rs, It can make
no alteration In the covenant of seisin,
which, as to the rule of compensation, Is
commensurate only with the ancient warranty.
I am, therefore, of opinion, In this Cftll(',
that the sum allowed f'or the Increased value
of the land, and the sum allowed for Improvements, be deducted from the verdict,
and that judgment be entered f'or the resldue only.

I

THOMPSON and YATES, JJ., concurred.

Judgment accordingly.
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BROOKS v. BLACK.

(8 South. 332, 68 Miss. 161.)

Supreme Court of Mississippi. Nov. 10, 1890. ‘

Appeal irom chancery court, Noxubee .

county; T. B. GRAHAM, Chancellor.

G. A. Evans and Brame & Alexander, ior‘

appellant. Bogle & Bogle, ior appellee.

attachment in chancery by the appellee,

Black. against his remote vendor, Brooks,

{to recover damages ior the breach of war-

anty of title to certain lands. In ING9,

Brooks conveyed the land, with covenants

of warranty. to one Spencer. the consider-

ation bemg the sum of$6,2‘.)6. Spencer exe-

cuted a deed of trust, with power of sale,

to one Smith, to secure the payment of a

debt of $400 to Graham. Black & Co. in

September,1878,the debt secured being un-

paid, the land was sold, as provided by
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the trust-deed. and at such sale Black, the

appeliee, became the purchaser. at the

price of $1,000. After his purchase, Black

conveyed to Mrs. Spencer on undivided

one-haii interest in the land. Aiterwards.

the heirs at law of Mrs. Caroline Daves

and Mrs. Neilson recovered in ejectment

from Black and Mrs.Spencer the undivided

one-haii interest in the land, claiming un-

der title paramount to that of Brooks.

Brooks was not notiﬁed of the pendency

of this action of eiectment. Black, by the

result of that suit, having lost the one-

haii of his half interest in the land, (the

one-iourth of the whole.) seeks by the

present proceeding to recover irom Brooks

one-iourth of the consideration paid him

by Spenrer, and interest thereon, and the

costs of deiending the action of electment

against the heirs of Daves & Neilson, in-

cluding attorney's iees. The chancellor

iound as iacts that the title of the heirs of

Mrs. Da ves and Mrs. Nellson was para-

mount to that of Brooks; that the value

of the land at the time of eviction was

$6,000; and that Black. in good iaith, and

in discharge of a legal duty, had deiended

the action of ejectment, and in so doing

had expended in court costs the sum of

$249.91, and the inrther sum of $200 ior at-

,torney's iees, which were reasonable. Up-

, on these iacts, he decreed that Brooks

i should pay to Black the sum of $1,500, the

, same being the actual value of the land

1\ lost by Black, and less than one-iourth of

. the

' Spencer, with interest at 6 per cent. irom

January 1‘ 1888, the date of Black's evic-

tion,and also the said sums of $249.91 and

$200, the court costs and attorney's ices.

with interest thereon from the commence-

ment of this suit. Brooks appeals and as-

signs ior error (1) that the court should

have not made any decree against him,

because the facts proved show that the

debt secured by the deed of trust irom

Spencer to Smith, trustee. had been paid

at and beiore the sale under said deed; (2)

that the measure of damages should be the
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should not have allowe<l attorney's fee
paid In defending said action.
It is sufficient to say, In reference to the
first assignment or error, that the factH do
not support appellant's contention.
The second asHignment of Arror preHentH
an intereetlng question which haH nen~r
before been consirlered h.\' this cou1·t, and,
so fa.r UR our researeheR have led, has not
COOPER, J. Thh1 le a pro1!eedlnll" by : often nri!-cen in other Htates. That quefinttachmeut In chanrery by the app1>llee, 1 tlou IH, what Is thP meaBure or damages, In
luck. against his remote ven<lor, Brooks, I a suit b.v an evicted vendee, upon the cov.
o ret·u\·er damages fur the breach of war- enunt of wnrranty of a remote vendor,
anty of title to certain hrnds. In 1S69, runnl111o1: with land? Ma.v he 1·ecovPr the
Brooks conveyed the land, with covenants purchase price recei\•ed by the remote venof wn1Tanty. to one 8pencer. the consider- dor, or is he limited by the consideration
ation being the sum off6,:!'J6. SpPncer exe- he himself has paid? It Is supposed by
cuted a. deed of trust, with power of 1:tale, counsel for the appellant that the sum paid
by the evicted party-the value of the land
tu one Smith, to l!ecure the pnyment of a
at the time of hil! purchase-ls fixed as the
deht or $400 to Graham, Black & Co. In
measure of d11ma~es In this state by the
September, 1878, the debt secured being unpaid, the land ~·as sold, as provided by ease of White v . Presly, 54 Miss. :US. But
the trust-deed, and at such sule Black, the the question w11s not ralHed by the l'ecord
appellee, heeame the purchaRer, at the In that cm1e; and although CHALMtrns, J .,
price of $1,000. After hlt1 purchase, Black in delivering the ovlnlon of the court, deconveyed to Mrs. Spencer an undl\'ided clares that the sum paid by the evicted parone-half interest In the land. Afterwar~. ty, with Interest, the same helng lel!R than
the h1>ll'R nt law of Mr... C1uollnfl Dtt\•eR the sum received by the remote vendor, Is
and Mrs. Nel1'4on ret:o\•ered In ejectnaent a correct measure of damages, the <ledartttlou does nut thereby b1>come declRl\"'e.
from Blaekand Mra.svencer the undlvll.Jell
one-half Interest In thll laurl, clulmiug nn- Io that cttse, HuntluJ?,ton hao sold lnnd
to one Junes, from whom the title hud
der title parnmuunt to thut of Brooks.
Brooks was nut notlfietl ol the pendency paBHed uruler execution sale to PresRly.
ol this action of ejedment. Black, by the Pres11ly lost the land by renson of title parresult or that suit, having lost the one- amount to that of Huntington, and sued
balf of his half Interest in the land, (the Huntlngton'eadmlnlstrator on the 1!ovenants of warranty, and recovered In the
one-fourth of the whole.) seeks by th6
preisent pruceelllngto l'f'Co\·er from Brooke court below the sum he had paid at exe.one-fourth of the consh.Jera tion vuld him cutlon sale, nnd Interest thereon, the Mame
by Spen,,e1·, and interest thereon, and the belng1e1111 than H1mtlnaton had received.
co11ts of defending the action of ejectment The administrator appealed. He. as apajtalnst tht' helni of Da veR &: Neilson In- pellant, could not assign RB error the fact
cluding attorney's fees. 'J'he chancehor that: damages less thau should have been
found as facts that the tltlEI of the belrl4 of awarded had been given; nor could the
Mrs. Daves and Mrs. Neilson was para- appellee raise the point here, that the judgwuunt to that of Brooks; that the ,·a.lue ment he sought to maintain should ha\·e
ol the land at the time of eviction wu been for a greater sum. 'J'he observation
of the judge was not upon any question
f6,000; and that Black, In 11:ood faith, and
sought to be raised, or which could have
In dh1charge of a legal duty, had deft-nded
the action of ejectment, and in so doing been decided, and therefore Is not the debad expended In coort costtl the sum of cision of the court. Among the first cases
$249.91. nnd the further sum of $200 for at- In which the liability of a vendor to hlR
, torney's fees, which were reaimnahle. l'P- vendee for breach of the warranty for
, on these facts, be oeereed that Brooks quiet posseHRlon was considered were
, should pay to Black the sum of $1,500, the Staats v. 'l'en Ey1·k, 3 Caines, 112, and
Pikber v. Livingston, 4 JohnR. 1. It was
1 same being the actual value of the lnnd
contended for the plaintiffs In these cal!ee
1 lmt by Black, and less thnn one-fourth of
that the covenant was on~ of Indemnity,
1. the purehwie price paid to Brooks hy
Spencer, with Interest at 6 per cent. from and therefore that the measure of damages
January 1, 1888, the date of Black's evic- 11huuld he the value of the land at thetlnw
tion, and also the eald sums of $2411.91 and of the breRrh. In Ste.atl4 v. Ten Eyck, recovery was sou~ht for the appreciation In
$200, the court costs and attorney's fees,
with Interest therr.on from the commPnce- the value of the land above the price pa.Id
ment of this suit. Brooks appealH and as- by natural causes, und In Pitcher v. Lh·elgns for error (1) that the court should lng11ton to recover tt bu \'l' the purchase prlcP
have not made any decree against him, the value of permanent Improvements 1rnt
because the facts prove(] show that the upon tht- l1tnd by the vendee. The nrgu.
debt 1:4ecured by the deed of tru>1t from mP.nt for the plnlntlffl! was rested upon
Spencer to Smith, trustee, had been paid the rule or damages in breaches of personat and before the sale under said dPe<l; ( :!) al co\·enanb1 In other instances, but the
that the measure of damages should be the court rejected the contention, ancl adoptone-fourth of the purchase price paid by ed, by anttlogy, the measure of damages
Black, and not the one-fom·th of the value applied In the common-law action of waror the land at the time of eviction, nor the rantia chartre, and In suits for the breach
one-fourth of purcblU!e mone.v recPlved by of the coventtnt of selRln, viz., the value
\ Brooks: l3J the court should not have al- of thP. land, rletermlnahle hy the price paid
)owed the court coHtH expemle1I In ddend- the \·end or; and, Hince the ven<lee was
'fog the action of ejectment; (4) tho court llallle to the real O\Yner fur meBne profit~.
BHOOKS v. BLACK.
(8 South. 332, 68 Miss. 161.)
Supreme Court of Mississippi. Nov. 10. 1890.
AppC'l1l from chancery court, Noxubee
COUii ty; 1.'. B. GRAHAM, Chuncellor.
G. A. Enws ancl Brame& Alex11nder,for· 1
aptit!lluut. Bogle & Bogle, for nppellee.
1
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he was also entitled to interest on the pur-

chase money for the time ior which such

mesne proﬁts might be recovered against

him. The measureof damages established

in these cases has been so generally adopt-

ed in other states as to have become al-

most universal. and it would be superﬂuous

to cite authorities in its support. It has

been announced as the rule in this state.

Phipps v. Tarpley. 31 Miss. 433. We refer

to the cases above not for the purpose of

announcing the rule which applies as be-

tween vendor and vendee, for that is too

well settled to admit of controversy. and

is conceded by counsel ior appellant; we

note them to show that the suggestion

now made that the covenant is one of in-

demnity was rejected by the court in the

earliest case.
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enants" are lor indemnity; but the sense

in which the word is now used, in argu-

ment of counsel. that redress is to be ai-

forded to the extent, and within the limit,

of the actual loss sustained by the vendee,

in anuction against his immediate vendor,

it may be conﬁdently asserted, is against

the overwhelming current of authority.

In these cases. at least, the decisions are

practically uniform that, regardless of the

value of the land at the time of eviction,

the recovery is measured by the value of

the land at the time of the conveyance,

which value is conclusively ﬁxed by the

price paid by the vendee or received by the

vendor. Another proposition may be

coniidently stated as supported by an

equally uniform current of authority, that

the covenant for quiet enjoyment runs

with the land, and passes to all subse-

quent owners claiming in the chain of

title. The purchaser of land gets, by oper-

ation of law, not only the land, but also

the covenant of the ﬁrst vendor, and that

as well where the covenant is by its words

to the vendee only, as where it is with

him and his assigns. When we come how-

ever to the precise question now presented,

which is whether a remote vendee may

recover from the remote vendor the pur-

chase money paid by the ﬁrst vendee. or is

limited to the amount paid by himself to

his vendee. we ﬁnd direct conﬂict in the

decisions. and,so far as we have found the

cases, they are nearly equal in number on

each side. In North Carolina, (Williams

v. Beeman, 2 Dev. 483.) Minnesota.

(Moore v. Frankenﬁcld, 25 Minn. :Twil),)

Tennessee, (Mctte v. Dow, 9 Lea. H3:

Whitzman v. Hirsh. 87 Tenn. 513. 11 S. W.

Rep. 421,) and Maryland. (Crisﬁeld v.

Storr, 36 Md. 129,) it is held that such re-

mote vendee can only recover what he

has paid to his own vendor. On the other

hand, it is held in South Carolina, (Low-

rance v. Robertson, 10 S. C. 8,) Iowa,

(Mischkc v. Baughn. 52 Iowa, 528, 3 N. W.

Rep. 543.) and Kentucky. (Dougherty v.

Duvall, 9 B. Mon. 57,) that such vendee

BREACH OF CONTRACTS RESPECTING REAL ESTATE.

he was also entitled to Interest on the purrl111se money for the time fur which such
meene profits might be recovered against
him. The measure of damages established
lo these cases bas been so generally adopted In other states as to ha.ve become almost universal, and it would besuperflnous
to cite authorities In Its support. It bas
bePn announced as the rnle in this state.
Phipps Y. Tarpley. 31 Miss. 433. We refer
to tbe cases abovl.' not for the purpoRe of
nnnounclng the rule which applies as between VP.odor and vendee, for that le too
well s ettled to admit of controversy, and
Is conceded by counsel for appelluot; we
note them to show that the sugge11tion
now made that the covenant ts one of Indemnity was rejected by the court In the
earliest cases. In a certain sense, all "covenants" nre for indemnity; hut the sense
In which the word is now used, in e.rgumen t of counsel, that rerJl'ese Is to be afforded to the extent, and within the limit,
of the actual loss susbllned by the vendee,
in an 11ction aii:ninst bis Immediate vendor,
It may be conficlently asserted, Is against
the overwhelming current of authority.
In these cases, at least, the decisions ere
pl'nctically uniform that, l't'gnrdleRs of the
\'al ue of the land at the time of eviction,
the recovery Is measured by the vulue of
the land 1tt the time of the conveyance,
which vulne is conclusively fixed by the
price paid by the vendee orrecr.ived by the
ventlol'. Another propm1ition may be
confi<lentl.v stated aK supported by an
e<innlly uniform current of a.nthorlty, that
tlrn covenant for quiet enjoyment runs
with the land, and pusses to all eubse; quent O\Vllel'S claiming in the Chllln Of
t title. 'l'he purchn.serof land gets, by operution or law, not only the hmd, but alfm
thf' covenant of the first vendor, and that
as well where the covenant is by its words
to the vendee only, as where it is with
him and his asi,;igne. When we come bow.
ever to thep1·eclsequestion nowprei,;ented,
which le whether a rem•>te vendee may
recover from the remote vendor the purchase money paid by the first vend~. or Is
limited to the a.mount paid by himself to
hie vendee, we find direct conflict In the
decisions, and, so fur us we have round the
caKes, they are n eul'ly equal In number on
each side. In North Carolina, ( Willlams
v. Beeman, 2 Dev. 483.) Minnesota,
(Moore v. FrankenfleM, 25 Minn. 540,)
Tennessee, (Mette v. Dow, 9 Leu. o:~;
Whitzman v. Hirsh, 87 Tenn. 513. 11 S. W.
Rep. 4~1.) and Maryland, (Crisfield v.
Storr, 36 Md. 129,) It ts held that such remote vendee can only recover what he
has paid to his own vendor. On the other
bane!, It is held in South Carolina, (Lowrance v. Hobertson, 10 S. C. 8,) Iowa,
ll\ll1<chke v. Baughn. 52 Iowa, 528, 3 N. W.
Rep. f>4:l.) and Kentucky. (Dougherty v.
Duvall, 9 B. Mon. 57,) that such vendee
lm«Y recover the full conHideratlon received
/~Y the defendant, the remote vendor.
1 Willlu.ms v. Beeman was decided
by a divided court, RUFFIN, J., dissenting, and
Mette\'. Dow (followed by Whltzman v.
Hirsh) overruled Hopkins v . Lane, 9 Yerg.
79. In Crisfield \", Storr, 36 Md. 129, the
court declares that It hucl carefully exam.
lned many authorities upon the point, and
that the decided weight or authority was

l

I

that the plaintiff could not recover on the i
warranty of n remotP vendor more than
be had himseU paid to his lmmedi11te ven·
dor, and In support of this declaration cites
the followlni; cases: Booker v. Bell's Ex'rs,
3 Blhb, 175; Kelly v. Dutch Church, 2 Hill,
116; Bennet v. J enklns, 13 Johns. 51; Hanson v. Buckner, 4 Dana, 253; Wyman v.
Ballard,12 Mes~ . 804; Stewart v. Drake, 9
N.J.Law,142: Wlleonv.Forbes,2 Dev.39;
Pitcher v. Livingston,4 Johns. 1. We have
exu mined these cases, and find all of them,
except Kelly v. Dutch Church, to be suits
hy the Immediate vendee, or his heirs at
law, against the immediate vendor, or his
personal representative. Kelly v. Dutch
Church waR a suit by thti UBRignee of the
JessPe against the leRsors of his nsRignor.
The tt·ial court had awarded, as damages,
the rent reserved In the lease; thus, as It
seems to us, making the t!Um paid to the
lessors. and not that paid for the assignment, tht> measure or damages. But the
facts are not vel'y clearly stated, and the
case cannot be held to decide anything upon the point. . The question ReernH to ba ve
been more fully exnmined upon principle
In the cnRes of Willie ms v. Beenrnn. 2 Dev.
483: Mette v. Dow, 9 Lea, 9:3, ancl Lowl'1rnce
v. Robertson, 10 S. C. 8, than in any others. In Williams\' . Beeman, themnjorlty of
the court thouµ:ht that the remote venclee
was sulug to recover hiH own d11ma,1.tes.
and not those of the first ven1lee, amt
thererore should he restricted to the nctua I clama~es he had sustained. In Mette
v. Dow, the court comparer! the cove1rnnt
to a penal bond. the recovery on which
woulcl be limited to the actual damages
sm1talned by the party suing. The dissenting- opinion of RnFFIN, J., In Williams
v. Beeman. Is, In our opinion, a complete
reply to this position. H~ snys: "The
vnlue at the time of the sale by the flrl'lt
vendorls themeasureprescribed. Itonght
to operate both we.vs. If the vendor be
not Jh1ble for more, he ought not to be for
Jess. I understand It to be1td111ittl•d that,
If his immediate vend<.'0 be evicted, he la
still llnble for that. I do not eee why he
11houhl not be Fqually1mt11 the a11signPe us
his vendee. Does the at1slg11ment change
his covenant? It runs with the land, and
be who buys the lend buys the coventint.
He gets the whole of It. Bnt It ls said that
the assignor In such case cannot recover
from the fi1·st vemlor m01-e than the avlcted vendee gave for the lancl, becautie this
11.t all the asshrnor would be oblii:ed to pny
theatosignee, and therefore he has complete
Indemnity. '!'hi!'! la changinµ:- the rule eitsentlally. It puts It upon the amount of
the Joss, not the price paid. It would
seem to me that whoever buys Janel with
a covenant adhering to It takes it with all
the a.1:1\'antage11 It conferred on bis assignor. It Is 110 In personal contracts, for
we do not Inquire what the assignee of
a bond gave fur it. 'l'be ohltgor must pay
him the whole." Thifl argument seems to
us unanswerable. It at leust never hRa
bePn an11wered In ariy case we have seen
\Vhen It Is conceded that, by his covenant,
a vendor bincle himself to return the purchuse price he recei\•es In the contini;:ency
of a failure of the title conveyr.d, nncl that
this obligation Is assigned , by operation
Of law, to whm~ver WUV SUCCl'ed to thtt
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title. it would seem to iollow, as a corol-

lary, that the recovery, by whomsoever

had, ought to be equal to the obligation.

But. under the rule announced in Mary-

land. Minnesota, Tennessee, and North Car-

olina, the obligation of the covenantor is

variable, and dependent upon transactions

with which he is not connected. in these

states, a man selling an estate to A. ior

$5.(i(iO would be liable to pay A. that sum

if he should be evicted. But ii A. sells the

same land to B. ior $500. the liability of

the ﬁrst vendor is reduced to that sum.

and thus B., the purchaser irom A.. gets

less than the obligation A. held. But it

A B. sells to C. ior $5,000. the original obliga-

' tion revives,and the absurdity is presented

of B.‘s iailing to get, and thereiore to have,

what A. owned, and still transierring to C.
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that which he never had. The rule an-

nounced in Kentucky, Iowa, and South

Carolina is not only commended by its

justice, and by analogy to other well-sob

tied principles, but possesses the advan-

tage of stability and uniformity. As we

have said, it is quite generally held that,

by the covenant ior quiet enjoyment. the

grantor binds himself to pay, in event of

iailure of title, the then value of the land,

which value is determined by the price

paid. Appreciation by natural causes. or

by improvements put upon the property

by the vendee, does not enlarge his liabil-

ity; nor is it decreased by depreciation in

value irom any cause. By legal intend-

ment the obligation is as though the cov-

enantor should say to the covenantce:

“You, or the person succeeding to the

title Iconvey,shall hold the land, or ii you

' cannot, by reason of title in another, the

\ money l have received shall be restored in

lien of the land." We are unable to per-

lceive any principle upon which this obliga-

, tion shall be diminished because of the

' price. in consideration of which it may be

assigned. We thereiore conclude that the

obligation of the covenantor is the same

to the assignee that ‘it was to the cove-

nantee, and. being such, is governed by the

same measure of damages.

The third and iourth assignments of er-

ror present the question whether taxed

costs and attorney's lees in excess of the

purchase price, and interest thereon, may

be recovered on the covenant. We are

unable to discover any just principle upon

which costs, whether taxed or otherwise,

have been allowed to plaintiffs over and

above the purchase price received by the

covculmtor. and interest thereon. We

readily perceive the justice of the rule by

which the value of the land at the time of

the sale by him is accepted as the measure

of the liability O1 the covenautor, and also

that the price paid shall be taken as con-

clusive evidence of that value. We also

appreciate thefairness of allowing interest

on the purchase money as compensation

tttle. It would seem to follow, as a corol-

lary, that the reco'\'ery, by whomsoev~r
had, ought to be e<1ual to the obligation.
But, under the rule announced In Maryland, Minnesota, Tennessee, and North Carolina, the obligation of the covAnantor la
varla ble, and dependent upon tran1mctlona
with which be Is not connected. In these
states, a man aelllng an eRtata to A. for
$5,000 would be liable to pay A. that sum
tr he should be el'lcted. But H A. 1-1ells the
sam6 land to B. for trioo. the liability of
the first vendor la reduced to that sum,
.sod thus B., the purchaser from A ., Kets
less than the obllglition A. hPld. But If
. B. seJls to C. for$5,000. the original ouligatlnn revives, and theabsunllty1spresentcd
of H. 'a falling to get, and therefore to have,
what A. owned, and still trans!Prrlng to C.
that which he never hu1l. The rule announced to Kentucky, Iowa, anil 8outh
Carolina le not only commended by Its
justice, and by analogy to other well-settled principles, but pm;seHses the ml vnntnge of Htabillty and uniformity. As we
have 1mld, It le quite generally held thnt,
by thP covenant for qull't enjoyment. the
grantor blncl11 himself to pay, In e~ent of
failure of title, tbA then value of the hind,
which value la det.ermlned by the price
pnld. Appreciation by naturul c11uscH, or
by improvements put upon the propPrty
by the vendee, does not enlar~io his llability; nor Is It decreased uy dl•p1·eciation In
valoe from any caui1e. By lt>g-nl lntenclment the obligation IA ae thongh the covennntor should say to the covennntl'o:
"You, or the perrmn succePdlni;i: to the
title I convey, shall hold the land, or If you
·\ eannot, by reason or title In another, the
money 1 have received shall ue rCRtorcd In
lieu or the land." We are unable to per1. eel\'!" any principle upon which this obllgatlon shall be dlmlnb1hcd hl'<'nnse of the
1
price, In comdderatlon of which It may be
assigned. We therefore concludP that the
oblhr:atlon of the covenantor Is the 1mme
' to the assignee that 'it was to the covenantee, antl. belo{!. such, la goYerncd by the
aiame mea1<ure of damages.
The third and fourth a11slgnments of error pre11ent the quP.Stlon whether ta:r.:ed
co11te and attorney's fees In exceHs of the
purchose prlet>, anrl lntarest thereon, may
be rel'overed on the covenant. We are
unable to cU.scover any jn11t principle upon
Which costs, whether tnxed or otherwise,
( have been allowed to plaintiffs over and
•boTe the parcbaeo price n'Celved by the

l,

co,·enantor. uud interest thereon. We
reac.llly perceive the justice of the rule by
which the value of the land at the time of
the sale by him ls accepted aa the measure
of the llabUity of the covenantor, und also
that the price paid shall be taken as conclusive evidence of that value. We also
appreciate thefalrnessof allowing lntereHt
on the purchalle money as compensation
to the coventtntee for so long n. time 111-1 he
has been held lle.ble to theownerfor meena
profits. But why costs In esceHB of the
purchase money und Interest ha,·eeverbeen
allowtid we cannot conjecture. In 4 Keot,
Comm. p. 476, It ts said: "The mea1rnre of
damages on a tota.lfallure of title, even on
the covenant of warranty, le the \alue of
the Janel at the execution of the deed; and
the evidence of that vnlue la the com1ideratlon money, with Interest and costs. n
How costs. which are uucertnln In amount.
Yarylng with referenl'P. to the rl111racter of
the Pult, the number of wltn"PR11es, and the
nature of the l11s11es preseutecl In a proceeding, could e\'er have bl"t'n supposed to
furnish any light upon the pn11t vnlue of
lands, pos;;es 11ur comprehension. Uut HO
It le that. by prncticnliy an unbrok<'n current of uuthnrity, the rule hns hf'en esttthllshed that they may be recoverprl In addition to the pnrchaee price and interest. Rnwle, Cov. c. 9; Huth. Dam. 302; 4
Amer. & Eng. Enc. Low, 666. BelieYlng
that the rule allowing nny cost:-; Rhuuld
never lutve l>ern eRtalillshrtl, we 1lecllne to
extend It beyond the llmltR of the taxed
costs of thl' case. Attornt>y'e fees hn ve
been allowed In some st1\tf'S, and dlHnllowed In others. The contlkt in these de•·.
chllona will be• found In the casPs cltccl by
the text writers, and the Encyrlope<lia,
abo\'e refern' cl to. Constrained liy nu thnrity to allow the taxed coHtH, we return to
corrPCt prlnclplPs at the ftrHt point at
which we may do so, and holrl that the
attorney's f('('s paid by the covenantee are
not recoverable on the covenant of the
grantor. In this cuuRe, the court allowed
the defendant an attorne,V'li fef't which,
added to the taxed co;it11 and othl'r clnmages, exceeded the value of th!" land at the
time of the snle. and Interest thereon, an'1
taxed costs. But, since the court nl'IO
erred In fixing thA value of the Janel at $6,000, Its value a the time or eviction, Instead of tS.296, the price paid to the d~
feudant, both errors must be corrPcte1l to
make a pru1wr result. The decree is reversed, and decree here.
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V GUTHRIE v. RUSSELL et ux.

(46 Iowa, 269.)

Supreme Court of Iowa. June 14, 1877.

Appeal from district court, Jasper county?

Suit in equity by one Guthrie against

James H. Russell and wife to recover the

amount plaintiff had been compelled to pay

to satisfy mortgage on lands conveyed to

plaintiff by defendants, with covenant of war-

ranty against incumbrances. Judgment for

piaintiff, and defendants appeal. Reversed.

J. N. Lindley and R. A. Sankey, for appel-

lants. Ryan Bros., for appellee.

ADAMS, J.

taining the covenant sued on conveyed an

interest which was paramount to the incum-

brance. That interest, it appears, was of the

value of $1,481.57. The amount necessary

to be paid by the junior incumbrancer to re-

deem was $1,681.57, but that covered im-
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provements made by the plaintiff. What the

plaintiff bought of the defendants was worth,

according to the evidence, about $200 less.

The plaintiff then paid $1,200, and acquired

an interest paramount to all others, worth

$1,481.57. To extinguish an incumbrance

junior to it, he paid, as we will assume, $378,

or gave property of that value, and he now

claims to recover that amount from his cov-

enantors.

Where real estate is conveyed with cove-

nants of warranty, it has been held in actions

for breach of covenant that the price paid

by the purchaser and received by the seller

should be taken, as between them, to be the

value of the property. In Baxter v. Brad-

bury, 20 Me. 260, the court said: “It the

covenant of seisin is broken, as thereby the

title wholly fails, the law restores to the

purchaser the consideration paid, which is

the agreed value of the land, and interest."

In Brandt v. Foster, 5 Iowa, 295, it was said:

“The measure of damages for breach of this

covenant is the consideration money and in-

terest, upon the ground that this is the actual

loss." In Field on Damages (section 461)

the author says: “In an action for the breach

of the modern covenant of warranty, the

general rule of damages in this country, in

the absence of fraud, is the value of the land

at the time of the execution of the deed, of

which the actual consideration is conclusive

evidence."

In the state where this rule prevails. it is

held in actions for breach of covenants

against incumbrances that the damages must

be limited to the amount of purchase money

and interest, although the amount paid to

remove the inenmbrance might be much

greater, the value of the property as between

the parties being taken to be the considera-

tion paid for it.

But, in Knadler v. Sharp, 36 Iowa, 232,

this court ignored the doctrine that the con-

,'__.._._._ _..__=,. -,4 ..a-.—_- _.______.i ,

In this case the deed con- ‘

sideration paid is to be taken as the value

of the property as between the parties. In

that case, the court aimed to give full com-
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4-ssary to redeem had come to be nearly $2,-

000. The amount paid by plaintiff to the

defendant was $1.200. As between the par-

ties. we think that the consideration paid

should be taken to be at least prima facie

evidence of the value. If the plaintiff claims

to recover upon the ground that they were

worth, not only more than that, but more

than the amount which he would have re-

ceived upon redemption, he should have

shown it in evidence. We are not satisﬁed

that the amount paid was fairly paid. If

the premises were really not worth redeem-

ing, in other words if the incumbrance paid

off was really of no value, there is ground

for suspecting that there wa collusion be-

tween the plaintiff and incumbrancer. Pos-

sibly the plaintiff would have been justiﬁed

in paying something for the extinguishment
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of the incumbrance, even if it had no value,

but in such case it would be incumbent upon

him to show that the amount paid was rea-

sonable. We cannot regard the defendants‘

covenant as extending further than that.

It may be said that this rule does not at-

ford the plaintif f complete protection,—that

possibly the incumbrancer was unreasonable‘,

but it should be borne in mind that the plain-

tiff bought with constructive notice of the

inenmbrance. If he was unaware of its ex-

istence it was his own fault. Perhaps it

would be fair to presume that he bought with

reference to it. At all events, it seems clear

to us that while holding an interest under

his deed of greater value than he paid for it,

he cannot properly claim the right to pay

an unreasonable amount to remove the in-

cumbrance and to recover the amount thus

paid of the defendants.

In Knadler v. Sharp, it seems to have been

taken for granted that the amount paid was

reasonable. There is, therefore, nothing in

the decision in that case which necessarily

conﬂicts with this. Reversed.

e,;sary to redeem had come to be nearly $2,000. The amount paid by plalntltf to the
defendant was $1.200. As between the parties, we think that the consideration paid
should be taken to be at least prlma facle
evidence of the value. It the plalntlfr claims
to recover upon the ground that they were
worth, not only more than that, but more
than the amount which be would have received upon redemption, he should have
shown It 1n evidence. We are not satlsfted
that the amount paid was fairly paid. It
the premises were really not worth redeeming, In other words It the lncumbrance paid
otr was really of no value, there ts ground
for suspecting that there was collusion between the plaintllf and lncumbrancer. Possibly the plalntttr would have been Justlfted
In paying something for the extlngulshment
of the lncumbrance, even- If It bad no value,
but In such case It would be Incumbent upon
him to show that the amount paid was rea-

sonable. We cannot regard the defendants'
covenant as extending further than that.
It may be said that this rule does not atford the plalntltr complete protectlon,-that
possibly the lncumbrancer was unreasonable;
but tt should be borne 1n mind that the plalntitr bought with constructive notice of the
lncumbrant-e. It be was unaware of Its existence 1t was his own fault. Perhaps It
would be fair to presume that be bought with
reference to It. At all events, It seems clea1~
to us that whjle holding an Interest under
bis deed of greater value than he paid for It,
he callllot lll'Operly claim the right to pay
an unreu1mnable amount to remove the lncumbranee nod to recover the amount thus
paid of the defendants.
In Knadler v. Sharp, tt seems to have been
taken for granted that the amount paid was
reasonable. There ls, therefore, nothing In
the decision In that case which necessarily
conflicts with this. Reversed.
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Supreme Court of Wi11con11ln. March 1, 1887.
Appeal from circuit court, Mllwa.ukee coun-
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. to the covenants in the lease.

/ POPOSKEY v. MUNKWITZ.

(32 N. W. 35, 68 Wis. 322.)

Supreme Court of Wisconsin. March 1, 1887.

Appeal from circuit court, Milwaukee coun-

ty.

The action is by a lessee against his lessor

for failure of the latter to give the lessee

possession of the leased premises according

Under date of

October 22, 1884, the parties executed an in-

denture of lease in and by which the de-

fendant leased to the plaintif f his store, No.

411 Broadway, in the'city of Milwaukee,

from November 15, 1884, to May 1, 1800, at

a yearly rent therein reserved, and therein

covenanted that, on paying such rent, and

performing the conditions contained in such

lease to be performed by him, the plaintiff
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should have the quiet and peaceful posses-

sion of the leased premises during such term.

The defendant was unable to give the plain-

tiff the possession of the leased store be-

cause he had theretofore leased the same to

Wilde & Uhlig for three years, commencing

May 1, 1883, and Uhlig was lawfully in pus-

session thereof under such lease when the

plaintiffs term under his lease commenced,

and so continued in possession thereafter.

The plaintiff paid the defendant rent until

December 1, 1884, at the execution of the

lease, being $41.67, as stipulated in the lease,

and performed all his covenants therein con-

tained. The plaintiff also put some goods in

the store with the consent of the defendant,

but was. required by Uhlig to take them

away. This involved an expenditure by the

plaintiff of $14.40. It is averred in the com-

plaint that, for 12 years.before the making

of the lease ﬁrst above mentioned, the plain-

tif f had carried on, in the city of Milwau-

kee, and for the last ﬁve years in the vicinity

of the leased store, a wholesale and retail

business in pictures, pictureframes, and ar-

tist's materials, and in manufacturing pic-

ture-frames, and had a very large and lucra-

tive custom and patronage established in

said business; that be leased the store No.

411 Broadway for the purpose of carrying on

and continuing the same business therein, of

which the defendant had notice; that such

store was especially well located, and adapt-

ed to the requirements of plaintiff's said

business; that, relying upon having posses-

sion of the leased store at the stipulated time

in which to carry on his business, he pur-

chased a large stock of goods adapted to the

holiday trade, in December, which is the

most proﬁtable trade during the year; and

that he lost this trade by reason of his fail-

ure to obtain possession of the store. Also

that, upon the refusal of the defendant to

give him possession of the store, the plain-

tilf diligently endeavored, but without suc-

cess, to obtain another store, suited to the re-

quirements of his business,and that the rent-

al value of the leased store for the term of

the lease is at least $2,000 more than the rent

t.y.

The action ls by a lessee against his lessor
for failure of the latter to give the lessee
possession of the leased premises according
to the covenants ln the lease. Under date of
October 22, 18S1, the parties executed an indenture of lease in and by which the defendant leased to the plalntltr his store, No.
411 Broadway, In the ·city of Milwaukee,
from November 15, 1SS4, to May 1, 1800, nt
n yearly rent therein reserved, and therein
covenanted that, on paying such rent, and
performing the conditions contained In such
lease to be performed by him, the plaintiff
should hn'l"e the Q.ulet and peaceful possession of the leased premises during such term.
The defendant was unable to give the plaintltr the possession of the leased store because he hacl theretofore leased the same to
Wilde & Uhlig for three years, commencing
:\lay 1, 1883, and Uhlig was lawfully in possession thereof under such lease when the
plnlntl.II's terw under his lease cowwenced,
and so continued in possession thereafter.
The plaintl.I! paid the defendant rent untll
December 1, 1884, at the execution of the
lease, being $!1.U7, as stipulated In the lease,
and performed all his covenants therein contained. 'l'he plalntltr also put some goods in
the store with the consent of the defendant,
but was. required by Uhlig to take them
away. This Involved an expenditure by the
plaintiff of $14.40. It ls averred in the complaint that, for 12 years . before the making
of the lease first above mentioned, the plaintiff had carried on, In the city of Milwaukee, and for the last five years In the vlclnlty
of the leased store, a. wholesale a.nd retall
business In pictures, plctur&-frames, and artist's materials, and ln manufacturin&" picture-frames, and had a. very large a.nd lucrative custom and patronage established In
said business; that he lee.sed the store No.
411 Bl'On.dwa.y for the purpose of carrying on
a.nd continuing the same business therein, of
which the defendant bnd notice; that such
store was especially well located, a.nd adapted to the requirements of pla.intlff's said
business; that, relying upon having possession of the leased store at the stipulated time
In which to carry on his business, he purchased a large stock of goods adapted to the
holiday trade, in December, which ls the
most profitable trade during the year; and
tliat he lost this trade by reason of hla fallure to obtain possession of the store. Also
that, upon the refusal of the defendant to
give him possession of the store, the plnlntltr diligently endeavored, but without success, to obtain another store, suited to the req nlrcments of his business, and that the rent-

al value of the leased store for the term of
the lease ls at least $2,000 more than the rent
thereof reserved In the lease. The closing
paragraph of the . complaint ls as follows:
"Thllt, by reason of the premises, plalnti!I's
sald business has been broken up a.nd destroyed, a.nd his trade and custom gone, and
his stock of goods purchased to carry on his
business at said store so lee.sed has become
greatly deprecla~d a.nd destroyed in value,
and plnlntllr has lost the profits which he
would and could ha:rn made in continuing
and can·ying on bis a.foresnld business at
sald leased premises since said fifteenth day
of November, 188!, had said lensed premises
been surrendered and delivered up to him as
agreed by defendant, and his said leasehold
Interest In said premises been lost ancl destroyed, to the damage of plalntllt In the sum
of five thouSIUld dollars." Judgment for $5,000 and costs Is demanded. The answer denies In detail each of the above nvermenta,
except that the defend~t owned the store
No. 411 Broadway, and executed a lease
thereof to the plnintlir as alleged In the complaint.
The controversy on the trial was confined
to the question of damages. The plalntltr
offered testimony for the purpose of proving
the special damages stated In the complaint;
but the same was rejected. and the judge
held that the measure of the plaintiff's damages Is the difference between the rent reserved In the lease a.nd the actual rental
value of the store, together with the expense
of remoTlng the plalntll'f's goods (before mentioned) from the store a.fter the term of the
lease commenced, and confined the testimony to those elements of damages. Only a
single question was submitted to the jury,
which Is as follows: "What was the actual
value per annum of the premises 411 Broad·
way, Mllwaukee, described In the lease from
defendant to plaintiff, from and after November 15, 18S1?" The jury answered $1,200. The rent reserved In the lease until
May 1, l&S7, ls $1,000, and $1,200 thereafter.
On April 5, 1886, the court gave judgment
for the plaintiff for $272.14 damages, and for
costs of suit. It la recited In the order for
judgment that the plaintiff admitted he went
Into possession of the leased store March 1,
l&S6. It Is understood that the judgment ls
made up of $200 per annum (being the excess In the value of the rent as found by the
jury, over and above the rent stipulated In
the lease) trom November 15, 1884, to M:arcu
1, 1886, and the Item of $14.40 above mentioned. The Item of $41.67 paid defendant
'on account of rent was disallowed for die
reason (as stated by the court) that the lease
to plaintiff "assigned, by operation of law,
the premises during Uhllg's term to Mr. Poposkey, and he has the right to recover the
rent from Mr. Uhlig." The plaintiff appeals
from the judgment.
0

BREACH OF LANDLORD'S COVENANTS.
BREACH OF LANDLORD'S COVENANTS. 3'11

Dey & Friend, for appellant. Jenkins,

Winkler, Fish & Smith, for respondent.

LYON, J. This action was brought to re-

cover damages for the failure of the defend-

ant to put the plaintiff in possession of the

store No. 411 Broadway, Milwaukee, leased

by the former to the latter, at the time stipu-

lated in the lease as the commencement of

the term. It is substantially an action for a ‘

breach of the covenant for quiet enjoyment

contained in the lease. 1 Tayl. Landl. & Ten.

§ 309. This appeal presents for determina-

tion the question, what is the true rule of

damages for a breach of that covenant hr

that case, in view of the facts proved and of-

fered to be proved therein? The rule is un-

doubtedly the same as in an action for a

breach of covenants for title in an absolute

conveyance; that is to say, had the plaintiff

purchased the store No. 411 Broadway of the
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defendant, and taken an absolute convey-

ance thereof, instead of a lease for ﬁve or

more years, under the same circumstances

which existed when the lease was executed,

the measure of his damages for a breach of

the covenants for title in such conveyance

would be the same that it is for a breach of

the covenant for quiet enjoyment in the

lease. 3 Suth. Dam. 147; Blossom v. Knox,

3 Pin. 262. Indeed, the covenant for quiet

enjoyment is one of the covenants for title in

a conveyance. Rawle, Cov. 17. It is also

said to be “an assurance consequent upon a

defective title." Id. 125.

The general rule of damages which ob-

tains in England and many of our sister

states for a breach of covenant for title was

ﬁrst authoritatively laid down in 1775, in the

case of the common pleas of Flureau v.

Thornhiil, 2 W. Bl. 1078. The defendant

covenanted to sell the plaintiff a rent for a

term of years issuing out of leasehold prem-

ises, but. without fault on his part, the de-

fendant was unable to make good title there-

to. The plaintiff claimed damages for the

loss of his bargain, but it was held that he

was not entitled thereto. De Grey, C. J.,

said: “Upon a contract for a purchase, if the

title proves bad, and the vendor is (without

fraud) incapable of making a good one, I do

not think the purchaser can be entitled to

any damages for the fancied goodness of the

bargain which he supposes he has lost."

Blackstone, J., said: "These contracts are

merely upon condition, frequently expressed,

but always implied, that the vendor has a

good title." The rule of the above case

has been much considered in both England

and this country; and while its scope has

been more clearly deﬁned, and its applica-

tion somewhat limited by later adjudica-

tions, the rule itself. as applied to cases in

which the vendor honestly believed he had a

good title, but the title failed for some de-

fect not known to him, and of which he was

not chargeable with notice, is now ﬁrmly es-

tablished in the jurisprudence of England by

the judgment of the house of lords in Bain

v. Fothergiil, L. R. 7 Eng. & Ir. App. 158.

Dey & Friend, tor nppellnnt. Jenkins,
Winkler, Fish & Smith, tor resp0ndent.
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not chargeable with notice, ls now firmly e::;tabllshed in the jurisprudence of England by
the judgment of the house of lords In Bain
LYON, J. This action was brought to re- v. Fothergill, L. R. 7 Eng. & Ir. App. l;:iS.
cover damages for the !allure of the defend- As akeady observed, the rule prevalls In sevant to put the plaintiff In possession of the eral of the United States, Including this
store :So. 411 Broadway, Milwaukee, leased state, under the limitations just mentioned, of
by the former to the latter, at the time stipu- good faith and ex.cusable Ignorance of the
lated In the lease as the commencement ot vendor of defects In hie title. Indeed. these
the term. It ls substantially an action tor a are scarcely limitations, but rather an Interbreach ot the covenant tor quiet enjoyment pretation ot the qualification "without
contained In the lease. 1 Tayl. Landi. & Ten. fraud," In the opinion by De Grey, C. J., in
f 309. This appeal presents for determina- the principal case. The rule as It now stands
tion the question, what la the true rule of has been applied In this state in Ulch Y.
damages tor a breach ot that covenant hr Johnson, 2 Pin. 88; Blossom v. Knox, 8 Pin.
that case, In Tiew ot the facts proved and ot- 262; Nichol v. Alexander, 28 Wis. 118; lleEltered to be proved therein? The rule ls un- t;Cr v. Oestreich, 52 Wis. 684, 10 N. W. 6, and
doubtedly the same as In an action for a 1n other cases.
Under this or any other rule, the plaintiff
breach of covenants for title In an absolute
conveyance; that ls to say, had the plaintiff la entitled to recover the consideration paid
purchased the store No. 411 Broadway of the by him on account of the purchase. Hence,
defendant, and taken an absolute convey- In the present case, whatever may be the
ance thereof, Instead of a lease for five or measure of damages, the plaintiff should
more years, under the same circumstances . have recovered the amount he advanced for
which existed when the lease was executed, rent, and Interest thereon. The reason gl>the measure of his damages for a breach f>f en by the circuit judge for excluding this
the covenants tor title In such conveyance amount from the plaintiff's recovery, t<>-wlt,
would be the same that It ls for a breach of that he could recover the rent from Uhlig,
the covenant for quiet enjoyment In the the tenant under the paramount lease, ls conlease. 8 Buth. Dam. 147; Blossom v. Knox, ceived to be unsound. The plaintiff did not
8 Pin. 262. Indeed, the covenant for quiet purchase a term subject to the lease of Uhenjoyment ls one of the covenants for title In lig, but an absolute term; and while he
a conveyance. Rawle, Cov. 17. It ls also might, perhaps, have treated his lease as an
said to be "an assurance consequent upon a assignment of the rents accruing under the
defective title." Id. 125.
prior lease, and collected the same from UhThe general rule of damages which ob- lig, there Is no rule of law which compels
tains In England and many of our sister him to do so. Indeed, had he done &o, It posstates for a breach ot covenant tor title was sibly might have operated as a waiver of
first authoritatively laid down In 1775, In the any claim for damages for the breach of the
case of the common pleas of Flurean v. covenant sued upon.
The llmltatlons of the rule of Flureau v.
Thornhill, 2 W. Bl. 1078. Thf! defendant
covenanted to aell the pl.nlntiff a rent tor a Thomhlll, or rather the exceptions thereto,
term of years leaning out of leasehold prem- are well stated In 3 Suth. Dam. 149, as folises, but, without fault on his part, the de- lows: "Where a lessor knows, or ls chargefendant was unable to make good title there- able wlth notice, of such defect of his title
to. The plaJntlff claimed damages tor the that he cannot assure• to hie Jessee quiet enloss of his bargain, but It was held that he joyment for the term which such lessor aswas not entitled thereto. De Grey, C. J., sumes to grant; where he refuses, In violasaid: "Upon a contract for a purchase, If the tion of hie agreement, to give a lease, or postitle proves bad, and the vendor ls (without session pursuant to a lease, having the ab111ty
fraud) Incapable of making a good one, I do to fulfill, as well as where the lessor evicts
not think the purchaser can be entitled to his tenant,-he le chargeable with full damany damages for the fancied goodness of the ages for compensation, and the doctrine of
bargaJn which he supposes he has lost." Flureau v. ThornhlJI has no appllcatlon. On
Blackstone, J., said: "These contracts are this general proposition the authorities agree.
merely upon condition, frequently expressed, In such cases the difference between the rent
but always lmplled, that the vendor has a to be paid and the actual value of the premgood title." The rule of the above case ises at the time of the breach for the unexhas been much considered 1n both England pired term ls considered the natural and
and this country; and while its scope has proximate damages. Where the Jessee ls debeen more clearly defined, ancl Its applica- prived of the possession and enjoyment untion somewhat limited by later adjudica- der such circumstances, the lessor ls either
tions, the rule Itself, as applied to cases in guilty of Intentional wrong, or he has made
which the vendor honestly believed he had a the lease, and assumed the obligation to asgood title, but the title failed for some de- sure the lessee's quiet enjoyment, with a
fect not known to him, and of which be was culpable Ignorance of detects In his title, or
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'on the chance of afterwards acquiring one.

In neither case has he any claim to favorable

consideration; and he is not excused, on the

doctrine of Flureau v. Thornhiil, from mak-

ing good any loss which the lessee may suf-

fer from being deprived of the demised prem-

ises for the whole or any part of the stipu-

lated term." This quotation doubtless con-

tains a correct statement of the law acted

upon in all the states, as well in those which

have adopted the rule in Flureau v. Thorn-

hill as in those which have not.

We are clear that this case comes within

the exceptions. When the defendant leased

the store to the plaintiff, he knew that there

was a valid paramount lease upon the prem-

ises, executed by himself to Wilde & Uhlig,

having 17 or 18 months to run after the com-

mencement of the plaintiff's term. There is

no claim that the former lessees had for-
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feited their lease. Indeed, the defendant aft-

erwards made an unsuccessful attempt to

evict them by legal proceedings for an al-

leged breach of the covenants of their lease,

occurring after the execution of the plaintiff's

lease. But it was held there was no breach.

Munkwitz v. Uhlig, 64 Wis. 380. 25 N. W.

424. These proceedings are in evidence.

Hence the defendant knew, when he leased

the store to the plaintiff, of a defect in his

title which prevented him from assuring to

the plaintiff the quiet enjoyment of the leas-

ed premises. He thus entered into the con-

tract on the chance of being able afterwards

to avoid, in some way, his lease to Wilde &

Uhlig, but having no legal cause for avoiding

it. These facts deprive him of the protec-

tion of the rule in Flureau v. Thornhill, and

bring the lease within the rule above quoted

from Sutherland. In other words, the case

is thus brought within the general rule

which prevails in actions for breaches of con-

tracts, that the plaintiff shall recover the loss

he has proximately sustained by reason of

the breach.

But, in order to determine what elements

of loss come within the general rule, it is

necessary to apply other rules of law to the

particular case. In the present case (per-

haps in most cases) the rules laid down in

the leading case of Hadley v. Baxendale, 9

Exch. 341, 26 Eng. Law & Eq. 398. which

have many times been approved by this court,

are sufﬁcient. Shepard v. Milwaukee Gas-

light Co., 15 Wis. 318; Hibbard v. W. U.

Tel. C0.. 33 Wis. 558; Candee v. W. U. Tel.

Co., 84 Wis. 471; Walsh v. Chicago, M. &

St. P. R. Co., 42 Wis. 30; Hammer v. Schoen-

felder, 47 Wis. 455, 2 N. W. 1129; Brown v.

Chicago. M. & St. P. R. Co., 54.Wis. 342. 11

N. W. 356. 911; Cockburn v. Ashland Lum-

ber Co., 54 Wis. 619. 12 N. W. 49; McNa-

umra v. Clintonviile. 62 Wis. 207, 22 N. W.

472: Thomas, B. & W. Manuf'g Co. v. Wa-

bash. St. L. & P. R. Co.. 62 Wis. 642. 22

N. W. 827: see. also. Richardson v. Chyno-

wcth, 20 Wis. 6513. See, also, a very learned

1ind elaborate note on the rule in the princi-

pal case, in which a great number of cases
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be lawfully required to take another store

out of the vicinityln which he was doing

businss when he took the lease from the de-

fendant. By removing to a remote part of the

city, he might, and probably would, to some

extent at least, have lost the good-will of

his business, which it is alleged he had car-

ried on successfully for a series of years in

the vicinity of the store No. 411 Broadway.

Neither was he required to take another

store not reasonably well adapted to his busi-

ness.

From the foregoing rules, and the partial

application of them already suggested. we

think the following propositions are estab-

lished: (1) The plaintiff is entitled to recov-

er the sum he paid as rent when the lease

was executed, and interest thereon; and also

the necessary expense of removing some of
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his goods to the store, with defendant‘s con-

sent, and taking them therefrom after he

failed to get possession of the store. (2) If

the defendant did not know, when he exe-

cuted the lease, the purposes for which the

plaintif f hired the store, or the uses to which

he intended to put it, the measure of the

plaintiff's damages for breach of the cove-

nant for quiet enjoyment (in addition to the

special damages just mentioned) would be

that adopted by the trial judge; that is, the

difference between the rent reserved in the

lease and the actual rental value of the store,

without regard to what it is used for, which

the jury found to be $200 per nnnum. All

these are natural and proximate damages re-

sulting from the breach. (3) If the defend-

ant, then, knew that the plaintiff was carry-

ing on the business stated in the complaint,

and hired the store No, 411 Broadway for

the purpose of continuing the same business

therein, and if, in the exercise of reasonable

diligence, the plaintiff might have procured

another store, reasonably well adapted to his

business and in the same vicinity, that is, in

a location in which he could have preserved

and retained substantially the good-will of

his former business, the rule of damages, in

addition to the special items ﬁrst above men-

tioned, will be the difference between the rent

reserved in the lease and the actual rental

value of the leased store for the purpose of

carrying on such business therein. In such

case the actual rental value would ordinarily

be measured by the amount of rent the plain-

tiff would be compelled to pay for another

store equally well adapted to his business.

If he could obtain another store for the same

rent he was to pay the defendant, or less, of

course he would suffer no general damages

for the defendant's breach of covenant, and

his recovery in that behalf would be con-

ﬁned to nominal damages, in addition to the

special damages ﬁrst above mentioned. If,

however, the expenses of removing to an-

other store would have been greater than

they would have been in removing to the

store No. 411 Broadway, such excess would

/'

be lawfully required to take another store
<>nt of the vicinity .In which be was doing
business when be t.ook the lease from the defendant. By removing to a remote part of the
<:lty, he might, and probably would, to some
extent at least, have lost the good-wlll of
his business, which It ls alleged he bad carried on successfully for a series of years In
the dclnlt;r of the store No. 411 Broadway.
Neither was he required to take another
atore not reasonably well adapted to his business.
1''rom the foregoing rules, and the partial
application of them already suggested, we
think the following propositions are established: (1) The plalntllf ls entitled to recover the sum he paid aa rent when the lease
was executed, and Interest thereon; and also
the necessary expense of removing some of
his goods to the store, with defendant's consent, and taking them therefrom after he
failed to get possession of the store. (2) It
the defendant did not know, when be exe<:uted the lease, the purposes for which the
plalntllf hired the store, or the uses to which
he Intended to put It, the measure of the
plalntlfr's damages for breach of the covenant for quiet enjoyment (In addition to the
special damages just mentioned) would be
that adopted by the trial judge; that is, the
difference between the rent reserved In the
lease and the actual rental value of the store,
without regard to what It ls used for, which
the jury fouu.d to be $200 per annum. .All
these are natural and proximate damages resulting from the breach. (3) It the defendant, then, knew that the plalntlfr was carrying on the business stated in the complaint,
a.nd hired the store No1 411 Broadway for
the purpose of continuing the same business
therein, and If, in the exercise of reasonable
d1ligence, the plalntlfr might have procured
another store, reasonably well adapted to his
business and In the same vicinity, that Is, In
a location in which he could have preserved
and retained substantially the good-will of
bis former business, the rule of damages, In
addition to the special Items llrst above mentioned, will be the d1trerence between the rent
reserved In the lease and the actual rental
value of the leased store for the purpose of
earrylng on such business therein. In strch
ease the actual rental value would ordinarily
be measured by the amount of rent the plalntlfr would be compelled to pay for another
store equally well adapted to bis business.
It he could obtain another store for the same
rent be was to pay the defendant, or less, of
-course be would sutrer no general damages
for the defendant's breach of covenant, and
llls recovery in that behalf would be confined to nominal damages, In addition to the
special damages first above mentioned. If,
howeYer, the expenses of removing to an<>ther store would have been greater than
they would have been In rt>ntovlng to the
store No. 411 Broadway, such ex<:css would
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also be a proper Item ot damngcs. (4) It
the plalntllf could reasonably have procured
another suitable store tor his business, he
cannot recover for damages to bis buslnesa,
because by leasing, and continuing his business In, such other store, he might have
avoided such damages. (5) But knowing that
the plalntllf hired the store tor the purpose
ot rontlnulng his former business therein, (If
he did know It,) and having executed the
lease with knowledge that he could not put
the plalntl1f In possession ot the store at the
stipulated time because ot his prior outstnndlng lease, the defendant took the risk of the
plnlntllf being able to procure another suitable store for hie buelne£1s, the Inability ot
the latter to do so would render the defendant liable for the damages resulting to plalntllf's business by reason of the breach of
covenant complained of. Thie le plainly
within the rule of Hadley v. Baxendnle, supra, because, under such circumstances. thA
parties may fairly be considered to have contemplated that the breach of covenant would
necessarily destroy or greatly Impair the
value of plnlntltr's business. It should be
observed that, If the plaintiff recovers for
damages to his bm1lness, be cannot also recover the value of his lease under the aboYe v
second or third proposition, because such
value ls necessarily a factor In estimating
the damages to the business. Smith v. Wunderlich, 70 Ill. 426, (433.) He may, however,
In that case, recover the special damngcs
mentioned In the first proposition, for these
are not such factors.
It follows that the testimony which wne offered by the plalntlfr to show that the defendant knew, when be executed the lense to
the plalntlfr, that the latter was carrying on
the business before mentioned In the same
vicinity, and took the lease of the store for
the purpose and with the Intention ot continuing such business the1·eln. eml thnt he was
unable, In the exercise of due dlllgence, to ·'
find another store sultnble for his business,
was competent, and should have been received. Further, after the plalntilT makes a
prlma facle ca11e entitling him to recover tor
dnmages to hie business, Pl'OC\f should be received, under the pleadlngs, to show the
value of such business.
We agree with with Mr. Justice Paine. In
Shepard v. Gas-light Co., 15 Wis. 318, that
to ascertain the value of a business an In·
qulry as to the prollts thereof Is necessary.
Probable "value" and "net prollts" are convertible terms as applied to a business. Yet
the law In many cases giYes damages for
breaches of contracts, bnsed on prospective
profits, when they are fairly within the contemplation of the parties, are not too remote
and conjectm·al, and are susceptlhle of bein:.:ascertalned with reasonable certainty. If
the plalntltT shows himself entitled to recover for damages to his buslnet>s. the character, eJ.:teot, aod value of his estulJllslled
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business when the lease was executed, and

before, will furnish a guide to the jury in as-

sessing the prospective and probable value

thereof, had the plaintiff been permitted to

transfer it to the store No. 411 Broadway.

Carried on in the immediate vicinity of the

old stand, and by the same person, presum-

ably the business would have been equally

prosperous. This presumption may be re-

butted by proof of facts and circumstances

tending to, show that the business would

probably have been less remunerative had it

been so continued.

It was said in argument that no case can be

found which gives damages for the loss of

anticipated proﬁts, because a landlord fails

to give possession at the time agreed upon.

This is scarcely a correct statement. The

case of Ward v. Smith, 11 Price, 19, cited
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by Mr. Justice Paine in Shepard v. Gas-light

Co., supra, seems to be just such a case. It'

is conceded that if the plaintiff had not a

business already built up and established in

the same vicinity, which, with its good-will,

could have been transferred to the store No.

411 Broadway, there would be no basis upon

which to estimate the prospective value of

the business which the plaintiff would have

done there had he obtained possession, and

carried on the brsiness therein. In such case,

proﬁts would probably be too conjectural and

uncertain to be the basis of a recovery.

Some of the cases refer to this distinction.

In Chapman v. Kirby, 49 Ill. 211, the court,

in speaking of the case of Green v. \Villiams,

45 Ill. 206, say: “In that case the lessee had

not entered upon the term, had not built up

or established a business, and had not suf-

fered such a loss. There was not in that

case any basis upon which to determine

whether there ever would be any proﬁts, or

upon which to estimate them." In the pres‘

ent case the offer was to prove facts which

would have shown a suﬂicient basis to de-

termine whether there would be proﬁts, and

upon which they might be estimated.

For the errors above indicated, the judg-

ment of the circuit court must be reversed,

and the cause will be remanded for a new

trial.

. BUEACH OF LANDLOllD'S
BREACH OF LANDLORD‘S COVENANTS.

/
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COHN v. NORTON. ‘/

(18 Atl. 595, 57 Conn. 480.)

Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut.

Sept. 13, 1889.

Appeal from court of common pleas, New

Haven county; Di-ziuNo, Judge.

Action by Louis (John against Samuel L.

Norton, for damages for breach of contract

to deliver possession of premises leased to

plaintiff. Judgment for plaintiff. Defend-

ant appeals. -

G. A. Fay, for appellant.

forappellee.

CARPENTER, J. On the 18th day of Au-

gust,1885, the defendant leased to the plaintiff

R. S. Pickett,

a store and dwelling-house, for one year from -
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the lst day of 5(-ptember, with the privilege

of renewing the lease for three years, at a

monthly rent of $50, payable in advance.

One month's rent was paid. The defendant

failed to put the plaintiff in possession. It

appears that when the lease was executed the

property was in the possession of one Alex-

ander. under a prior lease, with the right to ‘

hold the same until February 1, 1690. He

refused to surrender the possession. In an

action to recover damages the piluniid

claimed to recover the sum of $80, amount

paid to clerks for release from contracts. and

the sum of 8586.35, amount paid merchants

to take back goods bought, and for deprecia-

tion on the goods. The defendant objected ‘

to the introduction of all evidence upon either

of these claims. 'l‘he court admitted the evi-

dence, and allowed both items as damages.

Assuming that the plaintiff is correct in

his claim that these were, or might have been,

legitimate items of damage, still we think the

testimony was objectionable, unless it further

appeared that the sums paid were reasonable,

and that the obligation to pay was entered

into in good faith. The mere fact that the

plaintiff paid them is not of itself suﬂicient

to establish either proposition; and it does

not appear that there was any other evidence

tending to establish them, or either of them.

If the clerks employed by the plaintiff had

sustained no damage, or damage to a less

amount, or if the plaintiff was under no legal

obligation to pay, then the payment was un-

reasonable. The same is true of the money

paid to the merchants. If these clerks were

hired after he knew of the lease to Ale\':\nder.

it can hardly be claimed that the plaintiff

acted in good faith. How that was, we are

not told. It appears that he had full knowl. ‘

edge of that lease on the 23d of August; and

it is consistent with every fact found that all

the clerks were subsequently hired. So. too,

with respect to the purchase of the goods.

Four days after the plaintiff had actual

knowledge that Alexander could legally re-

tain the possession. August 27th, he wrote

the defendant as follows: “As i am now sit-

uated, I am on the fence, it being high time

COVEN~T8.

lees received the defendant's Jetter lnformtnir him that the prior lease had a year a'nd
D.ve months longer to run. The evidence is
strong, if not conclusive, that be purehased
his goods after that. It so, in no event hllB
Appeal from court of common pleas, New be any legal or moral claim on the defendant.
But the great question ls, what is the rnle
Haven county; DEMING, Judge.
of damages in cases like this? Before considAction by Lonia Cohn against Samnel L
Norton, for damages for breach of contract ering that question we will brietty notice anto deliver posseseion o( premiaes leased to other claim that the defendant Sl'ts up, and
plllintilJ. Judgment for plaintiff. Defend- that is, that it was the duty of the plaintiff,
al. his own expense, to take measures to gain
ant appeals.
·
possession of the property. Whatever may
(} . .A. Fay, for appellant. R. B. Pickett,
be the rule when a stranger wrongfully takes
foruppellee.
and holds possession, the principle contended
CAHPENTER, J. On the 18th day of Au- for can have no application where a pel'son
gust, 1885, thedefend1mt leased to the plaintiff holding rightfully 11 nder the lessor retains the
a store and dwelling-house, for one year from possession. Nor are we prepared to sanction
the lat day of :;.-pt1i111ber, wllb the privilt>ge the claim that in this case the defendant is
of renewing the Jeaae for three years, at a only liable for nominal damages. We can
monthly rent of $50, payable in advance. hardly say that a landlord who knows, or who
One month's rent waa paid. The defendant has the means of knowing, that his property
faill'd to put the plaintiff in poasession. It is incumbered with an outstanding lease,
appears that when the lease was execnted the which may prevent his giving possession,
property was in the possession of one Alex- acts in good faith in leasing unconditionally
ander, unt.ler a prior lease, with the right to to another. We come back lhen to the quesbold the same until ~'ebruary 1, ltiOO. He tion, what is the l'llle of damages'! In Hadrefused to surrendt>r the possession. In an ley v. Baxendale, 9 Exch. 341, the rule is laid
action to recover damages the plaintiff down thus: "\Vht't'e two parties have ma•le
claimed to reco\·er the sum of 880. amount a contract which one of them has broken, the
paid to clerks for rei638e from contracts, and damages which the other party ought to rethe sum or 8586.35, amount paid merchants ceive in respect of such breach of contrac·t
to take back goods bought, and for deprecia- should be either su<'h as may, fairly and reation on the goods. The defendant objected sonably, be considt>red &.Q arising naturallyto the introduction of all evidtmce upon either that is, according to the usual course of
of these claims. The court admitted the evi- thingi1-from such breach of contract itself,
dence, and allowe<l both item11 u damKgea.
or such as may reasonably be supposed to
Assuming that the plaintiff la correct in have bt'en In the contemplation of bo.th parhis cll\im that these were, or might have been, ties at the time they made the contract, as
legitimate items t>f damage, still we I.hi nk the the probable result of the breach of it."
t.estimony was objectionable, unless it further
This rnle h1111 been criticised somewhat, as
appeared that the sums paid were reasonable, not being s111Hciently definite; but we appreand that the o!Jligation to pay was entered hend that any difficulty of that sort has necinto in good faith. The mere fact that the essarily arisen from the dilliculty in applying
plaintiff paid them la not of itself sufficient the rule in given cases. It is not an ea.'ly
to establish either proposition; and •t; does matter, in many cases, t.o determine whether
not appear that there was any other evidence a given result is the natural consequence of
ten11ing to establish them, or either of them. a breach of a contract, or whether it arose
from a matter which may reasonably be supU the clerks employed by the plaintiff had
sustained no damage, or damage to a lesa posed to have been contemplated when the
amount, or if the plaintiff was under no legal parties entered into the contract. Oftentime11
obligl\tiou to pay, then the payment was un- it is a question on which men's minds may
reasonable. The same ls true of the money well ditl'er. In that case the plaintiff was the
paid to the merchants. If these clerks wt>re owner of a steam-mm. He sent the parts of
hired after be knew of the lease to Alexander. a broken shaft by the defendant, a carrier, to
it can hardly be claimed that the plaintiff a mechanic, to serve as a model for making
acted in good faith. How that was, we are a new one. 'fhe carrier did not deliver th"
not told. It appears that he had full knowl- · article within a 1·easonable time, by reason of
t'dge of that lt1ase on the 23d of Aug11st; and which the plaintiff's mill stood still several
it is consistent with every fact found thi.t all days. In an action to recover damages the
tbt1 clerks were sub:c1equently hired. 8o, too, defendant pleaded by paying £25 into court.
with respect to the purchase of the goods. The case went to trial, and the plaintiff had
J.t'our days afte1· the plaintiff had actual a verdict for £25 more. A rule to show cause
knowledge that Alexander could legally re- was argued, and the court promulgated the
tain the poaaession, August 27th, be wrote rule we have quoted. In that case It wa11
the dPfendant as follows: "As 1 am now sit- contended that the loss of protlls was tha diuated, I am on the fence, it heing high ti me rect and natural const>qUl'llCI' of the defl'ndfor mil to buy goods, and 1 don't know what ant's neglect. 'fhecourt did not accept that
to do about it." On the same day he doubt. view, but placed lt;e decision on somewhat
COHN "'· NORTON.
(18 .Atl. 005, 57 Conn. 480.)
Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut.
Sept. 13, 1889.
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‘ and communicated.

different grounds. The court says: “Now,

if the special circumstances underwhich the

contract was actuallv made were communi-

cated by the plaintiff to the defendant, and

thus known to both parties, the damages re-

sulting from the breach of such a contract

which they would reasonably contemplate

would be the amount of injury which would

ordinarily follow from a breach of contract

under these special circumstances, so known

But, on the other hand,

if those special circumstances were wholly

unknown to the party breakmg the contract,

he, at the must, could only be supposed to

have had in his contemplation the amount of

injury which would arise generally, and, in

the great multitude of cases, not affected by

any special circumstances from such a breach
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of contract; for, had the special circumstances

been known, the parties might have especially

provided for the breach of contract by special

terms as to the damages in that case, and of

this advantage it would be very unjust to de-

prive them." Thus the loss was attributed

to the failure of the plaintiff to inform the

defendant of the special circumstances, by

reason of which he contributed to the loss;

for, if the defendant had been fully informed,

it may be assumed that there would have been

a prompt delivery, and consequently no un-

necessary loss, and because he was not so in-

formed the court held that he was not liable

for special damages. The essence of the rule

seems to be that the defendant must, in some

measure, have contemplated the injury for

which damages are claimed. If it was the

direct and natural result of the breach of

contract itself, he did contemplate it; but if

the injury did not ﬂow naturally from the

breach, but the breach combined with special

circumstances to produce it, then the defend-

ant did not contemplate it, and consequently

is not liable, unless he had knowledge of the

special circumstances. There may, however,

be cases, growing out of the present methods

of business, in which a promise may be im-

plied, from the nature of the transaction, or

the character of the business in which the

party is engaged, to be prompt, and to use

the utmost diligence in the perf'ormance of

the duty undertaken. In such cases the law

will not require the party to be specially in-

formed, but will deem him to have contem-

plated the importance of the business, and

hold him responsible accordingly.

Apply these principles to this case. The

store was hired for a clothing store. That

seems to be all that the defendant knew

about it. He did not request the plaintiff to

hire clerks and purchase goods, nor was he ‘

While ‘

he may have supposed that the plaintiff '

advised that the plaintiff would do so.

would make suitable preparations to oc-

cupy the store, yet he could not know what t

preparations were necessary. He may have

needed no clerks, or they may have been pre-
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different gMunde. The court says: "Now,
if the special circumstanct>s undn . which the
contract wns a<'t1u1llv made Wt're com11111nicateJ by the plaintiff to the defendant, and
thus known to IJoth parties, the damagt•s resulting from the breach of such a contract
which they would rea.~onably contemplate
\\'<lllld be the amount of injury which would
ordinarily follow Crom a breach of contract
under these special circu mslances, so known
·and communkated. nut, on the other han<I,
if those special circumstances ,,.ere wholly
unknown to the party IJrtiakinio: the contract,
he, at the most, could only be supposed to
have had in his contemplation the amount or
injury which would arise generally, and, in
the great multitude of casPs, not affectet.I by
any special circumstances from sut'h a breach
of contract; for, had the special circumstances
been known, the parties might have e~pecially
provided for the breach of contract by special
tt'l'ms HS to the damages in that case, and of
this advantage it would be very unjust to deprive them." Thus the loss was attributed
to the failure of the plaintiff to inform the
dcfentlant of the special circumstances, by
reason of which he <'Ontributed to the loss;
for, If the dt>fendant had been fully Informed,
it may be assumed that there would have been
a prompt delivery, and consequently no unnecessary loss, and because he was not so informed the court held that he was not liable
for special damages. The esse111:e of the rule
seems to be that the defendant must, in some
measure, have contemplated the injury for
which damages a1·e claimed. If it was the
direct and natural result of the l>L"each of
contract itself, he did contemplate it; but if
the injury did not flow naturally froru the
breach, but the breach combined with special
circumstances to produce it, then th~ defendant did not contemplate it, and con!!equently
is not liable, unless he had knowledge of tho
special circumstances. There may, however,
be ca.~es. growini;t out of the present methods
of business, in which a promise may be im·
plied, from the nature of the transaction, or
the character of the business in which the
party is engaged, to be prompt, and to use
the utmost diligence in the performance of
the duty undertaken. In such ca.'les the law
will not require the party to he specially informed, but will deem him to have contem·
plated the importance of the business, and
bold him responsilJle accordingly.
Apply these prim·iples to this case. The
store was hired for a clothing store. That
seems to be all that the defendant knew
auout it. He did not reqneat the plaintiff to
hire clerks and purchase goods, nor was he
advised that the plaintilf would do so. While
he may have supposed that the plaintiff
would make suitable preparations to occupy the store, yet he could not know what
preparations were necessary. He may have
nteded no clerks, or they may have been previously engaged, and the necessary goods
may Ji.we been then in bis possession. As a
matter of law, it cannot be said that the de-

fenrlant contemplatPd that tlle plaintiff would
hire clerks and purchase gout.ls umhir such
circum~tances as to incur heavy liabilities in
case of failure for any cause. In no roper)
sense, thert>fore, was the defenda a parfy
to those arrangements, had no i .rest therl:'in, and had no ri~ht to int fere; consti
,quently he cannot be held resp, nsible. Again\'..
Jff these liabilities were I tirred after the
plaintiff knew that it was1 doubttul whether
be could have the store, as they prohal1ly
were, then, as suggested in a former part or
this opinion, they were incurred in bad faith,
and he assumed the entire risk. The .English rnlt>, then, as we understand it, will not
justify the measure of damages applied by
the court IJelow. The rule we have been
considering prevails generally In this count1·y.
Clo3ely allied to it is another principle, which
has some application to this case, and that is,
that profits which are in their nature doulJtful or uncertain cannot be recovered 11s damages in such casl's. But this principle does
not exclude profits as such, but only those of
a contingent nature. If they aredetinite and
certain, and are lost by reason of the defendant's breach of his contract, tht>y are in some
cases recoverable. An iustance of this is the
case of Booth v. Rolling-Mill Co., tiO N. Y.
487. The plaintiff had contracted to deliver
to a railroad company 400 Stet'l-eapped rails
at a given price. The defendant engaged
with the plaintiff to manufacture them, but
failed to do so. The plaintiff was allowed to
recover the profits he would have made had
he been able to dt>liver the rails. If a loss of
profits may thus be compensated, we see no
reason why a direct loi<s of money may not
be compensated. In either event, howev11r,
the- lose must be certain, not only as to its
nature and extent, but also as to the cause
which produced lt, and must be capable or
being definitely ascertained. In Gr1lHn v.
Colver, 16 N. Y. 489, the rule is thus stated:
"The broad, gt>neral rule in su1·h cases is
that the party injured is entitled to recover
all his d'amages, including gains prevente1l al'
well as losses sustained, and this rule is 1rnbject to but two conditions: The damages
must be such as may fairly be supposed to
have entered into thA contemplation of the
parties when they made the contract,-that
is, must be such as might naturally be expected to follow its violation i and they must
be certain, ltoth in their nature and in respect to the cause from whil'h they proceed."
Here we may concede that the loss sustained
was sutllciently definite and certain as to the
amount, lmt not so as t.o the cause from
which it proceeded. As we have already seen,
it is not prolJ!lble that the violation of the
contract caused these Josse:s; but. on the other
hand, the plaintiff himself needlessly sub· jected himself to them.
'
In an Illinois case cited by the plaintiff,
(Green v. Williams. 45 Ill. 206,) it was held
that nPcessary losses sustained might be recovert'<l. 'rhe plaintiff's case will hardly
s~J that test. The failure is twofold,-ln
1
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respect to the necessity for hiring clerks, and

purchasing goods, in the ﬁrst instance, and

also in respect to the payment of the sums

paid. There is no ﬁnding, and the facts do

not suﬂiciently indicate. that there was any

necessity for either.

Thus far we have assumed that the dam-

ages recoverable in this case are the same as

in ordinary cases of breaches of contract.

The defendant, however, contends that the

rule in actions on covenants in leases, ex-

press or implied, is that, where the plaintiff

has paid no rent or other expense, only

nominal damages can be recovered. Such a

rule once prevailed. It was adopted in anal-

ogy to actions on covenants in deeds of real

estate. and it now prevails to a limited ex-

tent in the state of New York. Conger v.

Weaver, 20 N. Y. 140. In that case Dr:NIO,
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J., not regarding the rule with favor, with

apparent reluctance considered that it was

too ﬁrmly established in that state to be dis-

turbed. In Mack v. Patchin. 42 N. Y. 167,

SMITH. J., says: "But this rule has not been

very satisfactory to the courts in this country,

and it has been relaxed or modiﬁed more

or less, to meet the injustice done to les-

sees in particular cases.” In Pnmpelly v.

Phelps. 40 N. Y. 59, it is declared that the

rule should not be extended, but limited

strictly to those cases coming wholly and ex-

actly within it. - In both those cases the cir-

cumstances are enumerated whichwill take

cases out of the operation of the rule. They

are so numerous as to well nigh abrogate the

rule itself. In England the rule has been re-

pudiated, and such actions are plau-ed upon

the same footing with other actions on con-

tracts. Williams v. Barrell, 1 Man., G. 80 S.

402; Look v. Furze, 19 C. B. (N. S.) 96.

In this state the rule has not been adopted.

and we are not disposed to adopt it. We

think it better to discard the rule, so as to be

in a position to determine all such cases upon

the general principles applicable to other con-

tracts. In that way we think we shall be

the better prepared to do justice in each case

as it arises.

We suppose the correct rule to be that the

plaintiff is entitled to recover the rent paul.

and the difference between the rent agreed

to be paid and the value of the term, together

with such special damages as the circum-

stances may show him to be entitled to.

Trull v. Granger, 8 N. Y. 115. The theory

upon which the court below assessed dam-

ages being inconsistent with these prin-

ciples, the judgment must be revelsed. and a

new trial ordered. The other judges con-

curred.
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respect to the necessity for hiring clerks, and strictly to those cases coming wholly and expurchasing goods, in the first instance, and actly within it. • In both those cases the ciralso in respect to the payment of U1e sums cumstances are enumerated whiob· will take
paid. There la no finding, and the facts do cases out ot the operation of the rule. They
not sufficiently indicate, that there waa any are so numerous as to well nigh abrogate tbe
rule itself. In England the rule has ut-tm reneet>BSlty for either.
Thus far we have assumed that the dam- pudiated, and 11uclJ acLions are placed upon
ages recoverable In this case arc the aame as the same footing with other actions on conin ordinary cases of breaches of contract. tracts. Williams v. Burrell, I Man., G. & S.
The defendant, however, contends that the 402; Lock v. Furzf', 19 C. B. (N. 8.) 96.
rule in actions on covenants In leases, ex- In this state the rule hHB not been aclopted,
press or implied, la that, where the plalntil! and we ·are not disposed to adopt it. We
has paid no rent or other expenBt't, only think it better to discard thf' rule, so Ill! to be
nominal damages can be recovered. Such a in a position todetnmine all imch cases up<m
rule once prevailed. It was adopted in anal- the general principles applicable to other conogy to actions on covenants in deeds of real tracts. In that way we think we shall be
the better prepared to do justice in each case
esta~. and it now prevails to a limited extent in the state of New York. Conger v. as it arises.
We supi>oee the correct rule to he that the
Weaver, 20 N. Y. 140. In that case DENIO,
J., not regarding the rule with favor, with plaintiff la entitled to recover the rt-nt pa11l,
apparent reluct1mce considered that it was and the difference betwePn the rent aizreed
too firmly established in that state to be dis- to be paid and the valut> of Lhe term, tngl'U1er
with such special damages as the drcumturbed. In Mack v. Patchin, 42 N. Y. 167,
SMITH, J ., says: "But this rule hM not been
stances may show him to be entitled to.
vny satisfactory to I.he courts in this country, Trnll v. Granger, 8 N. Y. 115. 'fhe thPory
and it has been relined or modified more upon which the court below assPBsed damor lesa, to meet the injustice done to lt-s- ages being inconsls!A>nt with thase prin·
eeee in particular CMt-B," In P11mp.,1Jy v. ciplt-s, the judgm..nt must be reve•B"'tl,and a
Phelps, 40 .N. Y. 69, it is declared that the new trial ord.,red. The other j uugdll cunrule should not be extended, but limit.eel curred.
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V KNOWLES v. STEELE.

(61 N. W. 557.)

Supreme Court of Minnesota. Dec. 21, 1894.

Appeal from district court, Hennepin coun-

ty; Henry G. Hicks, Judge.

Action by Alfred B. Knowles against

Franklin Steele, Jr., for damages for breach

of contract. Judgment was rendered for de-

fendant, and plaintiff appeals. Aﬂirmed.

KNOWLES T. STEEIJD.
(61 N. W. MT.)
Supt<eme Court of MinnetlOta. Dec. 21, 1894.
Appeal from district court, Hennepin coun~; Henry G. Hicks, Judge.
Action by Alfred B. Knowles agalll8t
Franklin Steele, Jr., for damages for breach
of contract. Judgment was rendered for defendant, and plaintitr appeals. .A.11lrmed.
George R. Robinson, for appellant. Kitchel, Cohen & Shaw, for respondent.

George R. Robinson, for appellant. Kit-

chel, Cohen & Shaw, for respondent.

MITCHELL, J. The following condensed

statement of the facts will be suilicient for

the purposes of this appeal: In 1881, the

defendant, being the owner of the premises

described in the complaint, executed a lease

(in which his wife joined) to plaintiff for

the term of 10 years at an agreed annual

rent. This lease contained a covenant that
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if the lessee should desire to continue the

lease for another 10 years he should have

'the privilege of doing so in the manner fol-

lowing. Not less than three months before

the expiration of the original term the lessee

should give to the lessors notice in writing

of his election to continue the lease for an ad-

ditional term, and in such notice name and

appoint an appraiser on his part. There-

upon the lessors should appoint an appraiser

on their part, and notify the lessee of such

appointment. The two appraisers thus ap-

pointed were to appoint a third, and the

three so chosen were to appraise the leased

premises at their then fair market value.

“and therenpon. without any further act.

this lease shall therenpon be extended for

the further term of ten years, upon the

same terms and conditions as before, except

that the annual rent for such second term

shall be such sum as is equal to six per

centum of such appraised valuation." In

1891 plaintif f seasonably gave defendant

written notice of. his election to continue to

lease for a second term, and in such notice

nominated an appraiser on his part to ap-

praise the property for the purpose of ﬁxing

the amount of the rent for the additional

term. On receipt of this notice defendant

sent plaintiff a written communication, by

which, in order to avoid the necessity of ap-

pointing appraisers, he proposed to ﬁx the

rent for the extended term at 6 per cent. on

the then present assessed valuation of the

property, $31,000. Immediately on reeeipt

of this proposition the plaintiff wrote to de-

fendant, notifying him of his acceptance of

it. The fact was, although unknown to

plaintiff, that soon after the execution of the

lease in 1881 the defendant had conveyed

the premises, through the medinm of a third

party, to his wife, from whom he had no au-

thority to make or accept the proposition re-

ferred to, and shortly afterwards she wrote

plaintiff, notifying him that she declined to

be bound by the act of her husband, and sug-

gesting that, if they could not agree on the

amount of the rent, they should resort to an-

appraisal of the property in accordance with

.MITCHELL, 3. The following condensed
statement of the :facta will be su1ftclent for
the purposes of this appeal: In 1881, the
defendant,. being the owner of the premises
described In the complaint, executed a lease
(In which his wlte joined) to plalntltr for
the term of 10 years at an agreed annual
rent. This lease ·contained a covenant that
If the leuee should desire to continue the
tease for another 10 years be should have
· the privilege of doing so In the manner fol·
lowing. Not less than three months before
the expiration of the original term the lessee
should gl-re to the lessors notice In writing
of his election to continue the lease for an ad·
dltlonal term, and In such notice name and
appoint an appraiser on his part. There·
upon the lessors should appoint an appraiser
on their part, and notify the lessee of such
appointment. The two appraisers thus appointed were to appoint a third, and the
three so chosen were to appraise tl1e leased
premises at their then fair market value,
""and thereupon, without any turther act,
this lease shall thereupon be extended for
the further term of ten years, upon tlle
same terms and condltlons as betore, except
that tlle annual rent tor such seco.,d term
shall be such sum as la equal to t1lx per
centum of such appraised valuntlon." In
18fil plalntUl' seasonably gave defendant
written notice of. his elrctlon to contluue to
lease for a second term, and In such notice
nominated an appraiser on his part to ap·
praise the property tor the purpose or fixing
the amount of the rent for the additional
term. On receipt of this notice defendant
sent plalntUl' a written communication, by
which, In order to a-rold the necessity ot appointing appraisers, he proposed to fix the
1·ent tor the extended term at 6 per cent. on
the then present assessed valuation of the
property, $31,000. Immedfately on re ~elpt
ut ibis proposition the plalntUT wrote to defendant, notltylng him or his accc·ptance or
It. 'nle faet was, although unknown to
plalntUT, that soon after the execution of the
lease in 1881 the defendant had con-reyed
the premises, through the mecllum ot a third
party, to his wire, from whom he had no authority to make or accept the proposition referred to, and short17 afterwards she wrote
plaintllf, notifying him that she declined to
be bound by the act of her husband, and sug-

gestlng that, It they could not agree on the
amount ot the rent, they should resort to an .
appraisal of the property ln accordance with
the terms of the lease. Plalntl1f having refused to accede to the proposition, .Mrs.
Steele brought an action against him to re·
cover possession ot the property, In which
the court decided that the notice served on
her husband was au1ftclent to bind Mrs.
Steele, but that she was not bound by the
proposition made by him ftxlng the rent:
and In accordance with the stipulation of the
parties to the action the court gave Mrs.
Steele further time In which to appoint an
appraiser on her part, which she did. The
two thus appointed by her and the present
plalntl1l', respectively, selected a third, and
the three appraised the market value of the
premises at '35,000, on which basis the rent
tor the second term was tlxed at $2,100 per
annum, at which rate the plalntitr has since
paid, whereas the rent, according to the
proposition of the defendant and accepted
by plalntltl', would have been only $1,914 per
annum. This action was brought to recover
damages :for defendant's breach or bis contract 6.xlng the rent on the basis of the assessed value ot the property. No evidence was
Introduced as to the actual rental value of the .
premises, and, the ejectment suit between
plalntl.IT and Mrs. Steele being res Inter allos
acta, nothing done or determined In that action ls evidence against the defendant on
that question.
The plalntltr contends that this la In the
nature of an action tor the breach of the
covenant In the lease for the quiet enjoyment
of the leased premises; that plalntltr bad a
right to purchase his right of possession
trom the true owner, and that his damages
9."e what It cost him to secure this right,
over and above the rent agreed on between
him and defendant. The rule as to the
measure of damages attempted to be Invoked has no application to the case. Plalntitr'a quiet enjoyment under the lease has
not been disturbed. He bas secured a second term on the exact terms upon which be
was entitled to It under the terms of the
lease. What be complains of ls that, If defeuclant had been able to perform and had
performed a certain other contract, he would
have obtained the extension on better terms.
thnu he was entitled to under the original
lease. He was not c>ompelled to take a
second term at all, still less to take It at a
rent greater than the actual rental value of
the premises. Therefore the measure of bis
damages, 1t he Is entitled to any, ls the loss
of bis bargain, viz. the difference between
the rent agreed In the accepted proposition of
the defendant and the actual market rental
value of the premises at the time this agreement was made. Therefore, assuming that
the proposition or the defendant and the acceptance ot it by plalntltr constituted a binding contra.ct, still the plalntitr was at most
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only entitled, under the evidence, to nominal

damages: and a new trial will not be grant-

ed for a failure to assess nominal damages

where no question of permanent right is in-

volved. Harris v. Kerr, 37 Minn. 537, 35 N.

W. 379; Hill. New Trials. p. 572. This ren-

ders it unnecessary to consider any of the

other questions discussed by counsel. Judg-

ment aﬂirmed.

GILFILLAN, 0. 1., absent, on account of

Generated for facpubupdates (University of Michigan) on 2014-06-12 19:23 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/mdp.35112105421491
Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd-google

sickness; took no part.
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MYERS v.. BURNS.

-' -(35 N. Y. 269.)

Court of Appeals of New York. 1866.

' John H. -R‘ey-nolds,“ for ‘appellant. -James

Emott, for respondent. ‘

HUNT, J. This is an action for rent on 8-

lcase dated May 28, 1856, brought by the

grantee of the reversion against the assignee

of the term. The present defendant went

into possession of the premises September

20, 1856.

The defense is a counter-claim, under a

covenant of the landlord to keep the prem-

ises in repair. There is also connected with

the covenant to repair. an agreement that

if the premises were damaged by ﬁre, so as

to be unﬁt for a ﬁrst-class hotel, the rent

should abate. The counter-claim set up in
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the answer is, ﬁrst, for $908, expended by

the defendant in repairs, and second, for

$700 damages occasioned by the loss of the

use of four rooms, alleged to be untenant-

able for the want of repairs.

The rent due was $1,000, with interest from

August 1, 1858.

The jury found specially $752.57, amount

of repairs made by the defendant, and $300

damages for the loss of the use of the rooms.

These amounts left a balance of $9.45 due

to the defendant, for which he had a verdict.

The most important questions in the case

were questions of fact, which were carefully ‘

and correctly submitted to the jury upon the

trial, and in relation to which their decision

is ﬁnal.

A question arose upon the charge for paint-

ing, on which an exception was taken by

the plaintiﬁl. Certain portions of the wood-

work of the hotel were repainted by the de-

fendant with zinc paint, which was about

iifteeen per cent. more expensive than com-

mon lead paint, which was the original style

of painting. and was more durable and more

ornamental.

defendant was entitled to recover the full

expense of the zinc paint, although it was

more expensive than the description of paint .

originally employed, it appearing that it was ‘

more desirable and a better material than

white lead." This charge was correct. The

plaintiff had the option of making these re-

pairs by his own mechanies, and with such

suitable materials as he should select. His

omission to do so gave the defendant the

right to make them by his mechanies, and

with such suitable materials as he should

select. He was bound to be reasonable and

judicious in his repairs; but he was not com-

pelled to select precisely the same kind of

paper or paint, or to be precise that the ex-

pense was not a farthing greater than had

before been expended upon the same spot.

He was at liberty to repair according to the

modern style. and adopt modern improve-

ments. The testimony showed that the re-

The court charged, that “the -

pair for the purpose in question was a -useful
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lures of an original character are required.

It is only required that those in the building

should be made to perform their proper duty.

The party agrees to “keep“ in repair, and

if. to keep in repair. it is necessary that the

roooms should ﬁrst he put in repair, the les-

sor is bound to perform that duty. Mayne,

Dam. 133, 92 Law Llb.; Payne v. Haine, 16

Mees. & W. 541. There is no covenant that

the rooms be kept in their then condition of

repair, and no exception of natural wear and

natural decay; but good repair and good

condition at all times is the fair intent of the

agreement . The requirements of a ﬁrst-class

hotel in Brooklyn demand all the comforts

and conveniences, and many of the luxuries

of civilised life. Different standards of com-

fort and civilization prevail in different parts

of the world. The location in question was
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that of the second city of the state, immedi-

ately adjoining the city of New York, and

the general standard of that latitude must

be assumed. A hotel of the ﬁrst class in

such a location without the means of heat-

ing its rooms would not be tolerated. It

would not indeed be a hotel of that character.

if the rooms had been rendered untenantable,

by water from the roof. would it have hecn

an answer to the request to repair, that the

leak existed when the lease was entered

into? If the ceilings had fallen, or the rooms

were ﬁlthy from dirt and want of paint. it

certainly would have been no answer. that

they were ‘in that condition when the lease

was made. The condition of the covenant,

to keep in repair, as already stated, can only

be performed by ﬁrst putting in repair, when

that is necessary. Beach v. Crain, 2 N. Y.

86, and cases supra.

The second proposition involved the extent

of the damages; the plaintiff claiming that

the defendant was entitled to no larger sum

than it would have cost if the defendant had

himself repaired the defect. and the defend-

ant claiming that he was entitled to recover

as damages the loss that he actually sus-

tained, from being deprived of the use of the

rooms.

The defendant had two different remedies.

of either of which he could have availed him-

self, in the event of the plaintiff's failure

to repair, after due notice. He could have

made the repair himself, and have called

upon the plaintiff to refund the expense, as

he actually did, in we case of the painting; ,

or he could have called upon the plaintitl‘ to

take the ordinary responsibility of a party

failing to perform his contract, to wit, to pay

the damages caused by such failure, as he did

in regard to the item in question. In the

ﬁrst case, the rule conﬁnes the damages to

the actual expense, if no special damage is

shown; but in the other, the cost of the re-

pair is not an element in the case. It is as

if there was no such right to repair on the

part of the lessee, but the claim rested solely

in damages. in Griﬂin v. Colver, 16 N. Y.

489, it was held that in the case of a failure
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tores of an original character are required.
The defendant had two different remedies.
It ls only required that those In the bulldlng of either of which be could have availed himshould be made to perform their proper duty. self, In the event of the plalntill's fallu1·e
1'he party agrees to "keep" In repnlr, and to repair, after due notice. He could have
If, to keep In repair, It Is necessary that the made the repair himself, and have called
rooorus ;ihould ftrst be put In repair, the les- upon the plalntilf to refund the expense, a~
11or Is bound to perform that duty. Mayne, be actually did, In u1e case of the painting;
Dam. 133, 92 Law Lib.; Payne v. Haine, 16 or be could have called upon the plalntltT to
Mees. & \V. Ml. Tht•re Is no covenant that take the ordinary responsibility of a party
the rooms be kept In their then condition of ' tailing to perform his contract, to wit, to pay
repair, nnd no eiceptlon of natural wear and tbe damages caused by such failure, as he did
natnrnl dl'cay; but good repair and good In regard to the Item In qulo;;tlou. In the
<'Ondltloo at all times ls the fair Intent of the first case, the rule confines the damages to
agreement. The requirements of a ftrst·dm1s the actual expense, If no special damage Is
hotl'l In Brooklyn demand all the comforts shown; bnt In thP other, the cost of the reand eonveniences. and many of the luxuries pair Is not an element In the case. It Is as
of cMllr.ed life. Dlft'erent atandards of com- If there was no such right to repair on the
fort and <'lvlllzatlon prernll In ~urerent parts part of the lessee, but the claim rested solely
of the world. The location In que11tlon was In damages. In Grltftn v. Colver, 16 N. Y.
that of the second city of the state, Immedi- 489, It was held that In the case of a fallnre
ately adjoining the C'lty of :Sew York, and to deliver a steam engine at the time conthe 11:1•11eral standard of that latitude must tracted, the party Injured could recover all
be a111mmed. A hotel of the ftrst class In his d1unai.res, Including gains prevented ai1
such 1t location without the means of heat- well as losses sustained, provided they were
ing Its rooms would not be tolerated. It certain, and such as might naturally be exwould not Indeed be a hotel of that character. pected to follow the breach. According to
lf the rooms bad been rendered untenantable, the reasoning of the learned judge In that
by walt>r from the roof, would It have ht>Pll <'lll!e, the damnges for tne lose of the use of
an answl'r to the request to repair, that the thl' rooms as here claimed, are both certain
teak Pxisted when the lease was entt:>red arid proxlmAte. See, also, Freeman v. Clute,
Into? If the ceilings bad fallen, or the rooms 3 Barb. 424, as explained by Judge Seldt>n;
were filthy from dirt and want of paint, It and Trull v. Granger, 8 N. Y. 115; aud Doe
certainly would have been no answer. that v. Rowlands, 9 Car. & P. 734, 88 E. C. L. 42f1.
they were In that condition when the lease
The judgment should be affirmed. All
was made. The condition of the covenant, concur, except DA VIES, C. J., and MOR·
to keep In repair, as already stated, can only GAN, J., dissenting.
be performed by first putting In repair, when
NOTE. In Cook v. Soule, !'16 N. Y. 420. the
that Is necessary. Beach v. Crain, 2 N. Y.
court, refl'rring to the rule lnid down in Myers
86, and cases supra.
v. BurnR, Kupra, Knid. l,ll'r Hrover, J.: "There
The second proposition Involved the extent may be ex~-eptions to th111 rule. In cases where
of the damages; the plaintiff claiming that the requiAite repairs are tritling, and the dam·
the defendant was entitled to no larger sum ages hy not making them are !urge, I think It is
the duty or the tenunt to make them, and
than It would have cost If the defendant had t•harge the lamllnrd with the cost. Miller v. Mar·
himself repaired the defl'ct, and the defend- lner's Church, 7 Greenl. IH; Loker v. Damon,
ant claiming that he was entitled to recover 17 Pick. 284. The tenant, after giving reason·
able notk-e and opportunity to the landlord to
as damages the 1088 that he actually sus- make
the repairs, it be neglects, may himself
tained, from being deprived of the use of the make them, and charge the landlord with the
rooms.
expense."
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(40 Mo. 475.)
BREACH OF CONTRACTS RESPECTING REAL ESTATE.

FISHER v. GOEBEL.

(40 Mo. 475.)

Supreme Court of Missouri. March Term, 1867.

Error to St. Louis court of common pleas.

Glover & Shepley, for plaintiff in error.

:o;upreme Court of Missouri. March Term, 1867.

1'.lrror to St Louis court of common pleas.
Glover & Shepley, for plalntltr in error.
Krum, Decker & Krum, for defendant In
Prror.

Krum, Decker & Krum, for defendant in

error.

IIOIAIES, J . The plaintiff had leased from

the defendant the premises called the “Flora

Garden," situated on the corner of Seventh

street and Geyer avenue, in 18551 There was

a cut some 15 or 20 feet deep on Geyer ave-

nue, and the lessor covenanted in the lease

that he would build at his own expense a rock

wall and fence on that side; and the lessee

covenanted to keep the leased property in a

state of repair. Some two years after this

wall was erected, it fell down by parts by

the action of the elements. The defendant
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was called upon to rebuild it, but before this

was done the plaintiff abandoned the prem-

ises and surrendered his lease.

The plaintif f proceeds on the assumption that

the covenant of the lessor had been broken by

the falling down of this wall, and that it be-

longed to the lessor and not to himself to re-

build it. The case appears to have been tried

on this theory, and the principal matters sub-

mitted for decision concern the instructions of

the court on the measure of damages.

The jury were instructed for the plaintiff

upon the basis that the proper measure of

damages was the difference between the rent

and value of the leasehold premises with a

good and permanent wall standing, and their

value in the condition in which they were left

without such wall.

The defendant's instructions were predicated

upon the rule that only the actual damages

resulting directly from the defendant's default

in relation to the stone wall. to be measured

by what it would cost to rebuild the wall, to-

gether with any loss that may have been sus-

tained as the direct and immediate conse-

quence of the insufﬁciency of the wall and

the breach of the covenant, could be recovered.

The jury found a verdict for the plaintiff

for $4.750 damages, and upon a remittitur of

$2,375 the defendant's motion for a new

trial was overruled, and judgment rendered

for the balance.

Under these covenants, it might admit of

serious question whether the plaintiff, after

he had accepted the wall without remon-

strance, and safely occupied the premises for

two years, was not bound under the covenant

for repairs to rebuild the wall himself, or at

least to put and keep it in a state of repair,

charging the defendant with damages only for

the original deﬁciency of structure.

appears to have been left to the jury under

the instructions to say whether the covenant

for the building of a wall had been complied

with. and whether the plaintiff had sustained

damage in consequence of a breach thereof;

and the case will be considered here only on

the matter of the damages.

Upon the facts of the case, we think the

HOLMES, J. The plalntltr had leased from
the defendant the premls~s called the "l<'lora
Garden," situated on the corner of Seventh
street and Geyer a.venue, In 1855< There was
a cut some 15 or 20 feet deep on Geyer avenue, and the le88or covenanted In the lease
that he would buHd at his own expense a rock
wall and fence on that side; and the lessee
c-overumted to keep the leased property In 11.
state ot repair. Some two years after this
wall was erected, It fell down by parts l>Y
the action of the elements. The defendant
was called upon to rebuild it, but before this
was done the plalutltr abandoned the premises and surrendered his lease.
T'he plalntltr proceeds on the assumption that
the rovenant of the lessor had been broken by
the falllng down of this wall, and that It belonged to the lessor and not t.o himself to rebuild It. The case appears to have been tried
on this theory, and the principal matters submitted for decision concern the Instructions of
the court on the measure of damages.
'.rhe jury were Instructed for the plalntltr
upon the basis that the proper measure of
damages was the dlft'erence between the rent
nnd value of the leasehold premises with a
good and permanent wall standing, and their
value in the rondltlon in which they were left
without such wall.
The defendant's Instructions were predicated
upon the rule that only the actual damages
resulting directly from the defendant's default
In relation to the stone wall. t.o be measured
by what It would cost to rebuild the wall, together with any loss that may have been sustained as the direct and Immediate' consequence of the Insufficiency of the wall and
the breach of the covenant, could be recovered.
The jury found a verdict for the plalntlft'
tor $4,760 damages, and upon a remlttltur of
$2,375 the defendant's motion for a new
trial was overruled, and judgment rendered
for the balance.
Under thPse covennnte, it might admit of
sPrlous question whether the plalntltr, after
he had accepted the wall without remonstrance, and safely occupied the premises for
two years, was not bound uuder the CO'l·enant
for repairs to rebuild the wall himself, or at
lPast to put and keep It in a state of repair,
!'barging the defendant with damages only for
the original deficiency of structure. But It

appears to have been left t.o the jury under
the Instructions to say ,.,·hether the covenant
for the building of a wall had been compiled
with, and whether the 1>lalntlff had sustained
damage in consequence of a breach tlwreof;
and the case will be considered here only on
the matter of the damages.
Upon the facts of the case, we think the
Instruction given for the plalntlft' allowed ll
lar~er latitude and measure of damages than
the justice or the law ot the case will warrant.
and that the rule given In the defendant's Instructions should have been adopted.
In Vivian v. Champion, 2 Ld. Raym. 1125,
It was said that the proper measure of damages in a breach of such covenants was what
It would cost to put the premises In repair.
This rule appears to have been slightly modified In some modern cases on covenant!\ by
tenants tor repairs, but, as we concelvl', not
to the extent Implied in this instruction for
the plaintiff'. Smith v. Peat, 9 Exch. 160;
Penley v. Watts, 7 Mees. & W. 601; City of
Worcester v. Rowlands, 9 Car. & P . 739;
Walker v. Swayzee, 3 Abb. Prac. 136. It has
been said to rover such damages as are direct
and Immediate, but not remote, speculative or
contingent damages, or such as might have
been avoided by the other party. Loker v.
Damon, 17 Pick. 288. It has been allowed to
Include such losses In addition to the actual
cost of repair as were necessarily sustained
during the periods required for making repairs, and some compensation for any 1088 of
the use of the premises whilst they were undergoing repairs. Mlddlekaulf v. Smith, 1
l\Id. 327. But we find no 111ttlsf11ctory authority for the position that the tenant In
such case mny wholly neglect to make the
necessary repairs himself, allow his leasehold
to depreciate In value, or his business to be
broken up and abandon his lease, and then
claim tor his damages the whole loss so In- ·
curred. The greater part of such dam11get1 a11
these might have been avoided, and are to be
attributed to his own fault; and for tllat he
must be content to beltlr the loss himself.
Thompson v. Shattuck, 2 Mete. (Mass.) 615.
As a general rule, we think It may be said
that the recovery must be confined to the actual damages, which are the direct, immedl:tte,. or proximate, and unavoidable consequence of the breach of the covenant. Sedg.
Meas. Dam. 195-100.
The evidence shows that this wall might
have been rebuilt at a cost ot some six or
eight. hundred dollars, and we are Inclined to
think that the plaintltr has recovered a larger
amount than he was justly entitled t.o <'inlm.
notwithstanding the remlttltur.
For these reasons the judgment will be reversed and the cause remanded. The other
judges concur.
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WATRISS v. FIRST NAT. BANK OF

CAMBRIDGE.

(130 Mass. 343.)

Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts.

dlesex. Feb. 21, 1881.

Action by Sarah W. Watriss against the

First National Bank of Cambridge. Defend-

ant was plaintiffs tenant, and, at the termi-

nation of its lease. removed ﬁxtures from the

leased premises. This action is for breach of

the covenant to surrender the premises in

Supreme Judicial Court of MaBSachwietta. Mid·
dlesex. Feb. 21, 1881.
Action by Sarah W. Watrlss against the
F'lrst :"atlonal Bank of Cambridge. Defend.ant was plalntltr~ tf'nant, and, at the termlm1tlon of Its lease. removed tl"\:tures from the
h'Sired premises. 'fhls aC'tlon Is for brea<'h of
the eovenant to eurrPnder the preml!les ID
good condition. Judgmt>nt for plalntltr.
S. H. Dudley, for plalntltr. J. W. Hammond. for deft>ndant.

good condition. Judgment for plaintiff.

S. H. Dudley. for plaintiff. J. W. Ham-

mond. for defendant.

Mid-

GRAY, O. J. As a general rule, the meas-

ure of damages for the breach of a lessee's

covenant to keep in repair, and to surrender
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the demised premises at the end of the term

in as good order and condition as they are in

at the beginning of it. is the sum it would

cost to repair the premises and put them in

the condition they ought to be in. In the

time of Lord Holt, this was the rule even in

an action brought before the expiration of the

lease. Shortridge v. Lamplugh, 2 Ld. Raym.

798, 803, 7 Mod. 71, 77; Vivian v. Champion,

2 Id. Raym. 1125, 1 Salk. 141. In Vivian v.

Champion, that great judge said: “In these

actions there ought to be very good damages;

and it has always been practised so before

me, and everybody else that I ever knew.

We always inquire, in these cases, what it

will cost to put the premises in repair, and

give so much damages, and the plaintiff

ought in justice to apply the damages to the

repair of the premises"

According to later cases, when the lessor

sues on the covenant to repair, pending the

lease, and so before he is entitled to posses-

sion of the premises, the damages may per-

haps be limited to the diminution in the mar-

ket value of his estate. See Nixon v. Den-

ham, 1 Ir. Imw it. 100, 1 Jebb & S. 416: Smith

v. Peat, 9 Exch. 161; Macnamara v. Vincent,

2 Ir. Ch. 481; Davies v. Underwood, 2 Hurl.

& N. 570; Bell v. Hayden, 9 Ir. C. L. 301;

Mills v. Guardians of Poor, L. R. 8 C. P. 79:

Mayne, Dam. (3d Ed.) 229. But when the

action is brought after the end of the term,

the measure of damages is still held to be

such a sum as will put the premises in the

condition in which the tenant is bound to

leave them. Elliott v. Watkins, 1 Jones,

Exch. 308: Burdett v. Withers. 7 Adol. & E.

136, 2 Nev. & P. 122; Penlcy v. Watts, 7

Mees. & W. (‘D1, 610, 611; Payne v. Heine,

16 .\Iees. & W. 541; Yates v. Dunster, 11

Exch. 15; Rawlings v. \Iorgan, 18 C. B. (N.

S.) 776; Mayne, Dam. 232. 233. In Yates v.

Dunster, Baron Parke quoted the statement

of Lord Holt, above cited. and referred to

.\'ewcastle v. Broxtowe, 4 Barn. & Adol. 273.

.1 Nev. & Man. 598, in which, in an action

against the hundred for the demolition of a

house by rioters, it was held that the owner

of the house was entitled to recover that sum

GRAY, O. J. As a general rule, the measure of damages for the breach of a lessee's
coven11nt to keep ID repair, and to surrender
the dt>mlsed premises at the end of the term
In as good order and contUtlon as they are In
at the beginning of It. Is the sum It would
COBt to repair the premises and put them In
the condition they ought to be ID. In the
time of Lord Holt. this was the rule even In
an action brought before the expiration of the
lease. Shortridge v. Lamplugh, 2 Ld. Raym.
W8. 800. i :Mod. 71, 77; Vivian v. Champion,
2 Ld. Raym. 1121.i, 1 Salk. 141. In Vivian v.
Champion, that grPat judge said: "In these
actions there ought to be very good damages;
and It h88 always been practised so before
me, and everybody else that I ever knew.
We always Inquire, In these cases, what It
will roi-t to put the prewlim1 In repair, and
give so mu<'h damages, and the plalntltr
ou1ht In jm1tlce to apply the damages to the
i·epalr of the premises."
According to later cases, when the lessor
sues on the covenant to repair, pend.Jog the
lease, and 80 before he la entitled to posses·
slon of the premises, the damages may perhaps be llmlt!'d t'J the diminution In the market value of his estate. See Nixon v. Denham, l Ir. Lew R. 100, 1 Jebb & S. 416: Smith
v. Peat, SJ Exch. 161; Macnamara v. Vincent,
2 Ir. Ch. 481; Davies v. Underwood, 2 Hurl.
& N. 570; Rell v. Hayden, 9 Ir. C. L. 301;
lfllls v. Guardians of Poor, I,. R. 8 C. P. 79;
Mayne, Dam. (3d Ed.) 229. But when the
action Is brought after the end of the term,
the measure of damages 111 still held to be
such a sum as will put the premlsee In the
eondltlon In which the tenant Is bound to
-' leave them. Elliott v. Watkins, 1 Jones,
Exch. 308; Burdett v. Withers. 7 Adol. & E.
136, 2 Nev. & P. 122; Penley v. Watts, 7
Mees. & W. 601, 610, 611; Payne v. Haine,
16 Mees. & W. 541; Yates v. Dunster, 11
J<~xch. 15; Rawlings v. Morgan, 18 C. B. (N.
S.) 776; llayne, Dam. 232, 233. In Yates v.
Dunster, Baron Parke quoted the statement
of Lord Holt, above C'lted. and referred to

.313

Xt>wl.'astle v. Broxtowe, 4 Barn. & Adol. 27a.
.1 '.l>e\·. & Yan. 598, In which, In an action
against the hundred for the demolition of a
hou11e by rioters, It was held that the owner
of the house was entitled to recover that sum
of money which would replace the house. as
nearly as practicable, In the situation anti
state It was at the time of the outrage committed, although the Injury to Its rental valm~
was only one fourth as much.
Without undertaking to lay down an luftexlble rule, applicable to all cases, WP are
of opinion that In the presPnt case thP defendant Is not aggrieved by the ruling at the
trial. The action Is brought after the termination of the lease. and the surrender of thP
prPml11e11 by the defendant to the J)lalntlll'.
The wrong complained of Is not mPre dllaplda tlon or suffering to go to decay: hut It lithe voluntary removal of fixtures that had
been annexed to the freehold. and were pJlrt
of the plalntltr's real estatP. at the beginning
of the lease sued on. \\'atrls!I v. Bank. 124
Mass. 571. In SU<'h a case, the mea11ure of
damages must be the sum which will put the•
premises In the condition In which the defendant was bound to leave them. allowing
for reasonable use and wear. \\"h1•11 that
sum ls Jess than the diminution In the market value of the premises by the removal of
the structures. neither party sutreri- hy this
rule; because the plalntttr, by applying that
sum to the restoration of- the premlseK. obtain& a full Indemnity. When, as In this
case, that sum exceeds the amount of thE' Injury to the market value of the premlsL•i-, the
plalntltr Is entitled to It; otherwise, a tenant
who, without the consent of his landlord. had
altered the nature or the arrangement of the
buildings demised, might escape all llahlllty
for more than nominal damages for the
breach of his covt>nant, by proving that his
alterations bad lnl'reased the market value
of the estate. Elliott v. Watkins, above cited. Maddock v. Mallet, 12 Ir. C. L. 17:1.
This case Is not dlstlngulsha ble In principle
from Lewton v. Railroad Co., 8 Cush. 230,
which was an action for breach of an agreement to bu!ld fences between the lnnds of
the plalnt!tr and of the defendant; the defendant contended that the plaJntUr could
only recover damagelJ for the Injury to his
land by Its being unfenced; but It was hE'ld
that be was entitled to the sum which It
would fairly cost to put up the fences according to the agreement.
Whether the defendant ls legally eotltlerl to
an allowance for the Increase of value by sub11tltutlog new material for old need not be
considered, because lo this case such au allowance hae been made with the plalntltr's
assent.
Judgment for the plalntllT for the larger
sum.
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SUTHERLAND v. WYER et al.

(67 Me. 64.)

Supreme Judicial Court of Maine.

1877.

April 9,

Exceptions from superior court, Cumber-

land county.

Assumpsit by John Sutherland against 1. T.

Wyer and others to recover for breach of

contract. On December 27th following, the

company of which the plaintiff was one were

addressed by one of the defendants as fol-

lows: “Ladies and gentlemen, I ﬁnd it nec-

essary to reduce your salaries one-third; any

one not willing to accept these terms will get

their full salary this week and be dischar-

zed-u

The following correspondence was also in-

troduced:
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"Portland, December 29, 1875. Mr. J. Suth-

erland: Your salary, from this date, will be

twenty-four dollars per week. Per order,

I. T. Wyer, Wm. Weeks, Treasurer."

“Portland, December 31, 1875. I. T. Wyer,

Esq. Dear Sir: Your note intimating your

determination to reduce my salary from the

‘ith instant. duly received. I most respect-

fully refuse to assent to any such proposition,

and will expect my full salary every week, in

fulﬁllment of the terms of our contract. Re-

spectfully yours. J. Sutherland."

“Portland. January 3, 1876. Mr. Suther-

land: Your services will not be required at

the Portland Musenm after January 8, 1876.

I. T. Wyer."

The jury were instructed as follows:

“If, on the other hand, you ﬁnd for the

plaintiff upon both branches of the case, you

will come to the question of damages, which

in this case assumes a somewhat peculiar

phase. The writ is dated January 11th.

When the writ was brought, according to the

contract nothing whatever was due to the

plaintiff. The plaintiff had been paid in full

up to January 8th. And this writ was

brought on Tuesday, the 11th, before another

week had elapsed. So, according to the terms

of the contract, when this action was brought

nothing whatever was due to the plaintiff.

“The general rule is—and it is almost an in-

variable rule, with the exception of some

classes where prospective damages are al-

lowed resulting from injury—that the damage

to be allowed is the damage that had ac-

crued when the writ was brought. The or-

dinary rule is that a man can only recover

what was due him at the time when he sued.

But I apprehend there is a rule which will

guide as correctly in determining the dam-

ages here. The damage to be allowed is ‘what

had been sustained by the plaintiff at the

time this writ was brought. Now what is

that damage he had sustained then? It is

conceded that he had been discharged. He

had lost then the prospect of earning his

wages in accordance with the terms of the

contract; that is to say, when he brought

this writ he had been discharged, and of
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suggestion of incompetency, and to receive

the stipulated weekly salary, until the end of

the eighteenth week; when he was dischar-

ged by the defendants, as they contended be-

fore the jury, for incompetency under the

rule; but, as the plaintiff there contended, for

the reason that he declined to accept twenty-

four dollars per week during the remainder

of his term of service.

Three days after his discharge and before

the expiration of the nineteenth week, the

plaintiff commenced this action to recover

damages for the defendants‘ breach of the

contract. ‘The action was not premature.

The contract was entire and indivisible. The

E:\IPLOYER.

. suggestion of ln<.'Ompetency, and to re<.oel\"e ed contracts stipulating for the support of
the stipulated Wt'ekly salary, until the end ot persons during their natural life. Sibley v.
the elcbteentb week; wben he was dischar- ,ltlder, 54 Me. 463; Phllbrook v. Burgess, 52
ged by the defendants, as they contended be- Me. 271.
The contract In controversy falls within th\•
fore the jury, tor Incompetency under the
rule; but, as the plalntllf there contended, tor BBme rule. Although, as practically construthe reason that be declined to accept twenty- ed by the parties, the salary was payable
tour dollars per week during the remainder weekly, stlll, when the plaintiff was peremptorily discharged from all further service
ut his term of service.
Three days after his discharge and before during the remainder of the season, such disthe expiration of the nineteenth week, the charge conferred upon him the right to treat
plalnwr commenced tb1s action to recover the contract as entirely at an end, and to
damages for the defendants' breach of the bring his action to recover damages for the
contract. "The action was not premature. breach. In such action he ls entitled to a
The contract was entlre and Indivisible. The just recompense for the actual Injury su11-/
performance of It had been commenced, and talned by the Illegal discharge. Prima fade,,
the plaintiff been discharged and thereby such -recompense would be the stipulated
been prevented from the further execution of wages for the remaining eighteen wel'ks.
It; and the action was not brought until This, however, would not necessarily be the
after the discharge and consequent breach. sum which he would be entitled to; for lb
Howard v. Daly, 61 N. Y. 362. and ca1lt's; cases of contract as well as of tort, It Is genDugan v. Andt>r11on, 36 Md. 007, and ca11e>!. erally Incumbent upon an Injured party to
The doctrine of Daniels v. Newton, 114 :\1ass. do whatever he reasonably can, and to Imr).'30, Is not opposed to this. Neither do the prove all r1•11sonable and proper opportunities
defendants Insist that the action was prema- to lesiwn the Injury. Miiier v. ~larlners'
turely commenced; but they contend that the Church, 7 Me. 51, 56; .Jones v. Jones, 2 Swan.
verdict should be set aside as being against 609: 2 Green!. E\•. 2Gl, and notes; Chamberlin v. Morgan. liS Pa. St. lll8; !i!Pdg. Mens.
the weight of evidence.
The verdict was for the plaintiff. The jury Dam. (flth F..d.) 416, 417, casetl supra. 'l'hc
must therefore have found the real cause of plaintiff C'ould not be justltlt>d in lying Idle
his discharge to be his refusal to con11ent to after the breach; but he was bound to 11111•
the proposed reduction of his salary. The ordinary diligence In securing employment
evidence upon this point was quite contllct- elsewhere, during the remainder of the tt>rm;
lng. Considering that all the company were and whatever sum he actually earned or
notified, at the same time, that their reKpec- might ha\"e earnf'd by the use of reaRonnhle
tlve salaries would be reduced one-third, dlllgence, should be deducted from tht>
without assigning any such cause as Incom- amount of the unpaid stipulated wages. Arni
petency; that no suggestion of the plalntltr's I this hulance with Interest thereon should h1!
Incompetency was ever made to him, prior I the amount of the verdict. Applying the rule
to his discharge; and that bis written tlls- ineutloned, the verdict will he fuunll too large.
chnrge was equally silent upon that subject,
By the plnlutltr's own testlmon.r. he receh·-we fall to tlnd sufticlent reason for disturb- ed only $00, from all source11 after his dh1ing the verdict upon this ground of the mo- charge,-$2o In February, and $35 from the
tion, especially since the jury might well find 10th to the 20th of April, at Booth"s. Hill
as they did on this branch of the case, pro- last engagement was for eight weeks, come
vided they belleved the testimony In behalf menclng April 10th, which he abandoned ou
the 20th, thus voluntarily omitting nn opporof the plaintiff.
There nre several cla88es of cases founded tunity to earn $57, prior to the expiration of
both In tort and In contract, wherein the his engagement with the defendan18, when
plaintiff is entitled to recover, not only the the law required him to Improve such an opdamages actually sustained when the action portunity, If reasonable and proper. We
was commenced, or at the time of the trial, think he should have continued the last enbut also whatever the evidence proves he gagement until May 6th, Instead of abandonwill be likely to suffer thereafter from the ing It and urging a trial In April, especially
Ka-me cause. Among the torts coming within Inasmuch as he could have obtained ·a trial
this rule, are personnl Injuries caused by the In May just as well. The Instructions taken wrongful acts or negligence of others. The together were as favorable to the defendants
Injury continuing beyond the time of trial, as they were entitled to.
the future as well as the past Is to be consldIf, therefore, the plaintiff will remit $57,
fred, since no other action can be malntnln- be may have judgment !or the balnnce of the
ed. So In cases of contract the performance verdict; otherwise the entry must be verdict
of which Is to extend through a period of set aside aml a new trial granted.
time which bas not elapsed when the breach
ls ma(\e anti the nctlo~ brought therefor and
APPLETON, C. J., nnd DICKERSO:S,
~he trial had.
Remelee v. Hall, 31 Vt. 582. BARROWS, DANFORTH, and LIBBEY,
Among these are actions on bonds or unseal· JJ., concurred.
1

performance of it had been commenced, and

1

the plaintiff been discharged and thereby

been prevented from the further execution of

it; and the action was not brought until

after the discharge and consequent breach.
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Howard v. Daly, 61 N. Y. 362. and cases;

Dugan v. Anderson, 36 Md. 567, and cases.

The doctrine of Daniels v. Newton, 114 Mass.

530, is not opposed to this. Neither do the

defendants insist that the action was prema-

turely commenced; but they contend that the

verdict should be set aside as being against

the weight of evidence.

The verdict was for the plaintiff. The jury

must therefore have found the real cause of

his discharge to be his refusal to consent to

the proposed reduction of his salary. The

evidence upon this point was quite conﬂict-

ing. Considering that all the company were

notiﬁed, at the same time. that their respec-

tive salaries would be reduced one-third,

without assigning any such cause as incom-

petency; that no suggestion of the plaintiffs

ineompetency was ever made to him, prior

to his discharge; and that his written dis-

charge was equally silent upon that subject,

—we fail to tind suiiicient reason for disturb-

ing the verdict upon this ground of the mo-

tion, especially since the jury might well ﬁnd

as they did on this branch of the case, pro-

vided they believed the testimony in behalf

of the plaintiff.

There are several classes of cases founded

both in tort and in contract, wherein the

plaintiff is entitled to recover, not only the

damages actually sustained when the action

was commenced, or at the time of the trial,

but also whatever the evidence proves he

will be likely to suffer thereafter from the

same cause. Among the torts coming within

this rule, are personal injuries caused by the

wrongful acts or negligence of others. The

injury continuing beyond the time of trial,

the future as well as the past is to be consid-

ered, since no other action can be maintain-

ed. So in cases of contract the performance

of which is to extend through a period of

time which has not elapsed when the breach

is made and the action brought therefor and

the trial had. Remelee v. Hall, 31 Vt. 582.

Among these are actions on bonds or unseal-

ed contracts stipulating for the support of

persons during their natural life. Sibley v.

Rider, 54 Me. 463; Philbrook v. Burgess, 52

1

*
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BREACH OF CONTRACTS BESPECTING PERSONAL SERVICE.

'L1D1)ELL v. CHIDESTER.

(4 South. 426, 84 Ala. 508.)

Supreme Court of Alabama. June 14, 1888.

Appeal from circuit court, Montgomery

county; John P. Hubbard, Judge.

This was an action brought by the appellee,‘

Thomas H. Chidester, against the appellant,‘

Forbes Liddell, for the recovery of a balance_

alleged to be due the plaintiff from the de-

fendant for services rendered, and by contract

entered into by plaintiff and defendant. The

defendant pleaded the general issue, payment,‘

and res adjudicata. The plaintiff demurred

to the defendant's plea of res adjudicata. The

court overruled the demurrer. There was

then a replication, and the pleadings were

very full. The court charged the jury, at the

written request of the plaintiff, as follows:

(1) “If the jury believe all the evidence, they
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must ﬁnd a verdict for the plaintiff." (2) “If

the jury believe the evidence, the plaintiff

would be entitled to recover the balance due

under said contract for each month, or part

of a month thereof, from the 1st day of Au-

gust, 1885, at the contract price, until the end

of the contract year, which was February 26,

1886, with interest thereon from this last

date." The defendant objected to the giving

of each of these charges by the court, and

duly excepted to the court's overruling his

objection. The rulings of the court on the

demurrer, and the giving of the ﬁrst and sec-

ond charges requested by the plaintiff, were

here assigned as error.

Arrington & Graham, for appellant. Troy,

'l‘ompkins & London, for appellee.

STONE, C. J. The most important inquiry

in this case, alike of law and of fact, was

whether Chidester was employed by Liddell

to perform a year's service for $1,000, to be

paid in gross, or to be paid in monthly install-

ments. If the former, then the recovery and

enforcement of the judgment for a part of the

demand in June, 1886, is a complete defense

and bar to this action, and nothing should be

recovered. This, under the well-known prin-

ciple that a plaintltl! cannot split up a single

cause of action into two or more suits; and

if he does so, and recovers a part of his de-

mand, this is a waiver of and a bar to the

residue of his claim, be it much or little.

Oliver v. Holt. 11 Ala. 574; O'Neal v. Brown,

21 Ala. 482; Railroad Co. v. Henlein, 56 Ala.

368; Wharton v. King, 09 Ala. 365. If, on

the other hand. the wages were due and de-

mandable at the end of each month. then the

recovery of one installment, unreversed,/is a

complete answer to and preclusion of all de-

fenses to the merits which were or could he

pleaded to such second suit. Rake v. Pope,

7 Ala. 161; 3 Brick. Ala. Dig. p. 580, § 75 et

seq.; 1 Whart. Ev. § 758; Gardner v. Buck-

ier, 3 Cow. 120. The contract in this case was

by telegraphic correspondence. Liddell's offer

was: "If one thousand dollars a year is an

inducement, come immediately. Answer."

Chldester's acceptance was: “Will accept one

thousand dollars a year." These communica-
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option of one of three remedies if the dis

-

charge was wrongful: (1) He could have

elected to treat the contract as rescinded, and

sue on a quantum meruit for any labor he

may have performed; (2) he could have sued

at once for an entire breach of the contract

by the defendant. in which event he would

have been entitled to recover all damages he

suffered up to the trial, not exceeding the en-

tire wages he could have earned under the

contract; or (3) he could have waited until

his wages wouldnnature under the terms of

the contract, and sue and recover as upon

performance on his part. Each of these

alternate rights. as we have seen, was depend-

ent on his ﬁxing on Liddell the fault of his

discharge. Strauss v. Meertief, 64 Ala. 299;

Davis v. Ayres, 9 Ala. 292; Ramey v. Hoi-
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combe, 21 Ala. 567; Fowler v. Armour, 24

Ala. 194; Holloway v. Talbot. 70 Ala. 389:

Wilkinson v. Black, &) Ala. 329; 3 Wait. Act.

& Def. 606. And, when wages are payable

in instalhaents, suits may be brought on the

several installments as they mature.- Davis

v. Preston, 6 Ala. 83. It is manifest that the

former suit was not brought on the ﬁrst of

the alternate grounds stated above. There is

nothing to show that it relied on the rescis-

sion or abandonment of the contract: and.

if it had. there were no past services actually

rendered, and unpaid for, on which to found

a recovery. The

salary for July which had not_heen paid.

Nor was~ th‘éWui1rb1%ught on"the second of

the gronuds.—nn entire breach of the con-

tract. On the contrary, it treated the con-

tract as continuing through the month of

July, and sued for the wages alleged to have

been constructively earned in July, after the

discharge. The former suit was, then.

brought on the third of the grounds, treating

the contract as still binding on Liddell, and

claiming wages according to its terms. It

was brought July 27, 1885, the ﬁrst day after

the completion of one of the months of the

wage year. If the contract was for the pay-

ment of $1,000 in gross at the end of the year,

February 26, 1886. that suit was premature-

ly brought, and there could have been no re-

covery. It was indispensable to plaintiff's

right of recovery to show that, by the terms

of the contract, his wages were due in month-

ly installments, one installment of which had

matured. This was “essential to the ﬁnding

of the former verdict." The foregoing facts

are placed beyond dispute in the record be

fore us. They estop Liddell from denying

that, by the terms of his contract with Chi-

dester, he was to pay him wages in monthly

installments, and that he discharged plaintiff

without cause; and the same inevitable result

would follow, no matter what proof he might

offer that the contract was for the payment

of Chidester's salary in gross, and that he

had good grounds for discharging him. We

have not deemed it necessary to consider the

rulings on demurrer. Whether right or

option of one of three remedies if the dlaeharge was wrongful: (1) He could have
elected to treat the contract as rescinded, and
sue on a quantum merult for any labor be
may have performed; (2) be could have sued
at once for an entire breaeb of the contract
by the defendant. In which event he would
have been entitled to rerover all damages he
sufl'ered up to the trla.I, not exceeding the entlre wages be could have earned under the
(·out.met; or (3) he could have waited until
bis wages would 'matl1re under the terms of
the contract, and sue ftlld recover u upon
performance on his part. Each of these
1tlterna.te rlgbtii. as we have aeen, was dc>pendent on his fixing on Liddell the fault of his
lllscha.rge. Strauss v. MPertlet, 64 Ala. :!00;
Davis v. Ayres, 9 Ala. 2D2; Ramey v. Hol•"Otnbe, 21 Ala. M7; !<'owler v. Armour. 24
Ala. 194; Holloway v. Talbot. 70 Ala. :J89;
WUkluson v. Black, 80 Ala. 329; 3 Walt. Act.
& Def. 606. And, when wages are 1myahle
In lnstatlmt>nts, suits may be brought on the
sevt-ral Installments as they mature.· Davis
v. Preston, O Ala. 83. It Is manifest that the
former suit was not brought on the first of
the alternate grounds stated abol"e. There Is
nothing to show that It rt>lll'd on the resd11slon or aba.nrlonment of the <'Ootract: and.
If It bad. there wert> no past sen1ces actually
rendered, and unpaid for, on which to fouud
a. recovery. Th_e suit was for that part pf &Ila
salar7 for July which had not _.been paid.
!"or was· th.e-ntt-bt'i'Hight.. on.The second of
th<' gro1111d11,--an ••ntlre brea<'h of the ron-
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tract. On the contrary, It treated the <'OU.tract as continuing through the month of
July, and sued for the w11ges alleged to haw
been constructively earned In July, after 1111'
discharge. The former suit was, tl1Pn.
brought on the third of the grounds, treatlni:
the contract as still binding on J,tddell, and
claiming wo.ges a<.'<'Ordlng to Its terms. It
was brought July 27, 1885, the first day aft('r
the completion of one of the months of the
wage year. If the contract was for the pa)··
ment of $1,000 in gross at the end of the yenr.
February 26, 1886, that suit was prematurely brought, and there could have been no rt"
covery. It was indispensable to plnlntlll"s
right of recovery to show that, by the tenns
of the contract, his wages were due In monthly Installments, one Installment of which had
matured. This was "essential to the flnrllng
of the former verdict." The foregulug fads
are placed beyond dispute In the reeo1·11 before us. They estop Liddell from denying
that, by the terms of his contract with Chidester, he was to pay him wages In monthly
Installments, and that he discharged plalntltl'
without cause; and the same Inevitable result
would follow, no matter what proof he might
otl'er that the contract was for the paym1•nt
of Chldester'R 881ary In 1tross, and that he
had good grounds for discharging him. We
hal"e not deemed It necessary to couslder tlw
rulings on demurrer. "·hether right or
wrong, they could not have ull'ected the 111'fenclant Injuriously. There was no error In
the charges of the court. Afflrmed.

3l8

BREACH OF COUTRAC"S RESPECTING PERSONAL SERVICE.

L3

McMULLEN v. DICKINSON CO.

(62 N. W. 120, 60 Minn. 156.)

Jan. 30, 1895.

Appeal from district court, Hennepin coun-

ty; Seagrave Smith, Judge.

Action by William McMinllen against the

Dickinson Company. From an order sustain-

ing a demurrer to the answer, defendant ap-

peals. Aﬂlrmed.

Penney. Welch 8:, Hayne and H. J. Horn,

for appellant. W. H. Donahue, for respond-

(BBL

Supreme Court of Minnesota.

CANTY, J. On the 25th of February, 1892,

the plaintiff entered into a written agrccment

with the defendant corporation, whereby it

agreed to employ him as its assistant mana-

ger, from and after that date, as long as he
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should own in his own name 50 shares of the

capital stock of said corporation, fully paid

up, and the business of said corporation shall

be continued, not exceeding the term of the

existence of said corporation, and pay him

for such services the sum of $1,500 per an-

num, payable monthly during that time, and

whereby he agreed to perform said services '

during that time. He has ever since owned,

as provided, the 50 shares of said stock, and

performed said service ever since that time

until the 28th of October, 1893, when he was

discharged and dismissed by the defendant

without cause. He alleges these facts in his

complaint in this action. and also alleges that

he has been ever since he was so dismissed,

and is now. ready and willing to perform

said services as so agreed upon. and that

there is now due him the sum of $125 for each

of the months of March and April, 1894, and

prays judgment for the sum of $250. The

defendant in its answer, for a second defense,

alleges that on March 2, 1894, plaintiff com-

menced a similar action to this for the recovery

of the sum of $512,forthe period of time from

his said discharge to the 1st of March, 1894,

alleging the same facts and the same breach,

and that on April 16, 1894, he recovered judg-

ment in that action against this defendant

for that sum and costs, and this is pleaded in

bar of the present action. The plaintiff de-

murred to this defense, and from an order

sustaining the demurrer the defendant ap-

peals. -

The plaintiff brought each action for install-

ments of wages claimed to be due, on the

theory of constructive service. The doctrine

of constructive service was ﬁrst laid down by

Lord Elienborongh in Gandell v. Pontigny, 4

Camp.375, and this case was followed in Eng-

land and this country for a long time (Wood,

Mast. & Serv. 254), and is still upheld by sev-

eral courts (Isaaes v. Davies, 68 Ga. 169;

Armﬂeld v. Nash, 31 Miss. 36l;~Strauss v.

Meertief, 64 Ala. 299). It has been repudiat-

ed by the courts of England (Goodman v. Po-

cock, 15 Adol. & E. [N. 8.] 574; Wood, Mast.

& Serv. 254), and by many of the courts in

this country (Id.; and notes to Decamp v.

DAMAGES IN ACTIO:-!S AGAINST E}IPLOYER.
DAMAGES IN ACTIONS AGAINST EMPLOYER.

819 "'_.I--

Armour, 24 Ala. 194; Wright v. Falkner, 37 '

Ala. 274; Colbnrn v. Woodworth, 31 Barb. ,

385. Then, if the discharged servant can ‘

have but one action, it is necessary for him 1

to starve and wait as long as possible before ‘

commencing it. If he waits longer than six ‘

years after the breach. the statute of limita- '

il0l\s will have run. and he will lose his whole

claim. If he brings his action within the six

years, he will lose his claim for the balance

of the time after the day of trial. Under this

rule, the measure of damages for the'breach

of a 30 year contract is no greater than for

the breach of a 6 or 7 year contract. Such a

remedy is a travesty on justice. Although the

servant has stipulated for a weekly, monthly,

or quarterly income, it assumes that he can

live for years without any income, after which

time he will cease to live or need income.
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The fallacy lies in assuming that, on the

breach of the contract, loss of wages is anal-

ogous to loss of proﬁts, and that the s:nne,

rule of damages applies. while in fact the

cases are wholly dissimilar, and there is

scarcely a parallel between them. In the one

case the liability is absolute; in the other it

is contingent. If the rule of damages were

the same, then, in the case of the breach of

the contract for service, the discharged serv-

ant should be allowed only the amount which

the stipulated wages exceed the market value

of the service to be performed, without re- ‘

gard to whether he could obtain other employ-

ment or not. If the stipulated wages did

not exceed the market value of the service, ‘

he would be entitled to only nominal dam-

ages; and in no case could his failure to ﬁnd

other employment vary the measure of dam-

ages. Clearly. this is not the rule. In the

one case the liability is a contingent liability

for loss of wages; in the other case it is an

absolute liability for loss of proﬁts. Such

contingent liability cannot be ascertained in

advance of the happening of the contingency,

and that is why prospective damages for loss

of wages are too contingent and are too

speculative and uncertain to be allowed, while

retrospective damages for such loss are ot

the most certain character. On the other

hand, if damages for loss of proiits are too

speculative and uncertain to be allowed, they

are equally so, whether prospective or retro- 1

spective. “The pecuniary advantages which

would have been realized but for the defend-

ant's act must _be ascertained without the aid

which their actual existence would afford.

The plaintiffs right to recover for such a loss

depends on his proving with sufﬂcient cer-

tainty that such advantages would have re-

sulted, and, therefore, that the act complained

of prevented them." 1 Suth. Dam. (1st Ed.)

107.

It is our opinion that the servant wrongfully

discharged is entitled to indemnity for loss oi‘

wages, and for the full measure of this in-

demnity the master is clearly liable. This

liability accrues by installments on successive

contingencies. Each contingency consists in

Armour, 24 Ala. 1~; Wright T. Falkner, 87
Ala. 274; Colburn v. Woodworth, 31 Barb.
:185. Then, ff the discharged servant can
llave but one action, It is necessary tor him
to starve and wait aa long u possible before
eowmenclng It. It he waits longer than six
years after the breach. the statute of limitations will have run, and he will lose his whole
dalm. It he brings hie action within the six
sears, he will lose his claim for the balance
of the time after the day of trial. Under this
rule, the measure of dama~ee tor the"breach
ot a 30 year contract is no greater than for
the breach of a 6 or 7 year contract. Such a
remedy Is a travesty on justice. Although the
"ern1nt has stipulated for a weekly, monthly,
or quarterly Income, it assumes tbllt he can
live for years without sny Income, aftl•r which
time he will cease to llve or need Income.
'fhe fallacy lies In assuming that, on the
breach ot the contract, loss of wages Is analogous to lol!S ot proft ts, 11nd thn t tbt> ""me.
rule ot damages applies. while in taet the
cases are wholly dissimilar, and there is
scarcely a parallel between them. In the one
case the llablllty ls absolute; In the other It
ls contingent. It the rule ot damages were
the same, then, 1D the case ot the breach ot
the contract tor service, the discharged servant should be allowed only the amount which
the stipulated wages exceed the market value
of the service to be performed, without regard to whether he could obtaln other employment or not. If the stipulated wages did
not exceed the market value of the service,
be would be entitled to only nominal damages; and ln no case could hie fallure to ftnd
other employment vary the measure ot damages. Clearly, this le not the ntle. In the
one case the llabll: :y Is a contingent llablllty
for loBB of wages; In the other case it is an
absolute liability for lose ot profits. Such
contingent Uablllty cannot be a.ecertalned In
advance of the happening of the contingency,
and that la why prospective damages tor 1088
of wages are too contingent and are too
speculative and uncertain to be allowed, while
retrospective damages for snch loss are 01
the most certain character. On the otlter
hand, If damages tor loss of proflt11 Rre too
8pe<.'ulath·e and uncertain to be allow1!d, they
are equally so, whetbt'r prospective or retrospective. ''The pecuniary advantages which
would have been reall7..ed but for the defendant's act must be ascertained without the aid
which their a~tun.I existence wonld afford.
The plalntlft''e right to recover for such a lost<
depends on his proving with eufHclent certalnty that such 11d\'antages would have re-

1
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snlted, and, thet'efore, that the act complained

I ot prevented them." 1 Suth. Dam. (1st Ed.)
! 107.

I

It Is our opinion that the servant wrongfully
I discharged ls entitled to Indemnity for loss of

wages, and for the full measure of this indemnity the master ls clearly Hable. This
liability accrues by Installments on successive
contingencies. Each contl~ency consists In
the failure of the servant without his fault
to earn, during the Installment period named
ln the contract, the amount ot wages which
he would have earned If the contract had
been performed, and the master ls liable for
the deficiency. This rule of damages Is not
consh;tent with the doctrine of constructive
service, but It ls the n1le which has usually
been applied by the courts which adopted
that doctrine. Under that doctrine the master should be held liable to the discharged
servant for wages as lt earned, while In fact
he ls held only tor indemnity for loss or
wages. 'fhe fiction of constructive service Is
false and llloglcal, but the measure of damages given under that fiction Is correct and
logical. It Is simply a case or a wrong reason gh·en for a correct rule. Instead of rejecting the false reason and retaining the
correct rule, many courts have rejected both
the rule and the reason. In our opinion, thl11
rule of damages should be retained; but the
' true ground on which lt is based Is not that
, ot constructive service, but the Uabllity of
the master to Indemnity the discharged servant, not to pay him wages, and this Indemnity
accrues by Installments. The original breach
is not total, but the taJlure to :pay the successive Installments constitutes successive breaches. Since the days of Lord Ellen borough thl11
class of caaes has been In some courts an exception to the rule that there' can be butoneactlon for damages for the breach.of a contract,
and there are strong reru.ons why It should
be an exception. Because the discharged
servant may, It he so elects, bring successive
actions for the Installments of Indemnity at<
they accrue, It does not follow that he COJl·
not elect to consider the breach total, and
bring one action for all his damages, and recover all of the same accruing up to the time
ot trial. Fowler & rroutt v. Armour, 24 Ala.
194; Strauss v. Meertlet, 64 Ala. 200. But
the wrongdoer can have no sueh election. He
should not be allowed to take advantage of
his own wrong, and, tor the purpose of preventing the use of an7 adequate remedy and
defeating any adequate recovery, to lns;st that
1 his own breach ls total.
The order appealed
from shouhl be afttrmed. So ordered.
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OL\ISTl‘l.-'\D v. BACH et al.

(27 Atl. 501, 78 Md. 182.)

Court of Appeals of Maryland. Oct. 5, 1893.

Appeal from Baltimore city court.

Action by Charles B. Olmstead against

Henry Bach, .lr., and others. for breach of

contract of employment. A demurrer to the

replication was sustained, and plaintiff ap-

peals. Afﬂrmed.

Argued before ALVEY, C. J., and ROBIN-

SON, BKYAN, IRVING. l\fcSHEltitY, FOW-

LER, PAGE, and llOBl£ltTS, JJ.

Charles Marshall and Wm. L. Hodge, for

appellant. Thos. M. Lanahan and Frank

Gosnell, for appellees.

McSHERRY,J. The declaration in this

case alleges that the plaintiff and defend-

ants entered into a written contract under

seal, whereby the latter agreed to pay to
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the former a salary of $50 per week, paya-

ble weekly, as compensation for the services

of the plaintiff as cutter in the business of

the defendants, and that the plaintiff agreed,

in consideration of said salary, to devote his

time and attention to the business of the de-

fendants, as is usual in conducting a mer-

chant tailoring business. The agreement

further provided that the contract should

of the peace upon the identical contract and

cause of action sued on in the case at bar.

and that thereafter the plaintiff recovered

judgment in that suit for the sum of $50 and

costs, which judgment was fully paid and

satisﬁed by the defendants before the pend-

ing action was brought. To this plea the

1 plaintiff replied that after the pretended dis-

missal of him by the defendants he, not-

withstanding the dismissal, presented and

offered himself to the defendants as ready

and willing to perform his part of the con-

‘ tract set forth in the declaration, and did

in fact continuously so offer to perform the

same, and that the suit mentioned in said

plea was a suit for his salary for one week

under said contract. This replication was

demurred to. The Baltimore city court sus-

tained the demurrer, and entered judgment

thereon for the defendants The plaintiff

- therenpon took this appeal from that judg-

. but had not been allowed, to perform.

continue in full force for one year from Fe - .

runry 1, 1892, to February 1, 1893. The

declaration also avers that the plaintiff en-

tcred into the service of the defendants un-

der the above contract, and performed his

duty therennder until April 5, 1892, when

the defendants refused to permit,him to per-

form his part of said contract, or to pay him

the salary to which he was entitled there-

under. after April 9. 1892. It further al-

leges that the plaintiff has always been ready

and willing to perform his part of the con-

tract, and to render the services which he .

agreed thereby to perform, and has always

held himself in readiness and offered to per- .

form said services according to said con-

tract. but that the defendants have refused ‘

to permit him to perform the contract on

-

--

- -- - - -
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tention of the parties that the hiring should

be for a week, determinable by notice, or

else merely a hiring at will, as it un-

doubtedly would have been had there been

no stipulation as to its duration. Iron Co.

v. Carpenter, 67 Md. 554, 11 All. Rep.

176. The good sense and reasonableness

of the particular case must always guide

and govern courts in determining wheth-

er a contract is divisible or entire. Du-

gan v. Anderson, 36 Md. 585; Jones v.

Dunn. 3 Watts & S. 101); Robinson v. Green,

3 liletc. (Mass.) 159. Whether a contract

must be sued on as an entirety or is divisi-

ble and can become the foundation of sep-

arate suits for the infraction of independent

stipulations depends on its terms; and. in

order to arrive at a correct construction,

due regard must be had to the intention of
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the contracting parties as revealed by the

language which they have employed, and the

subject-matter to which it has reference.

Broumel v. Rayner, 68 \Id. 47, 11 Atl. Rep.

833; Brewster v. Frazier, 32 Md. 3%;

Brantly, Cont. 216. LObviously the appel-

lant expected and contracted for continuous

employment for a year, and not for a week-

ly or still more precarious hiring at will, and

the appellees contemplated securing a per-

manent cutter in their tailoring business.)

Certainty in the duration of the employment,

a well as exemption from the annoyance

incident to frequent changes in such an em-

ploy, were manifestly within the contempla-

tion of both of the parties to the contract

when it was entered into, and with these

considerations before them it seems to us

clear that the appellant never supposed him-

sell only hired by the week or at will, and

equally clear that the a'ppellees never under-

stood 1that their employe was at liberty to

terminate the engagement upon a week's

notice. The hiring was for a year and the

wages were payable in weekly installments

of $50 each. The subsidiary provision as

to the payment of the wages each week does

not split up the contract into as many agree-

ments as there were payments or periods

named for payments to be made, (Norrington

v. Wright, 115 U. S. 188, 6 Sup. Ct. liep.

12;) nor is it inconsistent with a yearly hir-

ing. (Norton v. Cowell, 65 Md. 362. 4 Atl.

Rep. 408; Fawcett v. Cash, 5 Barn. & Adol.

908;) for, as said by Lord Kenyon in King

v. Birdbrooke, 4 Term R. 245: “Whether the

wages be to be paid by the week or the year

can make no alteration in the duration of

the service if the contract were for a year."

The contract is, then, an entire. and not

a divisible, one. It does not consist of dis-

tinct and independent subjects which admit

of being separately executed and closed. A

dismissal during the year was consequently

a breach of the contract as an entirety, and

furnished the party not in default with a

good cause of action. The contract being

entire, and having created the relation of

master and servant, and the latter having

•

tentlon ot the partieis that the hi.ring should
he for a week, determhmhle by notice, or
1·lse llll'rdy a hiring nt will, as it undouht1•1Uy would have t~·11 hatl thc1·c bet•11
110 stipulation as to its dumtL•n.
Iron Co.
v. C:u·1wnter, 67 Md. 5i>4, 11 Atl. Hep.
176. 'l'he good sense and rensouahll'lll'Si!I
ot the particular case must always 1.'11:1le
and govern courts ln determlnin~ wheth·
er a contract ls divisible or entire. Du·
~an v. Anderson, 36 .\hi. GS5; Jou1•s v.
Dunn. 3 \Vntb1 & S. lt~J; Hobi11son v. Ort•en,
3 l\Ietc. (Mass.) 159. Whether a contrnct
must be sued on as an entin•ty or ls dh·Lslble and can be:>-0me the foundation of separate suits for the- infraction of indepPn1lent
i;tlpulatlons depends on its terms; aml. In
01·der to arrive at a correct constru('tlon,
due regnrd must be had to the Intention oC
the contraC'tlng p:irti('S as revt>llll•d by the
language which tlti·y have employc1l, and the
i;ubject-run.tter to whlC'h It bas reference.
Rromuel v. U11yn1•r, 68 )id. 47, 11 AU. Rep.
s:.13; Brewster v. Frnzler, 32 Md. 3<8;
Brantly, Cont. 216. LObviously the appel·
lant expected and contracted for continuous
employment for a year, and not for a weekly or 11tiU wore precarious hh'ing at will, and
the 11ppellees contemplatOO securing a per·
manent cutter in thEi.r tallo1ing buslurus.)
Certainty in the duration ot the em1>loyment,
ns well as exemption from the annoyance
incident to frequent changes In such an employ, were manifestly within the contemplation ot both ot the parties to the contract
when it was entered Into, and with these
•~onslderatlons beforn them it seems to us
clear that the appellant never supposed himself only hlre!l by the week or at will, and
equally clear that the a·ppellees never -understood othat their employe was at liberty to
termfnate Uw engagl'ment upon a week's
notice. The hiring was for a year and the
wages were payable In weekly installmeil'ts
of $50 each. The subslillary provision as
to the payment of the wug.:!s each week doee
not spll-t up the contract Into as many agreements as there were payments or periods
nn.mP<l for payments to be made, (1'01Tington
v. Wright, 115 U. S. 188, 6 Sup. Ct. He}>.
12;) nor ls it inconsistent with a yPn.rly hir·
ing. ('.'i'orton v. Cowell, r.:; Md. 3tl:!. 4 ,\.1).
Rep. 408; Fawcett v. Cash, 5 Barn. & A<lol.
908;) for, as said by Lord ~{enyon in King
v. Blrdbrooke, 4 Term R. 24:i: "Whether the
wages be to be puld by the week or the year
•·an make no alteration ln tl1e duration of
the service It the contract were for a year."
The contract Is, then, an entire. and n<>t
) a divisible, one. It does not consist of distinct and lndep(•llfleut suhjl'cts which admit
of being sepn.ratPly executed and closed. A
dlsm.ls8al during the year was consequently
a breach ot the contract as an entirety, and
furnished the party not In dt>fault with a
good cause of aetlon. The contract being
entire, and ha.vlng en•n.te1l the relation of
master and sen·unt, and the latter haviug
LAW DA~l.211 Etl.-21
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been, as averred in the pleadings, dismissot the term for
whkh he I.tad been engaged, wnat relfress
was olJl'll to him? Obviously but one rc111t•dy for the recovery of the whole dnmttge
sustailwd by him. In Keedy v. Long, 71
l\Itl. 3SH, 18 AU. Rep. 704, thb1 court said:
"A servant wrongfullr diseh:ll'ged has only
two remedies open to him at law, either of
which he may JHll'i>lle immediately on his discharge. First, he mn;v treat the cont1·net as
continuing, nntl bring a special nction agulust
the master :l'or breaking It by discharging
Wm, and this rl•medy he may l•tmme whl~tlt
l'r his wnges urc paid up to the time of hit;
discharge or not; or, Rl'condly, if bis wages
are not paid up to the tim.~ of his discltm·go, he mny 11·cat the contract of hiring
as n•sdrnle<I, an•l ttuP his mnstcr on a qu:mhun mc1·uit tor the services he has nctllllllY
rendered. These two alternative remedie.;
are the only ones open to him. .\layne, Dam.
lfi!J. Upon a 11u:111tum merult he can 0111~·
recover ror Ute sen-kes actually ren<li>red.
Archard v. Hornor, 3 Car. & P. 349; Smith v.
Hayw1ml, 7 Adol. & E. 544. In nn action
for damages fo1• :i breach of the contract
he will be entitled to recover tl1e actual damages he has sustainrd, in 1111llition to tl11•
wages enn1ed; and in case he lms by dUigence bce11 unable . to secure otill'r <"llploymcnt dtlrlnt\' th~ Pntlre tl'rm, hr l'lln r(>t'O'l"PI'
the entire wai;-cl!, lesi< the ainount he h:u•
nctunlly earned during the interim, or the
amount he might have earned by the exerC'lse of prO'pCr diligence In l<l'l•klng fo1· employment ln the same or similar busin<'l!S.
Wood, :Mast. & S. 249; Mayne, Dam. l:is:
El<lerton v. Emmens, O C. B. HiO; Goo<lmun
v. Pocock, 15 Q. B. 576." Jat!ray v. mtJg,
34 Md. 217. In the case at bar the pleadings show that 1111 wn~es earoeJ by the appellant had been paid to him lu full up to
the end of the week dwfo~ which he wai;
dismissed. \\'hen hl' brought suit l.Jefore th1c>
jm;tice of tlie peace he hnd ra.rned no wag-e;
which had not been pni<l him, tor he bad
rendered no services after his clii,1missal. HP
was, tl1erefore, nt that time in no position
to sue upon n quantum men1lt for the vali11·
of services actunlly performed, and he could
only recoYer In r1111.t suit dam:igt>s for n
breach of the entire contract, unlt•s.<; the C'OIJtract was divisible Into 5:2 irnlPJ1(_•1J1lent
n~rf'f'rnPnt,., ench capable ot bl'in~ st>p:iratPly execuloo and closf'd. His wng1•s h:l\ini.t
hP•.•n pulli In full up to th~ time of hil'I (]i,.:mi!<snl, he had no 011tion ai< to tbe rc111 ..1IIP.<
which he might puri<11l'. He was confin<'ll
to nn action for the reco1·e1·y of damag1'"
which he had sustained by a breach of the
contract, because succ('s"i'"e actioni<. instituted for the recovtry ot fml'!iuns of the
same aggregate damages, cannot be supported. His suit bclore the mai,:istrnte was.
whatever it pw·ported to be, a snit for tJi.,
!Jreach of the contract of hiring. It coul•I
hnve beeu for nothing else, cx1.~·11t Cor served before the cxplrntlon

‘
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ices never rendered, the value of which was

measured by the price agreed to be paid for

them when actually performed. There was

but one dismissal and but one breach, and

the plaintiff could not split up his cause of

action, recovering a part of his damages in

one suit and the remainder afterwards in

other suits for that single breach. It is

an ancient and familiar rule of law that

only one action can be maintained for the

breach of an entire contract, and the judg-

ment obtained by the plnintitf in one suit

may he pleaded in bar of any second pro-

ceeding. Sedg. Dam. 224; Dugan v. An-

derson, 36 Md. 58-1. It was the appellant's

plain duty to incltlde‘a1l that belong_-ed to

that cause of action—that one breach—in the

ﬁrst suit, so that one proceeding and one
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recovery should settle the rights of the par-

ties. It would be at his own risk and peril

if he negligently or ignorantly omitted a

part of what might properly have been em-

braoed in the cause of action in the ﬁrst

suit. Or, as expressed by Lord Campbell

in Clossman v. Lacoste, 28 Eng. Law & Eq.

140, “if the contract is entirely broken, and

the relation of employer and employed put

an end to, I agree that the party suing ought

to allege in his declaration the whole grave.-

men that he suffers by such breach of con-

tract, and that he may recover therein all

the damages that may ensue to him in conse-

quence." Again, as clearly put by the su-

preme court of Ohio in James v. Allen Co.,

44 Ohio St. 226. 6 N. E. Rep. 246: “As a

result of the authorities, as well as upon

principle, we are satisﬁed that in such a

contract as the one in the case at bar, where

the employe is wrongfully dismissed. but all

wages actually earned up to that time are ,

paid, the only action the employe has,

whether he brings it at once or waits until

the entire period of time has expired, is an

action for damages for the breach of con-

tract; and the measure of damages will

be the loss or injury occasioned by that

breach, and one recovery upon such claim,

whether the damages be denominated ‘loss

of wages' or ‘damages for breach,' is a bar

to a future recovery." Wood, Mast. & S.

246.

it is to be observed that the case at bar is

distinguishable from a class of cases alluded

to in Ciossmau v. Lacoste, supra, where,

there having been no dismissal of the serv-

ant. the only breach of the contract con-

sisted in the failure of the master to pay,

when due, the wages or installments of

wages actually earned. In those instances,

the contract not having been broken by the

dismissal of the servant, and he not having

been prevented from performing his pork,

and the relation of master and servant still

continuing, an action on the contract could

be maintained to recover the salary or wages

due for a past stated period. Keedy v. Long,

71 .\Id. 392, 18 All. Rep. 70L But a dismiss-

D.-\.:'IL\UJ·:S Di .-\.CTLO:'.'iS .\.GAl:'.'iST EMPLOYER.
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sued for, the ground of the actions, though

the forms and the allegations of the plead-

ings are widely different. That which is

sought to be recovered in both cases is the

same thing. viz. wages as wages. though in

the one case it is under the allegation of

work and labor done, which allegation is at-

tempted to be supported by the proof of a

readiness and willingness to perform; and in

the other it is under an allegation of a re-

fusal to allow that work to be done which

the plaintiff had agreed to do. and continued

ready and willing to do. Salary as salary,

deiinitely ﬁxed and agreed to. and not a sum -

of money as unliquidated damages for a

broken contract of hiring, is what is sued

for under the declaration in the case at bar.

It is a suit to recover wa;:cs, though no serv-

ices hnve been rendered at all, and. if main-
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tainable in that form, would preclude the '

defendants from showing by evidence that

the plaintiff could have secured other sim'lar

employment during the time covered by the

contract; because, if wages, distinctively as

wages, can be recovered under such condi-

tions, instend of damages for a wrongful

discharge or dismissal, they must be re-

covered as speciﬁc, ascertained debts, the

amount of which is ﬁxed by the contract,

and is in no way subject to abatement by

circumstances which would reduce the dam-

ages in a suit founded on a refusal by the

defendant to allow the plaintiff to perform

his part of an indivisible contract of hiring.

In other words. if under such a contract the

plaintiff is entitled to recover wages as

wages upon a mere offer to perform. he must

be entitled to recover just precisely the

wages named in the contract, even though

he might have obtained other work of the

same kind, at the same price, during the

period for which he claims his wages under

the contract. This would be recovering for

constructive services. That doctrine has

been altogether repudiated. both in England

and in this country. Kcedy v. Long, 71 Md.

389, 18 Atl. Rep. 704. “The doctrine of con-

structive scrvice has, in England, where it

had its origin, been repudiated, and the law

there established that a servant wrongfully

discharged has not an action for wages, unless

something is due for past services actually

rendered; and as to any other claim on the

contract it is for the breach of it, and for

his damages resulting therefrom, being the

ordinary action for damages, and not the

common-law action of indebitatus assump-

sit." James v. Allen Co., supra; Howard v.

Daly, 61 N. Y. 362.—where Gandell v. Pon-

tigny, 4 Camp. 375, Thompson v. Wood, 1

Hilt. 96, and the cases in Alabama, .\Iissis-

sippi. and “'lri('()n>‘iil are distinctly tli<‘t‘ii|'niml,

and the doctrine of constructive service de-

cinred to be “so opposed to principle, so

clearly hostile to the great mass of author-

ities ‘ ‘ ' that" it could not be accepted.

Wt - hold, then, that the contract declared on

is entire and indivisible; that for the breach

sued tor, the 1.'Tound ot the actions, though
the forms nod th<' alh•gations or the pleadings nre whkly <lift't•rtmt. That which Is
sought to be reeovf'red In both cases Is the
AAme thing, viz. wngf's m1 wngf's, though In
the one cnsf' It Is un1h•r the nllt>gatlou ot
work nod labor don<', whkh nllt>;.:-:ltion Is nttem1>l<'ll to h<' supporh>tl hy thf' proof' of a
readiness nnil willingnf'SS to iwrfnrm; 11nd In
th<' oth1•r It Is mukr 1111 nl)l•g:1tlon of n rPtmml to nllow that work to b<' 1lone whkh
the plaintiff hall agreed to do. a11tl coutl11u1•1l
rt>a<I)· and willing to do. Salllry as salary,
d<'flnit<'ly fixe1l nrul 11i;:i·ee1l to, and not n sum
ot ruum·y as unliq11idatt·tl daum;.;Ps for n
hrokf'n conti·:wt of hlrini:. Is what Is i<nPd
tor undPr the t!Pt·larntion In thP ca,.;p at h:1r.
It Is n suit to l'P<'O\'f'r wa.::•·s. thon;:-h 11e1 SPt"1· lcf's hnve bC'<'n r('ll•h·rl'1I 111 all, mul. If 111:1intaiunble In that form, wonltl pn•<•lllfl<' tht!
dPfcon<lnnts trom showln;.:- hy evi1!Pnc<' that
tlw plaintiff coul1l have t-:<'eur1·ll otl!Pr sini'lnr
emp'oynll'nt during th<' time con·r••tl hy tlw
contrnct.; becnu;;I.', If wngPs, dlstinl'tiv1•ly ns
wages, can be rpco,·crc1I un<h•r sul'h eon1lltlons, lnstend of damagf's for a wrongful
dlscharg<! or <li"1mi:-1sal. thf'y mu<;t I\(' r<'coverP<l as sp<>l'lllc, nsr1'rtalnf'1l d1•ht:-1, the
amount of which Is fh'.Ptl by thf' contr:J('t,
am! is In no way subj,.ct to ah:ttPm,.nt hy
clreumstnnet•s which would r('(]u('c th1• <lamag1•11 In n suit fouml••<I on a r1•fnsal hy the
defendant to nllow thC' plaintiff to 1wrform
his pnrt of nn ludlvi><lhle contract of hiring.
In otlwr words, If u111.h•r such a contraet the
plaintiff Is C'ntltlt'll to recovf'r wngf'!! as
wngt.·s npon 11 nwn• (ltfer to perform, he must
be f'ntitlcd to recov<"r just pr<"els<'ly the
w:ig<'s namcd In th<' co ntract, ev<'n though
he mh~ht have obtainer! other work ot the
same kind, at th<' snnu• price, rlurlug the
period for which he claims his wagPs m11l1•r
the contract. Thi!! wonl:I ht:> r<'COV<'r'ng for
constructive servic•'l'I. That doctrine has
b<'f'll altogPtlwr rC'pudlntP<l, both In England
and in thi>< country. K1•1•1ly v. Long, i l !.\111.
&'lfl, 18 Atl. R<'p. 704. "'l'lw doctrinP of constrtwtlve spn·iee has, In F.nglaml, wll('re It
had Its origin. been repudiated, anll the law
thf'rf' est:ihlishPd that n servant wron~nlly
disehargt>ll has not nn :1ction tor wagPs, unl1•ss
something Is due for past s crvicl's actually
renth•red; and as to nny oth1>r claim on the

1

1

l'(•ntrnct It ts for the breach of It, and tot·
his damages resulting therefrom, bl'ing the
ordinary nctlon for danrng<'s, nnct not tile
common-law action of lndC'bilatus a.~sump
sit." .JamPs v. AllPn Co., supra; Howanl v.
Daly, 61 N. Y. 36::!.-where Gandell v. Pontigny, 4 Camp. 375. Thompson v. "'ooil, 1
Hilt. 00, and the cas(•s in .\labama, '.\lississippi. :11111 \\' i><1·011~i11 an· 1listin1 · tl~· !li"1 'lirnll'1l,
and the dol'lrlnP of constructive s<'rvi!'e d('clnret.l to be "so opprnwd to prlneiplP, so
clt•nrly hostile to the !,'l'!'at mass of anth•H'·
!ties • • • that" It l'Ould not be ncr·t•pt('d.
""e hold, tlwu, that the contract declarP1! 011
ls entire anti inllivisilJlc; that fur the breach
of it by tlw dl'fcudants In discharging the
p~ainlifl' lu·forc tile t.'Xpirntlon of the )'(':II',
or lu refusing to allow him to work, a right
or n e t 1011 urust.o, not fo1· 1111<'ar1w1l wag-l's 01·
salary, as such, but for damages for a br. a h
of thC' cuntraet, thC' mC'asur« of whl h •lanwg<''
wouhl be the sti1mlatt.od snlary fut· the stipulated J)(.•rlo<I of one year, less the amount
the plaintlfT nctnally earned, or rulg'1t, by
tine ll!Hl l'l'tlSOIJ:tblP dil'gl'llCe, have l'ar!l('ll.
after his dismissal, (.Jaffrny v. Kini:. :a l\111.
!!:!~;) thnt, as tlwre wns hut one br(':l<'h, but
one n<·tion coultl be mniutalned th<•r('for;
that, having recovered bpf,1re the magi:-1tratP
In a suit fountl<'tl on th:t t hrPach,- for ht•
could have lawfully recoven•d upon no ot~11·r
thl>tlry,-he Is barrPd, upon the !<nlisfw·tiou
of that judgmC"nt, from n~aln suing on tit<'
same <>cmtrnct, lwcause he coulJ have re·
con•rPd In one action na the danmge:-1 he sustained, lndudlng that ror which he now
SUPS; and that, If th<' pt.'111ling ae1ion lw
trPatt>d ns a suit to recover for installrw•nts
of salary undPr the e<mlr:H't, no ~e ·v cPs h:l\'·
Ing bl'<'n rPnll<'red by hlm. it mu:<t fail, because the spn•lcPs WP'.'C nt"Y<'r l'PtHIPr('d, but
were constructive. The p ':tlntlfT e!Pc·tc:l to
sue b<'fore a justice ot th(' p Paci> for 11 pnrtion of the amount he m'ght Inve r<'r OY('l't'll
had he claimPd more nPd stwd iu n <lifl'PrP11t
forum, and he must abi<IC' the rPs111t of that
eh'etion. He Is not at libPrty to srl't up h 's
cause ot nctlou Into frngnwnts, nnd snc1·1·sslvely sue for each, when tlwre h :ts bl'i.'n but
one br<'ach of an entir<' nnd ln ·Ji\-'.s ih'e con·
trnct. As we agree with thl~ court \!(•ow, Its
judgment will be affirmf':l. .Tu·lgment affirmed, with costs In both courts.
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BREACH OF CONTRACTS RESPEOTING PERSONAL SERVICE.

BOLAN/D v. GLENDALE QUARRY O0.

(30 S. W. 151, 127 Mo. 520.)

Supreme Court of Missouri. Division No. 2.

March 18, 1895.

Appeal from St. Louis circuit court; D. D.

Fisher, Judge.

Action by James Boland against the Glen-

dale Quarry Company to recover damages

for wrongful discharge. From a judgment

for plaintiff, defendant appeals. Afﬁrmed.

Chester H. Krum and Carl Otto, for appel- ‘

lant.

GANTT, P. J. The plaintiff, on the 18th

of January, 1890, entered into a written

agreement with the defendant, whereby he

was employed by defendant as superintend-

ent of its quarries and stone business for a

period of three years, beginning April 1,

1800, and ending March 31, 1893, at a salary
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of $2,000 for the ﬁrst year, payable in month-

ly installments of $166.66; and at a salary

of $2,250 for the second year, payable in

monthly installments of $187.50; and at a

salary of $2,500 for the third year, at $208.33

per month,—in consideration of which he

was to devote his time, labor, and exclusive

attention to the business of defendant, and

advance its interest. Plaintiff entered upon

his duties lmder the contract. and served un-

til May 9, 1891, when he was discharged.

He tendered his services, but defendant re-

fused to accept them after his dismissal.

lie commenced this action on the 10th day of

W. B. Homer, for respondent.

September, 1892, and prayed for $5,000 dam- ‘

ages for breach of his contract . Defendant, '

in its answer, admits the contract, and denies

eachand every other allegation in the petition.

It then pleads for further defense that plain-

tiff did not faithfully perform his duties,

caused defendant much less, and was dis-

charged for failure to properly perform his

duties; and further, that since his discharge

he has obtained other employment, for which

he has received more than he claimed from

defendant. A reply was duly ﬁled. The

cause was tried January 9 and 10, 1894, and

plaintiff obtained a verdict for $2,984.25, and

judgment therefor, with costs. Defendant

appeals.

1. The court, of its own motion, gave the fol-

lowing instruction on the measureof damages:

' “The court instructs the jury that, if they

ﬁnd their verdict for the plaintiff, they will

ﬁx their verdict for the whole amount that

would have been due the plaintiff if he had

(-onllnned work for the defendant under the 1

contract sued upon from the date of his dis-

vharge until the expirationof the contract,

after allowing credit for anything which the

evidence shows plaintiff may have earned

from services rendered to others, and after

allowing a further credit of an amount equal

to what the jury may believe, from the evi-

dence, he will be able to earn between now

and the 31st day of March, 1893." To which

said action of the court defendant then and

i
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,-oniract price agreed upon for his services.

It is unquestionably his duty to use reasona-

ble efforts to ﬁnd other similar employment,

if he can; but that he has obtained such

employment, or that, by reasonable efforts,

he might have obtained it, it is incumbent

upon the defendant to show in mitigation of

damages. Wood, Mast. & S. pp. 245, 246;

Koenigkraemer v.Glass Co.,24 Mo. App. 124.

in this case the trial took place more than

six months after the discharge, and within

one and one-half months prior to the expira-

tion of the contract time of service. The

plaintiff had given evidence in full of his ef-

forts to obtain similar employment, after his

discharge, and prior to the trial, in St. Louis.

Bloomington, Chicago, Rochester, and Cin-

cinnati, all of which efforts proved unavail- i

ing. He was thoroughly competent to judge
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of the probabilities as to whether similar ef-

forts in the month and a half yet remaining

would meet with any success. That he as-

sumed the burden 'of proof on this subject is

. pra;

a matter of which the defendant is in no ‘

position to complain." And the doctrine has

been very fully gone over in the recent case

in the Kansas (‘ity court of appeals of Hal-

sey v. Meinrath, 54 Mo. App. 341, in the

following language: “The suit was brought

before the expiration of the term of the con-

tract for which plaintiff alleges he was em-

ployed. A servant wrongfully discharged

may treat the contract of hiring and service

as continuing, and bring a special action

against the master for breaking it by dis-

charging him; and this remedy he may pur-

sue whether his wages are paid up to the '

period of his discharge or not. Ream v.

Watkins, 27 Mo. 516. And the general rule

damages cannot exceed the contract price;

neither is it necessarily the full contract

price, for it may be that the plaintiff, after

his dismissal, may sue and recover a judg-

(·outnict prk·e agrel'<l upon for his services.
It Is unquestlonabl)· Ws duty to use reasona·
ble etrom to tlnd other slmllar employment,
It he cau; but that he has obtnlned such
employment, or that, by reasonnble etrorts,
he might have obtained It, It Is Incumbent
upon the defendant to show In mitigation of
dnmages. Wood, Mast. & S. pp. 2-t5, 2-16;
Koenlgkraemer v.Glass Co.,24 .Mo. App. 124.
In this case the trial took place more than
slx months after the discharge, and within
one and one-half months prior to the explra·
tlon of the contract time of service. The
plalntltr had given evldl'nce In full of hie ef·
forts to obtain similar employment. after his
-discharge, and prior to the trial, In St Louis,
Bloomlni.-ton, Chicago, Ilo('lwst!•r, and Cln·
<'innatl, all of which efforts proved unavall·
Ing. He was thoroughly compt>tent to jmlge
ot the prohnbllltles as to whPther shuilar pf.
forts In the month and a bait yet remnlnlng
would lllt>l't with any sutTess. That he nssum1·1l the burden °of proof on this subjet·t is
a nrnttPr of whl<>h the defl'mlant Is In no
po:<itlon to complain." And the doctrine has
l1<•en ,-ny fully gone over In the recent cnse
In the Kansas ('lty court of appeals of Hal·
f!ey v. Meinrnth, 54 Mo. App. 341, ln the
following lan1n1age: "The suit was brought
before the expiration Of the term Of the COD•
tract for whkh plalntlfJ' alleges he was employed. A 11en·ant wrongfully discharged
may treat the contract or hiring and service
as <>ontlnulng, and bring a special action
against the master for l>reaklni: It by dis·
<!barging him; and this remedy he may pursue whether hie wages are paid up to the
period of his discharge or not Ream v.
Watkins, 27 Mo. 516. And the general rule
In cases of this kind Is that the measure of
damages cannot exceed the contract price;
neither la it necessarily the full contract
price, for It may be that the plaintiff, after
his dismissal, may sue and recover a judgment, and then obtain elsewhere employ·
ment. and receive for the residue of the term
much more than by the contract he would
have been entitled to It he had served out
his term. The damages must depend upon
the kind of 11ervicee to be performed and the
wases to be paid, and allowance 1hould be

ment, and then obtain elsewhere employ-

ment, and receive for the residue of the term

much more than by the contract he would

have been entitled to if he had served out

his term. The damages must depend upon

the kind of services to be performed and the

wages to be paid, and allowance should be

made for the time that would probably be

lost before similar employment could be ob-

tained. In some pursuits it may be almost

certain that the dismissal of a person at a

particular season will throw him entirely out

of employment for the residue of the year,

whilst in other pursuits similar employment

could readily be obtained elsewhere on bet-

ter terms; and therefore the amount 'of the

damages is a question for the jury under all

circumstances. Lambert v. Ilartshorne, 65

Mo. 551. ' ' ' But it is suggested that

the plaintiff could only recover such dam-

ages as had resulted at the time of the com-

mencement of the suit. This is an error.

The plaintiff was entitled to such damages

as accrued up to the expiration of his term

/

matle for the time that would probably be
· lost before similar employment could be obi tained. In some pursuits It may be almost
certain that the dismissal of a person at a
particular season will throw him entirely out
or employment for the residue of the year,
whilst In other pursuits similar employment
could readily be obtained elsewhere on better terms; and therefore the amount ·or the
damages Is a question for the jury under all
ch"cumstancee. Lambert v. llartshorne, 65
Mo. wl. • • • But It Is suggested that
the plnlntUr could only recover such damages as had resulted at the time of the commencement of the suit This Is an error.
'l'he plalntur was entitled to such damai:es
as accrued up to the expiration of his term
of service In a case like thlR, where the damages were of a continuing character. Lally
v. Cantwell, 4-0 Mo. App. riO; Miiler v. 8hoe
Co., 26 Mo. App. 61; Heam v. Watkins, supra; Lambert v. Hartshorne, supra. \Ye
must Indulge every presumption In s1111port
of the judgment" Both of the appdlate
courts have followed the decisions or this
court. and a rule so long established should
not be disturbed save for the most cogent
reasons. No error was committed In the Instruction, upon the facts in evidence. It
gave the jury full latitude to allow defend·
ant every deduction to which It could he en·
titled under the law. The plaintil'l's evidence of his effort to obtain other employment was uncontradl.cted, and the jury cr1~<l, lted defendant not only with what he hail
recelTed, but what he would likely receive to
the end of the term of service.
2. The competency of plalntllr was conceded on the trial, and there was no error In
assuming a fnct that defendant did not con.
trovert In hla pleadings. Defendant nowhere
i In its Instructions questioned the competency
I of plalntltr. It tendered the sole IS1:1ue that
I he had not faithfully performed hie duties.
a. Appellant has not pointed out any error
in the admission or exclusion of evidence.
The verdict Is not excessive, and ls evldentl;r
tor the right party. The Judgment Is affirmed.

1

i

BURGESS and SHERWOOD, JJ., concur.
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BREACH OF CONTRACTS RESI'EOTI.\G PERSONAL SERVICE.

STARK v. PARKER.

(2 Pick. 26?.)

Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts.

Suffolk and .\antucket. March

Term, 1824.

Exceptions from court of common pleas,

Suffolk and Nantucket counties; Strong,

Judge.

Assmnpsit by John Stark against Thomas

Parker for labour performed on defendant‘s

farm. Judgment for plaintiff. Defendant

brings exceptions. Reversed.

H. H. Fuller, for plaintiff. B. Sumner,

for defendant.

LINCOLN, J. This case comes before u

upon exceptions ﬁled, pursuant to the stat-

ute, to the opinion in matter of law of a

judge of the court of common pleas before

whom the action was tried by a jury; and-
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we are thus called upon to revise the judg-

ment which was there rendered. The ex-

ceptions present a precise abstract question

of law for consideration, namely, whether

upon an entire contract for a term of serv-

ice for a stipulated sum, and apart perform-

ance, without any excuse for neglect of its

completion, the party guilty of the neglect

can maintain an action against the party

contracted with, for an apportionment of

the price, or a quantum mcruit, for the serv-

ices actually performed.

the view properly taken of the contract be-

tween the parties in the case at bar, the point

upon which it was ruled in the court below

embraced but this single proposition. The

direction to the jury was, “that although

proved to them, that the plaintiff agreed to

serve the defendant for an agreed price for

a year, and had voluntarily left his service

before the expiration of that time, and with-

out the fault of the defendant, and against

his consent, still the plaintiff would be en-

titled to recover of the defendant, in this

action, a sum in proportion to the time he

had served, deducting therefrom such sum

(if any) as the jury might think the defend-

ant had suffered by having his service de-

serted." If this direction was wrong, the

judgment must be reversed, and the case sent

to a new trial, in which the diversity of con-

struction given to the character and terms

of the contract by the counsel for the re-

spective parties may be a subject for dis-

tinct consideration.

It cannot but seem strange to those who

are in any degree familiar -with the funda-

mental principles of law. that doubts should

ever have been entertained upon a question

of this nature. Courts of justice are emi-

nently characterized by their obligation and ‘

oﬂice to enforce the performance of con-

tracts, and to withhold aid and countenance

from those who seek, through their instru-

mentality, impunity or excuse for the viola-

tion of them. And it is no less repugnant

Whatever may be'

to the well established rules of civil juris-

prudence, than to the dictates of moral sense,

DAll.\UE:o; 1:-; .\l'TlO:-;S
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was considered as still subsisting. because

the loss sustained by the defendant in the

breach of it was to be estimated in the as-

sessment of damages to the plaintiff. A

proposition apparently more objectionable in

terms can hardly be stated, and if supported

at all it must rest upon the most explicit au-

thority. The plaintiff.sues in indebitatus as-

sumpsit as though there was no special con-

tract, and yet admits the existence of the

contract to affect the amount he shall recover.

The defendant objects to the recovery of

the plaintiff the express contract which has

been broken, and is himself charged with

damages for the breach of an implied one

which he never entered into. The rule that

expressum facit cessare tacitum is as appli-

cable to this, as to every other case.

contract is entire and executory. it is to be
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declared upon. Where it is executed and a

mere duty to pay the stipulated compensa-

tion remains, a general count for the money

is sufﬁcient. Numerous instances are indeed

to be found in the books of actions being

maintained where the speciﬁc contract has

not been executed by the party suing for

compensation, but in every case it will be

seen that the precise terms of the contract

have been ﬁrst held, either to have been ex-

pressly or impliedly waived. or the non-exe-

cution excused upon some known and settled

principle of law. Such was the case in

Burn v. Miller, 4 Taunt. 745, Thorpe v. White,

13 Johns. 53. and in most of the cases cited

by the plaintiff's counsel in which the de-

cision was had upon considering the obliga-

tion of the party to execute the contract,

and not upon the construction of the con-

tract itself. Nothing can be more unreason-

able than that a man who deliberately and

wantonly violates an engagement, should be

permitted to seek in a court of justice an

indemnity from the consequences of his

voluntary act, and we are satisﬁed that the

law will not allow it.

That such a contract as is supposed in the

exceptions before us expresses a condition to

be performed by the plaintiff precedent to

his right of action against the defendant,

we cannot doubt. The plaintif f was to labour

one year for an agreed price. The money

was to be paid in compensation for the serv-

ice. and not as a consideration for an engage-

ment to serve. Otherwise, as no precise time

was ﬁxed for payment, it tnight as well be

recovered before the commencement of the

labour or during its progress, as at any sub-

sequent period. While the contract was ex-

e(-utory and in the course of execution and the

plaintiff was in the employ of the defendant,

it would never have been thought an action

could be maintained for the precise sum of

compensation agreed upon for the year. The

agreement of the defendant was as entire on

his part to pay, as that of the plaintiff to

serve. The latter was to serve one year, the

former to pay one hundred and twenty dol-

lars. Upon the construction contended for by

.\.GAI~ST
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was considered as still imh8lstlng, because the pllllntlll's counsel, that the defendant was
the loss imstulnetl by thr defendant In the to pay for any portion of the time In whi<-h th1•
breaeh of It wns to be estimated In the as- plnintlff sbouhl labour, In the same proporst•,;snwm of du mngi>s to t be pin Int l!f. A tion to the whole sum which the time of laproposition appan•utly more ohjectlouable ln bour done should bear to the time agreed for.
wrms can bar1lly be stated. aml If tmpported there Is no rule by ·which the defendant's
nt all It must rest upou the most explicit au- liability can be determined. 'Ihe plaintllf
thority. 'fbe plalntllf.sues In lndebitatus as- might as well claim his wages by the month
sumpslt as though there was no special con- as by the year, by the week as by the month.
tract, and yet admits the existf.'nce of the and hy the d.'ly or hour as by elthet'. Thr
1·ontract to a1fect the amount he shall recover. rl~sponslhlllty of the defendant could thus be
The dPfrnd11nt objects to the recon•ry of ufl'eded In the munnl•r totally lnconsi><tent
the plnhrtilf the expr1•ss contract which bas with the terms or bis flJ:Tf.'ement to puy for a
been broken, nnd Is himself charged with yenr's senlee In one cl'rl:llln and entire
damagf's for the breaeh of an Implied one n mount. HPsides n construction to this efwbkb he ne'\"er eutt•re1l Into. The rule that frct Is utterly repugnant to the general underexpn•ssum tacit c·pssnre tacltum Is as appli- standlug or the nature or such engagC'ments.
cable to this. as to e\·ery other cnse. If the · The ui;agt's of the country and common opincontract Is entire and executory. It Is to be ion UJ>On 1mhjccts of this description are esdeclared upon. ""here It Is 1•Xl'CUted and a pN·lnliy to bt' regnrded, and we are bound
mere duty to pay the stipulnted compensa- jml!C'htlly to tnke notlee of that of \Vhlch no
tion remains, a general eonnt fur th1• mnney one Is in fuet li.."llorant. It may be safe to
Is sufficient. Xurnerous lnstan..l's nre Indeed nflirm, lh:1t In no case has a cunlraet In the
to be found ln the books of a..tious being terms of the one untlPr 1·011siclt'ration, bel'D
mnintnlned whrre the S)H'l'lfic contract has construl'd hy pr:H'lic·al men to give a r i;.:ht to
not bt'en eXl'C'lltl'<l by tlw party suini: for tlt•mand tht• ni:rt•Ptl ro111p1•11sation. hPfore the
compenflation, but In every cm•l' It will be performnnct' of the lal·or, and that the employseen that the pre<"ise tnms of the contract er nud employt•d alike unh"ersnliy so underhn'\"e ht'l'n first h r ld. elthrr to bn,·e be!'n ex- st:m!l It. The rule o! In w Is In entire :iec·ortlpressly or Impliedly wnived, or the non-exe- ance with this sentlnwut, nnd It woultl IJe a
cution excused upon sollll' known nnd srttled flagrant violation of the first prlnelples of
principle or law. Rueb wns the ens!~ In justice to hold It otherwise.
Rurn v. :\llll!'r, 4 Taunt. i4.!i, Thorpe v. White,
The performnnee of a year's ser'\"ice was
13 Johns. W, and In most o! the cases cited In this Clli<e a condition prl'cedent to the oblib;\· the plalntllf's coumwl In which the de- gatio n of payment. The plnintitr mus t percision was bad upon consldrrlng the ohlign- form the condition, before be Is ·e ntltlell to
tlon or the party to execute the contract, recover anything undrr the contruct, :ind he
and not upon the con,.tructlon of the con- bns no right to rPnounee his agreeml'nt nml
trad ltsl'lf. :Sotbing can be mort' unrenson- ~over upon a qunntum meruit. The cases
nblf.' than thnt a man who delih!'rately and of .:\I1·:\lill11n v. Yanrlrrllp, 1:! Johns. lf;;:J, Jenwuntonly violates an engagement, should be nings v. C:1rnp, 13 Johns. 94, and Heab v.
1wrrnlttl'd to S('ek In a court o! justice an Moor, 19 .Tohmi. 3:1i, are analogous in t heir
indemnity from the cons1•qu!'nc•ps o! his dr<"nmst1111c1·>< to the case at bar, ancl nre dl,·oluntary net. nucl we ltrP satisfied tbnt the reetly nod ;;trongly in point. The derisions
In the J<:nglisb c·asrs exprf'SS the same doclaw will not allow It.
That such a contract ns Is supposed In the trine (Wnllcllngton v. Oll~r. 2 Bos. & P. [X.
R.] 61; Elli<.1 v. Hamlen, 3 Taunt. 52\ ; and
1•xceptiom~ hefore us expres><!'S a comlitlon to
he pnformed hy the pluiutlff prl'el'1lent to the prlndple is fully supported by all the t'lehis right of action agnln,.t the dPfmdnnt, mentary writers.
we cannot douht. Tlw pblntllf was to lnhour
But it hns heen urged, that whnten~r mny
one year for nu ni:rPt>•l prier. Thl' mouey be thl' principle of the common law, nnd tlw
was to be paid In c·o111p('n>'atlo11 for tllf' snv- <le<'islous In the courts In New York on this
lce. and not ns n <'onsi1l1•r11tion for nn ('ngaire- !111hj1·et. a <li!Iereut rule of construction hns
rnent to fll'l'\"P. Ot hrrwist', 11>1 no prc.•eisl' time heen adopted In this comruonwe11ltb, 111111 we
wns fixed for pnyment, It 111i1:ht nR w ..11 he nre houucl to heli!''\"e thnt im<"h hns sometimes
r r coverecl ht•fo1·l' th" 1•01111111•11n•mPnt or the ht•1•n thr fnrt, from the opinion of the learned
bhour or tlnrlug It>< proirr•'""'· :1s at :my ;;nb- nIHI rPsped;1hle jnclge who tried th is cnuse,
Sl'quent pPrlod. ""hilt• the <"ontr:H't was ex- nrnl from i11"1 ;11w1·s of similar d!'eislous eitecl
t•1·11tory arnl in tll(' <·ouriw ot c•xc1·utlou nnd the nt the har. hut UlJt l'l'JH•rlt•tl. 'flip m·(·a,;ion of
plalntilf wns In tht• !'lllploy of the dPfPrnlant, so grt>"1t a tle)lartun~ from an<'ie ut nml wellit would lll'V<'r hnve hl'Pll lhuu~ht an netion estnhii><iwtl prim:iplt>s ennnot well he unclercoultl he maintainecl !or tht• l'I'PeisP. sum of s toocl. It hns rP<·1•iYrcl no sanerion a t a ny
c·omp1•11sat ion ngn•Ptl upon for the ~·t'ar. The time from the jud;..:meut of thi s eourt wit hin
agn•t•mPnt of the clPfPutl:lllt was as entirf' on the perimls of our HPports. As 1-'arly us the
his part to pa y, ni1 that of the plnintllT to spc•oml '\"olume of )1ass:1<'husl'tts Heports,
st•rn'. Tht• Int ter was to s1~n·e c111e ~·par, the pngt> 147, iu the c•ase of l•'nxon ,., )[11nstil·ill,
formc•r lo pa~· one hUnlll'P«I nnd twPnly dol- thP 1·ommo11-law tlol"lriut• in rl'latlon t o tlt>lars. {;pon tbe com;tnwtion contentled fur by pt'uue nt covenants was reeognlzetl allll up-
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plied, and in several subsequent cases it has

been repeated and uniformly adhered to.

The law indeed is most reasonable in itself.

It denies only to a party an advantage from

his own wrong. It requires him to act justly

by a faithful performance of his own engage-

ments, before he exacts the fulﬁlment of de-

pendent obligations on the part of others. It

will not admit of the monstrous absurdity.

that a man may voluntarily and without cause

violate his agreement, and make the very

breach of that agreement the foundation of

an action which he could not maintain under

it. Any apprehension that this rule may be

abused to the purposes of oppression, by hold-

ing out an inducement to the employer, by

unkind treatment near the close of a term of

service, to'drlve the labourer from his en-

gagement, to the sacriﬁce of his wages, is
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wholly groundless. It is only in cases where

the desertion is voluntary and without cause

on the part of the labourer, or fault or con-

sent on the part of the employer that the

principle applies. Wherever there is a rea-

sonable excuse, the law allows a recovery. To

say that this is not sufﬁcient protection. that

an excuse may in fact exist in countless

secret and indescribable circumstances,

which from their very nature are not sus-

ceptible of proof, or which, it proved, the law

does not recognize as adequate, is to require

no less than that the law would presume what

can never legally be established, or should

admit that as competent, which by positive

rules is held to be wholly immaterial. We

think well established principles are not thus

to be shaken, and that in this commonwealth

more especially, where the important business

of husbandry leads to multiplied engagements

of precisely this description, it should least of

all be questioned, that the labourer is worthy

of his hire, only upon the performance of his

contract, and as the reward of ﬁdelity.

The judgment of the court of common pleas

is reversed, and a new trial granted at the

bar of this court.

DAMAtms IN ACTIOl'\:" .\C:AI:\8T K\ll'LOYER.
DAMAGES IN ACTIONS .\(lAI.\'S'l‘ EMPLOYER.
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BRITTON v. TURNER.

(6 N. H. 481.)

Supreme Court of New Hampshire. Cheshire.

July Term, 1834.

Exceptions from Cheshire county.

BlllTTO~

v. TURXER.
(6 N. H. 481.)
Supreme Court of New Hampi;hire. Cheshire.
July Term, 18:34.

Exceptions from Cheshire county.
llr. Wiison, for plaintiff. llr. Handerson,
for defendant.

Mr. Wilson, for plaintiff. \Ir. Handerson,

for defendant.

PARKER, J. It may be assumed that the

labor performed by the plaintiff, and for

which he seeks to recover a compensation in

this action, was commenced under a special

contract to labor for the defendant the term

of one year, for the sum of one hundred and

twenty dollars, and that the plaintiff has in-

bored bnt a portion of that time, and has

voluntarily failed to complete the entire con-

tract.

It is clear, then, that he is not entitled to

recover upon the contract itself, because the
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service, which was to entitle him to the sum

agreed upon, has never been performed.

But the question arises, can the plaintiff,

under these circumstances, recover a reason-

able sum for the service he has actually per-

formed, under the count in quantum meruit?

Upon this, and questions of a similar nature,

the decisions to be found in the books are not

easily reconciled.

It has been held, upon contracts of this kind

for labor to be performed at a speciﬁed price,

that the party who voluntarily fails to fulﬁll

the contract by performing the whole labor

contracted for, is not entitled to recover any

thing for the labor actually performed, how-

ever much he may have done towards the

performance, and this has been considered

the settled rule of law upon this subject.

Stark v. Parker, 2 Pick. 267; Faxon v. Mans-

ﬁeld. 2 Mass. 147; McMillan v. Vanderilp, 12

Johns. 165; Jennings v. Camp, 13 Johns. 94;

lteab v. Moor, 19 Johns. 337: Lantry v. Parks,

8 Cowen, 63; Sinclair v. Bowles, 9 Barn. &

C. 92; Spain v. Arnott, 2 Starkle, 256. That

such a rule in its operation may be very un-

equal, not to say unjust, is apparent.

A party who contracts to perform certain

speciﬁed labor. and who breaks his contract

in the ﬁrst instance, without any attempt to

perform it, can only be made liable to pay

the damages which the other party has sus-

tained by reason of such non performance,

which in many instances may be triﬂing;

whereas a party who in good faith has en-

tered upon the performance of his contract,

and nearly completed it, and then abandoned

the further performance,—although the other

party has had the full beneﬁt of all that has

been done. and has perhaps sustained no

actual damage,—ls in fact subjected to a loss

of all which has been performed. in the na-

ture of damages for the non fulﬁllment of the

remainder, upon the technical rule, that the

contract must be fully performed in order

to a recovery of any part of the compensation.

By the operation of this rule, then, the

party who attempts performance may be

placed in a much worse situation than he

who wholly disregards his contract, and the

PARKER, J. It may be assumed that the
labor performed by the plalntllr, and for
which he seeks to recover a cow1lensatlon In
this action, was commrncecl under a special
contract to labor for the clt>fendant the term
of one year, for the sum of one lnrndred ai1tl
twenty dollars, and that the plalntllT has labored but a portion of that time, 111ul has
voluntarily failed to complete the entire contract.
It Is clear, then, that he le not entitled to
recol"er upon the contract Itself, becam,;e the
service, which was to entitle him to the sum
agreed upon, has never been performed.
But the question arises, can the plalntllT,
under these circumstances, rPcover a reasonable sum for the service he has actually performed, under the count In quantum merult?
Upon this, and questions of a similar nature,
the decisions to be found In the books are not
easily reconciled.
It has been held, upon contracts of this klncl
for labor to be performed at a specified price,
that the party who voluntarily falls to fulfill
the contract by performing the whole labor
contracted for, ls not entitled to recover any
thing for the labor actually performed, however much he may have done towards the
pl'rformance, and this baa been considered
the settled rule ot law upon this subject.
Stark v. Parker, 2 Pick. 267; Faxon v. Mansfield, 2 Maes. 147; McMillan v. Vanderlip, 12
Johns. 165; Jennings v. Camp, 13 Johns. 94;
Reab v. lfoor, 19 Johna. 337; Lantry v. Parks,
8 Cowen, 63; Sinclair v. Bowles, 9 Barn. &
CJ. 92; Spain v. Arnott, 2 Starkie, 256. That
such a rule In Its operation may be veey unequal, not to eay unjust, Is apparent.
A party who rontracts to perform certain
specified labor, and who breaks hls contract
In the ft.rst Instance, without any attempt to
perform It, can only be made liable to pay
the damages which the other party has sustained by reason of such non performance,
which In many Instances may be trifling;
whereas a psrty who In good faith has entered upon the performance of hls contract,
and nearly completed It, and then abandoned
the further performance,--althougb the other
party has had the full beneftt of all that has
been done, and bas perhaps sustained no
actual damage,-ls ln fact subjected to a loss
of all which has been performed. In the nature of damages for the non fulfillment of the
remainder, upon the technical rule, fhat the
contract must be fully performed In order
to a recovery of any part or the compensallon.
By the operation of thl.8 rule, then, the
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party who attempts performance may h<'
phtcl•d In a much worse situation than he
who wholly dlsrega1·ds his contract, an<l the
other )larty may 1·ecelve much more, by tht~
breach of the contract, than the Injury which
he has sustained by such bre11ch, and more
than he could be entitled to were he seeking
to recover damages by an action.
The case before us presents an Illustration.
Had the plaintiff In this case ne\'l'r ent<'rP<l
upon the perfor!Jlance of his contract, the
damage could not probably have been greater than some small expense and trouble incurred ln procuring another to do the labor
which he had contracted to perform. But
having entered upon the performance, and
lnhort'd nine and a half month!, the value of
whleh labor to the defendant as found by the
jury Is $n5, if the defendant can succeed In
this defence. he In fact reel'lves nearly ttve
sixths of the value of a whole year's labor,
by reason of the bn•ach of C'ontrnct by the
plalntilT, a sum not only utterly disproportionate to any probable, not to say po$slble tlamage which could have resulted from the neglect ot the plaintiff to continue the remaining- two and a half months, but altogether
beyond any damage which could hove been
recovered by the defendant, had the plnlntllT
done nothing towards the fulfilment o~ his
contract.
Another Illustration Is furnished In Lantry
v. Parks, 8 Cow. 83. There the defendant
hired the plaintiff for a year, at ten dollars
per month. The plelntltf worked ten and a
halt months, and then left saying he woul<l
work no more for him. This was on Saturday. On Monday the plaintiff returned and
offered to resume his work, but the defendant
said he would employ him no longer. The
court held that the refusal of the defendant
on Saturday was a violation of his contract.
and that be could recover nothing for the labor performed.
There are other cases, however, In which
principles have been adopted leading to 11 different result. It ls said, that where a party
contracts to perform certain work, and to
furnish materials, as, for Instance, to build a
house, and the work Is done, but with some
variations from the mode prescribed by the
contract, yet If the other party has the beneflt of the labor and materials he should be
bound to pay so much as they are reasonably worth. 2 Starkie, Ev. 97, 98; Hayward
v. Leonai-d, 7 Pick. 181; Smith v. First Cong.
Meeting House In Lowell, 8 Pick. 178; Jeweli
v. Schroeppel, 4 Cow. 564:; Hayden v. Inhabitants of Madison, 7 Greenl. 78; Bull. N. P.
139; 4 Boe. & P. 355; Llnnlngdale v. Livingston, 10 Johns. 36; Jennings v. Camp, rn
Johns. 97: 7 East, 479.
A different doctrine seems to have been
holden In Ellis v. Hamlen, 3 Taunt. 52, and
It Is apparent. In such cases, that If the house
has not been built In the manner specified In
the contract, the work has not been done.
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The party has no more performed what he

contracted to perform, than he who has con-

tracted to labor for a certain period, and

failed to complete the time.

It is in truth virtually conceded in such

cases that the work has not been done, for if

it had been. the party performing it would

be entitled to recover upon the contract itself,

which it is held he cannot do.

Those cases are not to be distinguished, in

principle, from the present, unless it be in

the circumstance that where the party has

contracted to furnish materials. and do cer-

tain iahor. as to build a house in a speciﬁed

manner, it it is not done according to the con-

tract, the party for whom it is built may re-

fuse to receive it,—clect to take no beneﬁt

from what has been performed; and there-

fore if he does receive, he shall be bound to
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pay the value. whereas in a contract for la-

bor. merely, from day to day, the party is

continually receiving the beneﬁt of the con-

tract under an expectation, that it will be

fulﬁlled. and cannot, upon the breach of it,

have an election to refuse to receive what has

been done, and thus discharge himself from

payment. '

But we think this difference in the nature of

the contracts does not justify the application

of a different rule in relation to them. The

party who contracts for labor merely, for a

certain period does so with full knowledge

that he must, from the nature of the case,

be accepting part performance from day to

day, if the other party commences the per-

formance. and with knowledge also that the

other may eventually fall of completing the

entire term.

If under such circumstances he actually re-

ceives a beneﬁt from the labor performed,

over and above the damage occasioned by the

failure to complete, there is as much reason

why he should pay the reasonable worth of

what has been done for his beneﬁt, as there

is when he enters and occupies the house

which has been built for him, but not accord-

ing to the stipulations of the contract, and

which he perhaps enters, not because he is

satisﬁed with what has been done, but be-

cause circumstances compel him to accept it

such as it is, that he should pay for the value

of the house.

Where goods are sold upon a special con-

tract as to their nature. quality. and price,

and have been used before their inferiority

has been discovered. or other circumstances

have occurred which have rendered it im-

practicable or inconvenient for the vendee to

rt‘.\t'ln(i the contract in toto, it seems to have

been the practice formerly to allow the ven-

dor to recover the stipulated price, and the

vendee recovered by a cross action damages

for the breach of the contract. “But accord-

ing to the later and more convenient prac-

tice. the vendee in such case is allowed, in

an aciion for the price. to give evidence of

the inferiority of the goods in reduction of

damages, and the plaintiff who has broken

DAMAGES
DAMAGES IN ACTIONS

AGAINST EMPLOYER. ‘33ll

sustained, instead of subjecting him to an '

entire loss for a partial failure, and thus

mak‘ the amount received in many cases I

wholly disproportionate to the injury. 1|

Sannd. 3200; 2 Starkie, Ev. 643.

it is as "hard upon the plaintiff to pre-

clude him from recovering at all. because he

has failed as to part of his entire undertak-

ing." where his contract is to labor for a {

certain period, as it can be in any other de- |

scription of contract, provided the defendant 1

has received a beneﬁt and value from the i

labour actually performed. 1

“'e hold then, that where a party under-

takes to pay upon a special contract for the ,

performan'ce of labor, or the furnishing of i

materials, he is not to be charged upon such ‘

special agreement until the money is earned 3

according to the terms of it; and where the
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parties have made an express contract the

law will not imply and raise a contract dif-

ferent from that which the parties have en-

tered into, except upon some further trans-

action between the parties.

In case of a failure to perform such special

contract, by the default of the party con-

tracting to do the service, if the money is

not due by the terms of the special agrcementt

he is not entitled to recover for his labour,

or for the materials furnished. unless the

other party receives what has been done, or

furnished, and upon the whole case derives a 1

beneﬁt from it. Taft v. Inhabitants of Mon-

tague, 14 Mass. 282; 2 Starkle, Ev. 644.

But if, where a contract is made of such

a c aracter, a arty actuall receives labor

or ma cna s a beneﬁt

f§_T1______,_ii.Dﬂ.JIll0¥.E,lhﬂ-dﬂ-U‘1““"“l;‘5‘“"9"

‘\,‘E1_l__El_§-—LQSl11LBl1_I.Bﬂm-1-118—5808-El\_ﬂ£_I.he f

contract b ' the ot a u-

i

all ' done ceivedI furnish a

ne c eration and the w

raises a romise to a to he ext nt e ,

reasonable worth of such excess -This may

b‘e"cﬁt's,_i?i_ta_tHl_—:1E_1§a_l<iTg__i_t’__-‘ttee\v'('ase. one not

within the original agreement. and the party

is entitled to “recoyer on s new case, for

t e work done not a d,..l.u.1-L_1el__ac;

Dane, Abr. 224.

on such failure to perform the whole, the

nature of the contract be such that the em-

ployer can reject what has been done. and

refuse to receive any beneﬁt from the part

performance. he is entitled so to do. and in

such case is not liable to be charged, unless

he has before assented to and accepted of

what has been done. however much the other

party may have done tmvards the perform- ;

ance. He has in such case received nothing, ;

and having contracted to receive nuthing but i

the entire matter contracted for. he is not ,

bound to pay.becausc his express promise was

only to pay on receiving the whole. and hav-

ing actually received nothing the law can-

not and ought not to raise an implied prom-

ise to pay. But where the party receives

value, takes and uses the materials. or has
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i<ustained, Instead of subjecting him to an
entire loss for a partial failure, and thus
mak4 the amount rt><·t•lved In many cases
wholly dlsproportlonah• to the Injury. 1
Saund. 320c: 2 Starkie. Ev. tH:3.
It Is as "'html upon the plnlntll'I' to predude him trom reC"overing at all, because be
has failed as to pnrt or his PutirP mulertakiug," where his eontral'I Is to labor for a
certain perlOll, a1:1 It enn be In any otlwr deRcrlptlon of contract. provided the defN1dant
has received a benetlt aml Yalul' from the ,
labour adunlly perforull'!l.
"'e hold then, that wlwre a party undertakes to pay upon a spt•dal <'tmtr:wt fur the
performance of labor, or thl' furnishing of
materials, he Is not to be t:hnrged upnn t111ch
1<pedal agret-ment until the money Is earue<l(i
nr·c•ordlng to the terms of It: nnd wht•re the 1
parties have made an express contrnct the
law will not Imply uud rulsP a eontrnet dlf·
fPrent from that whlC'h the partiPi< ban~ entered Into, except upon some fnrlht>r transactlon hehwen the pnrtlei<.
lu case of a fnllurP to plo'rfurm sueh special
eontruct. hy the default of tlw party contracting to do the service. If the mo1wy Is
not due by the h'nus or tlw spPclal ng1·1>t•111<•11t(
he Is not entitled to reco'l"er for his labour,
or for the materlal!l furnlsbC'd. uulrss the
othl'r party receives what bas b('(•n done, or
furnished, and upon the whole <'ase derives a
henl'fit from It. Taft v. Inbahltnnts of :\Iontngue. 14 ::\fass. 282; 2 Starkie, E\'. H44.
Rut If, whe a C'ontr t Is mad
f s
n c nracter. a party aduall
b'
nn ndvantngl', over agd uhm·e the d3me"
which has [!•!mlte1!. from thy breod• of the
eontract l>y the other portr the lohor nctu:Illy done, epd the ya!ae received, furnish a
i1ew consideration, and thl' law th1•rNmon
ralses a promise to pay to the extent 2! Ule
rt•af'o11ahle worth of such C'XCt•!ols, This may
he <"Onsldered as making a new case. one not
within the original agr~rnent, aml thiliiitli'
It> entitlt•d to "recoyer ou lils lll~W case. !or
the work <lone, not as pgrer1l, hut yet ae:
eepted h~· the d<>fenclant." 1 Dane, Abr. 224.
tr on s11d1 fnllurP to JlPl'form thP whale, the
nnture of the contrn<'t he suC'h that the em11loy1·r can n·jpl't whnt hns bt>Pll 1lot1P. amt
r .. fnsp to rec·ph·p nu)· IJPtwfit from the part
p1•rfor111an1·t>. he is Pntilh•1l Ko to do. and In
"11d1 l 1ts1• i:,; not llahh• to hP l'lrnrg1~<1. uuless
he haR l>eforP nssPntprJ to an<l accepted ot
what hH!! hl'l'n <10111·. howPn•r much the other
pnrty mny hnvl' dorw towanls the performnne<'. lie hnll iu 1111!'11 1·as" t'l't't•in•tl nothing,
nml ha\·ln~ t·ontrad1•<1 to r:•cpiv1• ll'1thi11g- hut
tlw 1·11tire rrntt!Pr <·ontra.-t .. tl for, hi' Is unt ,
houncl to pny. lwcnust• his Pxpress prombc• was
ouly to pay 011 rl'<·!'ivin~ thP whoh•. and h:n·ing aetually received nothing thl' hn\· l':lllnot and ought not to rnlse an lmpliPd promlse to pay. Rut where thr party r<'<'eh·ps
value, takes and uses tlie m11teriabs, or hns
0
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advantage from the labor, he Is liable to pay
the reasonable worth of what he has received. Farnsworth v. Garrard, 1 Camp. 38.
And the rule Is the same whether It wns
recelYed and accepted by the nssent of tht·
party prior to the brPnch, 1111tler n <'outrnd by
which, trorn lts nature, he was to rP<'l'iVP
labor, from time to time untll th<' •·.n11plPtlo11
of the whole contrn<"t: or wlll·tlwr it wm;
n•el'h·P<I and nc!'eptcll l>y an nsi<Pnt sultsPquent to th<> prrformanee of nil whieh wns l!J
fact <lune. If he re<.•plved It under sueh cir<'llllli<tanc!'s us precludt'<l. him from rPjPding
It aftl'rwards, that does not alt.t>r the case;
It hns still h<•en received by his assent.
In fnct, we think the tet:hnlcal reaRonlng.
that the pPrformance of the wbolp lahor Is
a condition prPcedent, and the right to recover anything <lepcmdl'nt upon It; that, thl•
contract belug entire, there can be no apportionmeut; nut! tbnt. tlwre belug an cxprri<s 1·ontrnct, no other can l>e Implied, even
upon the 11uhsP<JUP11t performance of serYict>,-ls not properly applicable to this speeh.•t1 of coutraet. wht>re a l>enettcinl sen·lce
hns hprn artually pPrformt·d; for WI' h:n·e
al>undant re:l11vn to lwlieve>, that tlw gl'nt>rnl
11111IPrstauding of tlw eommunlty h•, that tlw
hired laborer shall be entltlt'<'I to compl•n1<.11tlon for the sen·lce nctunlly 1wrfornw1l.
though he do not continue thr l'Utft·p !Prill
contrade<l for, and such contracts must ht•
prrsumed to be mu<le with refPrt'tH'P to thnt
understundlug, unless an express stipulation
shows llie contrary.
\\'here a beneficial service has heeu performed and rl'eC'lved, therefor!'. under contracts of this kind, the mutual agreements
cannot be cousldered as going to the whole
of the consideration, so as to make tlwm
mutual conditions the one precedent to thE'
other, without a specific provl~o to thnt l'ffeet. Boone Y. Eyre, 1 H. Bl. 2i3, note:
Campl){•ll v .•Jones, 6 Term R. 5i0; Hitd1le
v. Atkinson. 10 East, 21!5; Burn v. :Miller.
4 Taunt. 7·Ki.
It le easy, tr parties so choose, to provide
by an express ngreemeut that nothing !-!hall
be earned, If the lnhorer leaves his ernployer without hnvlug }l('rfnrm<'<I the whole st•rvice contemplated, and thC'n thPr!' can he no
pretence for a recovery If he volutnrlly tll'Rerts the service before the expiration of tlw
time.
The amount, however, for whieh the Piilployer ought to be chnrge<I, where the - lahore1· nha111!011s his contract, is onl~· till' rPasouahle worth or the amount of advn11t:1g-P
hl' receives npuil the· whole trant>al'liuu
(\Yadleii:h v. Sutton, (i ~. H. 1:1); and. In
estimating the vahw of the lahor, tlw contract price for thP st•rvi<"e <'nunot be ex<'l'l'tletl (Hayt!Pn v. Inhuhltauts of :l\I:11lii<on.
7 Greenl. 78; Duhoh1 v. Cnnal Co., 4 \Vend.
28ii; Koon " · Gn•,•nman, 7 \\'pn<J. 121).
If n person mnlws a <·ontra<'t fairly he is
l'ntitled tu have It fully !Jl'l'fol'lllP<l; and If

•
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this is not done he is entitled to damages.

He may maintain a suit to recover the

amount of damage sustained by the non

performance.

The beneﬁt and advantage which the par-_

ty takes by the labor, therefore, is the

amount of value which he receives, if any,

after deducting the amount of damage; and

if he elects to put this in defence he is

entitled so to do, and the implied promise

which the law will raise, in such case, is

to pay such amount of the stipulated price

for the whole labor, as remains after de-

ducting what it would cost to procure a

completion of the residue of the service, and

also any damage which has been sustained

by reason of the non fulﬁlment of the con-

tract.

If in such case it be found that the dam-
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ages are equal to or greater than the amount

of the labor performed, so that the employer,

having a right to the full performance of

the contract, has not upon the whole case

received a beneﬁcial service, the plaintiff

cannot recover.

This rule, by binding the employer to

pay the value oif the service he actually re-

‘ceives, and the laborer to answer in dam-

ages where he does not complete the entire

contract, will leave no temptation to the

former to drive the laborer from his service,

near the close of his term, by ill treatment,

in order to escape from payment; nor to

the latter to desert his service before the

stipulated time, without a snﬂicient reason;

and it will in most instances settle the whole

controversy in one action, and prevent a mul-

tiplicity of suits and cross actions.

There may be instances, however, where

the damage occasioned is much greater than

the value of the labor performed, and if the

party elects to permit himself to be charged

for the value of the labor, without interpos-

ing the damages in defence, he is entitled

to do so, and may have an action to recover

-

his damages for the non-performance what-

ever, they may be. Orowninshield v. Rob-

inson, 1 Mason, 93, Fed. Cas. No. 3, .

And he may commence such action any

time after the contract is broken, no ,,vith-

standing no suit has been instituted a iinst

him; but if he elects to have the da ges

considered in the action against hi he

must be understood as conceding that they

are not to be extended beyond the amount

of what he has received, and he cannot at-

terwards sustain an action for farther dam-

ages.

.~\pplying the principles thus laid down, to

this case, the plaintiff is entitled to judg-

ment on the verdict. The defendant sets

up a mere breach of the contract in defence

of the action, but this cannot avail him.

He does not appear to have offered evidence

to show that he was damniﬁed by such

breach, or to have asked that a deduction

should be made upon that account. The
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(30 Vt. 607.)

,.

SWIFT v. HARRIMAN.

(30 Vt. 607.)

Supreme Court of Vermont. Orange.
Term, 1858.

:\lm·<'b

Supreme Court of Vermont.

Term, 1858.

Orange. March

Aaaumpait for the breach of a contract by the

defendant, to carry on the plaintiff's saw mill.

The defendant ﬁled a plea in offset, but this

plea was not ﬁled so early as was required by

the rules of the court where the cause was tried.

After this plea was ﬁled. and before any objec-

tions had been made to it by the plaintiff, the

cause was referred by the consent of the par-

ties, and tried by the referees. and at the hear-

ing before them the plaintiff objected to the

defendant's demand in offset, among other

reasons, upon the ground that the plea in offset

was not ﬁled in season. The referees, however,

considered the defendant's claim in offset,
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which was for his labor and earnings durin

the time he carried on the mill, and reportc

the facts in the case, which are sufﬁciently set

forth in the opinion of the court. They found

that the plaintiff was entitled to recover of the

defendant ﬁfteen dollars for the breach of the

contract declared on, and that the defendant

was entitled to recover of the plaintiff. u on

his claim in offset, the sum of thirty-two dol ar

and ninety-two cents, and they accordingly re-

ported that the defendant recover of the plain-

Auumpaitfor the brcnch of a contract by the
defendant. to carry on the plaintiff's saw mill.
The defendant tiled a plea in offset, but this
plea was not filed so early as was require<! t)y
the rules of the court where the cause wns tried.
After this plea was flied. ancl hefore any objections had been m11de to it by the pl11i11ti!Y, the
cause waa referred by the consent of the parties. Rnd tried by the referees. and at the henring before them the plaintiff objected to the
defeudnnt's demand in o!Jset, amonJ{ other
reasons. upon the ground that the ple11 i·u offset
was not tiled in season. The referees, howe"er,
considered tho defendant's claim In offset,
which was fof hill labor and enrnings during
the time he carried on the mill, and reported
the facts in the case, which are sullkie ntly set
forth in the opinion of the court. They found
that the plaintiff WllS entitled to recover of the
defendant fifteen dollars fur the brea<'h of the
contract declare1l on, and that the defendant
was entitled to recover of the plaintiff. upon
his claim in offset, the sum of thirty-two dollars
and ninety-two cents, anti they ac1·ortlingly reported that the defcntlant recover of the plnintitY seventeen dollars and ninety -two cents (be·
ing the difference between the de"fendant's claim above stated, *and the plain- ~608
tiff's damages by reason of the breach of
the contrnctJ. and costs. The county court
rendered judgment for the defendant upon the
report, to which the plaintilf excepted.
.A. M. Dickey, for the plaintitT.
- - - - , for the defendant.
The opinion of the court was delivered by

tiff seventeen dollars and ninety-twp cents (be-

ing the difference between the defend-

ant's claim above stated, “and the plain- ‘B08

tiffs damages by reason of the breach oi.

the contract). and costs. The county court

rendered judgment for the defendant upon the

report, to which the Elaintiff excepted.

A. M. Dickey, fort e plaintiff.

, for the defendant.

The opinion of the court was delivered by

Al.l)l>‘, J. The question whether the plea in

offset was ﬁled within the time prescribed by

the rules of court, can not properly be raised

after a reference of the case. and a hearing be-

fore the referees. Even if out of time, the

court might have suspended the rule and ad-

mitted the plea. The objection must be held

as waived by the reference.

The contract between the plaintiff and the

defendant, as stated in the report, was this: a

verbal contract by which the defendant was to

carry on the plaintiff's saw mill for one year,

make all repairs costing one dollar or less at

any one time, run the mill all the time from the

1st of March to the 1st of May, and from the

fall till the 1st of March, 1854, and between the

ﬁrst of May and fall, when there was water

enough, and do all the work in a good work-

manlike manner, and to receive ﬁfty cents per

thousand for soft lumber sawed, and onethird

of the hard lumber for sawing the same. and

to take his pay out of the money received for

sawing, and out of the hard lumber. .

In September. 1853, the plaintiff dismissed

the defendant from the charge of the mill. on

the ground that he did not do the work in a .

ood workmanlike manner, and the defendant

eft. The referees ﬁnd that the defendant did

ALl>l!", .I. 'fhe 1p1cstion whether the plea in
offset was filed withiu the time prcs<'rihc<I by
the rules of court, can not properly be raised
after a reference of the case. noel 11 hearing before the referees. Even if out of time. the
court might have suspended the rule and admitt6-'d the plea. The objection must be held
as waived bv the reference.
The contract between the plaintiff and the
defendant, as stated in the report, was this : a
verbal contract by which the defond11nt was to
cRrry on the plaintiff's saw mill for one year,
m11ke Rll repairs costing one dollar or less at
ttnv one time, run the mill nil the time from the
1st of March to the 1st of Mav, and from the
fall till the ht of l\lnrch. 18.'i4, and between the
first of May and fall, when there was water
enough. and do all the work in a good workman like mnnner. and to receive fifty cents per
thousand for soft lumber sawed, and one-third
of the bard lumber for so.wing the same. and
to take bis pay out of the money received for
sawing, and out of the hnrd lumhcr.
In tie ptember. l &ia. the plaintiff di smissed
the defendant. from the charge of the mill. on
Lhe gruund \hat he did noL do the work in a

good workmanlike manner, and the dcfentl:rn ~
left. The referees find that the defendant did
not do bis work in a good workmanlike manner, and as this suit is brought to recover the
dumages occasioned to the plaintiff by such
brea('b of the contract, the referees assess such
dnnrnges at the sum of fifteen dollars.
The 1lefend11nt plends in offset bis claim for
the bnlRnce due him for bis labor and earnings
during the lime he carried on the mill.
The plaintiff objects to any allowance to the
defendant for sneb e11rnings. upon the ground
that the cont met was the mere hiring of a serv·
ant for a spec ific period of time. and that he
was di schnr!!'ed for good cause.
*609
*The contract in this case we can not
deem the mere hiring of a servant. It wns
an a~reement of a different chnracter, in
which the defend1rnt as!lumed liabili ties for repairs of the mill, bnd a share in its profits. and
rn fact. was put In pos~ession of. and had, to
some extent. an interest in real estate. He wns
not to receive an~· fixed sum as wages. but w11s
to have a proportion of tbe profits of the business be carried on. It was a contract for the
control and carrying on of a mill for a year.
Similar contracts are frequently made as to
the carrying on of farms on shares. In such
cases. the contracts have never been held mere
agreements by the teuantsto labor as hired servants.
Neither does it belong to that class of contracts where the stipulations are intended t o b~
a condition precedent, and there can b·e no recovery without a complete performance. The
agreement on the part of the defendant wns not
for such an entire thing that the whole must be
done before he would be entitled to recover: ou
the contrary, the terms of the contract. show
that both parties intended the defendant should
take bis pny out of the earnings of the mill as
they accrued.
Th is case seems to come within the reason of
those cnses, of whi ch there are many in our reports, where upon equitable considerations
~rowing out of the contrnct Rnd its part performan ce. a recove rv for the r eal beneticilil
value of the labor has been allowed.
The defendant's labor was beneficial lo the
plaintiff. Compensation to the plaintiff for
what he suffered from the breach of coutrnct
by the defendant wns easilv to be nscerta inc•d,
bas been a~scssed. and cau be detln eted from
the bene!lcial value to the plaiutiJI of the deant's labor.
It would be hi h

e ec1s10ns rn yer v.• ones, 8 Vt. 205; Gil man v. Hall, 11 Vt. 510; Bracket v. l\loore, 2:J
Vt. 054; and Morrison v. Cummin gs, 26 Vt. ~l'.!1;.
establish the right of the party to recover on n
quantum 11u-rn il, in cases where a compensation
c1tn bo made, and the stinulations are not intended as a condition precedent.
The judgment of the county court is affirmed.
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talned by the plalntltT In error. In his couu·
terclalm, the det'endant alleged the breach ot'
(-H Pnc. GSi. '.! Knn. App. 5i5.)
the contract, and that the defendant was un·
able to get help to take tile place of Glodfelty,
Court of Appeals of K11nsa8, ~orthern Depart- and could not, therefore. get his work done,
ment, C. D. April 3, lS!)fi.
wheat harvested, nor co1 n properly tilled, nor
Error from dlt1trict court, Osborne county. stock properly cared for, whereby he was
Action by C. W. Peach against J. C. Macy damaged in the sum of $'>00. The defPndant
tn a ju!'tiee court. Judgment for plaintiff, in error claims tbat, ns this netion was origand defemlunt ap1wals to the district court. inally brought before n justice of the pence,
Judgment for plaintiff, and dcfc>ndant bringi;i the district court, on nppeul, llad no jurisdiction of this counterclaim, it exceeding tile
error. Affirmed.
surn of '300. Hnd this objection been iuterHobinson & :\lcBride, for plaintiff In error.
posed in the trial eom1, the cases of Rull v.
IsrapJ :\Coore and \\'. :N. l\loore, for defendant Bi~imm, 43 Kan. 32i. 2.3 Pnc. fiG::i, and Wagln error.
staff v. Chnlliss, 31 Kan. 212, 1 Pne. c.-n,
woulcl be authorities supporting such contPI1CLARK, J. About the 1st ol' March, 18!:11., t1011; hut, as no ol.Jjedlon wus tlwre rn:Hle,
a n·rhal contraet was entl're(J Into between ' the defendant In error cnunot hi> lWrmlttcd, In
one Il(•nry G lodfelty and the ·plaintiff In er- this court, for the first tlml', to ohjP<"t to the
ror, ,J. C. l\iucy, whereby thl' forrner agreed jurlsrlletion of the trial court to hear and deto work for the latter, on his farm In Os- termine sueh counterclaim. Gregg v. Garverborne county, for a term of nine months at ick, 33 Kan. 100, 5 Pac. 751.
the stipulated wages of $17 per month. GlodDid the court err In refusing to allow the
fdty went to Wl'rk under this contract on dt:>ff'ndnnt d1minges under bis countPrdnlm?
March 4th nnd remained with Mr. Macy un- In Walrath v. Whitteklnd, 20 Kan. 482. )t Is
til July 8th, and then, wltllout any sutlklent said that "damages recoverable upon brPach
reason thcr1•for, and over Macy's objection, of contract are only those damages whleh
quit and rPfnsed further to comply with the are the dTrect and proximate result of the
terms of his contract. Glodfelty was a minor wrong complained of. Damages wllich are
ste11son of C. W. Peach, the defc>ndant In remote and speculative cannot be recovered."
error, and the latter brought an action before 'Vhlle the defendant may have suffered loss
n justice ot' the peace to recover the balance by reason of Glodfelty's misconduct, still It
of the wages claimed to be due bis stepson. must be remembered that the law does not
'l'he ease was subsequently tnken to the dls- hold one liable for all the consequences that
triet court, where amended bills of particulars mny follow the breach of his contract. It It
were liled by both parties, and n trial was were so, his liability would be witlruut a limit,
duly had before the court, a jury being for It would ~ontinue as far as the consewaived, resulting in a finding In favor ot' quences of his act could be traeed. Tile law
fbe plaintitT for the amount claimed by him wisely limits liability to the direct and Im·
"lf'ss the damages sustained by the defend- mediate effects of the breach of a contract.
ant in the sum of $18.60, to wit, that plaintiff The losses set up In defendant's counterclaim
iihould recover of the defendant the sum ot are not of this character. They may have
$45.2li; the damages allowed being the dif- resulted remotely from the fact that Glodfelty
ference between the per diem paid the em- failed to remain with the plaintiff In error
plo:rt\, Glodfelty, and $2 per rlny, the amount as a "farm hand" for the full period of nine
per cliPm the eourt considered a proper <'Om- months, but they cannot be said to be the
pensntion for which additional help could be natural and proximate consequence of Lheo
e·111 ployed, ns needed, to take the plaf'e of breach of the contract ot' employment. Fulsaid employ(• clurinl{ harvest." The defend- ler v. Curtis, 100 Ind. 237; Jackson v. H11ll,
ant PX<~1·11t1•d to the tlndlng of the court; tiled 84 N. C. 489; MeDanlel v. Crabtree, 21 Ark.
his motion for a new trial, setting forth all 431; .Johnson v. Mathews, 5 l(an. llS. In
the statutory grounds therefor, wllieh was support of the contention of pl:tlntlff in error
on•rrnkd. the defeudant duly excPpting; nnd that the court erred in assessing his damages,
jml;:-nwnt w;1s remlt·red In favor of the plain- , our attention has been called to the case of
tiff for IF-15.26. 'l'he defendant sePks a re- Houser v. Pearce, 13 Knn. 104, In which the
v•!r~al of this judgment.
plnintilf reeovered a judgment t'or dumag,•s
The only assignment of error to which par- for hrt>ach of n specllic contract to cut, bind,
tlc-uln r attention l::. <'lllkd by counsel Is thnt and staek certain oats, and the supreme court
the court erred In Its finding as to the dmu- held that If the plaintiff, after using all rennges which the dc>femlnnt below sustainc>d sonn ble preen utlon, lost bis crop by reason,
through the breneh of the contmct by Glod- solely, of the failure of the defemlnnts to pf'rfelty, and It Is claimed that, under the evi- t'rom tllelr contract, he was clearly entitled to
dence, the plaintiff in error wns entitled to recover the amount ot' sueb loss; nnd, as the
clumniws undl'r hb conntPrelnlm. and that rc:>eord did not mclude the evidetH'P, tile eourt
there was no evidt•nc<' In the:> cast• to war- l.Jeld that tile presum11tion was tllnt tile In·
rant the fimlini? of the dn11111ges thnt were as- struetion given of which complailit was wadi~
sessed by tit<' trial court as ha\·ing beeu llUB- was warrantL>d by the evidence.
:\!ACY v. PEACH.
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MAC! v. PE.\(‘I'I. |

(-14 Pac. 687. 2 Kan. App. 575.)

Court of Appeals of Kansas, Northern Depart-

ment, C. D. April 3, 1896.

Error from district court, Osborne county. ‘

Action by C. W. Peach against J. C. Macy i

in a justice court. Judgment for plaintiff, j

and defendant appeals to the district court.

Judgment for plaintiff, and defendant brings I

error. Aﬂirmed.

Robinson & .\I,cBride, for plaintiff in error.

Israel “core and W. N. Moore, for defendant l

in error.

CLARK, J. About the 1st of March, 1891,

a verbal contract was entered into between i

one Ilenry Glodfelty and the-plaintiff in er-

ror, J. C. Macy, whereby the former agreed

to work for the latter, on his farm in Os-

borne county, for a term of nine months at

the stipulated wages of $17 per month. Glod-
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felty went to work under this contract on

March 4th and remained with Mr. Macy un-

til July 8th, and then, without any sutﬁcient

reason therefor, and over Macy's objection,

quit and refused further to comply with the

terms of his contract. Glodfelty was a minor

stepson of C. W. Peach, the defendant in

error, and the latter brought an action before

a justice of the peace to recover the balance

of the wages claimed to be due his stepson.

The case was subsequently taken to the dis-

trict court, where amended bills of particulars

were tiled by both parties, and a trial was

duly had before the court, a jury being

waived, resulting in a ﬁnding in favor of

the plaintiff for the amount claimed by him

“less the damages sustained by the defend-

ant in the sum of $18.69, to wit, that plaintiff

should recover of the defendant the sum of

$45.26; the damages allowed being the dif-

ference between the per diem paid the em-

ploye, Glodfelty, and $2 per day, the amount

per diem the court considered a proper com-

pensation for which additional help could be

einployed, as needed, to take the place of ‘

said employe during harvest." The defend-

ant c.vccpted to the ﬁnding of the court; ﬂied

his motion for a new trial, setting forth all

the statutory grounds therefor, which was

overruled, the defeudant duly excepting; and

judgment was rendered in favor of the plain- I

tiff for $45.26. The defendant seeks a re-

versal of this judgment.

The only assignment of error to which par-

ticular attention is called by counsel is that

the court erred in its ﬁnding as to the dam-

ages which the defendant below sustained

through the breach of the contract by Glod-

felty, and it is claimed that, under the evi-

dence, the plaintiff in error was entitled to

damages under his counterclaim, and that

there was no evidence in the case to war-

rant the ﬁnding of the damages that were as-

sessed by the trial court as having been sus-

Bitl£.\(‘H Oi“ i‘lL\"l‘li.\L"[S I{ESl"EC'l‘l.\'G PEI{SO.\'AL SERVICE.

tained by the plaintiff in error. In his coun~

terclaim, the defendant alleged the breach of

the contract, and that the defendant was un-

able to get help to take the place of Glodfelty,

D.\\I.\(ll~l.\‘ I.\' .\("I‘I()NS .\(i.\l.\'.\"l‘ E‘..\H‘L()YE.

There is, however, quite a noticeable distinc-

tion between that case and this one. Here,

the contract between the parties was not

made with any special reference to the har-

vesting of the dei.endant's wheat crop, nor to

the cultivation of any particular ﬁeld of

growing corn; but, on the contrary, it is fair

to presume that the work expected to be per-

formed by him was general tn its nature,

such as is usually required of a “farm hand,"

and it cannot fairly be supposed that the

damages alleged in the counterclaim were

within the contemplation of the parties to

this contract when it was executed, nor could

such damages naturally be expected to fol-

low a violation of the contract. The evidence

in support of the damages sustained by the

defendant below, as alleged in his bill of

particulars, is very unsatisfactory. instead

of being recitals of fact, the testimony of the
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several witnesses amounts only to expressions

of opinion as to the damages which the de-

fendant sustained, and was clearly incompe-

tent. But we do not think the defendant be-

low was entitled to recover the damages al-

leged by him in his couitterciahn. In Peters

v. “'hitney, 23 Barb. 2-l, this identical ques-

tion was before the court, and it was there

held that “in an action for the breach of a

contract for work and labor to be done upon

a farm, evidence of damage occurring to the

plaintiff's crops in consequence of the defend-

ant's leaving his service is ina.dmissible. The

legal measure of damages in such cases is

the difference between the wages agreed to

be paid to the defendant, and the price the

plaintiff was obliged to pay for labor to sup-

ply his place." In Riech v. Bolch, 68 Iowa,

526, 27 N. W. 507, it is said that, “where one

employed by a farmer, for a given term,

abandons his employer before the end of the

term, in the midst of haying. the damages

sustained by the employer in the loss of hay

are too remote to be recovered in an action

for a violation of the contract." In that case,

the defendant offered to prove that, when

plaintiff left his service, he had a large quan-

tity of hay in the shock, and that he had a

quantity of uncut hay in the ﬁeld, and that

he was unable to employ other help to save

such hay, and that it was lost in consequence

of plaintiffs refusal tocontinue in his service

during the remainder of the term of his em-

ployment; and also offered to prmc the value.

of the hay at the time the plaintiff quit his

services. This evidence was excluded by the

district court, on the ground that it did not

afford the proper measure of damages. The

supreme court, in sustaining this runng. -held

that “it cannot be said that the injury com-

plained of is the natural and proximate con-

sequence of plaintiff's breach ‘of the contract."

In the case of Iiouser v. Pearce, supra. the

trial court refused an instmction to the jury

that the measure of damages was the differ-

ence between the contract price and what it

would have cost to have had the work done

by others; and the supreme court. speaking

through Mr. Justice Brewer, says that “th's
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HARVEY v. CONNECTICUT & P. R. R. CO.

(124 Mass. 421.)

Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts.

Suffolk. May 25, 1878.

Report from supreme judicial court, Suf-

folk county; Colt, Judge.

R. D. Smith, for plaintiff. C. T. Russell

and C. T. Russell, Jr., for defendant.

ICNIHCOTT, J. The defendant agreed in

writing with the plaintiff to transport lum-

her from certain' stations on the Grand Trunk

Railway, in Canada, to Boston, at a certain

rate of freight, for a period of twelve months

from August 31, 1871. This agreement con-

stituted a continuing offer, on the part of the

defendant, to transport such lumber as the

plaintiff should furnish at the speciﬁed points

during the period named, and was binding

on the defendant whenever, during that time,
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the plaintiff tendered lumber for transporta-

tion according to its te1ms; and failure to

transport the lumber afterwards offered by

the plaintiff was a breach of the contract.

Bornstein v. Lans, 104 Mass. 214.

It also appeared that the plaintiff informed

the company. at the time, that he desired to

make this contract, because he wished to

make contracts with other persons to sell

and deliver railroad ties in Boston. He aft-

erwards made contracts with two railroads

for the delivery of ties in Boston. He noti-

ﬁed the defendant for the ﬁrst time in May

or June, 1872, that he had made such con-

tracts. and demanded transportation for a

portion of these ties to Boston, under his con-

tract. This the defendant failed to do. As

the plaintiff had made no contracts for the

delivery of ties in Boston at the time when

the defendant entered into the agreement to

transport, and no notice was or could then

have been given of the character and terms

of those contracts, we are of opinion that the

defendant cannot be held liable in damages

for the proﬁts which would have accrued to

the plaintiff under such subsequent contracts.

Such damages could not have been in the con-

templation of the parties when they made

their contract, as a probable result of a

breach of it.

When a carrier receives goods for trans-

portation, and fails to deliver them, the own-

er is entitled to recover the market value of

the goods at the time and place at which they

should have been delivered. Spring v. Has-

kell, 4 Allen, 112. And where the carrier

negligently delays the delivery of goods, he

is liable for loss in their market value during

the delay. Cutting v. Railway Co., 13 Allen,

381. It is said in that case that this "is the

most simple and just rule, as well as the

easiest to be applied; for it depends on the

general market value of the goods, and in-

volves no question of contingent or specu-

lative proﬁts, and no consideration of any

other contracts made or omitted to be made

by the plaintiff in view of his contract with

I

i

the defendant. To refer to sul'h other contracts, or the profits which might have resulted from them, not within the knowledge
or contemplation of the detem:lant, would be
to hold him liable for the consequences, or allow him the benefit, not of his own contract
with the plaintiff, but of dealings between
the latter and third persons, with which the
defendant bad nothing to do."
It, therefore, the defendant had received
J.~NIHCOTT, J.
The defendant agreed In the ties tor transportation accor<llng to Its
writing with the plaintiff to transport lum- contract, and failed to deliver them at .all,
ber fl"om certain" stations on the Grand Trunk It would have been llable for their marRailway, In Canada, to Boston, at a certain ket v11lue In Boston at the time when they
i·atc of freight, for a period of twelve months should have been dellvered; or it it had negfrom August 31, 1871. This agreement con- ligently delayed the delivery, It would have
stituted a continuing otfer, on the part of the hren 11able f o r . diminution In thelr marrlef Pmlant. to transport such lumber as the ket value during the delay. It would not,
11l11 lntltr should furnish at the specified points In either event, have been llahle in damages
during the period named, and was binding for loss of profits sustained by the plalntitr
on the defendant whenever, during that time, under his subsequent contracts with other
the plaintiff tendered lumber for transportn· parties; unless it can be said that, by reason
tlon according to Its teuus; and failure to of the plaintiff's announcement that he Intransport the lumber afterwards otrered by tended to make such contracts, It was necesthe plalntitr was a breach of the contract. sarily within the contemplation of the parties
Bornstein v. Lnns, 104 Muss. 214.
when they mnde the contract of transportaIt also appeared that the plaintiff informed tion, and as the probable consequence of Its
the company, at the time, that he desired to b1·each, that the defendant might be llable
make this contract, because he wished to for dnmnges resulting to the plalntitf from
n111ke contracts with other persons to sell his inability to fulfill such contracts, the
and deliver railroad tl~s In Boston. He aft- terms or which were not and could not then
erwards made contracts with two railroads be disclosed.
for the delivery of ties in Boston. He not!·
The damn~es, for which a ca1Tier is liable'
fled the defendant for the first time In May upon fa!lure to perform bts contract, are
or Juul', 1872, that he had made such con- those which result from the natural and ortracts. and demanded transportation for a dinary consequences contemplated at the time
portion of these ties to Boston, under his con- ot making the contract of transportation;
tract. This the defendant failed to do. As and a larger llabll1ty can be Imposed upon
the plaintift' had made no contracts for the him, only when it ls in the contemplation of.
delivery of ties In Boston at the time when the parties that the carrier ls to respond, In
the defendant entered Into the agreement to case of breach, for special and exceptional
transport, and no notice was 01· could then damages. In such a case, the extent and
have been given of the character and terms character of the obligation he nssume~uld
of those contracts, we are of opinion that the be known to the caiTler, which In
se
defendant cannot be held liable in damages was impossible, as the contracts we
not
for the profits which would have accrued to then made. The mere knowledge on the pa.rt
the 1llnintitI unde1· such subsequent contracts. ot the defendant, that the JllalntilI Intended
Such damages could not have been in the con- to make contracts for the sale of the ties to
temr1Jatlon of the partles when they made be transported, cannot Impose a liability uptheir contract, as a probable result of a on the defendant tor loss of profits on such
contracts. Whether there would be a loss of
hM:icb of It.
'When a carrier receives goods for t1·ans- profits, It was of course then Impossible to
portation, and falls to dellver them, the own- determine, and probable profits would be Iner Is entitled to recover the market value of capable of estimation. If the defendant ls
the 1.wods at the time nnd place at which they liable in this case for such possible or probshould have been delivered. Rprlng v. Has-1 able profits, then every carrler who ls In·
kl'll, 4 Allen, 112. And where the carrier formed, when he takes goods for transportanej?llgentlr delays the delivery of goods, he l tion, that the shipper Intends to sell thl'm.
Is liable for loss In their market Yalue during Is liable, upon failure t<, perform his contra('!.
the delay. Cutting v. Railway Co., 13 .<\lien, for loss to the shipper ln his dealings with
381. It ls said In that case that this "ls the other parties, with which the carrier has
most simple and just rule, as well as the nothing to do, and the result of which it ls
easiest to be applied; for lt depends on the Impossible for him to anticipate. Scott v.
general market value of the goods, and in- Steamship Co., 106 llass. 468. This would
volves no question of contingent or specu- be to introduce a new and uncertain element
lative proftt1<, and no consideration of any of liability Into the contract, and we are not
other contracts made or omitted to be made aware of any authority which 1oea to that
by the plalntllf in view or his contract with extent.

HARVEY v. CO!'\"'XEC1.'ICUT & P. R.R. CO.
(124 Mass. 421.)
Supreme Judicial Court of ~Inesachusetts.
Suffolk. Mny 25, 1878.
Report from supreme judicial court, Suffolk county; Colt, Judge.
R. D. Smith, for plaintltT. C. T. Russell
and C. T. Russell, Jr., for defendant.
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In Hadley v. Baxendale, 9 Exch. 341. the

owners of a mill sent a broken shaft by a

carrier, as a pattern to_ a manufacturer, to

make a new shaft, and at the time informed

the carrier that the mill was stopped, and the

shaft must be delivered immediately. The

carried delayed its delivery for an unreason-

able time, in consequence of which the own-

ers did not receive the new shaft until some

days after they should have received it, and

were unable to work their mill for want of

it, and thereby incurred a loss of proﬁts. But

it was held that such loss could not be re-

covered, on the ground that it could not rea-

sonably be supposed to have been in the con-

templation of the parties t the time they

made the contract, as a pr le result of a

breach of it, that there would be necessarily

a loss of proﬁts.
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In Horne v. Railway Co., L. R. 7 C. I‘. 583,

the plaintiffs were under a contract to sup-

ply a quantity of military shoes at a cer-

tain day, in London, at an unusually high

price. They were delivered to the defendant,

with notice that the plaintiffs were under

a contract to deliver the shoes on that day,

and unless they were so delivered, they would

he thro\vn upon their hands; but no notice

was given of the terms of the contract. The

defendant, a common carrier, failed to deliv-

er them within the time. The plaintiﬂ claim-

In Hadley v. Baxrudalt•, 9 Exch. 341. the
uwm•rs of a mill sent a hl'oken shaft by a
carrier, as a pattern to. n mau11!acture1·, to
make a new shaft, and at the time Informed
the carrier that the mill was stopped, and the
shaft must be delivered Immediately. The
cnrriPd delayed Its delivery for an umeasona ble tlme, In consequPnce ot which the ownrrs did not receive the new shaft until some
days after they should have received it, and
were unable to work their mill tor want of
It, and thereby Incurred a loss of proftts. But
It was held that such loso1 could not be recovered, on the ground that It could not reasonably be supposed to have been In the contemplation of the partlee .1.t . the time they
made the contract, ae a prmtlle result of a
breach of It, that there would be neces>111rlly
a loss ot proftts.
In Horne v. Rnllwny Co., L. R. 7 C. P. ;:;83,
the plulntllfs were under a contract to supply a quantity of military shoes at a t't'rta!n day, In London, at an unusually high
price. They were delivered to the defendant,
with notice that the plalntl!Ts were under
a contract to deliver the shoes on that day,
and unless they were so delivered, they would
be thrown upon their bands; but no notice
was given of the terms of the contract. The
defendant, a common earrler, failed to deliver them within the time. The plalntl!T claimed as damages the difference between the
price at which they bad contracted to sell the
shoes, and the price which they ultimately
brought. But it waa beld that they were
LAW DAM.2d llld.-22

ed as damages the difference between the

price at which they had contracted to sell the

shoes. and the price which they ultimately

brought. But it was held that they were I

LAW DAM.2d Ed.—22

O

not entitled to recover that sum, the daniage

not being the natural consequence of the de-

fendant‘s failure to perform its contract, and

the defendant not having had notice that the

sale was at an exceptional price.

This question has been considered in nu-

merous cases, and it is suﬂicient to say that

the principle upon which Hadley v. Baxen-

dale was decided is now well established.

though some of the dicta of Baron Alderson,

in delivering the judg,ment, have been the

subject of criticism. Horne v. Railway Co.,

L. R. 8 C. P. 131, 133, 141; Gee v. Railway

Co., 6 Hurl. & N. 211; Borries v. Hutchinson.

18 C. B. (N. S.) 4-i5', Railway Co. v. Red-

mayne, L. R. 1 C. P. 329; Wilson v. Dock

Co., L. R. 1 Exch. 177 184, 186; Woodger v.

Railway Co., L. R. 2 C. P. 318; Sawmill Co.

v. Nettleship, L. R. 3 C. P. 499; Cory v.

Ironworks Co., L. R. 3 Q. B. 181. See. also.

Waters v. Towers. 8 Exch. 401, and Baron

Parke's observation thereon in Hadley v.

Baxendale, 9 Exch. 349.

We are therefore of opinion there was error

in instructing the jury that the pimntif f could

recover damages for loss of proﬁts on his

subsequent contracts. As the ties were not

sent to Boston, the true measure of damages

is the dlfference between the market price in

Boston and the market price in Canada at

the time when the defendant should have

•
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not entitled to recover that sum, the danrngl'
not being the natural rousequeuce of the 111'fendant's !allure to perform Its contrnct, mu\
the tlefl'mlant not having had notice thut tlw
suit! wns at an exceptional price.
This question has been considered In numerous cases, and it Is sufficient to say that
the principle upon which Hadley v. BnXl'll·
dale was decided Is now well establlslwd.
though some ot the dicta of Baron Alilerson,
In dell'ferlng the Judi;ment, have been the
subject of criticism. Horne v. Hallway Co.,
L. R. 8 C. P. 131, 133, 141; Gee v. Railway
Co., 6 Hurl. & N. 211; Borries v. Hutchinson,
18 C. B. (X. 8.) 4-15~ Railway Co. v. Red·
mayne, L. R. 1 C. P. 329; Wilson v. Dock
Co., L. R. 1 Exch. 177 UH, 186; Wootlger v.
Railway Co., L. H. 2 C. P. 318; Sawmill Co.
v. Nettleshlp, L. R. 3 C. P. 400; Cory v.
Ironworks Co., L. H. 3 Q. B. 181. See, also,
\Vaters v. Towers, 8 Exch. 401, and Baron
Parke's observation thereon In Hadley v.
Baxendale, 9 Exch. 349.
We are therefore of opinion there was error
In Instructing the jury that the pl:.. ntltf could
rC'Co'fer tla mages for loss of profits on bill
subsequent contraets. As the ties were not
sent to Boston, the true measure of damage11
Is the dl!Terenee between the market price In
Boston and the market price In Canada at
the time when the defendant should have
transported the ties according to Its contract,
deducting therefrom t:ie price stipulated In
the contract tor transportation.
Verdict set aside.
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WARD'S

CE~THAL &

PACIFIC LAKE 00.
v. ELKINS.

DAMAGES IN ACTIONS AGAINST CARRIERS.

WARD'S CE.\"l'RAL & PACIFIC LAKE 0O.

v. ELKINS.

(34 Mich. 439.)

Supreme Court of Michigan.

1876.

Error to superior court of Detroit.

(34 Mich. 439.)
Supreme Court of Michigan. October Term,
1876.
Error to superior court of Detroit.
Moore, Caufield & Warner, for plalntltr in
error. Alfred Russell, for defendant ln error.

Moore, Canﬁeld & Warner, for plaintiff in

error. Alfred Russell, for defendant in error.

October Term,

CAMPBELL, J. Elkins recovered dam-

ages against the plaintif f in error for failure

to carry certain salt from Bay City to Chi-

cago in November, 1874. Elkins was a salt

dealer in Chicago, and sued upon an alleged

contract whereby the plaintiff in error was to

carry three cargoes of salt, of about seven-

teen thousand bushels in all, only one of

which was taken. The cargoes were to be

called for from the 15th to the 20th of No-
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vember. The regular business of plaintiff m

error was between Buffalo and Duluth, with

power, as was claimed, to do business else-

where on the lakes.

Elkins gave evidence tending to show that

he could not get vessels to carry the salt

after plaintiffs default. He had it taken by

rail to Chicago in lots as he wanted it, from

January to some time in April, 1875, and

was allowed to recover the difference be-

tween the price agreed on with plaintiff and

what he paid for the transportation by rail.

This is the chief error complained of.

We do not see upon what rule this recov-

ery can be justiﬂed. The damage to which

Elkins was entitled, if any, would be such

as would have placed him in the position he

, would have occupied had the salt been taken

to Chicago by vessel as agreed. It was not

an article of speciﬁc utility for preservation,

but an article of merchandise, and only valu-

able as such. The only advantage he could

have gained by a timely shipment according

to contract would have been the excess of

the value of salt in the Chicago market at '

the date when it should have arrived, be-

yond what it was worth in Bay City and the

expenses of loading, shipment and delivery at

his warehouse in Chicago. If there was no

such excess in value at that time, then he

was not damaged. If there was such an ex-

cess, then he was entitled to that and noth-

ing more.

He would not have been justiﬁed in procur-

ing shipment by rail, if the railroad process

would have rendered it unproﬁtable. There

are, no doubt, cases where property is of

such a nature, or where the necessity of hav-

ing it at a certain point is so imperative. that

the circumstances may justify employing any

transportation which is accessible, and may

render the difference in cost of transporta-

tion a proper measure of damages. But this

can never be proper in regard to ordinary

articles of consumption, always to be found

in the market, and only valuable to the own-

er for their merchantable qualities. A per-

son has no right to put others to an expense

of such a nature as he would not as a rea-

CAMPBELL, J. Elkins recovered damages against the plalntilf In error for failure
to carry certain salt from Bay City to Chleago In November, 1874. Elkins was a salt
dealer In Chleago, and sued upon an alleged
contract whereby the plaintllf in error .was to
carry three cargoes or salt, of about seventeen thousand bushels In all, only one of
which was taken. The cargoes were to be
called for from the 15th to the 20th of November. The regular business of plalntllf m
error was between Buffalo and Duluth, with
power, as was claimed, to do business elsewhere on the lakes.
Elkins gave evidence tending to show that
be could not get vessels to carry the salt
after plaintiff's default. He had It taken by
rail to Chicago In lots as he wanted It, from
January to some time ln Aprll, 1875, and
was allowed to recover the dlfl'erence between the price agreed on with plalntltr and
what he paid for the transportation by rail.
This Is the chief error complained of.
We do not see upon what rule this recovery can be justified. The damage to which
Elkins was entitled, If any, would be such
as would have placed him in the position he
would have occupied had the salt been taken
to Chlrago by vessel as agreed. It was not
an al!tlcle of specific utlllty for preservation,
hut an article of merchandise, and only valuable as such. The only advantage he could
have gained by a timely shipment according
to contract would have been the excess of
the value of salt in the Chicago market at
the date when It should have arrived, beyond what It was worth In Bay City and the
expenses of loading, shipment and delivery at
his warrhouse In Chirngo. It there was no
such excess In value at that time, then he
was not damaged. If there was such an exC!'Sll, then he was entltl(•d to that and nothing more.
He would not have been justified In procuring shipment by. rail, lf the railroad process
would have rendered it unprofitable. There
arf', no doubt, cases where property 111 of
such a nature, or where the necessity of hnv-

lug It at a certain point Is so lmperath·e, thut
the circumstances may justify employing nny
transportation which ls accessible, and may
render the difference In cost of transporta·
tlon a proper measure of damages. But this
can never be proper In regard to ordinary
articles of consumption, always to be found
In the market, and only valuable to the owner for their merchantable qualities. A person has no right to put others to an expense
of such a nature as be would not as a reasonable man Incur on bis own account. Le
Ianche v. Railway Co., 1 C. P. Div. 286.
When such a necessity exists, It is maintained only as a necessity, and allowed because of Its urgency. If such a rule Is ever
applirahle. It ca.nnot be satisfied by allowing
a party, instead of seeking other means ot
car1·iage Immediately at hand, to awalf his
leisure and speculate on future chances and
make shipments piecemeal, as was done here.
It Is altogether likely that after the close
of navigation, and as the winter goes on,
prices may rise so as to warrant/shipments
by rail, when this would not have been profitable earlier; and It may be possible, after
paying rnll1·oad rates, to make as much profit
as If the salt had been received by steam on
the lakes and put In -market In the fall at
fall rates. It would be absmd to say that
these deliberate winter shipments were nrcessltated or justified by a fallure to get shipping facilities during the season, or near the
close of navigation in November. It would
be equally unjust to allow the owner of th.~
salt to speculate on the chances of a ma1·ket
without risk to himself.
The rule of damages should have been as
previously lndlrated, and should In no case
exceed the damages actually Incurred. A
party who hos lost nothing by a breach of
contract, Is not entitled to damages of a substantial character.
A
We think there was also error In "l'ilowlng
the statements of a steamboat clerk, who
was not shown to occupy any position of gl'll·
eral agency, to be received In evidence to
bind the company; and that lmp1·oper qm•stlons were allowed, which called for the Inferences of a witness rather than the actual
terms of the contract In suit.
But we do not enlarge upon these, as they
arc not llkely to arise again. and the main
Issue is upon the question of damages, and
the real terms of the agreement, as nhsolut..
or conditional.
The judgment must be reversed, with costs,
and a new trial granted. The other justices
concurred.

O.AURIEH~
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DEVEREUX v. BUCI§l'.EY et al.

(34 Ohio St. 16.)

Supreme Court of Ohio. Dec. Term, 1877.

Action by J. P. Buckley & C0. against Dev-

ereux, receiver of the Atlantic & Great West-

ern Railroad. A judgment for plaintiff in

the common pleas was atllrmed in the district

court, and defendant moves for leave to ﬂle

a petition in error. Motion overruled.

Durbin Ward, for the motion. Wm. E.

Imes, opposed.

GILMORE, J. The action in the court of

common pleas was not brought upon any ex-

press or special contract, but to recover dam-

ages for a breach of an implied agreement to

carry, and deliver at the place of consign-

ment, a large lot of eggs, within a reasonable

time, by a common carrier.

By falling to answer, the defendant (plain-
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tiff in error) admitted the breach as alleged.

On an inquiry of damages, the court,

against the objection of the defendant, per-

mitted testimony to go to the jury tending

to prove the market value of eggs at the place

of consignment on the day they ought to have

been delivered. and their value at that place

on the day they were actually delivered, and

that their value was less on the latter than

on the former day.

Counsel for the plaintiff in error contends

that the court erred-in admitting this testi-

mony to go to the jury, on the ground that

the defendant "is only bound to make good

the loss which is the natural and legitimate

result of his failure to comply with his con-

tract"; and that a loss arising from a depre-

ciation in the market value of eggs at the

place of delivery, in consequence of his

breach of the contract, is not a natural or

legitimate result of such breach.

In support of this proposition, counsel relies

very much upon the leading English case of

Hadley v. Baxendale, 9 Exch. 341. The rule

laid down in that case for the ascertainmen

of damages in cases of breach of contract i

divided into two alternative heads. Undeii

the ﬁrst of these. damages are to be allowedi

which would arise naturally, or according to‘

the usual course of things from the breach

of the contract; and, under the second, those

which may fairly be supposed to have been

contemplated by the parties as the probable

result of such breach.

The case before that court fell under the

ﬁrst of these heads, as will appear from the

following language, taken from the opinion:

“Now, in the present case, if we are to apply

the principles above laid down, we ﬁnd that

the only circumstances here communicated 1

by the plaintiffs to the defendants, at the .

time the contract was made. were that the ar-

ticie to be carried was the broken shaft of a

mill, and that the plaintlffs were the miiiers

of that mill. But how do these circumstan-

ces show reasonably that the proﬁts of the

mill must be stopped by an unreasonable de-

lay in the delivery of the broken shaft by the

carrier to the third person?"

889

ces show reasonably that the profits of the
mill must be stopped by an unreasonable de(34 Ohio St. 16.)
lay In the dellvery ot the broken· shaft by the
Supreme Court of Ohio. Dec. Term, 1877.
carrier to the third person?"
And the court was of the opinion that, unAction by J. P. Buck.Icy & Co. against Devder
circumstances, the profl.ts of the
a-eu. receiver ot the Atlantic & Great West- mill, those
which were lost ln consequence of the
~m Ra.llroad. A judgment for plalntltf In
the common pleas was a1Drmed ID the district breach of the contract to deliver the broken
court. and defendant moves tor leave to file shaft, which was to be used as a pattern for
a new one, within a reasonable time, did not
a petition In error. :Motion overruled.
constitute such damages as would arise not·
Durbin Ward, for the motion. Wm. E. urally, or according to the usual course of
Imes, opposed.
things, from the breach of the contract.
But we do not think that the tacts and cirGILMORE, J. The action In the court of cumstances of the case before us bring It
rommon pleas was not brought upon any e."1(- under the first, but on the contrary, for reapress or special contmct, but to recover dam- sons that will be stated below, we think It
ages for a breach of an Implied ngret>ment to clearly falls under the second, of the niteruacarry, and delh·er at the ph\cll of consl1m- tlve beads In Hadley v. Baxendale, nu1l th!lt
ment, a large lot of eggs, within a reasonable the plalntUfs were entitled to recover such
time, by a common carrier.
damages as may reasonably be supposed to
By falling to answer, the defendant {plnln- have been In the contemplation of the parties
tltr in error) admitted the breach as alleged. at the time they made the contract, as the
On an Inquiry of damages, the court, probable result of the breach of It.
Jtgalnst the objection of the defendant, perThe proposition, as thus stated, ls fully
mitted testimony to go to the jury tending sustained by an abundance of authority.
to prove the market value of eggs at the place Ward v. Rallroad Co., 47 N. Y. 29; Scott v.
-of consignment on the day they ought to have Steniruhlp Co., 106 Mass. 468; Sedg. D:tm.
been delivered, and their value at that place !6th Ed.) 79; Id. note, 81; Field, Dam. § 3;;;;
on the day they were actually delivered, and Grlftin v. Colver, 16 N. Y. 480; Cutting v.
that their value was less on the latter than Hallway Co., 13 Allen, 381.
on the former day.
In view of the doctrine as settled by these
Counsel for the plalntllf In error contends authorities, lt may be safely said that lf a
that the court erred -In admitting this testi- common carrier ls chargeable with knowledge
mony to go to the jury, on the ground that that the artlele carried ls Intended for the
the defendant "Is ollly bound to make good market, and unn>aspnably delays.Its dellvery,
the loss which Is the natural and legitimate and there Is a depreciation In the market valresult of his failure to comply with his con- ue of the article at the place of consignment,
tract"; and that a loss arising from a depre- between the time It ought to have been dellvclatlon In the market value of eggs at the ered and the time It was In fact dellvered,
place ot delivery, In consequence of his such dl'preclatlon will, In the absence of any
breach of the coqtract, Is not a natural or epcclnl contract, constitute the measure of
damages.
legitimate result of such breach.
In support of this proposition, counsel relies
Was the carrier chargeable with such novery much upon the leading English case of tice In this case? We think he was. Thll
Hadley v. BllXendale, 9 Exch. 341. The rule anxiety of the plalntllTs to obtain quick time
laid down In that case for the ascertalnmen~ on their shipments of eggs, which was comof damages In cases of breach of contract 14 municated to the defendants' agent, shows
dlvldecl Into two alternative heads. Unde!\ that, for some reason, they regarded "time"
the first of these, damages are to be allowed\ as an Important element In the shipments.
which would arise naturally, or according to· The agent, for some reason, appreclatl'<I thP.
the usual course of things from the breach necl'sslty for quick time ln the contemplated
of the contract; and, undPr the second, those shipments; named a time within which lw
which may fairly be suwos1•d to have been could carry the eggs over his part· of thl•
contemplated by tlle partll's :HI the probable route, and requested to be kept advised by
telegraph, so that be might give the eggs his
result of such breach.
The case before that court fell under the special attention when tlwy l'PIH'hed the point
first of these head!<, as will nppenr from the at which ht~ was to receiw• thPm. "'by this
following langungt'. tnken from tlw opinion: preconct•rh·<l nrr:111gemt•nt? With the lmowl··xow, In the present case, If we are to npply edgl• of bus!lwss. whh·h their nvol'ntio11~ mn~t
the prin<>lples nboTe laid down, we find that have put them lo poss~ssion of. both partll'S
the only circumstances here <>ommunlcated knt>w that when large quantities of eggs
hy tl1e plalntllTs to the defendants, at the were bPlng shipped to a great city. thl'y
time the contract was ma1lr, were that the ar- were usually, If not always, lntendt•tl for the
ticle to be carried was the broken shaft of a market at such city. And the r1•ason why
mill, and that the plnlntllTs were the millers both pnrtl1•s recognliwrl th<' 111•c·r1<1<lty or quiclc
of that mill. But how do the~ clrcumstan- time In the trnnsportatlou of the article, was
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BUCKLEY et al
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that they undoubtedly knew that in this

country the market value of eggs was liable

to decline at the season of the year in which

the shipment was made in this case, and the

damages consequent upon such a decline

must have been in the contemplation of both

parties at the time the contract was made.
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Motion overruled.

D,\:\U.Gl~S

IN ACTIONS AGAINST CARRIERS.

that they undoubtedly knew that In this
country the. market value of eggs was liable
to decline at the season of the year In whlcb
the shipment was made In this case, and the

damages consequent upon such a decline
must have been In the contemplation of both
parties at the time the contract was made.
Motion overruled.

C.\UHIEH~

CARRIE RS OF GOODS.
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(6 Ohio, 3l:i9.)
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McGREGOR et al. v. KILGORE.

(6 Ohio, 37t9.)

Supreme Court of Ohio. Dec. Term, 1834.

This cause was adjourned in Hamilton

county. It came before the court upon a

special verdict. The action was case upon

a bill of iading, dated July 5, 1832, for cer-

tain parcels of merchandise consigned to the

plaintiffs, shipped on board the steamboat

Chesapeake, to be delivered at Cincinnati in

good order (the danger of the river alone

excepted); “but in case of the water not

admitting the boat to proceed to Louisville,

the owners of the goods to pay the expense

of reshipping to that place from the point

where they are reshipped, and the captain

agrees they shall be forwarded without any

delay." Breach, that through the careless-

ness and negligence of the defendant, the
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goods were lost.

Plea, not guilty; notice that the low water

would not permit the boat to go up to Louis-

ville, and, therefore, the goods were landed

at Trinity, near the mouth of the Ohio, and

were injured after they were so landed. The

jury returned a special verdict, ﬁnding:

(1) The execution of the bill of lading, the

shipment of a cask of cutlery to be delivered

in Cincinnati according to the bill of lading,

and the delivery of the cask in an injured

state at Cincinnati.

(2) That the amount of the injury upon the

sterling cost and insurance is $419.24: the

amount exclusive of insurance, $389.24; the

amount, adding sixty per cent. to the ster-

ling cost, $622.78; the amount, predicated on

the value at Cincinnati, and the proceeds of

sale, $789.58.

(3) That the said cask of cutlery was land-

ed at Trinity, at the mouth of the Ohio. and

left in charge of the defendant,—the boat

having returned to New Orleans,—was pla-

ced under a temporary hed erected for the

purpose, near the river, and several days

afterward, while the boat hands were at-

tempting to remove it to another place of de-

posit adjoining, the cask, being large and

heavy, slipped away from the workmen, and

rolled into the Ohio river, and damaged the

goods by the wetting.

And if upon these facts the court is of

opinion the law arising is with the plaintiffs,

they ﬁnd the defendant guilty, and assess

the plaintiffs‘ damages to the amount of

either of the sums returned, which in law

is the true rule of damages, with interest to

be counted and added as in law is right. But

if the court shall be of the opinion that, upon

the facts there is no legal right in the plain-

tiff to recover, then the jury ﬁnd the defend-

ant not guilty.

It was a conceded matter at the trial that

the goods were landed because the water in

the Ohio river was too low for the Chesa-

peake to ascend to Louisville.

After the goods were landed at Trinity, the

defendant wrote to the plaintiffs notifying

them of the fact, and asking advice as to

Su1,reme Court of Ohio.

Dec. Term, 1S:W.

This cause was adjourned in Hamilton
eounty. It came before the court upon a
special verdict. The action was case upon
.a bill of lading, dated Juiy 5, 1832, for certain parcels of merchandise consigned to the
plaintiffs, shipped on board the steamboat
Chesapeake, to be delivered at Cincinnati In
good order (the danger of the river alone
excepted); "but In case of the water not
admitting the boat to proceed to Loulsvllle,
the owners of the goods to pay the expense
of reshipping to that place from the point
where they are reshipped, and the captain
agrees they shall be !orwanled without any
delay." Breach, that through 1111' earelt>~S
uess and nPgllgence or the dPft>ndant, the
goods were lost.
Plea, not guilty; notice that the low water
would not permit the boat to i:o up to Louisville, and, therefore, the goutlo,i were landed
.at Trinity, near the mouth of the Ohio, and
were injured after they were so landed. The
jury returned a special verdict, finding:
(1) The execution of the bill of lading, the
~hlpment of a cask or cutlery to be delivered
ln Cincinnati according to the bill of lading,
and the delivery or the cask In an Injured
state at Cincinnati.
(2) That the amount of the injury upon the
sterling cost and insurance Is $419.24: the
amount exclusive or Insurance, $38!l.24; the
Jlmount, adding sixty per cent. to the sterling cost, $622.78; the amount, predicated on
the value at Cincinnati, and the proceeds or
sale, $789.58.
(3) That the said cask of cutlery was landed at Trinity, at the mouth of the Ohio, and
left In charge of the defendant,-the boat
having returned to New Orleans,-was pla~ed under a temporary shed erected for the
purpose, near the river, and several days
.afterward, while the boat hands were attempting to remove It to another place of deposit adjoining, the cask, being large and
heavy, slipped away from the workmen, and
rolled Into the Ohio river, and d11maged the
goods by the wetting.
And If upon these tacts the court Is of
<>pinion the law arising Is with the plaintiffs,
they find the defendant guilty, and assl'ss
ihe plalntltl's' damages to the amount or
either or tile sums returned, which In law
Is the true rule of damages, with Interest to
be counted and added as In law Is right. But
Ir the court shall be or the opinion that, upon
the facts there ls no legal right In the plalntltr to recover, then the jury find the defendant not guilty.
It was a conceded matter at the trial that
the goods were landed because the water In
the Ohio rh·er was too low for the Chesapeake to ascend to I~oulsvllle.
After the goods were landed at Trinity, the
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defendant wrote to the plalntltrs notifying
them of the fact, and asking advice as to
the shipment up. The following answer was
sent to the letter:
"Cincinnati, August 14, 1832.
"Capt. Kilgore-Dear Sir: Your favor of
the - - Instant, came duly to hand. You
wish to know if you shall forward our
freight to Loulsvllle at fifty cents per one
hundred pounds.
"We do not wish lt sent at euch a high
freight. There ls now a rise of water which
will enable any of the common boats to get
to Loulsvllle with considerable freight on
board. Our loading ls of such a heavy nature as will not allow the present high rates
of freight. You wlll pl!'ase to send It up as
soon as you think tlie frdglit Is at as low
a rate as It will be at before the fall risesay. twenty or twenty-five cents per one liuudred pounds to Louisville. We are not Yery
mueh In want of It. We hope there Is no
additional expense accrued at Trinity on the
goods.
"""e understand there was some of our
freight sent to Loulsvllle some tlmt~ ago; say,
when the Chesapeake arrived last. We lun-e
not yet received It, nor have we heard from
It. We hope, however, that the present rise
of water will enable you to forward all the
freight at fair prices. You will please engage It all the way to Cincinnati lf you can.
"Respectfully, your most obedient servants.
"J. McGregor & Co."
B. Storer, for plaintiffs.
defendant.

E. S. Haines, for

WRIGH'.r, J'. It was not contended on the
trial before the jury, nor ls It now Insisted,
but the water In the Ohio river was so low
when the Chesapeake arrived at Its mouth
as not to admit or her proceeding to Louisville. There was no dispute then, nor Is
there any now, that the letter In evidence
was written by the plalntltfs to the defendant, and received by him at Trinity after
the goods were landed there. I therefore
take these two facts as a part or this case,
though not Included In the finding of the
jury.
The blll of lading was a contract to carry
from New Orleans to Cincinnati, anrl dcl!Yer
to the plalntltl's there In good order, with privilege to the carrier In the case of low water to
rei<hlp for Louisville In some other craft. anti
charge the lncreased·expense or such reshipment to the consignee. The first point presented, It appears to us, ls, did the lnnrllng of
these goods at Trinity In order for their reshipment, put an end to the defendant's connection with them as carrier under the contract, and convert him Into a warehouse keeper and forwarder? There seems no necessity
for Inquiring Into the custom of the river
when goods are tram:1'11ipped, to land and
protect them by t emporary warehouses, If
none other can be had, until a suitable craft
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arrive to take the lading up the river. The

bill of luding gave the carrier the privilege of

forwarding the goods on other craft than that

in which they were shipped in one event, and

it seems to us the right to land may be con-

ceded as incident to the shipment without at

all affecting the questions before the court.

It was but a privilege to the carrier, in the

execution of his contract to convey and de-

liver, inserted for his own beneﬁt, to secure

him the advantage of as great a portion of the

freight as he could earn, and to throw upon

the owner any increase of expense. The re-

lation of carrier continues from the shipment

of the goods until their arrival at their des-

tined port and delivery, unless that relation

has been interrupted by some act of the owner

or consignee. In that possible view of the

case the letter alluded to was read in evi-
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dence. It is now claimed that that letter con-

stituted the defendant the agent of the plain-

tiffs, and put an end to his duties as carrier.

There is nothing in the case, and there was no

evidence on the trial, to show that this letter

was received by the defendant before the

accident to the goods. If, therefore, the re-

ceipt of the letter was admitted to affect what

the defendant urges, a state of things is not

shown in this case in which the letter can

bear upon the injury. The utmost that could

he claimed for this letter, if received before

the jury, would be to exonerate the carrier

from injury while the goods were detained,

under the letter, for lower rates of freight.

It cannot reach back to inﬂuence an injury

which the goods received immediately after

they were landed, and before the letter was

received, or perhaps written. The defendant

had these goods, as carrier, when they were

injured, and is subject to the law of carriers.

“A common carrier warrants the safe de-

livery of goods in all but the excepted cases

of the act of God and public enemies." Ei-

liott v. Rossell, 10 Johns. 7. A carrier, in

-taking freight, is bound to use sound and

proper hands and machinery for lading and

unlading. and the safe handling and removing

the goods; and if loss ensue from the failure

in any particular, the carrier must bear it.

Abb. Shipp. 259; 1 Wiis. 282: 1 Doug. 278.

The injury in this case resulted from the want

of machinery to remove heavy articles, or the

he hands employed.

It remains, then, only to inquire into the

proper rule of damages in the case. The goods

carelessness, inattention, or want of strengtl.i{:vith interest.

were delivered at Cincinnati in an injured con- i

, bash,

dition. The carrier earned full freight for their

transportation. It would seem to be the die-

tate of natural justice that the person liable

for their safe delivery should make good to

the owner the injury they sustained while

under his care and control. The owner was

entitled to the goods at Cincinnati in their

perfect state. But for the act of the de-

fendant he would have had them in that con-

dition. The carrier, in case he deliver the
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arrive to take the lading up the river. The
bill ot lulling gave the carrier the privilege ot
forwarding the goods on other craft than tbat
In which they were shipped In one event, and
It seems to us the right to land may be conce<led as Incident to the shipment without at
all all'ectlng the questions before the court.
It was but a privilege to the carrier, In the
execution ot his contract to convey and deliver, Inserted for his own benefit, to secure
him the advantage of as great a portion ot the
freight as he could earn, and to throw upon
the owner any Increase of expense. The relation of carrier continues from the shipment
of the goods until their arrival at their destined port and delivery, unless that relation
has been Interrupted by some act of the owner
or consignee. In that possible view of the
case the letter alluded to was read In evl·
dence. It Is now claimed that that Jetter constituted the defendant the agent of the plalntlll's, and put an end to his duties as carrier.
There Is nothing In the case, and there was no
evidence on the trial, to show that this letter
was recel¥ed by the defendant before the
accident to the goods. If, therefore, the receipt of the letter was admitted to all'ect what
the defendant urges, a state of things Is not
shown In this case In which the Jetter can
bear upon the Injury. The utmost that could
be claimed tor this Jetter, It received before
the jury, would be to exonerate the carrier
from Injury while the goods were detained,
under the letter, for lower rates of freight.
It caunot reach back to lnfiuence an Injury
which the goods received Immediately a!ter
they were landed, and before the letter was
received, or perhaps written. The defendant
bad these goods, as carrier, when they were
Injured, and Is subject to the law of carriers.
"A common carrier. warrants the safe de11¥ery ot goods In all but the excepted cases
of the act of God and public enamies." Elliott v. Rossell, 10 Johns. 7. A carrier, In
·taking freight, Is bound to use sound and
proper hands and machinery for lading and
unlatllng, and the safe handling and removing
the goods; and If loss ensue from the failure
In any particular, the carrier must bear It.
Ahb. Shipp. 200; 1 Wlls. 282; 1 Doug. 278.
'l'he Injury In this case resulted from the want
of machinery to remove heavy articles, or the
carelessness, Inattention, or want of strength
lp"the hands employl'tl.
/It remains, then, only to Inquire Into the
proper rule of damages In the case. The goods
were delivered at Clndnnutl In an Injured con-

dltlon. The carrier earned full freight for thelrtransportatlon. It would seem to be the dictate of natural justice that the person liable
for their safe delivery should make good to
the owner the Injury they sustained while
under his care and control. The owner was
entitled to the goods at Olnclnnati In theirperfect state. But for the act of the defendant he would have had them In that condition. The carrier, In case he deliver the
goods at the port of delivery, earns, and Is entitled to demand full freights, notwithstanding they have been partially Injured, and the
consignee must look to his bill of lading forIndemnity. In New York the rule Is established that the measure of damage Is the
value of the goods at the- port of delivery.
Amory v. McGregor, 15 Johns. 38; Bracket
v. McNalr, 14 Johns. 171. 'l'he supreme court
of Pennsylvania, upon full examination, held
It best to remove from the carrier all temptations to fraud, and that was best done by
making him liable for the value of goods lost
at the place of delivery, and establlshetl that
as the rule of damages In such cases. founded
upon authority, general convenlenc.-e, and good
polley. Gillingham v. Dl'mpst>y, 12 Serg. &
R. 186. These authorities are not shaken by
those· cited by the de!entlant. We think this
Is obviously the rule of law snd justice. The
jury have returne<l two valuations looking ti>
this point:
(1) The value, adding sixty per cent. to the
sterling cost, as the mmal mercantile estimate
In Cincinnati, to cover the charges, freight.
and Insurance from Liverpool.
•(2) The actual value of the goods In Cincinnati, deducting therefrom the proceeds of
the goods, sold In their Injured condition.
Which of these furnishes the rule of damages ls the question? The first ls the usual
mode of ascertaining the net cost of such
goods In Cincinnati. In the absence of other evidence, that w.ould be taken as the value
of the goods. But when the actual value Is
found, the supposed or presumed value
yields. That Is the case here, the jury have
assessed the damages, as predicated on the
actual, as well as the supposed value, the
actual value measures the real Injury, and I~
the role of damage.
Judgment for the plalntltr for that sum.
with Interest.
See, nlso, Hadley ,.. Bnxendnle, 1111h•.
Thomas, Bagley & W. Mfg. f'o. v. W11St. L. & P. Ry. Co., 1111h'. 149; and
Mather v. F..xpress Co., ante, 135.
!\"OTE.

lli:
l1111<h,

•
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BROVVN et ux. v. CHICAGO, M. & ST. P.

RY. CO.

(11 N. W. 356. 911, 54 Wis. 342.)

Jan. 10, 1882.

Appeal from circuit court. Juneau county.

(11 N. W. 3M. 911, 54 Wis. 342.)
~u1m·me

Court of Wisconsin.

Jan. 10, 1882.

Appeal from circuit court. Juneau county.
D.S. Wegg, for appellant. J. W. Lusk, for
respondents.

D. S. Wegg, for appellant. J. W. Lusk, for

respondents.

Supreme Court of Wisconsin.

TAYLOR, J. The cause of action in this

case will be best stated by giving a copy of

the complaint, which sets forth fully the

facts upon which a recovery is sought. After

tating the incorporation of the defendant,

and alleging that it was a common carrier of

passengers in this state, it proceeds as fol-

lows: “That said plaintiffs, on or about the

second day of October, 1879, desired to go to

Mauston, aforesaid, from the said village of

Kiibourn City, and for that purpose bought
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and paid about $2.30 for tickets at Kiibourn

City, from the agent of said defendant. to

convey said plaintiffs to Mauston and return

to Kiibourn City, whereby it became the duty

of said defendants. as carriers of passengers,

to carry the said plaintiffs from Kiibourn

City to Mauston in their passenger train

which left Kiibourn City to go to .\Iauston

at about 6:20 p. m. of said day, and to treat

said plaintiffs in a respectful manner, and

carry them to the proper and usual landing

place at Mauston, to wit, the depot of said

defendant at said place. That the said de-

fendant wholly disregarded its said duty in

the premises, and its contract and obliga-

tions to and with said plaintiffs, and, when

about three miles east of the depot of the de-

fendant at the said village of Mauston, in-

formed said plaintiffs. by its proper agents

and servants, that they had arrived at Maus-

ton, aforesaid, and stopped the train for

them to get off. That said plaintiffs, sup-

posing and believing they had arrived at

Maustaon, as they were informed they had by

the defendant‘s servants, as aforesaid, alight-

ed from the defendant's train, and the said

train passed on. That after said train had

left them they perceived that they were not

at the Mansion depot, and did not know

where they were. That it was quite dark.

That they supposed and believed that they

were near the Mauston depot, and proceeded

up the track in the direction of Mauston. as

they supposed, expecting in a few moments

to arrive at the .\Iauston depot. That, in-

stead of being near the \Iauston depot, they

found afterwards they were not, but, on the

contrary, had been carelessly and negligently

put off the defendant's train by its servants

about three miles east of said depot, appar-

ently in the country; and the plaintiffs knew

not otherwise, but supposed and believed that

they had got to walk west on the track of the

defendant until they came to some station.

After walking on the track of the defendant

about three miles they came to the said vil-

lage of Mauston; the said plaintiff .\Iary A.

Brown being, by reason of said long walk,

very tired and exhausted, sick and prostrated,

TAYLOR, J. The cause of action In this
case will be best stated by gh"lng a copy of
the complnlnt, which sets forth fully the
tacts upou which a recovery 1a sought. After
stating the Incorporation of the detenduut,
and allt>glng that It was a common carrier of
passengers In this state, It proceeds BB follows: "That said plaintiffs, on or about the
second day of October, 1879, desired to go to
Mauston, aroresald, from the said vlllage of
Kilbourn City, and for that purpose bought
and paid about f2.8Q for tickets at Kilbourn
City, from the agent of said defendant, to
convey said plaintiffs to Mauston and return
to Kilbourn City, whereby It became the duty
of said defendants, as carriers of passengel"8,
to carry the said plalntltrs from Kilbourn
City to Mauston in their pn.ssenger train
which left Kilbourn City to go to Mauston
at about 6:20 p. m. of said day, and to treat
ll&ld plaintiffs 1n a respectful manner, and
carry them to the proper and usual landing
place at Mauston, to wit, the depot of said
defendant at said place. That the said defendant wholly d1aregarded Its said duty in
the premlaea, and Its contract and obligations to and with said plalnturs, and, when
about three miles east of the depot of the defendant at the said village of Mauston, Informed said plalntllfs. by Its proper agents
and servants, that they had arrived at Mauston, aforesaid, and stopped the train for
them to get otr. That said plalnturs, supposing and believing they had arrived at
:\lauston, as they were informed they had by
the defendant's servants, as aforesaid, allg..ted from the defendant's train, and the said
train passed on. That after said train had
left them they perceived that they were not
at the Mauston depot, and did not know
where they were. That It Wll8 quite dark.
That they supposed and believed that they
were near the Mauston depot, and proceeded
up the track in the direction of Mauston, as
they supposed, expecting In a few moments
to arrive at the Mauston depot. That, Instead of being near the Mauston depot, they
found afterwards they were not, but, on the
contrary, had been carelessly and negligently
put otr the defendant's train by Its servants
about three miles east of said depot, apparently in the country; and the plalntllTs knew
not otherwise, but supposed and believed that
they had got to walk west on the tra<"k of the
defendant until they came to some station.
After walking on the track of the defendant
about three miles they came to the said vlllage of Mauston; the said plalntilr )fary A.

Brown being, by reason of said long walk,
very tired and exhausted, sick and prostrated,
JJR8slug the balance of the night In 11 very
re;itlt•ss, uneasy, and feverish condltlou.
That previous to the said second day of Ol'tober, 18i9, and leaving Kilbourn City, as
afort.>said, the said plalntitr Mo.ry A. Brown
bad been a healthy, well, and robust person,
and at the time of taking said walk was
pregnant with child. That in consequence
ot being carelessly and negligently put off the
cars of the defendant, as aforeBllid, and her
said walk, she became sick, ailing, and very
much enfeebled, and continued getting worse.
although using the best or care and medical
attendance, until about December 20, 1879,
when she lost ber child. That tor a long
time the said plaintltr l\-Iary A. Brown was
seriously and dangerously Ill, so much so that
her Ute wu greatly endangered and despaired of, and she sutrered, had suffered,
continued to sutrer, great pain In body and
mind; and the said plulntltr Orange Brown,
her husband, sutrered personally great anxiety of mind, and w11s put to greut expense
and trouble In cnre, nnrl!lng, help, and medical atternlnnce 11ml metllclnes."
·
The defendant's answer was a general denial only. In the court below the plaintlll's
recovered, amonr other things, tor the alleged Injury to Mra. Brown.
Upon this appeal the learned counsel for
the railway company Insist that the damages
claimed for the sickness of the wife, and for
her medical attendance and care, are too remote to constitute a cause of action, and that
it was error on the part or the court below
not to take that part of the case from the
jury.

The first position taken by the learned
counsel for the appellant Is that the cause of
action set out 1n the plalntltrs' complaint is
tor a breach of contract, and not an action
in tort. Upon this point we cannot agree
with the appellant. We think the gravamen
of the action ls the negligence and carelessness of the appellant's agents and employ~s
In directing the plalntltrs to leave the train
before they had arrived at the end of thehjourney. They did not leave at a place short
of their destination knowing that fact, but
through the neglect of the appellant's employ~s they were Induced to leave the train
short of their journey's end, supposing that
they bad reached It. It Is true, the plaintiffs
In their complaint state that they paid their
fare and went on board the train as passengers, to be carried from one point to another
upon the appellant's road, and that by reason
of suc·h payment and entry upon that train It
became the duty of the appellant to carry
them from the point of starting to their destination. These facts are, perhaps. sufficient
to constitute a contract on the part of the
appellant to safely carry them to their destination. Still, It ls nec<>ssary In all actions
agnlnst a carrier of passengers to state facts
which show the right of the party to be car-
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ried before he can complain of any breach of

duty on the part of the carrier in not convey-

ing them safely, or in not carrying them to

their destination. The complaint in this case

is not so much that the plaintiffs were not

carried to their destination, but that on the

way the appellant's employes carelessly and

negligently induced them to quit the train

before they arrived at their destination, and

that in consequence of such wrong on the

part of the appellants they suffered damage.

It is the negligence in puttingthe plaintiffs

oii the train before the journey was com-

pleted which is complained of, and not a

breach of the contract for not carrying them

to the end of their journey.

We see no reason for distinguishing this

case from the class of cases which hold a

railway company liable in tort for an injury
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done to a passenger, while traveling on a

train. caused by collision, the breaking down

of a bridge, or from any defect in the road

or cars. All these matters are a breach of

the contract to carry the passenger safely,

yet the carrier is held liable, in an action of

tort, for any injury sustained, based upon the

allegation that it was incurred through the

carelessness and negligence of the company.

All the cases hold that the person injured

through the negligence or carelessness of the

carrier may proceed either upon contract, al-

leging the careless or negligent acts of the

defendant as a breach of the contract, or he

may proceed in tort, making the carelessness

and negligence of the company the ground of

his right of recovery; and if he proceed for

the tort it becomes necessary on the part

of the plaintiff to show that he stands in the

relation of a passenger of the carrier, in or-

der to show his right to recover damages for

the negligence of the carrier in not dischar-

ging his duty in carrying him safely. Where

the relation of passenger and carrier exists,

the law ﬁxes the duty of the carrier towards

the passenger, and any violation of that duty

is a wrong; and if injury occurs to the pas-

senger from such wrong, the carrier is respon-

sible and must make good the damage result-

ing therefrom,. Wood v. Railway Co., 32 Wis.

398; Walsh v. Railway Co., 42 Wis. 23;

Craker v. Railway Co., 36 Wis. 657-675, and

cases cited. In this case we deem it material

to determine whether the action is an action

for a tort,-or an action for a breach of the

contract to carry the plaintiffs to their desti-

nation, because we think the rules of dam-

ages in the two actions are essentially differ-

ent. We hold that the action in this case is

based upon the tor_t of the defendant in neg-

ligently and carelessly directing the plain-

tiffs to leave the cars before they reached

their destination.

The plaintiffs claim. and the evidence

shows, that they and their child, about seven

years old, were directed to leave the cars, by

the brakeman. at a place some three miles

east of .\lauston, being told at the time that

it was Mauston, their place of destination.
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rled before he ran eomplaln of any breach of
tluty on the part of the carrier In not conveying them safely, or In not carrying them to
their destination. 'rhe complaint in this case
Is not so much that the plalntllfs were not
carried to their destlnatlon, but that on the
way the appellant's employ(lis carelessly and
negligently lnducl'<l them to qult the train
before they arrived at their destination, and
that In consequence of such wrong on the
part of the appellants they sulfered damage,
It Is the negligence In putting .the plaintiffs
oft'. the train before the journey was completed which Is complained of, and not a
breach of the contract for not carrying them
to the end of their journey.
"'e see no reason tor distinguishing this
case from the class of cases which hold a
railway company liable In tort tor an Injury
done to a passenger, while traveling on a
train. caused by collision, the breaking down
of a bridge, or from any defect In thP. road
or cars. All these matters are a bren<'h of
the contract to carry tbe p111<;:enger snfely,
yet the carrier Is held !ht hie, In :m action of
tort. tor any Injury sustained, bns}'(l upon the
allegation that It was lncurreil through the
<!llrelt•ssm•ss and negligence of the company.
All the cnses hold that the person Injured
through the negligence or carelessness of the
rarrlcr may proceed either upon contract, alleging the careless or negligent acts of the
liefendant as a breach of the contract, or he
ma~· proceed In tort, making tbe carelessness
11nd nt>gllgence of the company the ground of
his right of recove1·y; and It he proceed for
the tort It becomes necessnry on the pnrt
of the plalntllf to show thnt he stands In the
rt>lntlon of a passenger of the carrli>r, In orrlC'r to show his right to re<'Over tlnmnges tor
the negligence of the carriC'r In not discharging his rlnty in cqrrylng him s:tf{'))·. Where
the relation of pasl'enger nnil c·nrrll'r exists,
the law .llxe'J the duty of the carrier towards
the passenger, and any violation of that duty
Is a wrong; and If Injury occurs to the passenger from such wrong, the carrier Is responsible and must make good the damnge resulting therefrom. Wood v. Railway Co., 32 Wis.
398; Walsh v. Railway Co., 42 Wis. 23;
Craker v. Railway Co., 36 Wis. 657~75, and
<'ases cited. In this case we ilPem it material
to determine whetll('r the action is an action
for a tort, ·or an action tor a breach of the
eontra<"t to carry the plalntllJs to their destination, bPcause we think the rules of damages In the two actions are essentially dllJerl'n t. We hold that the action In this case Is
hn!lt>d upon the tor,t of the 1letendant In neg·
llJ't>ntly aml carl'h•11;:ly direl'tlng the plalntlt'fs to lea,·e the <"ars bPfore they renched
thl'lr destlna t!on.
'l'he plnintltrs clnlm. nnd the evidence
11hows, that they ancl tlll'lr child, about seven
yl'nrs oht were dlrl•C'tt>1l to leave the cars, by
the brnke1m111, itt a pl:Jl"P some three miles
l'nst of lluuston, bl'lng told nt the time that
It was Mauston, their pince of destination.

When they left the cars It wa.s night; It w1ts
cloudy, and had ralne1l the day before; that
there was a freight train standing on a side
track where they were put olJ the train; no
platform, and no lights visible except those
on the freight train; that plalntllfs soon ascertained that they were not at Mauston, and
did not know where they were. They dld
not see the station-house, although there was
one, but it was hid from their view by the
freight train standing on the side track. They
supposed they were at a pince two miles east.
where the train sometimes stopped, but where
there was no station-house. They started
west on the track towards Mauston, expecting to find a house where they might stop,
but did not find one until they came to the
bridge. about a mile east of Mauston, and
then they thought it easier to go on to Mauston than Meek shelter at the house, which wns
a considerable distance from the track. They
wPnt on to ~laulrton and arrived there late at
nlJ:"ht. Mrs. Brown quite exhausted from the
walk. She was pregnant at the time. She
hail severe pains during the night, and the
pains continued from time to time, and after
a few d11ys she commenced flowing. The
pains and fiowlng continued until some time
In December, when a miscarriage took pince,
after which lntlammat!on set In, anrl for some
time she was so sick that she was In lmml·
nent danger of dying. The plalntll!'s claim
that the miscarriage and subsequent sickness
were all caused by the walk l\frs. Brown Wll.8
compelled to take to get from the place where
they were left by the train to Mnuston.
The Important question In the case Ill
whether the appellant Is liable for the Injury
to Mrs. Brown, admitting that It was caused
by her walk to Mauston. Whether the sick·
nell11 of Mrs. Brown was caused by the walk
to Mauston was an IBBue in the case, and the
jury hal"e found upon the evidence that It
was caused by the walk. There Is certainly
some evidence to sustain this finding of the
jury, and their flndlng ls, therefore, conclusive upon this point. Admitting that the
walk caused the miscarriage and slcknes11 of
the plalntllJ Mrs. Brown, It Is Insisted by the
learned counsel for the appellant that the
appellant Is not liable for such Injury: that
it Is too remote to be the subject of an aetlon: that the negligence and carelessness of
the defendant's employ& In putting the plalntllJs olJ the cars at the place they did was
not the proximate cause of the miscarriage
and sickness, and for that reason the appellant company Is not liable therefor.
To sustain tills position of the learnl'<l conn·
sel tor the appellant reliance Is plal'etl upon
the case of' Walsh v. Railway Co., 42 Wis. 23,
and It Is lnsh~ted tbat there cnn be no rt'al
distinction made behnen that case anrl this.
Upon a careful exnmlnatlon of that case It
wlll be seen, we think, the court did distinguish between an action which was purely
an action for a brench of contract and one In
tort. In that case the learned circuit judge
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charged the jury as follows: "If you ﬁnd that

the failure to return to Madison on the day

in question, at the time agreed upon in the

contract, was caused directly by orders from

the headquarters and principal manager of

the railway company, made with the full

knowledge that the plaintiff and the other

ext-ursionists were ready and waiting to be

carried home according to the arrangement

made therefor, and made in wilful disregard

of the rights of the plaintiff and the other

excursionists, subordinaiing their rights to

the convenience of the company, when they

had the means at hand readily to have ful-

tilied their duty; in short, that the conduct

of the company was wilful and oppressive.—

then you may give full compensatory, ilmugh

not punitive, damages, embracing such loss

of time, such injury to health, such annoy-
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ance and vexation of mind, and such mental

distress and sense of wrong as you ﬁnd was

the immediate result of the misconduct, and

must necessarily and reasonably have been

expected to arise therefrom to the plaintiffs

as one of the excursionists." This instruc-

tion was excepted to, and this court held the

instruction erroneous, and reversed the judg-

ment for that cause.

The present chief justice, who wrote the

opinion in the case, takes special pains to

show that the action was based solely upon a

breach of contract, and was in no sense an

action of tort, and he expressly declares that

the rule of damages is not the same where the

action is for a breach of contract as for a

tort. Upon this point he uses the following

language: “It will be seen that the circuit

court was requested to charge that the plain-

tiff was only entitled to recover such damages

as naturally and fairly resulted from the

breach of contract, but could not recover dam-

ages for the disappointment of mind. sense

of wrong, or injury to his feelings by reason

of such breach. This rule the learned circuit

judge disaﬂirmed, holding that if the conduct

of the company was wilful and oppressive,

then such injury to health, annoyance, and

vexation of mind, mental distress, and sense

of wrong as were the immediate result of the

misconduct, and must reasonably have been

expected to arise therefrom to the plaintiff,

were proper matters to be considered in giv-

ing compensatory damages. This was con-

founding the lmportant distinction, so far as

the rule of damages is concerned,_ between an

action in tort and one upon contract. It was,

in fact, applying to this case the rule which

was laid down in Craker v. Railway Co., 36

Wis. 657, in an action for a tort committed

by an agent of the company. In the case of

wrongs the jury are permitted to consider in-

jury to feelings and many other matters

which have no place in questions of damages

for a breach of contract."

The chief justice then quotes at large from

the case of Hobbs v. Railway Co., 10 L. R.

Q. B. 111, with approval. In that case the

English court of appeals held that when the

chnrgP1l the jury as follows: "It you fi1ul flint
the failure to return to M1111lson on the dny
In question, at the Umt.• fl!,rr1•1•d upou In the
contract, was caused dlrP<'tly by orders from
the headquarters and principal manager or
the railway company, made with the full
knowlt>dge that the plalntltT and the other
t•xenr1<loul>1ts were rea1ly and waiting to be
•·nrrled home according to the arrangl'ment
matle therPtor, and made In wilful dlsr1'gnrd
or th<' rights of the vlalutltr and tht• othl'r
t'lH'Ur1<l11ulsts, suhorillmtt lug their rights to
the convt>nlem·t• of the comp1111y, when they
hnrl the mt>:ms at hand rradlly to ha'l"e fnltllled tlwir duty; In short, that the conduct
of the company was wilful and opprP"'dY<>.then ;\"Oil 11111;\" glYe full com1wnsntory, 1houi.:h
not pnnitiYc, d:1n111ges, emhruclng 11ucll loss
of time, :rncb lnjmy to health, such annoyanre and 'l"exatlon of mind, and sut•b mentnl
distress and seuse of wrong as you find was
the immediate result of the mfS{·ondu!"t, and
must necessa1·1Iy and rensonahly huvP been
expected to arise ther<'from to the plaintiffs
as one of the excursionists." This Instruction was excepted to, and thl!! !'ourt held the
Instruction erroneous, and revc1·sed the judgment for that cause.
· The present chief justice, who wrote the
opinion In the case, takes sprclal pains to
show that the action was hased solely upon a
llrPuch of contract, autl was In no lilense an
action of tort, and he cxpr1•ssl;\· dc>clares that
the rule of damages Is not tile same where the
action Is for a breach of contrart as tor n
tort. Upon this point he uses the followi11g
lllnguage: "It wlll be seen that the clr<·ult
i'OUrt was re<1twste<l to dmrge that the plalntitl' was onl;\· i>ntitlt>d to reeover :,inch damages
as 1111t11rally and fairly resulted from the
hreach of contract, but could not recover damages for thl• disappointment of mint!. sense
of wrong, or Injury to his feelings by rt>a!!nn
of such breach. This rule the learnetl eh·cnlt
judge dlsafftrmed, holding that It the conduct
of the company was wilful and oppressive,
then such Injury to health, annoyance, and
vexation of mind, mental distress, and sense
of wrong as were the Immediate result of the
misconduct, and must reasonably have been
expected to arise therefrom to the plaintltr,
were proper matters to be consl!lered In giving compensatory damages. This was confounding the Important distinction, so far as
the rule of damagps ls concerned,_ between an
action In tort and one upon contraet. It wn;i.
In fact. applying to this case the rnle which
was lnld down In Craker v. Hnllway Co., au
Wis. tiai, In an adlon for a tort committed
11y an ngt>nt of tht> compnny. In the case of
wrongs the jury nre permitted to !'Onsltler Injury to feelln~s a 111! mnny other mutters
wbleh have no plaet> In questions of damages
for a breach of contract."
The chief Justice then qnotPs at lltrge from
the case of llohhs v. Unilwny Co., 10 L. R.
Q . B. 111, with npprornl. In thnt !'nse the
English court of 11p1wnls lield that when tile

rnilwn~· compnny hnd negledetl or refusp(\
to <'nrry the plaintiffs to their destlnntion.
and they were compellt•d to get out at n station about five miles from It, late at night,
and being unable to get a con'l"eyance or accommodation at an Inn they walked home a
dli;tance of five milt's In the rain, and the wife
rnnght !'oltl u111l wns sick as 11 ronsequence of
the walk an<l exposure, they could not reco'l"rr
for the Injury to the wife.· It would seem.
frow the opinions given by the learned jutlg·
es In the Hobbs Cnse, that they treated the action as an action upon contract and not an aC'tion for a tort. All the judges speak of It 11s
nn action to recover for the l)reach of contract
to carry the plaintift's to thPlr tlP!itlnntion.
The rule as to what damages may be reCOVl'rt•tl In actions for breach of contract Is
laid down hy this court In the cnse of Candee v. Telegmph Co., 34 Wis. 4W, cited from
Hadley Y. BaXt>JHlnle, 9 Exch. :141, and appro'l"ed. It Is as follows: "Where two parties have matle n contract, whid1 one.of them
has broken, the damages whil"h the other
ought to receive In respect of such !)reach of
contrnct should he either snch as mny fairly
and substantially be considered as arising
naturally-that Is, according to the usual
course of things-from such breach of contract Itself, or such as muy reasonably he supposed to have been In the contemplation of
both pa1·tles, at the time they made the eontmct, as the probable result of the brench of
It.''
The latter part of this rule, ns above quoted, would seem to cover all cases of br~nch
of contract; for It must be presumed thnt
the parties would reasonably be supposed to
have contemplated that the party Injured by
the breach of the contract would sustain such
damages as would fairly and substantially, In
the usual course of things, result from such
breach. And Ro It Is often said thnt, In an
' action for a hn•nrh of contract, the dnmag-es
to be recovere,1 are such as may reasonaoly
be supposed to ha'l"e been In the contemplation of both parties when they made It.
Under this rule the damages which may be
recovered In an action for the brpach of a
contract are sometimes more remote and farrencblng than those recoverable for a tort.
In the case of Richardson v; Chynoweth, 26
Wis. Qij6, ls an lllustratlon or the rule. In
that caRe the court say: "In stwh cnsrs,
where the controllh~g party Is advised of the
special purpose of the thing to be c·om1ilek1l,
antl or the damage that would naturally UC"crue from failure to complete It nt the Slll'dfie<l time, antl In view of this expressly sti)lulates to finish It at a given time, tllcre is no
reason why he should not be responsible for
such dnmuge as Is the 1llrect naturnl re>-iult
of bis failure, even though beyond the mere
dlft'erence between the contract nod market
price." See Shepherd v. Ga~ligllt Co., 15
Wis. 318; Flick v. Wetherbee, 20 Wis. 3tl2.
In many caseR of brt"f1clt of contr:wt the
courts have by their dcdsions estul>llsh~d a
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rule of damages which is applicable to all

of a class. in an action for a breach of con-

tract to pay money at a ﬁxed time, the dam-

ages are the lawful interest on the money

withheld, from the time it was payable to the

date of the judgment, unless the contract ex-

pressly stipulates for other damages. So, in

act,ions for a breach of a covenant of war-

ranty of title, the damages are limited, ordi-

narily, to the purchase money paid and in-

terest. In these and other classes of cases

the damages are ﬁxed by arbitrary rules;

but still the general rule above stated, that

the damages are such as “would reasonably

be supposed to have been contemplated that

the party injured by the breach of the con-

tract would sustain," would apply to such

cases; for, in contracts of the classes above

mentioned, the parties would enter into them
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knowing the law ﬁxing the damages for the

breach, and so they would be supposed to

have contemplated the payment of such dam-

ages in a case of breach and no other.

In the case of Hobbs v. Railway Co., supra,

the learned justices state the rule in case of

breach of contract in more concise language.

They say: “Such damages are recoverable as a

man when making the contract would con-

template would iiow from a breach of it."

Under this rule it was held in the Hobbs

Case, and by this court in the Walsh Case,

that in an action for a breach of contract in

failing to carry a passenger to his destination

damages could not be recovered for injury

to the health, annoyance, and vexation of

mind and mental distress, on the ground that

such damages were not such as the parties

making the contract would contemplate as

likely to result from its breach.

We are not disposed now to question the

correctness of the decision made by this court

in the case of Walsh v. Railway Co., supra,

limited as that case was to an action solely

for a breach of contract. In such cases the

wilfuiness of the party in refusing to fulﬁl

the contract does not in any way change the

rule of damages. The rule as to the damages

in actions upon contract is the same whether

the breach be by mistake. pure accident, in-

ability to perform it, or whether it be wilful

and malicious. The motives of the party

breaking the contract are not to be inquired

into. 1 Sedg. Meas. Dam. 439 et seq., and

cases cited.

The rules which limit the damages in ac-

tions of tort, so far as any general rules can

be established, are in many respects different

from those in actions on contract. The gen-

eral rule is that the party who commits a

trespass or other wrongful act is liable for

all the direct injury resulting from such act,

although such resulting injury could not have

been contemplated as a probable result of the

act done. 1 Sedg. Meas. Dam. 130, note;

Eten v. Luyster, 00 N. Y. 252; Hill v. Win-

sor, 118 Mass. 251; Lane v. Atlantic Works,

111 Mass. 136; Keenan v. Cavanaugh, 44 Vt.

268; Little v. Railroad Co., 66 Me. 239; Col-
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rule of tl11.1uuges which Is applicable to all
of a class. In au ndlon for a breach of contract to pay money at a fixed time, the damages arc the lawful Interest on the money
withheld, from the time it was payable to the
date of the judgment, unless the contract expressly stipulates for other damages. So, In
actions for a breach of a covenant of warranty of title, the damages are limited, ordinarily, to the purchase money paid and Interest. In these and other classes of cases
the damages are fixed by arbitrary rules;
but stlll the general rule above stated, that
the damages are such as "would reasonably
be supposed to have been contemplated that
the party Injured by the breach of the contract would sustain," would apply to such
cases; for, In contracts of the classes above
mentioned, the parties would enter Into them
k.nowing the law fixing the damages for the
breach, and so they would be supposed to
have contemplated the payment of such damages In a case of breach and no other.
In the case of Hobbs v. Railway Co.. supra,
the learned justices state the rule In case of
breach of contract In more concise language.
They say: "Such damages are recoverable as a
man when making the contract would contemplate would flow from a breach of It."
Under this rule It was held In the Hobbs
Case, and by this court In the W11lsh Case,
that In an action for a breach of contract In
failing to carry a passenger to his destination
damages could not be recovered for Injury
to thf' health, annoyance, and vexation of
mind and mental distress, on the ground that
such damages were not such as the parties
making the contract would contemplate as
likely to result from Its breach.
We are not disposed now to question the
correctness of the decision made by this court
In the case of Walsh v. Railway Co., supra,
limited as that case waa to an action solely
for a breach of contract. In such cases the
wilfulness of the party In refusing to fulfil
the contract does not In any way change the
i.-ule of damages. The rule as to the damages
In actions upon contract is the same whether
the breach be by mistake, pure accident, Inability to perform It, or whether It be wilful
and malicious. The motives of the party
breaking the contract are not to be Inquired
Into. 1 Sedg. Meas. Dam. 439 et seq., lllld
cases cited.
'l'he rules which limit the damages In actions of tort, so far as any general rull's can
be established, are In many respects dltrerent
from those In actions on contract. The general rule is that the party who commits a
trespass or other wroni:ful act Is liable for
all the direct Injury resulting from such act,
although such resulting Injury could not have
been <"ontemplated as a probable result of the
act done. 1 Selig. Meas. Dam. 130, note;
Eten v. Luy~ter, 00 N. Y. 252; Hill v. Winsor, 118 Ma;;s. 2lH; Lane v. Atlantic Works,
111 Mass. 136; Keenan v. Carnnaugh, 44 Vt.
2U8; Little v. H;1ilroad Co., 66 Mc. 239; Col-

lard v. Railway Co., 7 Hurl. & N. 79; Hart
v. Railroad Corp., 13 Mete. (Mass.) 99, 104;
Wellington v. Oil &., 104 Mass. 64; Metallic
Compression Casting Co. v. Fitchburg R. Co.,
109 Mass. 277; Sall!>llury v. Hcrchenroder,
106 Mass. 458; PerJ~y v. Railroad Co., 9S
Mas.s. 41-1; Krllogg v. Railway Co., 26 Wis.
223; Patten v. Railway Co., 32 Wis. 524, and
36 Wis. 413; Williams v. Vanderbllt, 28 N.
Y. 217; Ward v. Vanderbilt, 34 How. Pra.c.
144; Bowas v. Tow Line, 2 Sawy. 21, Fed.
Cas.. No. 1,713. These cases, and.'tnany more
which might be cited, clearly establish the
doctrine that one who commits a trespass orother wrong Is liable for all the damage
which legitimately flows directly from sucll
trespass or wrong, whether such damages
might have been foreseen by the wrong-doeror not.
As stated by Justice Colt In the case or
Hill v. Winsor, 118 Mass. 251: "It cannot
be said, as a matter of law, that the jury
might not properly find It obviously probable
that Injury In some form would be caused to
those who were at work on the fender by
the act of the defendants In running against
It. This constitutes negligence. and It Is not
necessary that the Injury. In the precise form
in which It In fact resulted, should have been
foreseen. It Is enough that It now appears
to have been a natural and probable consequence."
In the case of Bowas v. Tow Line, supra.
Judge Hotl'man, speaking of the rule In relation to damages on a breach of contract. as
contrasted with the rule ln case of wrongs.
says: "The effect of this rule Is more often
to limit than to extend the llab1llty for a
breach of contract, although sometimes,
when the special circumstances under which
the contract was made have been communicated) damages consequential upan a breach
made under those circumstances will be
deemed to have been contemplated by the
parties, and may be recovered by the defendant. But this rule, as Mr. Sedgwick remarks, has no application to torts. He who
commits a trespass must be held to contemplate all the damage which may legitimately
fl.ow from his Illegal act, whether be may
have foreseen them or not: and so far as It
Is plainly traceable he must make compensation for It."
The justice and propriety of this rule are
manifest, when applied to cases of direct Injury to the ·person. If one man strike another, with a weapon or with his hand, he Is
clearly liable for all the direct Injury the
party struck sustains therefrom. The fact
that the result of the blow Is unexpected aml
unusual can make no difference. If the
wrong-doer should In fact Intend but slight
Injury, and deal a blow which In ninety-nine
cases in a hundred would result In a tt·lfilni:
Injury, and yet by accident produced a verr
grave one to the person recel\'ing it, owlnir
either to the state of health or other acd·
dental circumstances of the party, such fact
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would not relieve the wrong-doer from the

consequences of his act. The real question

in these cases is, did the wrongful act pro-

duce the injury complained of? and not

whether the party committing the act would

have anticipated the result. The fact that

the act of the party giving the blow is un-

lawful renders him liable for all its direct

evil consequences.

This was the substance of the d('t-islt)n in

the old and often-cited squib case of Scott v.

Shepherd, 2 W. Bl. 892. Justice Nares there

says that “the act of throwing the squib

being unlawful, the defendant was liable to

answer for the consequences, be the injury

mediate or immediate;" and in this view of

the case all the judges agreed, although they

differed upon the question as to the form of

th action. -
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n the case at bar the question to be

termined is whether the negligent act'of th

defendant's empioyes in putting the plaintiffs

and their child off the train in the night-time,

at the place where they did, was the direct

cause of the injury complained of by the

plaintiffs, or whether it was only a remote

cause for which no action lies. We must

in considering this case take it for granted

that the walk from the place where they left

the cars to Mauston was the immediate cause

of the injury complained of, and the negli-

gence of the defendant in putting them off

the cars was the mediate cause. We think

the question, whether there was any negli-

gence on the part of the plaintiffs in taking

the walk, was properly left to the jury, as a

question of fact, and they found that they

were guilty of no negligence on their part.

They found themselves placed by the wrong-

ful act of the defendant where it became

necessary for their protection to make the

journey.

The fact that there was a station-house near

by, at which they might have found shelter

until another train came by, is not conclusive

that the plaintiffs were negligent in the mat-

ter. They were landed at a place where they

could-not see it, and the jury have found

that under the circumstances they were not

guilty of negligence in not ﬁnding it. The

defendant must. therefore. be held to have

caused the plaintiffs to make the journey as

the most prudent thing for them to do under

the circumstances. And, we think, under the

rule of law, the defendant must be liable

for the direct consequence of the journey.

‘Had the defendant wrongfully placed the

plaintiffs off the train in the open country,

where there was no shelter, in a cold and

stormy night, and, on account of the state of

health of the parties, in their attempts to ﬁnd

shelter they had become exhausted and per-

lshed, it would seem quite clear that the de-

fendant ought to be liable. The wrongful

act of the defendant would be the natural

and direct cause of their deaths, and it would

seem to be a lame excuse for the defendant,

that if the plaintiffs had been of more robust

would not relieve the wrong-doer from the
consequences of his act. The real question
In theee cases ls, did the wrongful act produce the Injury com1Jlalned of? and not
whether the party committing the act would
have anticipated the result. The fact that
the act of the party giving the blow ls unlawful renders him liable f<1r all Its direct
evil consequences.
This was the substance of the d<•t"li;lon In
the old 1111d often-cited squib case of Heott v.
Shl:'phi>rd, 2 W. Bl. 892. Justice ~ares there
says that "the act of throwing the squib
being unlawful, the defendant was liable to
answer for the consequences, be the Injury
mediate or Immediate;" and In this view of
the case all the judges agreed, although they
1lltrt•red UPon the question aa to the form of
th action.
n the case at bar the question to be emlned Is whether the negllitent act · of th
l'Udant's employ(1s In putting the plalntllfs
a d their c-hlld oft' the train In the night-time,
nt the place whl're they dlti, Wilt! the direct
cause of the Injury complained of by the
plalntlll's, or whether It was only a remote
cause for whkh no action lies. We must
In considering this case take It for granted
that the walk from the place where they left
the ears to Mauston was the Immediate cam'le
of the Injury complained of, and the negligence of the defendant ln putting them ofl'
the cars was the mediate cause. We think
the question, whether there was any negligence on the part of the plalntlfl's In taking
the walk, was properly left to the jury, as a
question of fact, and they found that they
were guilty of no negligence on their part.
They found themselves placed by the wrongful act of the defendant wJm·e It became
necessary for their prote<'tlon to make the
journey.
The fact that there was a station-house near
hy, at which they might have found shelter
unt II another train came by, ls not conclusive
that the plalntlft's were negligent In the mattt>r. They Wt>re landed at a place where they
could . not see It, and the jury have found
that under the <'lrcumstanees they were not
guilty or negligence In not finding It. The
defendant must. therefore. be held to have
.-auseu the plnlutlft's to make the Journey as
lht> most prudent thing for tllem to do under
thP dr1•umsta11res. Aud, we think, under the
rult•s of law, the defendant must be liable
tor the direct consequence of the journey.
•Jlntl the defendant wroni;fnlly placed the
1•lalntltrs oft' the train In the open country,
wht.>re there was no shelter, In a cold and
Rtormy night, and, on account of the state of
lwallh or th£> pnrties, In their att£>mpts to find
sheltn they had he<'ome exhausted and perished, It would RPl'm quite clear that the defendant ought to be liable. The wrongful
net of th1• ll£>fenl11111t woulc1 be the natural
and direct cause of tht>lr dt>aths. anrl It would
seem to be a Ill.me ex<·n•e for the defernlant,
that 1f the plalntltfs bad been of more robust
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health they would not have 11erisbed or have
suft'ered any material Injury.
The defendant Is not excused because it did
not kllow the state of health of Mre. Brown,
and ls equally responsible tor the consequence of the walk as though Its employ~s
had full knowledge of that fact. This court
l'Xpressly so held In the case of Stewart v.
City of Ripon, 38 Wis. 584, and substantially
In the case of Oliver v. Town of La Valle, 36
Wis. u92.
Upon the tlmllngs of the jury In this case
It appl'ars that the defendant was guilty of
a w1·ong In putting the plalntltrs oft' the c· :rs
at thP l•lnel' they did; that In order to tJrotect themsdYes frQm the effects of stwll.
wrong they made the walk to Mauston; that
In making such walk they were guilty of no
negligence, but were compelled to make It on
account of the defendant's wrougful act; and
that on account of the peculiar state of health
or l\Jrs. Brown at the time she was Injured
by such walk. There was no Intervening Independent cause of the Injury other than the
net or the defendant. All the acts done by
the plalntltfs, and from which the injury
flowed, were rightful on their part, and compelled by the act of the defendant. We think,
therefore, It must be held that the Injury to
Mrs. Brown was the direct result of the defendant's negligence, and that such negligence was the proximate and not the remott>
cause of the Injury, within the declslons
above quoted. We can see no reason why
the defendant Is not equally liable for an Injury sustained by a person who ls placed ln
a dangerous Position, whether the Injury ls
the Immediate result of a wrongful act, or
results from the act of the party In endeavoring to escape from the Immediate danger. _ ..
- When by the negligence of another a per- ~
1soD
ls threatened with danger, and he at- :
\ tempts to escape such threatened danger by:
'an net not culpable In Itself under the cir-.
~ cnmstances, the person gullty or the neglli gence ls liable tor the Injury received In such
: attempt to escape, even though no lnjttry
; would have been sustained had there been
· no attempt to escape the threatened danger.
This was so held, nud we think properly, In
the case of a passenger riding UPoD a stnge-·
coach, who, supposing the coach would be
· overturned, Jumped therefrom and was lnjm·ed, although the coach did not overturn,
and would not have done so had the passenger remained ID his seat. The passenger acted upon appearances, and, not having actE•rl
I nt>gllgently, It was held he could recover; It
being shown that the coach was driven negligently at the time, which negligence produced the aIJpearnnce of danger. Jones v. ·
Boyce, 1 Starkie, 4!.13. The ground of tlw •
decisions Is very RIJtly and briefly stated hy.
Lord Ellenborougb in the case as follows~
"If I place a man In such a situation that h•~
must adopt a perilous alternative, I am re- :
sponslble for the consequences."
· So In the case at bar the defendant, by
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its negligence, placed the plaintiffs in a

'position where it was necessary for them to

act to avoid the consequences of the wrong-

ful act of the defendant, and, acting with

ordinary prudence and care to get them-

selves out of the difﬁculty in which they

had been placed, they sustained injury.

Such injury can be, and is, traced directly

to the defendant's negligence as its cause,

and it is its proximate cause, within the

rules of law upon that subject . The true

meaning of the maxim, causa proxima non

remota spectatur, is probably as well de-

ﬁned by the late Chief Justice Dixon in the

case of Kellogg v. Railway Co., supra, as

by any other judge or court. He states it

as follows: “An eiiicient adequate cause

being found, must be considered the true

cause, unless some other cause not incident
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to it, but independent of it, is shown to

have intervened between it and the result."

In the cae of Railway Co. v. Kellogg, 94

U. S. 469, the court say: “We do not say

that even the natural and probable conse-

quences of a wrongful act or omission are

.n all cases to be chargeable to the mis-

feasance or nonfeasance. They are not

when there is a suﬁicient and independent

'cause operating between the wrong and in-

jury. In such a case the resort of the suf-

ferer must be to the originator of the inter-

mediate cause. But when there is no in-

termediate eﬂlcient cause the original wrong

must be considered as reaching to the effect;

and proximate to it. The inquiry must,

therefore, always be whether there was any

intermediate cause disconnected from the

primary fault, and self-operating, which pro-

duced the injury. ' ‘ “ In the nature of

things there is in every transaction a suc-

cession of events, more or less dependent up-

on those preceding. and it is the province of

a jury to look at this succession of events

or facts and ascertain whether they are not-

urally and probably connected with each oth-

er by a continuous sequence, or are dis-

severed by new and independent agencies,

and this must be determined in view of the

circumstances existing at the time."

Within this deﬁnition the negligence of the

defendant was the proximate cause of the

injury to Mrs. Brown, as there was no other

cause not incident to such negligence which

intervened to cause the same.

There is, I think, but one case cited by

the learned counsel for the appellant which

appears to be in direct conﬂict with this

view of the case, except those which relate

to breaches of contract, and that is Car 0o. v.

Barker, 4 Colo. 344. This case is, we think,

unsusmined by authority, and is in direct con-

ﬂict with the decisions of this court in the

cases of Stewart v. City of Ripon and Oliver

v. Town of La Valle, supra. This decision is,

it seems to me, neither supported by the

principles of law nor humanity. It in ef-

fect says that if an individual unlawfully

compels a sick and enfeebled person to ex-
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its negligence, plact-d the plaintiffs In a pose himself to the cold and storm to escape
· position where it was necessary _for them to worse consequences from his wrongful act.
act to avoid the consequences of the wrong- he cannot recover damages from the wrongful act of the defendant, and, actlng with doer because It was his sick and enfeebled
ordinary prudence and care to get them- condit1011. which rendered his exposure Inselves out of the difilculty In which they jurious. Certainly such a doctrine does not
had been placed, they sustained Injury. commend Itself to those kinder feelings
Such Injury can be, and ls, traced directly which are common to humanity, and I know
to the defendant's negligence as its cause, of no other case which sustains Its concluand it Is its proximate cause, within the sions.
niles of law upon that subject. The true
In the case of Sharp v. Powell, L. n. 7 C.
weaning ot the maxim, causa proxlma non P. 253, the defendant was not held liable In
i·eruota spectatur, Is probably as well de- an actlou ot tort under the following clrcumfined by the late Chief Justice Dixon In the stanl'es: He unlawfully washed a van in the
case of Kellogg v. Railway Co., supra. as street, and the water ran down the gutter
}\y any other judge or c_
o urt. He states It towards a grating leading to the sewer. In
as follows: "An efficient adequate cause consequence of the extreme cold weather the
being found, must be considered the true grating was obstructed with Ice, so that the
cause, unless some other cause not Incident water could not escape, and so spread out
to it, but lnde1n•1Hlent of It, is shown to and frol!'e over the causeway, which was
have Intervened between It and the result." badly paved and rough, and there froze.
In the case of Railway Co. v. Kellogg, 94 The plaintiff's horse, while being led past
U. S. ·1li9, the court say: ""'e do not say the spot, slipped upon the lee and was lamed.
that even the natural and probable conse- The action ~as brought to reeover for the
quences of a wrongful act or omission are Injury to the horse, and because It wa11
.n all cases to be chargeable to the mis- shown that the defendant did not know that
feasance or nonfeasnuce. They are not the grate was· stopped so that the water
when there is a sufllelent and lndepenclent could not escape, he was held not liable.
eause operating between the wrong and In- This case comes within the rule above statjury. In such a case the resort of the suf- ed; there was an Intervening and lnde1>endferer must be to the originator of the lnter- ent agency "blch caused the forming of the
mellla te cause. But when there is no in- lee In the street, and the consequent Injury,
termediate efllclent cause the original wrong vl:>l. the frozen condition of the grate, of
must be considered as reaching to the effect; which be was Ignorant, and for which he
and proximate to It. The Inquiry must, was In no way responsible.
therefore, always be whether there was any
The cases of Railway Co. v. Birney, 71 Ill.
intermediate cause disconnected from the 391, and I?r:rn<'ls v. Transfer Co., 5 Mo. App.
primary fault, and self-operating, which pro- 7, were both cases similar to the one at bar,
duced the Injury. • • • In the nature of but both cases were decided in favor of the
things there Is In every transaction a suc- defendants, because It was held by the court
cession of events, more or less dependent up- that the plaintiffs, after being wrongfully
on those preceding. and It Is the province of left by the defendants short of their joura jury to look at this succession of events ney's end, were guilty of gross negligence
or facts and ascertain whether they are nat- Jn their manner of attempting to complete
urally and probably connected with each oth- the journey, and so were !lOt entltlecl to reer by a continuous sequence, or are dis- cover. I should say, from the reasoning of
severed by new and Independent agencies, the judges Jn both these cases, that the
and this must be determined In view of the judgment would have been for the plalntl1fs
had there been no fault on their part, and an
circumstances existing nt the time."
Within this definition the negligence of the Injury bad occurred to them In prosecuting
defendant was the proximate cause of the the journey not arising from their fault. or
injury to Mrs. Brown, as there was no other the fault of a third person.
In the case of Phillips v. Dickerson, 85 Ill.
cause not Incident to such negligence which
11, the defendant was doing no wrong . to
Intervened to cause the same.
There Is, I thlnK, but one case cltetl by the plaintiff, and, so far as the case shows,
the lt>arned counsel for the appellant which was unconscious of her existence at the
appears to be In direct conflict with this tlme. It was an exceptional case.
view of the case, except those which relate
It would extend this opinion to too great
to breactes of contract, and that ls Car Co. v. length to undertake n.ny review of the alBarker, 4 Colo. 344. This case Is, we think, most infinite number of case!! ln which the
unsustained by authority, and is in direct con- question of remote or proximate C'auses is distllct with the decisions of this court In the cussed. No general and ftxed rule can be
cas('S of Stewart v. City of Ripon nnd Oliver laid down to go,·ern all cases. It Is said by
v. Town of La Valle, supra. This decision ls, the snp1·eme court of the United States In
It Se(>ms to me, neither supported by the Railway Co. v. Kellogg, supra: "The true
principles of law nor humanity. It In ef- rule Is that what Is the proximate cause of
fect says that it an Individual unlawfully an Injury Is ordinarily a question for the
eompels a sick and enfeebled person to ex- jury. It Is not a qul'Stlon of science or legal
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knowledge. It is to be determined as a

fact, in view of the circumstances of fact at-

tending it." And similar language was used

by this court in the ease of Patten v. Rall-

way Co., 32 Wis. 5214135. In that case the

present chief justice says: "At all events,

we think the question was properly submit-

ted to the jury to determine, whether under

all the circumstances the failure of the com-

pany to have a light at the depot on the

arrival of the train was the direct and pr i-

mate ause of the accident.“'

e think that all the objections made b

e learned counsel for the appellant to the

right of the plaintiffs to recover for the in-

jury to the health of Mrs. Brown were over-

ruled by this court in the cases of Oliver v.

Town of La Valle and Stewart v. City of

Ripon. In the Oliver Case the injury com-
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plained of was like that in the case at bar.

The only difference in the two cases is that

in the Oliver Case the evidence connecting

the injury with the negligence of the defend-

ant was more satisfactory than in the case

at bar. But the question of the conclusive

ness of the evidence is one for the jury,

and they have settled that question in favor

of the plaintiffs. In the Oliver Case the

negligence of the town caused the defend-

ant's horses to fall through and get entan-

gled in a bridge in the highway, which ren-

dered it necessary that the plaintif f should

make exertions to free the horses from their

diﬂiculty, and such exertions caused the in-

jury complained of. It is the same in the

case at bar, only not as plain in its circum-

stances. The negligence of the defendant

put the plaintiffs in a situation which ren-

dered it necessary for theiu to make an ex-

ertion to get out of such difﬁculty, and in

doing so the plaintiff Mrs. Brown was in-

jured, the same as Mrs. Oliver in the other

case.

The case of Stewart v. City of Ripon set-

tles the other question, that the pecuiiar con-

dition of Mrs. Brown at the time is no de-

fense to her claim for damages.

The objection made that the verdict should

be set aside because the evidence shows a

want of care on the part of the plaintiffs,

and that the injury resulted from such want

of care after the walk to Mauston, was

clearly a question of fact for the jury. it

does not appear from the record that any

instruction upon this point was asked for

by either party on the trial. There is, there-

fore, no error upon this point on the instruc-

tion. The evidence is not so clear that the

damage was caused by the subsequent neg-

lect of the plaintiff to procure proper medical

attendance as would justify this court in set-

ting aside the verdict as against the evi-

dence.

The judgment of the circuit court is aﬂirm-

COLE, C. J., and LYON, J., dissent.

On Rehearing.

April 5, 1882.

TAYLOR, J. Although the learned counsel

knowl<>tlgl'. It Is to be clett•1·ml11ec.l as a
tnet, In vh·w or the dreumstunees of fact attending It." .And similar langunge was usec.l
by this court In the l'ase or rattl·n v. Railway Co., a:! Wis. ri:!-hj:J5. In that case the
present chief justice says: "At all events,
we think the qnl•11tlon wus pl"Operly submitted to the jury to detPrmlne. wllether under
all the clreuwstnnel•S the failure of the company to ha\·e a llgllt at the dPpot on the
urrlvaJ or the train was th1! direct and pr Ima te a use of t!w acddt>u t.''•
e think that all the objectlonK made b
e learned counRel for the appellant to the
right of the pl:ilntltfs to recover for the Injury to the health of Mrs. Brown were overruled by this court In the cases of Oliver v.
Town of La Valle and Stewart v. City of
lUpon. In the Oliver Case the Injury com·
plnlnec.l of was like that In the case at bar.
The only difference In the two cases Is thnt
In the Oliver Case the evidence conneding
the Injury with the negllgen<>e of the deft>nc.lant was more satisfactory than In the case
at bar. But the question of the conclui;i,·eness of the evidence ls one for the Jury,
and they have settll'tl that question In fnvor
of the plalntllls. In the OllYer Case the
negligence of the town caused the defendant's horses to fall through and get entangled In a bridge in the highway, which rendered It necessary that the plalntur should
make exertions to free the horses from their
dlftl.culty, and such exertions caused the Injury complained of. It Is the same In the
case at bar, only not aa plain In Its clrcumstan<'Cs. The negligence of the defendant
put the plaintiff& In a situation which rendered It necessary for them to make an exertion to get out of such dllflculty, and In
doing so the plalntlft' Mrs. Brown was Injured, the same as Mrs. Oliver In the other
case.
The case of Stewart v. City of Ripon settles the other question, that the peculiar condition of Mra. Brown at the time la DO defense to her claim for damages.
The objection made that the verdict should
he set aside because the evidence shows a
want of care on the part of the plalntttrs,
and that the Injury resulted from such want

of care aftn the wulk to Mauston, wa!o
clearly a qtwstion of fact for the jury. It
does not ap1K'nr from the teco1·d that any
Instruction upon this point wn1:1 asked for
by either party on the trial. There ls, then•fore, no error upon this point on the instruction. The evidence is not so dear thut the
damage was cmui<'d by the 1mbseque11t nPglect of the plulutllf to pro(~ure 11roper medical
attendance as would justify this court In setting aside the verdlet as against the evldenc<'.
Th<' Judgment of the ch"eult court Is attirmCOLE, 0. J., nnd LYON, J., dissent.
On Hehearlng.
April 5, 1882.
TAYLOR, J'. Although the learned counsel
for the appellant has made a Yery vigorous,
not to say denunclatory, attack upon the
opinion filed In this case, we do not deem it
proper to deviate from our ordinary rule of
denying the moUon for rehearing without
comment, when no questions are raised or
argued upon such motion which were not
fully argued at the original hearing. In
denying this motion we deem It pro11er to
say that the Intimation ot the learned counsel for the appellant that this case was not
thoroughly argued at the original bearing,
or carefully considered by the court before
the opinion was delivered, Is hardly just t>l·
ther to the counsel or the court. Certainly,
on the part of the court, we Intended to give
It that careful consideration which rts Importance demanded, and we are not con·
sclous that we have failed In our duty in
that respect, and after reading the very earefully prepared brief submitted by the learned
counael for the appellant, and bearing his
clear and forcible oral argument at the original bearing of this case, we think he does
Injustice to himself In suggesting that the
points decided were not thoroughly argued
at such bearing.
NOTE. See Vosburg v. Putney, ante, 165,
and Lewis T. Railway Co., ante, 182.
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MacKAY v. OHIO RIVER R. CO.

IN ACTIONS AGAINST CARRIERS.

lfocKA Y "· OHIO RIVER R. CO.
(11 S. E. 737. R4 W. Vn. 65.)
~11pr!'mP Court ot Appenl8 of ·west Virginie.

(11 S. E. 737. 34 W. Va. 65.)

JUDE'

:!4.

1~>0.

Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia.

June 24. 1390.

Error to circuit court, Ohio county.

V. B. Archer and Robert li'hit-e, for plain-

tiff in error. J. O. Pendleton, for defend-

ant in error.

B RA .\'N()N, J. This was an action oftres-

pass on theense. in the1drcait court of Ohio

county, brought by Winﬁeld S. MacKay

against the Ohio River Railroad Company,

resulting in a verdict and judgment for the

plaintiff for $539.17, to which judgment this

l

writ of error was granted on the petition ‘

of said company.

laration will raise the question whether

it states a cause of action ex contractu

or ex delicfo; whether it isin assumpsiton
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a contract for transportation, or for tort

for the ejection of the plaintiff from a. car.

It avers that the defendant company an-

dertook and promised,for certain hire and

reward paid to it, to safely and securely

convey the plaintiff in its cars from the

town of Ravenswood to Wheeling, and

back again to Ravenswood, and that the

plaintiff, conﬁding in such promise and un-

dertaking of defendant, did take a seat as

a passenger, in the defendant's car, and was

conveyed to Wheeling, and that after-

wards, still conﬁding in such promise and

undertaking of the defendant, he took a

seat as a passenger in one of its cars to be

conveyed back from Wheeling to Ravens-

wood; but the defendant, not regarding

its promise and undertaking, but contriv-

ing to injure the plaintiff. did not convey

him from Wheeling to Ravenswood, but

neglected and refused so to do. Thus far

the declaration seems to be based on the

contract of conveyance made by the de-

fendant, as a carrier, with the plaintiff.

But it then immediately avers that, in-

stead of so conveying the plaintiff, the de-

fendant, by its servants, violently and

with great force caused the plaintiff,

against his will and protest, to be ejected

from said car, and to be pushed and hurled

from it upon the ground, and to be pre-

vented from going to Ravenswood on that

day. by means whereof he was compelled

to walk along distance to a hotel, was

greatly humiliated in his feelings and hurt

- in his pride, by being exposed to other

passengers on the car, and was compelled

to remain in Wheeling, from his business

and homc. and to pay hotel bills, and

spend three or four dollars for telegrams

sent to his wife, to allay her uneasiness

on account of his failure to reach home

when expected, and to spend money to

purchase a ticket to reach home, and to

borrow money for that purpose, and that

his wife was ill, and her alarm from his

failure to reach home when expected in-

jured her, and protracted her iliness, caus-

ing him to pay large medical bills, and

Error to circuit court, Ohio county.
V. B. ArclleI" and llobeI"t ll'hite, for plaintiff In error. J. O. Pendleton, for defendant in e1-ror.
BHA '.'IXON. J. 'l'hiH Wlll'IHn action of treeJIVl<'l lln thPrm<1•. in tlwf'!rcnit court of Ohio
eounty, brouµ:ht by WlnflPld S. MAcKay
11gnim;t the Ohio Itiv-erRallroadCompany,
rl'sulting in n nmllct and judgmf'nt for the
plnlntiff for $:i;J!J.l7, to which judgment thie
writ of error wae granted on th<' petition
of 1mid ro1upany. An Inspection of tlHHleclarntion will rail;e the qu<'etion whether
It stat!'s a cam'!e of action ex contr:wt11
or ex cfolicto; whether it Is In 11s.<111m11sit on
a eon tract for transportation, or for tort
for the e]C'Ctlon of the plaintiff from I' car.
It av!'rs that the defendant com1mny undertook and promised,fur ce1·taln hire and
reward paid to It, to saf!'ly and i;ecurely
convey the plaintiff in its cars from the
town of !ta \'enswood to Wheeliug, and
baek again to Ra\·enswood, and that the
plaintiff, confiding in such pl'Omlse and undertaking of defen<Jant, did take a eea.t ae
a passenger, in tbedefendant'eear, and wae
~onveyed to Wheeling, and that afterwortll!, Rtill confiding in such promise and
undertaking of the defendant, be took a
l'Pll t us 11 pRsAenger In one of Its cars to be
conwyed baek from Wheeling to Ravenswood; but the defendant, not regarding
Its promise and undertal<lng. but <~ontriv
lng to injure tbe plaintiff. did not convey
him from Wheeling to Ilavemnvood, but
n<'iclec·ted and refm1ed so to do. Thus far
the dechLratlon seems to be based on the
<'ontract of conveyance made by tbc defl'urlan t, as a carrier, with the plaintiff.
But It then immediately Rvere that, lnAtend of so conveying thP plaintiff, the defendant, hy Its servants, violently and
with gl't'at force cauee<l the plaintiff,
ugnim;t hl11 will and protest, to be ejected
from i;uld <'ar, 1md to be pushed and hurled
from it upon the ground, and to ue preventC'd from going to Ravenswood 011 that
dny. h;v means whereof he waa compelled
to wnlk a long 11iKtunce to a hotel, was
g1'('11tly humiliated In his feelings and hurt
in his pritle, b;v being exposed to other
pnssengPrs on the car, anu was compelled
to rt>mnin In Wheelinir. from his buslnei;s
anti hom<'. urnl to 1m.v hotel hills, and
sp!'llll three or four dollars for telegra mR
Rl'llt to hit; wi'"e, to allny her une11!o!iness
on 11e1·otmt of bis failure to reach home
whPn 1~xpectcrl, and tu spend mone,v to
1111r1'1111se a tkket to rl'neh horn!', and to
borrow mont'y for thu t purpos!', Rnd that
hit< wife waR Ill, and lwr alarm from his
failure to rC'nch home when ex1wct('(] injured lwr, nm.I protr11ete<l her ill111•sF1, euui;lng him to puy lnrire medieai hilli;, nnd
th11t hiR h11F<i11ess wur1 damaged hy his dete11 ti on from hume, uud he su1>taiuell n umeronK 11tf1,.r tnjur:es. to hlR dnmuge ,10,000.
'rhe Ill Ost or t Ii iH lllll ttt"r rel II teR to the
tort of 1·jeet Ing tl.e plaintiff from the cnrs,
and lookK to that m1 the cnuRe or J(r11vamt!n ul the nctiun. The declnration thus

I

contains matter ha11ed on the contract.
and matter based on the tort; and lt is
somewhat lllfttcult to eay whether lt aim,.
to 11tate the breach of the contract to convey, or the tort In ejecting him from t,he
car, as the l(ra.vame11 of the action. But
ltcaunot be treated asdoubleln nature. It
must be classed either afl an Retion e.~ contl'l1ct11 or ex delicto. The writ summons
the d!'fendunt to nnswer an nctlon of tre11pnss on the cas<>, and the declaration Ilenominates the action ae trespaHR on the
case; and I &ouclude to regard the 11tateme11t of the contract of conveynuce as a
passengl'r as matter of Inducement explun· ntory or the n-ason of the plaintiff'11 presence on the car, and the ejection of the
plaintiff Jrom the car with force and nrmA
aH the gravamen of the action, and shall
treat the action as trespass on the case.
This classification of the nctlon is necessary in passing on the motion to exclude
the plaintiff's evidence; for, If we r1•gard
the declaration as ln ass11111psit, the evidence would go to sustain the action, and
the motion to exclude it would consequently be overruled, but, If we regard it
flS In ca11e, the evidence 111 not 1rntttcient to
sustain the action, and the motion to exclude lt should have been eustainecl.
The plaintiff's evidence shows that h('
purchased from the defendant's agent at
Ravenswood what was regarded a roundtrlp ticket from Ravenswood to Wheeling
and retnrn, and paid $7.35 for it, and under It went to Wheeling, and, when he
started to return to Ravenswood, found
that hie ticket was stamped on each end
from" Ravenswood to Wheeling" ln11tead
of being stamped, ae it should have been,
on one end for passagti from Ravenswood
to Wheeling. and on the other from Wheeling to Ravenswood; that he did not notice the mistake when hfl purch1111ed tbt•
ticket, and tlrst noticed it when he hoarded the train at Wheeling to return to ltavenRwood. 'fhe conductor on the trnln to
Wheeling tore off one end or coupon of the
ticket, and whim, on hts return, the plaintiff preE1ented his ticket to the conductor,
he 1·e(uE1ed to receive it because It called for
a passage from Ravenewootl to Wheeling,
not from 'Vheeling to Ravenswood, and
P.ald to plaintiff: "This ticket le no goo11.
You will have to pay your fare, or get
off, "-and the plaintiff repli('d, "I'll be
damne<t If I do." The conductor pulled
the bell-rope to stop the trRln; and, as
the train was stopping, plaintiff askerJ the
conductor what was the matter with the
tieket, and he sail.I It was not good. '!'he
plaintiff Informed him that he had conw
up on It the day before with C'onductor
Patri<'k: and the conductor, Rice, then
SRl1l, "He gnve you tht• wrong end," and
said, further, "You will have to puy your
fnre." Plaintiff then said to him that he
ha<l no money, amt that, If the conductor
had given him the wrong enll of the tickl't.
it wus a mistake, and it did not cost an;\·
more to tnkt- him hack thnn to bring bim
up, to which Conductor Hice replied, "It
don't mnkA a damn bit of dlfferen<'C'," and
thnt plaintiff must pay fa.re or get (\ff.
W hN1 the trnin stopped. t.he plaintiff said:
"Jr I ~l·t off here. 1;omchody will hu ve to
pay for it. I want to get home OD this

Sil
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train." Plaintiff says he then ,',ot off the ‘

train down upon the street in the city of 1

Wheeling. He further says: “Of course

the passengers could not hear what was

said between the conductor and myself.

and they did not know what I was put off

for." I

There is no act of trespass shown by |

this evidence. There is not the slightest '

evidence of iorce or violence used by any i

of the deiendant's employes upon the|

plaintiff. He was not, as alleged in the

declaration, violently and with great force I

ejected and pushed and buried irmn the

car, but walked from it hintself, without I

the slightest battery or assault upon his '

person. He does not himself say so, and

otherevidences make itquitc clear that no

force or violence was used. The evidence
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does show a breach of the company‘s con-

tract to convey the plaintiff as a passenger,

or an agreement to sell a different ticket,

but not a trespass for which an action

based on a tort can be maintained. It is

simply the case of a refusal and failure to

carry out its contract of conveyance, for

which an action of trespass on the casc,in

assumpsit based on that contract, might

be maintained. The mere manner of his

expulsion would not sustain the action as

one based on tort, The plaintiff's evi-

dence is that the conductor“talked short"

to him, and he to the conductor, and,

when he was presenting his views as to

the validity of the ticket, the conductor

said, “It don't make a damn bit of differ-

ence, "-that he had to get off or pay fare.

In the late case in the supreme court of

North Carolina, (Rose v. Railroad Co., 11

S. E. Rep. 526,) an action for putting plain-

tiff and her husband off a train. it ap-

peared that,their ticketnot being stamped

as required, the conductor told the hus-

band they must pay iarc or get off, and

afterwards. at the next station, said. in a

brusque, decided manner: “This is H., if

you are going to get off," and. they say-

ing they had no intention of getting off

unless ordered, he said, “Then 1 order you

off." and they got offfrand returned and

paid fare, and it was held that the com-

pany was not liable for damages, though

plaintiff was lying on pillows, and appar-

ently an invalid. But. had forcebeen used,

if no more than was necessary to re-

move the plaintiff from the car, or if it be

said that actual force is not necessary to

sustain the action,but thatthreatened ex-

pulsion and departure of the passenger

from the car by reason of it shall stand in

lien of it. 1 do not think the action can be

maintained.

In Frederick v. Railroad Co., 37 Mich.

342, it is said that the uniform and uni-

versal practice is for railroad companies

to issue tickets with the places designated

from and to which the passenger is to be

carried, and that these tickets are unhesi-

train... Plalntln HllYB ht' then : ,ot on thl' ' ls loet, or wherl.' hy mil1ta'ke the wrong
train down upon the Atrt•et In thf' city of ticket wus tlPllvet't'd to the pm1senger. and
Wheeling. He further soys: "Of <'OUrde he wlll he ohllged to pay hle fare a second
the pnFll!t'ngers could not hear what was time to p11~11e his Journey,aml , U he le unsaid hetween thf' conductor and myHelf, able to do so, great delay and injury nrny
and they did not know what I was put on result. Such delay and Injury would he
the natural result of the losR of the th-ket
for."
Tht>re is no art of trespass shown by or breach of the contract, but would, In
thiH evidenl'e. There 111 not the Mllghket part, at least, be in com1equence of the
e'l"ldPnce of force or violence u11ed by any pPCnnlnry clrcumstance11 of the party,
of the defrudant's employt-S upon the Tbat11uch l'ases are exceptional, and howplaintiff. He waR not, as alleged In the ever unfortnnate thP pnrty who ls so situ•lt'C.·lnrntioo, vlolt•ntly nnd with p:reut fore~ atp1], yet no rule baR ever been deviHed
eje<:ted und pushed and hurlt•d from the the t would not at tlmt'B lnjuriom1ly afft'Ct
enr, but walked from It himself, without • those it was de11lgned to accommodate.
the slightest battery or assault upon hie The Jntlge then asks: "How, then, is the
1>erson. He does not bimHelf May FJO, anti ' conductor to ascertain the ('Ontruc·t enother evidences mnke ltqnlte clenr that no tered Into between the pa1>e"'nger 1md the
force or violence was 111oied. The evidence rallrond company wht're a ticket le llllrdof'R 11how a hrearh of the company's con- rha~Pd and p1'1'11entecl to him? Practlcnltract to con\"eythe plalntlffnHH t>1tH11enger, J~·. there are but two waytJ,-one, the t-vlor an aicreemeot to sell a tllffl'rent tll'ket, rlrnce aftorded by the ticket: the oth··r,
but not a trespaes for whkh an adlon the etatemPnt of the pullReup:er, contrabased on a tort can be maintained. It Is dicted by the tlt•ket. Which should govslm1>ly the caMe of a refueal and failure to ern? • • • Thf'rP Is hnt one rule which
carry out Its coutract. of l'Onveyuncf', for can 11nfely be toleratrd with nny decent
whkh an action of treHpees on the caHr, In rrgard to the rl.i:hts of ruilroatl companies
ass11mpsit ba11ed on that contract, might and pa11111•ngers generally. As
ween
be maintained. The mere manner of his the rondnctor anti pt1Heengerund thPrl?!'1ll
expulsion would not sustain the adlon as of the latter to travel. the tlckt't pr01ltn·1·11'
one based on tort. The plalntlrf'M evi- must be l'Oncluslve evidence; and he mu11t
dence ls that the condul'tor"talked 11hort" produce It, when cullecl npon, as the e,·tto him, urid be to the condurtor, and, dence of his right to the st•at he claim11.
when he was present.Ing llls views n11 to Where a pR88Pnger has pnrchm~ed a t:ckPt,
the vulldlty of the tleket, the condnctor and the conductor does not carry him acRaid, "It don't ruake a damn bit of c;ttrer- cording to Its terms, or if the co111pt111J',
en~. "-that he hud to get off or pay fare.
throu~h the mistake of ltR agent, bee givIn the late case In the lluprrme court of en him the wrong tlt-ket, eo that he h1111
North Carolina, (ltoi~e v. Uallroad Co., 11 been compelled to rellt111ul11b his Ht'nt, or
S. E. Uep. 526, I au action for putting plaln- pay his fare a Hecontl time In order to rt•tlrf and her husband off a train, It ap- taln it, he wonld have a remedy Ojl"11i11Ht
peared that, their ticket not being stamped the rompany for a brench of tbP cuntrnct;
as l'f'QUlrecJ, the conductor told the hus- but he would have to adopt a declura Lo 1
band they must pny fnrr or Ji;et off, and dlftl'rlnu; eFJHentlally from the on~ reeol"tf'tl
afterwards. at the next station, said. lo a to In thlH ca11e." In thnt caRe the pasHenbrusqne, drelded manner: "This le H., if ger hntl paid t.o a point beyond tbnt cnllt•1l
you are going to get off," and, they say- for by the ticket, and, refnslng to pny fal'e,
lop; they bad no Intention of getting off was ejl'Cted, and was denied a recovery In
unless ordered, he said, "Then I order you an al'tlon on the caRe. The prinl'iple
off.,. anrl they got ott,..and n-turned and eoundnted in this c1111e In Mlehigan. thnt,
paid fare, and It was held that the com- as between the pRMRenicrraml the conllnctpany was not llahle for damages, though or, tl•e tll'ket Is the conclusl ve evldt'llCP of
plaintiff was lying on pillows, and appur- the pa1111enl(er'11 rhi:hts, Is sustnlned In flevently ao iovRlld. But, had force been used, ern.l well-l'onsltlered cnMeR. 'l'own11end v.
if no more than was necessary to r&- Railroad Co., 66 N. Y. 295; opinion hy
movc the plaintiff from the car, or if lt be Chief Justl<'e C'oOl.EY In Hufford v. Htillsald that actual force ls not necp1<11ary to road Co., M Mkh. 11'<. ll:! N. W. Rt>p. 5 :o;
euMtalo the action, but thatthreate1w<l ex- Railroad Co. v. Griffin, 6~ Ill. 4!JU; J\lcpuh1ion and depurture of the pni;srnger Clure v. Rnllroad Co., 34 Md . f1.'l2: Slw' t,rn
from the car by reason of lt Mh111l 11ta11d in v. Rallrm1d Cu., 2!1 Ohio St. 214: DownH v.
lieu of It. l do not think the uctlon can be R11llrot1d Co., 36 Conu. 2'7; Petrie v. H11llronrl Co., 42 N. ,J. Law, 419; Y.orton v.
maintained.
Io :Frederkk v. Railroad Co., 37 Mich. Rnilroad Co., 54 Wis. 2J4. 11 N. W. RPp.
342, it le said thut the uniform untl uni- 41\2; Bradshaw v. Railroad Co., 135 .Mai;s.
versal prnctlce Is for railroad co111w111iP11 40i.
to lseue tickets with the pluc('H !)(•Hig1111 ted
In the Ohio ce11e of Shelton v. Rnilt·on1l
from and to which the pnHHt>Dgl•r IH to be Co .. Rupra. It w1111 held thttt the fact th11t
n tlck<>t had bet•n rrnrcho11e1l, which was
carried~ and that tlll'Ht' tlckl'ts are unhesltnth1gly nccepted by thr conductor as evl- aftnw1trd11 wrongfully taken up h.v a
dencu of the contract hetween the com- cuntlnctor on onf' tl'tiln, wlll not re:len~ ''
pany nod pns11enger, 11nd that the conduct- paRRl'nlCer from the duty of huylnu; IJ tkk·
or has seldom any otlll'r menus uf nscer- . et or paying rare on onothcr train or thr
talnlng or Jeal'nlng. within time to be of defen1lnnt, and that in 1mch case thP rl~ht
any avail, the term11 ofthecontruct,unlesR of action would he for wrongfully tuk111g
he relief! on the E<ta tenwnt of thr p1111lien- up the ticket. and not for remm·ul lrom
ger, contradlctetl, perhup11, by the ticket, the train for fullure to poy fltre.
and that there will he cn11ee wlJl•re a ticket
In the llllnuloJ case above cited, (Hall-
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road Co. v. Griﬂin,l it was held that if a

passenger pay fare to a certain station,

and the agent inadvertently give him a

ticket to an intermediate station, the

demand of a second fare will be a breach

of theimplied contract on the part of the ,

company to carry him to the proper sta-

tion. By paying a second time, his action

will be as complete as if he resist the de-

mand, and suffershimself to be ejected; and

his ejection will add nothing

of action. It is his duty to pay the second

fare; and, if the company fail to make

reparation, he can maintain his appropri-

ate action. This case recognizes the con-

tract as the proper ground of action.

Hall v. Railroad Co., 9 Fed. Rep. 585.

in Yorton v. Railroad Co., supra, the

passenger. desiring to stop over, and ha v- ‘
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ing the right toa stop-overticket, was giv-

en instead a trip check, through the con-

ductor's fault; and it Was held that a

second conductor may demand additional

fare, and may, on refusal to pay,eject him

from the train, using no unnecessary force.

and that such ejection will be no ground

of recovery against the company, though

it w‘ be liable for the fault of the ﬁrst

conductor.

in Townsend v. Railroad Co., supra, it ,

was held that a regulation of a railroad

company requiring passengers to present

evidence to the conductor of a right to a

seat or pay fare, is reasonable, and for

non-compliance a passenger may be put

otf, and the wrongful taking of the pas-

senger's ticket by a conductor ofa pre-

vious train, on which the passenger had

performed part of his journey, does not

exonerate him from compliance with the

regulation, and that for the wrongful act

to his cause ‘

of the former conductor the company is

liable. It does not justify the passenger

in violating the company's lawinl regula-

tion on another train.

In Hibbard v. Railroad Co., 15 N. Y. 455,

it was held that a passenger who had a

ticket in his pocket, and had exhibited it

once to the conductor, and refused to ex-

hibit it again when called on, was proper-

ly ejected for refusing to exhibit his ticket.

Here the plaintiff had a ticket not

good for the ,trip he was making, and

declined to pay fare. He cannot main-

tain an action for ejection, or a threat-

ened election, from the train, but must

look to the breach of contract, or the act

of receiving money for the round trip and

giving a wrong ticket. If the passenger

have a ticket good for the passage, and

the conductor should refuse to recognize

it, and expel the passenger, the act would

be a tort; and an action as foratortcould

be maintained. Judge COOLEY said in

Hufford v. Railroad Co., supra, that all

the judges of the Michigan supreme court

agreed that if the ticket was apparently

DA~IAm~s

IN .\.CTIO.NS AGAINST C.\.RRil!.'RS.

road Co. v. Griffin,) It wnH hehl that if fl.
IHIH>1<'11ger pay Jure to a certain station,
urnl the agent lnndVl•rtently give him a
ticket tQ an Intermediate station, the
demand of a second fare will be a breucb
of tht." Implied contract on the part of the
compnny to carry him to thP proper station. lly paying a second time, bis action
will be as complete as if he rt."slst the demnnd, und suffers hlm11elf to be ejected; and
llls t•jection wlll add nothing to his cause
of uctlon. It ls his duty to pay the second
fure; and, If the company fall to make
reparation, he can maintain his appropriate action. This case recognizes the contract wi the proper ground of 11ctioo.
Hull v. Railroad Co., 9 Fed. Rep. 585.
In Yorton v. Railroad Co. , supru, the
passenger, deslrln,,; to stop over, and ha vln~ the right totl stop· over ticket, was given lnstt>1ul a trip check, through the conductor'!! fault; and It ~ held that a
sec.·ond conductor may demand additional
fare, nnd may, on refusal to pay, eject him
from the tI"aln, using no unnecessary force.
and that such ejection will be no ground
of recovery ngalnst the company, though
It wW be liable for the fault of the first
conductor.
lo Townsend "· Railroad Co., supra, It
was bPld that a regulation of a railroad
com puny requiring passP.ngerH to preRent
evidence to the conductor of R right to a.
sent or vay rare, ls reasonable, nnd for
non-compliance a passenger mny be put
off, end the wronarful taking of the passenger's ticket by a conductor of a previous train, on which the pas11e11~1· had
pPrformed part ol his Journey, does not
exonerate him from compliance with the
regulation, and that for the wrongful act

of the former comluctor the company Is
liable. It does not justify the pai.;Ewng<'r
In violating the company's lawlul l'l'~nht
tlon on another train.
In Hibbard v. Railroad Co., 15 N. Y. 4!",.'J,
It was helil that a patisenger who hatl &
ticket In his pocket, and had exhibited It
once to the conductor, and refused to exhibit It again when called on, was properly ejected for refusing to exhibit his ticket.
Here the plaintiff had a ticket not
gdod for the .trip he was making, and
declined to pay fare. He cannot maintain an action for ejection, or a threatened ejection, frum the train, but must
look to the breach of contract, or the act
of receiving money for tbe round trip and
giving a wrong ticket. If the passenger
have a ticket good for the pwisage, and
the conductor should refuse to recognize
It, and expel the passenger, the act would
be a tort; 11nd an action a.e fora tort could
be maintained. Judge CooLEY said In
Hufford v. Railroad Co., supra, that all
the judges of the Michigan supreme court
agreed that If the ticket was apparently
good the p8.8irenger need not leave the car.
But here the ticket waR very apparently
not good. Therefore tbc motion of thi.
defendant to reject plalntlH's evidence as
not sustaining hie action should have
been sustained, not overruled. Ae the evidence should have been excluded, It becomes unncceSRary to pa88 on the lnetructlone. 'l'he judgment ls reversed• the verdict of the jury set aside, and the case ls
remanded for -a new trlnl In accordance
with principles herein Indicated.
SNYDEH, P., and ENGLISH, J., concurred. LUCA8, J., dle11entlog.

C.\HHIElt8 01'' PAS::!E:\GERS.
C.\ltllIEllS OF PASSENGERS.
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>I:Tll v. CIIH'.\llO, B. & Q. RY.
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.r‘.l1l..\‘“'Uil'l‘H v. CHl('.\GO, B. & Q. RY.

(ti:~

N. ""· US4, 95 lo\\·n. 98.)

CO,

(63 N. W. 584, 95 Iowa. 98.)

Supt-cme (‘ourt of Iowa.' May 28. i895.

Appeal from district court, Adams county;

H. M. Towner. Judge.

(in the morning of September 27, 1893, the

plaimiff procured a ticket on defend:mt's line

of road from Prescott to Corning, a distance

of 715; miles. Because of the fair at Corning,

the company was selling round-trip tickets at

reduced rates, which tickets had to be ﬁlled

in with a pen. The plaintiff was late reach-

ing the depot at Prescott, so that there was

no time to ﬁll up a round-trip ticket, and he

told the agent to give him a “straight ticket."

The train was moving, and plaintiff took the

ticket handed him, and caught the train, and

got onto the rear platform. Because of his
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haste, he did not pay for the ticket, but said

to the agent that he would pay on his return,

to which the agent assented. By a rule of

the company, tickets must be used on the

day they are purchased, and. if not so used.

they may be returned, and the purchase

money will be refunded. The ticket given

plaintif f was dated September 24, 1893. in-

stead of the 27th, the day on which it was

handed to plaintiff. The delivery of the

ticket to plaintiff was a mistake. it having

before been sold, and not used, and then re-

1

' thereafter.

of the time on which said ticket will be

honored, and, as such, is a reasonable limita-

tion and rule. You are further instructed

that, presnunptively, the date of the ticket

was the day of its sale. But if, as a mat-

ter of fact, the day of the sale differs from the

date of the ticket, yet the said ticket by its

express terms was good from the date of

sale, and you ﬁnd from the evidence that said

ticket was purchased by plaintiff on the 26th

or 27th day of September, 1893, and was pre-

sented within one day from the actual date

of such sale, it was good for such passage

between the points named. to wit, Prescott

and Corning." The instruction is said to in-

~npr"m"

Court ot Iowa.' May 28.

um;;.

API>Pal from di>'trlct court, Adams county;
H. :\I. Towner..ludgl'.
On the murulug of St•ptember 27, l8!1:i, the

plaiutilf procured a tkkl'I nn dl'fend1wt'.- line
of rORd from Prell<'Ott to Corning, a dh~tnnce
of i~f, m!les. l\ecam1<> of the fnlr at Cuming,
tllt:> ('QIDpany was selling nmud-trlp tickets at
rP!lm~~l rates, which tlckPts hucl to be flllecl
lu with a pen. The plalutitr wa11 late reaching the depot at Prescott, so that there wss
no time to fill up a round-trip tkkt>t, and he
told the agent to gh·e hlm a "Htnih:ht ticket."
'l'he traiu was moving, and pluiutlfT took the
til'ket handed him, and caught the train, null
i:ot onto the rear platform. Bel·n~ of hl11
haste, he dlll not pay for the ti<'ket, but R!lld
to th<> ai:ent that he would pay on bis return,
to wbld..1 the 11gent a.~~>nted. By a rule llf
the company, tlekets must be used on the
<In.).· they are pur<'hased, and, If not 110 usect.
tlwy may be returned, and the 1mrchnse
money will be refunded. The ticket given
plulntltr was dated Septeml)('r 24. 18m. Instead of the 27th, th~· 1tuy on which it was
bnnded to plalntltr. The delivery or the
ticket to plalntllf was a mlstnke. It ltnvlng
before been sold, and not Utied, allll tht-n redeeme<l, us above stated. The redemption
wm1 b~· the night ngent at Prescott, who put
It In tlll' <!rawer In the ticket office, and the
dn~· 11g<'11t, without noticing the date, gave It
to plnh1tllf. \\'hen a short distance 1'n>m
Pre>«·ott. the ronductor asked for plalntilI's
tlekt•t, 111ul the ticket In question wns banded
him. whid1. h•'<·ause of Its date, he refusp1),
anJ flp11111111h•1I thr fart>. The n'gulnr fare to
Corning is ~.? l'l'nt11, and hy the rules of the
company, nuthorlze<I by the laws or the l'ltate,
10 <'<'Ills above the r<'1-'1llnr fare Is colil'<'IPll
by eomluetors when the ticket office hns b1>en
OJIPll for a rPaio;o1u1 hie time before tlle de1•u 11 ure or trains, and ticket11 nre not ge.
cured. After the refmml or the comluctor to
reet•lve the ticket, plaintiff olfere1l to 11ny the
rc>gular fn.re. but refused to pay tlw :uldltiounl 10 cenh•. The tmin was stopped , u111l
plnlutitf c>jl'l'tl'ci. uud this action is for llnmuges. There was a verdi<"t and judgment for
tb• plnlut ilT, and the dPfrnil:rnt app1•nle1l.
Attirn1e1l.

volve error because it treats the transaction

between the agent and plaintiff as a sale of

the ticket, when it appears that the tickct

:-:mith ;\fd'hc•1.,..n11, for :lflill'll:tnt.

Dnvh,i &

\\' .. lls. for :l(>(>l'llt>e.

was not paid for on delivery, but it was

paid for afterwards on the same day On

that branch of the case the court gave the

following instruction: “In the case at bar it

is admitted that plaintiff procured a ticket

from the defendant's agent at Prescott be-

fore entering defendant's cars. It is also ad-

mitted that payment was not made until

On this branch of the case you

‘ are instructed that a neglect of plaintiff to

deemed, as above stated. The redemption 1

after, constitute a valid consideration and

was by the night agent at Prescott, who put

it in the drawer in the ticket ofﬁce, and the

day :u.u-nt, without noticing the date, gave it ,

to plaintiff. When a short distance from

Prosculr. the conductor asked for plaintiffs

GflANGER, J. 1. Tht> l·c111rt i:n ,·p thr jury
the following Instruction: "The tkket iutro.i uced In l'\"illl'ncl', aud whid1 is nclmitt.,J a
tit" one lHll'l' hased hy plaintiff of ud1•t1cla11t',.;
:igeut, is datl'tl 8cpte111\Jpr :!4, l~U3, and 1·011taius the following clan><c: 'Continuous pfH!·
,:izc• witlii11 Olll' clny of 1late of >111le.' You
n re i11,;u·111·tl~l that ><:t ic! c·lan<c is a limitation
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uf the time on which said tkket will he
honored, and, as such, Is a rensonable lhnitntiun a111l rule. You are further lnstructe1\
thnt, pn.,mmptlvely, the dnll! of the tlclil't
was the dny of Its !!Ille. But If. as a mutter of fal't. the> llny or thP ><llll' 1lift'l'rs from tit ..
date of the ticket, yet the saill tickN lly its
expn'l's terms "\Vas goo1\ from the date of
sale, aml you find from the e\·hlc>11l·e t11nt snlcl
ticket was pun·hased hy plnlntifl' on the 2lith
or 27th day of He11i1•mher, 18H3, and was pre' sente1I within one clay from the actual dnte
or such sale, It was good for such passage
betwc>en the points named. to wit, Prescott
and Cllrniug." The instruction ls l!Uld to involve error because it treats the trnnsuctinn
bet wt-en the ai:N1t and plaintiff ns a sale of
the til:ket, when It np11ears thnt tile tkkl•t
'lll'a11 uot paid for on delivery, hut It was
paid !01· aflerwanh1 on the same day Ou
tbnt branch of the 1it>l(• the court gaYe tlw
following Instruction: "In the case llt bar it
Is admitted tbnt pluintilf proeured a tkkN
from the defeudnnt'!l ugent at l'rt>sL-ott h c•fore !'lltPring defpmlunt's c111'8. It 11'1 also 111lmitt1>d thut pu~· nwnt wns not wu<le until
thereafter. On th!s hrnnl'l1 of the <:al:!c you
are ln>itrn1•ted thnt a neglect of plaintiff to
pay for the 8llme at thnt time, urnler the clrcu111sta11<·el:! showu on the trlnl of this cn.~l'.
·would not alone, or for th11t rearon, mv1hidt.te th<' tit'ket; and an an·1>pt1mce on till'
part or tltc ngent of pfalntltr's promise to par
therefor on his return, and a 1111~·11wnt there
nfter, con!"titnte a valid con,..i1ll'rntlon anti
ra.J.' lllent therefor." It !"l'('lllS to \IS thnt thllt
Is the corr<'Ct rule. Hnd there been a re fu>'al
to llet'<'Pt the ticket bl~muse not paid t or , t111•
qut:>stlou might be dlff<'rent. It Is not whn l
cou!tl be cnlieil a credit sale, nor was It in·
tc>1uled as such, but only a delny In paynw11t.
bt•eause tl1Pre wns not tluw to llllY nnd gl't
the train, Ollll payment was expected the
l!llruc duy, and 110 made.
2. Tlwre is u further compla Int of im1tl'\11"
tlon No. 6 becnusP, notwith>1tunding the
cl111111e, "1•onti11uous 1ia><s11gp within one du~·
of datP of sale," it holf\s thl' til°l{t-t good if
preseute<I "within one day from the actunl
•late of such sale." This coutPntion menn><
tl1nt thf' \':tlidity of tilt: ti1·ket for the pa,.:1111gl' dt'pl'111h~11 upon Its date rather than til e
fuc-t ns to the sale. '\Ye c·ntmot con1·ur in
that view. It Is not to be believed that thl'
<'om pa ny evl'r lnt<'n•lNl to sell a ti('ket that
shonifl not he ho11orP<I for a pal'sage on thr
day of the netnal snle. It Is tme that tlu•
intent Is, In sud1 c·usPs. to ha 1·e the two
datef'.I conenr. hut uo <·0111panr or pern.i11
wo uld ever design that its mi>'t a ke lu snc· lt
a way sltonld bl• tu tllt' 11rpj11dic·p of a Jilli'·
clu\,'<1•r of a ti cket. It Is not to be 11"11l1t ( •ti
that hoth the eompnny nml the plnintifl' lrt .. 1ule<I that tltP tkk<'t ill question s!Jo1!l1l llf•
gooc.l for a pas,.,ai:e on tlie train on which it
was otT.. rrtl. The fac ts admit of nn 11 t l11·r
1·011d11~io11.
It is eqnall~· t rue that th" Jtlai!l ,.till'. was, ns between him~e1r aud the coiU--
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pany, entitled to passage on that train, and l on the ticket, and, refusing to pay his fare

that his ejectment from it was wrongful.

The more diﬂicult question is as to his rem- ,

‘ edy for the wrong done him; that is, when ,

the conductor refused to accept the ticket

because of its date, had the plaintiff the le- ‘

gal right to insist on a passage on that train,

and resist removal therefrom, or should he

have paid his fare, as demanded, and sought ;

redress from the company on that basis, or,

not wishing to do that, should he, on request

of the conductor, to avoid damage, have left

the train without resistance, and based his

damage on the mistake in selling him the

ticket? Authorities on this question are far

from being harmonious. Other courts have,

and this court should, in determining these

questions. keep in mind the ditliculties to

be met with and overcome in a successful
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management of the railway passenger trafﬁc

of the country, both as to the public and the

carriers. To such an end it is clearly im-

portant that there shall be rules for the

guidance of empioyes in the diflerent parts

of the service, and that such rules should be

conclusive as to their course of conduct, even

though at times the rule may operate to the

prejudice of an individual passenger. We

may instance a case or two as illustrative

of it, as when a person who has purchased

a ticket loses it. All will at once see that,

although he has paid for the passage, he is ‘

not entitled to it on the lost ticket. because

the only evidence to show the conductor that

he has purchased a ticket is his word, and .

the confusion and consequences to result ,

I ger to the claims of the conductor in either

i case, and his seeking a remedy otherwhw

from such a system of management are too

manifest to deserve comment. Take, also, a

case in which a ticket is paid for, but no ‘

ticket handed to the passenger, through the ,

neglect of the agent, and the passenger

boards the train with no evidence of a right

to a passage. The equitable status of the

passenger in this case is somewhat stronger

than in the other, but the importance of a

rule of conduct for the conductor is equally V

strong. In such a case there is no harsh-

ness in the rule requiring him to seek his

damage, if any, on the basis of a failure to

deliver the ticket, and which excludes him

from any rights on the train because of his .

payment for the ticket. It is safe to state,

as a rule of passenger traiiic, that no person

has a right to passage on a train without

paying fare, unless a ticket or other evidence

of a right to transportation is presented to

the conductor. This holding, at the outset.

puts us to that extent in line with the au-

thorities on the subject, a number of which

are cited by appellant in support of its con-

tention in this case. A case relied on by

appellant is Frederick v. Railroad Co.,.37

Mich. 342. We have examined the case with

care. in that case it was claimed by plain-

tiff that he called and paid for a ticket from

ishpeming to Marquette, and, by mistake,

DAMAGES IN ACTIONS AGAINST CARRIERS.

pany, entitled to passage on that train, and on the ticket, and, refusing to pay his fa~
that his ejectment from It was wrongful to Marquette, he was ejected from the train,
The more difficult question Is as to bis rem· because of· which he brought the action. In
edy for the wrong done him; that Is, when that case It will be seen that the passenger
the conductor refused to accept the ticket had no ticket from Morgan to Marquette, a
be<•ausp of Its date, had the plalntltT the le- fact known to him before reaching Morgan.
gal right to Insist on a passage on that train, The case in this respect IS quite In line with
and resist removal therefrom, or sboul'd be the rule we announce, and, In this respect,
hn ''" paid his fare, as demanded, and sought unlike the case at bar. The opinion In that
redress from the company 0•1 that basis, or, case deals somewhat elaborately with the
not wishing to do that, should he, on request Importance of rules to guide conductors, and
or the conductor, to avoid damage, have left or the conduslveness of the ticket as to his
tbe train without resistance, and based his duty. In the opinion In that case It is said:
damage on the mistake in selling him the "As between the conductor and passengPr.
ticket? Authorities on this question are far the ticket must be the conclusive evltle1u·1•
from being harmonious. Other courts have, of the extent of the passenger's right to
and this court should, In determining these travel. No other rule can protect the conquestions, keep In mind the difficulties to ductor in the performance of his duties, or
be met with and overcome In a successful enable him to determine what he may or
management of the rallway passenger traftlc may not lawfully do In mnnaglng the train
of the country, both as to the public and the ' or collecting fares." With the proposition
carriers. To such an end It Is clearly Im- we do not dltTer, for, as between the conducportant that there shall be rules for the tor and passenger, no other rule can well
guidance of employ~ In the dltTerent parts obtain, but that is not to say that a paSl!enof the service, and that such rules should be ger may not have rights on a trnln that a
conclusive as to their course of conduct, even conductor, obser,·lng his Instructions, may
tbnugh at times the rule may operate to the not violate eo that the company will be Ii·
prl-judlce of an Individual passenger. We .able. The reasoning in that case would
may instance a case or two as illustrative carry the elfect of the rule further than we
of It, as when a person who has purchased Indicate our approval. It treats of the dua ticket loses It. All wlll at once see that, ties of passengers, even when entitled to a
although he has paid for the passage, he ls passage on a ticket, and the right ls denied
not entitled to It on the lost ticket, because by a conductor, and when a wrong ticket is
the only evidence to show the conductor that Issued by mistake of the agent, so that he
he has purchased a ticket ls his word, and , has not the ticket he should have, and It
the confusion and consequences to result favors a yielding on the part of the pasiieufrom such a system of management are too ger to the claims of the conductor In eltllf'r
manifest to deserve comment. Take, also, a case, and his seeking a. remedy otherwil!c·
case In which a tlck~t Is paid for, but no than for an ejectment from the tmln. Thi•
tlc•ket handed to the passenger, through the force of that case as an authority In the renegleet of the agPnt, ancl the passenger spects stated Is much lessened, If not entirely
boards the tmln with no e\·ldence of a right lost. from the fact that, of the four judges,
to a passage. The ~1ultable status of the two ot them place their concurrence In an
passenger in this case Is somewhnt stronge1· ' atllrwance on a different ground, and It does
than In the other, but the Importance of a not appear that the reasoning referred to is
rule of conduct for the conductor ls equally approved by them. In a later Michigan
strong. In such a case there ls no harsh- case, that of HutTord v. Railway Co., 53
ness In the rule reqnh'lng him to seek bis !\lich. 118, 18 N. W. r.so, the language of the
damage. If any, on the basis of a failure to Frederick Case, that we approve, le in subdeliver the ticket, aml which excludes him stance stated and approved. In the lattPr
Crom any rights on the train becau11e or bis case the ticket purchased was a part or an
payment for the ticket. It Is AAfe to Mtnte, excursion ticket that had, In part at leust.
as a rule of passenjl'er truttlc, that no person been canceled, :ind Lhis was apparent on the
but' a right to passnge on ·a train without face of the ticket. The ugent, when shown
paying fare, unless a ticket or other evidence the ticket by the purchaser, said It was good,
of n right to transportation Is presented to but It really was not. In that Cfil'IC, to pretlw cn111J11ctor. This holding, at the outset. vent ejectment from the train, the passenputs 111< to thnt extent in line with the nu- ger paid the fare, and the action wa.~ for
thorltles on the subjeN, a number of which damages because the conductor laid his hand
are cited by ap1wll11 nt In snp1101·t of ltR con- on him to put him otT, antl took hold of the
tention In this case. A ('llHP relied on by bell rope to stop the train for that purpose.
a1ipellant is Frederick v. Uailroad Co.,. 37 It ls not necessary for us to say whether er
not we concur In the bollllng In that case,
Jllkh. 342. We have examhwd the case with
care. In that case It was daimell hy plain- for we understand that court to rest its holding on the ap1mrent Invalidity of the tickPt
tiff th11t hi' mlled and paltl for 11 ticket from
lsh11eming- to ~lal'qllt'tte, and, by mistake, on its fa ce. it hu viug ht•en rauceled. It is
said In thnt oplnlou: "Hut we aw nil of th<'
tlw c·o1ultll'tor gu ve him oue t<.1 Morgan, an
lnterme1li11te station. He rode io .Morgan opinion that, if the plnlntllI's ticket was
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apparently good, he had a right to refuse to

leave the car." That is what we regard as

the situation in this case. Plaintiffs ticket

was apparently good on its face. It should

have entitled him to one ﬁrst-class passage

from Prescott to Corning. The fact render-

ing it not good was a rule of the company

as to the time in whiqh it could be used.

These rules are changeable at the pleasure of

the company, and when a ticket is purchased

from one station to another, and on its face

it indicates a right to that passage, no rule

or regulation of the company should be per-

mitted to defeat that right. A passenger has

a right to assume that an agent placed at a

station will observe the rules with reference

to such matters as dates in or on a ticket.

What may ‘be the rule to-day may not be to-

morrow. Conceding plaintiff to have known
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of the rule previously, he was not called

upon to question the act of the agent as to

the rule on the day he bought the ticket. It

is neither reasonable nor practicable for pas=

sengers to take notice of such matters, or at-

tempt to correct agents in regard to them.

With a ticket that expressed his right to a

passage to Corning, he was not required to

look behind it for the authority of the agent

to issue it. We do not understand that the

supreme court of Michigan would apply the

rule as to yielding to the directions of a con-

ductor to a case like this, where the ticket

is apparently good, but, even if otherwise,

we cannot so hold. It would be doing too

much in favor of a party in the wrong

merely to subserve a public convenience, for

which much is claimed. A thought in argu-

ment is, and some language of the opinions

referred to seems to favor it. that it is the

duty of the passenger to not enhance dam-

ages by resistance, because it is of no use,

but that he should submit quietly to eject-

ment, and then seek his damages. To say

the least, we think he may make any resist-

ance, not amounting to a criminal disturb-

ance of the peace. as was done in this case,

and that he is not called upon to ubmit to

a wrongful ejection for the purpose of econ-

omizing the damages to be recovered. Town-

send v. Railway Co:, 56 N. Y. 295, ls another

case cited and relied upon by appellant. In

that case the passenger had surrendered his

ticket to a conductor on another train. He

changed trains, as was necessary, to reach

his destination, but he had no evidence what-

ever of a right to a passage on that train.

He claimed to the conductor that he had pur-

chased a through ticket, and that the other

-conductor had taken it, and not given it back.

For a refusal to pay, he was ejected, ans‘ a Y

of another train; that he should have left

the train without resistance, and if he in-

vited force, by resistance, the company was

not liable for it. The rule is not against our

conclusions. The conductor was right in re-

fusing the passage without a ticket. In such

a case the passenger must pay or leave the

train. If he does not he is in the wrong.
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llpparently good, be had a right to refuse to of another train; that be should have left
leave the car." That ls what we regard as the train without resistance, and If he Inthe situation ln this caee. Plaintiff's tleket vited force, by resistance, the company was
was apparently good on Its face. It should not liable for It. The rule Is not against our
have entitled him to one ftrst-elnss passage conclusions. '.rbe conduetor was right In refrom Prescott to Corning. '.rhe fact render- fusing the passage without a ticket. In su<'h
ing It not good was a rule of the company a case the passenger must puy or leave the
.as to the time in whl~1 it could be used. train. If he does not he Is In the wrong.
·Tlwse rules ure changeable nt the pleasure of But even In that case two of the judges
the coU111any, and when a ticket is purd1nsed based their concmrence on the first gl'Ound,
trom one station to another. and on its fnce and one on the last.
it indicntes a right to that passage, no rule
The case of Hutrord v. Railway Co., cited
or regulation of the company should be per- above, was appealed a second tlme and Is
mitted to defeat that right. A JlllSscnger has reported In 64 Mich. 631, 31 N. W. GH. It
a right to assume that an agent placed at a will be remembered that It Is the case where
station will observe the rules with refrrence the canceled ticket was sold and refused by
to sueh matters as dates in or on a tkket. the conductor. As bearing upon the effect
What may 'be the rule to-day may not be to- of such a ticket when presented this lanmorrow. Conceding plalntllT to have known guage Is used : "The ticket given by the
-Of the rule previously, he was not culled ugent to tbe plulntitr was the evidence agrred
upon to question the act of the agent us to upon by the parties, by whleh the defendant
the rule on the day be bought the tieket. It should thereafter recognize the rights of the
ls neither reasonable nor practicable ror pas: plaintitr In his contract; and neither the
sengers to take notice of such matters, or at· company, nor any of Its agents, could the1·e·
tempt to correct agents In regard to them. after be permitted to say that the tieket was
With a ticket that expressed his right to a
not such evidence, and conclusive upon the
passage to Corning, he was not required to subject. Passengers are not Interested In
look behind It for the authority of the agent the Internal atrairs of the companies whose
to lBBue It. We do not understand that the coaches they ride In, nor are they requh·etl
supreme court of Michigan would apply the 1 to know the rules and regulations made by
rule as to yielding to the directions of a con- the directors of a company tor the control
ductor to a case like this, where the tkket of the actions of Its agents and the manage·
ls apparently good, but, even lf otherwise,
ment of Its atralrs." The case holds thnt
we ea-..not so bold. It would be doing too even the canceled ticket, because llll'ued for
much ln favor of a party ln the wrong 11 p:ll!Sllge, WSS good and conc·ws1 \'I!. huu•
merely to subserve a public eonvenlence, for way Co. v. J>ougherty, 86 Ga. 744, 12 S. E.
which much ls claimed. A thought In argu· . 747, was an action by a colored woman for
ment ls, and some language of the opinions being ejeeted from a train, where there was
referred to seems to fa,·or it, that It is the a mistakr. her tleket being to Asheville,
duty of the passenger to not enhance dam- N. C., Instead of Atlama., Ga.. as she supages by resistance, be<>ause It ls of no use, po8e11. In th!' opinion it lfl sni1l: ""'p think
but that be should submit quietly to ejeet- she had a right to rely on the ticket she had
ment, and then seek bis damages. To say purchased from the agent ot the ralh'oad
the lenst, we think be may make any resist- company es being a proper one, without an
an<·e, not amounting to a erlmlnal clistul'b- examination of the same; end, nothing else
ance of the peace. us wns clone ln this case, appearing, there being no Intervening cirand that he Is not <·nlled upon to submit to cumstances which required her to look at the
a wrongful ejeetlon for the purpose of econ- ticket, If she could have read the same, such
omizing the damages to be recovered. Town- conduct upon the part of the railroad comsend v. Railway eo,. 56 N. Y. 295, \s anothet pany and its agents authorized her to recover
caae cited and relied upon by appellant. In d:unnges." 8ee Hailrond Co. v. Olds. 77 t;a.
that case the passenger bad surrendered bis 673; Railroad Co. v. Winter's Adm'r, Ha U.
ticket to a conductor on another train. He S. 60, 12 Sup. Ct. 356; Rallwoy Co. v. Fix,
changed trains, as was necessary, to reach 88 Ind. 381; Railway Co. v . Holdridge, 118
his destination, but he had no evidence what- Ind. 281, 20 N. E. 837; Railroad Co. v. Rice,
ever of a right to a passage on that train. 64 Md. 63, 21 Atl. 97; Murdock v. Railroad
He claimed to the conductor that be bad pur- Co., 137 Mass. 293; Burnham v. Railway Co.,
«based a through ticket, and that the other 63 Me. 298.
.conductor bud tal<en lt, and not given it back.
Some Importance ts attnt•hed to the fact
For a refusal to pay, he was ejected, am' a
that the plalntltr acquiesced In the demand
recovery had In the lower court. The cnse ot the conductor by o!Terlng to pay the n·1rn·
was reversed on two grounds, the latter lar fare, and only objected to the extra 10
ground being the part of the opinion relied cents, but we do not see how that mnkes a
on by npppllant. The l'Ule of the case Is that difference as to his right of recovery. It is
the remedy was an action for the wrongful not to be questioned but that he claimed hi&
act of the first conductor in tu king his tleket; right to a passage on the t!cket, and made
that the act of the first conductor did not jus- the o!Ter to avoid ejcctment from the train.
tify the v1olatlon of the lawful regulations As he had a ticket. he felt that he should not

DAMAG~·~S

IN ACTIONS AGAINST CARRIERs.

be called upon to pay a penalty tor a neglect
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ot which he was not guilty. We cannot see

DA\IAGICS IN ACTIONS AGAINST CARRIERS.

be called upon to pay a penalty for a neglect

of which he was not guilty. We cannot see

how an offer to pay that was not accepted

could excuse his ejectment from a train on

which he was entitled to be.

The court authorized the jury to ﬁnd ex-

emplary damages, if it found that the act

bf defendant was malicious. Complaint is

‘ made of the instruction under the evidence.

‘ but it was warranted. There was evidence

of the previous bad feeling and threats

which, with what was done at the time of

the ejectment, made the question one for the
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jury. The judgment is aﬂirmed.

how an offer to pay that was not accepteu
could excuse. his ejectment !rom a train on
which he was entitled to be.
The court authorize(} the jury to find ex·
emplary damages, if it found that the act

Of defendant was mallclous.

Complaint is
made o! the instruction under the evidence,
but it was warranted. There W811 evltleu<:e
ot the previous bad !eellng and threats
which, with what was done at the time or
the ejectment, made the question one tor the
jury. The Judgment is afllrmed.

DAMAGES IN ACTIONS AGAINST TELEGRAPH COMPANIES.
DAMAGES IN ACTIONS AGAINST TELEGRAPH COMPANIES.

857

PRIMROSE v. WESTERN UNION TEL. CO.

(14 Sup. Ct. 1098, 154 U. S. 1.)

May 26, 1894.

No. 59.

In error to the circuit court of the United

States for the eastern district of Pennsyl-

vania.

This was an action on the case, brought

January 25, 1888, by Frank J. Primrose, a

citizen of Pennsylvania, against the Western

Union Telegraph Company, a corporation of

New York, to recover damages for a negli-

gent mistake of the defendant's agents in

transmitting a telegraphic message from the

plaintiff, at Philadelphia, to his agent at

Waukeney, in the state of Kansas.

The defendant pleaded (1) not guilty: (2)

that the message was an unrepeated mes-

sage, and was also a cipher and obscure mes-
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sage, and therefore, by the contract between

the parties under which the message was

sent, the defendant was not liable for the

mistake. At the trial. the following facts

were proved and admitted:

On June 16, 1887, the plaintifl' wrote and

delivered to the defendant, at Philadelphia,

for transmission to his agent, William B.

'1‘oland, at Ellis, in the state of Kansas, a

message upon one of the defendant's printed

blanks, the words printed below in italies

PRIMROSE "· WESTERN UNION TEL. CO.
(14 Sup. Ct. 1008, lM U. S. 1.)
Ma1 26, 189t.
No. 59.
In error to the circuit court of the United
States for the eastern district of PenD.1171·
van la.
This was an action on the case, brought
January 25, 1888, by Frank J. Primrose, a
citizen of Pennsylvania, agalmt the Western
Union Telegraph Company, a corporation of
New York, to recover damages !or a negllgent mistake of the defendant's agents In
transmlttlog a telegr1141blc message from the
plnlnt11r, at Philadelphia, to his agent at
Wnukeney, In the stnte of Knm~ns.
The dC'ff'ndnnt pleaded (1) not guilty; (2)
tbnt the message was an unrepeated message, and was nlso a cipher and obscure message, and therefore, by the contract between
the parties under whl<'h the message was
sent, the defendant was not liable for the
mistake. At the trial. the following facts
were praved and admitted:
On June 16, 1887, the plnlntUf wrote and
dellvered to the defendnnt, at PhlladPlpbln,
for transmission to bis agent, Wllllum B.
Tolnnd. at Ellis, In the stute of Kansas, a
message upcn one of the defendant's printed
blank..<t, the words prlntrd below In Italics
being the worls written therein by the
plalntllr, to wit:
··THI:<~ WESTEltX U~IO:S TELgGUAPH
CO::Ul'A.NY.

being the words written therein by the

plaintiff, to wit:

"'l‘HE WESTEllN UNlON

COMPANY.

TELEGRAPH

"THOs. 'r. EPKERT.

GV-i,-rai .\i,n8-mr.

“Receiver's No.

NORvIN GREEN.

Pm-sident.

Check "_

_ _Tim: 1‘“1ie?1

13

“Fond the following message,

subject to the terms on back

ht-ri2()f, which are hereby

agreed to.

“To Wm. B. Toland, Ellis, ]?ans1zs.

“Drape! am e.rreedi'ngl_1/ b1my bay all kinds qua

1)er/mps brncken half of it mmca moment promptly

of purchases.

‘FRANK J. PRIMROSE.

“W READ THE norms AND AGnEl£h1l£NT oN

BACK or nus BLANK._El1" '

June 16, 1887.

Upon the back of the message was the fol-

lowing printed matter:

"ALL MESSAGES TAKEN BY THIS CO\I-

PANY ARE SUBJECT TO THE FOL-

LOWING TERMS:

“To guard against mistakes or delays, the

sender of a message should order it RE-

PI~L\'l‘lCD; that is, telegraphed back to the

ori,ginating oﬂice for comparison. For this,

om-half the regular rate is charged in ad-

dition. It is agreed between the sender of

the foilowin,'.,' message and this company

that said company shall not be liable for

"TH08. T. E<'KERT,
G··n••ral llauager,

NORVIN OREF.:N.
Prealdeu\.

------"Receiver'11No. I Tlm~:iled

I

Check

.. fiend the following meHagA,}
s11hject tot.he terms on back June 16 1887.
bt•r1!nf, which are hereby

'

agreed to.

<Jj purcluuu.

negligence of Its servants or otherwise, beyond the amount received tor sending the
1ame; nor tor mistakes or delays In the
transmission or dellvery or for nondelivery
of any BEPll:ATED message beyond fifty times
the sum recelTed for sending the same, unless specially insured; nor In any case for
delays arising from unavoidable Interruption
In the working ot Its llnea, or tor errors In
cipher or ob8C1ll'e messages. And this com~
pany ls hereby mad'e the agent of the sender, without llablllty, to forward any message over the lines of any other company
when necesaary to reach Its destination.
"Correctness In the transmission of a message to any point on the lines of this coW.pany can be JNSUllED by contract In writing,
stating agreed amount ot risk, and paymen•
ot premium thereon, at the following rates.
In addition to the usual charge for r<'peate1I
message11, viz. one per cent. !or any distance'
not exceeding 1,000 miles, and two per cent.
tor any greater distance. No employe of th1•
company ls authorized to vary the foregoing
"No responsibility regarding messages attaches to this company untll the same ar<'
presented and accepted at one of Its trnn~·
mlttlng oftlces; and, If a messuge Is sent t"
such office by one ot the company's messengers, he acts for that purpose as the agent
of the sender.
"Mei:;sages will be delivered free with'•
the established free delivery limits of the
h•rminal office. For dellvel'y at a grrnter
tlistance, a special charge will be made to
coTer the COBt of such dellYery.
"The compnny wlll not be liable for rlnmages or statutory pt>nnltles In any cnsP where
the claim Is not presented In writing within
sixty days after th~ message ls tlled with
the company for transmission .
"NORVIN GREEN, President.
"THOS. T. ECKERT, General Manager."
On the evening of the

•To Wm. B. To'and, BU1i, Kan1tU.
•De-pol am urudingly bult]I briy all kind1 quo
ptrlu1 p.• brnl'ken J1alf of d minclJ moment prompU71

•FRANK J. PRIJfROSB.

85i

sam~

day, an agent

ot the defendant delivered to Toland, at
Waukeney, upon a blank of the defendant
company, the message In this form, the wlitten word& being printed below In Italics:

"c:FRF.:AD THE NOTTC'E AND AGREEMENT ON
BACK OF TIJIS BLANK. A]"
.

''THE WESTERN UNION TELBGnAPH
COMPANY.

Upon the ba<'k of the message was the following printed matter:
"AU~ MESS.AGES TAKEN BY THIS COMPA:SY ARE SUBJECT TO THE FOLLOWING TERM:;l:
"To guard against mistakes or delays, the
sencll'r of a mcss:1ge should order It RI!J·
PE.\TED; that ls, telPgraphed back to the
ori;:iuating office for comparison. !<"or this,
01w half the regular rate le charged In ndditiuu. It is n;.:reC'd between the sender of
the following mPssn~<' nnd this company
th::t said compan.> sh:tll not be liable for
mistakes or tldnys tu the transm!,::sion or
de! i Ycry or for no11<11·: iv ny of any c:rnE·
ri::ATL:D mr: s -a;;c,
wl.11.: t!Jer huppcning by

"This COIDJJany TRANSl\U'l'S and DELIYEHS mesMuges only on conditions limiting Its liability, which have been assented to
by the sender of the following message.
"Errors can be guarded against only by repenting a mcssnge back to the sending station for compnrl~n. and the company will
not hold Itself liable for errors or dl'lays In
transmission or delivery of U~HEPEA'fED
MESSAGES beyond the auwuut of tolls
paid thereon. nor In any case where the claim
Is not pre:-;ented In writing within sixty days
aftl'r sending the mc>!"sagf'.
"This Is an U~HEl'L\TF.D !IIE~~.vm.
nnd is ddivPrl'1l hy r<'qnP:<t of the sL•111k1·,
under the cumlitions n:w1 L'U ubu1·e.
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WTHOs. 't‘. ECKERT. NORvIN GREEN.

DAMAGES IN

, "THOS. T. ECKERT,

a..neral M&D61n11'.

~uMnER J SENT BY
Rt.

8.

I

ACTIO~S

AGAINST TELEGRAPH COMPANIES.

NORVIN GREEN,

Preeldent.

REC'D BY J
CHECK.
F . N.
22 ClJlltcl 8alra'IDIJrd1.

General Manager. President

NUMBER sENT BY REC'D BY CillICK.

Iii. S. F. N. 22 Collect Scadra words-

“RECEIVED at 5 K. p. m. June 16,1887.

“ Dated Philadelphia, l0. Forwarded from Ellis.

“To W. B. Toland, Wau/senry, Kansas.

“Destroy am e.1:ccrdl'ng(y busy buy all kinds quo

"RECEIVED at 5 K. p. m.
Jun~ 16, 1887.
"Dated Philadelphia, 16. Forwarded from Ellu.
"To W. B. Toland, Wau!.:eney, Kanaaa.
"Dealroy am tJZcudingly buay buy all kinda quo
per/1.apa bracken lialf of it mince moment fJ1"0mptly

d/ purcl1a1e.

•FRANK J. PRIMROSE.•

perhaps bracken ha.I_/‘of it mince moment promptly

of purchase.

“FRANK J. PRLi[ROSE."

The difference between the message as

sent and as delivered is shown below, where

so much of the message sent as was omitted

in that delivered is in brackets, and the

words substituted in the message delivered

are in italies.

“[Despot] Destroy am exceedingly busy

[bay] buy all kinds quo perhaps bracken half
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of it mince moment promptly of purchasc[s]."

By the private cipher code made and used

by the plaintiff and Toland, the meaning of

these words was as follows:

“Yours of the [ﬁfteenth] aerentcmfh re-

ceived; am exceedingly busy; [I have bought]

buy all kinds. ﬁve hundred thousand pounds;

perhaps we have sold half of it; wire when

you do anything; send samples immediately,

promptly of [purchases] purchase."

The plaintiff testiﬁed that on June 16. 1887,

he wrote the message in his own oﬂice on

one of a bunch or book of the defendant's

blanks which he kept at hand, and sent it to

the defendant's oﬂlce at Philadelphia; that

he had a nmning account with the defend-

ant's agent there, which he settled monthly,

amounting to $180 for that month; that he

did not then read, and did not remember that

he had ever before read, the printed matter

on the back of the blanks; and that he paid

the usual rate of $1.15 for this message, and

did not pay for a repetition or insurance of it.

He also testiﬁed that he then was, and for

many years had been, engaged in the busi-

ness of buying and selling wool all over the

country, and had employed Toland as his

agent in that business, and early in June,

1887, sent him out to Kansas and Colorado,

with instructions to buy 50,000 pounds, and

then to await orders from him before buying

more; that, before June 12th, Toland bought

50,000 pounds, and then stopped buying; and

that he had sent many telegraphic messages

to Toland during that month and previously,

using the same code.

The defendant's agent at Philadelphia,

called as a witness for the plaintiff, testiﬁed

that he sent this message for the plaintiff,

and knew that he was a dealer in wool, and

that Toland was with him, but in what ca-

pacity he did not know; that he had fre-

quently sent messages for him, and consid-

cred him one of his best customers during the

wool season; that telegraphic messages by

the present system were sent and received by

sound, and were all dots and dashes; that

“b" was a dash and three dots, and “y" was

two dots, a space, and then two dots; and that

The difference between the messnge as
sent and ns delivered ls shown below, where
so much ot the message sent ns was omitted
In that delivered ls In brackets, and the
words substituted in the meS11age delivered
are In Italics.
"[Despot] Deatroy am e:i:ceedlngly busy
[bl\y J buy all kinds quo perhaps bracken half
of it mince moment promptly of purchase[s]."
By the private cipher code made and used
by the plaintltr and Tolund, the meaning of
these words was as follows:
"Yonrs of the [ firteenth 1 aerniumfh re·
celved; am exceedingly busy; [I have bought)
b'U.1/ all kinds. 'five hundred thousand pounds;
pe1·Imps we have sold hnlt' of It; wh·e when
you do anything; send samples immediately,
promptly of lpurchascs] purcliaac."
'.rhe plaintitr testiftoo thnt on June 16. 1887,
he wrote the message In his owu office on
one of a bunch or book of the defendant's
blanks which he kept at hnnd, and sent lt to
the defc-ndant's otflce at Plllladelphla; that
he had a running account with the defendant's agent there, which he settled monthly,
amotmtlng to $180 for that month; that he
did not then read, and did not remember that
he had ever before read, the printed matter
on the back of the blanks; and that he paid
the usunl rate of $1.15 tor this messnge, and
did not pay for a repetition or Insurance of it.
He also testified that he theu was, and tor
many years had been, engaged In the business ot buying and selling wool all over the
country, and hnd employed Toland as his
agent in that buslnl'!'s, und early in June,
1887, sent him out to Kansas and Colora.do,
with instructions to buy 50,000 pounds, and
then to await orders from him before buying
more; that, before June 12th, Toland bought
50,000 pounds, and then stopped buying; and
that he had sent many telegraphic messnges
to Toland during that month aud previously,
m;lng the same code.
The defendant's agent at Philadelphia,
cnlled as a witness for the plaintiff, testified
that he sent this message tor the plaintiff,
and knew that he was a dealer In wool, and
that Toland was witl1 him, but In what capacity he did not know; that he had frequently sent messages for him, nnd considered him one ot his best customers during the
wool season; that telegraphic messages by
the present system were sent and received by
iiOUntl, and were all dots nnd dashes; that
"b" was a dash and thr<>e dots, and "y" wws

two dots, a space, and then two dots; and that
the difference between "a" and "u" was one
dot, "a" being a dot and a dash, and "u" two
dots and a dash, and the pause upon the last
touch of the "u;" that nn experienced telegraph operator, if the words were properly
rapped out, and he was paying proper attention, could not well mistake the one tor the
other, but might be misled If he was not
careful; and that it was very likely that another dot could be put in if there was any Interruption in the wire. He further testified
that there was a great difference between the
words "despot" and "destroy" in telegraphic
symbols; and that the letter "s" was· mnde
by three dots, so that, ft an operator received
the word "purchases" over the wires, and
wrote down "purchase," he omitted three
dots from the end of the word.
The plaintiff Introduced depositions, taken
fn September, 1888, of one Stevens and one
Smith, who were respectively telegraph operntors of the defendant at Brookville and at
Ellis, in the state of Kansas, on June 16,
1887.
Stevens testified that BrookvUle was a relay
station ot the com1mny, at which messnges
from the east were repented westwnr<l; that
on thut day one Tindall, his fellow operato«
In the Brookville office, handed him a copy In
Tlnuuu's handwriting of the message In question (an Impression copy of which ,he identified and annexed to his deposition), containing the words "despot" and "bay," and he Immediately transmitted It, word for word, to
Ellis; that the equlpment ot the office at
Brookville was In every respect good and suf·
ftclent; and that he had no recollection of
the wires between it and Ellis having been in
other than good condition on that day.
Smith testified that on that day he received
the message at Ellis from Brookville, and
Immediately wrote it down, word for word,
just as received (and Identified and amwxed
to bis deposition an lmpreBSton copy of what
he then wrote down), containing the words
"destroy" and "buy," and transmitted It, ex·
aetly as he received It, to Wnukeney, to
which Toland had directed any messages tor
him to be forwarded; and that the office at
Ellis was well and sufficiently equipped tor
Its work, but he could not recall what was
the condition of the wires between it and
Brookville.
The plnlntltr also introduced evidence tending to show that June 16, 18S7, was a bright
and beautiful day nt Ellis and Waukeney;
thnt Toland, upon receiving the messnge at
Waukeney, mnde pu1·chases of about 300,000
pounds of wool; and that the plaintiff, in settling with the sellers thereof, suffered a loss
of upwards ot $20,000.
'l'he ~lrl!ult court, following White v. Telegraph Co., 5 Mccrary, 103, 14 Fed: 710,
and Jones T. Telegraph Co., 18 Fed. 717.
ruled that there was no evidence ot gross
negligence on the part of the defc.ndant; and
that, as the messnge hnd not been repeated.

-

-

- ------
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the plaintiff, by the terms printed upon the

back of the message, and referred to above

hi signature on its face, could not recov'er

more than the sum of $1.15, which he had

paid for sending it. The piaintiff not dalm-

ing that sum, the court directed a verdict for

the plalntUf, by the terms printed upon the
back of the meesage, and referred to above
hla algnature on ita face, could not recover
more than the sum of $1.u;, which he had
paid for sending it. The plaintiff not claiming that BUJll, the court directed a verdict for
the defendant, and rendered judgment thereon. The plalntUf tendered a bill of exceptions, and sued out this writ of error.

the defendant, and rendered judgment there-

on. The plaintiff tendered a bill of excep-

tions, and sued out this writ of error.

Geo. Junkin and Jos. de F. Junkin, for

plaintiff in error. Silas W. Pettit, John H.

Geo. Junkin and Jos. de II'. Junkin, for
plaintiff In error. Silas W. Pettit, .Tohn H.
Dillon, Geo. H. Fearons, and Rush Taggart,
for defendant in error.

Dillon, Geo. H. Fearons, and Rush Taggart,

for defendant in error.

Mr. Justice GRAY, after stating the case,

delivered the opinion of the court.

This was an action by the sender of a tele-

graphic message against the telegraph com-

pany to recover damages for a mistake in the

transmission oi.‘ the message, which was in
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cipher, intelligible only to the sender and to

his own agent, to whom it was addressed.

The plaintiff paid the usual rate for this mes-

sage, and did not pay for a repetition or in-

surance of it.

The blank form of message, which the

plaintiﬂl ﬁlled up and signed, and which was

such as he had constantly used, had upon its

face, immediately above the place for writing

the message, the printed words, “Send the

following message, subject to the terms on

back hereof, which are hereby agreed to;"

and, just below the place for his signature,

this line: “ @‘Read the notice and agree-

ment on back of this blank "

Upon the back of the blank were conspicu-

ously printed the words, "All messages taken

by this company are subject to the following

terms," which contained the following condi-

tions or restrictions of the liability of the

company:

"[1] To guard against mistakes or delays,

the sender of a message should order it RE-

PEATED; that is, telegraphed back to the

originating ofﬁce for comparison. For this,

onehalt the regular rate is charged in addi-

tion. It is agreed between the sender of the

following message and this company that

said company shall not be liable for mistakes

or delays in the transmission or delivery or

for nondelivery of any UNREPEATED message,

whether happening by negligence of its serv-

ants or otherwise, beyond the amount re-

ceived for sending the same; [2] nor for mis-

takes or delays in the transmission or deliv-

cry or for nondelivery of any REPEATED mes-

sage beyond ﬁfty times the sum received for

sending the same, unless specially insured;

[3] nor in any case for delays arising from

unavoidable interruption in the working o!

its lines, or for errors in cipher or obscure

messages." After stating the rates at which

correctness in the transmission of a message

may be insured, it is provided that “no em-

ploye of the company is authorized to vary

the foregoing." "[4] The company will not

be liable for damages or statutory penalties

m any case where the claim is not presented

in writing within sixty days after the mes-

Mr. Justice GRAY, after 11tatlng the case,
delh·ered the opinion of the court.
This was an action by the sen1kr ot a telegraphic message agnlnst the telPgraph com·
pany to recover damages for a mistake In the
transmission of the message, which was in
cipher, Intelligible only to the sender and to
his own agent, to whom It was addressed.
The plalntll'f paid the usual rate for this message, and did not pay for a repetition or Insurance of It.
The blank form of mcssnge, which the
plalntilf filled up and signed, and wllich was
such as be had constantly used, bad upon Its
face, immediately above the place for writing
the message, the printed words, "Send the
following message, subject to the terms on
back hereof, which are hereby agreed to;"
and, Just below the place for bis slgna ture,
0:11 line: "U- Read the notice and agreement on back of this blank ..El. n
Upon the back of the blank were conspicuously printed the words, "All messages taken
by this company are subject to the following
terms," which contained the following conditions or restrictions of the liability of the
company:
"[1) To guard against mlstakee or delays,
the sender of a message should order It REPEATED; that Is, telegraphed back to the
originating otllce for comparison. For this,
one-bait the regular rnte Is charged In addltkln. It Is agreed between the sender of the
tollowlng message and this company that
said company shall not be liable for 1nlstnkes
or delays in the transmission or delivery or
for nondelivery of any UNREPEATED message,
whether happening by negligence of Its servants or otherwise, beyond the am~unt received for sending the same; (2) nor for mi&tnkes or delays In the transmission or delivery or for nondelivery of any REPEATED meesa;:e beyond fifty times the sum rE>celved for
senuing the same, unless specially insured;
[3] nor In any case tor delays arising from
unavoidable Interruption In the working ot
Its lines, or for errors In cipher or obscure
mc!iillges." After stating the mtes at which
correctness in the transmission of a. message
may be insured, It is provldl'<l that "no employe of the company is authorized to vary
the foregoing." "(4] '!'he company will not
be liable tor damages or statutory penalties

859

lD any case where the claim ls not presented
In writing within sixty days after the message la filed with the company for transmission."
The conditions or restrictions, the reasonableness and mlldlty of which are directly
Involved In this case, are that part of the
first by which the company ls not to be liable for mistakes In the transmission or delivery of any message beyond the sum received for sending It, unless the sender or·
ders It to be repeated by being telegraphed
back to the originating otllce for comparison,
and pays half that sum In addition; and that
part of the third by which the company ls
not to be liable at all tor errors In cipher or
obscure mes.sages.
Telegraph companies resemble railroad
companies and other common carriers, In
that they are Instruments of commerce, and
In that they exercise a public employment,
and are therefore bound to serve all customers alike, without discrimination. They
have, doubtless, a duty to the public to receive, to the extent of tbelr capacity, all
messages clearly and Intelligibly written,
and to transwlt them upon reasonable term3.
nut tllcy are not common carriers. Their
duties are difl'crent, and are performed In
difl'erent ways; and they are not subject
to the same llabllltles. Express Co. v. Caldwell, 21 Wall. 2U!, 269, 270; Telegraph Co. v.
Texas, 105 U. S. 460, 4G.l
The rule of the common law by which
common carriers of goods are held liable
for loss or Injury by any cause whatever, except the act of God or of public ~nemies, does
not extend even to warehousemen or wharr.lngers, or to any other class of bailees, except
Innkeepers, who, like carriers, have pecullar
opportunities for embezzling the goods or
for collusion with thieves. The carrier has
tile actual and manual possession ot the
goods. The Identity of the goods wblch he
receives with those which he dellvers can
hardly be mistaken. Their value can be
easily estimated, and may be ascertained by
Inquiry of the consignor, and .the carrier's
compensation fixed accordingly; and his liability In damages Is measured by the value
or the goods.
But telegraph companies are not bailees,
In any sensP. They are lntrusted with nothing but an order or message, which ls not to
be carried In the form or characters In which
It Is received, but ls to be translated and
transmitted through different symbols, by
means or electricity, and ls peculiarly liable
to mistakes. '!'he message cannot be th&
subject or embezzlement. It Is of no intrinsic value. Its Importance cannot be estimated, except by the sender, and often cannot
be disclosed by him without danger of defeating his purpose. It may be wholly valueless, It not forwarded Immediately; and
the measure of damages, for a failure to
transmit or deliver It, bas no relation to nny
value of the message Itself, except as sucb
value may be disclosed by the message, or
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be agreed between the sender and the com-

pany.

As said by Mr. Justice Strong, speaking

for this court, in Express Co. v. Caldwell,

above cited: "Like common carriers, they

cannot contract with their employers for ex-

emption from liability for the consequences

of their own negligence. But they may by

such contracts, or by their rules and regula-

tions brought to the knowledge of their em-

ployers, limit the measure of their responsi-

bility to a reasonable extent. Whether their

rules are reasonable or unreasonable must

be determined with reference to public poli-

cy, precisely as in the case oi.‘ a carrier."

By the settled law of this court, common

carriers of goods or passengers cannot, by

any contract with their customers, wholly

exempt themselves from liability for dam-
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ages caused by the negligence oif themselves

or their servants. Railroad Co. v. Lock-

wood, 17 Wall. 357; Liverpool & G. W.

Steam Co. v. Phenix Ins. Co., 129 U. S. 397,

442, 9 Sup. Ct. 469, and cases cited.

But even a common carrier of goods may,

by special contract with the owner, restrict

the sum for which he may be liable, even in

case of a loss by the carrier's negligence;

and this upon the distinct ground. as stated

by Mr. Justice Blatchford, speaking for the

whole court, that “where a contract of the

kind. signed by the shipper, is fairly made,

agreeing on the valuation of the property

carried, with the rate of freight based on

the condition that the carrier assumes lia-

bility only to the extent of the agreed valu-

ation, even in case of loss or damage by the

negligence of the carrier, the contract will

be upheld as a proper and lawful mode of

securing a due proportion between the

amount for which the carrier may be respon-

sible and the freight he receives, and of pro-

tecting himself against extravagant and fan-

ciful valuations." Hart v. Railroad Co., 112

U. S. 331, 343, 5 Sup. Ct. 151.

By the regulation now in question, the tele-

graph company has not undertaken to wholly

exempt itself from liability for negligence;

but only to require the sender of the message

to have it repeated, and to pay half as much

again as the usual price, in order to hold the

company liable for mistakes or delays in

transmitting or delivering or for not deliv-

ering a message, whether happening by neg-

ligence of its servants or otherwise.

In Telegraph Co. v. Hall, 124 U. S. 444,

453. 8 Sup. Ct. 577, the effect of such a regu-

lation was presented by the certiﬁcate oi!

the circuit court, but was not passed upon

by this court, because it was of opinion

that. upon the facts of the case, the damages

claimed were too uncertain and remote.

But the ft-tls(\innhll'ili‘8.\‘ and validity of such

re;_'ulations have been upheld in i\it-Andrew

v. 'l‘cl\-‘.:1'aph Co., 17 C. B., 3, and in Baxter

v. '.l‘clcgr:\ph Co., 37 U. C. Q. B. 470, as well

as by the great prepomleranee of authority

in this country. Hnly a, i.(_‘\\' of the principal
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Mr. Justice Alvey (since chief justice of Mary-

land and of the court of appeals of the dis-

trict of Columbia), said: “The appellant had

a clear right to protect itself against extra-

ordinary risk and liability by such rules and

regulations as might be required for the pur-

pose." “The appellant could not, by rules

and regulations of its own making, protect

itself against liability for the consequences

of its own willful misconduct or gross neg-

ligence or any conduct inconsistent with

good faith; nor has it attempted by its rules

and regulations to afford itself such exemp-

tion. It was bound to use due diligence, but

not to use extraordinary care and precaution.

The appellee, by reqnirmg the message to be

repeated, could have assured himself of its

dispatch and accurate transmission to the

other end of the line, if the wires were in

Generated for facpubupdates (University of Michigan) on 2014-06-12 19:23 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/mdp.35112105421491
Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd-google

working condition; or. by special contract

for insurance, could have secured himself

against all consequences of nondelivery. He

did not think proper, however, to adopt such

precaution, but chose rather to take the risk

of the less expensive terms of sending his

message; and, having refused to pay the

extra charge for repetition or insurance,

we think he had no right to rely upon the

declaration of the appellant's agent that the

message had gone through, in order to ﬁx the

liability on the company." .

In Passmore v. Telegraph Co., 9 Phiia. 90.

78 Pa. St. 238, at the trial in the district

court of Philadelphia, there was evidence

that Passmore, of whom one Edwards had

offered to purchase a tract of land in West

Virginia, wrote and delivered to the company

at Parkersburg, upon a blank containing

similar conditions, a message to Edwards,

at Philadelphia, in these words: “I hold the

Tibbs tract for you; all will be rigbt,"—but

which, as delivered by the company in Phila-

delphia, was altered by substituting the

word "sold" for "hold;" and that Edwards

therenpon broke off the contract for the pur-

chase of the land, and Passmore had to sell

it at a great loss. The verdict being for the

plaintiff, the court reserved the question

whether the defendant was liable, inasmuch

as the plaintiff had not insured the message

nor directed it to be repeated, and after-

wards entered judgment for the defendant,

notwithstanding the verdict, in accordance

with an opinion of Judge Hare, the most im-

portant parts of which were as follows:

“A railway, telegraph, or other company,

charged with aduty which concerns the public

interest, cannot screen themselves from lia-

bility for negligence; but they may prescribe

rules calculated to insure safety, and dimin-

ish the loss in the event of accident, and

declare that, if th -se are not observed, the

injured party shall be considered as in de-

fault, aud precluded by the doctrine of

contributory negligence. The rule must

howevcr. be such as that reason, which is said

to be the life of the law, can approve; or.

at the least, such as it need not condemn.
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by Judge Hare and above stated. 78 Pa. St.

246; Telegraph Co. v. Stevenson, 128 Pa. St.

442, 455, 18 Atl. 441.

In Breese v. Telegraph Co., 48 N. Y. 132,

the plaintiffs' agent wrote, at his own oilic(!

in Palmyra, on one of the company's blanks,

substantially like that now before us, and

delivered to the company at Palmyra, a mes-

sage addressed to brokers in New York, and

in these words, “Buy us seven ($700) hundred

dollars in gold." In the statement of facts

upon which the case was submitted, it was

agreed that he had never read the printed

part of the blank, and that “the message

thus delivered was transmitted from the

ofﬁce at Palmyra as written; but, by some

error of the defendant's operators working

between Palmyra and New York," it was

received in New York and delivered in this
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form, "Buy us seven thousand dollars in

gold," and the brokers accordingly bought

that amount for the plaintiffs, who sold it at

a loss. It was held that there was no evi-

dence of negligence on the part of the com-

pany, and that, the message not having been

repeated, the company was not liable.

In Kiley v. 'l'eiegruph Co., 10!) N. Y. 231,

235-237, 16 N. E. 75, a similar decision was

made. the court saying: “That a telegraph

company has the right to exact such a stipu-

lation from its customers is the settled law

in this and most of the other states of the

Union and in England. The authorities hold

that telegraph companies are not under the

obligations of common carriers; that they

do not insure the absolute and accurate trans-

mission of messages delivered to them; that

they have the right to make reasonable regu-

lations for the transaction of their business,

and to protect themselves against liabilities

which they would otherwise incur through

the carelessness of their numerous agents,

and the mistakes and defaults incident to the

transaction oi.‘ their peculiar business. The

stipulation printed in the blank used in this

case has frequently been under consideration

in the courts, and has always in this state,

and genemlly elsewhere, been upheld as rea-

sonable." “The evidence brings this case

within the terms of the stipulation. It is not

the case of a message delivered to the oper-

ator, and not sent by him from his oﬂice.

This message was sent, and it may be infer-

red from the evidence that it went so far as

Buffalo, at least; and all that appears fur-

ther is that it never reached its destination.

Why it did not reach there remains unex-

plained. Iti was not shown that the failure

was due to the willful misconduct of the do

fendant, or to its gross negligence. If the

plainiifl' had requested to have the message

repeated back to him, the failure would have

been detected and the loss averted. The case

is therefore brought within the letter and

purpose of the stipulation."

In the supreme judicial court of Massachu-

setts, the reasonableness and validity of such

regulations have been repeatedly aiﬁrmed.
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by ;Judge Hare and above stated. 78 Pa. St.
246; 'l'elegraph Co. v. Stevenson, 128 Pa. St.
442, 45:i1 18 AU. 441.
In Breese v. Telegraph Co., 48 N. Y. 13'.?,
the plalntlffs' agent wrote, at his own o1llcc
In Palmyra. on one ot the company's blanks,
suhstantlally like that now before us, and
delivered to the company at Palmyra. a message addressed to brokers In New York, and
in these words, "Buy us seven ($i00) hundred
dollars In gold." In the statement ot facts
upon which the case was submitted, it was
agreed that he had never read the printed
part of the blank, and that "the message
thus delivered was transmitted trom the
office at Palmyra as written; but, by some
error of the defendant's operators working
between Palmyra and New York," 1t was
recelvec1 in New York ond delivered. 1n this
form, "Buy us seven thousand dollars In
gold," and the brokers accordingly bought
that amount for the plaintiffs, who sold It at
a loss. It was held that there was no evidence of negligence on the part of the company, and that, the message not having been
repeated, the company was not liable.
In Kiley v. 'l'elei,>Tnph Co., 109 N. Y. 231,
235-237, 16 N. E. 75, a similar decision. wns
made. the court saying: "That a telegraph
company has the right to exact such a stlpula~lon from lts customers ls the settled law
in this and most of the other states of thr
Union and In England. The auth<>rlties hold
that telegraph companies are ncn under the
obligations of common carriers; that they
tlo not Insure the absolute and accurate tr-.:msmlssion of messages delivered to them; thBlt
they have the right to make reas<>nable regulations for the transaction of their business,
und to pl'Gtect themselves against llabilltles
which they would otherwise Incur throu~h
the cureleesness of their numerous agents,
and the mistakes and defaults Incident to the
transaction or their peculiar business. The
stipulation printed in the blank used In this
case has frequently been under consideration
in tho courts, and has always in this state,
and generally elsewhere, been upheld as reasonable." "The evidence brings thls case
within the terms of the stipulation. It Is not
the case <>f a message dell vered to the opera tor, and not sent by him from hls office.
This message was sent, and it may be inferred from the evidence that it went s<> far as
Buf'l'alo, a.t least; and all that appears furthe1· ls that it never roochetl its destlnntion.
Why it did not reach there remains unexplained. It was not shown that the failure
was due to the wUltul misconduct of the de:fendant, or to Its gross negligence. If the
pl:iluli:T llatl rcquc-sted to have the message
repoote<l back to him, the failure would have
been detected and the loss averted. The case
Is therefore brought within the letter and
purpose or the stlpula tlon ...
In the supreme judicial court of Massachusetts, the reasonableness and validity of such
regulations haYe been repeatedly a11lrmed.

Ellis T. Telegraph C<>., 13 Allen, 226; Redpath v. Telegraph Co., 112 Mass. 71; Grinnell
v. Telegraph Co., 113 Mass.. 299; Clement v.
Telegraph Co., 137 Mass. 463.
There are cases, indeed, in which such regulations have been considered to be wholly
v<>ld. It will be sufficient to refer t<> tho&e'
specially relied on by the learned counsel for·
the plalntif'I', many of which, however, upon
examination, appear to have been in1luence<t
by ronslderati<>ns which have D<> application.
t<> the case a.t bar.
Some of them were actions brought, not by·
the sender, but ·by the receiver, of the message, who hn.d no n<>tlce of the printed conditions until after he received it, and could
not therefore have agreed to them In advance. Such were Telegraph Co. v. Dryburg,
85 Pa. St. 298; Harris v. Telegraph Co., 9'
Phila. 88; and De la. Grange v. Telegraph
Co., 25 La. Ann. 383.
Others wel'C cases of night' messages, h1t
which the whole provision as to repeating
was omllted, and a sweeping and comprei.Jensive provlsl1>n substituted, by which. In effect, all liability beyond the prire paitl was
avoided. '!'rue v. Telegrapl.J Co., 00 Me. 9. 18;
B!lrtlett v. Telegraph Co.; t.I~ Me. 2U:l, :!15;
Candee v. TelEgrnph Co., 34 Wis. 471, 47li~
Hibl>;ird v. Telegraph Co., 33 Wis. 5:i8, GtH.
In Bartlett's Case the court said: "Most, If
not all, the cases upon this subject, refer ~
rules requiling the repeating of messall:eS to
insure accuracy, and seem to be justitit'll In
their .c<>nclusion on the ground that, owing
t1> the liability to error from causes beyond
.the skill and care of the operatOt", it is but
a matter ot comm<>n care and prudence to.
have the messages repeated, the neglect or
which in messages of importance, after being
warned of the danger, Is a want of care on
the part of the sender, and, as the person
sending the message is presumed t<> be the
best jutlge <>f Its importance, he must, on his
own resp<>nslbllity, make hls electl1>n whether to have it repeated." 6'2 Me. 216, 217.
The passa.ge cited from the opinion of the
circuit court of appeals In Delaware & A.
Telegraph & Teleph<>ne Co. v. State, 3 U. S.
App. 30, 105, 2 C. 0. A. 1, and 50 Fed. 6i7.
In which the same judge who had decided
the present case in the circuit court said, "It
ls DI> longer open t<> question that telepllone
and telegraph c1>mpanies are subject to the
rules governing corumon carrters and other&
engaged In like public employment," had regard, as Is evident from the context, and
from the reference to Budd v. New York, 143
U. S. 1'>17, 12 Sup. Ct. 468, to those rules <>nly
which require persons <>r corporations exercising a public employment to serve all alike,
without discrimination, and which make
them subject to legislative regulation.
In Rittenhouse v. Independent Line, etc, 1
Daly, 474, 44 N. Y. 263, and in Turner v. Telegraph Oo., 41 Iowa, 458, it does not appear
that the company hall undertaken t1> re11U'ict
Its liability by express stipulation.
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The Indiana decisions cited appear to

have been controlled by a statute of the state

enacting that telegraph companies should “be

liable for special damages occasioned by fail-

ure or negligence of their operators or serv-

ants in receiving, copying, transmitting, or

delivering despatches." Telegraph Co. v.

Meek, 49 Ind. 63; Telegraph Co. v. Fenton,

52 Ind. 1.

The only cases cited by the plaintiff in

which, independently of statute, a stipulation

that the sender of a message, if he would hold

the company liable in damages beyond the

sum paid, must have it repeated and pay hall,‘

that sum in addition, has been held against

public policy and void, appear to be Tyler v.

Telegraph Co., 60 UL 421, 74 Ill. 168; Ayer v.

Telegraph Co., 79 Me. 493, 10 Atl. 495; Tele-

graph Co. v. Griswold, 37 Ohio St. 301; Tele-

Generated for facpubupdates (University of Michigan) on 2014-06-12 19:23 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/mdp.35112105421491
Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd-google

graph Co. v. Crali, 38 Kan. 679, 17 Pac. 309;

Telegraph Co. v. Howell, 38 Kan. 685, 17 Pac.

313; and a charge to the jury by Mr. Justice

Woods, when circuit judge, as reported in

Dorgan v. Telegraph Co., 1 Am. Law T. (N.

S.) 400. Fed. Cas. No. 4,004, and not included

in his own reports.

The fullest statement of reasons, perhaps,

on that side of the question, is to be found in

Tyler v. Jelegraph 0o., above cited.

In that case the plaintiffs had written and

delivered to the company on one of its blanks,

containing the usual stipulation as to repeat-

ing, this message, addressed to a broker:

“Sell one hundred (100) Western Union; an-

swer price." In the message, as delivered by

the company to the broker, the message was

changed by substituting

(1,000)." It was assumed that “Western

Union" meant shares in the Western Union

Telegraph Company. The supreme court of ‘

Illinois held that the stipulation was “unjust,

unconscionable, without consideration, and

utterly void." 60 ‘Ill. 439.

The propositions upon which that decision

was based may be sutiieiently stated, in the

very words of the court, as follows: “Wheth-

er the paper presented by the company, on

which a message is written and signed by the

sender, is a contract or not, depends on cir-

cumstances;" and “whether he had knowl-

edge of its terms, and consented to its restric-

tions, is for the jury to determine as a ques-

tion of fact, upon evidence alinnde." “Admit-

- ting the paper signed by the plaintiffs was a

contract, it did not, and could not, exonerate

the company from the use of ordinary care

and diligence, both as to their instruments

and the care and skill of their operators."

"The plaintiffs having proved the inaccuracy

of the message, the defendants, to exonerate

themselves, should have shown how the mis-

take occurred;" and, “in the absence of any

proof on their part, the jury should be told

the presumption was a want of ordinary care

on the part of the company." The 1)rlnli.‘1l

conditions could not "protect this company

from losses and damage occasioned by causes

wholly within their own control," but “must

The Indiana declalona cited appear to
b&ve been controlled by & statute ot the state
enacting that telegraph companies should "be
liable for special d&mages ocC&lllooed by fallU1'9 or negligence ot their operators or eervantB in receiving, copying, tranemitting, or
dellvedng despatches." Telegraph Co. v.
Meek, 49 Ind. Ga; Telegraph Co. v. Fenton,
52 Ind. 1.
The only cases cited by the plaintill In
which, Independently of statute, a stipuluUon
that the sender ot a message, if he would hold
the company liable in damages beyond the
1um paid, must have It repeated and pay halt
that sum In addition, has been held against
public policy and void, appear to be Tyler v.
Telegraph Co., 00 Ill 421, 74 Ill. 168; Ayer v.
Telegraph Co., 79 Me. 493, 10 Atl. 495; Telegraph Co. v. Griswold, 37 Ohio St. 301; Telegraph Co. v. Crall, 38 Kan. 679, 17 Pac. 309;
Telegraph Co. v. Howell, 88 Kan. 685, 17 Pac.
313; and a charge to the jury by Mr. Justice
Woods, when clrcult judge, as reported in
Dorgan v. Telegraph Co., 1 Am. Law T. (N.
8.) 4-0G, Fed. Cas. No. 4,00t, and not Included
in hie own reports.
Tbe fullest statement ot reasons, perhaps,
on that 11lde ot the question, ls to be found in
Tyler v . .:'elegraph Co., above cltC>d.
In that case the plnintll!e bad writt<.>n and
delivered to the company on one or its blanks,
containing the usual stipulation ae to repeating, this message, address<'d to a broker:
"Sell one hundred (100) Western Union; answer price." In the message, as delivered by
the company to the broker, the message was
changed by aubstltuting "one thousand
(l,000)." It was assumed that "Western
Union" meant shnr~ in the Western Union
Telegraph Company. '.fhe eupreme court ot
Illinois held that the stipulation was "unjust,
unconscionable, without consideration, and
utterly void." 60 Ill. 430.
The propositions upon which that decision
was based may be eutllclently stated, In the
Tery words ot the court, as follows: "Whether the paper presented by the company, on
which a message is written nnd signed by the
sender, ls a contract or not, depends on circumstances;" and "whether he bad khowledge ot its terms, nnd consented to its restrictions, le for the jury to determine as a question of fact, upon evidence nliunde." "Admit. ting the paper signed by the plaintltrs was a
conu·act, it did not, and could not, exonernte
the company from the use of ordinary care
and diligence, both as to their lnstrummts
and the care nod skill ot their operators."
"'l'be plnlntltrs bn>lng prove<l the inaccuracy
or the message, the defendants, to <'Xonerate
themselves, should have shown how the mistake occurred;" and, "in the absence or any
proof on their part, the jury should be told
the presumption was a want of ordinni·y cm·e
on tbe part of the company." The prtntPtl
conditions could not " protect this company
from losses and damage occasioned by causes
wlloliy within their own control," but "must
be confined to mistakes due to the infirm! ties
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ot tele~phy, and which are unavoidable."
60 Ill. 431-433.
The etrect ot that construction would be
either to hold telegraph companies to be llllbject to the liability ot common carriers, which
the court admitted In an earlier part of Its
opinion that they were not, or else to allow to
the stipulation no ellect whatever; for, it they
were not common carriers, they would not,
even It there were no express stipulation, be
liable tor unavoidable mistakes, due to causes
over which they had no control.
But the final, and apparently the principal,
ground tor that decision, was restated by th<'
court when the case came before it a second
time, as follows: "On the question whether
the regulation requiring messages to be repented, printed on the blank of the company
on which & message ls written, Is a contract,
we held It was not a contract binding in
law, for the reason the law Imposed upon the
companies duties to be performed to the public, and for the performance ot which they
were entitled to a compensntlon fixed by
themselves, and which the sender bad no
choice but to pay, no matter how exorbitant
it might be. Among these duties, we held,
was that of transmitting messages correctly;
that the ta.rill paid was the consideration for
the performance ot this duty in each particular case, and, when the charges were paid, the
duty ot the company began, and there was
therefore no consideration for the supposed
contract requiring the sender to repent the
message at an additional cost to him or fifty
per cent. ot the original charges." 74 Ill. 170,
171.
The fallacy In that reasoning appears to us
to be in the assumption that the company, under its admitted power to fix a reasonable
rate ot compensation, establishes the usual
rate as the compensation tor the duty of
transmitting any message whatever; whereas, what the company has done le to fix that
rate for those messages only which are transmitted at the risk ot the sender, and to require payment of the higher rate of hnlf ae
much again if the company 1s to be liable for
mistakes or delays In the transmission or delivery or in the nondelivery ot a message.
Indeed, that learned court frankly admitted
that Its decision wns against the general current ot autbo1-lty, saying: "It must, bowe>er,
be conceded thut there Is great barII11tny In
the decisions that these companies can protect themselves from loss by contract, and
that such a regulation as the one un<ler which
appellees defended Is a reasonable regulation,
and amounts to a coutrnct." And, ngu!n:
"'Ve are not satisfied with the groun<ls on
which a majority of the decisions or resp C'ctable courts are place<l." 00 Ill. 430, 431, 4:~;:;.
In the case at bar, the message, as appeared
by the plaintiff's own testimony, was written
by him at his office In Philn<lelphln., upon one
or a bunch or the defendant's blanks, which
be ke pt there for the purpose. Although he
testified that he did not remember to have
r ead the printed matter on the back, he did
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not venture to say that he had not read it;

still less that he had not read the brief and

clear notices thereof upon the face of the

message, both above the place for writing the

message and below his signature. There can

be no doubt, therefore, that the terms on the

back of the message, so far as they were not

inconsistent with law, formed part of the

contract between him and the company un-

der which the message was transmitted.

The message was addressed by the plain-

tiff to his own agent in Kansas, was written

in a cipher understood by them only, and

was in these words: “Despot am exceed-

ingly busy bay all kinds quo perhaps bracken

half of it mince moment promptly of pur-

chases." As delivered by the company to

the plaintiffs agent in Kansas, it had the

words “destroy" instead of "despot," “buy"
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instead of “bay," and “pm-chase" instead of

"purchases."

The message having been sent and received

on June 16th, the mistake, in the iirst word, of

“&espot" for “destroy," by which, for a word

signifying to those understanding the cipher,

that the sender of the message had received

from the person to whom it was addressed

his message ot June 15th, there was substi-

tuted a word signifying that his message o1f

June 17th had been received (which was evi-

dently impossible), could have had no other

effect than to put him on his guard as to

the accuracy of the message delivered to

him.

The mistake of substituting, for the last

word "purchase," in the singular, the word

"purchases," in the plural, would seem to

have been equally unimportant, and is not

suggested to have done any harm.

The remaining mistake, which is relied on

as the cause of the injury for which the

plaintiff seeks to recover damages in this ac-

tion, consisted in the change of a single let-

ter, by substituting “n" for “a," so as to put

“buy" in the place of “bay." By the cipher

code, “buy" had its common meaning, though

the message contained nothing to suggest to

any one, except the sender or his agent, what

the latter was to buy; and the word “bay,"

according to that code, had (what no one

without its assistance could have conjec-

tured) the meaning of “I have bought."

The impression copies of the papers kept

at the'det'endant's oﬂices at Brookville and

Ellis, in the state of Kansas (which were an-

nexed to the depositions of operators at those

oliiees, and given in evidence by the plain-

tiilf at the trial), prove that the message was

duly transmitted over the greater part of its

route, and as far as Brookville; for they

put it beyond doubt that the message, as re-

ceiwrd and written down by one of the opera-

tors at Brookville, was in its original form,

and that, as written down by the operator

at Ellis, it was in its altered form. While

the testunony of the deponents is conﬂicting,

there is nothing in it to create a suspicion

that either of them did not intend to tell the
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not venture to say that he had not reaa tt;
still less that he had not rend the brief and
clear notices thereof upon the face of the
message, both above the place for writing the
message and below his signature. There can
be no doubt, therefore, that the terms on the
back of the message, so tar as they were not
Inconsistent with law, formed part of the
contract between him and the company under which the message was transmitted.
The message was addressed by the plaintiff to his own agent In Kansas, was written
In a cipher underatood by them only, and
was In these words: "Despot am exceedingly busy bay all klndl!' quo perhaps brncken
halt of lt mince molllf'lt promptly of purchases." As delivered by the company to
the plaintiff's agent In Kansas, It had the
words "destroy" lnste~d of "despot," "buy"
Instead of "uay," and "purchase" instead of
"purchases."
The message having been sent and received
on Jlllle lllth, the mistake, in the first word, of
"~espot" for "destroy," by which, for a word
signifying to those understanding the cipher,
that the sender of the messn~e had received
from the person to whom It was addressed
his message ot June 15th, there was substituted a. word signifying that his message of
June 17th hnd been receiYed (which was evidently impossible), could have had no other
effect than to put him on his guard as to
the accuracy of the message delivered to
him.
The mistake of substituting, tor the last
word "purchase," In the singular, the word
"purehases," In the plural, would seem to
have been equally unlmportnnt, and ls not
su~gested to have done any ha1·m.
The remaining mistake, which ls relied on
as the cause of the injury for which the
plalntltr seeks to recover damages In this action, consisted In the change of a single letter, by substituting "u" for "a," so as to put
"buy" In the place of "bay." By the cipher
code, "buy" had Its common meaning, though
the message contained nothing to suggest to
any one, except the sender or his agent, what
the latter was to buy; and the word "bay,"
according to that code, bad (what no one
without Its assistance could have conjectured) the meaning of "I have bought."
The Impression copies of the papers kept
at the"dPfen<l:rnt's offices at Brookville and
Ellis, In the state of Kansas (which were annexed to the depositions of operators at those
otlices, and given In evidence by the plaJntiff at the trial), prove that the message was
duly transmitted over the greater part of Its
route, and as far as Brookvllle; for they
put it beyond doubt that the message, as received and writtlo'n down hy one of the operators at Brookville, was in Its original form,
nntl Umt, ns written down by the operator
nt Ellis. it was in its nltercli form. While
the tesurnony of the deponents Is conflicting,
th•~re i:c1 n•Hhin~ in It to Cl'l':ltC' a !;1i~pk ' o11
that either of thrrn <lid not intcntl to tell the

truth; nor Is there anything In the case tending to show that there was any defect In the
defendant's Instruments or equipment, or
that any of Its operators were incompetent
persons.
It the change of words ln the message was
owing to mistake or inatt~ntlon of any of the
defendant's servants, It would seem that It
must have consisted either In a want of
plainness of the handwriting of Tindall, the
operator who took It down at Brookville, or
In a mistake of his fellow operator, Stevens,
ln reading that writing or in transmitting it
to Ellis, or else In a mistake of the opera tor
at Ellis In taking down the message at that
place. If the message had been repented,
the mistake, from whate\·er cause it arose,
must have been detected by men.ns of the
dltrerin~ versions made and kept at the offices at Ellis and Brookville.
As has been seen, the only mistake of any
consequence In the transmission of the message consisted in the change of the word
"bay" into "buy," or rather of the letter "a"
Into "u." In ordinary han<lwriting, the llkelll'SS between these two letters, and the likelihood of mist.'lklng the one for the other,
especially when neither the word nor the
context bas any meaning to the reader, are
familiar to all; and In telegraphic symbols,
according to the testimony of the only witness upon the subject, the dltrerence between
these two letters Is a single dot.
'!'he conclusion ls Irresistible that, If there
was negligence on the po.rt of any ot the defrndant's servants, a jury would not h21Ye
been warranted in finding that it was more
than ordinary negligence; and that, upon
principle and authority, the mistake was one
for which the plalntltr, not having had the
message repeated according to the terms
printed upon the back thereof, and forming
part of his contract with the company, could
not recover more than the sum which he had
paid for sending the single message.
Any other conclusion would restrict the
right of telegraph companies to regulate the
amount of their liability within narrower
limits than were allowed to common carriers
In Hart v. Railroad Co., already cited, In
which five horses were delivered by the plain·
titr to a railroad company for transportation
under a bill of lading, Signed by him and by
Us agent, which stated that the horses were ·
to be transported upon the terms and conditions thereof, "admitted and accepted by"
the plaintil'l "as just and reasonable," and
that freight was to be paid at a rate specified, on contlitlon that the carrier assumed
a llauility not exceeding ~:.!00 on ea.ch horse;
and the circuit court, and this court on writ
of e1Tor, hrld that the contract between the
parties could not be contl'Olled by evidence
that one of the horses was killed by the negllg-cnce of the railroad company, and was a
race horse, worth $15,000. 2 ::\IcCrnry, a:i.1,
7 Fetl. G:~o; 11'.! u . s. :'.~n. 5 ::>up. ct. 1::>1.
It is abo to be rem em uerell that, by the
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third condition or restriction In the printed

either arising naturally-I. e. according to th<•
usual course ot thlngs-trom such breach of
these pe.rtlett, It Is stipulated that the com· contract ltsel!, or such ns may reasonably
pany shall not be "liable in any case" ''for be supposed to have been In the contemplaerrors in cipher or obscure messages;" and tion of both parties, at the time they made
that It Is further stipulated that "no em- the contract, as the probable result of the
ploye of the company Is authorized to vary breach or It Now, if the special clrcumthe foregoing," which evidently includes this ' stances under which the contract was actualas well as other restrictions.
ly made were communicated by the plalntltr1<
It ls di.IH.cult to see anything unreasonable
to the defendants, and thus known to both
or a:,,'1llnst public policy in a stipulation that parties, the damages resulting from the
lf the handwriting of & message · delivered breach or such a contract,. which they would
to the company for transmlesloo Is obscure, reasonably contemplate, would be the amount
so as to be read with dUHculty, or 18 In of Injury which would ordinarily follow from
cipher, so that the reader has not the usual a breach of contract under these special ell"·
assistance of the context In ascertaining par- cumstaoces BO known and communicated.
ticular words, the company wW not be re- But, on the other hand, 1t these special cirsponsible for Its miscarriage, and that none cumstances were wholly unknown to the
ot Its agents shall, by attempting to trans- party breaking the contract; he, at the most,
could only be supposed to have had in his
mit such a mell88.ge, make the company responsible.
contemplation the amount which would arise
As the message was taken down by the
generally, and In the great multitude of cases
tele~aph operator at Brookville In the same
not affected by any special circumstances,
words In which It was delivered by the r>laln- from such a breach of contract." 9 ExC"h.
titr to the compauy at Philadelphia, It Is evl· 354, 355.
dl•nt that no obscurity In the message, as
In Sanders v. Stuart, which was an action
originally written by the plalntit't, had any· by commission merchants against a person
thing to do with Its failure to reach Its ulti- whose busln<'SS It was to collect and transmate destination In the same form.
mit telegraph messages, for neglect to transBut lt•ce1-tal11ly was a elpher message, and mit a message in words by themselves wholly
to hold that th<' ncc1•ptance by the detend· unintelligible, but which could be understood
ant's opl'rator at Philadelphia made the com· by tbe plalntltrs' corresi>0ndent In New York
pany liable for errors In its transmission as giving a large order for goods, whereby
would not only disregard the express atlpu- the plalntitrs lost profits, which they would
la tlon that no employe ot the company could otherwise have made by the transaction, to
vary the ooodltloos of the contract, but would
the amount of n;:;o, Lord Chief Justice Coler·
wholly nullity the condition as to cipher ldge, speaking for hlmsel! and Lords JusmessngN•, for the fact that any message is tices Brett and Lindley, said: "Upon the
written In cipher must be apparent to every facts of this case, we think that the rule In
reader.
Hadley v. Baxendale applies, and that the
B<'yond this, under any contract to transdamages recovemble arc nominal only. It
mit a ruC'ssnge by tcl<';.;raph, as under any Is not necessary to decide, and we do not
other contract, the damages for a breach give any opinion, bow the case might be It
the message, Instead of being in language
must be limited to tllose which may be fairly
consillered ns arising according · to the usual utterly unintelligible, had been conveyed in
course of things from the breach of the very
plain and Intelligible words. It was concontract In question, or which both parties veyed lo terms which, as tar ns the defend·
must reasonably hnve understood and con- ant was concerned, were simple nonsense.
templah'd, when making the contract, as For this reason, the second portion of Baron
likely to result from Us brmch. This was .A.lderson's rule clearly applies. No such
directly adjudged In Te!Pi.:raph Co. v. Hall, damages as above mentioned could be 'rea·
124 U. S. 4-14, S Sup. Ct. r>77.
sonably supposed to have been In the conIn lladky v. Baxendale (decided In 18:->4) templa tlon of both parties, at the time they
9 Exch. 3-Ki, C\'Pr sinef! consir\erC'd a Jeadlni:
made the contract, as the probable result
case on both sides of the Atlautic, and ap- ot the breach of it;' tor the simple reason
proved nnd followed by this court In Tel<'- that the def('ndnnt, at least, did not know
graph Co. v. Hall, above cited, and In How- what his contract was about, nor what nor
ard v. ~Iunufacturlng Co., 13!) U. S. Hm, 20t;.
whether any damage would follow from the
::?07, 11 Sup. Ct. 500; Baron Alderson lnlll
breach of It. And tor the same reason, viz.
down, ns the principles by which the jury the total Ignorance of the defendant as to
ought to be guided in estimating the dam- the subject-matter of the contract (an lg-nor·
lll'eS arising out of any breach of con- ance known to, and Indeed Intentionally protract, the following: "Where two parties cured by, the plaintiffs), the first portion of
have made a contract which one ot them
the rule applies also; tor there are no dam·
has broken, . the damages which the otl1er ages more than nominal which can 'fairly
party ought to receive In respect of such and reasonably be considered as arising natbrl'ach of contract should be such a~ urally-I. e. according to the usual course of
things-from the breach' of such a contract
may fairly and reasonably be considered
terma forming part of the contract between
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third condition or restriction in the printed

terms forming part of the contract between

these parties, it is stipulated that the com-

pany shall not be “liable in any case" "for

erro1s in cipher or obscure messages;" and

that it is further stipulated that “no em-

ploye of the company is authorized to vary

the foregoing," which evidently includes this

as well as other restrictions.

It is diﬂlcult to see anything unreasonable

or against public policy in a stipulation that

if the handwriting of a messagedelivered

to the company for transmission is obscure,

so as to be read with diﬁiculty, or is in

cipher, so that the reader has not the usual

assistance of the context in ascertaining par-

ticular words, the company will not be re-

sponsible for its miscarriage, and that none

of its agents shall, by attempting to trans-

Generated for facpubupdates (University of Michigan) on 2014-06-12 19:23 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/mdp.35112105421491
Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd-google

mit such a message, make the company re

sponsible.

As the message was taken down by the

tele;_'raph operator at Brookville in the same

words in which it was delivered by the plain-

tiff to the company at Philadelphia, it is evi-

dent that no obscurity in the message, as

originally written by the plaintiff. had any-

thing to do with its failure to reach its ulti-

mate destination in the same form.

But it'certainly was a cipher message, and

to hold that the acceptance by the defend-

ant's operator at Philadelphia made the com-

pany liable for errors in its transmission

would not only disregard the express stipu-

lation that no cmploye of the company could

vary the conditions of the contract, but would

wholly nullify the condition as to cipher

messages, for the fact that any message is

written in cipher must be apparent to every

reader.

Beyond this, under any contract to trans-

mit a message by telegraph, as under any

other contract, the damages for a breach

must be limited to those which may be fairly

considered as arising according to the usual

course of things from the breach of the very

contract in question, or which both parties

must reasonably have understood and con-

templated, when making the contract, as

likely to result from its breach. This was

directly adjudged in Telegraph Co. v. Hall,

124 U. S. 444, 8 Sup. Ct. 577.

In Hadley v. Baxendale (decided in 1854)

9 Exch. 345, ever since considered a leading

case on both sides of the Atlantic, and ap-

proved and followed by this court in Tele-

graph Co. v. Hall. above-cited, and in How-

ard v. Manufacturing Co., 130 U. S. 199, 206.

207, 11 Sup. Ct. 500; Baron Aiderson laid

down, as the principles by which the jury

ought to be guided in estimating the dam-

ages arising out of any breach of con-

tract, the foliowing: "Where two parties

have made a contract which one of them

has broken, _the damages which the other

party ought to receive in respect of such

breach of contract should be such as

either arising naturally—i. e. according to the
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as this." 1 C. P. Div. 326, 328, 45 Law J.

C. P. 682. 684.

In Telegraph Co. v. Gildersicve, already re-

ferred to, which was an action by the sender

against a telegraph company for not deliver-

ing this message received by it in Baltimore,

addressed to brokers in New York, "Sell

ﬁfty (50) gold," Mr. Justice Alvey, speaking

for the court of appeals of Maryland. and ap-

plying the rule of Hadley v. Baxendale, above

cited, said: “While it was proved that the

dispatch in question would be understood

among brokers to mean ﬁfty thousand dol-

lars of gold. it was not shown. nor was it

put to the jury to ﬁnd, that the appellant's

agents so understood it, or whether they un-

derstood it at all. ‘Sell ﬁfty gold' may have

been understood in its literal import, if it

can be properly said to have any, or was as
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likely to be taken to mean ﬁfty dollars as

ﬁfty thousand dollars by those not initiated;

and, if the measure of responsibility at all

depends upon a knowledge of the special cir-

cumstances of the case, it would certainly

follow that the nature of this dispatch should

have been communicated to the agent at the

time it was offered to be sent, in order that

the appellant might have observed the pre-

cautions necessary to guard itself against the

risk. But without reference to the fact as

to whether the appellant had knowledge of

the true meaning and character of the dis-

patch, and was thus enabled to contemplate

the consequences of a breach of the contract,

the jury were instructed that the appellee

was entitled to recover to the full extent of

his loss by the decline in gold. In thus in-

structing the jury, we think the court com-

mitted error, and that its ruling should be

reversed." 29 Md. 232, 251.

In Baldwin v. Telegraph Co., which was an

action by the senders against the telegraph

company for not delivering this message,

“'l‘clegraph me at Rochester what that well

is doing," Mr. Justice Alien, speaking for the

court of appeals of New York, said: “The

message did not import that a sale of any

property or any business transaction hinged

upon the prompt delivery of it, or upon any

answer that might be received. For all the

purposes for which the plaintiffs desired the

information, the message might as well have

been in a cipher or in an unknown tongue.

It indicated nothing to put the defendant up-

on the alert, or from which it could be in-

ferred that any special or peculiar loss would

ensue from a nondelivery of it. Whenever

special or extraordinary damages, such as

would not naturally or ordinarily follow a

breach, have been awarded for the nonper-

formance of contracts, whether for the sale

or carriage of goods or for the delivery of

messages by telegraph, it has been for the

reason that the contracts have been made

with reference to peculiar circumstances

known to both, and the particular loss has

been in the contemplation of both, at the

time of making the contract, as a contingen-
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land was in his employ, had no tendency to

show what the message was about. Accord-

ing to any understanding which the tele-

graph company and its agents had, or which

the plaintif f could possibly have supposed

that they had. of the contract between these

parties, the damages which the piaintitt seeks

to recover in this action, for losses upon wool

purchased by Toland. were not such as could

reasonably be considered. either as arising,

according to the usual course of things. irom

the supposed breach of the contract itself, or

as having been in the contemplation of both

parties, when they made the contract, as a

probable result of a breach of it.

In any view of the case. therefore, it was

rightly ruled by the circuit court that the

piaintiff could recover in this action no more

than the sum which he had paid f.0r, sending
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the message. Judgment aﬂirmed.

Mr. Chief Justice FULLER and Mr. Justice

HARLAN dissented.

Mr. Justice WHITE. not having been a

member of the court when this case was ur-

gued, took no part in its decision.

land was In his employ, had no tendency to
-show what the message was about. According to any understanding which the tel~
graph company and Its agents had, or which
the plaintiff could possibly have supposed
that they hnd, of the contract between these
parties, the damages which the plalntltt seeks
to rl.'COver In this action, for losses upon wool
purchased by Toland, were not such as could
reasonably be considered, either as arising,
according to the usual course of things, from
the supposed breach of the contract Itself, or
as having been In the contemplation of both

367

parties, wben they made tbe contract, ns a
probable result of a breach of It.
In any view of the case, therefore, It wns
rightly ruled by the circuit court that the
plalnUll could recover In this action no wo1·e
than the sum which Ile llad paid t.or sendhlg
the message. Judgment atliL'wed.
l\Ir. Chief Justice FULLER and Mr. Justice
HARLA.i.'i dissented.
Mr. Justice WHITE, not having bem n
member of the court wllen this case was urgued, took no part In Its decision.
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XVESTERN UNION TEL. CO. v. WILSON.

(14 South. 1, 32 Fla. 527.)

Nov. 8, 1893.

Appeal from circuit court, Escambia coun-

ty; James 1(‘. McClellan, Judge.

Action by Charles M. Wilson against the

Western Union Telegraph Company for a

failure to transmit and deliver a message.

Plaintiff had judgment, and defendant ap-

peals. Reversed.

Mallory & Maxwell, for appellant. John

C. Avery, for appeilee.

Supreme Court of Florida.

TAYLOR, -T. The appeilee sued the ap-

pellant in the circuit court of Escambia

county, in case, for damages for its faiim-e

to transmit and deliver a telegraphic mes-

sage in cipher. The suit resulted in a judg-

ment for the plaintiff in the sum of $688.88,
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and therefrom the defendant telegraph com-

pany appeals.

The declaration alleges as follows: “That

the Western Union Telegraph Company, a

corporation, the defendant, on the 12th day

of December, 1887, was engaged in the busi-

ness of transmitting telegraphic messages

between Pensacola, Fla., and New York, in

the state of New York, and in the delivery

thereof to other cable and telegraph com-

panies for transmission to Liverpool, Eng-

land, where the said plaintiff had a. regular

merchant broker or agent, to wit, one A.

Dobell, through whom the plaintiff negoti-

ated, by means of such messages, the sale in

Europe of cargoes of lumber and timber, the

p1aintiil" being then and there a timber and

lumber merchant at the city of Pensacola.

That on said day the plaintiff delivered to

the defendant, and the defendant received

from him at its oﬂice in the city of Pensa-

cola, aud undertook to transmit and cause

to be transmitted, and it was its duty to

transmit and cause to be transmitted, to the

said A. Dobell, the following cipher message:

‘Dobell, Liverpool: Giadfuiness—shipment—

rosa — bonhenr — inciform — banewort —

margin,'—which the said Dobell would have

understood, and the plaintiff intended to be

an offer of a cargo of lumber and timber

from said port of Pensacola for sale through

the said Dobell in Europe, and the said Do-

bell would have sold the same for the plain-

tiff on the terms of said offer at a proﬁt to

the plaintiff of twelve hundred dollars, but

the defendant failed and neglected to send

the said message, in violation of its duty

to the plaintiff, and to the piaintiff's loss of

$1,200," and therefore he sues, etc.

At the trial the plaintiff, over the defend-

ant's objection, was permitted to testify, in

esialdisiunent of the damages claimed, that

he had to sell his cargo of lumber in Europe

~upon the market for the best price he could

get, which was 52 shillings a load, and

which amounted to $630.84 less than the

price at which he offered same for sale in

the message failed to be sent. The over-

ruled objection of the defendant to this testi-
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employed, or the compensation demanded | be a complete upheaval of all the old land

for sending an unimportant dispatch, or that

it would aid the operator in its transmission.

For what reason, then, could he demand in-

formation that was in no way whatever to

affect his manner of action, or impose on

him any additional obligation? It could

only operate on him persuasively to perform

a duty for which he had been paid the price

he demanded, which, in consideration thereof,

he had agreed to pt-rform, and which the

law, in consideration of his promise, and the

reception of the consideration therefor, had

already enjoined on him." The answer to

all this is that the same argument is equally

applicable as a reason why the rule in Had-

ley v. Baxendale should not apply to carriers

of goods for hire. The carrier of goods, in

contracting to carry and deliver, deals with

the tangible. When he contracts, he has in
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his mind's eye, from the visible, tangible

subject of his contract, what will be the

probable damage resulting directly from a

breach of it on his part, and so has the

other party to the contract with the carrier.

Therefore,‘ the damage likely to ﬂow from

a breach by the carrier can properly be said

to enter mutually into the contemplation of

both parties to the contract, and it is this

mutuality in the contemplation of both parties

to the contract of the results that will be

likely to ﬂow directly from its breach that

really furnishes that equitable feature of the

rule that the damages thus mutually contem-

plated are in fact the damages that the law

will impose for the breach. Why? Because,

in the eye of the law, the parties having

mutually contemplated such damages in go-

ing into such contract, those damages can

alone be inferred as having entered into their

contract as a silent element thereof. The rule

in Hadley v. Baxendale is applicable alone to

breaches of contract, and formulates con-

cisely the measure of damages for the breach

of/those contracts that do not within them-

selves, in express terms, ﬁx the penalty to

follow their breach. In other words, this

rule does nothing more than to give ex-

pression to that part of the contract which,

in the eye of the law, has been mutually

agreed upon between the parties, but con-

cerning which their contract itself is silent.

This essential leading feattu'e of the rule, we

think, was wholly lost sight of in the discus-

sion of the question in Telegraph Co. v. Hyer,

supra, i. e. that the damages provided for un-

der the rule arise ex contractu, and that, un-

less there is mutuality in all the essential ele-

tents that enter into or grow out of the

contract, the whole fabric becomes unilateral,

and abhorrent in the eyes of the law. The

assertion, as a rule of law, that one party to

a contract shall alone have knowledge that

a breach of that contract will directly re-

sult in the loss of thousands of dollars, and

that upon such breach he can recover of the

other party to the contract all of such, to

him, unforeseen, unexpected, uncontemplated,

nonconsented-to damages, seems to us to
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egraph Co., 60 Me. 9; Squire v. Telegraph

Co., 98 Mass. 232; Telegraph Co. v. Wenger,

55 Pa. St. 262; Tyler v. Telegraph Co., 60

Ill 421; Telegraph Co. v. Gildersleve, 29 Md.

232; Telegraph Co. v. Kirkpatrick, 76 Tex.

217, 13 S. W. 70; Cannon v. Telegraph Co.,

100 N. C. 300, 6 S. E. 731; Landsberger v.

Telegraph Co., 32 Barb. 530; Manville v.

Telegraph Co., 37 Iowa, 214; Telegraph Co.

v. Edsall, 63 Tex. 668; Hibbard v. Telegraph

Co., 33 Wis. 558; Thompson v. Telegraph

Co., 64 Wis. 531, 25 N. W. 789; Abcles v.

Telegraph Co., 37 Mo. App. 554; Telegraph

Co. v. Cornwell, 2 C01o. App. 491, 31 Pac.

393; 3 Suth. Dam. 298; Wood, Mayne, Dam.

40; Thomp. Elect. §§ 311-316, inclusive; Id.

§§ 346, 358-375, inclusive. Opposed to this

array of authorities are the following de-

cisions by divided courts, with the exception

of the Georgia and Mississippi cases: Tel-
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egraph Co. v. Hyer, supra; Daughtery v.

Telegraph Co., 75 Ala. 168; Id., 89 Ala. 191,

7 South. 660; Telegraph Co. v. Way, 83 Ala.

542, 4 South. 8-1»l; Telegraph Co. v. Fatman,

73 Ga. 285; Alexander v. Telegraph Co., 66

Miss. 161, 5 South. 397. The case of Tele-

graph Co. v. Reynolds, 77 Va. 173, is also

cited as sustaining a contrary rule. but a

careful reading of that case will disclose the

fact that the conclusions reached are predi-

cated upon a statutory provision in their

Code. In the case at bar, the message that

it is alleged the defendant company failed to

send was in cipher, and contained nothing

that would indicate to the defendant's oper-

ator whether it contained a criticism upon

the “Horse Fair" painting by the great artist,

Rosa Bonhenr, named in the message, or

whether it related to a matter of dollars and

cents. There was no explanation made to the

operator as to its meaning or importance,

except that the plaintiff said that the word

f

"gladfuiness," in the message, had a special

meaning. What that special meaning was,

/

he did not disclose. Under these circum-

stances, all that the plaintiff could rightfully -

recover for the defendant's failure to send or

deliver the message would be nominal dam-

ages, or, at most, the sum paid by him as the

price of its transmission. It was error,

therefore, for the court to admit testimony

as to the damage sustained by the plainti

by the loss of sale of a cargo of timber con

sequent upon the failure to forward the mes-

sage.

There is another feature presented in the

proofs, aside from all that has been said up-

on the rule of damages in such cases, that

would prevent the recovery had in this case.

The plaintiff himself testiﬁes that he re-

ceived from his agent, Dobell, in Europe, an

offer for the cargo of timber. What that

offer was, is nowhere stated or shown. Then

he says: “I decided to make a ﬁnal propo-

sition, which I did by taking the message to

the telegraph oiﬁce, that was not sent, which

message, when translated, was an offer by

me of said cargo of timber for sale at 54

shillings per load." Then he says that he

\ ,'
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egraph Co., 60 Me. 9; Squire v. Telegraph missed the sale of the cargo n.t the terms
Co., 08 Mass. 232; Telegraph Co. v. Wenger, offered by him In his message In consequence
55 Pa. St. 262; Tyler v. Telegraph Co., 60 of the defendant's !allure to send tt, and C()n.
Ill 421; Telegraph Co. v. Gildersleve, 29 Md. sequently had to sell on the market for the
232; Telegrnpli Co. v. Kirkpatrick, 76 Tex. best price he could get, which was 52 shll217, 13 S. W. 70; Cannon v. Telegraph Co., lings per load. There is not a word of proof
100 N. C. 300, 6 S. E. 731; Lanllsbcrger v.
In the record to show that his offer contained
Telegraph Co., 32 Barb. 530; Manville v. in the unsent message would ever have been
Tt'legrnph Co., 37 Iowa, 214; Teleg1·nph Co. accepted, or that he could ever at any time
v. Edsall, 63 Tex. GG8; Hibbard v. Telegraph have sold the timber at the price at which
Co., 33 Wis. 558; Thompson v. Telegraph he so offered it, or that tt could ever have
Co., 64 Wis. 531, 23 N. W. 789; Abeles v. bcl•n sold at nny greater price than the one
'l.'<'legraph Co., 37 JHo. App. 554; Telegraph he actually recl'i\•ed for same, whether Iii:;
C',o. v. Cornwell, 2 Colo. App. 491, 31 Pac.
message bad been sent or not. Yet, in the
:m3; 3 Suth. Dam. 208; Wood, Mayne, Dam. face of this stnte of the proofs, damages
40; Thomp. Elect. §§ 311-316, Inclusive; Id. have been allowed to the plaintiff equal to
§§ 346, 358-375, tncluslve. Opposed to this
the dltl'erencc between a price nt whkh he
army of authorltic-s are the following de- simply offered his timber for sale, and the
clslons by divided courts, with the exception price actmlly received lJy him for It, withof the Georgia and l.lississlppi cases: Tel- out a word of proof to show whether the
egrnph Co. v. Hyer, supra; Daughtery v.
higher price at which he offered It for sale
Telegraph Co., 75 Ala. 168; Id., 89 Aln. 101, could ever have been obtained for it or
7 South. 660; Telegraph Co. v. Wny, 83 Ala. not.
542, 4 South. 844; Telegraph Co. v. Fatmnn,
'!.'he appellee contends that because of the
73 Ga. 285; Alexander v. Telegraph Co., 66
decision in Telegraph Co. v. Hyer, supra,
Miss. 161, 5 South. 397. The case of Tele- the question of damnges cannot ·be consldgraph Co. v. Reynolds, 77 Vn. 173, Is also ered; that, ns to this case, tt ts stnre declsls.
cited as BUstnining a contrary rulf', but a
This dochine, as we understand it, Is prop·
careful rending of that case will disclose the erly applicable to decisions furnishing rules
fact that the conclusions reached are predl- of property, and those construing statutes,
cated upon a statutory provision in their and to those passing upon the validity of
Code. In the case at bar, the message that contracts in which investments have or may
It Is alleged the defendant company failed to hnve been made upon the faith of the adjn·
send was tn cipher, and contained nothing dlcatlon as to their validity, In which cas{'S
that would indicate to the defendhnt's oper- former decisions upon the same que11tions
n.tor whether tt contained a criticism upon will be adhered to, but we do not think this
the "Horse Fair" painting by the great artist,
case falls within the rule.
Rosa Bonheur, named tn the message, or
In reversing the former ruling of the court
whether tt related to a matter of dollars and in the Hyer Case, we do not interfere with
cents. There was no explanation made to the any vested right acquired upon the faith or
operator as to its meaning or importance, tb.at adjudication, but pass upon the rule of
except that the plaintiff said that the wonl damages, as upon an abstract proposition, to
"glndfulness," tn the- message, bad a special follow the breach of such contracts. Of the
meaning. What that special meaning was, erroneousness of the rule as laid down In
he did not disclose. Under these circum- · that case, we are perfectly and clParly sntstances, all that the plaintiff could rightfully · tsfied; and In such case, In determining the
recover for the defendant's failure to send or propriety of overruling It ns a solemn ndjudeliver the message would be nomlnnl dam- dicntion, we ore to be governed largely by n
ages, or, at most, the sum paid by him as the consideration of the results that will likely
p-rice ot its transmission. It was erro~r ftow from the enunciation and establishment
therefore, for the court to admit testimony of the .one or tb.e other of the two rules. If,
as to the damnge sustained by the plaint!
In such case, we conclude that the affl.rmance
by the loss of sale of a cargo of timber con
of what we deem to be the erroneous rule In
sequent upon the fa.llure to forward the mes- that case will be productive of more far·
sage.
reaching and harmful results than would
'.rhere ts another ff'nture presented In the follow the dtsatlirmance thereof, then It beproofs, aside from all thnt has been said up- comes our duty to overturn tt, and such we
on thf' rule of damages In such cases, that think would be the result here. Besides bewould prevent the recovery had In this case. Ing unilateral and wb.olly unfair, as we have
The plnintiff himself testifies that he re- before stated, we cannot see why, 11 the proccived from his agent, Dobell, In Europe, an tectlon of the rule In Hadley v. Baxendale Is
oft'er for the cargo of timber. What that to be withheld from contracts with telegraph
offer wns, Is nowhere stated or shown. Then companies, it should not also be denied In
he says: "I decided to make a final propo- the dally recurring contractual controversies
sltlon, which I did by taking the message to between Individuals. To overturn the rule In
the telegraph office, that was not sent, which controversies as between man and man,
m<'ssni.:•', when trnnslated, was an offer by would be such an uprooting of the old land·
me of sai(l cargo of timber for sale at 54 marks n.s to make It Impracticable to surshilllngs per lond." Then he says that he mlse the harmful results thnt would follow.
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Entertaining these views, we do not think

that the doctrine of stare decisis constrains

us to adhere to the rule in the Hyer Case,

but thlnn (hat less harm will follow our re-

turn to the well-beaten and familiar track

that furnishes a plain and easily compre-

hended rule for all contracting parties, be

they corporate or individual. .

The judgment appealed from is reversed,

and a new trial ordered.

RANEY, C. J'., (concurring) A reconsld.

.

eration of the question of the measure of

damages involved here conﬁrms the correct-

ness of the view expressed in my dissenting

opinion in Telegraph Co. v. Hyer, 22 Fla.

649 et seq., 1 South. 129, and I concur in the

opinion of Judge Taylor, that the rule fol-

lowed in the case mentioned is unfair, and
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ought not to be perpetuated; and, without

committing myself further upon the question

of stare declsis, my conclusion is that more

injury will result in the future from adhering

to the rule of the Hyer Case than will accrue

to parties to past transactions from changing

it, and that the judgment should be re-

versed. Cooley, Const. Lim. (5th Ed.) (33,

and note 1; Wells, Stare Dec. 5 624 et seq.;

Chamberlain, Stare Dec. 19.

MABRY, J., (dissenting) The question of

liability to damage for a failure on the part

of a telegraph company to send a cipher

message is not a new one in this court.

Over six years ago this question was delib-

erately settled here by the decision in the

case of Telegraph Co. v. Hyer, 22 Fla. 652, 1

South. 129. It is proposed new to revel-se

this case, and my view is that it should not

be done. Every question in reference to

cipher messages entering into the ease now

before us was fully discussed and maturely

considered in the Hyer Case, and this case

has the support of decisions in Alabama,

Mississippi, Georgia, and Virginia. Under

the decision in the Hyer Case. there was a

remedy for damages for a failure on the part

of a telegraph company to send a cipher mes-

sage, when it had, for compensation. agreed

to do so. There is much merit in the rule

that, where the company holds itself out to

the public as a transmitter of cipher mes-'

sages for pay, it houid not be allowed. after

receiving the money and agreeing to send the

message, to deny its liability for damages

resulting from its own violation of duty on

the ground that the message was in cipher,

and its contents not known to the company

when it agreed to send it. This court hav-

ing planted itself in favor of this rule over

six years ago. I do not think we should now

disturb it. I do not see how greater harm

will result from adhering to the decision than

overruling it.
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FIRST NAT. BANK OF BAlt.\'lCSViLLE v.

VVESTERN UNION TEL. CO.

(30 Ohio St. 555.)

Supreme Court of Ohio. Dec. Term, 1876.

Error to district court, Belmont county.

J. H. Collins, for piaintif f in error. J. W.

Okey and O. J. Swaney, for defendant in er-

ror.

WRIGHT, J. The First National Bank of

Barnesville brought an action in the court

below, against the telegraph company, to re-

cover damages for failure to transmit and

deliver a telegraphic message. The bank

was located in Barnesvilie, Ohio. It had

done business with one Aaron Lowshe, and

.had frequently cashed drafts for him, in a

small way, prior to February, 1809. In that

month, Lowshe wanted two more drafts

cashed—one on Beiiis & Milligan, New York,
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for $1,000; one on Ege & Otis, same place,

for $1,400. The amounts being large, and

the bank cautious, the cashier wrote to a

correspondent in New York, George F. Baker,

- cashier First National Bank, New York, as

follows: “Would like information in respect

to Mess. Ege & Otis, No. 168 W. W. Market;

also, Mess. West, Titus & Co., No. 129 West

street. Are they responsible parties? If not

too much trouble, would be pleased to have

you inquire of each, if dft., at sight, drawn

by A. Lowshe for $1,400 to $1,000, would

be paid. If the ﬁrms or either of them, are

not reliable for that amt., or if they should

be unwilling to accept, please answer by

telegram. If all right, need not dispatch.

If not right, would' like to hear by Saturday

evening. (13th)."

This letter was dated at Barnesville, Feb-

ruary 11th, which appears to have been

Thursday. No mention is made, it will be

observed, of Bellis & Miiligan, on whom the

$1,600 draft was drawn.

The letter was received in New York by

Baker, to whom it was addressed, on Febru-

ary 15th. It is stated in evidence that the

ordinary time of mail communication, be-

tween Barnesville and New York, is two days.

This advice to Baker probably reached its

destination after close of bank hours, on Sat-

arday, and was taken up in the ordinary

course of business on Monday morning. On

that day Baker made inquiries of Ege & Otis,

mi whom the $1,400 draft was drawn. and at

4:55 of that day telegraphed as follows. to

the Bank at Barnesvilie: “February 15, 1809.

To J . F. Davis, Cash., Barnesvilie, 0'. Parties

will accept if bill lading accompanies the

draft. Parties stand fair. Geo. F. Baker, C."

This message never was received at Barnes-

ville. There is testimony tending to show

that it started to and perhaps reached Buffa-

lo. But it is not traced beyond that point,

and the telegraph company give no satisfac-

tory account of what became of it. The one

certain fact about it is, that the Barnesviile

bank never received it. New York not be-

ing heard from, the Barnesvilie bank cashed

the drafts, on Monday the 15th, before three
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‘it is true. and perhaps might have had it in

noon or evening of February 16, 1869, any

means would have been used to recover the

money; if so, what? A. I am conﬁdent

means would have been used to recover it."

Mr. Lowshe also makes this statement: "Q.

If the bank had discovered, while you were

at Barnesville or Zanesville, that those drafts

which you had cashed at the Barnesville bank ,

would not be accepted, and had demanded

the money back, would you have refunded it ‘

to the bank? A. At Zanesville, on the after-

noon of the ﬁrst day there, I sent ﬁve hun- i

dred dollars of the money home. Had the

bank informed me at Barnesville the drafts

would not be accepted, I would have return-

ed the money to the bank. Had such infor-

mailon reached me at Zanesville. before I

sent the live hundred dollars home, I would
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have returned it all. Had such information ‘

reached me at Zanesville after I sent the ﬁve

hundred dollars home, I would have returned

the balance to the bank. I would have re- ,

turned the money immediately on receiving

such information."

In this connection the court charged the

jury in effect, that if defendants were guilty ‘

of negligence in not transmitting the message, 1

then plaintiffs must show that Lowshe was |

' where they could have reached him with legal

process and that he had property in such po-

sition that the law could lay hold of it; and if

this was not shown, but it appeared that the

recovery of the money depended upon the

happening of a new contingency which might

or might not have occurred. the damages

were so remote that no recovery could be had.

Upon the case as thus made, we are clearly

of opinion that the plaintiff was not entitled

to substantial damages. If the New York '

dispatch had arrived upon the 15th or 16th,

it is not made apparent, either in pleadings or ;

proof. how the bank was to secure itself. with

that certainty the law requires, in order to

justify a claim for damages. It is not made I

to appear that Lowshe 'had property that

could be seized. He had obtained this money, I

his possession, but he might easily have put

it beyond the reach of process. But even if

he had the money where he could lay his hand

upon it, it is not p inted out how the bank

proposed to reach 1 Had he been arrested

on the ground of fraud, it might have been ‘

diﬂicult to sustain such aprot-ceding, until aft-

er the drafts had been actually protested for ,

nonacceptance, by which time Lowshe was

lost sight of. Nor is it alleged or proved that

an actual arrest would have produced the

money. It is true, the bank claims that Mr.

Lowshe would have returned the money, be- ‘

cause he said he would; still the jury might

have considered that as the “mere contin- .

gency," which, the court instructed them, only

occasioned a damage that was remote.

The rule as to damages is thus laid down

by Earl. J., in Leonard v. Telegraph Co., 41

N. Y. 544: “The damages must ﬂow directly

and naturally from the breach of contract,
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pany, the company making such mistake will

not be liable in damage for such loss."

In Landsberger v. Telegraph Co., 32 Barb.

536, it was held that plaintiff could not re-

cover damages, because, “on receiving the

despatch from transmission, the defendant

had no information whatever in relation to it,

or the purposes to be accomplished by it, ex-

cept what could be derived from the dispatch

itself."

In ,Telegraph Co. v. Gildersleve, 29 Md. 232,

Allen, Tel. Cas. 390, it is held that knowledge

of special circumstances must be shown, to

lay a foundation for special damages. Ste-

venson v. Telegraph Co., 16 U. C. Q. B. 530,

537. The telegraph cases, generally, follow

the rule of Hadley v. Baxendale, with re-

gard to notice, as is shown by the numerous

authorities cited by counsel.
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It therefore appears to us that the possi-

bility of recovering the money from Lowshe

was a contingency too remote upon which

to base a recovery. The fact. that the com-

pany were not advised of any importance

attaching to the message, either by the mes-

sage itself or actual notice given. goes further

to show a case where substantial damages

cannot be recovered.

And in this connection, and as relating to

the question of damages, we may consider

the rule, “causa proxima non remota spec-

tatur," as to which Parsons says (volume 2,

p. 257, "Telegraphs, Measure of Damages"):

“If the telegraph company is in default, but

their default is made mischievous to a party

only by the operation of some other interven-

ing cause, then the rule above mentioned

would prevent the liability of the company;

because their default would only be the re-

mota, the remote or removed cause of the in-

jury, and not the proxlma. or nearest cause."

If the telegraph company were guilty» of

negligence in not delivering the message at

Barnesvilie, the question remains, whether

there would have been a loss if there were no

other cause intervening. Clearly the failure

in the message was not the moving cause

that induced Lowshe to obtain the discounts

and pocket the money; neither would the

delinquency of the telegraph company have

occasioned any damage had Lowshe evi-

denced that integrity which, in a virtuous

mind, would have induced the return of the

money to the bank. The loss was occasioned

by two causes,—the short-coming of the tele-

graph company, in not delivering the mes-

sage. and the still shorter-coming of Lowshe,

in appropriating to himself what belonged to

somebody else.

In Lowery v. Telegraph Co., 60 N. Y. 198,

B. sent a telegram to plaintiff, asking for:

$500; by mistake, the telegraph company

changed the message to $5,000, which B. ob-

tained, embezzled, and absconded. The ref-

eree held the telegraph company liable for the

loss in the whole amount. This was held

error; that defendant's negligence was not

the proximate cause of the loss, as the em-
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pany, the company making such mistake will
not be llnble In damage for such loss."
In Landsberger v. Telegraph Co., 32 Barb.
u36, It was held that plaintiff could not recover damages, because, "on receiving the
tlei<pa tch from transmission, the defendant
had uo Information whutever In relation to It,
or the purposes to be uccompllsbed by it, except what could be tlerived from the dispatch
Itself."
In :.relegrnph Co. v. Gll<lersleve, 29 l\ld. 232,
Allen, Tel. Cas. 390, It ls held that knowletlge
of s11eclal circumstances must be shown, to
lay a foundation for special damages. Stevenson v. Telegraph Co., 16 U. C. Q. B. 530,
5:l7. The telegraph cases, generully, follow
the rule of Hadley v. Baxendale, with regard to notice, as Is shown by the numerous
auth01.'ltles cited by counsel.
It therefore appears to us that the possibility of recove1·lng the money from Lowshe
was a contingency too remote upon which
to base a reco,·ery. The fact that the company were not advised of any importance
attaching to the message, either by the message Itself or actual notice given, goes further
to show a case where substantial damages
cannot be recovered.
And In this connection, and as relating to
the question of damages, we may consider
the rule, "causa proxima non remota spectatur," as to which Parsons says (volume 2,
p. 257, ··Telegraphs, Measure of Damages"):
"If the telegraph company Is ln default, but
their default Is made mischievous to a party
only by the operation of some other Intervening cause, then the rule above mentioned
would prevent the liability of the company;
because their default would only be the remota, the remote or removed cause of the Injury, and not the proxlma, or nearest cause."
If the telegraph company were guilts- of
negligence In not delivering the message at
Barnesvllle, the question remains, whether
there would have been a loss If there were no
other cause Intervening. Clearly the failure
In the messuge was not the moving cause
that Induced Lowshe to obtain the discounts
and pocket the money; neither would the
delinquency of the telegrnph company have
occasioned any damage had Lawshe evidenced that integrity which, In a virtuous
mind, would have Induced the return or the
money to the bank. The loss was occasioned
by two causes,-the short-<'omlng or the telegrnph company, in not delivering the message. and the still 11horter-Pomlng of J..owsl1e,

In appropriating to himself what belonged to
somebody else.
In Lowery v. Telegraph Co., 60 N. Y. 108.
B. sent a telegram to plaintiff, asking for_
$500; by mistake, the telegraph company·
changed the message to $5,UOO, which B. obtained, embezzled, and absconded. The referee held the telegraph company liable for the
loss In the whole amount. This was held
error; that defendant's negligence was not
the proximate cause of the loss, as the embezzlement of B. did not naturully result
therefrom, and could not reasonably havebeen expected.
In this case, the court, quoting from Crain
v. Petrie, 6 Hill, 522, lay down this rule:
"To maintain an action for special damages.
they must appear to be the legal and natural
consequences arising from the tort, and not
from the wrongful act of a tWrd person Induced thereby. In other words, the damages must proceed wholly and exclusively
from the Injury complained of."
In any aspect, therefore, In which we areable to view the case, we cannot but consider that the dnmages are too remote to uphold recovery to any substantial amount.
But the plaintiff was entitled to recover
nominal damages. Upon the breach of an
agreement, the law Infers damages, and, if
none are pro\•etl, noinlnal can be recovered.
Sedg. Meas. Dam. 47; Field, Dam. 679; Parks
v. Telegraph Co., 13 Cal. 425; Oandee v. Telegraph Co., 34 Wis. 471.
The plaintiff asked the court to charge that.
It the nondelivery or the message was by
reason of defendant's negligence, plalntltr
was entitled to nomlnnl damages, If there
were no actual damage. This was refused.
and the court did charge that there was no.
right or action, unle8s Injury was shown.
This was error, for which the Judgment must
be reversed.
The state ot the pleadings relieves us from
consideration of those point.a in the casewhich refer to the special contract which
forms the heading to the message Itself.
This contract was set up as a defense In th~
answer to the original petition. Subsequently, however, an amended petition was filed ..
To this an answer was filed, not making the
original answer a part thereof, and not setting up the special contract as a defense. In
this state of the pleadings, we look to theamendecl petition and answer alone. Thus
the 11peclal contract Is eliminated from thecase. Judgment reversed.
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CONNELL v. “'ESl‘ER..\' UNION TEL. 00.

(22 S. W. 345, 116 Mo. 34.)

Supreme Court of Missouri. Division No. 2.

May 16, 1893.

Error to circuit court, Pettis county; Rich-

ard Field, Judge.

Actionby Mat.hewConnell against the West-

ern Union Telegraph Company for failure to

promptly deliver a telegram. From an or-

der of dismissal for want of jurisdiction,

plaintiff appeals. Atiirmed.

Wm. S. Shirk, for plaintiff in error. Karnes,

Holmes & Krauthoff, Charles E. Yeater, and

G. H. I'‘earons, for defendant in error.

GANTT, P. J. This is an action for dam-

ages for the negligence of defendant in

failing to deliver to plaintiff the following

telegraphic message sent to him by his wife:

“Sedalia, Mo., Dec. 13, 1589. To Matt Con-
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nell, Soldiers' Home, Leavenworth, Kan-

sas: Your child is dying. liiary." The 1

plaintiff alleged that his wife paid the cus-

tomary charge, 50 cents, for its transmis-

sion, and that he had refunded that sum to

her. Piaintiff then alleges that his child died on

the 24th day of December, 1889, "and that if

said message had been transmitted and

delivered with any degree of diligence or

promptness whatever, he would have been

able to be present with his said child during

its last sickness, and at its death, and that ‘

by reason of the great negligence and care-

lessness of defendant in failing to deliver .

said message, and of his being thereby de- I

prived of being with his said child during

its last sickness, and at its death, he lost,

not only the ﬁfty cents paid for sending said

message, but also suffered great anguish and

pain of mind and body, and was physically

and mentally prostrnted when he learned that

his child had died, and been buried, without

knowledge on his part of its sickness and

death." He alleges that he was an inmate

of the soldiers‘ home from December 13,

1889, continuously, till February 21, 1890,

and by the slightest diligence he could have

been found. He alleges, further, that he is

damaged in the sum of $5,000, for which he

prays judgment. On motion of defendant the

circuit court struck out of the petition the

words, “but also suffered great anguish and

pain of mind and body, and was physically

and mentally prostrated, when he learned

that his child had died, and had been buried,

without knowledge on his part of its sick-

ness and death." This left the action pend-

ing for the 50 cents only, and, plaintiff declin-

ing to amend, the court sustained another

motion to dismiss for want of jurisdiction

of the subject-matter of the action.

The sole question discussed by the appel-

lant in this case is this: “Where a telegraph

company is advised by the contents of a

message that great mental suffering and pain

will naturally result from its neglect to trans-

mit aul deliver the message promptly, can

damages be recovered by the sendee for such

mental agony and distress, caused by a fail-

3i6
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cial telegram could recover for the mental an-

guish caused by delay in its delivery. The

authorities relied upon by the supreme court of

Texas in that case were actions for physical

injuries, in which the mental agony formed

an inseparable part,_s. doctrine never ques-

tioned in this state since Porter v. Railroad

Co., 71 Mo. 66. The learned commissioner

who prepared the opinion did quote a sug-

gestion of the authors of Shearman & Red-

ﬂeld on Negligence, to the effect that they

thought such an action ought to lie, but they

did not claim that any court in this country

or England had previously sustained their

view. The Texas mse has been followed in

that state in a great number of cases, and

has been adopted in Indiana, North Carolina,

Kentucky, Alabama, and Tennessee. On the

other hand, this new departure has been vig-
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orously assailed and denied by the supreme

courts of Mississippi, Georgia, Kansas, and

in Dakota, and in a most luminous dissenting

opinion by Judge Lurton, of'the supreme

court of Tennessee, now judge of the United

States circuit court for the sixth circuit, in

which Folkes, J., concurred. The majority

of the supreme court of Tennessee do not

go to the length contended for by the appel-

lant here. The majority lay great stress

upon the fact that by virtue of a statute

in Tennessee a cause of action is given to

the aggrieved party for damages for failure

to deliver any message. Hence they argue

that, as the party has the right to some

damages by virtue of the statute, they con-

clude they may add the anguish of mind as

an element. It is impossible to escape the

feeling that the very able judges were re-

sorting to a ﬁction to justify them in sup-

porting the action. The case of So Relle

v. Telegraph Co., 55 Tex. 310, has been no-

where more ﬂatly repudiated than by the

supreme court of Texas itself, in Railway 00.

v. Levy, 59 Tex. 563. Judge Stayton, in an

able and lucid discussion of the authorities,

demonstrates “that the cases in which

damages have been allowed for mental dis-

tress ‘ ' ' was the incident to a bodily

injury suffered by the distressed person, or

cases of injury to reputation or property, in

which pecuniary damage was shown, or the

act such that the law presumes some dam-

age, however slight, from the act complained

of. They are not cases in which the bodily

injury or other wrong was sai1‘ered by one per-

son, and the mental distress by another." The

reasoning of the supreme court of Tennessee

—that, because the Code gave an action for

some damages, that opened the way to add

damages for mental distress—is, we think, at

complete variance with our own decisions.

In this state we have a damage act which

gives a right of action where death has re-

sulted, and similar statutes exist in most of

the states. The construction placed upon

these statutes has been that no relative,

save those named in the statute, can

recover at all, and no recovery as a
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clal telegram could recover for the mental anguli;h c1msed. by delay In Its delivery. The
authorities relied upon by the supreme court of
Texas In that caee were actions for physical
Injuries, In which the mental agony formed
an Inseparable part,-a doctrine never questioned In this state slnoe Porter v. Rallroad
Co., n Mo. 66. The loo.med commissioner
who propnred the opinion did quote a suggestion of the authors of Shenrmnn & Redfield on Negligence, to the effect that they
thought such an aotlon ought to Ile, but they
did not claim that any court In this country
or England had previously sustained their
vle-w. Tiie Texas cn.se has been followed In
that state In a groat number of cases, and
bas been adopted In Indiana, North Carolina,
Kentucky, Alabama, and Tennessee. On the
other hand, this new departure has been vigorously assnlled. and denied by the supreme
courts of Mississippi, Georgia, Kllll.9llS, and
In Dakota, and In a inost luminous dissenting
opinion by Judge Lurton, of· the supreme
court of Tennessee, now judge of the United
States circuit court for the sixth cl.rcult, In
which Folkes, J., concurred. The majority
of the supreme court of Tennessee do not
go to the length contended for by the appellant here. 'l'he majority lay great stress
upon the fact that by virtue of a statute
In Tennessee a cause of notion ls given to
the aggrieved party for damages for failure
10 <leJl\·er nuy message. Hence they argue
that, as the party has the right to some
damages by virtue of the statute, they conclude they may add the anguish of mind a.e
:m el<.'ment. It ls impossible to escape the
feeling that the very able judges were resorting to a fiction to justify them In supporting the action. The case of So Relle
v. TelPgrnph Co., 55 Tex. 310, has been nowhere more 11ntly repudinted thim by the
supreme oourt of Texns itself, In Railway Oo.
v. Levy, 59 Tex. 563. Judge Stayton, in an
able and lucid discussion of the authorities,
demonstrates "that the cases In which
darunges have been allowed for mental distress • • • was the lnctdent to a bodily
Injury suft.'ered by the distressed person, or
cases of Injury to reputation or property, In
which pecuniary damage wns shown, or the
net such that the law presumes some dam·
ai:-e, however slight, from the net complained
ot. 'l'lley are not oases In which the bodily
Injury or other wrong was sulfered by one person, nnd the mental distress by another." The
reasoning of the supreme court of Tennessee
- that, because the Code gave an notion for
some damnges, that opened the way to add
d:1mn1.ws for mental distress-ls, we think, at
complete variance witlh our own decisions.
In this state we have a damage act which
gives a right Cl'! action where death has re11nlted, and slm!lnr statutes cx.lst in most of
~b.e smtc>s.
The <'Onstrnotion placed upon
1lwse statutes has been that no rcla tlve,
i;ave those named In the statute, can
l'('('Over at all, 1111d no recovery as a
solatlum for mental sulfe1ing Is allowed,

where n&t exprl'Ssly given by the statute.
Field, Dam. 498; Porter v. Rallrn:ul Co., 71
Mo. 66; Parsons v. Railroad Oo., 91 Mo.
286, 6. S. W. Rep. 464; Schaub v. Railroad
Oo., 106 Mo. 74, 16 S. W. Rep. 924.
But lt is said damages for Injury to the
feelings have always been allowed In actlom
founded upon a breach of promise to marry,
and this Is true In this as In other stwtes. Wilbur v. Johnson, 58 r.Io. 600; Bird v. Thompson, 96 Mo. 424, 9 S. W. Itep. 788. But it
has always been regarded as an exception to
the rule. In this aotion, plalntlft."s pecuniary
loss forms an important element. The action ls ot common-Jaw origin, and at common
law the husband, on marriage, became liable
for the wife's debts, and for support ln a
manner and style oommensurnte with his
own social standing, and evidence of his station In ll!e and flnnnclal oondition has always
been admitted. Wilbur v . .Johnson, supra.
As was well said by Cooper, J., in Telegraph
Co. v. Rogers, 68 l'l!lss. 748, 9 South. Rep.
8'.!3: "This action, though In form one tor
the breach of contract, part:iJ;:es In several fealur<'S of the chnra.cteristlcs of an
action for the wlllful tort; and, though the
damages recoverable for the plain tUr for
mental suffering are spoken of as 'compensatory,' the fervent language of the courts
lndlrates how shadowy ls the line that sep·
arntes them from those strictly perunlary."
Harrison v. Swift, 13 Allen, 144; Kurtz T.
Frank, 76 Ind. 595; Thom v. Knapp, 42 N.
Y. 475; Coryell v. Colbaugh, 1 N. ;J. Law,
77. "Especially those cases In which evidence of seduction Is admlbt.ed to ascertain
the damages. So much, Indeed, does the
motive of the defendant enter Into the question of damages, that In J<>hnson v. Jenkins,
24 N. Y. 252, the defendant was permitted
to give In evidence, In mltigntlo11 of dam·
ages, the faot that he refused to consummate
the marriage because of the settled opposition of his morther, who was In lntlrm
health."
'l'hese considerations sufficiently Indicate
the reasons that actuated the courts to
make this exception. Few · precedents for
this action will be found where the defend·
ant was impecunious. The learned counsel
has collected various other cases In whkh
mental anguish was recognized as an element of damage, and concludes with the
query, "If allowed In these, why not In this
action?" Let us consider these In the order
of his brief: Assault and battery. Under
this head ls cited the case of Crnke1· v.
R111lway Co., 36 Wis. 657. In that case the
comluctor of a train seized upon the moment when the other employes were absent
from the car to take Improper liberties with
a Indy passenger. The evidence showing that
he placed his nrm ar01md her, and, against
her vehement protests, kissed her. It was
a clear physical violation of her person,
which the courts have ever held constituted
nn n11snult and battt'l'Y, and actionable. Thr.
law rech'esst'S sud1 a wrong In Its Initial
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stages. The protection of the person has

ever been an object of great solicitnde to

the common law. The present ability of

actual violence often justiﬁes recourse to

extreme measures in preventing a consum-

mation of threatened wrong to the person.

The cases cited under this head clearly add no

weight to plaintiff's claim. The cases of ma-

licious prosecution and false imprisonment

come under that general class of willful

wrong to the person, affecting the liberty,

character, reputation, personal security, and

domestic relations. Judge Lumpkin, in Chap-

man v. Telegraph Co., (Ga.) 15 S. E. Rep. 901,

disposes of the argument attempted to be

drawn from this class as follows: “In an ac-

tion for wrongful attachment, on the ground ‘

that the defendant was about to dispose of his

property with intent to deprive his creditors,
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it was held (by a divided court) that the mor-

tiﬁcation was a part of the actual damages. .

Byrne v. Gardner, 33 La. Ann. 6. Of course '

it was a case of serious injury to the plain-

tit!'s business standing, and therefore, even if

sound, is no authority on the present question.

In an action for false imprisonment, or for

malicious arrest and prosecution, mental an-

guish has been held a proper subject for

compensatory damages. Fisher v. Hamil-

ton, 49 Ind. 341; Stewart v. Maddox, 63

Ind. 51; Coleman v. Allen, 79 Ga. 637, 5

S. E. Rep. 204. Of course, such injuries are

essentially willful, and, besides, are viola-

tions of the great right of personal security

or personal liberty." As to the action of

seduction, every lawyer knows that proof

of some service by the daughter has been

invariably required to sustain it; and the

same rule is rigidly adhered to in Magee v.

Holland, 27 N. J. Law, 86, to which we are

cited by counsel, for the forcible abduction

of a daughter. In the case of enticing away

a daughter, we are referred to Stowe v.

Heywood,7 Allen, 118. The court permitted .

damages for mental suffering on the express

ground that it was a willful injury, and

declined to say whether such damages could

ever be recovered for negligence alone, as

in the case at bar. This case illustrates the

greatest diiiienlty in estimating damages

for mental suffering. Judge Mctcalf says:

“Mental suffering cannot be measured aright

by outward manifestations, for there may

be a show of great distress where little or

none is felt. And great distress may be

concealed, and borne in silence, with an

apparently quiet mind. Ab inquieto saepe

simulator quies." "And we nowhere ﬁnd

that any other evidence of mental suffer-

ing, besides that of the injury which was

the alleged cause of action, was ever be-

fore admitted." The court reversed the

case because the trial court permitted evi-

dence “tending to show" plaintif f suffered

from “pain and anxiety of mind." It is

hardly necessary to add that in a case of

libel or slander, if the words are not ac-

tionable per se, special damages must be al-
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plaintiff, is not to be expected. That the

grief natural to the death of a loved relative

shall be separated from the added grief

and anguish resulting from delayed informa-

tion of such mortal iliness or death, a.nd

compensation given for the latter only, is

the task imposed by the law, as determined

by the majo1ity of the supreme court of

Tennessee." “It is legitimate to consider

the evils to which such a precedent logically

leads. Upon what sound legal considera-

tions can this court refuse to award dam-

ages for injury to the feelings, mental dls- :

tress, and humiliation, when such injury re-

sults from the breach of any contract? Take

the case of a debtor who agrees to return

the money borrowed on a certain day, who

breaches his agreement willfully, with

knowledge that such breach on his part
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will probably result in the ﬁnancial ruin

and dishonor of his disappointed creditor.

Why shall not such a debtor, in addition to

the debt and the interest, also compensate his

creditor for this ruin, or at least for his

mental sufferings? Upon what principle

can we longer refuse to entertain an action

for injured feelings consequent upon the

use of abusive and defamatory language,

not charging a crime, or resulting in special

pecuniary damage? Mental distress is, or

may be in some cases, as real as bodily

pain, and it as certainly results from lan-

guage not amounting to an imputation of

crime; yet such actions have always been

dismissed as not authorized by the law as

it has come down to us, and as it has been

for all time administered."

this state in regard to this contract, shall it

not apply to all disappointments and mental

sufferings caused by delays in railroad '

trains? Telegraph companies are common

carriers; so are railroad companies; and yet

this court, in the Trigg Case, held the com-

pany not liable for mental anguish, as an

independent cause of action for a mere act

of negligence. A similar conclusion was also

reached in the United States circuit court

for the fourth circuit in Wilcox v. Railroad

Co., 52 Fed. Rep. 264, 3 C. C. A. 73, where

the plaintiff made a special contract for a

train to take him to the bedside of a sick

parent. The court held that the trouble of

mind caused by the delay at a railroad

station could not be made the basis of an

action, saying: “But we know of no decided

case which holds that mental pain alone,

unattended by injury to the person, caused ‘

, Co., 66 Tex. 580, 18 S. W. Rep. 351; Rail-

by simple negligence, can sustain an action."

“The plaintiff was the subject of two mental

pains,—one, for the condition of the sick

person; the other, from the delay at the sta-

tion,—the latter, only, being the subject of .

this action." “It cannot be pretended that

damages from the latter cause of ‘anxie-

ty' and ‘suspense'—uncertain, indeﬁnite, un-

deﬁnable, unascertainable, dependent so

largely on the peculiar temperament of the

DALJAGES IN ACTIONS AGAINST TELEGlL\l'H UOMPANIES.
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89 Ala. 510, '7 South. Rep. 419;Thompson v.

Tele;:raph Co., 106 N. C. 549, 11 S. E. Rep.

269; Chapman v. Same. (Ky.) 13 S. W. Rep.

880; Young v. Same, 107 N. O. 370, 11 S. E.

Rep. 1044; Thomp. Elect. 5 378, and cases

cited. The cases opposing this view are, no-

tably, the dissenting opinion of Judge Lurton

in Wadsworth v. Telegraph Co., 86 Tenn.

695, S S. W. Rep. 574; Chapman v. Telegraph ‘

Co., (Ga.) 15 S. E. Rep. 901, in which Judge

Lumpkin, of the supreme court of Georgia, '

reviews all the cases in a most admirable

tone, and with great clearness; Wilcox v.

Railroad Co., (4th circuit,) 52 Fed. Rep. 264,

3 C. C. A. 73; Crawson v. Telegraph Co., 47

Fed. Rep. 544; Chase v. Same, 44 Fed. Rep.

554, where all the authorities are cited; West

v. Same, 39 Kan. 93, 17 Pac. Rep. 807; Russell

v. Same, 3 Dak. 315, 19 N. W. Rep. 408; Tele-
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graph Co. v. Rogers, 68 Miss. 748, 9 South.

Rep. 823; Lynch v. Knight, 9 H. L. 577; Com-

missioners v. Coultas, L. R. 13 App. Cas. 222;

'1‘yler v. Telegraph Co., 54 Fed. Rep. 634;

Kester v. Telegraph Co., (Taft, Judge,) 3.3

Fed. Rep. 603.

We are fully aware that the plaintiﬂ."s

claim appeals strongly to the sensibilities;

but to adopt that view we must either be

guilty of adopting one rule of damages for

I one class of common carriers, and the breach

t of their contracts, or we must conclude that

1 all of our predecessors in the great common-

; law courts were at fault, and henceforth

‘ repudiate, not only their utterances, but our

own, on this subject, and this we have no

inclination to do. We prefer to travel yet

awhile super antiquas vias. If, in the evolu-

tion of society and the law, this innovation

should be deemed necessary. the legislature

can be safely trusted to introduce it, with '

those limitations and safeguards which will

be absolutely necessary, judging from the

variety of cases that have sprung up since

the promulgation of the Texas case. Our

conclusion is, the judgment should be and is

aﬂlrmed. All concur.

DAMAGES J!'OR CA.USING DE.A.TH.

380

DWYER v. CHICA.GO, ST. P;, M. & O. RY.

co.
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DWYER v. CHICAGO, ST. P.', M. & O. RY.

CO.

(51 N. W. 244, 84 Iowa, 479.)

Supreme Court of Iowa. Feb. 1, 1892.

Appeal from district court, Plymouth coun-

ty; Scott M. Ladd, Judge.

Action for pe|sonal injury. Judgment for

plaintiff and the defendant appealed.

(ISl N. W. 244. 84 Iowa, 479.)
Supreme Court of Iowa. Feb. 1, 1892.
Appeal from district court, Plymouth county; Scott M. Ladd, Judge.
Action tor personal Injury. Judgment for
plalntHl' and the defendant appealed.
J. H. & C. M. Swan, for appellant. Joy,
Hudson, Call & Joy, for appellee.

J. H. & C. M. Swan, for appellant. Joy,

Hudson, Call & Joy, for appellee.

GRANGER, J. 1. The plaintif f is the ad-

ministrator of the estate of Ann Dwyer,

deceased, who was on the 9th day of July,

1889, struck by defendant's cars, as a re-

sult of which she died about 30 days there-

after. The petition speciﬁes the injuries sus-

tained, and adds: “All of which caused her

great pain and suffering for a period of about ,

thirty days, when she died from such in-
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juries." A motion to strike out the words as

to pain and suffering was overruled, and the

court instructed the jury that, if it found for

the plaintlff, to allow a “reasonable compen-

sation for pain and suffering." The jury re-

turned a general verdict for the plaintiff for

$3,000, and specially found that $2,300 of the

amount was for “pain and suffering," and

$700 “as damages to the estate." An assign-

ment brings in question the correctness of

the court‘s action in permitting the jury to

consider pain and suffering as an element of

damage. The action was commenced after

the death of plaintli‘i."s intestate. If the ac-

tion had been commenced in her life-time, it

is unquestioned that pain a-nd suffering caus-

ed by the injury would have been a proper

element of damage; and this would be true

if, after the commencement of the action, she

had died, and her administrator had been sub-

stituted as party plaintiff, and prosecuted

the suit to judgment. Muldowney v. Rail-

way Co., 36 Iowa, 462. We come, then, to

the important inquiry if such damages are

permissible in such a case, where the action

is commenced by the administrator. The

only authority for maintaining such an action

by the legal representative is by virtue of the

statute. At the common law, the cause of

action abated with the death of the injured

party. The law authorizing the action is

found in Code, 2525. “All causes of action

shall survive and may be brought notwith-

standing the death of the person entitled or

liable to the same." We are cited to no case,

in this or any other state, where the rule

contcnded for by the appellee, and allowed

by the district court, has been sustained. It

is claimed, however, that the reason for this,

as to other states, is because of the peculiar-

ity of the statutes under which such actions

are permitted to survive. In several cases

this court has expressed its view as to the

measure of damages in such cases, and in

such a way that the appellant regards the

law on this point as settled in its favor, while

the appellee regards the language thus relied

upon as merely incidental to other points de-

termined, and in no way decisive of the ques-

GRANGER, J. 1. The plalntltr ls the administrator ot the estate of Ann Dwyer,
deceased, who was on the 9th day ot July,
1889, struck by defendant's cars, as a result of which she died about 30 days thereafter. The petition specifies the Injuries sustained, and adds: "All of which caused her
great pain and suffering tor a period ot about
tlllrty days, when she died from such injuries." A motion to strike out tlle words as
to pain and eutrerlng was overruled, and the
court instructed the jury that, it it found for
the plaintl11', to allow n "reasonable compensation for pain and sull'erlng." The jury returned a general verdict for the plalntltr for
$3,000, and specially found that $2,300 of the
amount was for "paln and sulfering," and
$i00 ''as damages to the estate." An assignment brings In question the correctness of
the court's action In permitting the jury to
consider pain and sull'ering as an element ot
damage. The action was commenced after
tlle death ot plalntUf's Intestate. It the uctlon had been commenced in her Ute-time, it
Is unquestioned that pain and sutrerlog caused by the Injury would have been a proper
element ot damage; and this would be true
if, atter the commencement ot the action, she
had died, and her admlnistmtor had been substituted as party plalntlll', and prosecuted
the suit to judgment. Muldowney v. Railway Co., 36 Iowa, 462. We come, then, to
the Important inquiry It such damages are
permissible in such a case, where the action
le commenced by the administrator. The
only authority tor maintaining such an action
by the legal representative ls by virtue of the
statute. At the common law, the cause ot
action abated with the death ot the Injured
party. The law authorizing the action le
found In Code, § 2525. "All causes ot action
shall survive and may be brought notwithstanding the death of the person entitled or
liable to tlle same." We are cited to no case,
In this or any other state, where the rule
contended tor by the appellee, and allowed
hr the district court, has been sustained. It
Is dnhned, however, that the reason tor this,
as to other states, le because ot the peculiarity of the statutes under which such actions
are permitted to survive. In several cases
this court has expressed Its view as to the
measure of damages In such cases, and lo
such n wny that the appellant regards the
lnw on this l>Olnt as settled In Its favor, while
the nppellee regards the language thu11 relied

upon as merely Incidental to other points determined, and ln no way decisive of the question now before us. It is true that the precise question now before us was not Involved
for determination In any ot the Iowa cases
cited, and the language relied upon by the appellant has been used lncldeotally In the discussion ot other questions; but It is not to be
understood, because ot this, that such language ls without value In our deliberations on
this question; tor much of the language so
used le In regard to questions so allied to this
In Its legal significance as to make them determlna ble upon quite similar considerations.
For Instance, the rule as to the measure ot
damage In cases ot this kind has been considered, and, with the point before us in view, a
rule excluding such damage has been adopted.
In Rose v. Railway Co., 39 Iowa, 246, It ls
said: "The action is brought by the administrator tor the Injury to the estate ot the deceased sustained In bis death. There ls therefore no basis tor damage for pain and suffering. • • • Compensation for the pecuniary
loss to his estate le alone to be allowed."
See, also, Donaldson v. Railway Co., 18 Iowa,
at page 290, and Muldowney v. Railway Co.,
: 36 Iowa, at page 468. In the latter case the
action was commenced by the Injured party,
who died pending the suit, and his administrator was substituted; and It was held thnt
pain and sull'erlng were proper elements ot
damage because ot the action having been
commenced by the Injured party; but the
court guards the rule by saying: "A different
rule would obtain If the action had been commenced after his death." It ls thought that
the expression may be accounted tor on the
1 theory that the case was determined under a
dltrerent statute. Rev. St. § 3467, under
which the action arose, ls as follows: "~o
cause of action ex delicto dies with either or
both of the parties, but the prosecution the1-eot may be commenced or continued by or
against their personal representatives." With
reference to the particular matter under consideration, It is dUDcult to trace a distinction
between the statutes. The one says, In effect, that such causes of action shall survive
the party, and the other that It does not die
with the party. The effect of each ls to create a survival, and the one, as plainly as the
other, contemplates the existence of the cause
ot action before the death. It Is not the ef·
feet ot either, as seems to be thought by the
appellee, to create a cause ot action because
of the death. The statutes deal with the
"cause of action," and not with the rule ot
damage to be applied. In fixing the damage, we look to the wrong to be remedied;
to the Injury to be repaired. It the action Is
brought by the Injured party, the law attempts to remedy the wrong to blm,-not specifically to hie estate,-and that may Include
loss ot property, time, and that bodily ease
and comfort to which he ls entitled as against
the wrong-doers. If the action ls brought to
repair an injury to his estnte, the law lookil,
'j
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in ﬁxing the rule of damage, to how the es-

tate is affected by the act, and attempts to

repair the injury. Loss of time and expenses

paid, as a result of the wrong, presumably

lessen the estate; but bodily pain and sutfer-

mg in no manner affect it. It is an item of

damage peculiar to the person, and not to

pecuniary or property rights. Under our stat-

ute, these damages belong "to the estate of

the deceased." Code, § 2526. This distinc-

tion is maintained throughout all the cases

and authorities that have come to our notice.

This court has repeatedly said that these ac-

tions are for “injury to the estate." See

cases cited supra: Rose v. Railway Co., Don-

aldson v. Railway Co., Muldowney v. Rali-

way Co. Mr. Sutherland. in his work on

Damages, (volume 3, p. 282,) speaking in gen-
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eral of these statutes of survival of actions,

says: “The measure of damages is not the

loss or suffering of the deceased, but the in-

jury resulting from his death to his family.

It is only for pecuniary injuries that this stat-

utory right of action is given. Although it

can be maintained only in cases in which an

action could have been brought by the de-

ceased if he had survived, damages are given

on different principles and for different caus-

es. Neither the pain and suffering of the de-

ceased, nor the grief and wounded feelings of

his surviving relatives, can be taken into ac-

count in the estimate of damages." In Rail-

way Co. v. Barron, 5 Wall. 90, a like case, it

is said, speaking of the wife or next of kin,

who, under the Illinois statutes, are the bene-

ﬁciaries in such a case: “They are conﬁned

to the pecuniary injuries resulting to the wife

and next of kin; whereas, if the deceased had

survived, a wider range of inquiry would

have been admitted. It would have embraced

personal suffering as well as pecuniary loss,

and there would have been no ﬁxed limita-

tion as to the amount." The language of

the Illinois statute is different in phrascology

from ours, but not to the extent of inducing

a different rule in this respect. Under the

statute of Minnesota. so similar to ours as to

justify the same rule as to these damages, it

is held that “no compensation can be given

' ' ' for the pain and suffering of the de-

ceased." Hutchins v. Railway Co. Qiinn.) 46

N. W. 79. We conclude, without doubt, that

the district court erred in its ruling on the

motion and the instruction to the jury. Some

other questions are argued which we have

examined, the consideration of which would

require extensive quotations from the evi-

dence. and we think they do not involve re-

versible error, and it is unnecessary to dis-

cuss them. The cause is remanded to the

district court, with instructions to deduct

from the judgment entered the $2,300 allowed

for pain and suffering, and give judgment for

the balance. Modiﬁed and aﬂirmed.

in fixing the rule of damage, to how the estate ls affected by the act, and attempts to
repair the Injury. Loss of time and expenses
paid, BB a reeult of the wrODIJ, presumably
lessen the estate; but bodily pain and sutrerlng ln no manner atiect It. It ls an item or
damage peculiar to the person, and not to
pecuniary or property rights. Under our statute, these damages belong "to the estate of
the deceD.sed." Code, § 2526. This distinction Is maintained throughout all the cases
and authorities that have come to our notice.
This court bas repeatedly said that these actions are for "Injury to the estate." See
cases cited supra: Rose v. Railway Co., Donaldson v. Railway Co., Muldowney v. Railway Co. Mr. Sutherland, in his work on
Damages, (volume 3, p. 282,) speaking in general of these statutes of survival of actions,
says: ''The measure or damages ls not the
loss or suffering of the deceased, but the injury resulting from bis death to bis family.
It ls only for pecunlary lnjurl.ell that this statutory right of action is given. Although lt
can be maintained only ln cases In which an
action could have been brought by the deceased If he had survived, damages are given
on different prlnclplea and for dlffel'ent causes. Neither the pain and suffering or the deceased, nor the grief and wounded feelings of
h1a survlvlDIJ relatives, can be taken into account lo the estimate ot damages." In Rall-

way Co. v. Barron, 5 Wall. 90, a like case, It
Is said, speaking of the wife or next of kin,
who, under ti.le Illinois statutes, are the beneficiaries In such a case: "They are confined
to the pecuniary Injuries resulting to the wife
and next of kin; whereas, if the deceased had
sul'vived, a wider range of Inquiry would
have been admitted. It would have embraced
personal sutl'erlng as well as pecuniary loss,
and there wouhl have been no fixed limitation as to the amount." The language of
the Illinois statute ls different In phraseology
from ours, but not to the extent of inducing
a different rule In this respect. Under tlm
statute or Minnesota, so similar to ours as to
justify the same rule as to these damages, it
ls held that "no compensation can be given
• • • for the pain and suft'erlng of the deceased." Hutchins v. Ilall"·ay Co. (Minn.) 46
N. W. 79. We conclude, without doubt, that
the district court erred in its ruling on th~
motion and the Instruction to the jury. Some
other questions are argued which we havo
examined, the consideration or which would
require extensive quotations from the evidence, and we think they do not Involve reversible error, and It ls unnecessary to discuss them. 'l'he cause 111 remanded to the
district court, with instructions to deduct
from the judgment entered the ,2,300 allowed
for pain and sulrering, and give judgment fo1·
the balance. ModlJled and a.tll.rmed.
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MORGAN v. SOUTHERN PAC. CO. (No.

14,812.)

(30 Pac. 603, 95 Cal. 510.)

Supreme Court of California. Aug. 5, 1892.

Department 2. Appeal from superior court,

Kern county; A. R. Conklin, Judge.

Action by Flora Morgan against the South-

ern Paciﬁc Company to recover damages for

the death of her child caused by defendant's

negligence. From a judgment rendered on

the verdict of a jury in favor of plaintiff, de-

fendant appeals. Reversed.

The facts fully appear in Morgan v. Paciﬁc

Co., 30 Pac. 601.

E. L. Craig, Foshay Walker, Horace Hawes,

and R. B. Carpenter, for appellant. Charles

MORGAN v. SOUTHRRN PAC. CO.
14,812.)

(No.

(30 Pac. 603, 95 Cal. 510.)

Supreme Court of California. Aug. 5, 1892.
Department 2. Appeal from superior court,
Kern county; A. R. Conklin, Judge.
Action by Flora Morgan against the South·
ern Pacific Company to recover damages for
the death of her child caused by defendant's
negligence. From a judgment rendered on
the verdict of a jury In favor of plniotltr, defendant appeals. Reversed.
The facts fully appear In Morgan v. Pacific
Co., 30 Pac. 601.
El. L. Craig, Foshay Walker, Horace Hawes,
and R. B. Carpenter, for appellant. Charles
G. Lamberson, Lamberson & Taylor, and J.
W. Ahern, for respondent.

G. Lambcrson, Lamherson & Taylor, and J.

W. Ahern, for respondent.

liIcFARLAND, J. The parties to this ac-
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tion are the same as in Morgan v. Paciﬁc Co.,

30 Pac. Rep. 601 (No. 14,841, this day decid-

ed), in which plaintiff recovered a judgment

for $15,000 for alleged personal injuries re-

ceived by being thrown from the steps of de-

fendant's car, which judgment was by this

court aﬂirmed. When she fell from the steps

of the car she had in her arms her infant

daughter, aged about two years. Nine days

afterwards the child died ﬁom an attack of

pnenmonia; and plaintiff brought this present

action to recover damages for the death of said

child, upon the theory that the pnenmonia was

caused by said fall. The jury gave her dam-

ages in the amount of $20,000, for which sum

judgment was rendered; and defendant ap-

peals from the judgment, and from an order

denying a motion for a new trial. The evi-

dence upon the issues of the alleged negligence

of defendant's employes at the time of the ac-

cident, and the alleged contributory negligence

of piaintiff, was substantially the same as in

the other case, and as to those issues the ver-

dict cannot be disturbed. There was some ev-

idence tending slightly to show that the death

of the child was caused by the accident, but

it is not necessary to inquire whether or not it

was suﬂicient to establish that fact, because

the judgment must clearly be reversed on ac-

count of the excessive damages awarded by

the jury.

There_was no averment in the complaint of

any special damage, and no averment of any

damage at all, except the general statement

that the child died, "to the damage of plaintif

f

in the sum of ﬁfty thousand dollars;" and

there was no evidence whatever introduced or

offered upon the subject of damage. The ju-

ry. therefore, had nothing before them upon

which to base damages except the naked fact

of the death of a female child two years old;

and it is apparent. at ﬁrst blush, that “the

amount of the damages is obviously so dispro-

portionate to the injury proved as to justify

the conclusion that the verdict is not the result

of the cool and dispassionate discretion of the

jury." The main element of damage to plain-

tiff was the probable value of the services of

McFARLAND, J. The parties to this action are the same as In Morgan v. Pacific Co.,
30 Pac. Rep. 601 (No. 14,841, this day decld·
ed), In which plalntltr recovered a judgment
for $15,000 for alleged personal Injuries received by being thrown trom the steps of defendant's car, which judgment was by this
court amrmed. When she fell from the steps
of the car she had In her arms her Infant
daughter, aged about two years. Nine days
afterwards the child died from an attack of
pneumonia; and plalntlft' brought this present
action to recover damages tor the death of said
child, upon the theory that the pneumonia was
caused by said tall. The jury gave her dam·
ages In the amount ot $20,000, for which sum
judgment was rendered; and defendant appeals trom the judgment, and from an order
denying a motion for a new trial. The evl·
dence upon the Issues ot the alleged negligence
ot defendant's employes at the time of the ac·
cldent, and the alleged contributory negligence
ot plalntltr, was substantially the same as in
the other case, and as to those Issues the verdict cannot be disturbed. There was some ev·
ldence tending slightly to show that the death
ot the child was caused by the accident, but
It Is not necessary to Inquire whether or not It
was sufficient to establish that tact, because
the judgment must clearly be reversed on ac·
count of the excessive damages awarded by
the jury.
There .was no averment In the complaint of
any special damage, and no averment of any
dama~e at all, except the general statement
that the child died, "to the damage of plnlntltr
In the sum ot fifty thou88nd dollars;" and
there was no evidence whatever Introduced or
offere<l upon the subject of damage. The ju·
ry. therefore, had nothing before them upon
which to l:nse damages except the naked fact
of the death of a female cbll<l two years old;
and It Is apparent, at first blush, that "the
amount of the damages ls obviously so dlsproportlonute to the Injury proved as to justify
the conclusion thnt the verdict Is not the result
of the cool and <Iii-passionate lll,:cretlon of thf

jury."

The main element of damage to plain-

tiff was the probable value of the services

or

the deceased untll she had attained her ma·
jorlty, consl<lerlng the cost of her support and
maintenance during the early and helplew
part of her llfe. We think that the court erred
In charging that "the jury ls not limited by the
actual pecuniary Injury sustained by her, by
reason of the death of her child." An action
to recover damages for the death of a relative
was not known to the common law; It Is ot
recent legislative origin. There are statutes
In many of the American stat~ providing for
such an action, and It bas been quite uniformly held that In such an action tht! plalntitr does
not re1>resent the right of action which the deceased would have bad If the latter bad survived the Injury, but can recover only for the
pecuniary loss sulfered by the plalntltr on account of the death of the relative; that sorrow
and mental anguish caused by the death are
not elements of damage; and that notblng can
be recovered as a solatlum for wounded feel~
lngs. The authorities.outside of this state are
almost unanimous to the point above stated.
The following are a tew of such authorities:
Railroad Co. v. Vandever, 36 Pa. St. 298; Iron
Co. v. Rupp, 100 Pa. St. 95; Railroad Co. v.
Freeman, 36 Ark. 41; Railroad Co. v. Brown,
26 Kan. 443; Pennsylvania Co. v. Lilly, 73
Ind. 252; Donaldson v. Rallroed Co., 18 Iowa,
280; Railroad Co. v. Paulk, 2! Ga. 3fitl; Railroad Co. v. Miller, 2 Cc.lo. 4H6; Kesler v.
Smith, 66 N. C. 154; March v. Walker, 48
·.rex. 372; Railroad Co. v. I.evy, 59 Tex. 003;
James \"'. Christy, l!i Mo l!l2; Hyatt v.
Adams, 16 Mich. 180; Cblcago v. Major, 18
Ill. 349; Railroad Co. v. Delaney, 82 Ill 198;
Blake v. Railroad Co., 18 Q. B. 93.
With respect to the decisions In this state we
do not think those cited by respondent (except
one) are, when closely examined, Inconsistent
with the general authorities. Beeson v. Min·
Ing Co., 57 Cal. 20, Is a leading case on tbe
subject, and ls cited by all the cases which
follow It. In that case the action was brought
by the widow for the death of her husband,
and the question was whether or not the lower
court erred In allowing evidence of the kindly
relations between the plalntllf lllld the deceased during the llfetlme of the latter. Tbe
court sustained the ruling of the court below,
but clearly upon the ground that those relations could be considered only in estimating
the pecuniary loss. The court say: "It ls
true that in one sense the value of social relations and of society cannot be measured
by any pecuniary standard; • • • but, In
another sense, It might be not only possible,
but eminently fitting, that a loes from seve-rIng socln.l relations, or from deprivation of
society, might be measured or at least considered from a pecuniary standpoint. • • •
If a husband and wife were living apart by
mutual consent, neither rendering the other
assistance or kindly offices, the Jury might
take Into consideration the absence of social
relations and the absence of society lu estl·

DAMAGES FOR CAUSING DEATH.
DAMAGES FOR CAUSI-.\'G DEATH.

383

mating the loss sustained by either from

the death of the other. So if the husband

and wife had lived together in concord, each

rendering kindly oﬂices to the other, such

facts might be taken into consideration, not,

as the books say, for the purpose of afford-

ing solace in money, but for the purpose of

estimating pecuniary losses. The loss of a

kind husband may be a considerable pe-

cuniary loss to a wife; she loses his advice

and assistance in many matters of domestic

economy." A quotation is made from a

Pennsylvania case where the same rule was

applied to the loss of a wife, the court say-

ing that “certainly the service of a wife is

pecuniarlly more valuable than that of a

mere hireling." The Beeson Case, therefore,

does not decide that the jury may depart

from a pecuniary standpoint in assessing
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damages; it merely holds that in estimating

the pecuniary losses of a wife from the

death of her husband they may consider

whether or not the deceased was a good has-

band, able and willing to provide well for

his wife. The opinion of the court no doubt

goes somewhat further in this direction than

the general current of authorities, but it de-

cides nothing more than above stated. Cook

v. Railroad Co., 60 Cal. 604. also cited by re-

spondent, decides nothing more than the

Beeson Case. In McKeever v. Railroad Co.,

.39 Cal. 300, the point was not involved, and

in Nehrbas v. Railroad Co., 62 Cal, 320, the

point does not appear in any way to have

been involved; and the dictum at the close

of the opinion, as it refers to the Beeson

Case, must be held as only intended to go to

the length of the latter case. It is true, how-

ever, that in Cleary v. Railroad Co., 76 Cal.

240, 18 Pac. 269, a decision in department,

views were expressed favorable to respond-

ent's contention. The opinion of the commis-

sion in that case was, however, expressly

based on Beeson v. Mining Co., supra, and

upon, as we have seen, a misunderstanding

of that case. There appears to have been no

petition for a hearing in bank. it was stat-

ed in that case that there could be a recov-

ery for the “mental anguish and suffering of

the parents." but we have been referred to

no other case that holds such doctrine. Cer-

tainly it was not so held in the Beeson

Vase. But entirely contrary views were ex-

pressed in the latest decision of this court

on the subject (Munro v. Reclamation Co.,

84 Cal. 515, 24 Pac. 306). In that case-

which was for the death of an adult son—

the lower court had instructed that the jury

in estimating the damages might consider

“the sorrow, grief, and mental suffering oc-

casioned by his death to his mother;" and

this court held the instruction erroneous,

and for that reason reversed the judgment,

the court holding that such a rule would

afford an “opportunity to run into wild and

excessive verdicts." The court said: “We

are of opinion that the court erred in includ-

ing in the instruction the words‘ ‘sorrow,

mating the loss sustained by either from
tbe death of the other. So It the husband
~nd wtfe had lived together In concord, ea.ch
rendering kindly omces to the other, such
facts might be taken Into consideration, not,
as the books say, tor the purpose of affording solace In money, but for the purpose of
.estimating pecuniary losses. The loss of a
kind hu"band mny be n considerable pe-cunlnry loss to a wife; she loses his ndvice
and assistance In many matters of domestic
-t->conomy." A quotation Is made from a
Pennsylvania case where the same rule was
ap11llro to the loss of a wife, the court saylng that "certainly the service of a wife Is
pecunlarlly more valuable than that of a
mere hireling." The Beeson Case, therefore,
does not decide that the jury may depart
from a pecu.nlary standpoint In a11sesslng
damages; It merely holds that In estimating
the pecuniary losses of a wife from the
death of her husband thl'y may consider
·whether or not the decoosed was a good hus·
band, able and willing to provide well for
his wife. The opinion of the court no doubt
goes somewhat further In this direction than
the general current of authorltlee, but It dc<!ldes nothing more than above stated. Cook
v. Railroad Co., 60 Cal. 004, also cited by r1>t1pondent, decides nothing more than the
Beeson Case. In McKeever v. Railroad Co.,
U9 Cal. 300, the point was not Involved, and
ln Nehrbe.s v. Railroad Co., 62 Cal, 320, the
point does not appear In any way to have
been Involved; and the dictum at the close
of the opinion, as It refers to the Beeson
Case, must be held as only Intended to go to
the length of the latter case. It ls true, however, that In Cleary v. Railroad Co., 76 Cal.
240, 18 Pac. 269, a decision In department,
views were expre!lsed favorable to respond~nt's contention. The opinion of the commlstilon In that case was, however, expressly
based on Beeson v. Mining Co., supra, and
upon, as we have seen, a misunderstanding
<>f that case. There appears to have been no
petition for a hearing In bank. It was stated In that case that there c>ould be a reco\·ery tor the "mental anguish and suffering of
the parents," but we have been referred to
no other case that bolds such doctrine. Certainly it was not so held In the Beeson
·Case. But entirely contrary views were expressed In the latest decision of this court
<>n the subject (Munro v. Reclarnntlon Co.,
84 Cal. 515, 24 Pac. 303). In thnt casewhich was for the death of an adult soothe lower court had Instructed that the jury
in estimating the damages mli:ht consider
"the sorrow, grief, and mental surrerlng oc<'asloned by his death to his mother;" and
this court held the Instruction erroneous,
and for that reason reversed the judgment,
the court holding that such a rule would
.nl'lord an "opportunity to run Into wild and
•'X<'CSt<lve verdicts." The court sold: "We
are of opinion thnt the court erred In lnelud111;:: In the ln~truetlon the words, 'sorrow,
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grief, and mental suffering, occasioned l1y
the death of the son to his mother.' In thus
directing the jury the court fell Into error.
In our opinion, the damage should have been
confined to the pecuniary loss suffered by
the mother, and the loss of the comfort, society, support, and protection ot the dt.>eensed. • • • We have found no case In which
damages tor sorrow, grief, and mental suffering are allowed, under any of the st:i.tutes." And, further, that the statutory action Is o. new one, "and not the trnnsfe1· to
the representative of the right of acti<>n
which the deceased person would have had
It he had survived the Injury." The case
was decided In bank. Justice Thornton delivered the opinion, which was concurred In
by two other justices, and a fourth justice
concurred In the Judgment, and must, therefore, have concurred In the one· main reason tor which the judgment was reversed.
He may not have been n'fldy to say that the
"comfort and society" ot the deceased could
be considered. There was only one dissent,
but upon what ground does not appear. We
think, therefore, that the case Is full authority on the main point. At all events, we
think that the opinion states the general
propositions of law governing the case correctly, although, as to·one matter, It may be
misunderstood. The language, "the loss of
the comfort, society, support, and protection
of the deceased," must be held as having
been used within the meaning given to It In
Beeson v. Mining Co., supra, as berelnbetore
stated, that Is, with reference to the value
ot the life of the deceased, and the pecuniary
loss to the plalntl!r caused by the death.
The said language would not be correct In
any other sense. But In the case at bar the
jury were not confined by the ln~tructlons to
pecuniary loss or any other kind of loss;
they were given wide range to run Into any
wild and exc>e"slve verdict which their caprke might suggest. Wedonotthlnktlmtthe
complaint ls defec>tlve because It does not
specially aver the loss of the services of the
deceased; that was a natural and necessnry
sequence of the death. It was uol special
damage necessary to be a verre<l. 'fh{'re Is
nothing In the point made by respondent
that tl1e answer was not verlfted. Upon that
point the court ruled in favor of defendant,
and plalntUf Is not appealing. The judgment and order appealed from are reverst.'11,
and a new trial ordered~
SHARPSTEIN, J. I concur.
DE HAVEN, J. I concur In the jndgrn~nt
and generally In the foregoing o)llnlon. The
mea11ure of damages In actions hy a parent
for the death of a child, when the fac>tR are
not such as to warrant exemplary damages,
·Is correctly stated In section 7fl3 of Rhearman and Redfield on Negllgenc>e. as follows:
"The damajl,'es recovel'ahle hy n hm•hnnd. pnrent, or master to>: a negligent Injury to the
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person of his wife, child, or servant are

strictly limited to an amount fully compen-

satory for the consequent loss of service for

a period not exceeding the minority of the

child, or the term of service of a servant,

and the expenses which the plaintif f has in-

curred in consequence of the injury, such

as for surgical attendance, nursing, and the

like." The sixth instruction given upon the

:;quest of plaintiff, to the effect that “in

estimating the damage sustained by her the

jury is not limited by the actual pecuniary

injury sustained by her by reason of the

death of her child, but such damages may

be given as under all the circumstances of

the case may be just," is contrary to this

rule, and was erroneous. The object of sec-

tion 376 of the Code of Civil Procedure is

not to give redress or compensation for the
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mental distress of a mother, consequent up-

on the death of her child. The general lan-

guage of section 377 of the Code of Civil

Procedure, that in actions of this character

"such damages may be given as under all

the circumstances of the case may be just,"

is used with reference to the fact that the

damages which are allowed to be recovered

by sections 376 and 377 of the Code of Civil

Procedure are, with the exception of the ex-

penses incurred by the plaintiff in conse-

quence of the injury resulting in the death

for which they are claimed, prospective in

their nature, relating, as they do, to the loss

of future service, and necessarily based up-

on probabilities, and upon data which in

many respects are uncertain, and therefore

the estimate of such damages must neces-

sarily call for the exercise of a very large dis-

cretion upon the part of the jury; and all

that is meant by the language quoted is that

the jury shall, in view of all the circumstan-

ces of the case, and considering also the age

and the ability of the deceased to serve the

relative for whose beneﬁt the action is

brought, give such damages as they shall

deem just, keeping in view that such dam-

ages are to be measured by what shall fair-

ly seem the pecuniary injury or loss to the

plaintiff.

Hearing in bank denied.
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person of his wife, child, or servant are
strictly limited to an amount tully compensatory for the consequent loss of service f<.>r
a period not exceeding the minority of the
cl!ild, or tl!e term of service of a servant,
nnd the expenses which the plaintiff has Incurred in consequence of the injury, such
as for surgical attendance, nursing, and the
like." The sixth instruction given upon the
:;;quest of plalntlft', to the etrect that "In
estimating the damage sustained by her the
jury ls not limited by the actual pecuniary
injury sustained by her by reason of t!le
death of her chlld, but such damages may
be given as under all the circumstances of
the cuse may be just," ls contrary fo this
rule, and was erroneous. The object of section 3i6 of the Code of CivH Procooure is
not to give redress or compensation for the
mental distress of a mother, consequent up.
on the death <.>f her chlld. The general Ian, guage of section 377 of the Code of Civil
Procedure, that in actions of this character
"such damages may be given as under all
the circumstances ot the case may be just."

Is used with reference to the fact that the
damages which are allowed to be recovered
by sections 376 and 377 of the Code of Civil
Procedure are, with the exception of the expenses Incurred by the plalntllf In consequence of the Injury resulting In the death
for which they are claimed, prospective In
their nature, relating, as they do, to the loss
of future service, and necessarlly based upon probabilities, and upon data which In
many respects are uncertain, and therefore
the estimate of such damages must nece~
sarlly call for the exercise of a very large discretion upon the part of the jury; and all
that is meant by the language quoted ls that
the jury shall, In view of all the circumstances of the case, and considering also the age
and the ablllty of the deceased to serve the
relative for whose benefit the action ls
brought, give such damages 11s they shall
deem just, keeping In view that such darn·
ages are to be measured by what sllall fairly seem the pecuniary Injury or loss to the
plaintiff.
Hearing In bank denied.
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DEMAREST et alqv. LITTLE.

(47 N. J. Law, 28.)

Supreme Court of New Jersey.

1885.

Argued at November term, 1884, before

BEASIJCY, C. J., and DIXON, REED, and

MAGIE, JJ.

DE.MAUEST et nl. ·v. LIT'fI.K
(47 N. J. Law, 28.)
~nprt'me C'ourt of New Jersey.
Feb. Tetm.
1885.
Arg1wd at November term, 1884, before
BEA~I.EY, C. J., and DIXON, REI·:D, and
~IAGrn, JJ.
B. \\'llliamson, for the rule. John Linn,
opposed.

B. Williamson, for the rule. John Linn,

opposed.

Feb. Team,

MAGIE, J. This action was brought to re-

cover damages for the death of plaintiffs

testatot‘, which occurred in the disaster at

Parker's Creek Bridge, on the Long Branch

Railroad, on June 29, 1882. Defendant was

charged with responsibility therefor as re-

ceiver of the Central Railroad Company of

New Jersey, and as having, in that capacity,

contracted to carry deceased with due care.
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The case was ﬁrst tried in 1883. and a ver-

dict rendered for plaintiffs, assessing their

damages at $30.000. This verdict was aft-

erwards set aside upon a rule to show cause.

.\'o opinion was delivered. but the court an-

nounced that a new trial was allowed be-

cause the damages were excessive. The case

has been again tried, and the verdict has

been again rendered for plaintiffs. assessing

their damagesat $27,500. A rule to show

cause was allowed, and is now sought to be

made absolute upon the following grounds:

First, that the evidence was not suiiicient to

justify the conclusion that testator's death

was due to nu-gll[:enc8 or want of care; sec-

ond, that if so, defendant, as recch'er. was

not liable for any negligence except his own,

while the alleged negligence was that of em-

pioyes; and third, that the damages award-

ed are excessive.

Upon the ﬁrst ground it was urged that

the evidence upon this trial was variant from

and more favorable to defendant than that

produced on the former trial. Whether that

be so or not, a careful perusal of the evi-

dence satisties me that there was suﬂlcient

to warrant the conclusion that testator's

death was due to negligence or want of prop-

er care.

The second objection has already been dis-

posed of in a case growing out of this same

disaster. and in which the court of errors

has aﬂirmed the responsibility of the receiv-

er for such negligence. Little v. Dusenbcrry,

46 N. J. Law. 614. The verdict ought not to

be disturbed on those grounds.

The question presented by the claim that

the damages are excessive is of'morc diflicui-

ty. The action is created by statute. which

supplies the sole measure of the damages re-

coverable therein. 'll‘hey are to be determin-

ed exclusively by reference to the pecuniary

injury resulting to the widow and next of

kin of deceased by his death. The injury to

be thus recovered for has been deﬁned by

this court to be “the deprivation of a reason-

able expectation of a pecuniary advantage

which would have resulted by a comiimance

LAW DA)I.2d lCd.—25

~LA.HIE, J. This action was hrought to recover damages for the rll'nth of 11Iuiutll'l"s
h'stntor, which occurred In the disaster at
Parker's Creek Bridge, on the Long Branch
Railroad, on June 29, 1882. Del'entlllnt was
charged with responsibility therefor as receh·er or the Central Railroad Company of
:\ew Jersey, and as having, In that capacity,
<'outructed to carry deceased with due cnrc.
'fhc case was first tried In 11'\~i. and a n•r11lct rendered for plnlutlft's, as!wl'lsing thPlr
1lnn111ges at $::10.000. This verdict was al'tt•rwar1l11 11et usitl1• upon a rule to 11how 1·nuse.
Xo opinion wns 1lPlln•red, but the comt n1111u11ncl'd that a 1ww trlnl w1111 nllowl'tl be1·n11sP the damni;res Wl're excessive. The case
11111< hl'Pn again tried, snd tbe verdict has
het>n ag11ln rendered !or plaintiffs, as1wsslng
their damuges at $2i,r.OO. A rule to show
cause wtts allowed, and Is now sought to be
made absolute upon the following grounds:
J.'irst, thnt tlw Pvldence was not sutti<·h•nt to
jlh~tlfy the 1·01wluslon that testntor·s death
wai< line to 11..~llin•nce or wunt or <'nre: i.rcund, that II' so, dPf1•ndnnt, 1111 rl'<'Ph·Pr. \Hts
not liable tor any neJl'liJ:l'twe ex<·t•pt hl11 own,
while the allei;red negllJ?ence was ti.lat of em)Jloy~s; and third, that the dnmngri1 nwnrllNI are exC'esslve.
Upon the firl!t ground It was urged that
thr t•videnPe upon th!" tri11l wni. vnriant from
nncl morP ftl\'ora hlP to <l<'fPtulunt than that
tlrodueell on the former trlnl. WlwthPr that
he so or not, a en rPful pnusal of tlw ev 1tlen<'e sat!Httes me that tlll're was i.ufttdent
to warrant the conclusion that tPstntor's
rlPath wns <lne to nrJ?llJ?Pll<'P or wnnt of prop1>r care.
Tht• 11P<·or11l ohjP<"lion has alrPa<lr hl't>ll <11!'1·
poi.et.I of In a cnsr grr>wlng ont of thi1< 11ame
•ll1<1111trr. and In whl<·h tlw <'ourt of ••rro1·s
hni. nfttrmP<I tlw rPspo1111lhlllty or thr n•1·1•lv<'r tor such 111•J!llgl'nl'I'. Litth• v. Dmw11h1•rry,
4'1 X..J. Law. H14. The \'l'nlld ouirht not to
ht• tlli.turlwtl on those J!romuli<.
Thi' •ttlt'stlon prei.enlt•1l hy the dnim thnt
thP t11111111ges are PX<-es11ive h• or· more• 1liftt1·11lt)·. Thi• action Is crPlltP•l hy !ltntutl'. which
s1111plll'I! the sole mru11111·p of the 1h1111aJ.(1'!! re1·on•r111JIP tlwrl'in. Tlwy nre to hP t1 ..1,.r111ln1•1l exduslv1•))· hy l'l'ferP111·e to the p1•1·1111i11ry
injury re!'nltlng to the widow and 1wxt ol'
kin of lle<'l'U!w•I hy his <ll'uth. The Injury to
he thui1 rP<·on•rf'tl for haR been dettnecl by
this court to IX' "the <lPprlvntlon of a T<'UF1011:1hlc expectation of n )IP<'lllliary :uhnutai:e
whlPh would hnve rl'Rlllt<'<l hy a c·o11ti1111nnce
LAW DA:\I.211 E<l.-:W

of

the lite of -dec1>11sed." PnuhnlPr Y. U11llroad Co., 34 N. J. Law, 151. Com1ieni.ut1011
for such deprivation la therefore the soil>
measure of damage In such cases. A dlttlcult task Is thereby Imposed upon a jury, for
they are obliged to determine prohuhlllt1i11.
and "must, to a large extent, fom1 tlwlr"-i>stlmate ot damages on conjectures nml 11u(,!e1·talntles." But the case In hand srerns to prP·
sent leas compllcatNl problems than other
cases of th<' 11nme nature.
De<'ensed left no widow, and but three
chlldrl'n. All or them had reached runturjty.
Two snnFJ wne self-1111pportlng; the 1Jnuich·
ter was married. HP owed no pn•sent duty
ol' support, and there Is nothing to show nny
fixed allowance or even C'asnal henel'11ct1011H
to them. They are therefore dPprlved of 1rn
Immediate pecuniary adrnntaJtt• derivable
from him. At his death he was In business.
In partne1·shlp with bis sons and son-In-law.
All the partners gave attention to the busl111>i.s and the ca11ltal wns furnished by dl'<·ensNI. His death dls11olved the partn.. ri.hlJ)
anti dP11rlved thl' 1<urvlvlng partners of 1md1
benellt ns they had derlvPd l'rom hlR 1·rP1llt,
capital, skill and reputation. Rut the Injury thus resulting Is not within thP s<·ope of
this statute, which gives damages for lnju .
rles resulting from the severance of a rein·
tlon of kinship and not of contract. No dnrn ·
ages could be awarded on that 1otround.
DefemlnntlilJstrenuously urge that, onttiido
of the partnership or In the event or Its dissolution, the next or kin had a rensonnbfo
rxpl'<'tatlon of deriving from the par1>11tnl rl'lution an ndvuntage by way or services rendPN<l or coun11rl given hy tlt><'eased In thPir
aft'nlrs. A clahn or thll'I l'ort lllURt be ('llJ"I'·
l'ully restricted within tlw llmltl'I of the stnt·
Ut<'. 'fl1e counRelR of a fntlwr mny. In a mm··
al point of \"lew. he of" inP1<tlnu1hlP \"llhll'.
The Ponflde11tl11l lnter<'llurst• ht>tWl'l'll pnr.. 11(
1tml 1·hlld m:1y he )JrlzPtl 11,,~·111111 llll':lsnre, 11ml
Its dl'prlvatiou may he protlu..th·r of the ket'l1est pain. But the leiclsl11t11rp hnR not Sl'l'll
flt to permit recovery for !<Ud1 Injuries. It
huoi rt'l'llrlcted recovPr~· to the fll'1·11nl11ry lnjm·~·; that Is. the loss of 110111.. thlng h11vh1J?
pecuniary value.
~ow, It may with some renson ht• :111tll"i1111te1l that a fathPr, out of Ion• :mil 11ft'1•1"1lon.
might. II' l'ir<'um;1t111JcPI! rPnderP1I it pro111•1·.
perform ~ratultonR service tor a <"111ld. whleh
by rendrrlng mm<'<"Pssury the employ11w11t of
a paid servant, would he of pt'<'llnlury vnhw.
and tl111t he might, by advice In respect to
hu11lness aft'all"!I, be or a pos!!lhlP pecuniary
h1•1wttt. But whetlll'r 1mch an nnt.idp:itton I~
l'P:Ji:<onn hie or not must deJll'IH) 011 tlll' <'h <•111111<t:111<•f's. Considering tht' n1ote. tlw n"s111·1•4J
pmdtiou, the business 111111 otlwr rl'lntlon" or
tlwst> d11ldren, It IR ohvlouf' thnt tlu• proh:1·
hlllty of nny pN·1mlury :1drn11tnir1• ro ae1·ru•·
to them In thesr 1110<IPs wn::i very slll.'111. Iii·
dPcd, It would not be too much to say thnt
rPsort n111i;it he IL1d to speenlntlon to di"""\'·
er any such advnutuge. At nil events, com·
0

386
386

DAMAGES FOR CAUSING DEATH.

pensation for this injury in this case could

not exceed a small sum without being excess-

ive.

The principal basis for plaintiff's claim is

obviously this: That the death of deceased

put an end to accumulations which he might

havetherenfter made and which might have

come to the next of kin. Deceased had ac-

cumulated about $70,000, all of which, ex-

cept $10,000 capital invested in the business,

seems to have been placed in real estate and

securities as if for permanent investment.

By his will the bulk of his property was given

to his children. At his death he had no oth-

er sources of income than his investments

and his busines.

In determining the probability of accumu-

lations by deceased if he had continued in

life, no account should be taken of the in-
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come derivable from his investments. These

have come in bulk to the children, who may,

if they choose, accumulate such income. A

deprivation of the probability of his accumu-

lating therefrom is no pecuniary injury. On

the contrary, it is rather a beneﬁt -to them

to receive at once the whole fund in lien of

the mere contingency or probability of re-

ceiving it, though with its accumulations (at

best uncertain), in the future. Indeed, the

beneﬁt thus accruing to the next of kin in

receiving at once this whole property, in the

view of one of the court, is at least equiv-

alent to the present value of the probability

of their receiving it hereafter. if deceased had

continued in life, with all his probable future

accumulations from any source whatever, in

which case it is evident that his death has not

resulted in any pecuniary injury to them.

But without adopting this view of the evi-

dence, it is plain that in determining probable

future accumulations attention should be re-

stricted to such as would arise from the labor

of deceased in his business. His ‘receipts

from the business for the two years it had

been conducted were proved. What he ex-

pected was not proved, but left to be in-

ferred for his mode of life. At death he was

about ﬁfty-six and a half years old, and by

the proofs had an expectation of life of six-

teen and seven-tenths years.

From these facts the jury were to ﬁnd what

deceased would probably have accumulated.

what probability there was that his next of

kin would have received his accumulations,

and then what sum in hand would compen-

sate them for being deprived of that proba-

bility. In what manner the jury attempted

to solve this problem we cannot ascertain.

Plaintiffs' counsel attempts to show the cor-

rectness of the result reached, by calculation.

He assumes the income of deceased from his

business during the last year as the annual

income likely to be obtained, and deducts on-

ly $1,000 each year as the probable expendi-

ture of deceased, and then ﬁnds the present

worth of the net income so determined for

the deceased's expectation of life is $27,710.-

32.
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pensatlon for this Injury In this case could
not exceed a small sum without being excessive.
The principal basis for plalntllf's claim la
obviously this: That the death of deceased
put an end to accumulations which he might
have· thereafter made and which might have
come to the next of kln. Deceased had accumulated about $70,000, all of which, except $10,000 capital invested in the business,
seems to have been placed in real estate anrl
securities as If for permanent investment.
By his will the bulk of bis property was given
to his children. At bis death he had no other sources of income than his investments
and his business.
In determining the probablllty of accumulations by deceased If he had continued In
life, no account should be taken of the Income derivable from his Investments. These
have come In bulk to the children, who may,
if they choose, accumulate such Income. A
deprivation of the probability of his accumulating therefrom ls no pecuniary Injury. On
the contrary, it is rather a benefit to them
to receive at once the whole fund In lieu of
the mere contingency or probabillty of receiving It, though with its accumulations (at
best uncertain), In the future. Indeed, the
benefit thus accruing to the next of kin In
receiving at once this whole property, In the
view ot one ot the court, Is at least equivalent to the present value of the probability
of their receiving It hereafter, if deceased had
continued in life, with all hJs probable future
accumulations from an;v source wh.'ltever, In
which case It is evident that his death has not
resulted in any pecuniary injury to them.
But without adopting this view of thl' evidence, it is plain that In determining probable
future accumulations attention should be restricted to such as would arise !rom the labor
of deceased In his lmslness. His · rec·elpts
from the business tor the two years it bad
been eonducted were proved. 'Vhat he expected was not proved, but left to be Inferred tor his mode of life. At death he was
about fifty-six and a halt years old, and by
the proofs had an exp1>ctatlon of lite of slxIC'en 1111d spn•n-t<>ntb!' :years.
From the11e facts the jury were to find what
deceased would probabl:r hnvP accumulated.
whnt prohublllty tlll're wmi that bis next of
kin would have received his iweumulations,
and then what sum In band would compensntP them for being ll<'prlved of that probability. In what manner the jury attempted
to solve this problem we cannot ascertain.

Plaintiffs' counsel attempts to show the correctness of the result reached, by calculation.
He assumes the Income of deceased from his
business during the last year as the annual
Income likely to be obtained, and deducts only $1,000 each year as the probable expenditure of deceased, and then finds the present
worth of the net Income so determined for
the deceued's expectation of llfe ls $27,710.32.
'l'hls calculation tests the propriety of this
verdict, and In my judgment conclusively
shows that It was rather the result of sympathy or prejmll<'e than a fair deduction from
the evidence. For, assuming the amount nttrlbutnble to the loss ot deceased's services
was but small (and If more It was excessive).
the award of the jury on this account was
but a few hundred dollars less than the pres·
ent worth of the full net Income If recelve1l
for his full expectancy of life. To reach such
a result the jury must have found every Olli'
of the following contingencies In favor of
the next of kln, viz.: That deceased, who hnd
nlr!'ady acquired a competence, would have
continued In the toll of business for his full
expectancy of lite; that he would have retained sufficient health of body and vigor of
mind to enable him to do so, and as successfully as before; that he would have been abll'
to avoid the losses Incident to business, and
would have safely Invested his accumulatlom1;
and that the next of kin would have receh·ed
such accumulations at his death. A verdict
which attributes no more weight than this
has, to the probablllty that one or more of all
these contingencies would happen, cannot
have proceeded from a fair consideration of
the case made by the evidence.
Having 1·eached this conclusion, what should
be the result as to the verdict? The charge
of the court below declared the rule of damages with accuracy. The verdict ls a sec·
ond one. and somewhat smaller thnu that
prevlomdy set aside as excessive. It Is 11n .
usual to set aside a 1.1econd verdict, but thouirh
unusual It Is within the power of the court
In the exercise or Its discretion. That powl'r
will be discreetly used in setting aside any
verdict which does palpable Injustice.
To ohvlate, If possible, tile nere!lslty of another trial, It has been determlnerl that If
plalntltrs will reduce their verdict to $1:i.001
hy remitting the excess, the verdil't may
stand for that sum, and the rule to show
cause be dlschargl'd. Unless thl~Y comwnt to
such remission, the rule must be made nhsolute.

I
DAMAGES FOR INJURIES TO PUOPF>RTY.
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which the proposition Is asserted that, while
fruit-trees form a part of the land, the true
rule Is that If the thing destroyed has a .
~urt of Appeals of New York, Second Division.
value which can be accurately measured
March 16, 1892.
without reference to the value of the soil In ·
Appeal from supreme court, general term, which It stands, or out of which It grows, ·
Fourth department.
the recovery must be for the value of the ·
Action by Ira Dwight against the Elmira. thing destroyed, and not tor the dlt'l'.erence
-Oortland & Northern Railroad Company. In the value of the land before and after '
From a judgment for plalntitr entered on an SU<'h dl.'Structlon. The court cited no au-0rder atlirmlng a judgment entered on the thority for the conclusion reached, and our
i·eport of a referee, defendant appeals. Re- attention has not been called to any prior
versed.
decision justifying lts position. Nor has the
James Armstrong, for ,a ppellant. Ray- Whitbeck Case been approved In this court,
although cited and distinguished in Argotmond L. Smith, for respondent.
singer v. Vines, 82 N. Y. 309. While the
PARKER, J. The judgment awards to rule Is, undoubtedly, as stated by the learned
the plalntitr KJ03 for damo.ges occasioned by judge ln the Whitbeck Case, that a reeovery
the defendant";i negligence In setting on tire may be had for the value of the thing dend destroying 21 apple-trees, 2 cherry-trees,
stroyed, where It has a value which may
and 21h tons of standing grasa, and also In- be accurately measured without 1·eference
uring 7 apple-trees, the property of plain- to the soil In which It stands, he apparently
UI'. The only question presented on this ap- O'\"erlooked the fact that fruit-trees clo llut
peal ls whether the proper measure of dam- have such a value; and the rule was, theren.i:es was adopted on the trial.
fore, as we think, wrongly applied. Cases '
A wltneBB ealled by the plaintltr was ask- are not wanting to Illustrate a proper appll- ·
ed: "Question. What were those twenty-one cation of that rule. Where timber forming i
trees worth at the time they were killed?" part of a forest Is fully grown, the value of;
Objection was made that the evidence did the trees taken or destroyed can be recover- ;
not tend to prove the proper measure ot ed. In nearly all jurisdictions, this is all
damages, but the objection was overruled, that may be recoYered; and the reason as- .
and the answer was: "Answer. I should signed tor It ls that the realty has not been.
say they were worth fifty dollars apiece." damoged, because, the trees having bee1~
Similar questloDB were propounded as to the brought to maturity, the owner ls advantug-\
other trees; a like objection lnterpot1ed; the ed by their being cut and sold, to the end'.
same ruling made; answers to the same ef- that the soil may again be put to productive
fE-ct, except as to value, given; and appro- uses. 3 Suth. Dam. p. 374; 3 Sedg. Dam.
priate exceptions taken. Testimony was al- (8th Ed.) p. 45; Single v. Schnelder, ao Wis.
so given, tending to prove that the land 070; Webster v. Moe, 35 Wis. 75; · Webber
burned over by the tire was depreciated In v. Qunw, 46 Wis. 118, 49 N. W. 830; Hasel\'alue $30 per acre. The only evidence of- tine v. Mosher, 51 Wis. 443, 8 N. W. 273;
fered by the plfllntltl', touching the question Tuttle v. Wilson, 52 Wis. 643. 9 N. W. 8!..>2;
ot damages, was ot the character already Wooden-Ware Co. v. U. S., 106 U. S. 432, 1
Sup. Ct. 398; Graessle v. Carpenter, 70 lowa,
alluded to.
.l<'rult-trees, like those which are the sub- 16U, 30 N. W. 392; Ward v. Rnlh'oad Co., 13
ject of this controversy, have little It any Nev. 41; Tilden v. Johnson, 52 Vt. U28;
'·alue afte1· being detached from the soil, as Adams v. Blodgett, 47 N. H. 219; Cushlug v.
the wood cannot be made use of for any Longfellow, 26 Me. 306. In this state It ls
practical purpose; but, while connected with settled that even where full-gMwn timber
rthe land. they have a producing capacity Is cut or destroyed the damage to the land
\which adds to the value of the realty. Neces- may also be recovered, and In such cases
sarily the testimony adduced tended to show, the measure of damages ls the dlt'l'.erence in
not the value of" the trees severed from the the value of the land before and after the
freehold, but their value as bearing trees, cutting or destruction complained ot. Argot11'0t1nected with and depending on the soil slnger v. Vines, 82 N. Y. 308; Van Deusen
. for the nourishment essential to the growth . v. Young, 29 N. Y. 36; Easterbrook v. Hallof fruit. How much was the realty, ot which road Co., 51 Barb. 94. The rule Is also apthe trees formed a part, damn~ed, was the plicable to nursery trees grown tor marruult aimed at by the questions and at- ket, because they have a value for transh mpted to be secured by the answers. Can planting. The soll ls not damaged by their
the owner of an Injured freehold because removal, and their market value necessa1·i1y
the trees taken or destroyed happen to furnishes the true rule ot damages. 3 Sedg.
be fruit Instead of timber trees, have his Dam. (8th Ed.) p. 48; Blrket v. Williams. ao
damages measured In tbat manner? Is the Ill. App. 451. CoRI furnishes another Illusquestion presented now, tor the tlrst time, tration of the rule making the value ot the
In this court, so far as we have observed. thing separated from the realty. althoui:h
The learned referee followed the decision In once a part of It, the measure of damages.
Whitbeck v. Railroad Co., 36 Barb. 644, 1n where It bas a value after removal, anJ the
DWIGHT

't'.

ELMIRA, C. & N. R. CO.

(30 N. E. 398, 132 N. Y. 199.)

D\\'iGI-IT v. ELMIRA, C. & N. R. CO.

(30 N. E. 398, 132 N. Y. 199.)

Court of Appeals of New York,Second Division.

March 15, 1892.

Appeal from supreme court, general term,

Fourth department.

Action by Ira Dwight against the Elmira,

Cortland & .\orthorn Railroad Company.

From a judgment for piaintif f entered on an

order atiirming a judgment entered on the

report of a referee, defendant appeals. Re-

versed.

James Armstrong, for appellant . Ray-

mond L. Smith, for respondent.

PARKER, J. The judgment awards to

the plaintif f $303 for damages occasioned by

the defendant's negligence in setting on ﬁre

and destroying 21 apple-trees. 2 cherry-trees,

and 2t,;; tons of standing grass, and also in-
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uring 7 apple—trees, the property of plain-

iff. The only question presented on this ap-

peal is whether the proper measure of dam-

ages was adopted on the trial.

A witness called by the piaintif f was ask-

ed: “Question. What were those twenty-one

trees worth at the time they were killed?"

Objection was made that the evidence did

not tend to prove the proper measure of

damages, but the objection was overruled,

and the answer was: “Answer. I should

say they were worth ﬁfty dollars apiece."

Similar questions were propounded as to the

other trees; a like objection interposed; the

same ruling made; answers to the same ef-

fect, except as to value, given; and appro-

priate exccptions taken. Testimony was al-

so given, tending to prove that the land

burned over by the ﬁre was depreciated in

value $30 per acre. The only evidence of-

fered by the plaintiff, touching the question

of damages, was of the character already

alluded to. »

Fruit-trees, like those which are the sub-

ject of this controversy, have little if any

value after being detached from the soil, as

the wood cannot be made use of for any

practical purpose; but, while connected with

the land. they have a producing capacity

hich adds to the value of the realty. Neces-

sarily the testimony adduced tended to show,

not the value of‘ the trees severed from the

freehold, but their value as hearing trees,

}('OnBe(Sted with and depending on the soil

, for the nourishment essential to the growth,

of fruit. How much was the realty, of which

the trees formed a part, damaged, was the

r(sult aimed at by the questions and at-

tunpted to be secured by the answers. Can

the owner of an injured freehold because

the trees taken or destroyed happen to

be fruit instead of timber trees, have his

damages measured in that manner? is the

question presented now, for the ﬁrst time,

in this court, so far as we have observed.

'l‘he learned referee followed the decision in

Whitbeck v. Railroad Co., 36 Barb. 644, in

which the proposition is asserted that, while

fruit-trees form a part of the land, the true
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land has sustained no injury because of it. 3

Sedg. Dam. (8th Ed.) p. 48; 3 Suth. Dam.

p. 374; 5 Am. & Eng. Enc. Law, p. 36, note

2; Stockbridge iron Co. v. Cone Iron-Works,

102 Mass. 80; Coal Co. v. Rogers, 108 Pa.

St. 147-152; Dougherty v. Chesnutt 86 Tenn.

1, 5 S. W. 444; Coleman's Appeal, 62 Pa. St.

252; Ross v. Scott, 15 Lea, 479-488; For-

syth v. Wells, 41 Pa. St. 291; Chamberlain

v. Collinson, 45 Iowa, 429; Morgan v. Pow-

ell, 3 Q. B. 278; Martin v. Porter, 5 Mees. &

W. 351. On the other hand, cases are not

wanting where the value of the thing de-

tached from the soil would not adequately

compensate the owner for the wrong done,

nd in those cases a recovery is permitted,

||mbracing all the injury resulting to the

land. This is the rule where growing tim-

ber is cut or destroyed. Because not yet

fully developed, the owner of the freehold
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is deprived of the advantage which would

accrue to him could the trees remain until

fully matured. His damage, therefore, nec-

essarily extends beyond the market value of

the trees after separation from the soil, and

the difference between the value of the land

before and after the injury constitutes the

compensation to which he is entitled. Long-

fellow v. Quimby, 33 Me. 457; Chipman v.‘

Hibberd, 6 Cal. 163; Wallace v. Goodall, 18

N. H. 439-456; Hayes v. Railroad Co., 45

Minn. 17-20, 47 N. W. 260. In Wallace's

Case, supra, the court said: “The value of

young timber, like the value of growing

crops, may be but little when separated from

the soil. The land, stripped of its trees may

be valueless. The trees, considered as tim-

ber, may from their youth he valueless; and

so the injury done to the plaintiff by the tres- I

pass would be but imperfectly compensated 1

unless he could receive a sum that would be

equal to their value to him while standing

upon the soil." The same rule prevails as to

shade-trees, which, although fully developed,

may add a fmther value to the freehold for

ornamental purposes, or in furnishing shade

for stock. Nixon v. Stillwell (Sup.) 5 N. Y.

Supp. 248, and cases cited supra. The cur-

1

O

" DAMAGES FOR INJURIES TO PROPERTY.

rent of authority is to the effect that fruit-

trees and ornamental or growing trees are

subject to the same rule. Montgomery v.

Locke, 72 Cal. 75, 13 Pac. 401; Mitchell

v. Billingsiey, 17 Ala. 391-393; Wallace v.

Goodall, 18 N. H. 439-456; 3 Sedgw. Dam.

(8th Ed.) § 933.

It is apparent from the authorities already

cited, as well as those following, that in cases

of injury to real estate the courts recognize

two elements of damage: (1) The value of

the tree or other thing taken after separa-

tion from the freehold, if it have any; (2)

the damage to the realty, it any, occasioned

by the removal. Ensley v. Mayor, 2 Baxt.

144; Striegel v. Moore, 55 Iowa, 88, 7 N. W.

413; Longfellow v. Quimby, 33 Me. 457;

Foote v. Merrill,_54 N. H. 490. A party may

land has sustained no Injury because ot It. 3 rent of authority Is to the effect that trultSedg. Dam. (8th Ed.) p. 48; 3 Suth. Dam. trees and ornamental or growing trees are
p. 37-1; 5 Am. & Eng. Enc. Law, p. 36, note subject to the same rule. Montgomery v.
2; Stockbridge Iron Co. v. Cone Iron-Works, Locke, 72 Cal. 75, 13 Pac. 401; Mitchell
102 l\lass. 80; Coal Co. v. Rogers, 108 Pa. v. Billingsley, 17 Ala. 391-393; Wallace v.
St. 147-152; Dougherty v. Chesnutt 86 Tenn. Goodall, 18 N. H. 439-456; 3 Sedgw. Dam.
1, 5 S. w. 444; Coleman's Appeal, 62 Pa. St. (8th Ed.) § 933.
2.o2; Ross v. Scott, 15 Lea, 479-488; ForIt ls apparent from the authorities already
syth v. Wells, 41 Pa.. St. 291; Chamberlain cited, as well as those following, that In cases
v. Collinson, 45 Iowa, 429; Morgan v. Pow- ot Injury to real estate the courts recognize
ell, 3 Q. B. 278; Martin v. Porter, 5 Mees. & two elements of damage: (1} The value o! \
W . 351. On the other hand, cases are not the tree or other thing taken after separawantlng where the value of the thing de- tlon trom the freehold, If It have any; (2)
. tached from the soil would not adequately the damage to the realty, If any, occasioned
ompensate the owner tor the wrong done, by the removal. Ensley v. Mayor, 2 Baxt.
nd In those cases a recovery ls permitted, 144; Striegel v. Mooce, 65 Iowa, 88, 7 N. W.
mbraclng all the Injury resulting to the 413; Longfellow v. Quimby, 33 :Me. 457;
land. This le the rule where growing tim- Foote v. Merrlll,,M N. H. 490. A party may
ber le cut or destroyed. Because not yet be content to accept the market value of the
fully developed, the owner of the freehold thing taken when he Is also entitled to rels deprived ot the advantage whlch would cover for the Injury done to the freehold.
accrue to him could the trees remain until But If he asserts his right to go beyond the
fully matured. His damag-e, therefore, nee- value of the thing taken or destroyed a·fter
essarlly extends beyond the market value of severance from the freehold, so ae to secure
the trees after separation from the soil, and compensation for the damage done to his
the difference between the value ot the land land because of It, then the measure of dambefore and after the Injury constitutes the ages le the difference In value of the land
compensation to which he le entitled. Long- before 11.nd after the Injury. In this ca.se the
fellow v. Quimby, 33 l\le. 457; Chipman v. plaintiff was not satisfied with a recovery
Hibberd, 6 Cal. 163; Wallace v. Goodall, 18 based on the value of the trees deirtroyed.
after separation from the realty, of which
N. H. 43~56; Hayes v. Railroad Co.,
Minn. 17-20, 47 N. W. 260. In Wallace's they formed a part,-as Indeed be should not
Case, supra, the court said: "The value of have been, as such value was little or noth·
~·oung timber, like the value of growing
lng,-eo be sought to obtain the loss occa·
crops, may be but little when separated from eloned to the land by reason of the destructhe soil. The land, stripped of its trees may tlon of an orchard of fruit-bearing trees,
be valueless. The trees. considered as tim- which added largely to Its productive value.
her, may from their youth be valueless; and This was his right, but the measure of damso the Injury done to the plaintiff by the tres- . ages In such a case is. as we have observed.I
pass would be but Imperfectly compensnted : the difference In value of the land before and\
r unless he could receive a sum that would be
after the injury; and as this rule was not
' equal to their value to him while standing followed, but rejected, on the trial, and a
·. upon the soil." The same rule prevails as to method of proving damages adopted not recshade-treee, which, although fully developed, ognlzed nor permitted by the courts, the judgmay add a fw·ther value to the freehold for ment should be reversed. All concur, except
ornamental .pw·poses, or In furnishing shade BRADLEY, BROWN. and LANDON, JJ .•
tor stock. Nixon v. Stillwell (Sup.) 5 N. Y. dissenting.
Supp. 248, and cases cited supra. The curJudgment reversed.
.
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BEEDE v. LAMPREY.

(15 Atl. 133, 64 N. H. 510.)

Supreme Court of New Hampshire. Belknap.

July 19, 1888.

( Trover for 200 spruce logs. The defendant

was defaulted, with the right to be heard as

to the assessment of damages. Facts found

by the court. The parties own adjoining tim-

ber lots in Moultonborough. The defendant,

while engaged in an operation on his own lot,

negligently, but without malice, cut over the

line dividing the lots, and cut down, trimmed,

hauled to, and deposited in the lake at Mel-

vin village, in Tuftonborough, and thence

towed to his saw-mill, the trees in question,

which facts constitute the cause of action.

The question whether the measure of dam-

/ages is the value of the stumpage, or the

value of the logs when cut and trimmed, or
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( when deposited in the lake, or when deliv-

Supreme Court of New Bampahlre. Belknap.
.11117 19, 1888.
( Trover for 200 spruce logs. The defendant
was defaulted, with the right to be beard aa
to the aasessment of damages. Facts found
by the court. The parties own adjoining tlm·
ber lots In Moultonborough. The defendant,
while engaged In an operation on bis own lot,
negllgently, bot without mallce, cut over the
line dividing the lots, and cut down, trlmmet1,
hauled to, and depotdted In the lake at Melvin village, In Tuftooborough, and thence
towed to bis saw-mill, the trees In questloo,
which facts constitute the cause of action.
'rhe question whether the measure of damges 18 the value of the stumpage, or the
value ot the logs when cut and trimmed, or
:vhen dePoSlted lo the lake, or when dellv·
ered at the mill, was reserved
E. A. & C. B. Hibbard, for plalotltr. Jewell & Stone, for defendant.

f:

‘ered at the mill, was reserved.

E. A. & C. B. Hibbard. for plaintiff. Jew-

ell & Stone, for defendant.

ALLEN, J. The claim of the plaintiff to

recover as damages the value of the legs at

/the mill, which includes the value added by

‘ cutting and transporting them, is founded up-

.on his title and right of possession of the

I‘ property there, and his right to treat it as

, converted at any time between its severance

from the realty and the commencement of the

action. The plaintiff had the title to the logs

and the right of possessing them at the

mill. Whenever and wherever they may have

been converted, the conversion did not change

the title so long as the property retained its

identity. The title could be changed only by

salt for damages with judgment, and satis-

faction of that judgment. Smith v. Smith, 50

N. H. 212, 219; Dearth v. Spencer, 52 N. H.

213. 'l‘he plaintiff might have recovered the

logs themselves at the mill, or wherever he

could have found them, and so availed him-

self of their value there, by repievin, or by

any form of action in which the property in

specie. and not pecuniary damages, are sought.

But in such a case, it the claimant makes a

title, no question of damages or compensation

for loss arises. He recovers his own in the

form and at the time and place in which he

ﬁnds it. In trespass quare ciausum, with an

averment of taking and carrying away trees,

the plaintiff may recover for the whole in-

‘jury to the land, including the damage for

prematurely cutting the trees, and for the loss

of the trees themselves, but nothing for the

value added by the labor of cutting and trans-

porting them. Wallace v. Goodall, 18 N. H.

456; Foote v. Merrill. 54 N. H. 490. Trover

cannot be maintained for any injury to the

realty, but only for the conversion of chattels;

and in this case the plaintiff is limited in his

recovery to the loss of the trees; that is, his

loss by the defendant's converting them by

their severance from the land. The usual rule

of damages in actions of trover is compensa-

tion to the owner for the loss of his property

occasioned by its conversion; and where the

ALLEN, J. The claim of the plalntltr to
1 recover as damages the value of the logs at
/ the mill, which Includes the value added by
i -cutting and transporting them, Is founded up. on bis title and right of possession of the
/ property there, and his right to treat It as
, -converted at any time between Its severance
from the realty and the commencement of the
action. The plalntltr had the title to the logs
~nd the right of posr.esslng them at the
mill. Whenever and wherever they may have
been converted, the conversion did not change
· the title so long aa the property retained Its
identity. 'The title could be changed only by
suit for damages with judgment, and satisfaction of that judgment. Smith v. Smith, 50
N. H. 212, 219; Dearth v. Spencer, 52 N. H .
213. 'l'he plalntlfr might have recovered the
logs themselves at the mill, or wherever he
<.:ould have found them, and so availed himself of their value there, by replevln, or by
any form of action In which the property In
specie, and not pecuniary damages, are sought.
But In such a case, It the claimant makes a
title, no question of damages or compensation
for loss arlsea. He recovers his own In the
Curm and at the time and place In which be
finds It. In trespass quare clausum, with an
a\·erment ot taking and carrying away trees,
the plaintltr may recover for the whole In• jury to the land, Including the damage for
prematurely cutting the trees, and for the loss
ot the trees themselves, but nothing tor th\!
value added by the labor of cutting and transp0111ng them. Wallace v. Goodall, 18 N. H.
456; Foote v. Merrill, M N. H. 490. Trover
cannot be maintained for any Injury to the
realty, but only for the conversion of chattels;
and In this case the plalntltr ls limited In his
recovery to the loss of the trees; that Is, his
loss by the defendant's converting them by

I
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their severance from the land. The usual rule
of damages In actions ot trover ls compensation to the owner for the lou of bis property
occasioned by Its conversion: and where the
conversion is complete, and results In an entire appropriation of the property by the{
wrong-doer, the loes Is generally measured by
the Talue of the property converted with Interest to the time of trial. Hovey v. Grant,
52 N. B. 569; Gove v. Watson, 61 N. H. 136.
The defendant converted the logs by cutting
and severing the trees from the land, and, the
conversion being complete by that wrongful
act, their value there represents the plalntUf's
loss. His loss 18 no greater by reason of the
value added by the labor of cutting and transportation to the mlll. It does not appear that
the logs were of special or exceptional value
to the plalntltr upon the land from which they
were taken, nor that he had a special.use for
them other than obtaining their value by a
sale, nor that the market price had risen after their conversion. It, lo estimating the
damages, the value at the mill, Increased by
the cost of cutting and transportation, ts to
be ta.ken as the criterion, tbe plalntltr wlll recelve more than compenRatlon for his loss.
With such a rule of damages, If. besides the
defendant, another trespasser bad cut logs of
an equal amount upon the same lot, and had
hauled them to the lake shore, and a third had
simply cut and severed the trees. from the
land, and sold them there, and suits for their
conversion had been brought against each
one. the sums recovered would differ by the 1
cost of transporting tbe logs to the place ot '
the alleged conversion, while the loss to the
plalntltr would be the same ·In each of the
three cases. The Injustice of such an appllc_a tlon of the rule ot damages ls apparent
from the unequal results. In Foote v. Merrill, supra, which was trespass quare clam:ium, and for cutting and removing trees, It
was decided that the plalntltr could recover
for the whole Injury to the land, Including the
value ot the trees there, but not any Increase
In value made by the cost of cutting and taking them away. In the opinion It Is said,
(Hibbard, J. :) "It the owner ot timber cut
upon his land by a trespasser gets. P08Se8·
slon of it Increased In value, he has the beneftt of the Increased value. The law neither
divests him of his property, nor rcquh·es him
to pay for Improvements made without his
authority. Perhaps, lo trover, and, possibly,
In trespass de bonls asportatls, he may be en·
titled to the same benefl.t." This dictum, not
being any part of, nor n~ary to, the decision of that case, and given In lnngunge expressive of doubt, cannot be Invoked as a
precedent decisive ot this cnse. When trespass de bonls asportatls ls coupled with trespass auare clausum. either as a separate count
or as an averment In aggravation of damages, as In Foote v. Merrill, the Increase In
dama~ee bv reason or such averment and
proof of It ls the value of the chattels taken

I
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and converted; and in such a case is the same

as the whole damages would have been in an

action of tresnas de bonis. Smith v. Smith,

50 N. H. 212. 219. Had the plaintiff in Foote

v. Merrill, sued in trespass for taking and

carrying away the trees merely, he would

have recovered their value upon the lot at the

time of the taking, allowing nothing for the

expense of cutting and removing them; and

no good reason appears why the same rule of

damages should not prevail in trover as in

trespass de bonls asportatis. The loss to the

plaintiff from the taking and carrying away

of his property is, ordinarily, the same as the

conversion of it by complete appropriation,

and the rule of compensation for the loss

gives him the value of his property at the

time and place of taking or conversion, and

interest from that time for its detention.
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The English cases upon the subject give as

the rule of damages. when the conversion and

appropriation of the property are by an inno-

cent mistake. and bona ﬁde, or where there

is a real dispute as to the title, the value of

the property in place upon the land. allow-

ing nothing for enhancement of value by la-

bor in its removal and improvement. But

hen the conversion is by fraud or willful

respass, the full value at time of demand

nd refusal is given. Martin v. Porter, 5

Mess. & W. 351; Morgan v. Powell, 3 Adol.

& E. (N. S.) 278; Wood v. Morewood, Id. 440,

note: Wild v. Holt. 9 Mees. & W. 672; In re

United Collierles Co., L. R. 15 Eq. 46. The

rly New York cases give the full value at

he time of conversion, including any value

dded by labor and change in manufacturing.

etts v. Lee. 5 Johns. 348; Curtis v. Groat.

6 Johns. 168; Babcock v. Gill, 10 Johns. 287;

Brown v. Sax, 7 Cow. 95; Baker v. Wheeler,

8 Wend. 505. In these cases the conversion

is treated as tortious, and the same as if

made by willful trespass. In later cases a

distinction is made between a willful taking

and conversion. and the rule of just compen-

sation is upheld in case of the conversion of

trees at least, and their value upon the land,

is given as damages when the conversion

does not result from willful trespass. Whit-

beck v. Railroad Co., 36 Barb. 644; Spicer v.

Waters, 65 Barb. 227. The Illinois decisions

make no distinction between cases of willful

trespass and those of conversion by mistake

or inadvertence, and include in damages all

enhancement in value, from any cause, be-

fore suit is brought. Robertson v. Jones, 71

Ill. 405; Coal Co. v. Long, 81 Ill. 359; Rall-

road Co. v. Ogle, 82 Ill. 627. In Maine the

increased value added by cutting and re-

moving the timber is not included in the

damages, although the conversion be by will-

ful trespass. Cushing v. Longfellow, 26 Me.

306; \Ioody v. Whitney. 38 Me. 174. And

the same rule seems to govern in Massachu-

setts. (Iron Co. v. Iron-Works, 102 Mass. 80,

80.) and did in Wisconsin (Weymouth v. Rail-

way Co., 17 Wis. 567; Single v. Schneider, 30

Wis. 570) until the legislature of that stater

DAMAGES FOR l!IOJUIUES TO PROPERTY.

null cou\"erted; and In such a case ls the same Wis. 570) until the legislature of that stater
as the whole damages would have been In an In 1873, enacted a statute providing that theaction of tresoa• de boDis. Smith v. Smith, rule of damages, In the case of one wrong50 N. H. 212. 219. Had the plalntU'f In Foote fully cutting and converting timber on tbev. Merrill, sued In trespass for taking and land of another, should be the highest marcarrying a way the trees merely, he would ket value of the property up to the time of
have recovered their value upon the lot at the trial, In whatever state It might be put.
time ot the taking, allowing nothing for the Webster v. Moe, 35 Wis. 75; Ingram v. Ranexpense of cutting and removing them; and kin, 47 Wis. 406, 2 N. W. 755. The weight·
no good reason appears why the same rule ot ot authority, however, In this country ls in .
damages should not prevail In trover as In favor of the rule which gives compensation
trespnss de bonls aSPOrtatls. The loss to the for the loss; that ls, the value of the propplaintiff from the taking and carrying away erty at the time and place of conversion.
ot hlS property ls, ordinarily, the same as the with Interest after, allowing nothing for
conversion of It by complete appropriation, value subsequently added by the defendant,
and the rule of compensation tor the 1088 when the conversion does not proceed from
glYeS him the value of his property at the wlllful trespass, but from the wrong-doer's.
time and place of taking or conversion, and mistake or from his honest belief of owner. ship In the property, and there are no clrInterest from that time tor Its detention.
'l'he English cases upon the subject give as cumstancelil showing a special and peculiar
the rule of damag;es. when the conversion and value to the owner or a contemplated special '
appropriation of the property are by an Inno- use of the property by him. Forsyth v.
cent mistake. and bona fide. or where there Wells, 41 Pa. St. 291; Herdlc v. Young, ro
Is a real dlsuute as to the title. the value of Pa. St. 176; Wooley v. Carter, 7 N. J. Law.
the property In place upon the land, allow- 85; Coal Co. v. McMlllan, 49 Md. 549; Coal
ing nothln&- tor enhancement of value by la- Co. v. Cox, 39 Md. 1; Bennett v. Thompson,
bor In Its removal and Improvement. But 13 Ired. 146; Railway Co. v. Hutchins, 32
en the conversion Is by fraud or willful Ohio St. 571; Wetherbee v. Green, 22 Mich.
s1111ss, the full value at time of demand 311; Winchester v. Craig, 33 Mich. 205; Nes<I refusal ls given. Martin v. Porter, 5 bitt v. Lumber Co., 21 Minn. 491; Ellis \".
l\lees. & W. 351; Morgan v. Powell, 3 AdoL Wire, 33 Ind. 127; Ward v. Wood Co., 13
Nev. 44; Waters v. Stevenson, Id. 177; Gol& E. {N'. SJ 278; Wood v. Morewood, Id. 440,
Parker, 38
note: Wild v. Holt, 9 Mees. & W. 672; In re ler v. Fett, 30 Cal. 481; Gray
United Colllerles Co., L. R. 15 Eq. 46. The Mo. 160, 166; Wooden Ware Co. v. U. S.,
rly New York cases etve the full value at 106 U. S. 432, 434, 1 Sup. Ct. 398; Sedgw.
e time ot conversion. Including any value Dam. (5th Ed.) 571, 572; Cooley, Torts, 457,
dded by labor and change In manufacturing. 458, note. In cases of conversion by willful ,
etts v. Lee. 5 Johns. 348; Curtis v. Groat. act or by fraud, the value added by the
6 Johns. 16~; Babcock v. Gill, 10 Johns. 287; wrong·doer, after conversion, ls sometimes
Brown v. Sax, 7 Cow. 95; Baker v. Wheeler, given as exemplary or vindictive damages,
8 Wend. 505. In these cases the conversion or because the defendant ls precluded from
la treated as tortloWJ, and the same as If showing an Increase In value by his own
made by wlllful trespass. In later cases a wrong, and from claiming a corresponding
distinction ls made between a wlllful taking reduction of damages. The contention ot
and con'11erslon, and the rule of just compen- the plalntUr that he ls entitled to recover
sation ls upheld In case of the conversion of the value of tbe logs Increased by the extrees at least, and their value upon the land, pense of cutting and removal to the mlll In
ls given as damages when the conversion Wolfborough, because, as the case finds, the
does not result from wllltul trespass. Whit- defendant's acts constituting the conversion
beck v. Railroad Co., 36 Barb. 644; Spicer v. were negligent, cannot be sustained on any
Waters, 65 Barb. 227. The llllnols decisions ground warranting vindictive damages. The
make no distinction between cases of wlllful cutting and ta.king the logs was not wlllrul
trespass and those of conversion by mistake trespass; nor does It appear that the deor Inadvertence, and Include In damages all fendant's want of rettBOnable care amounted
enhancement In value, from any cause. be- to a fraud. No malice ls shown, nor were
fore suit ls brought. Robertson v. Jones, 71 there other facts of outrage upon which such
Ill. 4-05; Coal Co. v. Long, 81 Ill. 359; Rail- damages could be predicated.. No part of
road Co. v. Ogle, 82 lll. 627. In Maine the the damages In dispute ls found as exemIncreased value added by cutting and re- plary, and the plalntUr cannot be permitted
moving the timber Is not Included In the to assign as damages to his feelings a mere
damages, although the conversion be by wlll- value added to the property by the defendtul trespass. Cushing v. Longfellow, 26 Me. ant after the completion of the tort, nor take
300; Moody v. Whitney, 38 Me. 174. And as a benefit that which ls outside of compenthe same rule seems to govern In Massachu- sation for the wrong. lt'ay v. Parker, 53 N.
setts. (Iron Co. v. Iron-Works, 102 Ma88. 80, H. 342; Bixby v. Dunlap, 56- N. H. 456; Kim80.) and did In Wisconsin (Weymouth v. Rall· ball v. Holmes, 60 N. H. 163. The damages
way Co., 17 Wis. 567; Single v. Schnelder, 30 J!lUSt ~ accordln_g t~ the usual rul!_~o- !"!!~f~-

f
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)£h1§:lLi5 the value o1' the property at the

time of conversion, and interest after. The

severance of the trees from the land, and

their conversion from real to personal prop-

erty, was in law a conversion of the proper-

ty to the defendant's use. The value of the

trees. immediately upon their becoming chat-

teis,—that is, as soon as telled,—which is

found to be $1.50 per thousand feet, with in-

terest from that time, the plaintiff is entitled

to recover. Judgment tor the plaintiii.

SMITH, J., did not sit. The others con-
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curred. '

)\'hlth 111 the value of the property at the
time ot conve1-slon, and interest after. Tbe
severance ot tbe treei> trow the land. and

8!H

their conl"erslon from real to personal prop-

telB,-that la, as soon as felled,-wbich 18
found to be $1.50 per tboU81lnd feet, wltb Interest from that time, the plaintiff Is entitled
to recover. Judgment tor the pla.lntur.

erty, was In law a conversion ot tbe property to the defendant's use. The value ot tbe
trees, Immediately upon thelr becomtnr chat-

SMITH, J.,_ did not Bit.
curred.

The others con-
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DA~IAGES

llshed In thfs state by the declslons which
hold that s. vendee of land by a parol con("JO 8. E. 188, llts N. C. 85.)
tract of sale, who takes possession and makes
Supreme Court of· North OaroliDa. Oct. 16, lmprovementll, and ls afterwards eject.ed by
the vendOI", may recover the value of hls Im1894.
provements. Albea v. Grlftln, 2 Dev. & B.
Appeal from 'superior court, Craven ~unty; Eq. 9. So If one .who has purchased land
Bynum, Judge.
from another, not having title, ent.ers and ImAction of trespass by Pa1By Ann Gaskins proves, believing his title good, and ls ejected
against Henry C. :Qavls. Judgment was r~ by the rightful owner, he ls entitled to comdered for defendant, and plaintiff appeals. pensation. In both cases one who ls morallv
Reversed.
Innocent has confused his prope!"ty with th;t
W. W. Clark, for appellant. F. M. Sim- of another, and he ls held entitled to separate It In the only way It can be done, Tlz.
mons and P. M. Pearsall, for appellee.
by being allowed the value of his lmproTeA VERY, J. The plaintiff's complaint ls In ments In the raw material." The judge laid
the nature of a declaration for trespass In down coITectly the rule as to the damage\
the entry by the defendant upon her land, that the plalntitr was entitled to recover of
:after being forbidden, and cutting, carrying the defendant for the original trespass,-the
away, and converting to his own use valuable value of the logs when severed at the stump,
\ timber that was growing thereon, to her and adequate damage for Injury done to the
damage $500. The logs, after being severed, land In removing them. Potter v. Mardre,
were transported to Newbt>.rn in two lot.a, one supra; 5 A.m. & Eng. Enc. Law. p. 36; Ross
or which lots was seized by plalntltr after v. Scott, 15 Lea, 4'i9. The character of the
reaching that city, where ft was much more logs had not been changed by cutting and
valuable than at the stump, and was sold transporting to Newbern, but the value had
by her for the sum of $112. The other lot probably been greatly enhanced. The apwas converted Into boards and sold by the proved rule, where the plaintiff 1!1 ruildngdefendant. The defendant, for a second de- damage for trespass, seems to be that the
fense, sets up by way of counterclaim the owner ls entitled to recover the value of
seizure of the logs by the plaintiff; and the logs when and where they were sever~/
though the counterclaim may be a defective and without abatement for the cost of sever
statement of the defendant's cause of ac- ance. Cool Co. v. McMillan, 49 lid. 549.
tion, in that It falls to aver an unlawful tak- But, If he prefers to follow and claim the
ing, the defect ls cured, If the counterclaim timber removed, he Is entltled to do so, as
can be maintained at all, by the reply, which, long as the species remains unchanged. The
by way of alder, raises the question of the · plalntltf was entitled to recover In a claim
rightfulness of the seizure. The well-estab- and delivery proceeding the logs that she
llshed rule ls. that In such cases the Injured seems to have acquired peaceful possession
party ls entitled to recover of the trespasser of without action. Waa the defendant en, the value of the timber where It was first titled, by way of recoupment, to the benelltl
severed from the land and became a chn ttel ot the enhanced value Imparted to the prop1 ·
(Bennett v. Thompson, 13 Ired. 146), together erty by transporting It to market? Had they
with adequat.e damage for any Injury done to been sawed up in planks, and used to conthe land In removing It therefrom. .As long struct a boat, the plnlntltr would not have
as the timber taken was not changed Into a been entitled to recover the boat, or the madifferent species, as by sawing into boards, terial used in Its construction. But It the
the owner of the land retained her right of plalntltr had then unlawfully seized and lost
property In the specific logs as fully as when or destroyed the boat, and the defendant hn<~
by se\'erance it became her chattel, instead been thereby driven to an action to recover
of a part of the realty belonging to her. Pot- compensation for his loss, he might have reter v. linrdre, 74 N. C. 40. The value of the covered the value of the boat, together with
mnterinl taken indicates the extent of the the damage, If any, done to bis land In reloss, where there are no circumstances of ag- moving It therefrom; but the present plaingravation or willfulness shown, and Is the tiff would have been entitled "to deduct.
usual measure of damages. Where the tres- by way of counterclaim, the value of the
paRRcr has convel."ted the property taken Into timber which was manufactured Into the
a. dilTerent species, under the rule of the boat, just after It was felled and converted
civil law which we have adopted, the article, Into a chattel." Potter v. Mardre, supra. It
tn its altered state, cannot be recovered, but seems to have bel'n conceded that the defendonly damages for the wrongful tnkJng and ant cut and carried away the logs under the
conversion, when the change In Its form ls honest but mistaken belief that the land upon
"made by one who Is acting in good faith, and which they were growing was his own.
under an honest belief that the title was In Where a trespasser acts in good faith under
him." In Potter v. :\Iardre, supra, Rodman, a claim of right In removing timber, though
J., delivering the opinion of the court, says: he may not be allowed compensation for the
"The principle of equity [applied In that case] cost of conver ting the tree Into a chattel, may
ts !!upported by the analogy of the rule estab- he not recoup, In analogy to the equitable doc-
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GASKINS v. DAVIS.

(20 S. E. 188, 115 N. C. 85.)

Supreme Court of North Carolina. Oct. 16,

1894.

Appeal from superior court, Craven county;

Bynum, Judge.

Action of trespass by Patsy Ann Gaskins

against Henry C. Davis. Judgment was ren.-

dered for defendant, and plaintiff appeals.

Reversed.

W. W. Clark, for appellant. F. M. Sim-

mons and P. M. Pearsail, for appellee.

AVERY, J. The plaintiff's complaint is in

the nature of a declaration for trespass in

the entry by the defendant upon her land,

after being forbidden, and cutting, carrying

iaway, and converting to his own use valuable

itimber that was growing thereon, to her

Generated for facpubupdates (University of Michigan) on 2014-06-12 19:23 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/mdp.35112105421491
Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd-google

idamage $500. The logs, after being severed,

were transported to Newbern in two lots. one

of which lots was seized by plaintiff after

reaching that city, where it was much more

valuable than at the stump, and was sold

by her for the sum of $112. The other lot

was converted into boards and sold by the

defendant. The defendant, for a second de-

fense, sets up by way of counterclaim the

seizure of the logs by the plaintiff; and

though the counterclaim may be a defective

statement of the defendant's cause of ac-

tion, in that it fails to aver an unlawful tak-

ing, the defect is cured, if the counterclaim

can be maintained at all, by the reply, which,

by way of alder, raises the question of the

rightfuiness of the seizure. The well-estab-

lished rule is that in such cases the injured

party is entitled to recover of the trespasser

the value of the timber where it was ﬁrst

severed from the land and became a chattel

(Bennett v. Thompson, 13 Ired. 146), together

with adequate damage for any injury done to

the land in removing it therefrom. As long

as the timber taken was not changed into a

different species, as by sawing into boards,

the owner of the land retained her right of

property in the speciﬁc logs as fully as when

by severance it became her chattel, instead

of a part of the realty belonging to her. Pot-

ter v. Mardre, 74 N. ,C. 40. The value of the

material taken indicates the extent of the

loss, where there are no circumstances of ag-

gravation or willfuiness shown, and is the

usual measure of damages. Where the tres-

passer has converted the property taken into

a diiierent species, under the rule of the

civil law which we have adopted, the article,

in its altered state, cannot be recovered, but

only damages for the wrongful taking and

conversion. when the change in its form is

“made by one who is acting in good faith, and

under an honest belief that the title was in

him." In Potter v. Mardre, supra, Rodman,

J., delivering the opinion of the court, says:

“The principle of equity [applied in that case]

is supported by the analogy of the rule estab-

iished in this state by the decisions which

hold that a vendee of land by a parol con-
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trine of bettermems, for additional value im-

parted to the property after its conversion in-

to a chattel, and before it is changed into a

different species? The judge below, in allow-

ing the defendant, by way of recoupment,

the beneﬁt of the enhanced value imparted to

the logs by removal from the stump to the

Newbern market, seems to have acted upon

the idea that the defendant, by reason of his

good faith, was entitled to the beneﬁt of the

hmprovement in value imparted by his labor

and expense. In Ross v. Scott, supra, where

it appeared that the defendant had entered

upon land to mine for coal, and, under the

honest but erroneous belief that he was the

owner. had built houses thereon, it was held

that the plaintif f might recover the cost of

the coal in situ, subject to reduction by an

allowance for permanent improvements put
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upon the land. See, also, In re United

Merthyr Collieries Co., L. R. 15 Eq. 46; Hil-

ion v. Woods, L. R. 4 Eq. 432; Forsyth v.

Wells, 41 Pa. St. 291. The weight of authori-

ty, it must be conceded, sustains the rule

that, where the action is brought for damages

for logs cut and removed in the honest belief

on the part of the trespasser that he had title

them, the measure of damages is the value

in the woods from which they were taken,

with the amount of injury incident to re-

moval. not at the mill where they were car-

ried to be sawed. 'I‘iiden v. Johnson, 532 Vt.

628. 36 Am. Rep. 769, and note, 770; Ilcrdic

v. Young. 55 Pa. St. 176; Hill v. Canﬁcld. 56

Pa. St. 454: Moody v. Whitney. 38 Me. 174;

Cushing v. Longfellow, 26 Me. 306; Gollcr v.

Fett, 30 Cal. 482; Foote v. Merrill, 54 N. H.

496; Railway Co. v. Hutchins, 32 Ohio St. 571.

In the absence of any evidence that would

justify the assessment of vindictive damages,

there is only one exception to the rule, as we

have stated it, and that is where the trees

destroyed are not the ordinary timber of the

forest, but are peculiarly valuable for orna-

ment, or as shade trees.

It being settled in this state that the right

to the speciﬁc chattel, which vests on sever-

ance from the land in the owner of the soil,

remains in him till the species is changed,

we are constrained to go further, though

it may sometimes subject a mistaken tres-

passer to hardship, and hold that the true

owner is entitled to regain possession of a

log cut and removed from his land, either

by recapture or by any other remedy pro-

vided by law, whatever additional value may

have been imparted to it by transporting it

to a better market, or by any improvements

in its condition short of an actual alteration

of species. In Weymouth v. Railroad Co.,

17 Wis. 550, the court say: “In determining

the question of rccaption the law must either

allow the owner to retake the property, or it

must hold that he has lost his right by the

wrongful act of another. If retaken at all,

it must be taken as it is found, though en-

hanced in value by the trespasser. It cannot

be returned to its original condition. The

trlne f>t bettermenta, tor additional value Imparted to the property after Its conversion Into a chattel, and before It la changed Into a
ditrerent ispectea? The 'udge below, In allowing the dstendant, by way of recoupment,
the benellt of the enhanced value Imparted to
the logs by removal from the stump to the
Newbern market, seems to have acted upon
the Idea that the defendant, by reason of his
.Jrood faith, was entitled to the benefit ot the
~mprovement in value lmpnrted by bis labor
and expense. In Ross v. &ott, supra, where
tt appeared that the defendant bad entered
upon land to mine tor coal, and, under the
honest but erroneous belief that he wns the
owner, had bullt bou11e& thereon, it was held
that the plalntltr might recover the cost ot
the coal In situ, subject to reduction by an
allowance for permanent improvements put
upon the land. See, also, In re United
:Merthyr Collieries Co., L. R. 15 Eq. 46; Hilton v. Woods, L. R. 4 Eq. 432; Forsyth v.
Wells, 41 Pa. St 291. The weight of authority, It must be conceded, sustains the rule
that, where the action Is brought for damn~rs
tor logs cut and removed In the honest bellrf
on the part of the trespasser that be had title
~ them, the memmre of damages Is the value
l!D the woods from w,hkh they were tnkf.'D,
with the amount ot injury Incident to removal. not at the mill where tl1f.'y were carried to be sawed. Tilden v. Johnson, 52 Vt.
<J'>-8. 36 Am. Rep. 769, and note, 770; Ilerdlc
v. Young. 55 Pa. St 176; Hill v. Canfield. fiO
Pa. St. 454; Moody v. Whitney. 38 Me. 174;
Cushing v. Longfellow, 2G Mc. 306; Goller v.
Fett, 30 Cal. 482; Foote v. l\lerrlll, M N. H.
406; Railway Co. v. Hutchins, 32 Ohio St. 571.
In the absence of any evidence that would
justify the assessment of vintlictlvc damages,
there Is only one exception to the rule, as we
have stated It, and that Is where the trPeS
destroyed are not the ordinnry timber ot the
forest, but are peculiarly valuable for ornament, or as shade tre(!s.
It being Eettled In this state tlmt the rlgbt
to the specltlc chattel, which vests on severnnce from the land In the owner of the soil,
remains In him till the 11peeies Is changed,
we are constrained to ·go further, though
It may sometimes subjert a ·mistaken trespasser to hnrdslllp, and bold that tl1e true
owner is entitled to regrun possession of a
log cut and removed from hie land, either
by recapture or by any other remedy pro,·lded by law, whatever additional value may
huve bN'n Imparted to It by transporting It
to a better market, or by any Improvements
In Its condition short of an actual alteration
of species. In \Veymoutll v. ~allroad Co.,
17 Wis. G50. the court say: "In determining
the question of recnptlon the law must either
allow the owner to retake the property, or It
must hold that he bas lost his right by the
wrongful act of another. If retaken at all,
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It must be taken as It Is found, though enhanced In value by the trespasser. It cannot
be returned to Its original condition. The
law, therefore, being obliged to say either
that the wrongdoer shall lose his labor, or
the owner Bhall lose the right to take the
property wherever be may ftnd It, very properly decides in favor of the latter. But where
the owner voluntarily· waives the right to reclaim the property Itself, and sues for damages, the dlmculty of separating the enhanced value from the original value no longer exists. It Is then entirely practicable to
give the owner the entire value that was
taken from him, which It seems that natural
justice requires, without adding to it surb
value as the "property may have nfterwartle
acquired from the labor of the defentlnnt. In
the case of recaptlon the law does not allow
It, because It Is absolute justtce that the original owner should have the additional value.
But where the wrongdoer has by his own ·
act created a state ot tact.<1, when either he
or the owner must lose, then the law says
the wrongdoer shall lose." Id., 20 Am. Rep.
529, note. When, therefore, the plnlntitr rec-.iptured the one lot of loA'S that had been
enhanced In value by transportation from
the stump to the city market, she but exerl
clsed the right given her by law to peacefully regain possession of her own chat.tel
wherever found. She was guilty of no In
!rlngement of the rights of the defendant. for
which an action would lie. It Is familiar
learning that a defendant can only maintain
successfully a counterclaim when It is of
such a nature that he could recover upon It
In a separate suit brought against the plnlntil?. The defendant could not recover, ther&-~
rore, either In a 41st1nct action for the tnklng
of the logs, or by way of counterclaim.
When the plalntiJr recaptured the logs she
was guilty or no wrong, B.Dd the que:>tiun ot
title to the property so rightfully taken was
ellmlnntcd from all possible future controversy, Her remedy by a.ct of the lnw remained as to so many of the logs as she had
not regained possession of by her own act.
Alter she had recaptured one lot the property
In them In their altered stnte, nnd nt the new
situs, revested In her, with the absolute jus
dlsponendl, as In the case of. her other personal property. Nothing remained to be adjusted In the courts, except her clnlm for ,
damages ·for the taking of the other lot nnd \ .
the Injury to the land, if any, Incident to the
removal of both lots. It was error, thet"efore, to Instruct the jury that the enhanced f .
value Imparted by removal to the one lot i
of log11 might be allowed the defend.int as a \
counterclaim, so as to set off the damn:.:-es
assessed for Injury to the land and for the
value at the stump of the other lot, and the
plalntltr Is entitled to a new trial.
New trial.

l
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OMAHA & GRANT SMELTING & RE-

FINING CO. et al. v. TABOR et al.

(21 Pac. 925, 13 Colo. 4L)
Supreme Court of Colorado. May 28, 1880.

(21 Pac. 925, 13 Colo. 41.)

Supreme Court of Colorado. May 28, 1.

Commissioners' decision. Appeal from dis-

trict court, Lake county.

/ Two suits. in the nature of actions in tro-

ve

‘

r, brought by Horace A. W. Tabor, David

H. Mofiatt, Jacob J. B. Du Bois, James G.

Blaine, and Jerome B. Chal‘fee,—the ﬁrst,

against Eddy, James, and Grant; the second,

against the Omaha 80 Grant Smelting & Re-

ﬁning Company, in which it appears the bus-

iness of the former defendants was merged.

Plaintiffs alleged that they, with Charles E.

Rider, were the owners and in the possession

of the mine in the county of Lake known as
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the “lvluid of Erin Lode," and as survey

“Lot No. 568," and “Mineral Entry No.

384," from the 1st day of January, 1882, un-

til the 11th of October, 1883. That between

the 3d ol"July and the 31st of August, 1883,

Thomas Ovens, Stanley G. Wight, and oth-

ers wron;_vfm"ly entered upon the prouerty,

and mined and took out a large quantity of

valuable ore, and sold the same to thedefend-

ants, who converted it to their own use; and

that the ore so mined, sold, and purchased

by the defendants was of the value of 825.-

000 over and above the cost of mining, rais-

ing, hauling, and treating. That about the

9th day of March, 1886, the plaintiff Jerome

B. Chaffee died, and David H. Moffntt be-

came executor. That on or about the 20th

of Noveml-er, 1885, Charles E. Rider sold and

transferred to l‘‘vid H. Moffatt his cause or

causes of action in the premises, and that the

defendants mixed and confused the ores of

plaintiffs with other ores, destroyed their

identity, and sold and converted them into

money. Plsintills pray judgment for $25,-

000. and interest. Defendants answer, de-

nying all the allegations in the complaint,

except the allegation of sale and assignment

by Rider to Moffatt, in regard to which they

say they are not informed, and the allegation

that defendant had not paid plaintiffs for the

ore. which is admitted. For further defense,

defendants allege that, at the time of the al-

leged entry and wrongful taking of ore, Stan-

ley G. Wight, Jervis Joslin, Chester B.

Bullock, Loyd Park, A. W. ltucker, and

Rucker were the owners and in the

possession of the Vanderbilt lode mining

claim, which conﬂicted with and embraced a

part of the Maid of Erin claim. That the

territory in conﬂict was in htigation between

the respective parties. '1‘hat several actions

at law and equity concerning it were pend-

ing and undetermined. That at the dates

mentioned in the complaint Wight and oth-

ers were mining and taking ores from the

Vanderbilt claim, and from th.-it part in con-

fhct with the Maid of Erin. 'l‘hat these facts

were unknown to defendants; and that the

ore so taken, or a part of it. was sold and

Commissioners' decision. Appeal from district court, Lake county.
Two suits, in the nature of :wtio11s in trnver, brought by Horace A. W. Tabor, David
H . .Moffatt, Jacob J. B. Du Bois, James G.
Blaine, and Jerome B. Chaffee,-the lirst,
against Eddy, James, and Grant; the second,
against the Omaha & Grant Smelting & Refining Company, in which it appears the business of the former defendants was merged.
Plaiutifl's alleged that they, with Charles E.
RidtH', were the owners and in the possession
of the mine in the county of Lake knowu as
tl1e "Mahl of Erin Lode," and as survey
"Lot No. 568," and "Mineral Entry No.
8t!4," from the 1st day of January, lt!82, until the 11th of October, 1883. That between
the &I of July and the 31st of August, 1~~3,
Thomas Ov!·ns, Stanley G. Wight, and others w1·ongf11ily entern,1 upon the pro1•erty,
a11d mirll'd and took out a large quantity of
vai ualile ore, and sole I Lhe same to thP. defe1Hlants, who convertl'd it to their own use; and
tl1at the ore su mined, sold, and purchased
by the defendants Willi of the value of $25,000 over· and above the t·ost of mi11ing, 1·aising, hauling, and treating. That about the
9th day of March, 1880, tile plaintiff Jerome
ll. <..:ha!Tee died, and David H. Moffatt became executor. 'fhat on or about the 20th
ol' Noverut.er, 1885, Charles E. Rider sold and
trnnsfnred to r •vid H. Moffatt his cause or
causes of action in the premises, and that the
detendants mixed and confused the ores of
plaintiffs with other ores, destroyed their
identity, <1nd sold and conve1·ted them into
money. Plaintilis pray judgment for 825,000. and inLerest. llefen1lants answer, 1lenying all the allegations In the complaint,
except the allegation of sale and assignment
by Hider to Moffatt, in regard to which they
say they are not informed, and the allegation
that defendant had not paid plaintiffs for the
ore, which is admitted. }~or further defense,
defernlants allege that, at the time of the alleged entry and wrongful taking of orf', Stanley G. Wight, Jervis Joslin, Chester B.
Bullock, 1,oyd Park, A. W. !tucker, and
- - - Rucker were tl1e owners and in the
possession of the Vanderbilt lode mining
claim, which conllicted with and embraced a
part of the Maid of E1·in claim. 'fhat the
territory in contlict was in litigation bot ween
the re;ipecti ve parties. That several actions
at law 11nd equity concerning it were pending and undetermined. That at the dates
mentioned in the complaint Wight and others were mining and taking ores from the
Vanderbilt claim, and from that part in conflict with the Maid of Erin. That these facts
were unknown to dcfen!.lants; and that the
ore so taKeu, or a part of it. was sold and
deli\'erell to the defemlant at its smelting

works in Leadville, as ore from the Vanderbilt lode, and purchased by defendants in
regular course of business. That long after
the purchase of the ore by defendants they
were informed that the ore was taken from
the ground in dispute. Defendants furlher
say, in answer, that some ti mo during August or September, 1883, they did purchm1e
ore:s belonging to Wight, Uuc:ke1·, anti others
which were known RS and called "Vanderbilt Ores," which as defendants believe were
taken from the Vand••rbilt claim, of which
the said Wight and others were the owners
and claimants, and in possession under claim
and color of title. Plaintiffs, in reply, deny
that Wight and others were the ownt>rs of
any part of the Vanderbilt claim in conflict.
with the Maid of Erin claim: deny that any
part of the Vanderbilt claim conflicted; and
allege that prior to the dnte mentioned the
government of the United l:itatea had sold t<>
the plaintiffs Tabor and Du Bois the Maid of
Erin claim, and given a receiver's rPceipt for
the same from the land-office at Leadville~
and aver that Ovens and Wight wrongfully
went into a portion of the gr11und descrilietJ
in the complaint while plaintiffs were in possvssion uf it, ancl 111i11ed anc.l carriell I\ way the
Ol'e, which was the same ore weutiuneJ in
defendants' answer; d"ny that Ovens and
Wight had any title to the ground from whkb
ore wa~ taken, an!.1 avt>r that all the possession they hall was wrongful and illegal, an!.I
temporary, for the purpose of obtaining the
01·e; that the entry of Ovens and Wight WlL'I
through a shaft on the Big Chief claim, nut
ownt>d by t'ither party to the controversy,
and that from such shaft they worked over
the boundal'y into plaintiffs' propt>rty; deny
that defemlants did not know that Ovens and
Wight were taking the ore from plaintiffs'
ground; and a\·er full notice and knowle<l,!.(t'
of the fact. The two suits were consolidated
for the purpose of the trial. The venue was
change<\ to LakH county; the cause triecl before the court and a jury, .April 15, 1888~
rnrdict for plaintiffs against Eddy, James,
and Grant for $3,990.45, and against thtt
Omaha & Grant Smelting & Relining Company for $14,:197.67. 'l'here are 61 1ts:11g11ments of error. Of these, 38 are to the ruling of the court in admitting and rejectin;;
testimony; 22 (being those from 39 to 00,
both inclusive) are to the rulin~sof the court
in giving and i·efusing the instructions asked;
tl1e 6lst and last is to the refusal of the
court to grant a new trial. The other facls
necessary to a proper u nderstund i ng of the
case necessarily appeal' in the opinion.
Pattersou & 1'/tumas, for app1·llant. Wolcott & Vail11, J. B. lfo1sell, anu L. C. R0<:kwell, for appellees.
REED, C., (ofter stating the far:t.v a.•
aboce.) The lirst 15 and tbe 18th error1111S·
signed are to the ruling of the court on the
cross-examination of plaintiffs' witness O. II.
Harker. Counsel in their argument for appellants say: "The defendants sought tc:
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show by cross-examination of the plaintiffs' ' James v. Stookey, 1 Wash. C. C. 330.t

witnesses that at the time of the commission

of the trespasses complained of, the Maid of

Erin mine was owned by the Henriett Mm-

ing 80 Smelting Company and J. B. Du Bois,

and that the original trespassers were en-

joined at the suit of these parties by proper .

proceedings instituted for that purpose, but ,

1 this action. And although he was the ageit

‘ of plaintiffs, in charge of their work in the

they were not permitted to do so." it ap-

pea1s that counsel for appellants (defendants

below) upon the trial attempted, on cross-

examination of the witness, to show that the

plaintiﬂ Du Bois owned one-half of the Maid

of Erin property, and the Henriett Company

the other hall‘, and that the other plaintiffs

were not owners, by showing that the wit-

ness had so stated in a legal document signed
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and veriﬁed by him as manager and agent in

some former proceeding concerning the prop-

erty, in which case an injunction was issued

to restrain a trespass upon the Maid of Erin

claim upon the complaint so signed and ver-

itied; bntthe court would not permit it to be

done. An examination of the questions asked

the witness, which the court did not per-

mit him to answer, will show that none of

the testimony sought went to any issue in

the case, was not directed to anything in his

direct testimony, and was not legitimate

cross-examination. Many of the questions

were in regard to facts that could only have .

been proved by production of records or doc-

umenls. Some of the questions were in re-

gard to suits at law and proceedings where

there is nothing in the record to show he in

any way participated or.of which he had any

knowledge; and all the testimony sought, in

our view of the case, was immaterial, except

in so far as it tended to discredit him or

weaken his testimony by showing that his

acts or declarations on previous occasions

were at variance and inconsistent with his

testimony at that time. This counsel had a

right to do by introducing the records or doc-

uments, and asking him in regard to oral

statements. It appears that in the course of

the trial the papers executed by the witness,

to which his attention was called, were ad-

mitted in evidence for the purpose of im-

peachment,—the only legitimate purpose they

could serve.

It is clear that the title of the Henriett

Company to one-half of the Maid of Erin

- claim could not have been established by pa-

rol statements, or the acts of an agent in

verifying papers where the facts were so

stated. Counsel say this was one purpose

for which the evidence was sought to be elic-

ited on cross-examination. llad it been

proper cross-examination, and directed to an

issue, it was incompetent for the declared

purposes for which it was sought. The

agency of the witness had not been estab-

lished by any testimony but his own. He stat-

ed under oath at the time suit was brought

that he was the manager and agent of the

'l'O REAL PHOI'EHTY.

ahow by croes-examlnation of t.he plainti1's' '
witnesses that at the time of the commi11Sion
of the trespasses complained of, t.he Maid of
Erin mine was ownt'd by the Henriett Min·
ing & ~melting Company and J.B. Du Bois,
and that the original lrespa.'4sers were enjoined at the suit of these pa1·ties by proper
proceedings instituted for that purpose, but
they were not. permitted to do so." It u~
pears that counsel for appellants (defendant.a
below) upon the trial attempted, on cross·
~xamination of the witness, to show that the
plain till Du Bois owned one-half of the Maid
of .El'in property, and t.he HenriPtt Company
the other half, and that the other plaintiffs
were not owners, by showing that the witness hlld so stitted in a legal document signed
and veriHed by him as manager and agent In
some former proceeding concerning the property, in which case an injunction was issued
to restrain a trespa1111 upon the Maid of Erin
claim upon the complaint so signed and ver·
iliPd; but the court would not permit it to be
clone. An examination of the questions asked
the witness, which the court did not per·
mit him to answer, will show that none of
the t~timony sought went to any issue in
the case, was not directed to anything in has
1lirect testimony, and was not legitimate
cross·examlnation. Many of the questions
were in regard to fact11 that could only have_
been provtd by procluction of records or documente. Some of the questions were in regard lo suits at law and proceedings where
there is nothing in the record to show he in
any wily participated or.of which he had any
knowledge; and all the testimony sought, lo
our view of the case, was immaterial, except
in so far as it tended to discredit him or
weaken his testimony by showing that bis
acts or declarations on previous occasions
were at variance and inconsistent with his
l:E>stlmony at that time. This counsel had a
right lo do by Introducing the records or documents, and asking him in regard to oral
statements. It appears that In the course of
the trial the papen1 executed by t.he witness,
to which his attention was called, were ad·
mitted in evidence for the purpose of Im·
peachment,-theooly legitimate purpose they
c,"Oultl serve.
It is clear that the title of the Henriett
Company to one-half of the Maid of Erin
. claim could not have been established by pa·
rol statements, or the acts of an agent in
verifying papers where the facts were so
atated. Counsel say this was one purpose
for which the evidence was sought to be elioited on cross-examination. Hl&d it been
proper cross-examination, and directed to lln
issue, it was incompetent for the declared
purposes for which it was sought. The
agen<>y of the witness had not been establishe<l by any testimony but his own. He stated under oath at the time suit was brought
that he was the manager and agent of the
HenriettCompany. This was insufficient. An
agency cannot be established by his own <let•
luations. Harker v. Dement, 9 Gill, 16:

39:;

James v. Stookey, I Wash. C. C. 830.t If an
agency had been proved, it was tl111.t ut the
time of verifying the papers he was the man·
ager and 11ge11t of the Hemiett Company;
and his sworn statement that he was such
agent, and that his principal ownbd one-halr
of defendants' claim, could not be binding
upon or In any way affect the plai11tiffll in
this action. .And although he was tl1e ac,eit
of plaintiffs, in charge of their work 1ll the
Mllid of Erin, no statement, no matter how
solemnly made by him as the agent of the
Hemiett Company, in favor of such company,
or against the title of plaintiffs, could affect
eit.her,muchlessconcludeandestoptheplaintiffs frum asserting the contrary, as is urged
by counsel. There was no plea or property in
the Henriett Company, and of entry anu juAtitlcatlon undn such a title. The defe11d1mt in
this case cannot set up a title of a third person in defense, unlPi-s he in some mannt-r
connects himself with it. Duncan v. Spear.
11 Wt-nd. M; Weymouth v. Hailroad Co., 17
Wis. 555; Harker w. Dt>ment, 9 Gill, 7. It
follows that the court did not err in limiting
the testimony on the cross-t-xaminatio11 to
the attempted discl'editing of the witn1·ss,
and in refusing to admit records, except fur
puq..1osps of impt>achment.
It is assigned for error that the court allowed plaintiff Tabor to teiltify to a con\'ersat.ion with McComb after the lattf'r had
been called, and hl&d given his ,·ersiou of it.
Counsel put it upon the ground that a party
cannot be nllowed to contradict or impeach
his own witness. It does not appear that
Tabor was called for any such purpose, or
that his testimony hnd that eff1•ct. He wa11
called to give his version of what occurred
at that interview with McComb. A careful
comparison of the testimony of both shows
that of Tabor more corroborative of t.han coutradictory to that of McComb,-at least, Kl!
to the result of such convermtion.~1lthongla
there is some discrepancy in regard to I.he
language used. "The party calling a witnE>ss is not precluded from proving the truth
of any pal'ticular fact. by any othel' co111petent
testimony." 1 Greenl. Ev.§ 448.
Appellants' coun!lel rely upon the conversation of Tabor with McDomb as " liceni1e or
consent on the part of 1'auor to thf' entry and
taking of the ores from the Maid of Erin
ground, and contend that his license or cunsent as a co-owner to the extent of one-sixteenth of the Maid of Erin ground was conelusive upon himself, and also upon his coowners of the other fifteen-sixteenths, and
was equi\'alent to a license or consent from
all, to the extent of covering the entireprope1ty. A license or consent cannot be extended by inference as a consent to entPr
property not spoken or or referre.I to in the
conversation, and we can find nothing in tl11·
testimony of either McComlJ or T<&bor in regard to entering and taking ore from the
Maid of Erin ground. It was not attempted
1
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to be shown that Ovens. Wight, and Rucker

entered under license or consent from Tabor.

At the conversation both testify that Tabor

was informed the parties had entered under

an order from the court, against which he

was powerless for the time. It further ap-

pears that those parties were in at the time

McComb and Tabor had the conversation,

and McComb only asked consent to join

them'. It cannot be contended that such a

consent was a license to Ovens, Wight, and

Rucker to enter. The testimony went to the

jury, and in the eighth and ninth instruc-

tions given on prayer of plaintiffs they were

instructed‘, in effect. that they could uotlimit

or reduce the amount to be recovered by rea-

son of the supposed license or consent of

Tabor, unless they should ﬁnd that there was

a consent on his part that they should enter
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through the B.g Chief shaft, and take the

ore from the Maid of Erin claim; and the

same proposition is submitted in theinstruc-

tion given on behalf of defendants in place

of No. 7‘ refused. These instructions on

that point, we think, were correct. and fairly

submitted to the jury the question of license

or consent. -And it is evident from the ver-

dict that the jury found against any such

license or consent; and. the jury having so

found, it would seem unnecessary to deter-

mine whether the instructions were correct

or otherwise in regard to the extent such con-

sent. if found, should affect or modify the

amount; or, in other words, whether it should

cover the whole taking of ore, or be conﬁned

to the one-sixteenth owned by Tabor. The

jury having found no consent or license on

the part of Tabor, (l8ft-1‘|‘l2I,nts could not be

prt'jmliced by the instructions of the court in

regard to its effect, if it were found.

The question is quite different from what

it would be if it related to a transaction is

the ordinary course of business relative to

the joint property of tenants in common.

Here it is attempted to justifyatort, and

the injury to the entire property by the sup-

posed license of one joint owner. If the en-

try had been made by Tabor in person, and

the wrongs attempted to be justltied under

permission from, had been done by, him, his

co-tenants could have had against him the

same actions at law for injuries to their in-

terests that all a1e attempting to en1orce

against parties having no interest. It is

held “an action on the case sounding in tort

may be maintained by one tenant in common

against his co-tenant for a misuse of the com-

mon property, though not amounting to a

total destruction of it." McLellan v. Jen-

ness, 4;3 Vt. 183; Agnew v. Johnson. 17 Pa.

St. 373; Lowe v. Mdler, 3 Grat. 205. And,

if one tenant in common assume to own and

sell the thing held in common. the other may

mamtain an action of trover against him.

Burbank v. Crooker. 7 Gray, 159; Wheeler

v. Wheeler, 33 Me. 347; Coursin's Appeal,

79 Pa. St. 220; White v. Osborn, 21 Wend.

72; bmyth v. Tankersley, 20 Ala. 212. , The

DAMAGES FOR INJURIES TO PROPERTY.

to be shown that O\•ens, Wight, and Rucker be extended to cover acts or others that heentered under license or consent from '.fabo1·. could not legally have done himsetr, Hence
.At the conversation both testify that Tabor the coun was correct in holding and instructwas informed the parties had entered under ing the jury that the consent or li~nse of
an order from the court, against which he Tabor, if such were found, could only extend
was powerless for the time. It further ap- to the interl'st owned by him in the common
pears that those parties were ip at the time proptirty•
.McComb and Tabor had the conversation,
Appellants further assign for error the rut·
and McComb only asked consent to join Ing of the court in a1lmitting the testimony
them: It cannot be contended that such a of Tabor when called by the plaintiffs to
cousent was a license to Ovens, Wight, and show that, by a pan>l agreement made at the
Rucker to enter. The testimony went to the tin1e of the conveyance Qf the diffnent Interjury, and in the eighth and ninth instruc- ests by Tabor, Moffatt, and Chaffee in the
tions given on prayer of plaintiffs they were Henriett Company, possession of the properinstrncti>d~ in effect, that they could not limit
ty conveyed was to remain in the grantors
or reduce the amount to be recovered uy rea- until the purchase price was paid; that iL
11011 of the surposed license or consent of
never was paid; and possession under the
Talior, unless thPy should find that there was conveyance never df'li vered. A part of such
a consPnt on his part that they should enter testimony-that which went to show that
thl"Ough the B.g Chief shaft, and take the posses!lion was to be retained-was inad·
ore from the Maid of Erin claim; and the tnissi11le. "All conveyances of real e~tate
same proposition is su bmilted in the instruc- and of any intt>rest iherein duly executed
tion given on behalf of defendants in place and delivered shall be held to carry with
of No. 7, l'efused. Thel!e insll'uctions on them the right to immediate possession of
that µoint, we think, wne correct, and fairly the premi~es or Interest conveyed, unless a
submiltecl to the jury the question of license f'utul'e day for the possession is therein specior consent. .And it is evident from the ver- lietl." Gen. St. c. 18, § 9; Dr1tke v. Root, 2
dil}t that the jury found against any such Colo.. 685. Under the statute. it is certainly
license or consent; and, the jury having so required that the intention to postpone the
fmmd, it would s ..em unnecessary to deter- operation of a deed shall be declarf'd in thei
mine whether the instruct.ions were corl'ect _instrnment, and it cannot be proved by parol.
or otherwise in regard to the extent snch con· It follows that the instructions of the court
sent. if found, should affect or modify the on this point were in part erroneous; that
amount; or, in other words, whether it should part of the t•·stimony going to prove that
cover the whole taking of ore, or be confined possession of the property was ne\'er delivto the one-sixteenth owned by Tahor. The ered, and remained in the gl'anlors, was
jury having found no consent or license on clearly competent and proper; and the inthe part or Tabor, defl'mlants could noL bo structions of the court were proper on tlmt
pn•j 1111iced by the instruclions of the court in point.
regard to its effect, if it were found.
The admission in evidence of the deeds of
'l'he question is quite different from what reconveyance by the Henriett Mining Comit wo11ILI be if it :celated to a transaction il'l pany and the assignment of Uider of his
the ordinary course of business rP!ative to cause of action was. not erron~ous, and
the joint property of tenants in. common. should be s11slained,-th11 former investing
Uere it is attempted to justify a tol't, and plaintiffs with full title before the comthe injury to the entire propPrty by the sup- mencement of snit; and of the validitv of
pm;ed liumse of one joint owner. If the en- the latter, so ns to enable Moffatt, assignee,
try hail been made by Tabor in person, and to succeed. to all the r:ghls of his assignor.
the wrongs attempteLI to be JUstitied under there can be no question lintier our statute.
permission from, had been done by, him, his Had defendants, by proper and competent
co-tenants could have had against him the testimony, atrempted to prove the ownership of one-half of the Maid of Erin claim in
samtt actions at law for injudes to their in·
terests that all 111e attempting to t1n1orce the Heniielt Company, it wonld have lieen
11gainst parties having no interest. It is inadmissiltle. There was no attemped justiht'hJ "an actian on the case sounding in tort licat on of entry or Wh:ht and other11 unmay be maiutained by one teuant in common der the Henriett title of one-half. Undel' a
against his cu-tenant for a mhrnse uf the cum· plea that lhe close upon which the alleged
mon property, though not amounting to a trespass was cornmitte,1 was not at that
total destruction of it." McLellan v. JPn· time the close of the plaiutitf, the deft>ndant
uess, 4;3 Vt. 1:53; Agnew v. Juhn~on, 17 Pa. may show lawfnl right to the possession of
St. 37J; Lowe v. Miller, 3 Grat. 205. And, the close in a tbirtl person, undel' whom he
if one tenant in common assume to own and claims to have acted. .Jones v. Chapman, 2
sell the thing ht.>ld in common, the otl11•r may Exch. 803. But a bare tol't-feasor can not
marntain an action of tro\'er against him. st.>t up in defense the t;tle of a third person
Buruank v. Cl'ooker, 7 Grily, 159; Wheeler between whom and himseH there is 110 privBl'anch v. Doane, 18
ity of conne"tion.
v. Wheeler, 33 Me. 347; Coursin's Apµeal,
79 Pa. ~t. 220; White v. O~IJorn, 21 Wt'nd. c;inn. 238. Jn justifying ~ander a thirtl per72; :::.myth v. Tankersley, 20 Ala. 212 . . 'fhe son, the defendant must show both the title
authority of the tt.'nant in common could not aw.I the po:.Se<jS.011 of that person, (Cpamllers
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v. Donaldson, 11 East, 65; Merrill v. Bur-

bank, 23 Me. 538; Reed v. Price, 30 Mo.

442,) and that the acts were done by that

person's authority. (Dunlap v. Glidden, 31

Me. 510.) A defendant can only justify up-

on the ground of a better right or title than

the plamtiﬂs have.

And it has been held ,

that mere naked possession, however ac- -

quired, is good as against a person having

no right to the possession. Knapp v. Win-

I and gave a receipt.

chester, 11 Vt. 351; Haslem v. Lockwood, ‘

87 Conn. 500; Cook v. Patterson, 35 Ala.

102. It will be apparent that in the judg-

ment of this court the effort of defendants

to set up title to half of the property in the

Maid of Erin claim in the Hennett Company,

without a plea to that effect, and attempt-
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ing to show privity or attempting to justify

under it, was unwarranted in law, and that

no testimony should have been taken in

support of any such attempted defense.

Another defense interposed, which seems

incompatible with the former, was that cer-

tain parties, named in the answer, were the

owners of the Vanderbilt claim, and that

such claim conﬂicted with and comprised a

part of the Maid of Erin claim, and that the

claim was in the possession of the owners

named under claim and color of title; and

that the ground from which the ore was tak-

en was in conliict between the owners of the

claim, and that divers suits in regard to the

same were pending and undetermined; that

Wight and othe1s, while engaged in mining

the Vanderbilt claim, took the ores from the

ground in controversy, which defendants

bought as Vanderbilt ore; and that the same

was taken by the owners of such claim while

the locus was in their possession under color

of title. it is shown in evidence that there

were two entries on the property in contro-

versy,—the ﬁrst by Wight, one of the owners

of the Big Chief in 1882. after the Maid of

Erin had a receiver‘s receipt from the United

States land-oilice, when a drift was run from

the Big Chief shaft for the Maid of Erin,

and was run over the line 20 or 28 feet, in-

lo the Maid of Erin ground. The second

entry was by the s:une party and others, in

the same way, and upon the same g1ound.

Neither entry was made by extending the

work of the Vanderbilt claim to its exterior

limits, and thus entering the Maid of Erin

property. The party entering and partici-

pating in the proceeds of the ores mined

were not the owners of the Vanderbilt, but

seems to have been one made up for the occa-

siun,—part of the owners of the Vanderbilt,

some of the owners of the Big Chief, and, per-

haps, parties owning in neither. 'l‘he plain-

tiﬂs pleaded title to the Maid of Erin claim

from the government of the United States,

and put in evidence a receiver's receipt for

the purchase of the property, of date Novem-

ber 23, 1881, and a patent from the United

States government dated March 17, 1884.
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v. Donaldson, 11 East, 65; Merrill v~ Bur- .and in courts of law is e\·idence of the trne
bank, 23 Me. 588; Reed v. Price, SO Mo. pel'formance of every prereq uh1ite to its is442,) and that the acta were done by that suance, and cannot be questioned either in
person's authority. (Dunlap v. Glidden, 31 court.J of law or equity, except upon grountl
Me. 510.) A defendant can only justify up- of fraud or mi11take, and, if not assailed for
on the ground of a better right or title than fraud or mistake, is conclusive evidence of
the pla111tiffa have. And it has been held title. On the2ad of November, 1881, the govthat mere naked possession, however ac- ernment parletl with its title to the Maid of
quired, is good a., against a person ha\·ing ' Erin property, sold it to Tabor and Du Bois,
no right to tht> posses~ion. Knapp v. Win- and giwe a receipt. The government could
thereafter no more dispose of the land th;in
chester, 11 Vt. ai>l; Haslem v. Lockwooo,
37 Conn. 500; Urok v. Patterson, 85 Ala. if a patent had been issued. "The final cerI0-2. It will be apparent that in the judg- tificate o[)tained on the payment of the money
ment of this ronrt the effort of dt'fendanta la as binding on the go\·ernwent as the patto set UJ> title to half of the property in the ent. • • • When the patent issues it
Maid of Erin claim in the Bennett Company, relates back to the entrv. • • •" .Aswithout a plea to that effect, and attempt.- trom v. Hawmond, 8McLean,107; 2 Blach·
ley v. Coles, 6 Colo. a50; Poil'e v. Wells. Id.
in~ to show privity or attempting to jt13tity
under it, wns unw11rranted in law, and that 406; Steel v. Smelting Co., 106 U.S. 447. 1
no testimony should have been taken in Sup. Ct. Rep. 389; Heydenfeldt v. Mining
Co., 93 U.S. 634. The patent does nut insupport of any such attempted defense.
Another defense interposed, which seems vest the purchaser with any additional propincompatible with the former, was that cer- erty in the lanu. It only gives him better legal
tain parties, named In the answer, WPl'e the evidt'nce of the title which he first acquired
owners of the Vanderbilt claim, and that by the certiHcate. Cavender v. Smith, 5
such claim conflicted with and comprised a Chirke, (Iowa,) 189; Id. 3G. Green, 34!); .Arpart of the M11id of Erin rlaim, and that the nold v. Gl'imes, 2 Clarke, (Iowa,) l; Carroll
claim wns in the possef!Sion of the owners v. lSafford, 8 How. 460; Bagnell v. Brodernamed undl'r claim and color of title; 11nd ick, 13 Pt>t. 450; Carman v. Johnson, 29
that the ground from which the ore was tak- .Mo. 94; Hutchings v. Low, 15 Wall. 88. A
en was in conflict between the owner.i of the patent title c-.mnot he attacked collnterally.
claim, and that divers suits in regard to the "Individuals can reJ'list the conclusivenessof
same were pending aml undetel'mined; that the patent only by showing that it contlicte
Wight and others, while engag..d in mining with prior rights vested in them." Boggs
the Vanderliilt claim, took the orPS from the v. Mining Co., 14 Cal. 362; Leese v. Cla1·k,
ground in controversy, which defemlants 18 Cal. 555; Jackson v. Lawton, 10 Johns.
bought 11s Vanderbilt ore; nod that the same 24. .An "adverse possession" is delioPd to
was taken by the owners of such claim while ht, the enjoyment of land, or such Pstate 11s
the lucua was in tlwk possession undel' color lies in grant, under such circumstances as
of title. It is shown in evidence th11t there lndicatt> that such enjoyment bas hl'en comwere two entries on the property in contro- menced and continued underasse1·tion or color
versy ,-the first by Wight, one of the owners of right on the part of the possessor. Walof the Big Chief in 1882, arter the Mai<! of lace v. Duffield, 2 Serg. & R. 5:.!7; French
Erin had a receiver's receipt from the United v. Pearce, 8 Conn. 440; Smith v. Burtis, 9
States Jand-ottice, when a drHt was run from Johns. 174. The entry of a stranger, and
the Big Chief shaft for the Maid of Erin, the taking of rents or profits by him, is
and was run over the line 20 or 28 ftlt't, In· not an ad verse possession. When two parties
to the Maid of Erin ground. The SPC•md are in possession, the law adjudges it lo be
entry was by the same party and others, in the possession of the party who ha.'i the
the same way, and upon the same ground. right. H.eading v. Rawsterne, 2 Ld . .llaym .
.Neither entry was macle by extencling the 82J; Barr v. Gratz, 4 Wheat. 213: Smith v.
work of the Vanderbilt, claim to its exterior Bnru~. 6 Johns. 218; Stevens v. Hollister, 18
limits, and thus entel'ing the Maid of Erin Vt. 29-1; Brimme1· v. Long Wharf, 5 Pick.
pl'operty. The party entering and partici- 131. Possession, to he supported by the law.
pating in the proceeds of the ore11 mined must be under a claim of right, and adverse
Wt>re nut the ownel's of the Vanderbilt, but possession must be strictly provoo. Grube
seems to have been one made up for the occa- v. Wells, 84 Iowa, 150. 'fhe color must
sion,- part of the owner11 of the Vanderbilt, arise out of some conveyance purporting to
some or the owners of the Hig Chief, and, per- convey title to a tract of land. 3 Washb.
haps, pal'ties owning in neither. 1'he plain- Ueal Prop. 155; Shnckiefol'd v. Bailey, 35
ti1Is pleaued title to the Maid of Erin claim lll. 391.
'l'he title of the Maid of Erin chtim was in
from the government of the United States,
and put in evidence a receiver's receipt for the goyern111ent of the United Stales until
the purchase of tho property, of date Novem- diYeRted by its own act. 'fhere could be no
ber 23, 1881, and a patent from the United w:lve1·s1J possession against the government.
States government dated March 17, 1884. The claimants of the Vanderbilt claim enIt has been frequently held that a patPot for teretl u11der license only from the governland emanating from the government of the
United btates ls the higbe:it evidence of title,
:1 Fed. Cas. No. 596.
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ment. Admitting, for the purposes of this

case. that the entry under the license was

legal, that they had complied with the laws

of congress and the state, and that their pos-

session extended toand was protected to their

evtenor lines while the fee remained in the

government, when the fee passed from the

government to the other party conveying the

locus, before that time in controversy, the

supposed license was revoked, and all acts

and declarations of the parties themselves,

whether by record or otherwise, as estab-

hshing a possessory right, were void as

against the grantees of the government,

and there could be no entry under color of

title, except by some right by conveyance

either from the government or its grantees.

The fact of the actual possession and occu-
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pancy of the Maid of Erin by plaintiffs was

not seriously disputed, and the testimony

was ample to warrant the jury in ﬁnding the

fact. The government had granted thel 'nd

previous to the entry of Wight and others,

and that such possession under a legal title

was co-extensive with its bounds is so well

settled that authorities in its support are un-

necessary.

We do not think the court erred in refusing

to admit the testimony offered in support of

possessory title of the Vandrrbilt in the land

from which the ore was taken. nor in re-

fusing the testimony in reference to litigation

and suits pending between the parties.

Neither the title nor right of possession of

plaiutiffs could he attacked collaterally as at-

tempted, and the testimony offered under

the law as shown above was incompetent and

inadmissible to prove either adverse pos-

session or color of title. From our view of

the law controlling the case, as stated above,

it follows that the court did not err in re-

fusing the instructions asked on this point

by the defendants, or in giving those which

were given. They were substantially correct.

The sale of ore by Wight and others, and

purchase by the defendants. was a conver-

sion. A “conversion" is di-ﬁned to be any

act of the defendant inconsstent with the

plaintill"s ri;:ht of possession, or subversive

of h.s right of property. Harris v. Saunders,

2 5trob. Eq. 370. note; Webher v. Davis, 44

Me. 147; Gdman v. Hill, 36 N. H. 311: Clark

v. Wlnlaker, 19 Conn. 319. The defend-

ants, by purchasing the ore, acquired no

title, and are consequently equally liable for

its conversion as the parties who sold it.

Clark v. Wi-lls, 45 Vt. 4; Clark v. ltideout,

39 N. II. 238; Carter v. Kingman, 103 Mass.

517. And it was a matter of no importance,

so far as the legal liability of defendants was

, concernel, whether they were ignorant or

' informed of the true ownership. Morr|ll v.

Moulton. 4U Vt. 242; Johnson v. Powers, Id.

611; Railroad Co. v. Car-Works Co.'. 32 N.

J. Law, 517; Dixon v. Caldwell, 15 Ohio St.

412; Hoffman v. Carow. 22 Wend. 285. The

principle caoeut emptur applies. A person

•
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ment. Admitting, for the purposes of this
title is, does so at his peril, and, although
<:ase, thaL the entry under the license was
honestly mistaken, will be liable to the ownf.'r
lf'gal, that they had complied with the laws for a conversion. Taylor v. Pope, 5 Cold.
of congress and the state, and that thf'ir pos413; Gilmore v. Newlon, 9 Allen, 171;
si-ssion extended to and was protectt>d to their ::lpraights v. Hawley, 39 N. Y. 441.
e'ttt>rtor lines while the fee remained in the j The question of the proper mt>asure or
government, when the fee passed from the , damages is one of much greater difficulty.
gowrn ment to the other party conveying the ; We can find no conclusive adjudication in our
lucus, before that time in controversy, the
own court. The decisions of the different
supposed license was revoked, and all nets states are conHicting and irreconcilable. Alamt declarations ot the pat-ties themselves,
though, under oul' Code, different forms of
wlwther by record or otherwise, as estab- action are abolished, the principles controlling
lishing a po.:111e:isory right, were void as the uitlerellt act10ns remain the same as liefore its adoption. Consequenlly the law apagainst t11e grantees of the government,
and there could be no entry under color of plicable and to be administf'red in each case
title, except by some right by conveyance depends as much as formerly upon the nature of the case,-the allegations and the diseither from the governmt>nt or its grantees.
The fact of the actual possession and occu- tinetive fol'm the case assumes. In many
pancy of the Maid of Erin by plaintiffs was states the courts have attempted in this acnot seriously disputejl, and the testimony tion to make the rule of damage correspond
was ample to warrant the jury in finding the to that in the action of trespass. and make it
fact. 'fhe govt>rnment had grnnted the l 1nd in that respect as full and complete a remedy.
previous to the entry of Wight and others, In the state of New York it was long hf'ld,
and that such pos!les11ion under a legal title and perhaps still is, that the increased value
was co-extensive with its bounds is so well of the propetty, adtled by tbe labor and acts
settled that authorities in its support are un- of defendant, belongs to the rightfnl owner ·
of the property, and the value of the propt•rty ·
necf'ssa ry.
We do not think the con rt erred in refusing in its new and improved state thus lJecomes ,
to admit the te:;timony otfel'ed in support of tbe measure of damages, but the doctrine
po!!sessory tille of the V1md.. rbilt in the land has been questioned and severely criti<'isoo
from which the ore was taken, nor in re- in the same state. Brown v. Sax, 7 Cow. ~5.
fusing the testimony in refert>nce to litigation In trespass, damage for the whole injnry, inand suits pending between the parties. cluding diminution in the v1due of the land
Neither the title nor right of possession of by the entry and removal, as well as of tl1e
plaintiffs could he attitcked collaterally as at- value ot the property removed, may be retempted, and the testimony offe1·ed under covered; and the charactN' of the t>ntry,
the law RS shown above was incompf'tent and whether willful and malicious, or in good
inadmissible to prove fliLher adverse pos- faith, through inadvertence or mistake, is an
St'SSion or color of title. ~'l'Om our view of important element,-an element that cannot
the law cont.rolling the case, as stated above, enter into the action of trover. In trover,
it follows that the court did not err In re- tbP specific articles cannot be recovered as in
fusing the instructions asked on this point replevin. Consequently th~ same rule as to
by the defendanhl, or In giving those which increased value cannot be applied as in that
Wt're given. 'fh.-y were substantially corr.-ct. action, where the specific property can be
The sale of ore by Wight and others, and followed, and, when identified, taken without
purchase by the defendants, was a con \·er- regard to the form·it has assumed. lt srems,
sion. A "conversion" is d··finetl to be 1my on principle, therefo1·e, (and this is in haract of the tlefentlant incons.stent with the mony with the English authorities and those
plainlilI's ri;.d1t of possession, or subversive of many of the states,) that where a party '
of h.s right of prop11rty. Harris v. Saurulers,
makes his elPction, and adopts trover, the)
2 :Stroh. E'l. 370, note; Wt>bher v. Davis, 44 rule of damage is and should be proper com·
.Me.147; Gilman v.Hill,36.N.H.311: Clal'k pensation for the property takt!n and con-·
v. Whitaker, l9 Conn. am. The defend- verted, regardlf'ss of the manner of entry and
ants, by purcl111sing the ore, acquired no taking; and, where the chatkl was severed
title, and are const:>quently equally liable for
from the realty, regardless of the diminished
its conversi.>n a., the parties who sold it. vnlue of the reaUy by reason of tht! taking.
Clark v. w..us, 45 Vt. 4; Clark v. Hideout, In other words, the true rule should be the
:J~ .N. H. <!38; Carter v. Kingman, IOJ Mass.
value of the chattel as such wht!n and where
517. And it wa.s a matt... rof no importance, flrst st1vered from the realty and becoming a
so far as the legal liability of defemlants was chattel. An examination of the authol'ILies
concerne I, wht:>lher they were Ignorant or will show that the rule of damages to some
int'ornaed of the true ownership. Morrill v. extent depends upon the form of action,
.Moulton, 4V Vt. 242; Johnson v. PoWt'l'll, Id. -whether the act.ion is for an injury to the
till; H.ailroad Co. v. Car-Works Co:, 32 N. land itself, or for the conversion of a chattel
J. Law, IH7; Dixon v. Caldwell, 15 Ohio St. which had been severed from the land. This
41~; Hoffman v. C..:arow, 22 Wend. 285. 'fhe
distinction seems well foundetl in principle
Jir• nciµle ca1'etlt em1,for applies. A person and l'Pason. This view of tl1e law is suppurchasing propert.\' of the party in posse.s- ported by Martin v. Porter, 5 .Mees. & W. 352;
aiun, wiLIJOut ascertaining wl.ae1·e the true Wild v. Holt, 9 Mtles. & W. 672; Morgan'"
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Powell. SQ. B. 278; Hilton v. Woods, L. R.
4 Eq. 482; Maye v. Yappen, 23 Cal. 806:
Goller Y. Fett, 30 Cal. 481; Coleman's Appeal.

Powell, 8 Q. B. 278; Hilton v. Woods, L. R.

4 Eq. 432; Maye v. Yappen, 23 Cal. 306;

Goller v. Felt. 30 Cal. 481; Coleman's Appeal.

62 Pa. St. 252; Cushing v. Longfellow, 26

Me. 306; Forsyth v. Wells, 41 Pa. St. 291;

Kier v. Peterson, Id. 857; Moody v. Whit-

ney, 38 Me. 174. We are therefore of the

opinion that the rule of damage adopted, and

the instructions of the court as to the meas-

ure of damage, were erroneous, and that it

should have been the value of the ore sold, as

shown. less the reasonable and proper cost of

raising it from the mine after it was broken,

and hauling from the mine to the defendants'

place of business.

sary to decide whether or not plaintiffs‘ coun-

sel, by stating in the complaint that the ore

taken and converted was of a certain value

“over and above the cost of mining, digging. .
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and extracting the same from the ground,

raising the same to the surface, hauling the ‘

same to thedefendants' reduction works. and -

the cost of treating the same," and det'end- '

ants taking issue upon it, precluded them

from proving and taking greater damage

upon the trial; but if it were necessary, for

the purpose of determining this case, we

should be inclined to so hold. In this action

value is a material averment, and the plain-

tiffs have deliberately asserted one rule, and,

issue having been taken upon it, should not

be permitted to change base. and adopt upon

trial another more disadvantageous to the de-

fendants. In this case it could not have

been said the evidence was in support of the

allegation or directed to an issue. The testi-

mony should have been directed to the issue,

or the pleadings amended.

Counsel for appellees. after obtaining leave

from this court, assigned for cross-error the

refusal of the court to allow interest on the

amount found due from the time of the con-

version, and the instruction of the court on

that point. It is true, as stated by the learned

judge, “that interest in this state is a creat-

ure ol' statute. and regulated thereby; that it

, is only recoverable in the absence of contract

in cases enumerated in the statute; and that

damages to property arising from a wrong or

negligence of the defendants is not one of the

enumerated cases." This could not come

under the last clause of the instruction. It

is not for damage to property. It is for the

wron'_-ful detention of money belonging to

plaintiffs. It is I-learly distinguishable from

Railroad Co. v. Conway, 8 Colo. 1. 5 Pac.

Rep. 142, and Hawley v. Barker, 5 Colo. 118. .

There does not appear to have been any de-

cision in this state directly on the question

presented.

We do not ﬁnd it neces- ‘

The same statute has been con- i

strued in Illinois (from which state it was

taken)as allowing interestin this class ofcuses

from the time of the conversion, and there

has been an unbroken line of decisions in

that state from Bradley v. Geiselman, 22 Ill.

494, to llailroad Co. v. Cobb, 72 I1]. 148, in

62 Pa. St. 252; Cushing v. Longfellow, 26
.Me. :i06; Forsyth v. Wells, 41 Pa. St. 291;
Kier v. Peterson, Id. 857; Moody v. Whit-

atrued ln Illinois (from which state it was
taken)as allowing interest in this cl11Ss of casl'S
from the time or the conversion, nnd thne
bas been an unbroken line or decisions in
that state from Bradley v. Geis..Jman, 2:! Ill.
494, to Hailroad Co. v. Cobb, 72 Ill. 14::!, in
which it is said, reviewing the dedsious:
"The doctrine established by these authorities ls, where property has been wrongfully
takenorcon¥erted iuto money, and an acti.1n
of trespa.~ or tro,·er may be maintained, interest may properly be recovered; and this
Is based upon the statute which authorizes
interest when there has been an unreason1tlile and vP.xalious delay of paymPnt. There
can be no difference lietween the dehayof payment of a money ilemand anti one wh: re property has been wrongfully takPn, or taken and
converted into money or its equivalent. 'l'he
two rest upon the same principle." The rule
is that when the statute of another state is
adopted the construction of t.he 11tat11te in
that state Is also ndopt•·d, nnd remains the
true construction until anthoritativeh· construed by the coui·ts of the st11te a1lopti ng it.
The gener1tl rule in trover is that tho tl1t111ap;es should Pmhr11c11 the value of the pro1,.
erty at the time of the conversion, with interest up to the time of judgment, anJ this
a·u11:o has bt-en fol10Wt'tl in a1111osL ii uoL all
the stntes, and seems right on principle. J3ut
our statute does not seem to have rl'CPivetl
the same construction lu~re its in the slate of
Illinois. While in that stale it 111\.'1 heen put
plainly and squarely as intere:tt u11der the
statute, in our state dama~e for the det1•11tion
of the money equal to the le).(al intert>st upon
the value or the chattf'ls converted from the
time of the conversion has been allowe•I, not
as interest, but as damalle. Machetle v.
W1tnleiis, 2 Colo. 170; Hanauer v. Bartels, Id.
514; 'fucker v. !'arks, 7 Colo. ti2, 1 l'nc. Hep.
427. We think the court f'rret.I in its instrnc·
tions to the Jnry on this point. They should
ha,·e been im1tructed to 11t.ld to the 11mo11nt
found as the value of the or•., a.ct furtlwr '
damage, a sum equal to legal interest on the
s1tme from the time of the conversion. }'or
the errors in a!lse>ising the damage, the ca!le
should lie reversl'd, and reman led for a new
trial in accordance with the views herein expressed.

ney, 38 Me. 174. We are therefore of the
opinion that the rule of damage adopted, and
the instructions of the court as to the measure of damage, were erroneous, and that it
hould have b...en the value of the ore sold, as
shown, less the reasonable and prO!Jer cost of
raising it from the wine after it was llroken,
and hauling from the mine to the defendant!.''
place of business. We do not find it necesary to decide whether or not plaintiffs' counsel, by stating in t111~ complaint that the ore
taken and converted was of a certain v1tlue
"over and above the cost of mining, digging,
aml extracting the same from the grnund,
raising the same to the snrface, hauling the
sa111e to the«lefendants' reduction works, and
the cost of treating the same," and dt"fendants taking issue upon it, prerluded them
from proving and taking greater damage
upon the trial; but it it were neet-ssary, for
the purpose of determining this c11se, we
should be inclined to so bold. Iu this action
value is a material averment, and tht'I pluintiffs have deliberately asserted one r111 ... and,
issue having been taken upo11 it, should not
be permitted to change base. and adovt upon
trial another more disltdvnntageous to the def~ndants.
In this case it could not have
been said the evidence was in support or the
allegation or directed to an issne. The testimony should have been directed to the issue,
or the pleadings 11mended.
Counsel forappellees, ufterobtaining leave
from this court, assigned for cross-error the
refullal of the court to allow lnterl"st on the
amount found due from the time of the conversion, and the inst.ruction of the court on
th11t point. It is true, as stated by the learned
judge, "that interPst in this state is a creature of statute. and reguhah'<l thereby; that it
. is only recoverable in the abs.. nce of contract
in cases enumerated in the statute; 1tn<l that
damages to property arising from a wrong or
negligence of the defendants is not one of the
enumerated cast's." This could not come
under the lust clause of the instruction. It
is not for damage to prop..rty. It is for the
HICHMOND and PATTISO~. CC., conwroni.:fnl detention of money belonging to
plaintiffs. lt is dearly distinguishable from cur.
Railroad Co. v. Con way, 8 Colo. 1, 5 Pac.
!Wp. 142, and Hawley v. Barker, 5 Colo.118. i PER CURI AM. For the reallon~ 11t11ted
There does not appear to h11ve b..en any de- in the foregoing opinion the Judg.m~nt i11 recision in this state directly 011 the question f versed.
pre.tented. 'fhe same statute has been conReversed.
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(1 Sup. Ct. 898, 106 U. S. 432.)

E. E. BOLLES WOODEN WARE CO. v.

UNITED STATES.

(1 Sup. Ct. 398, 106 U. S. 432.)

Supreme Court of theslélnited States. Dec. 18,

1 2.

In Error to the Circuit Court of the United

States for the Eastern District of Wiscon-

sin. ’

Samuel Hastings, Jr., for plaintif f in

error.

Supreme Court of the United States. Dec. 18,
1882.

In Error to the Circuit Oonrt of the United
States tor the Eastern District ot Wisconsin.
'
Samuel D. Hastings, Jr., tor plalntur In
error.
Asst. Atty. Gen. Maury, tor defendant In
error.

Asst. Atty. Gen. Maury, for defendant in

error.

MILLER, J. This is a writ of error to

the circuit court for the eastern district of

Wisconsin, founded on a certiﬁcate of di-

vision of opinion between the judges holding

that court. The facts, as certiﬁed, out of

which this difference of opinion arose ap-

pear in an action in the nature of trover,
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brought by the United States for the value

f 242 cords of ash timber, or wood suitable

for manufacturing purposes, cut and re-

moved from that part of the public lands

known as the reservation of the Oneida tribe

( of Indians. in the state of Wisconsin. This

, timber was knowingly and wrongfully taken

‘from the land by Indians, and carried by

them some distance to the town of Depere,

and there sold to the E. E. Bolies Wood-

Ware Company, the defendant, which was

not chargeable with any intentional wrong

or misconduct or bad faith in the purchase.

The timber on the ground, after it was felled,

was worth 25 cents per cord, or $60.71 for

the whole, and, at the town of Depere. where

defendant bought and received it, $3.50 per

cord, or $850 for the whole quantity. The

question on which the judges divided was

whether the liability of the defendant should

be measured by the ﬁrst or the last of these

valuations. It was the opinion of the circuit

judge that the latter was the proper rule of

damages, and judgment was rendered

against the defendant for that sum. We

cannot follow counsel for the plaintiff in er-

ror through the examination of all the cases,

both in England and this country, which his

commendable research has enabled him to

place upon the brief. In the English courts

the decisions have in the main grown out of

coal taken from the mine. and in such cases

the principle seems to be established in those

courts that when suit is brought for the

value of the coal so taken. and it has been

the result of an honest mistake as to the

true ownership of the mine, and. the taking

was not a willful trespass, the rule of dam-

l ages is the value of the coal as it was in the

mine before it was disturbed, and not its

value when dug out and delivered at the

mouth of the mine. Martin v. Porter, 5

Mees. & W. 351; Morgan v. Powell, 3 Adol.

& E. (N. 8.) 2'8; Wood v. Morewood. 3 Adol.

& E. 440; Hilton v. Woods, L. R. 4 Eq. 438;

Jegon v. Vivian, L. R. 6 Ch. App. 760.

. . The doctrine of the English courts on

this subject is probably as well stated by

Lord Hatherly in the house of lords, in the

MILLER, J. Thie le a writ ot error to
the ch-cult court for the eastern district of
Wisconsin, founded on a certificate of dlvlelon of opinion between the Judges holding
that court. Tbe facts, u certified, out of
which this d!Jrerence of opinion arose apear In an action in the nature of trover,
brought by the United States for the value
t 242 cords of ash timber, or wood suitable
for manufacturing purposes, oot and re-moved from that part of the publlc lands
known as the reservation ot the Oneida tribe
( or Indians, In the state of Wisconsin. This
. timber was knowingly and wrongfully taken
' Crom the land by Indians, and carried by
them some distance to the town of Depere,
and there sold to the E. E. Bolles WoodWare Oompany, the defendant, which was
not chargeable with any Intentional wrong
or misconduct or bad faith In the purchaae.
The timber on the ground, after It was felled,
was worth 25 cents per cord, or $60.71 tor
the whole, and, at the town ot Depere, where
defendant bought and received It, $3.50 per
cord, or $850 for the whole quantity. The
question on which the Judges divided was
whether the llablllty of the defendant should
\ be measured by the tlret or the last of these
valuations. It was the opinion of the circuit
judge th~t the latter was the proper rule of
damages, and judgment was rendered
against the defendant for that sum. We
cannot follow counsel for the plaintiff In error through the examination of all the cases,
both In England and this country, which his
commendable research hnR enabled him to
place upon the brier. In the Engllsh courts
the decisions have In the main grown out ot
coal taken from the mine. and In such co.see
the principle seems to be establlshed In those
courts that when suit ls brought for the
v11lue ot the coal BO taken. nncl It has been
the result of an honest mistake as to the
true ownership of the mine, and the taking
wns not a willful trespass, iht! rule of dam, ages Is the value of the coal as It was In the
mine before It was disturbed, and not Its
value when dug out and delivered at the
mouth ot the mine. Martin v. Porter, 5
Mees. & W. 3!>1; Mo11tnn v. Powell. 3 Ado!.
& E. (N. S.) 278; Wood v. Morewood. ~ Adol.
& E . 440; Hilton v. Woods, L. R. 4 F.q. 488;
.Tegon v. Vivian, L. n. 6 Ch. App. 700.

~

The doctrine ot the English courts on
this s.ubject Is probably as ·well stat~ by
Lord Hatherly In the house of lords, In the
c1u1e of Livingston T. Coal Co., L. R. 5 App.
Cae. 33, as anywhere else. He said: "There
Is no doubt that If a man furtively. and In
bad faith, robs his neighbor ot hls property,
and because It Is underground Is probably
tor some little time not detected, the court of
equity In thia country wlll struggle, or I
would rather say, wlll aasert Its authority.
to punish the fraud by fixing the person wltl1
the value of the whole of the property which
he has so furtively taken, and making him
no allowance In respect of what he has so
done, as would have been justly made to
him it the parties had been working by
agreement." But "when once we arrive at
the fact that an Inadvertence has been the
cause ot the misfortune, then the simple
course Is to make every just allowance for
outlay on the pe.rt of the person who has so
acquired the property, and to give back to
the owner, so far as le possible under the
circumstances of the case, the full value of
that which cannot be restored to him In
specie."
There seems to us to be no doubt that In
the case of a willful trespo.ss ·t he rule as
stated above ls the law ot damages both lo
England and In this country, though in some
ot the state courts the milder rule has been
applied even to this class ot cases. Such are
some that are cited from Wisconsin. Single
v. Schnelder, 24 Wis. 299; Weymouth v. Rall·
road Co., 17 Wis. 567. On the other hand.
the weight of authority In this country as
well as ln England favors the doctrine that
where the trespass ls the result of lnad·
vertence or mistake, and the wrong was not,
Intentional, the value of the property when
first taken must goYern, or If the conve1·slo11
sued for was after ''nine hnd been added w
It by tht' work of the <lcfendnnt, be shoul<I
be credited with this addition. Winchester
v. Ornlg, 33 Mich. 205, contains a full exaw·
!nation of the authorities on the point.
Heard v. James, 49 Miss. 236; Baker ,.,
Wheeler, 8 Wend. GOO; Baldwin v. Porter.
12 Conn. 484. Whlle these principles are
sutllclent to enable us to fix a measure ot
damages In both classes ot torts where the
original trespasser Is defendant, there re·
mains a third class where a purchaser from
him Is sued, as ln this case, for the conver·
sion of the property to his own use. In such
case, If the first taker of the llroperty wer<>
guilty of no willful wrong, the rule mn In
no case be more st1·lngent agnlust the defendant who purchased ot him than agnln11t
his vendor.
But the case before us Is one where, by
reason of the willful wrong of the pa1-ty who
committed the trespass, he was linble, under
the rule we haYe supp08ed to be established,
for the value of the timber at Depere the
:uoment before he sold It, and the quest1011
to be decldrd Is whether the defendant who
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purchased it then with no notice that the'

property belonged to the United States, and

with no intention to do wrong, must respond

by the same rule of damages as his vendor

should if he had been sued. It seems to us

that he must. The timber at all stages of

the conversion was the property of plaintiff.

its purchase by defendant did not divest the

title nor the right of posseslon. The recov-

ery of any sum whatever is based upon that

proposition. This right, at the moment pre-

ceding the purchase by defendant at Depere,

was perfect, with no right in any one to set

up a claim for work and labor bestowed on

it by the wrong-doer. It is also plain that

by purchase from the wrong-doer defendant

did not acquire any better title to the prop-

erty than his vendor had. It is not a case

where an innocent purchaser can defend
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himself under that plea. If it were, he would ,

, fendant was the innocent purchaser of the

be liable to no damages at all, and no re-

covery could be had. On the contrary, it is

a case to which the doctrine of caveat,

‘ a market was the largest item in their value

emptor applies, and hence the right of re

covery in plaintiff. On what ground, then,

can it be maintained, that the right to re-

cover against him should not be just what it

was against his vendor the moment before

he interfered and acquired possession? If

the case were one which concerned addition-

al value placed upon the property by the

work or labor of the defendant after he had

purchased, the same rule might be applied as

in case of the inadvertent trespasser. But

here he has added nothing to its value. He

acquired possession of property of the .United

States at Depere. which, at that place, and in

its then condition, is worth $850, and he

wants to satisfy the claim of the government

by the payment of $60. He founds his right

to do this. not on the ground that anything

he has added to the property has increased

its value by the amount of the difference be-

tween these two sums, but on the proposition

that in purchasing the property, he pur-

chased of the wrong-doer a right to deduct

what the labor of the latter had added to its

value.

If, as in the case of an unintentional tres-

passer, such right existed, of course defend-

ant would have bought it and stood in his

shoes; but, as in the present case, of an in-

tentional trespasser, who had no such right

to sell, the defendant could purchase none.

Such b the distinction taken in the Roman

law as stated in the Inst. Just. lib. 2, tit. 1,

§ 34.

After speaking of a painting by one man

on the tablet of another, and holding it to

LA “' DA\I.2d Ed.—26

be absurd that the work of an Appelles or

Parrhasins should go without compensation

to the owner of a worthless tablet, if the

painter had possession fairly, he says, as

translated by Dr. Cooper: “But if he, or any

other, shall have taken away the tablet felo-

purchased It then with no notice that the ·
property belonged to the United States, and
with no intention to do wrong, must respond
by the same rule of damages as his vendor
should If be bad been sued. It seems to us
that he must. The timber a.t a.11 stages of
the conversion was the property of plalntltr.
Its purchase by defendant did not divest the
title nor the right of possession. The recovery of any sum whatever Is based upon that
prop<>llltlon. This right, at the moment preceding the purchase by defendant at Depere,
was perfect, with no right In auy one to set
up a claim for work and labor bestowed on
It by the wrong-doer. It ls also plain that
by purchase from the wrong-doer defendant
did not acquire any better title to the property than his vendor had. It Is not a case
where an Innocent purchaser can defend
himself under that plea. It It were, he would
be liable to no damages at all, and no reco\·ery could be had. On the contrary, It ls
a case to which the doctrine of caveat
emptor applies, and hence the 1;ght of recovery In plalntltr. On what ground, then,
ran It be maintained. that the right to recover against him should not be just what It
was against hie vendor the momeut before
he Interfered and acquired possession? It
the case were one which concerned additional value placed upon the property by the
work or labor of the defendant after be had
purchased, the same rule might be applied as
in case of the Inadvertent trespasser. But
here he has added nothing to Its value. He
acqulre<l possession of property of the .United
:States at Depere, which, at that place, and In
Its then condition, ls worth $850, and he
wants to satisfy the claim of the government
by the payment of $60. He founds his right
to do this. not on the ground that anything
he has added to the property has Increased
Its value by the amount of the dllference between these two sums, but on the proposition
that In purchasing the property, he pur.-Jmsed of the wrong-doer a right to deduct
what the labor of the latter had added to Its
value.
It, as In the case of an unintentional trespasser, such right existed, of course defendant would have bought It and stood in hie
!!hoes; but, as In the present case, of an Intentional trespasser, who had no such right
to sell, the defendant could purchase none.
Such Is the distinction taken In the Roman
law as stated In the Inst. Just. lib. 2, tit. 1,

4Ul

l'llOP~UTY .

be absm·d that the work of an Appelles or
Parrhasius should go without compensation
to the owner of a worthless tablet, If the
painter had possession fairly, he says, as
translated by Dr. Cooper: "But If he, or any
other, shall have taken away the tablet feloniously, It ls evident the owner may pros~
cute by action of theft."
The case of Nesbitt v. Lumber Oo.1 21 l\llun.
491, ls directly In point here. The supreme
court of ~Ilnnesota says: "The defendant
claims that because they [the logs] were enhanced In value by the labor of the original
wrong-doer In cutting them, and the expense
of transporting them to Anoka, the plalntitr
ls not entitled to recover the enhanced value,
that Is, that he Is not entitled to recover the
full value at the time and place of conversion."
'
That was a case, like thJe, where the defendant was the Innocent purchaser of the
logs from the willful wrong-doer, and where,
mi In tills case, the transportation of them to
a market was the largest Item In their value
at the time of conversion by defendant; but
the court overruled the proposition and affirmed a judgment for the value at Anoka,
the place of sale. To establish any other
principle Jn such a case
this would be
very disastrous to the interest ot the public
In tlie Immense forest lands of the govern~
ment. It has long been a matter of complaint tlJat the depredations upon these lauds
are rapidly destroying the finest forests In
the world. Unlike the Individual owner,
who, by fencing and vigilant attention, can
protect hie valuable trees, the government
has no adeQuate defense against this great
evil. Its liberality In allowing trees to be cut
on Its land for mining, agricultural, and other specified uses, ha.a been used to screen
the lawless depredator who desh·oys and
sells for profit. To hold that when the government firn:1s its own property In hands but
one remove from these willful tre.<ipassers,
and asse1·ts Its right to such property by the
slow processes of the lnw, the holder cau
set up a claim for the ralue which has been
added to the property by the guilty party In
the net of cutting. down the trees and removing the timber, Is to give encouragement
and reward to the wrong-doer, by providing
a safe market fo1· what he has stolen and
compensation for the labor be has been compelled to do to make his theft effectual and
profitable.
We concur with the circuit judge In thlM
A 34.
After speaking of a painting by one man I case, and the judgment of the circuit court
on the tablet of another, and holding It to Is affirmed.
LAW D.\:\l.2d l!:d.- 26
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{judgment appealed from is both illegal and
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GRIGGS v. DAY et al.
(32 N. E. 612, 136 N. Y. 152.)

Uourt of Appeals of New York. Nov. 29,
1892.

(32 N. E. 612, 136 N. Y. 152.)

Uourt of Appeals of New York. Nov. 29,

1892.

Appeal from superior court of New York

City. general term.

Action by Clark R. Griggs against Mel-

ville C. Day and another, as executors of

Cornelins K. Garrison, for an accounting

for transactions had between plaintiff and

said Garrison. From a judgment of a ref-

eree both parties appeal. For former re-

ports, see 11 N. Y. Supp. 885, 12 N. Y. Supp.

958, 18 N. Y. Supp. 796, and 19 N. Y. Supp.

Appeal from superior court of New York
City, gcneml term.
Action by Clark R. Griggs against Melville C. Day and another, as executors of
Cornellus K. Garrison, for an accounting
tor trnnsnctlons had between plalntUr and
said Garrison. From a judgment ot a referee both parties appeal. For former reports, see 11 N. Y. Supp. 885, 12 N. Y. Supp.
958, 18 N. Y. Supp. 796, and 19 N. Y. Supp.
1019. Reversed.
Melvllle C. Day and Esek Cowen, tor appellants. John H. Post, tor respondent.

1019. Reversed.

Melville O. Day and Esek Cowen, for ap-

pellants. John H. Post. for respondent.

EARL, C. J. This action was brought
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against Cornelins K. Garrison, since deceas-

ed, for an accounting. It was referred to

a referee. and he ordered judgment in favor

of the plaintiff for upwards of $188,000.

The record is very voluminous, and in the

briefs submitted and the arguments of coun-

sel many questions of law and fact were

presented for our consideration. A careful

study of the record has satisﬁed me that the

unjust. In September, 1879, the piaintiff

entered into a contract with the Wheeling

& Lake Erie Railroad Company, an Ohio

corporation, for the construction and equip-

ment of its line of railroad in that state

according to the speciﬁcations and upon the

terms and conditions mentioned in the con-

tract. By one of the provisions of the con-

tract the railroad company was "to furnish

the contractor available subscriptions, or pro-

eeds thereof, and aid, to the amount of

$4,000 per mile of main track, branches,

and sidings, or so much as may be neces-

sary to furnish right of way, grade, bridge,

and tie said railroad between Hudson's and

Martin's Ferry," a distance of 143 miles, and

“to use its best endeavors to secure for the

contractor available subscriptions and aid

to the extent of $4,000 per mile, or so much

as may be necessary," for a similar pur-

pose. as to the balance of the road, a distance

of 58 miles. For the performance of this '

contract, besides the aid to be furnYshed

as above stated, the plaintiff was to receive 1

bonds and stock of the company. He was

without ﬁnancial ability, and he applied to

Garrison for ﬁnancial aid to enable him to

perform his contract; and upon his appli-

cation Garrison, from time to time. advanc-

ed him large sums of money, amounting in

all, besides interest, to nearly $4,500.000. For

the money so advanced the plaintiff as-

signed and delivered to Garrison as collat-

eral security his construction contract and

bonds and stock of the company, and some

of it was repaid by the sales to him of bonds

and stock. In 1882 the plaintif f received

from the company for extra work claimed

to have been done by him. and on account

of its failure to perform the portions of the

EARL, C. J. This action was brought
against Cornelius K . Garrison, since deceased, for an accounting. It was referred to
a referee, and he ordered judgment In favor
ot the plalntlft' tor upwards of $188,000.
Th~ record Is very voluminous, and In the
briefs submitted and the arguments of coun11el many questions of law and tact were
presented tor our consideration. A careful
study of the record has satisfied me that the
r1udgment appealed from ls both Ulepl and
lunjust. In September, 1879, the plnlntlft'
entered Into a contract with the Wheeling
& Lake Erle Railroad Company, an Ohio
corporatloo, tor the construction and equipment ot Its line of railroad In that state
according to the speclllcatlons and upon the
terms and conditions mentioned In the contract. By one ot the provisions of the contract the railroad compe.ny was "to furnish
the contractor available subscriptions, or pro~eds thereof, and aid, to the amount of
( '4,000 per mile of main track, branches,
and sidings. or 110 much as may be necessary to furnish right of way, grade, bridge,
and tie said railroad between Hudson's and
1\lartln's Ferry," a distance of 143 miles, and
"to use Its best endeavors to secure for the
contractor available subscriptions and aid
to the extent of $4,000 per mile, or so much
as may be necessary," for a shnllar purp<.lS'.:!, as to the balance of the road, a distance
of 58 miles. For the performance of this
contract, besides the aid to be turnti"11ed
&!! above stated, the plaintift' was to receive
bonds and stock of the company. He was
without !lnanclal ability, and he applied to
Garrison for financial aid to enable him to
perform bis contract; and upon his oppllcutlon Garrison, from time to time, nclvanc' etl him large sums of money, amounting In
1 all. hesidcs interest, to nearly $4,500.000. F1>r
' the money so advanced the plalntlfr assigned and deli>erc<I to Garrison as collateral security bl!i <'01H1tructlon contract and
bonds and ~tock of the COlll!llln.v. and some
of It wns repaid by the sales to him of bonds

and stock. In 1'882 the plalntlft' received
from the company tor extra work claimed
to have been done by him, and on account
of Its failure to perform the portions of the
contract above quoted, Its promissory notes,
amounting to $1,949,710.72, and they were
dellvered by him to Garrison tor moneys advanced and to be advanced by him for the
construction of the road. Garrison held
these notes until May, 1883. when there wa11
due to him tor mone:rs advanced to the
plalntllf for the construction of the roa<l
nearly $2,500,000. He then received from the
company 2,280 of Its second mortgage bonds
ot the denomination of $1,000, at 75 cents
on the dollar, amounting, with some Interest.
to $1,736,GOO, to apply upon his claims, and
he then surrendered to It all of the abovementloned promissory notes, and they were,
canceled. On the same day he caused au
original entry to be made In his journal,one ot his account books,-as follows: "This
amount of notes and Interest. $2,00'2,643.13,
taken from contractor at 75 per cent.• $1,54-0,982.35." He then charged the compe.ny
In his books of account with the whole
amount of the notes and Interest, and gave
It credit for $1,736,000,-the price, Including
Interest, at which lie took the second mortgage bonds; and he credited the plalntltf
with the sum of $1,546,982.35. The difference between the total amount due upon the
notes and the amount allowed by him for
the second mortgage bonds was $326,043.13.
and thus he had In his hands, not used for
the payment of the b1>nds, the notes to that
amount, which he then surrendered to the
company without any consideration whatever; and, as the referee found, he elected
to look to the company as his debtor on
open account for that amount. The referee
also found that by reason of the surrender
of the notes In consideration of the purchase
ot tbe bonds, and by reason of the surrender
ot the balance of the notes, and by reason
of tlle election before mentioned, Gan·ison
discharged the Indebtedness of the plaintiff
to him to the amount of the face value of
the notes at the time ot the surrender. Hl•
also found that the plalntlft''s rights us
pledgor In the construction contract, and in
the bonds, stock, and other property trans·
ferred to Garrison as collateral security, were
never cut o1J by foreclosure or his rights. or
In any other wuy. These facts having been
found by the referee, he found. among other
conclusions of law, that the legal en'ect of
the surrender by Garrison to the rallroatl
company of the promissory notes held by
him as collateral security for moneys ail·
vanced to the plaintiff. and of the chnrge
by him against the railroad C())npany of tb<'
full amount of the notes and Interest, wu~
to relieve the plaintiff' from any liability to
him for the amount thereof; and In the ac·
eountlng be charged Garrison with the full
amount of the notes, with Interest. Tbe
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only question which I deem it important ,

now to consider is whether the learned

referee was right in making that charge.

The further fact must be taken into con-

/sideration that the notes surrendered were

- of no value as against the company. It

was utterly inolvent, with property no

more than sufﬁcient to pay its ﬁrst mort-

gage bonds. The second mortgage bonds

were absolutely of no intrinsic value. The

referee held these facts to be immaterial,

and that, under the circumstances. Garri-

son had made himself chargeable with the

-full amount of the notes, without reference

l'to their value. Such a conclusion is some-

what startling, and should not be sanctioned

unless it has support in well-recognized

principles of law or authorities which we feel

constrained to follow. The entries in Garri-
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son's books of account in reference to these

notes have very little bearing upon the con-

troversy between these parties. They were

private entries, made by Garrison, undis-

closed to the plaintiff. and without his author-

ity. They were important simply as evidence,

and are entitled to no more weight than would

have been the oral declarations or admissions

of Garrison made to any third party. They

show what use he made of the notes, and

about that there is no dispute. They did not

bind the plaintiff, and he has never, so far as

appears, assented to them. They show that

Garrison intended to take the notes at 75

cents on the dollar, and that he was willing

to allow the plaintiff that sum for them. But

there was no actual purchase of them. If that

entry had come to the knowledge of the plain-

tiff, and he had adopted it, and so notiiied

Garrison, he could probably have held him

ito a purchase of the notes for that sum. But

(he repudiates that entry, and refuses to let

‘Garrison have the notes for that sum. He

cannot use that entry to fasten upon him

a purchase of the notes at their face value.

The minds of the parties never met upon

such a contract. Garrison either purchased

the notes used in exchange for the bonds at

75 per cent. of their face value, or he did

not purchase them at all. Therefore, as the

plaintiff repudiates the purchase at the price

<_named, there was no contract of purchase;

‘and as to these notes, pledged for collateral

security, Garrison must be held to have wrong-

fully converted them to his own use. It would

make no difference whether we consider these

notes as having been exchanged for the bonds.

or as having been used in payment for the

bonds. In either view, Garrison was, at most,

guilty of a conversion of them. As to the

balance of the notes, which were surrendered

to the company without any consideration.

there was simply a wrongful conversion of

them. They had no value as obligations

against the company, and it is preposterous to

suppose that Garrison intended by the sur-

render to charge himself for their full face

value against an indebtedness of the plaintiff -

to him for money actually loaned. By the
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-only question which I deem It Important to h1m for money actuall,J lo&lled. BJ: the
now to consider ls whether the learned surrender he did not lntend to release the
company from Its Indebtedness evidenced by
referee was right In makin~ that charge.
The further tact must be taken Into con- the notee, but he Intended and elected 11tlll
/slderatlon that the notes surrendered were to bold the Indebtedness, evidenced by bis
( -ot no value as against the company. It charge In open account upon his books.
was utterly Insolvent, with property no The obligation of the company was not Immore than suftlclent to pay Its first mort- paired or lessened by the transaction, and It
gage bonds. The second mortgage bonds owed just as much after 1t as before. Even (
were absolutely or no intrinsic value. The It be made the notes his own by surrenderreferee held these facts to be immaterial, ing them, there was simply a conversion of
.and that. under the circumstances, Garrl- them. It ls true that be elected to bold the
J<>n had made himself cha~eable with the companyasbls debtor uponopenaccount,just
/full amount ot the notes, without reference 88 it was bis debtor before for the same
I.to their value. Such a conclusion Is some- amount evidenced by the notes. He dtd not
what startling, and should not be sanctioned take a new debtor. but he retained and Inunless it has support In well-recognized tended to retain the same debtor. Here
llrinclples of law or authorities which we feel there was no novatlon, and nothing resem«'D>ltrnlned to follow. 'l'h11 entries In Garrl- bling It. It usually, If not always, takes
.son's books of account In reference to these three parties to make a novatlon, and they
notes have very little bearing upon the con- must all concur upon sutftclent consld~rution
troveray between these parties. They were ln making a new contract to take the place
private entries, made by Garrison, undis- of another contract, and In substituting a
closed to the plalntilr, and without his author- new debtor ln the place of anothe1· debto·r.
ity. They were Important simply as evidence, "Novatlon'' ls thus briefly defined: "A tmnsand are entitled to no more weight than would actlon whereby a debtor Is discharged from
have been the oral declarations or admissions his liability to bis original creditor by con·
of Garrison made to any third party. They tractlng a new obligation lo favor or a
show what use he made of the notes, and new creditor by the order ot the original
about that there Is no dispute. They did not creditor." 1 Pars. Cont. 217. Here there
bind the plalntlfr, and he has never, so far as was no element answering to this detlnl.appears, usented to them. They show that tlon. There was no Intention to make a no. Garrison Intended to take the notes at 75 vation, no consideration for a new contract,
cents on the dollar, and that he was willing no concurrence of the three or even of
to allow the plaintiff that sum for them. But the two parties. So we reach the conclusion -.... r1
there was no actual purchase of thew. U that 88 to all the notes that Garrison, by their
entry had come to the knowledge of the plain- surrender, made himself liable for a wrongtiff, and he bad adopted It, and so notllled ful conversion of them to his own use, and
Garrison, be could probably have held him thus became responsible to the plalntlfr for
>
!to & purchase of the notes for that sum. But the damages caused by the wrong; and the
he repudiates that entry, and refuses to let question ls, what were such damages? 'l'he
r
Garrison have the notes for that sum. He answer must be, the value of the notes con-..f
<'ltunot use that entry to fasten upon him verted. There can be no other weasu1·e, as
u purchase of the notes at their face value. ffiitmeasures the entire damage of thll
'The minds of the parties never met upon plalntltr absolutely. As to the notes surrensuch a contract. Garrison either purchased dered for the bonds, the plaintlfr could have
the notes used In exchange for the bonds at elected to take the bonds or thelr value;
i5 per cent. ot their face value, or be did but this he refuses to do, as the bonds have
not purchase them at all. Therefore, as the no value. and thus he ls confined absolutely
1 vlalntlfr repudiates the purchase at the price to the value of the notes.
\ named, there was no contract of purchase;
Now, bow does the case stand upon au· nnd as to these notes, pledged for collateral thority? In Garlick v. James. 12 Johns. HU,
seC'Urlty, Garrison must be held to have wrong- the plalntlfr deposited with the defendant a
fully converted them to his own use. It would promlsso1·y note or a third person as collatmake no difference wbether we consider these eral security for a debt, and the defendant.
notes as having been exchanged !or the bond11. without the knowledge or consent of the
or as having been used In payment tor tl1e plalntllr, compromised with the maker of the
bonds. In either view, Garrison was, at most, note, and surrendered the note to him upon
guilty of a conversion of them. As to the payment of one half of the face thereof. It
balance o! the notes, which were surrendered was found that the maker was at the time
to the company without any consideration, of the compromise abundantly a!Jle to pay
there was simply a wron~ul conversion of the full amount of the note. and under such
them. They bad no value as obligations circumstances It was properly held that the
against the company, and It Is preposterous to pledgee was liable for the balance unpaid upsuppose that Garrison Intended by the sur- on the note. In Hawks v. HlncbcllO', 17
render to charge hlmselt for their full face Barb. 492, the plalntltr sued the defendant
, ·nlue agnlnst an Indebtedness of the plalntltr · upon an account for mer<:h:indlse dellve1·cd,
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- and the defendant showed that the plaintiff

took two notes for the amount of the ac-

count as collateral security for the payment

thereof; that he transferred one of the notes

to a person, who recovered judgment there-

on against the makers, and afterwards as-

signed the judgment to one Prindle; that he

recovered judgment upon the other note, and

assigned that to Prindle; and it appeared

that the defendants in those judgments had

never paid the notes or the judgments. It

was held that the plaintiff, the pledgee, could

not recover upon his account. It was not

shown upon what consideration the notes

and the judgments were transferred by the

pledgee, or that at the time of the transfer

the makers of the notes were not perfectly

solvent. The plaintiff there relied upon the

simple fact that the notes and judgments
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were not paid. Upon this state of the facts

the court held that the presumption, nothing

appearing to the contrary, was that the note

and judgments were transferred by the plain-

tif f for the full amount appearing to be due

upon them, and hence he was charged with

the full amount. There are some broad ex-

pressions contained in the opinion, which,

when isolated from the facts of the case,

tend to give some countenance to the plain-

tii1"s contention here. In Vose v. Railroad

Co., 50 N. Y. 369, it was held that a wrong-

ful sale by a creditor of collateral securities

placed in his hands by the principal debtor

does not, per se, discharge even a surety

for the debt (much less the principal debtor)

in toto, but that by such sale the creditor

makes the securities his own to the extent

of discharging the surety only to an amount

equal to their actual value. In Potter v.

Bank, 28 N. Y. 641; Booth v. Powers, 56 V.

Y. 22; and Thayer v. Manley, 73 N. Y. 305,

—it was held that in an action to recover

damages for the conversion of a promissory

note the amount appearing to be unpaid

thereon at the time of the conversion, with

interest, is prima facie the measure of dam-

ages, but that the defendant has the right to

show in reduction of damages the insolven-

cy or inability of the maker, or any other

fact impugning the value of the note. In

Bank v. Gordon, 8 N. H. 66. where the bank

had received a note as collateral security,

and had subsequently, without the consent of

the pledgor, compromised it by receiving the

one half thereof from the maker, it was

held that the bank was bound to credit the

pledgor with only the amount received upon

compromise, upon proof that the compromise

was advantageous, and that the maker was

insolvent, and unable to pay the balance; and

the general rule was laid down which was

announced in the cases last above cited. If

the pledgee of the note of an insolvent mak-

er may surrender it upon a compromise for

one dollar without being made liable for

more than he receives, upon what conceiva-

ble principle can a pledgee be held for the

face value of a‘worthless note by surren-
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and the defendo.nt showed that the plaintltr
took two notes for the amount of the account as collate1·al security tor the payment
thereof; that he transferred one of the notes
to a person, who recovered judgment thereon against the makers, and afterwards assigned the judgment to one Prindle; that be
recovered judgment upon the other note, and
assigned that to Prindle; and it appeared
that the defendants In those judgments had
never paid the notes or the judgments. It
was held that the plalntur, the pledgee, could
not recover uwn his account. It was not
shown upon what consideration the notes
, und the judgments were transferred by the
pledgee, or that at the time of the transfer
the makers of the notes were not perfectly
solvent. 'l'he plaintltr there relied upon the
simple fact that the notes and judgments
were not paid. Upon this state of the facts
the court held that the presumption, nothing
appearing to the contrary, was that the note
and judgments were transferred by the plaintilf for the tun amowrt appearing to be due
upon them, and hence he was chari.:ed with
the full amount. There are some broad expressions contained in the opinion, wWch,
when Isolated f1·om the facts of the case,
tend to give some countenance to the plaintiff's contention here. In Vose v. Railroad
Co., 50 N. Y. 369, it was held that a wrongful sale by a creditor of collateral securities
placed in his hands by the principal debtor
does not, per se, discharge even a surety
for the debt (much less the principal debtor)
in toto, but that by such sale the creditor
makes the securities his own to the extent
of discharging the surety only to an amount
equal to their actual value. In Potter v.
Bank, 28 N. Y. 641; Booth v. Powers, 56 N.
Y. 22; and Thayer v. Manley, 73 N. Y. 305,
-it was held that in an action to recover
damages for the conversion of a promissory
note the amount appearing to be unpaid
thereon at the time of the conversion. with
interest, ls prima tacle the measure of damages, but that the defendant has the right to
show in reduction of damages the insolvency or inabll!ty ot the maker, or any other
tact impugning the value of the note. In
Bank v. Gordon, 8 N. H. 66, where the bank
bad received a note as collateral security,

and had subsequently, without the consent of
the pledgor, compromised It by receiving the
one half thereof from the maker, it waa
held that the bank was bound to credit the
pledgor with only the amount received upon
compromise, upon proof that the compromise •
was advantageous, and that the maker waa
Insolvent, and unable to pay the balance; and
the general rule was laid down which waa
announced In the cases last above cited. If
the pledgee ot the note of an insolvent maker mny surrender 1t upon a compromise for
one dollar without being made liable for
more than he receives, upon what conceivable principle can a pledgee be held for the
face value of a 'worthless note by surrendering It without any consideration whnte\·er? It one !ntrusted with a note as agent,
or holding It as pledgee, loses it by his carelessness, or even willfully destroys It, he can,
In an action against him by the principal or
pledgor, be held liable only tor the value of
the note. It Garrison had broken Into the
plaintiff's safe and taken these· notes with·
out any right whatever, in an action tor
their conversion the IJlnintlfl' could have recovered against him as damages only the actual, not the face, value ot the notes. l
need go no further. Othe1· lllustratlons are
not needed. Our attention has been called
to no case in law or equity which upholds
the IJlalntlfl''s contention as to these notes.
I should be greatly surprised to find any,
and do not belleve there are any. I have
assumed, without a careful examination ot
the defendants' objections to the notes, that
they were valid, and properly Issued by the
company for their full amount. I have also
11Bsumed, without examining the matter, that
upon this record we must hold against the
contention of the defendants that the second mortgage bonds took the place of the
notes given for them, and were held in their
stead as collateral security. Statements
made upon the argument by the counsel tor
the appellants re11de1· It unneceBSary for us
to consider any other objections to the judgment, and for the reasons stated the judgment should be reversed, and new trial granted, costs to abide the event. All coucur;
GRAY, J., in result.
Judgment reversed.
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DIMOCK et al. 7. UNITED STATES NAT.

BANK.

(25 Atl. 926, 55 N. J. Ltlw, 296.)

Court of Errors and Appeals of New Jersey.

Feb. 6, 1893.

Error to circuit court, Union county; Van‘

Syckel, Judge.

Action on a note by the United States Na-

tional Bank against Anthony W. Dimock

and others. Plaintiff had judgment, and

defendants bring error. Aﬂirmed.

The facts appear in the following state-

ment by DEPUE, J.: \

This suit was brought upon a note of which

the following is a copy:

“$Z)0,00(). New York, April 15, 1884. Four

months after date, without grace, we prom-

ise to pay to the United States National
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Bank, or order, at its oiiice in the city of

New York, the sum of ﬁfty thousand 00/l00

for value received, with interest at the rate

of six per cent. per annum payable; having

deposited herewith, and pledged as collater-

al security to the holder thereof, the fol-

lowing property, viz.: 2()0 shares Bankers‘

& Merchants‘ Tel. stock; 200 shares Mis-

souri Paciﬁc R. R. stock; 200 shares Dela-

ware, Lac. & W. R. R. stock; 15 shares Cen-

tral Iowa, Ill. Div. 1st bonds,—with author-

ity to the holder hereof to sell the whole of

said property, or any part thereof, or any

substitute therefor, or any additions there-

to, at any brokers' board in the city of New

York, or at public or private sale in said

city or elsewhere, at the option of such hold- '

er, on the uonperformance of any of the

promises herein contained, without notice of

amount claimed to be due, without demand

of payment, without advertisement, and

without notice of the time and place of sale,

each and every of which is hereby express-

ly waived.

“It is agreed that, in case of depreciation

in the market value of the property hereby

pledged, (which market value is now

$5 ,) or which may hereafter be pledged

for this loan, a payment shall be made on

account of this loan upon the demand of the

holder hereof, so that the said market value

shall always be at least per cent. more

than the amount unpaid of this note; and

that, in case of failure to make such pay-

ment, this note shall, at the option of the

holder hereof, become due and payable

forthwith, anything hereinbefore expressed

to the contrary notwithstanding; and that

the holder may immediately reimburse

by sale of the said property or any part

thereof. In case the net proceeds arising

from any sale herennder shall be less than

the amount due hereon, promise to

pay to the holder, forthwith after such sale,

the amount of such deﬁciency, with legal

interest.

"It is further agreed that any excess in

the value of said collaterals, or surplus from

the sale thereof beyond the amount due

DI.MOCK et aL

UNITED STA.TES NAT.
BANK.
~ Atl. 9'J6, CSli N. J. Law, 296.)
Court of lllrrora and Appeals of New Jersey.
Feb. 6, 1893.
Error to circuit court. Union county; Van
Syckel, Jud.Ke.
Action on a note by the United States National Bank against Anthony W. Dimock
and others. Plalntur bad Judgment, and
defendanta bring error. A.1!lrmed.
The racta appear In the following statement by DEPUE, J.:
.'This suit was brought upon a note of whlcb
the following Is a copy:
/ : "$50,000. New York, April 15, 1884. Four
months after date, without grace, we prom·
lse to pay to the United States National
Bank. or order, at Its oftlce In the city of
New York. the sum of fifty thousand OO/ioo
for value received, with Interest at the rate
of six per cent. per annum payable; having
deposited herewith, and pledged as collateral security to the bolder thereof, the following property, viz.: 200 shares Bankers'
& Merchants' Tel. stock; 200 shares Missouri Pae!Jlc R. R. st<><'k; 200 shares Delaware, Lac. & W. It. ll. stock; 15 shares Central Iowa, 111. Div. 1st bonds,-wlth authority to the holder hereof to sell the whole of
said property, or any part thereof, or any
substitute therefor, or any additions thet"eto, at any brokers' board In the city of New
York, or at public or private sale In snld
dty or elsewhere, at the option of such hold- ·
er, on the nonperformance of any of the
promises herein contained, without notice of
amount claimed to be due, without demand
of payment, without advertisement, and
without notice of the time and place of sale,
each and every of which Is hereby expressly waived.
"It ls agreed that, In case of depreciation
In the market value of the property hereby
pledged, (which market value Is now
$ - , ) or which may hereafter be pledged
tor this loan, a payment shall be made on
account of this loan upon the demand of the
holder hereof, so that the said market value
shall always be at least per cent. more
than the amount unpaid of this note; and
that, In case of failure to make such payment, this note shall, at the option of the
bolder hereof, become due and payable
forthwith, anything herelnbefore expressed
to the contrary notwithstanding; and that
the holder may Immediately reimburse - by sale of the said property or any part
thereof. In case the net proceeds arising
from any sale hereunder shall be less than
the amount due hereon, - - promise to
pay to the holder, forthwith after such sale,
the amount of such deftclency, with !egal
lnterL>st.
"It Is further agreed that any excess In
the value of said collateral1.1, or surplus from
the sale thereof beyond the amount due
T.
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hereon, shall bo applicable upon any•other
note or claim held by the holder hereof
against - - now due or to become due,
or that may be hereafter contracted; and
that, It no other note or claim against - ls so held, such surplus, after the payment
of this note, shall be returned to - - or
- - assigns.
"It ls further agreed that, upon any sale
by virtue hereof, the holder hereof may purchase the whole or any part of such prop.
erty discharged from any right of redemption, which ls hereby expressly released to
the holder hereof, who shall retain a claim
against the maker hereof for any deficiency
arising upon such sale. A. W. Dimock &
Co."

.

The other facta appear In the opinion of
the court.
Bradbury C. Chetwood, for plnlntllf in er·
ror. Edward A. & William T. Day, for de·
fendants In error.
DEPUE, J. (after stating the facts). The
note on wWch this suit was brought was
In terms made payable In four months after ~
date. · It became due August llS, 1884. Thi!!
suit was brought May 21, 1891. The suit
was in all respects regular, and Its regularity was In no wise dependent upon that
paragraph in the pledge of securities which,
upon certain condltlons, accelerated the umturlty of the note, and made the money payable at a time earlier than that named on
Its face. The securities pledged tor the payment of the note were sold by the plaintiff
ou the 15th of May, 1884, as the note matured \
In the following August. From the sale the
sum of $45,456.26 was realized, leaving a 1
balance due on the note of $4,456.25, for :
which the plalntlfr claimed judgment. The ·
defendants' contention was that the sale In .
May was unauthorized, and amounted In
law to a conversion. In all other respects
the sale was In conformity with the power.
On the theory that the sale at the time In .
question was unauthorized, the defendants
contended that they were entitled to have
the value of the securities allowed to them
at their highest market price between the
conversion and the tJme of the trial. The
defendants gave In evidence the fact that In
December, 1886, and April and May, 1887,
these securities were worth in the market
the sum of $56,860, su1Dclent to pay the,
plalntur•s note, and leave a balance or $U.i·
800 due the detendanta. The defendants·
claim was disallowed, and judgment given
for the plalntllf for the sum of $4,456.25,
being the balance due on the note after crediting on It the proceeds of sale with Interest.
The case was tried by the judge, a jury being waived. A general exception was taken
to his ftndlng. Upon such an exception, if
there be evidence ta sustain the finding, the
exception wlll not be sustained.
The platntilf Is a national oonk, located In
the city of New York. The defendants, at

J
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the time of these transactions, were bankers

and brokers in New York. The debt for

which the note was given was a loan of $50,-

000 to the defendants. The form of the con-

tract pledging securities for the repayment

of loans is such as is usual in that city. It

must be assumed that the parties were

aware of the effect of the terms of such con-

tracts, and with the course of dealing in that

market with securities pledged as security

for loans.

By the ﬁrst paragraph in the defendants'

contract the plaintiff was authorized to sell

the securities at any brokers' board in the

city of New York, or at public or private sale

in said city or, elsewhere, at its option, on

the nonperformance of any of the defend-

ants' promises therein contained, without

any notice of the time and place of sale.
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This contract was embodied in and made

part of the note itself, and the promise to

pay in the note was one of the promises on

the nonpayment of which a sale was author-

ized. The sale was made through a ﬂrm of

brokers who were members of the stock ex-

change in New York city. There is no

foundation in the evidence for complaint of

the manner or fairness with which the sale

was conducted.

The power of the plaintiff to sell the se-

curities before the four months named in the

note had expired depends upon the con-

struction and effect of the second paragraph

of the contract. There was some discussion

on the argument as to the right to ﬁll the

blanks in that paragraph. The evidence was

not suﬂicient to justify the court in ﬁlling

the blanks. The contract will be construed

in the condition it was in when it was de

livered to the plaintiff. In this paragraph

it is provided that, in case of a depreciation

in the market value of the property pledged,

the defendants should, on demand by the

holder of the note, make a payment thereon,

so that the market value of the securities

should always be more than the amount of

the debt; and that, in case of the failure of

the defendants to make such payment, the

note should, at the payee's option, become

due forthwith; and that the plaintiff might

immediately reimburse itself by the sale of

the property or any part thereof; and that in

case the net proceeds of such sale should be

less than the amount then due on the note,

the defendants should forthwith, after such

sale, pay the amount of such deﬁciency, with

interest. The power to sell the securities be-

fore the maturity of the note, according to

its terms, was made to depend upon the con-

currence of two conditions,—the depreciation

in the market value of the property pledged;

and the failure of the defendants, after de-

mand, to make a payment on account of the

loan, so that the market value of the secu-

rlties pledged should be more than the

amount due on the note. The proof was

that on the 6th of May, 1884, the ﬁrm of

Grant. Ward & Co. failed, and the Marine
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the time of these transactions, were bankers
and bl'Okers in New York. '.rhe debt :tor
which the note was given wo.s a loan of $50,·
000 to the defendants. The form of the contract pledging securities for the repayment
of loans Is such as is usual In that city. It
'must be assumed that the parties were
a ware of the etrect of the terms of such contracts, and with the course of dealing in that
market with securities pledged as security
for loans.
By the first paragraph In the defendants'
contract the plaintiff was authorized to sell
the securities at any brokers' board In the
city of New York, or at public or private sale
in said city or elsewhere, at Its option, on
the nonperformance of any of the defendants' promises therein contained, without
any notice of the time and place of sale.
This contract was embodied In and made
part of the note Itself, and the promise to
pay In the note was one of the promises on
the nonpayment of which a sale was authorized. The sale was made through a firm of
brokers who were members of the stock exchan1te In New York city. There Is no
foundation In the evidence tor com11Jnlnt of
the manner or fairness with which the sale
was conducted.
The power of the plalntltr to sell the securities before the four months named in the
note bad expired depends upon the construction and effect of the second paragraph
of the contract. There was some discussion
on the argument as to the right to fill the
blanks In that paragraph. The evidence was
not sufficient to justify the court In filling
the blanks. The contract wlll be construed
In the condition it was In when It was delivered to the plaintiff. In this paragraph
It ls provided that, in case of a depreciation
In the market value of the property pledged,
the defendants should, on demand by the
holder of the note, make a payment thereon,
so that the market value of the securities
should always be more than the amount of
the debt; and that, in case of the failure of
the defendants to make such payment, the
note should, at the payee's option, become
due forthwith; and that the plaintiff might
Immediately reimburse Itself by the sale of
the property or any part thereof; and that In
case the net proceeds of such sale should be
less than the amount then due on thP. note,
the defendants should forthwith, after such
sale, pay the amount of such deficiency, with
Interest. The power to sell the securities before the maturity of the note, accorfllng to
its terms, was made to depend upon the- concurrence of two condltlons,-the depreciation
In the market value of the property pledged;
and the failure of the defendants, after demand, to make a payment on account of the
loan, so that the market value of the securltl~ pledged should tie more than the
amount due on the note. The proot was
thnt on the 6th of May, 1884, the firm of
Grant, Ward & Co. failed, and the Marine

Bank closed Its doors. On the 14th, the Metropolitan Bank closed Its doors, and a ·number of leading bankers failed. These failures created a panic lo the money market.
and a great depreciation In the market valtll>
of all commercial securities. Early on the
morning of the 15th, the defendants' embarrassments led them to an as9ignment· for
the benefit of their creditors. It fully appeared that, at the commencement of business hours on the morning of May 15th, the
secmitles pledged bad so depreciated that
their n1arket value was considerably below
the amoont of the plaintiff's debt. Under a
pledge, with a power of sale such as exists
in this case, the pledgee, unless restrained
by other conditions In the contmct of pledge, ,
has a right to sell whenever the condition of
the market makes It prudent for him to do )
so for the protection of his interests. The
other condition was that a. demand sboulo
be made upon the defendants, and that, upon such demand, the defendants should pay
on account of the note a sum sufilclent to reduce the amount due below the market value
the securities then had. The case shows
that, at the beginning of buslneBB hours on f
the morning of the 15th, two notices were
served on the defendants. One of these notices was' ln form signed by the cashier of
the oonk, In these words: "l hereby call
your loan of April 15, 1884, for $50,ooo.•·
This notice was plainly not a demand In conformity with the condition expressed In the
contract. A depreciation ln the market value of the securities pledged did not convert
the loan, which was made on four months'
time, Into a call loan. That condition of affairs Imposed upon the defendants the obllgatlon not to pay the note ln full, but, by a
payment upon It, to reduce the loe.n until
the amount remaining due was under the
market value of the securities. It appeared
In evidence that the other notice served was 1·
"a demand for the payment on account of\
the loan to a degree corresponding to thl'
depreciation of the securities." Neither the
original notice nor a copy was produced.
The witness who testified upon this subject
was not able to state the amount of the depreciation, but he added that such depreciation was known to both the borrower and
lender. The object of a demand lo a contract of this sort ls to give the party an
opportunity to comply with the terms of bls
contract, and preserve his secmltles from
sale before the expiration of the time for
which the loan was negotiated; and lt would
be reasonable that, In making the demand.
the party, before he ls put In default, should
have been made aware of the extent of the
deprecllitlon, approximately at least, and thesum required to be paid to save his rights
should be specltled. It the case rested isolely)
on the sufficiency of the demand made, T
should have some hesitation ln sustaining
this judgment.
Assuming that tile sale of the securities In
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May was unauthorized, it was a conversion

of the property, though the sale was made in

good faith. Nevertheless, the judge's ﬁnd-

ing, and the rule of damages applied, were

correct. The general rule is that the meas-

ure of damages for conversion is the value

of the property at the time of the conversion.

This rule has been modiﬁed with respect to

the conversion of stocks and bonds, commer-

cial securities vendible in the market, the

market value of which is liable to frequent

and great ﬂuctuations, caused by the depres-

sion and inﬂation of prices in the market.

In Markham v. Jaudon, 41 N. Y. 235, the

court of appeals held that as between a cus-

tomer and his broker, holding stock pur-

chased for the former which had been pledg-

ed as ‘seem-ity for advances made in the

purchase, the measure of damages for the
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conversion by an unauthorized sale was the

highest market price between the time of

the conversion and the trial. Relying upon

this case, the defendants put in evidence no

proof of value except the market value in

December, 1886, and April and May, 1887.

But Markham v. Jaudon has been overruled

by a series of cases in the New York courts,

and the rule adopted that in such cases the

principal may disaﬂirm the sale, and that

the advance in the market price from the

itime of sale up to a reasonable time to ie

\place it after notice of the sale was the prop-

er measure of damages. Baker v. Drake,

53 N. Y. 211, 66 N. Y. 518; Gruman v. Smith,

81 N. Y. 25; Colt v. Owens, 90 N. Y. 368.

These decisions were made in cases where

the transactions were dealings between the

customer and broker in the purchase and

sale of stocks on a margin. Subsequently

the same rule was applied where the owner

of stock for which he had paid full value,

and which he held as an investment, put it

in the hands of a broker as collateral securi-

ty for the debt of a third person, upon condi-

tion that it should not be sold for six months,

the stock having been sold without the own-

er's authority before the expiration of that

time. Under the decisions of the New York

courts, reasonable time, where the facts are

undisputed, is a question of law for the

court. Wright v. Bank, 110 N. Y. 238, 18

N. E. 79. In Colt v. Owens, 90 N. Y. 368,

30 days after the sale and notice of it was

regarded as reasonable time. The rule of

the highest intermediate value between the

time of the conversion and the time of the

trial has been rejected in the supreme court

of the United States as the proper measure

of damages, and the rule that the highest in-

termediate value between the time of the

conversion and a reasonable time after the

owner has received notice of it was adopted

as the correct view of the law; for the rea-

son, as expressed by Mr. Justice Bradley,

that more transactions of this kind arise in

the state of New York than in all other parts

of the country, and that the New York rule,

as ﬂnally settled by its court of appeals, has

May wu anauthorlzed, It was a conversion
of the property, though the sale was made in
good ta!th. Nevertheless, the judge•s finding, and the rule of damages applled, were
correct. The gejieral rule l8 that the measure ot damages for conversion ls the value
of the property at the time of the conversion.
This rule has been modified with respect to
the conversion of stocks and bonds, commerdal securities vendible tn the market, the
market value of which ls liable to frequent
and great ftuctuatlons. caused by the depreslllon and lnftation of prices tn the market.
In Markham v. Jaudon. 41 N. Y. 235, the
court of appeals held that as between a. customer and bis broker, holding stock purcl-ased for the former which had been pledged as '8ecurlty for advances made In the
purchase, the measure of damages tor the
converslou. by an una.uthorlzed llllle wa.e the
highest market price between the time ot
the conversion and the trial. Relying upon
th18 cue, the defendanta put tn evidence no
proof of value except the market value In
December, 1886, and April and May, 1887.
But Mukham v. Jaudon bas been overruled
by a series ot cases In the New York courts,
and the rule adopted that In such cases the
principal may dlsaftlrm the sale, and that
the advance In the market price from the
( time or ale up to a reasonable time to teplace It after notice of the sale was the proper measure of damages. Baker v. Drake,
53 N. Y. 211, 66 N. Y. ri18; Gruman v. Smith,
81 N. Y. 2ri; Colt v. Owens, 90 N. Y. 368.
These decisions were made In cases where
the transa.ctlons were dealings between the
customer and broker In the purchase and
sale of stocks on a margin. Subsequently
the ea.me rule wu applied where the owner
of stock for which be bad paid full value,
and which he held as an Investment, put It
In the ballds ot a broker as collateral security for the debt ot a third person, upon condition that It should not be sold for six months,
the stock having been sold without the owner's authority before the expiration of that
time. Under the decisions of the New York
1-ourta, reasonable time, where the tacts are
undisputed, ls a question of law for the
~"OUrt.
Wright v. Bank, 110 N. Y. 288, 18
~. ~- 79.
In Colt v. Owens, 90 N. Y. 368,
:ro days after the sale and notice of It was
regarded as reMOnable time. The rule of
the highest intermediate value between the
ttme of the conversion and the time of the
trial bas been rejected In the supreme court
of the United States as the proper measure
ot damages, and the rule that the highest In·
termedlate value between the time of the
conversion and a reasonable time after the
owner has received notice of it was adopted
as the correct view of the law; for the reason. as expres.<1ed by Mr. Justice Bradley,
that more transactions of this kind arise In
the state of New York than in all other parts
ot the <''.lUntry, and that the New York rule,
as finally settled by Its court of appeals, has

f

~
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the most reesou in lta favor. Gallgher v.
Jones, 129 U. S. 194, 9 Sup. Ct. 335. The
principle upon which this doctrine rests ls
the consideration that the general rule that
In an action for a conversion the market
value of the property at the time of the conversion would alTonl an inadequate remedy,
or rather no remedy at all, for the real Injury, which consisted In the wrongful salt:
of property of a fluctuating value at au unfavorable time, chosen by the broker himself;\
hence the cost of replacing the securities by
a purch1UJe In the market, allowing a reasooable time for that purpose, has been regard- ,
ed as the proper measure of damges. As
was said by Mr. Justice Bradley In Gallgber
v. Jones: "A reasonable time after the
wrongful act complained of ls to be allowed
to the party 1.njured to place himself In the
position he would have been lo had not his
rights been Invaded." The general rule that
the market yalue at the time of the conversion Is the measure of dan.ages being found
to be Impracticable tn these cases, and having been abandoned, the etfort has been to
obtain some rule by which substantial justice, as near as may be, may be attaJned.
In En~land the market value at the time or
the t1·lal appears to be the measure of damages. Owen v. Routh, 14 C. B. 327. In
some of the sister states the rule of the high·
est Intermediate price before the trial has
been adopted. In New York, and in most of
the sister states, as well as In the supreme
court of the United Sta.tee, the formula wblcb
bas been called the "New York Rule'" h1ui
been adopted, and ls the rule which will accomplish the most complete justice In the ordinary transactions between the broker and
his customer dealing in stocks when an unauthorized sale Is the act of conversion. In
such cases the customer bu a. choice of remedies. He may claim the benefit of the sull\
and take the proceeds; he may require the
broker to replace the stock, or replace It himself, and charge the broker for the loss; or
be may recover the advance in the market
price up to a reasonable time within which/
to replace it after notice of the sale. Cook,
Stock & S. 460. But where stocks and negotiable securities are pledged as collateral
security for the payment of a debt to become due and payable on a future day, an·
other element enters Into the consideration
ot the compensation to be awarded to th~
owner of the securltles for the unauthorized
sale of them before the debt matures. Upon such a ballment It Is the duty of the
pledgee to keep the securities In hand at all
times ready to be delivered to the pledgor on
the payment of the debt. Cook, Stock & S.
469-471. An unauthorized sale before the
debt matures Is a conversion, tor which the
pledgor may have remedy In the manner
above mentioned. But the sale may be made !
when the market value Is depreciated, nnd :
the market with a downwarrl tcn<lcncy. "lite
market m~y revive, and prices !Je enlmucc<l
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hhefore the debt matures. Under such cir-

“cumstances, a rule that the piedgor shall be

at liberty to elect to treat the unauthorized

sale as a conversion, or to hold the pledgee

for the breach of his duty to keep the secu-

rities until the maturity of the debt. and

recover as damages the market value of the

\securitles as of that time, would commend

itself in reason and justice. As applied to

the facts of this case, this rule would be

eminently just. The plaintiff in good faith

sold the securities in the manner authorized

by the contract of pledge. The breach of

duty was in selling at an unauthorized time.

The debt was not paid or tendered at maturi-

ty; and if the plaintiff had held the stock,

and sold it at that time, the sale would have

been strictly in conformity with the power.

If the defendants lost anything by the sale
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at a time unauthorized, they would be rec-

ompensed for that loss by an award of dam-

ges equivalent to the market value of the

securities at the time the debt became due.

Tested by either of these standards, the prop-

er credit was allowed, the proof being that

the prices of the securities were less when

the note matured than when the securities

were sold. No evidence of an increased

price prior to December, 1886, was produced.

The ﬁnding of the judge should be atiirmed

on the ground, also, that the sale was con-

sented to and ratiﬁed by the defendants.

The notices served on the morning of May

15th informed the defendants that the secu-

rities pledged had, in the plaintiffs estima-

tion, depreciated in market value, and that

the contingency provided for in this part of

the contract had happened, and also plainly

indicated the purpose on the part of the

piaintilf to avail itself of‘the right which,

under those circumstances, would accrue un-

der the contract. Immediately after the sale

was made, the defendants had notice of the

fact of sale, and, very shortly after, of the

amount realized therefrom. No objection

was made to the sale or the amount realized.

On the 4th of June, 1884, the defendants

ﬁled a schedule of their indebtedness under

their assignment. This schedule was veri-

ﬁed by the oaths of the defendants that it

contained a true account of their creditors,

and of the sum owing to each, and also a

statement of any existing collateral or other

security for the payment of such debt. In

this statement the plaintiff was put down as

a creditor for the sum of $4,737.50, which

was about the amount due the plaintif f after

the proceeds were applied to the debt; and

to this speciﬁcation of the existing debt due

the plaintiff was appended a statement that

for the payment of this debt there was no ex-

isting collateral or other security. In Sep-

tember, l885, the defendants caused to be

presented to the plaintiff a composition

agreement with a view to a compromise with

their credito1s, in which the debt due the

plaintiff was stated to be the sum of $5,118.-

87, ﬁgures which represented approximately

\~umstnnces, a rule that the pledgor shall be
1at liberty to elect to treat the unauthorized
'sale as a conversion. or to hold the pledgee
for the breach of his duty to keep the securities until the maturity ot the debt, and
recover as damages the market value of the
securities as of that time, would commend
'itself In reason and justice. As applied to
the facts of this case, this rule would be
eminently just. The plaintil! in good fa1th
sold the securities In the manner authorized
by the contra.ct of pledge. The breach of
duty was In selling at a.n unauthorized time.
The debt was not paid or tendered at maturity; and if the plalntllf had held the stock,
and sold It at that time, the sale would have
been strictly in conformity with the power.
It the defendants lost anything by the sale
at a time unauthorized, they would be recompensed for that loss by an awa1·d of dam')nges equivalent to the ma1·ket value of the
/!ecurlties at the time the debt became due.
Tested by either of these standards, the proper credit was allowed, the proof being that
the prices of the securities were less when
the note matured than when the securities
were sold. No evidence of an increased
price prior to December, 1886, was pl'Oduced.
The finding of the judge should be affirmed
on the ground, also, tllat the sale was consente<l to and ratified by the defendants.
\The notices serv~ on the morning of :May
I 15th Informed the defendants that the secu\1·ities pledged had, In the plalntil!'s estimation, depreciated in market value, and that
the contingency provided for In this part of
the contra.ct had happened, and also plainly
Indicated the purpose on the part of the
plaintiff to avail itself of 'the right which,
under those circumstances, would acc1·ue under the contrac:t- Immediately after the sale

was made, the defendants had notice of the
fact of sale, and, very shortly after, of the
amount realized therefrom. No objection
was made to the sale or the amount realized.
On the 4th of June, 1884, the defendants
filed a. sche<lule ot their lndebtedcess under
their assignment. This schedule was verified by the oa.ths of the defendant.a that lt
contained a true account of their creditors,
and of the sum owing to each, and also a
statement of any existing collateral or other
security for the payment of such debt. In
this statement the plaintiff was put down aa
a creditor tor the sum ot $4,737.50, which
was about the amount due the plaintiff after
the proceeds were applied to the debt; and
to this specl.fkation of the existing debt due
the plaintil! was appende<l a. statement that
for the payment of this debt there was no existing collateral or other security. In l:leptember, 1885, the defendants caused to be
preseute<l to the plaintill' a compOBition
agreement with a view to a compromise with
their credlto1s, in which the debt due the
Qlalntill' was stated to be the sum of $5,118.·
87, figures which represente<l approximately
the net amount due the plaintltr on the note
after applying thereon the proceeds of the
sale of the securities, with Interest. This
agreement was signed by the plaintiff, but
the project fell through, the defendants being
unable to el!ect a compromise with all their
creditors. The defendants bad the election
either to ratify the sale, and claim the benefit of It, or repudiate It, and hold the plaintltr In damages. The act of the defendants
In applying the proceeds of the sale as a
credit on the plaintiff's note Is so positive
and emphatic an act of ratification and adoption that It cannot be retracted. The case
was properly decided at the trial, and the
judgment should be a.fH.I"Illed.
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',against, and was injured.

Supreme Court of Michigan.

Nov. 15, lSSD.

ELLIS v. HILTON.

(43 N. W. 1048, 78 Mich. 150.)

Supreme Court of Michigan. Nov. 15, 1889.

Error to circuit court. Grand Traverse

county; RAMsDELL, Judge.

Error to circuit court. Grand Traverse
county; RAMSDELL, Judge.
Pratt. & Davis. for appellant. Lorl11 Roberts (J. H. Adsit, of counsel), for appellee

Pratt & Davis. for appellant. Lorin Rob-

erts (J. 1i. Adsit. of counsel), for appellee.

LONG, J. This is an action to recover

damages against the defendant for negli-

gently placing a stake in a public street in

Traverse City. which plaintiff's horse iau

It was conceded

on the trial by counsel for defendant that

the horse of plaintiff was so injured that it

was entirely wortldess. Plaintiff claimed

damages, not only for the full value of the

horse, but also for what he exp.nded in at-

tempting to cffent a cure. and on the trial
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his counsel stated to the court that plaintiff

was entitled to recover a reasonable expense

in trying to cure the horse before it was de-

cided that she was actually worthless. The

court ruled, however. that the damages could

not exceed the value of the animal. A claim

is made by the declaration for moneys expend-

ed in trying to effect a cure of the horse after

the injury. Upon the trial the plaintiff testi-

tied that he put the horse. after theinjury, in-

to the hands of a veterinary, and paid him

$35 forcure and treatment. On his cross-‘ex-

amination, he also testiﬁed that the veteri-

nary said “there was hopes of curing her, if

the muscles were not too badly bruised. He

didn't say he could cure her. He thought

there was a chance that he might."

)r. DeCow, the veterinary, was called. and

testiﬁed, as to the injury, that the stake en-

tered the breast of the horse, on the left

side. about six inches; that the muscles were

bruised, and the left leg perfectly helpless.

He got the wound healed, but on account of

the severe bruise of the muscles the leg be-

came paralyzed and useless. On being asked

whether he thought she could be helped when

he ﬁrst saw her, he stated that he did not

know but she might; that she might be

helped. and kept for breeding purposes, and

be of some value.

It is evident from the testimony that the

plaintiff acted in good faith in attempting

the cure, and under the belief that the mare

could be helped, and be of some value. The

court below, however, seems to have based

its ruling that no greater damages could be

recovered than the value of the animal, and

that these moneys expended in attempting a

cure could not be recovered, upon the ground

that the defendant was not consulted in rela-

tion to the matter of the attempted cure.

Whatever damages the plaintlff sustained

were occasioned by the negligent conduct of

the defendant, and recovery in such cases is

always permitted for such amount as shall

compensate for the actual loss. If the horse

had been killed outright the only loss would

have been its actual value. The horse was

seriously injured; but the plaintiff, acting in

LONG, J. This is an action to recover
damages a~ainst the defendant for negligently placing a stake in a public stt·1·et in
Traverse City, which plaintiff's horse mu
against, and was injured. It was conceded
<>n the trial by courn1el for defendant. that
the horse or plaintiff was so inj un·tl that it
was entirely worthless.
Plaintiff clai1ned
damages, not only fo1· the full value of the
horse'. but ahm for what he exp.. nded in attemptmg to elfert a cure, ancl on the trial
his counsel stated to the court that plainttJf
~as e~titled to recover a reasonable expense
rn tryrng to cure the horse before it was <te.cidPd that she was actually worthless. The
(court ruled, however, that the damag!'S could
not exceed the value of the animal. A claim
is made by the declaration for moneys expended in trying to effect a cure of the horse after
the injury. Upon the trial the plaintiff testified that he put the horse, after the injury, into the hands of a veterinary, and paid him
e·~5 tor cure and treatment. On his cross~ex
amination, he also testified that the veterinary said "there WM hopP.s of curing her, if
the muscles were not too badly bruised. He
clidn't say he could cure her. He thought
there was a chaoce that he might."
Jr. DeCow, the veterinary, was called, and
testified, as to the injury, that the stake ent~red the breast of the horse, on the left
~•de. about six Inches; that the muscles were
bruised, and the left leg perfectly helpless.
He got the wound healed, but on account of
the severe brui11e of the muscles the leg heeame paralyzed and useless. On 'being asked
whether he thought she could be helped when
he flrRt saw her, he stated that he did not
know but she might; that she might be
helµed, and kept for breeding purposes, and
be of some value.
I.t i~ evident from the testimony that the
plarnt1ft acted In good faith in attnnpting
the cure, and under the belief that the mare
could be helped, and be of some value. The
<:ourt below, however, seP.ms to have based
its ruling that no greater damages could be
1·ecovered than the value of the animal, and
that these moneys expended in attempting a
cUJe could not be recovered, upon the ground
that the defendant was not consulted in relati?n to the matter of the attt>mpted cure.
Whatever damages the plai nl:II sustained
were occa.sioned by the negli~ent comluct of
the defendant, and recovery in such catses is
al ways permitted for such amount as shall
comµrnsate for the actual los~. H the horse
had been kille<l outright the only loss would
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ha\•e bPen its actual Yalue. The hor.ie was
seriousl.Y injure~; but the plaintiff, acting in
good faith, and m the belief that she might be
helped and made of some value, expended
this $35 in care and medical treatment. He
is the loser or the actual valuti of the horse.
and what he in good faith thus expended.
He Is permitted to recover the val11t:', but cut
off from what he has paid out. This is not
compensation.
Counsel for defendant <"Ontentls that such
damages cannot exceed the actual value of
the property lost, because the loss or 1.hlstructi<!n is total. '!here may be cases hohli ng to
this rule; b11t 1t Sl'ems to me the rulP. is well
stated, and basf'd upon good re:isoil, in Watson v. Bridge, 14 Me. 201, in which the court
says: ".Plaintill' is entitled t.o a fair i11drmnity for his loss. He has lost the value of
his horse, and also what he has e:qwnlled in
endeavoring to cure him. The jury having
allowed this part of his claim, it must be u11?erstood t.hat it WM an expense prud<•ntly
incurred, m tho 1easonahle expectation th.it
it would prove !Jenellcial. It was inenne<l,
not to aggravate, but to Je11sen the amount
for whid1 the defendants mi~ht be heh I liable. Hiul it prnvell successful, they would
have had the benefit or it. J's it turnf'd out·
othnwise, it is but just, in >11r ju<igment,
that they should susLain thP oss." In ;\I urphy v. McGraw, 41 N. W. :tep. 917. it appeared on the trial that the 11or:.e was wurlhless at the time of purchase hy reason of a
disease callecl "eczema." The court charr"LI
the jury that If the plaintiff was led by defendant to keep on trying to curl:' the horse
the expense thereof would be chargf'al1le to the
defendant, as would also be the case if there
were any circumstances, in the judgment of
the jury. which rendered it rea!lonahle that
be should keep 011 trying as long as he did to
effect the c11re. The plaintiff recovered for
such expense and on the hearing here the
charge of the trial court waa held correct.
It is a question, under the circ11Ihstances,
for the jury to determine whether the plaintiff acted in good faith, and upon a reasonable belief that the horse conld be cured, or
made of some value, if properly taken care
of; and the trial court was in errt1r in withdrawing that part of the case from them.
Such damages, of cours11, must always be
confined within rea..,onable bounds. Hnd 110
one would be justified, under any circumstances, in expending more than the animal
was worth in attempting a cure. This is the
only erroi· we nre:i notice. 'fhe judgment
of the court below must be rever:1ed, with
costs, and a new trial ordered.
CHAMPLIN and MOUSE, JJ., concuneif
with LO:NG, J.
SHERWOOD, U. J.
sult.

I concur In the re-

CAMPBELL, .J. I think the rule laid
down at the circuit tl1e pruper one.

tPJ
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SILSBURY v. M(C0().\' et al.1

(8 N. Y. 379.)

Court of Appeals of New York. July. 1850.

This was an action of trover for a quantity

of whisky. On the ﬁrst trial before Willard,

circuit judge, at the Montgomery circuit, in

May, 1843, the plaintiffs were nonsuited.

The supreme court on bill of exceptions set

aside the nonsuit, and ordered a new trial.

See 6 Hill, 425. The case was again tried

in November, 1844, before the same judge.

On that trial it was proved that one Hack-

ney, a deputy of the sheriff of Montgomery

county, on the 22d of March, 1842, by virtue

ﬁ1f a ﬂeri facias issued on a judgment in the

‘supreme court in favor of \IcCoon and Sher-

man, the defendants, against Uriah Wood,

sold the whisky in question, being about

twelve hundred gallons, having made a pre-
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vious levy thereon; and that upon the sale

the defendants became the purchasers, and

afterward converted it to their own use. The

whisky was levied on and sold at the distil-

lery of the plaintiffs, who forbade the sale.

The plaintlffs having rested, the defendants

offered to prove, in their defense, that the

whisky was manufactured from corn belong-

“lg to Wood, the defendant in the execution:

that the plaintiffs had taken the corn and

manufactured it into whisky without any au-

thority from Wood, and knowing at the time

they took the corn that it belonged to him.

The plaintiffs' counsel objected to this evi-

dence, insisting that Wood‘s title to the corn

was extinguished by its conversion into whis-

ky. The circuit judge sustained the objection

and refused to receive the evidence. The de-

fendants‘ counsel excepted. The plaintiffs

had a verdict for the value of the whisky,

which the supreme court refused to set aside.

See 4 Denio, 332. After judgment the de-

fendants brought error to this court, where

the cause was ﬁrst argued by Mr. Hill, for

the plaintiffs in error, and Mr. Reynolds, for

the defendants in error. in September, 1848.

Court of Appeals of New York. July, 1850.

This was an action of trover for a quantity
of whisky. On the first trial before Wlllard,
circuit judge, at the Montgomery circuit, In
May, 1843, the plalntilTs were nonsuJted.
The supreme court on bill of exceptions set
n~lde the nonsuit, and ordered a new trial.
~c 6 Hill, -125. The case was again tried
In November, 18-14, before the same judge.
On that trial It was proved that one Hackney, a deputy of the sheriff of Montgomery
r:ounty, on the 22d of ~larch, 18-12, by virtue
.lot a fieri faC'las Issued on a judgment In the
supreme court In favor of McCoon and Sher1111111, the defendants, against Uriah Wood,
sold the whisky In question, being about
twelve huudred gallons, having made a previous levy thereon; and that upon the sale
the defendants became the purchasers, and
afterward converted It to their own use. The
whisky was levied on and solll at the distillery of the plalntlt'l's, who forbade the sale.
The plaintiffs having rested, the defendants
01Ter1!d to prove, In their defense, that the
whisky was manufactured from corn belonging to Wood, the defendant In the esecutlon:
that the plalntlt'l's had· taken the corn and
manufactured It Into whisky without nny authority from ·wood, and knowing at the time
they took the corn that It belonged to him.
'The .Plaintiffs' counsel objected to this evldenC'e, ll!slstlng that Wood's title to the corn
was t>Xtingulshed by Its conversion Into whisky. 'l'he circuit judge sustained the objection
and refused to receive the evidence. The defendants' counsel excepted. The plaintiffs
bad a verdict for the value ot the whisky,
which the su11reme court refused to set aside.
See 4 Denio, 332. After judgment the defendants brought error to this court, where
the cause was first argued by Mr. Hill, for
the plalntlt'l's In error, and l\lr. Reynolds, for
the defendants In error. In September, 18-18.
'l'he judges being divided In opinion. a reargument was ordered, which came on In January last.
N. Hill, Jr., tor plaintiffs In error. M. T.
Reynolds, for defendants In error.

'l‘he judges being divided in opinion. a rear-

gument was ordered, which came on in Janu-

ary last.

N. Hill, Jr., for plaintiffs in error.

Reynolds, for defendants in error.

M. T.

RUGGLES, II. It is an elementary princi-

ple in the law of all civilized communities,

that no man can be deprived of his property,

except by his own voluntary act, or by opera-

tion of law. The thief who steals a chattel,

or the trespasser who takes it by force, ac-

quires no title by such wrongful taking. The

HUGGLES, J'. It le an elementary principle In the law of all clvlll7.ed communities,
that no man can be deprived of bis property,
except by his own voluntary act, or by operation of lnw. The thief who steals a chattel,
pr the trespasser who takes it by force, acquires no title by such wrongful taking. The
s11ln:1e11uent possession by the thief or the trespasser Is a continu!ng trespass; and If, during
Its continuance, the wrong-doer enhances the
value of the chattels by labor and skill hestowed upon It, as by sawing logs Into boards,
splitting timber Into rails, making leather In-

subsequent possession by the thief or the tres-

passer is a continuing trespass; and if, during

its continuance, the wrong-doer enhances the

value of the chattels by labor and skill he-

stowed upon it, as by sawing logs into boards,

splitting timber into rails, making leather in-

1 Dissenting opinion of Bronson, C.J'.,omitted.

to shoes, or iron into bars, or into a tool; the

manufacttn'ed article still belongs to the own-

er of the original material, and he may re-

1

Dissenting opinion of Bronson, C.J.,omitted.

to shoes, or Iron into bars, or Into a tool; themanufactured nrtkle still bl.'lougs to the owner of the original material, and he may retake It or recover Its Improved value In IW]
action for damages. And If the wrong-doersell the chattel to an honest purchaser having
no notice of the fraud by which it was acquired, the purchaser obtains no title from
the trespas~r. because the trespasser had
none to give. '.fhe owner of the original material may stlll retake It In Its Improved state,
or he may recover Its Improved value. The
right to the Improved value In damages Is a
consequence ot the continued ownership. It ·
.would be absurd to say that the original own-:
er may retake the thing by an action of re-:
11levlu In Its Improved state, and yet that hemay not, If put to his action of trespass ortrover, recover Its Improved value In damages. Thus far, It ls conceded .that the com·
mon law agrees with the clvll.
They agree In another respect, to-wit, that
If the chattel wrongfully taken afterward'
come Jnto the hands ot an Innocent bolder
who, believing himself to be the owner, converts the chattel Into a thing of dlt'l'erent
species, so that its Identity Is destroyed, the·
original owner cannot reclaim It. Such a
change Is said to be wrought when wheat ls
made Into bread. olives Into oil, or grapes
Into wine. In a ease of this kincl the chau1w
In the species of the chattel Is not an Intentional wrong to the original owner. It Is.
therefore, regarded as a destruction or con·
sumptlon of the original waterlals, and the
true owner ls 1;1ot permitted to trace their
Identity Into the manufactured article, for
the purpose of appropriating to his own us1•
the labor and skill of the Innocent occupant
who wrought the change: but be Is put to bl,..
action tor damages as for a thing consume1l.
and may recover Its value as It was when
the conversion or consumption took place.
There Is great confusion In the books upon
the question what constitutes change of Identity. In one case (Y. B. 5 Hen. VII. p. 15), It Is
said that the owner may reclaim the goods
so long as they may be known, or In other
words. ascertained by Inspection. But this
In many cases Is by no means the best evldenre of Identity; and the examples put by
way ot Illustration serve rather to disprove
than to establish the rule. The court say
that It grain be made Into malt. It cannot tw
• reclaimed by the owner. because It can not
be known. But If cloth be made Into a cont.
a tree Into squared timber. or Iron Into n
tool, It may. Now as to the cases of the coat
and the timber they may or may not be capnble of ldentlfil'8tlon by the senses merely; and
the rule Is enth"ely uncertain In Its appllratlon; and ns to the Iron tool, It certalnlv cannot be Identified ns made ot the origin~) ma·
terlal, without other evidence. This lllustrn·
tlon, therefore, contradicts the rnle. In another cnf!t' (Moore, 20), trees were made Into
timber, and It was arljudged that the owner
of the trees might reclaim the timber, "be-
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/cause the greater part of the substance re-

mained." But if this were the true criterion

it would embrace the cases of wheat made in-

to bread, milk into cheese. grain into malt,

and others which are put in the books as ex-

amples of a change of identity. Other writ-

ers say that when the thing is so changed

that it cannot be reduced from its new form

to its former state, its identity is gone. But

this would include many cases in which it has

been said by the courts that the identity is

not gone; as the case of leather made into

a garment, logs into timber or boards, cloth

into a coat, etc. There is. therefore, no deﬂ-

nite settled rule on this question: and al-

though the want of such a rule may create ‘

embarrassment in a case in which the owner

seeks to reclaim his property from the hands

of an honest possessor. it presents no difﬁ-
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culty where he seeks to obtain it from the

wrong-doer; provided the common law agrees

with the civil in the principle applicable to

such a case.

The acknowledged principle of the civil law

is that a willful wrong-doer acquires no prop-

erty in the goods of another, either by the

wrongful taking or by any change wrought

in them by his labor or skill, however great

that change may be. The new product in its

improved state belongs to the owner of the

original materials, provided it be proved to

have been made from them;

loses his labor, and that change which is re-

garded as a destruction of the goods. or an

alteration of their identity in favor of an

honest possessor, is not so regarded as be-

tween the original owner and a willful vio-

lator of his right of property.

These principles are to he found in the Di-

gest of Justinian. Lib. 10, tit. 4, leg. 12, §

3. “If any one shall make wine with my

grapes, oil with my olives, or garments with

my wool, knowing they are not his own, he

shall be compelled by action to produce the

said wine, oil or garments." So in Vinnins‘

Institutes (title 1, pl. 25): "He who knows

the material is another's ought to be consid-

ered in the same light as if he had made the

species in the name of the owner, to whom

also he is to be understood to have given his

labor."

The same principle is stated by Puffendorf

in his law of Nature and of Nations (b. 4, ch.

7. it 10), and in Wood':-x institutes of the Civil

Law tpage 92), which are cited at large in

the opinion of Jewett . J., delivered in this

case in the supreme court (4 Denio, 338), and

which it is unnecessary here to repeat. In

Brown's (iivil and Admiralty Law (page 240),

the writer states the civil law to be that the

uIji]:lntll owner of any thing improved by the

act of another. retained his ownership in the

thing so improved. unless it was changed into

a different species; as if his grapes were

made into wine, the wine belonged to the

maker. who was only obliged to pay the own-

er for the value of his grapes. The species,

however, must be incapable of being restored

·.ro P1'1R80!\.AL

subBtan~

/cause the greater part of the
remalned." But If this were the true criterion
it would embrare the ca8t'8 of wheat made Into bread, milk Into cheese, grain Into malt,
and others which are put In the books as examples of a change of Identity. Other writere say that when the thing 18 so changed
that It eannot be reduced from Its new form
to Its former state, Its Identity ls gone. But
this wi>uld include many c8.8e8 in which It bas
been snld by the courts that the Identity is
not gone; as the case of leather made Into
n garmPnt, logs luto timber or boards, cloth
Into a coat, etc. There ls, therefore, no detlnite settled rule on this question; and although the want of sucn a rule may create
embarrassment In a case In which the owner
seeks to reclaim his property from the bands
of an honest possessor. It pre11Puts no dlfficulty where he seeks to obtain It from the
wrong-doer; provided the common law agrt>es
with tlll" civil In the prlnclplP appllmble to
such a case.
Tht> neknowll'llged prlndplP of the civil law
ls that a willful wrong-doer at·qulrcs uo prop1•rty In the goods of another, either by the
wroogful taking or by any change wrought
In them by his labor or skill, however great
that change may be. The new product In Its
Improved state belongs to the owner of the
orlglual materials, provided It be proved to
have been made from thPm; the trespasser
loses his labor, and that change whl<'h Is regardl'd aa a destruction of the goodii. or an
alteration of their Identity In favor of an
honest possessor, ls not so regarded as betwPen the original ownPr and a willful vlolator of his right of propPrty.
These principles are to be found In the DIgest of Justinian. Lib. 10, tit. 4, leg. 12, f
3. "It any one shall make wine with my
grapes, oil with my ollves, or garmenh with
my wool, knowlnJP; they are not his own, he
shall be compelled by R!'tlon to produce the
said wine, oil or garmPnts." So In Vlnnlus'
Institutes (title 1, pl. 2'il: "He who knows
thP matl'rlal is another's ought to be roneld•·rPd In the same light as If ht> had IIlJlde the
11pecles In the name ot the owner, to whom
also he ls to be understood to have given bis
labor."
The same principle Is statl'd by Putrendorf
In bis law of Nature and of Nations (h. 4, cb.
i. • 10), and In Wood's lm;tltnte8 of thP Civil
Law tpagp 92), which art• C'lted at large In
the opinion of Jewett. J., delivered In this
l"ase In the !mpremp court (4 Denio, 3.~). and
which It Is unnecessary here to repeat. In
Hrown's Civil and Admiralty Law <pn11:e 240),
tht> wrltPr states the civil law to hP that the
ni:lgh111I owupr of any thing lmpro\'Pd hy the
aet of anothPr, rt>talned his owm•rshlp In the
thlnir !<o lmpro'l'Pd. nult•ss it was d1auged into
11 dilfPrPnt 11pt>dPs; as If his grapt•s were
mmlP Into wine, the wine belongP<I to the
111akt>r. who wns only ohllgPd to pay the own1•1· tor the Yalue of hl>i Jtl'apes. 'l'he spPcles,
however, must be Incapable of being restored
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to Its ancient form; and the materials mUiSt
have been taken In Ignorance of their being
the property of another.
But It wu thought In the court below that
this doctrine had never been adopted Into thP
common law, either in E,ngland or here; and
the distinction between a willful and an lnvoluntary wrong-doer herelnbefore wentloned, was rejected not only on that ground but
also because the rule was supposed to be too
bar1b and rigorous agalnst the wrong-doer.
It ls true that no case bas been fouud In
the English books In which that distinction
hne hPen expressly recognized; but It hi
PqUally true that In no case until the present
has It been rPpudlated or denied. The comwon law on this subject was evidently borrowed from the Roman at an early day; and.
at a period when the common law furnished
no rule whatever In a case of this kind. Bracton, in his treatise compiled In the reign of
Henry III., adopted a portion of Justinian's
Institutes on this 11ubject without noticing
the distinction; and Blackstone, In his Cowmeutarles (voluuw 2, p. 404:), In stotlng what
the Roman law was, follows Bracton, but nf'lther of these wrltPrs intimate that on thP
point In question there Is any dl!Terence hetween the civil and the common lnw. The
authorities referred to by Blackstone In support of his text are three only. '.rhe first In
Ht·ooks' Abridgement, tit. "Property." 2.'3, Is
the case from the YPar Book, 5 H . VII. p. Hi
(translated In a note to 4 Denio, 33~. In whkh
the owner of leather brought trespass for
taking sllppers and boots, and the defendant
pleaded that he was the owner of the leath1•r
I and balled It to J. S., who gave It to the
plalntltr, who manufactured It Into sllppers
and boots, and the defendant took them as
he lawfully might. The plea was held good
and the title of the owner of the leather un<'banged. The second reference Is to a case
In Sir Francis l\loor's Reports (page 20), In
which the action wu trespass for taking
timber, and the defendant justified on the
ground that A. entered on hie land and eut
down trees and made timber thereof, and carrled It to the place where the trespass was
alleged to have bt>t>n committed, and aftt>rward gave It to the plalntlQ', and that thP
defendant, therefore, took the timber as hi'
lawfully might. In these cases the chattt>l11
bad passed from the hands of the original
trespasser lrfto tht> hands of a third per-Ron:
In both It was held that the title of the orlglnal owner was unchanged, and that hP hail 11
right to the property In Its lmpro'l'ed stnti>
against the third person In possession. Tlwr
are In conformity with the rule of the civil
law; and Cl'rtalnly fall to prove any dllft>rence between the civil and the common law
011 the point In question.
The third case clted Is from Popham"s Reports (page 38), and
was a ease of confu!'lon of goods. The plnlutiff voluntnrlly mixed his own hay with the
bay of the defendant, who carried the whole
away, for which he was sued In trespnlls:

4.12
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and it was adjudged that the whole should

go to the defendant; and Blackstone refers to

this case in support of his text, that “our

law to guard against fraud gives the entire

property, without any account, to him whose

original dominion is invaded and endeavored

to be rendered uncertain without his own

consent." The civil law in such a case would

have required him who retained the whole of

the mingled goods to account to the other for

his share (Just. Inst. lib. 2, tit. 1, § 28); and

the common law in this ‘particular appears to

be more rigorous than the civil; and there is

no good reason why it should be less so in a

case like that now in hand, where the neces-

sity of guarding against fraud is even greater

than in the case of a mingling of goods, be-

cause the cases are likely to be of more fre-

quent occurrence. Even this liability to ac-
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count to him whose conduct is fraudulent

seems by the civil law to be limited to cases

in which the goods are of such a nature that

they may be divided into shares or portions,

according to the original right of the parties;

for by that law if A. obtain by fraud the

parchment of B. and write upon it a poem, or

wrongfully take his tablet and paint there-

on a picture, B. is entitled to the written

accounting for the value of the writing or

of the picture. Just. Inst. lib. 2, tit. 1, §§ 23,

24. Neither Bracton nor Blackstone have point-

ed out any difference except in the case of

confusion of goods between the common law

and the Roman, from which on this subject

our law has mainly derived it principles.

So long as property wrongfully taken re-

tains its original form and substance. or may

be reduced to its original materials, it be-

longs, according to the admitted principle

of the common law, to the original owners

without reference to the degree of improve-

ment. or the additional value given to it by

the labor of the wrong-doer. Nay more, this

rule holds good against an innocent purchaser

from the wrong-doer, although its value be

increased an hundred fold by the labor of the

purchaser. This is a necessary consequence

of the continuance of the original ownership.

There is no satisfactory reason why the

wrongful conversion of the original materials

into an article of a different name or a differ-

ent species should work a transfer of the

title from the true owner to the trespasser,

provided the real identity of the thing-can

be traced by evidence. The diﬂiculty of prov-

ing the identity is not a good reason. It re-

lates merely to the convenience of the tem-

edy, and not at all to the right. There is

no more diﬁiculty or uncertainty in proving

that the whisky in question was made of

Wood's corn, than there would have been in

proving that the plaintiff had made a cup

of his gold. or a tool of his iron; and yet in

those instances. according to the English

cases, the prooi.I would have been unobjec-

tionable. In all cases where the new pro-

duct cannot be identiﬁed by mere inspection,

the original material must be traced by the
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and it was adjudged that the whole should
go to the defendant; and Blackstone refers to
this case In support of his text, that "our
law tf) guard against fraud gives the entire
property, without any account, to him whose
original dominion ls Invaded and endeavored
to ·be rendered uncertain without his own
consent." The civll law In such a case would
have required him who retained the whole of
the mingled goods to account to the other for
his share (Just. Inst llb. 2, tit 1, § 28); and
the common law in this particular appears to
be more rigorous than the civil; and there is
no good reason why It should be less so In a
case like that now In hand, where the neces!lity of guarding against fraud Is even greater
than in the case of a mingling of goods, because the cases are Ukely to be of more frequent occurrence. Even this liability to account to him whose conduct ls fraudulent
seems by the clvll law to be limited to cases
In which the goods are of such a nature that
they mny be divided Into shares or portions,
accordinir to the original right of the parties;
for by that law If A. obtaln by fraud the
parchment of B. and write upon It a poem, or
wrongfully take his tablet and paint there~
on a picture, B. is entitled to the written
parchment and to the painted tablet, without
accounting for the value of the writing or
of the picture. Just. Inst. lib. 2, tit. 1, §§ 23,
24. Neither Bracton nor Blackstone have pointed out any difference except in the case of
confusion of goods between the common law
and the Roman, from which on this subject
our law has mainly derived its principles.
So long as property wrongfully taken ret.ains Its original form and substance, or may
be reduced to Its original materials, It belongs, according to the admitted principle
of the common law, to the original owners
without reference to the degree of Improvement, or the additional value given to It by
the labor of the wrong-doer. ~ay more, this
rule holds good against an innocent purchaser
from the wrong-doer, although Its value be
Increased an hundred fold by the labor of the
purchaser. This Is a necessary consequence
of the continuance of the original ownership.
There ls no satisfactory reason why the
wrongful conversion of the original materials
Into an article of a different name or a different species should work a transfer of the
title from the true owner to the trespasser,
provhled the real Identity of the thing can
be traced by evidence. The difficulty of proving the Identity ls not a good reason. It relates merely to the convenience of the remedy, and not at all to the right There Is
no more difficulty or uncertainty In proving
that the whisky In question was made of
·wood's corn, than there would have been hi
proving that the plalntilT had made a cup
of his gold, or a tool of his Iron; and yet In
those Instance!!, acco1·dlng to the English
casPs, the proof would hnve been unobjectionable. In all cases where the new product cannot be Identified by mere inspection,

the original material must be traced by the
testimony of witnesses from hand to han<l
through the process of transformation.
Again: The court below seem to have rejected the role of the civil law applicable to
this case, and to have adopted a principle
not heretofore known to the common law;
and for the reason that the rule of the civil
law was too rigorous upon the wrong-doer
In depriving him of the benefit of bis labor
bestowed upon the goods wrongfully taken.
But we think the civil law In this respect ls
In conformity not only with plain principle!!
of morality, but supported by cogent reasons
of public policy; while the rule adopted by
the court below leads to the absurdJty of
treating the willful trespal!ser with greater
kindness and mercy than It shows to the Innocent possessor of another man's goods. A
single example may suffice to prove this to be
so. A trespasser takes a quantity of Iron ore
belonging to another and converts It Into Iron,
thus changing the species and Identity of the
article; the owner of the ore may recover Its
vnlue In trover or trespass; but not the value
of the Iron, because under the rule of tht•
court below It would be unjust and rigorous
to deprive the treapnsser of the value of his
labor In the transmutation. But If the same
trespasser steals the Iron and sells it to an
Innocent purchaser, who works It into cutlery, the owner of the Iron may recover of
the purchaser the value of the cutlery, because by this process the original material ls
not destroyed, but rema1ns, and may be I'<'·
duced to Its former state; and aC"Cordlng to
the rule adopted by the court below as to
the change of Identity the original ownership
remains. Thus, the innocent purchaser Is
deprived of the value of his labor, while the
guilty trespasser ls not.
The rule adopted by the court below seems.
therefore, to be objectionable, because It operates unequally and unjustly. It not only
divests the true owner of bis title, without
bis consent, but It obliterates the distinction
maintained by the civil law, and as we think
by the common law, between the guilty and
the Innocent; and abolishes a salutary check
ag:ilmit violence and fraud upon the right!! or
property.
We think, moreover, that the law on thl~
subject has been settled by judle?lal declslomi
In this country. In Betts v. Lee, 5 Johns.
349. it wn.s decided that as against a trespasser the original owner of tpe property may
seize It In Its new shape, whatever alteration
of form It may have undergone, If he can
prove the Identity of the original materlnls.
That was a case In which the defendant had
cut down the plalntltr's trees and made them
Into 11hlngles. The property could neither bt>
Identified by inspection nor restored to It!!
original form; but the plaintiff recovered tile
value of the shingles. So, In Ourtls v. Groat.
6 Johns. 169, a trespasser cut wood on another's land and converted It Into charcoal.
It was held that the charcoal still belonged
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to the owner of the wood. Here was I.

change of the wood into an article of different

kind and species. No part of the substance

of the wood remained in its originhl state;

its identity could not be ascertained by the

senses, nor could it be restored to what it

originally was. That case distinctly recog-

nizes the princlpie that a willful trespasser

cannot acquire a title to property merely by

changing it from one species to another. And

the late Chancellor Kent, in his Commenta-

ries (volume 2, p. 363), declares that the Eng-

lish law will not allow one man to gain a ti-

tie to the property of anmner upon the prin-

ciple of accession, it he took the other's prop-

erty willfully as a trespasser; and that it

was settled as early as the time of the Year

Books, that whatever alteration of form any

property had undergone, the owner might

Generated for facpubupdates (University of Michigan) on 2014-06-12 19:24 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/mdp.35112105421491
Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd-google

seize it in its new shape it he could prove the

identity of the original materials.

The same rule has been adopted in Penn-

sylvania. Snyder v. Vaux, 2 Rawle. 427.

And in Maine and Massachusetts it has been

applied to a willful lutermixture of goods.

Ryder v. Hatinnvay. 21 Pick. 304, 305; Win-

gntc v. Smith, 7 Shep. 287; Willard v. Rice,

11 Metc. (.\Iass.) 493.

We are, therefore, of opinion that if the

piaintiffs below, in converting the corn into

whisky, knew that it belonged to VVood, and

that they were thus using it in violation of

his right, they acquired no title to the manu-

factured article, which, although changed

from the original material into another of dif-

ferent nature, yet, being the actual product

of the corn, still belonged to Wood. The

evidence offered by the defendants and re-‘

jected by the circuit judge ought to have

been admitted.

The right of Wood's creditors to seize the

whisky by their execution is a necessary con-

sequence of Wood's ownership. Their right

is paramount to his, and of course to his elec-

tion to sue in trover or trespass for the corn.

The judgment of the supreme court should

be reversed and a new trial ordered. Judg-

ment reversed.

GARDIXER, JEWEl‘T,

PRATT, JJ., concurred.

IH'liLlil;"l‘, and

BRONS()N. C. J., and HARRIS, J., dissent.

TAYLOR, J., did not hear the argument,

and gave no opinion.

to the owner of the wood. Here waa a
1·hange ot the wood Into an article ot dltrerent
kind and spe<'lefl. Xo part ot the substnnce
of the wood rewalnPd lu Its orlgln\l state;
Its Identity could not be ascertained by the
Menses, nor could It be restor.e d to what lt
originally wll8. That case distinctly rt>t.'Ognizes the prlnl'lple that a willful treHpasser
··unnot acquire a title to property merely by
\ 1~banglng It from one species to another. And
the late Chancellor Kent, lo bis Commt>ntarles (volume 2, p. 863), declare!! that the English law wlll not allow one man to gain a title to the property of anotner upon the prlo(•lple ot accession, lf be took the other's propl'l"ty willfully as a trespasser; and that It
was settled as early as the time of the Year
Books, that whateYer altnatlon ot form any
11roperty had undt•rgone, the ownE'!r mlrd1t
seize It In Its new shape It he could pron.! th1•
Identity ot thP original materials.
The snnu• rule has been adopted In Pennsylvania. ~nyder v. Vaux, 2 Rawll', 4:.!i.
And in lluine and :Mal!88chusetts It ha11 hPPll
npplkd to a willful lntermlxture ot good11.
Hy1ler v. Hathaway. 21 Pick. 304, 305; Wingate ,.. ~mlth, 7 Shep. 287; Willard v. Rice,
11 i\It>tc. (:Masa.) 493.

r
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We ure, therefore, of opinion that If the
plulntltrs below, in converting the corn Into
whisky, knew that lt belonged to Wood, and
that they were thus using 1t In violation of
bis right, they acquired no title to the manufactured article, which, althou~h changed
from the original material Into another of different nature, yet, bi>ing the actual product (
of the corn, stlll belonged to Wood. The
evidence ottered by the defendants and re'
jected by the circuit judge ought to have
been admitted.
The right of Wood's creditors to seize the
whisky by their execution Is a necessary consequence of Wood's ownership. Their right
ls paramount to his, and ot course to bis elPt'·
tlon to sue In trover or trespass tor the corn.
The judgment or the supreme court shoultl
be reversed and a new trial ordered. Juugment revE'!r8t'd.
GARDl:'\ER, JEW.h."'TT, Hl"l<LHFl', nml
l'RATT, JJ., concurred.
RROX~OX,

C. J., and HAHHl8, J., dissent.

TAYLOR, J., did not hear the argument,
and ga.Ye no oplnlon.
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OLEME~'T v. DUFFY.
(1 N. W. 85, 54 Iowa, 632.)
Supreme Court of Iowa. Oet. 21, 1880.
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OLEMENT v. DUFFY.

(7 N. W. 85. 54 Iowa, 632.)

Supreme Court of Iowa. Oct. 21, 1880.

Appeal from circuit court, Wright county.

( This is an action of replevin for 225 bushels

of wheat. The writ was issued on the twen-

ty-sixth day of September, 1879, and the

wheat being in stack, the sherif f delivered it

to the plaintiff, who proceeded to thresh and

market it. Each party claimed to be the ab-

solute owner of the grain. The trial was had

on the nineteenth day of November, 1879.

A jury was empanelied, and the plaintiff in-

troduced his evidence, wherenpon the court,

on motion of the defendant, withdrew from

~.
the jury the question of ownership and right

of possession, and rendered judgment there-

for in favor of the defendant. By the agree-

ment of the parties, the question of the as-
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sessment of damages and the value of the

property was also withdrawn from the jury'

and submitted to the court.

It was admitted that the wheat in contro-

versy consisted of 225 bushels, and that on

the day the same was taken from the defend-

ant. under the writ of replevin, wheat was

Itorth. in the nearest market, 65 cents per

i

‘ bushel in the nearest market.

ushel; that after the taking and before the

day of trial the wheat advanced in value.

and the highest value in the nearest market

during said interval was one dollar a bushel;

that plaintiff sold the same in market at 90

cents a bushel; that the threshing and haul-

ing to market were worth 20 cents a bushel.

The defendant offered to prove that wheat

of the quality of that in controversy was,

at the time of the trial, worth one dollar per

This evidence

was objected to, and the objection was sus-

tained, and defendant excepted. No further

evidence having been introduced, the court

held that the defendant was entitled to re-

cover the value of the wheat at the nearest
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Appeal from circuit court, Wright county.
( This Is an action of replevln tor 225 bushels
of wheat. The writ was Issued on the twenty-sixth day of September, 1879, and the
wheat being In stack, the sherltr delivered It
to the plalntltr, who proceeded to thresh and
market It. Each party claimed to be the absolute owner of the grain. 'l'he trial was had
on the nineteenth day of November, 1879.
A jury was empanelled, and the plaintur lntl'Odueed his evidence, whereupon the court,
on motion of the defendant, withdrew from
the jury the question of ownership and right
-0f possession, and rendered judgment therefor In favor of the defendant. By the agreement or the parties, the question of the assessment of damages and the value of the
property was also withdrawn from the jury
and submitted to the court.
It was admitted that the wheat In controversy consisted of 225 bushels, and that on
the day the same was taken from the defendant. under the writ ot replevln, wheat was
jvorth: In the nearest market, 65 cents per
bushel; that 8.fter the taking and before the
( day of trial the wheat advanced In value,
and the hlghl'st value In the nearest market
during said Interval was one dollar a bushel;
that plaintltr sold the same In market at 00
cents a bushel; that the threshing and hauling to market were worth 20 cents a bushel.
The defendant .offered to prove that wheat
ot the quality of that In controversy was,
at the time of the trial, worth one dollar per
bushel In the nearest market. This evidence
was objected to, and the objection was sustained, and defendant excepted. ~o further
evidence having been Introduced, the court
held that the def Pndant was entitled to recover the value of the wheat at the nearest
market on the day the same was taken under
the writ of rppll7\"ln, less the expem;p of
threshing and marketing, without regard to
the subsequent advance In value, and without regard to the priee actually obtained by
plalntitr, a111l rN1dered judgment accordingly.
Defendant appeals.
S. M. 'Veaver, tor appellant.

I

market on the day the same was taken under

the writ of replevin, less the expense of

threshing and marketing. without regard to

the subsequent advance in value, and with-

out regard to the price actually obtained by

plaintiff. and rendered judgment accordingly.

Defendant appeals.

S. Weaver, for appellant.

ROTHROCK, J. 1. The only question to

be determined is the measure of damages

which the defendant is entitled to recover.

It is claimed that he should receive the high-

est market price up to the time of the trial.

The action of repievin, or for the recovery

of speciﬁc personal property. as it is de-

nominated in the Code, is a contest for prop-

crty and not for damages. Where an issue

is made in the action. each party claims that

he is entitled to the possession of the prop-

erty. The property is the primary subject of

the conirovers_v. Ordinarily the plaintiff ex-

ecutes the bond provided for in section 3229,

and the property is delivered to him. The

ROTHROCK, J. 1. The oqly question to
be determlnrd Is the memmrP ot damages
whll'h the defendant Is entitled to recover.
It is dninwd that he should reeeh-e the highest market prier up to the time of the trial.
The action or replevln, or tor the recovery
()f s pec·lftc personal property, as It le denominated In the Cude, Is a C'ontest for propt'l'ty and not tor damages. \\"here an Issue
is madf' In thr al'tion. P1H'h party claims that
be Is entitled to the po~sesslon of the propnt)-. ThP 111·01wrty Is the primary subject of
thP 1•011tr0Yer!<~". Orclinnrlly the plaintiff executes the bond provided tor In section 3229,
nnd the propPrty Is deth·ered to hlm. The

obligation ot his bond la "that be will appear
at the next term of the court and prosecutP
his suit to judgment, and return the prop. erty If 'a return be awarded, and also pay
all costs and damages that may be adjudged
against him."
By section 3238 the jury are required to usess the value of the property, as also th1•
damages for taking or detention thereof. Wt·
think, where the plalntltr seizes the property
upon his writ, and the .defendant succeeds In
the action and le found to be the absolute
owner of the property, and ls therefore entitled to Its return, that the value should be
assPssed as of the time of the trial. Such Is .
the obligation of the bond. The plalntlft'
thereby undertakes to deliver the property to
the defendant In case a return be awarded.
If he bas In the meantime, by a sale of the
property or otherwise, put It out of his power
to make the delivery required by the bond.
he must render Its equivalent ae of the tlmt•
when the delivery should have been made.
The case Is not different In principle from an
ordinary sale of property to be delivered tu
the future. In this case the grain lncreaSl'll
In value pending the action. It ls property
ot that character which ftuctuates In value.
It It had decreased In value the measure of\
the defendant's recovery would still be tb..
~alue at the time or the trial, with damages
for the decrease In value, because the defendant, by hie bond, undertakes not only to return the property, but also to pay damages;
and the jury are, by section 3238. required to
assess the damages for the taking or detention.
A large number of authorities have been
cited by counsel for appellant upon the question whether, In an action of trover, the plalntllf ls entltlPd to recover the value of th1•
property at the time of the con\·erRlon, or th1•
highest valuP up to the time of t.he trial.
'Ve have examined many casrs upon the subjeet. A full review of the authorities UJ>OD
the question will be round In a note to tht•
sixth edition of Sedgwick on the Measure of
Damages (page 500). Upon the one hand
It ts held that In actions for thl' wronjl'ful conversion of stocks and of pprsonal property
ot tluctuatlng value the wea1mre of the dawagps Is the highest market price which the
property may have had from the date of thl•
c•onverslon to the end of the tl'ial, provld~I
the action be brought and pressed with proper diligence. Other authorities hold that th1•
value must be limited to the date of the 0('tual conwrslon of the property. It has be('11
held by this court that the measure of dnm ·
n~Ps tor the breal'h of an exPcntory contr1wt
for the purchase of goods wbieh are paid for
In advanee Is the hl1llwst market price up to
the time of the trial. Cannon v. l<'olsom. :!
Iowa, 101; Davenport v. Wells, 3 Iowa, 242.
But we need not pursue this Inquiry, nor
determine this question. \\·e think It 111 dP:tr
that. by the very terms of the bond, the plalutltr In this case was bound to account for the
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~t the time at which he W88 hound to deliver
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_-grain and for damages for its detention, as

of the time at which he was bound to deliver

it.

2. It is urged by counsel for appellant that

the court erred in deducting from the value

I -of the grain the cost of threshing and market-

ing; and it is said that where a wrong-doer

\expends labor upon the property of another,

\he is not entitled to compensation therefor.

But in this case it does not appear that the

plaintiff knew, when he commenced the ac-

tion and seized the grain, that it was the de-

\,tendant's property. He may have acted in

entire good faith, believing that he was the

owner. We believe the rule should be limit-

ed to wilful wrong-doers. Such eems to

have been the opinion of the court in Sila-

bury v. McCoon, 3 N. Y. 379. The cases

.
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where the question has arisen are mostly

those where it has been claimed that the right

of property may be lost by reason of the

change of identity. See 2 Kent. Comm. 363.

What is said in Stuart v. Phelps, 39 Iowa,

18, upon the subject, should. we think, be

considered as applicable to a wilful trespass.

In our opinion the expense of threshing and

marketing the grain was properly deducted

from the market price. Grain is ordinarily

held for sale on the market. In the stuck

it is of no value as an ar(icle of commerce;

and the plaintiff did no more than what the

defendant would have been required to do to

realize the money upon it.

For the error in assessing the value as of

the time when the grain was seized under

the writ, the judgment must be reversed.

2. It Is urged by counsel tor appellant that
the court rrred In ded1wtlng from the Yalue
-of the gmln the cost of thrPshlng and marketing; and It Is said that wbt-re a wrong-doer
\ t•xpende labor upon the property of another,
1 he le not entitled to compen!latlon therefor.
Rut In this case It does not appPar that the
pb1lntUl' knew, when be commenced the a1·I tlon and srlzed the grain, that lt was the de\ frmlant's property. He may have acted In
entire good faith, bellt>vlug that he was the
-0wner. We believe the rule should be llwltro to wilful wrong-doers. Such seems to
have been the opinion of the court In Sile.bury v. McCoon, 3 N. Y. 379. The CABeS
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where the question baa arisen arP. mostly
tho!<!' where It has been claimed that the right
of pro11e1·ty may be lost by relll!on of the
r hange of identity. See 2 Kent. Comm. 363.
What ls said In Stuart v. Phelps, 30 Iowa,
18, upon the subject, should. we think, be
considered as applicable to a wilful trespass.
In oar opinion the expense of threshing and
marketing the grain was P'"Operly dedurted
from the market price. Grain le ordinarily
held for sale on the marl:et. In the stac·k
It Is of no v11lu£> as an article of commer~;
and the plnlntltr did no more than what the
def1>ndant would have be<>n rec111lred to do to
realize the money upon U.
For the error In a11ses11lng the value as of'
the time when the grain was seized under
the writ, the Judgment must be reversed.
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JACKSONVILLE, T. & K. W. RY. CO. v. I by its agents.

PENINSULAR LAND. TRANSPORTA-

TION & MANUFACTURING CO.I

(9 South. 661, 27 Fin. 1.)

Supreme Court of Florida. April 25, 1891.

Appeal from circuit court, Orange county;

John D. Broome, Judge.

J. R. Parrott, Robt. W. Davis, Hammond

~& Jackson, and T. M. Day, Jr., for appei-

lant. Alex. St. Clair-Abrams and Beggs &

i'almer, for appellee.

RANEY, C. J. This is an appeal from a

judgment recovered against appellant by the

appeilee in April, 1890, for the sum of $52,-

909.03 and costs, in an action of trespass.

The amended declaration states that the

defendant, who is a corporation under the

laws of Florida, on April 9, v1888, owned,
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controlled, managed, and operated a railroad

from the town of Sanford, in Orange county,

to Tavares, in Lake county, in this state,

known as the “Sanford & Lake Eustis Divi-

sion of the Jacksonville, Tampa & Key

West Railway Company;" and that at the

same time. and at the time of the construc-'

tion of the said Sanford & Lake Eustis road.

the plaintiff. a body corporate under the

laws of this state, was the owner of certain

buildings in Tavares, to wit: The Peninsu-

lar Hotel, of the value of $40,000; a store

building on Tavares boulevard,‘ at the corner

of New Hampshire avenue, of the value of

$0,000; and another store building, on the

same boulevard, and near the same avenue,

of the value of $2,000;

valued at $1,500; one cottage, on East Ruby

street, valued at $600; another at the corner

of the same street and Joanna avenue, valued

at $500; two other cottages on the same ave-

nue, valued, respectively, at $500 and $400;

and one on Texas avenue, valued at $400;

and that the plaintiff was at the time stated

the owner of the following personal property,

viz.: The furniture and entire outﬁt of the

hotel, oi.‘ the value of $16,000; the counters,

shelves, cases, etc., in the ﬁrst-named store,

of the value of $1,000; chairs, tables, maps,

desks, life-preservers, and harness of the

value of $1,000; one outﬁt of printing ma-

terial, of the value of $1,200,—the buildings,

tenements, and personal property aggregat-

ing in value the sum of $72,100. That the

railroad was constructed along Tavares bou-

lcvard, within 150 feet of plaintiﬂ"s stores

and hotel, and within 1,000 feet of all the

other above-described property; and that de-

fendant, although well aware of the inﬂam-

mable nature of the material of which the

buildings, tenements, and personal property

were composed, and of their liability to take

lire, negligently and carelessly permitted its

locomotive engines, operated and controlled

I Portion of opinion omitted.

one livery stable, -

servants, and employee to

be run along the said boulevard without tak-

ing necessary and proper precaution to pre-

DA.MAGES FOR INJURIES TO PROPER'£Y.

JACKSONVILLE, T. & K. W. RY. CO. v. • by . its agents. servants, and employl!s to
PENINSULAR LAND, TRANSPORTA.be run along the said boulevard without tokTH>N & MANUFACTURING C0. 1
ing necessary and proper precaution to prevent sparks of ti.re escaping from the smoke(9 South. 661, 27 Flo. 1.)
stack of the locomoth·e engines, therE>by endangering the prorwrty of. the plalntllT to deli!upreme Court of Florida. April 25, 1891.
struction by ti.re; and that, on the morning
Appeal from circuit court, Orange county; ot the day aforesaid, the defendant's train of
John D. Broome, Judge.
cars, drawn by one of Its locomotive engines,
J . R. Parrott, Robt. W. Davia, Hammond and controlled, managed, and operated by
· & .Jackson, and T. M. Day, Jr., for appel- one .of Its employ~. agents, and servants,
hmt. Alex. St. Clalr·Abrnms and Begglil & started trom the said boulevard for Sanford,
the said locomotive not having a spark-arl'nlmer, for appellee.
rester therein, (lt there was any spark-arrester at all,) so arranged ns to prevent the esRA~EY, C. J.
This Is an appeal from a cape of sparks from the smoke-stack; and
judgment recovered agaln11t appellant by the the defendant having negligently, recklessly,
nppellee In April, 1890, for the sum of '!>2,- and carelessly omitted and tailed to exercise
909.03 and costs, In an action of trespass.
due care and precaution to prevent the escape
The amended declaration states ti.mt the of sparks of fire from the smoke-stack of
defendant, who Is a corporation under the said locomotive engine, and not t>.xerclslng
laws of Florida, on April 9, 1888, owned, due care and diligence In managing, controlcontrolled, managed, and operated a railroad ling, and operating the locomotive, It, the said
from the town of Sanford, In Orange county, locomotll"e, there being at the time of leaving
to Tavares, In Lake county, In this state, said boulevard, and before, a high wind
known as the "Sanford & Lake Eustis Divi- blowing, threw out from Its smoke-stack a
sion of the Jacksonville, Tampa & Key considerable number of sparks and biasing
West Railway Company;" and that at the fragments of wood, which then and there
same time, and at the time of the construe-· set ftre to a certain wooden sidewalk on said
tlon of the said Sanford & Lake Eustis road, . boulevard, and the ti.re was communicated
the plalnt!IT, a body corporate under the : to the n<ljncent bull<llngs, Including the plainlaws of this state, was the owner of certain tiff's said hulldlngs. tenements, and personal
buildings in Tavares, to wit: The Peninsu- , prorwrty, and plalntlfT's propertJes aforesaid
lar Hotel, of the Ynlue of '4(),000; a store ; were, nil and each of them, totally destroyed
building on Tan1rea boulevard; at the corner by said fire; the plalntur being without fault.
of Xew Hampshire avenue, of the value of and unable to arrest or prevent the spread
$G,OOO; and another store building, on the of the fire, which fire was caused by the
same boulevard, and near the same avenue, gross negligence of dPfendant In not exercisof the value of ,2,000; one llnrr stable, ing due cnre and p1·ecautlon In preventing
valnt>d at ,l,500.; one cottage, on East Huhy 1 the escape of the sparks from the locomotlv<';
street, valued at '600; another at the corner ' the plnlnt:Hf claiming -'75,000 damages.
of the same street and Joanna avenue, valued
•
•
at $500; two other cottages on the same aveVII. As to the measure of damngE's, the folnue, valued, respectively, at $500 and $400; lowlnic lnstru<>tlons, num l.lt'red here as ln the
and one on Texas avenue, valued at $400; record. were given to the jury:
and that the plalntllT was at the time stated
"(21) That the nwnsure of damnge In cases
the owuer of the following personal property, of this kind Is the value ot the property at
\'lz.: The furniture and E>ntlre outfit of the the time It was desh·oyed, wltl1 Interest at the
hotel, of the value of $16,000; the counters, rate of 8 per cent. per annum; that the jury
shelves, cases, etc., In the first-named !!tore, have the 1•lgbt to arrlYe at this value from
of the value of $1,000; chairs, tables, maps, the testlmou~· of the wltnessE>s, of the weight
desks, life-preservers, and harnesR ot the and credibility of which they are thr sole
nlue of $1,000; one outfit of printing ma- judges." (117th error assigned.)
terial, of the value of $1,200,-the buildings,
"(8) [General charge by the court:] It the
tenPments, and personal property nggregat- jury believe from the evlclencr that the tire
lnir In -rnlue the sum of $72,100. 'l'hat the which destroyed plnlntift"s pro11el."ty was causmllroall wa11 l'oniltructed along Tavares bou- ed, as laid down In the declaration, by the
levnrd, within mo fef't of l>lalnt!IT'!! stores negllgen<>e of the defendant as n proximate
11rnJ hotel, aml within 1,000 fe<•t of all the C'8use, and that no n<'gllgence of the plnlntltr
other ahove-dell<'rllw<I property; nnd thnt <le- cmwurred as <·ontrlbutlng to the result, the
tendnnt, although well aware of the lnft.am- plalntllT Is Pntltled to reeoYer from the demable nature ot the material of which the fendant the value of the property destroyed
bnlldingR, trnen1ents, nnd perRonal prop<>rty at the time and place of Its dei;tructlon, which
were composed, nncl of thE>lr liability to take value you must arrll"e at from the evldenre.
fire, nE>gllgently and l'nrelessly permitted Its with eight per cent. per annum lnte!'('st added
locomoth·e pnglnes, OPf'l'llted and controlled from the 9th of April, 18AA, to this tlow."
om~th error assigned.)
1 Portion of opinion omitted.
t:pon the same question the following In-

I

•

•

•

•

•
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structions were asked for by the defense, and

refused to be given by the court, numbered

here also, as in the record. to-wit:

“(28) The court instructs the jury that,

should they ﬁnd from the evidence that the

defendant is liable for the burning of plain-

tiff's property, in estimating the damages for

the property destroyed they must be govern-

ed by the market value of the property at the

time and place it was destroyed." (Its re-

fusal is assigned as the 128th error.)

W29) That it devolves upon the plaintiff to

prove by a preponderance of evidence, the

market value of the property destroyed." (Its

refusal is assigned as the 129th error.)

“(30) That, should the jury ﬁnd from the

evidence that defendant is liable for the

burning of plaintiffs property, in estimating

the damags resulting therefrom they are con-
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ﬂned to the market value of the property de-

stroyed at the time and place of its destruc-

tion, and they are not to be governed alone

by the cost of the property to the plaintiff;

bufthey may take into consideration the age

of the property destroyed, its deterioration

from use, its situation, the quality of its ma-

terials. and all other facts given in evidence

which bear on the market value of the proper-

ty at the time and place it was destroyed."

(Its refusal is assigned as the 130th error.)

The law as to what is the “measure of dam-

age" in the abstract, in cases where the prop-

crty of one has been destroyed, unintentional-

ly, but by the negligence or carelessness of

another, where there is no element of will-

fuiness or maliciousness in the destruction, is

well settled to be “just compensation in mon-

ey for the property destroyed;" such an

amount as will fully restore the loser to the

same property status that be occupied before

the destruction. To arrive at the amount of

such compensation. inquiry, in the absence

of malice, is necessarily conﬁned strictly to

the ascertainment of the value of the proper-

ties destroyed, with such incidents of inter-

est for the retention of such value from the

person entitled thereto as may be sanctioned

by law. The contention of the appellant in

urging as error the giving of the above-

quoted instructions by the court on this sub-

ject, and the refusal to give the above in-

structions by it asked for, is that the plain-

tiff, in establishing the value of his destroyed

properties should have been conﬁned to proof

of its market value at the time and place of

its destruction; and that the admission of evi-

dence as to the original cost of the properties,

and as to the depreciation thereof from its

original cost by usage or 0therwise, was er-

roneous; and that it was error to instruct

the jury that the plaintiff was entitled, as

matter of law, to interest. at the rate ﬁxed

by law, upon whatsoever amount of damages

they might ﬁnd the plaintiff to be entitled to.

Wherever there is a wcll-known or ﬁxed

market price for any pr.|[wrty. the value of

which is in controvcrs_v. it is proper. in os-

tablishing the value. to prove such market

~truc:rions

were asked tor hy the dl'fPnsP, and
refused to be given IJy the court, numbered
here also, as In the recoril. to-wit:
"(28) The court lnstl'Uct;; the jury that,
should they find from the evidence that the
defendant ls liable for the burning of plaintiff's property, In estimating the damages for
the property destroyed they must be governed by the market value of the property at the
time and place It was destroyed." (Its refusal Is assigned as the 1:!8th error.)
"(29) That It devolves upon the plaintiff to
prove by a preponderance of evidence, the
market value of the property destroyed." (Its
refusal Is assigned as the 129th error.)
"(30) That, should the jury find from the
evidence that defendant ls liable for the
bumlng of plalntitr's property, in estimating
the dawa,_. ti resulting therefrom they are confined to the market value of the property destroyed at the time and place of Its destruction, and they are not to be governed alone
by the cost of the property to the plnlutltr;
but-they may take Into consideration the age
of the property destroyed, Its deterioration
from use, Its situation, thf' quality of Its matt•rlal11. nn!l all other !acts given In evidence
whkh ht•ar on the market value of the property at the time and place It was destroyed."
(Its refusnl ls assigned as the 130th error.)
The law as to what Is the "measure ot damage" In the abstract, In cases where the propt>rty of one has been destroyed, unintentionally, but by the negligence or carelt•ssness of
another, where thf're Is no elem«>nt of willfulness or maliciousness in the destruction, Is
well Sl'ttled to be "just compcusatlon In money for the property destroyed:" su<>h an
amount ns will fully restore the lmwr to the
1<11me pro1w1'ty status that he oe<·npicrl hcfore
the destruction. To arrive at the nmmmt of
such eom1wnsntlo11. ln1;11lry, in tlw 111Jsl'nce
of malkP, Is nen•ssnrily confined strictly to
the mwertalnmeut or the value of the propl•rtles destroye<I, with such lucl<lents of lntPrest tor the retention of such value from the
person entltlt•d tlll'r('to as may be snul'tloned
by law. The contention of the appellant in
urging as rrror tlw giving of the a\Juve·quoted Instructions by the court on thh1 subject, and the refusal to gh·e th1· :i hum lust ructions by it asked for. Is that th<' plulutill', In estuhlishlng the value of his 1lestt·urell
properties shuuhl have been coufl11P1l to lH'oof
of Its market value at thl' tlrut> u111l plnee of
its tlPstructlon; nml thut the :11l111ls,..lou of evltlence as to the original cost of thf' prope1·ti1'S,
uu<l as to the dc111·et:i11tlou ther1·of from Its
oriidnnl cost by usage or otlll'rwlsP, wns erroneous; and that It Wllf< erro1· to Instruct
the jury thut the plalutllf was enti1l1•<l, ns
mutter of law, to iutl'rcst. nt the mt,. ftxNl
by law, upon whutsop,·er amount of d:111111;.:cs
they might tlml the pla 1111 iff to he PI1tit1P1l to.
Where\·er there Is a wl'!l-known or tixell
murket price for aur 111·.1p1•rtr. the value of
whl<·IJ Is In contron•r;;y. it is pr1·111f'r. In es·
tnlJli>;hiug the vahw. lo prove sucl.1 market
LA\\' D.DL2ll EJ.-27
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value; but, In ord1.•r to say of n thing tila 1 it
has a market vnlue, It ls necessary thut there
shall be 11 marlfot !or such commodity; that
Is, a d<>mnnd therefor,-an ability, from s11d1
tlrmand, to sell the same when a sale thert•11f
Is desired. ·where, therefore, there Is no dt>mand for a tblng,-no ablllty to sell the samt>,
-then It <'annot be said to have a market
value "at a time when, and at a place where."
there Is no market for the same. We think
It would have been a very harsh rule In a
case like this to have confined the plalntltr to
proof of the market value of the property at
the time and place of its destruction, In the
absence or proof that at the time and place
of such destruetlon there was a market fur
such property. In cnses where property Is of
a well-known kind In general use, having a
recognized standard value, It ls not proper to
cir~umscribe the proof of such value within
the limits of the market demand at the time
when, and at the place where, lt was destroyed.
Were the rule contt'uded for to prevail, then
the compensation tor personal properties, conf1•ss1'11ly worth thousands of dollars, woulll
be reth1<·P1l to a pittance In cents If dcstroyf'd
en route from market to market, In a thlnlysettled, barren country where. there was no
demand, simply because of the accident of
"time and place" or ltl! destruction. In actlous of this kind, where the value of the
properties destroyed Is the crltel"ion of the
11111ount ot dnmnge to be awarded, and the
property destroyed has no market value nt
the place of Its destruction, tlwn nil such p1•rtlnent facts and circumstances are ndmlsslble In evidence that tend to estalJlish Its real
and ordinary value at the tlm~ of its destrtl('·
tlon; such tacts us will furnish the jury, who
alone determine the amount, with su<:h perti·
neut data as wlll enable them re111mnably and
lntl>lligcntly to arrive at a fal1· valuation; and
to this end the orlglual market cost of thf'
property; the mnuuer In whkh It has beeu
used; Its g<'neral comlition aml quality; tlw
percentage of Its depreciation since Its purchase or f'rectlon, from ust', damage, age, cll'cny, or otherwlse,- are nil elements of proof
proper to \Je submitted to the jury to aid tlwrn
lu us<'<•rtalning Its value. And to establish
vulue tu such cases the oplulous of wltuesse:<
lll'<ttmint1•tl with the standard vulne of s1wh
prn1wrtles :u·e properly admlsslhh•. Rnlliv:i:i
,.. Lear, 23 Fla. 403, 2 South. 8-lfi : Rnllrmt'l
C'o. v. \Vinslow, 06 Ill. 219; 1 Thomp. 'l'rinl~,
§ 3SO; Rallroud Co. v. Irvin, 27 lll. 178; Whi11•
v. Hermann, 51 Ill. 243; Railroad Co. Y. Bm1nPll, 81 l'n. St. 4H; Vandine v. Rurpcc, 1:1
:\IPtc. 28~. Jmlge Cooley, In Insurance Co.
v. Horton, 28 .Mich. 175, In spcuklng of evidt•n1·e l>asl'll on a knowledge of !hi' purclrn"''
prlet' of 1n·o1wrty, says: "'J'he oh.lP<'tlon that
the tlanghter of the plnlntlft' wns allowerl to
t1•stll'y to the value of nrtld!'s hur11l'd, withonl
having heen shown to possess the pro111•r
kuowled~e to 111tallfy her to spf'u k ns nu t•xJ•Prt. wnfl uot well takf'n. Hhf' tPst ifiP<l th:ll
tihe hought a goou many of the arliclPs, allll
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was present when others were bought. On

this evidence she had some knowledge of

values which it was proper she should com-

municate to the jury. The extent of that

knowledge, and its suﬂlciency as a basis for

a verdict, were to be tested by her examina-

tion, and by the good sense and judgment of

the jurors." Coburn v. Goodall, "2 Cal. 498,

14 Pac. 190; Com. v. Sturtivant, 117 Mass.

122; Derby v. Gallup, 5 Minn. 119, (Gil. 85;)

The ‘Slavers, 2 Wall. 375; Johnston v. War-

den, 3 Watts, 104; Whipple v. Walpole, 10 N.

H. 130; Joy v. Hopkins, 5 Denio, 84. In Nor-

man v. Wells, 17 Wend. 136, the court says:

“The ordinary, and in general the only, legal

course is to lay such facts before the jury as

have a bearing on the question of damages,

and leave them to ﬁx the amount. They

are the only proper judges. They are impar-
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tial, and capable of entering into these ordi-

nary matters." In Clark v. Baird, 9 N. Y. 183,

Johnson, J., delivering the opinion, says:

“Upon this ground, as well as upon that of

superior convenience and the constant recep-

tion of such testimony upon trials without ob-

jection,—a tacit, but strong, proof of its pro-

priety,—it must be deemed established that,

upon a question of value, the opinion of a wit-

ness who has seen the thing in question, and

is acquainted with the value of similar things,

is not incompetent to be submitted to a jury."

Hamer v. Hathaway, 33 Cal. 117; Rogers v.

Insurance Co., 1 Story, 603; Blydenburgh v.

‘ Welsh, 1 Baldw. 331; Whitbeck v. Railroad

Co., 36 Barb. 644; Luse v. Jones, 39 N. J.

Law, 707; Brown v. Werner, 40 Md. 15; Al-

lison v. Chandler, 11 Mich. 542; Railroad Co.

v. Marley, 25 Neb. 138, 40 N. W. 948; Browne

v. Moore, 32 Mich. 254. We think the evi-

dence as to values admitted in this case were

fully conﬁned within the limits of the princi-

ples announced, and that there was no error

in the admission of such testimony, nor in the

giving of the instructions above quoted upon

the question of the measure of damages, nor

in the refusal to give the above-quoted in-

structions asked for by the appellant.

IOilOiI

The amount which it would have cost to

erect buildings of the same kind on the day

of the ﬁre, less a proper deduction for dete-

rioration, is not the proper measure of dam-

ages in a case of this kind. In Burke v.

Railroad Co., 7 Heisk. 451, where the plain-

tii‘f‘s dwelling and contents had been de-

stroyed by ﬁre communicated by sparks from

the railroad company's locomotive, the jury

were instructed that the measure of dam-

ages would be just what it would cost in

cash at the time and place of the burning to

replace the house and each article consumed

in it. This was held to be inaccurate, and

calculated to produce confusion in the esti-

mate of damages, and the better instruction

to be that the measure of damages would

he the value of the property destroyed at the

time and place of the destruction. In Rall-

1oad ('o, \~. “'inslow, 66 ill. 2l9, a case of

was present when others were bought. On
this evltlence she had some knowledge of
values which It was proper she should comwunlca te to the jury. The extent of that
knowledge, and its sufficiency as a basis for
a verdict, were to be tested by her exnm.l nation, aml by the good sense and judgment of
tht> jurors." Coburn v. Goodall, 72 Cal. 498,
14 Pae. 190; Com. v. StUl'tlvant, 117 Mass.
122; Derby v. Gallup, 5 Minn. 119, (Gil. 85;)
The Slavers, 2 Wall. 375; Johnston v. Warden, 3 Watts, 104; Whipple v. Walpole, 10 N.
H. 130; Joy v. Hopkins, 5 Denio, 84. In Norman v. Wells, 17 Wend. 136, the court says:
"The ordinary, and In general the only, legal
course Is to lay such facts before the jury as
have a bearing on the question of damages,
and leave them to fix the amount. They
are the only proper Judges. They are Impartial, and capable of entering Into these ordl·
uary matters." In Clark v. Baird, 9 :N. Y. 18.3,
Johnson, J., delivering the opinion, says:
"Upon this ground, as well as upon that of
superior convenience and the constant reception of such testimony upon trials without ob·
jectlon,-a tacit, but strong, proof of its proprlety,-lt must be deemed established that,
upon a question of value, the opinion of a witness who has lieen the thing In question, and
ls acquainted with the value of similar things,
Is not Incompetent to be submitted to a Jury."
Hamer v. Hathaway, 33 Cal. 117; Rogers v.
Insurance Co., 1 Story, 603; Blydenburgh v.
Welsh, 1 Baldw. 331; Whitbeck v. Railroad
· Co., 36 Barb. 644; Luse v. Jones, 39 N. J.
Law, 707; Brown v. Werner, 40 Md. 15; Alllson v. Olandler, 11 Mich. 542; Railroad Co.
v. Marley, 25 Neb. 138, 40 N. W. 948; Browne
v. Moore, 32 Mich. 254. We think the evidence as to values admitted Jn this case were
fully conftned within the limits of the principles announced, and that there was no error
In the admission of such testimony, nor ln the
giving of the Instructions above quoted upon
the question of the measure of damages, nor
In the refusal to give the above-quoted In·
atructlons asked fo1· by the appellant.

•

•

•

•

•

•

•

The amount which It would have cost to
erect buildings of the same kind on the do.y
of the fire, less a proper deduction for deterioration, Is not the proper mensure of damllg('S In a case of this klml.
In Burke v.
Rnilroad Co., 7 Heisk. 451, where the plaintiff's dwelling and contents bad been destroyed by fire communicated by sparks from
the rnllroatl company's locomotive, the jm·y
were Instructed that the measure of damagt>s would be just what It would cost ln
c-a~h nt the time and place of the burning to
r(•pln<'e the house and each article consumed
in It. '!'his was held to be Inaccurate, and
<'Hl<'nlat('d to produce confusion In the estimate of damages, and the better Instruction
to be that the measure of damages would
hi' the vnhw of the prope~· cl('!!tro~·ed at the
th111• :1111! pince of the ctestrnC"tion. In Railrnatl ('n. Y . "·111~low, G!i Ill. :HO, a case of

condemnation of private property for railroad purposes, the company havlng taken
the land and destroyed the buildings upon
It, It ls sald: "For all the property of appel·
lees taken by the corporation for their uses,
or damaged by It, just compensation must
be made to the owners. If a building
stands In the way of the road which It la
necessary to destroy, lta value must be paid
by the corporation, and the jury, In estimating tts value, will take Into consideration,
not the value of the materials composing
the bulh.ling, but the value of the building
as such."
The value of the property at the time and
place of the fire Is the question the Jury la
to pass upon. This the court charged, and
the plalntUr admitted. Market value Is what
a thing will sell tor. Railroad Co. v. Bunnell, 81 Pa. St. 414. To make a market,
however, there must be buying and selling.
Blydenburgh v. Welsh, 1 Baldw. 340. Property may have a value for which the owner
may recover If it be destroyed, al though it
have no market value. Railroad Co. v. Struiford, 12 Kan. 354, 380. "Suppose," asks the
court In the case just cited, "a rod of railway
track, or a shade tree, or a fresco painting
on the walls or celling of a bouse, or a bushel
of corn on the western plains, should be destroyed, could there be no recovery for these
articles simply because there might be no
actual market value for the same?" To
fix the market value of a thing, It seems to
us that there must be a selling of tilings of
the same kind. U there had ever been a
sale of an hotel, or of any other building,
in 'l'avarea, we are not Informed; and we
have no judicial knowledge, nor does the
record Inform us, that hotels have a market
value there._ Yet, though there Is no market
value or standard value, the plalntltr should
not be allowed more than the property destroyed by fire on the 9th of April, 1888,
was reasonably worth In Tavares. To do
this it Is proper to Invoke the aid of all facts
calculated to show Its value, and we are unable to perceive that the circuit judge erred
In admitting the evidence ot the cost of replacing the building on the day of the fire.
It was a fact tending to show, and to be
considered with others, by the jury in determining what amount of money would put
the plaintiff In the position In which he w:us
at the time. If there were any other facts
Incident to the condition of Ta vu res, considered in a busl~i!SS or other point of view,
calculated to affect the value of this or any
other property there, and which would qual·
lfy or outweigh the item of this cost of
restitution, and such facts do not appear in
the record, we are not responsible. It must
be assumed there were none other existing.
By saying the testimony was admissible we
do not say what weight should be given It.
nor do we come Into conflict with the Tennessee and Illinois c:1s<>s Inst mentioned. '.1.'he
evident m<'llnln~ of th""" casf's ls that the
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cost of restitution or of the materials is not

the measure of damages governing the jury,

and not that such facts can never be con-

sidered in arriving at the true value or meas-

ure of damages. If an article has no mar-

ket value, its value may be shown by proof

of such elements or facts affecting the ques-

tion as exist. Recourse may be had to the

items of cost, and its utility and use. 2

Suth. Dam. 378. In Luse v. Jones, 39 N. J.

Law, 707, the plaintiff was permitted to

show the cost of a bedstead as tending to

prove its value. This cost was the price at

which a regular dealer in such articles had

sold it when new in the ordinary course of

trade. "A sale so made," said the court,

“was evidence of the market,value of the

thing when new, and the value of such goods

when worn can scarcely be ascertained ex-
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cept by reference to the former price, and

the extent of the depreciation. Of course,

the cost alone would not be a just criterion

of the present value, but it would constitute

one element in such a criterion, and the at-

tention of the jury inthis case was clearly

directed to the importance which it deserved

to have." See, also, Sullivan v. Lear, 23

Fla. 463, 474, 2 South. 846. In Whipple v.

Walpole, 10 N. H. 130, it was held it was

admissible to prove what horses like those

lost or injured cost at a town near the place

where the loss occurred. Upon the same

principle, and for even stronger reasons, we

think that the cost of restitution at the time

of the destruction of the building was an

element which might be considered by the

jury with others in ascertaining value.

The suggestion of appellants brief that

what a building is used for, whether it was

a home or a business house, what income

was derivable from it, where it was located,

what its surroundings, enter into the consid-

eration of value, is, as to the hotel, met by

the evidence in this case, and, except as to

that of income, the same may be said of the

other buildings. Whether or not any of the

buildings were proﬁtable as investments at

the time of the ﬁre the defendant could, if

such evidence was admissible, have elicited

on cross-examination of plaintiffs witnesses,

or by independent testimony, asmight have

been proper under the circumstances; and

the same may be said also of the suggestion

as to the “prospects" of these properties, and

of the value of other property in the vicinity,

and of the land after the houses were burn-

ed. “What were the whole premises worth

in the market as they stood at the time of

the ﬁre," is, if we substitute the words “at

Tavares" for “in the market," the question

really submitted to the jury for decision.

The question of value in cases where, as

here, there is no market value, is one pe-

culiarly for the jury. Nothing has been per-

mitted to go to this jury which it was im-

proper for them to consider in coming to 8.

conclusion as to the value of the several

kinds of property involved. It cannot be

eoet ot restitution or ot the materials Is not
the mt•asure of damag<>s governing the jury,
and not that such tacts can never be con·
81dered In arriving at the true value or meuure of damages. It' an article has no market value, Its value may be shown by proof
()f such elements or tacts atrectlng the ques·
tlon as exJet. Recourse may be had to the
items of cost, and Its utility and use. 2
~uth. Dam. 378. In Luse v. Jones, 39 N. J.
Law, i07, the plalntltr was permitted to
show the cost ot a bedstead as tending to
prove Its value. This cost was the price at
which a regular denier In such articles had
solil It when new In the ordinary course of
trade. "A sale so made," said the court,
"was evidence of the market, value of the
thing when new, and the value of such goods
when worn can scarcely be ascertained ex·
<!ept by ref~rence to the former price, and
the extent of the depreciation. Of course,
the cost alone would not be a Just criterion
of the present value, but It would constitute
one element In such a criterion, and the attention of the Jury In· this case was clearly
directed to the Importance which It deserved
to have." Bee, also, Sullivan v. Lear, 23
Fla. 463, 474, 2 South. 8-16. In Whipple v.
Walpole, 10 N. H. 130, It was held It was
.admissible to prove what horses like those
lost or Injured cost at a town near the place
where the loss occurred. Upon the same
principle, and for even stronger reasons, we
think that the cost of restitution at the time
ot the destruction ot the building was an
element which might be considered by the
jury with others In ascertaining value.
The suggestion of appellant's brief that
what a building Is used tor, whether It was
a home or a business house, what Income
was derivable from It, where It was located,
what Its surroundings, enter Into the consideration of vafue, 11, as to the hotel, met by
the evidence In this case, and, except as to
that of Income, the same may be said of the
other buildings. Whether or not any of the
buildings were profitable as Investments at
the time ot the fire the defendant could, If
such evidence was admissible, have elicited
on cross-examination of plaintltr'e witnesses,
or by Independent testimony, as _might have
been proper under the circumstances; and
the same may be said nlso of the euggt•stlon
as to the "prospects"' of theRe proprrties, and
of the value of otlll'r prop1•rt~· In the vicinity,
and of the land after the housPs were burned. "What were the whole premises worth
in the market as they stood nt the time of
the fire," Is, If we substitute the words "at
Tavun•s" for "In the market," the question
really submitted to the jury for decision.
The question of value in cases where, as
here, there Is no market value, Is one peculiarly for the jury. Nothing has been per·
mltted to go to this jury which It was Improper for them to ronsltlPr In coming to a
<·onduslon as to the valuf' of tilt' several
kinds of property lnvoh·ed. It cannot be
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assumed that there were other persons who
would have testified to facts or clrcumstan·
ces other than those shown by the record,
ot a character to ln6uence the jurors to &
lower estimate ot the values, or have themselves placed a lees value on the property.
The jury has returned a verdict according
to Its judgment, and It le undeniable that
they have not given the _plaintltr the benetlt
of the several values Insisted upon by the
plalntltr's chief witness, but It le apparent
that, after considering all the facts and cir·
cumstancee and testimony, the jury has said
what they deemed the property to be wo1·th,
falling considerably below the aggregate of
that witness' opinion. There was. In our
judgment, euftlclent evidence to suetnln the
verdict, and we fall to find In the brief any
contention that the verdict should be reversed as being excessive. _It there were
such contention, we could not sustain It.
VIII. Upon the question of the allowance
of Interest as matter of right upon the
amount of damages found by the jury, from
the date of the destruction ot the property
In cases like this, where the damages sued
tor are unllquldated, the following authorities, with others that we have examined,
hold, In etrect, "that the jury may, at their
discretion, allow and Include Interest In their
verdict as damages, but not as interest eo
nomlne:" 2 Sedg. Mens. Dam. p. 190; authorities cited In note to Shelleck v. l<'rench,
6 Am. Dec. 100; Black v. Transportation Co.,
46 ·Barb. 40; Railroad Co. v. Sears. llll Ga.
499; Lincoln v. Claflin, 7 Wall. 13:l; Garrett
v. Railway Co., 36 Iowa, 121; Brady v. Wll·
co:xson, 44 Cal. 239. In all these authorities
no other reason is given for this rule than
that It has been so· held In other cases that
have gone before them, except that In a few
cases It ls put upon the ground that where
property Is wrongfully taken and withheld,
the defendant gets the benefit of Its use during the detention, and Is required to pay Interest as compensation for such use, when
In cases ot property wrongfully destroyed
the defendant derives no benefit therefrom.
The answer to this theory Is that, In cases
of this kind tor the negligent and wrongful
destruction of property, the Issue as to the
amount of the compensation does not depend
upon benefits that accrued therefrom to
the defendant, whose negligent act brought
about the destruction; but the Issue rests
wholly upon the question as to what ls the
sum of the d11mage to the party whose prnp·
erty has· been destroyed.
Neither do we
think this theory can properly be applied
even In cases of tre~pnss and trover. Inter·
est on the value of the property taken In those cases cannot correctly be said to be
allowed to the plalntltr "because the defendant derives benefit from the use of the
property," but Is nllowt>d to the plaintiff to
compensate him for his deprivation of Its
nse during the detention tlwreof. Suppose
In this case the furniture In this hotd, In-
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stead of being destroyed, had been wrongful-

ly taken by the defendant. and had been car-

ried away and disposed of at once by gift

to other parties, or had been destroyed by

ﬁre or otherwise after the taking, so that it

really derived no beneﬁt therefrom, in an

action for the recovery of its value interest

under the modern authorities would be re-

coverable as matter of legal right; but in

such case, would the subsequent gift or de-

struction thereof, and absence of beneﬁcial

use to the defendant, have any effect upon

the right to the recovery of interest? The

answerin the negative is self-evident,

In Ancrum v. Slone, 2 Speer, 594, in which

this question of interest is discussed at great-

er iength than in any case we have exam-

ined holding this view, Frost, J., says: “To

the argument, if interest may be allowed in
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the aggregate damages found by a verdict,

why may it not be allowed eo nomine?—the

reply is: The law does not inquire into the

particulars of a verdict for damages, and

in some cases interest furnishes a just and

convenient measure for the jury. But it is

a stated compensation for the use of money,

and, as it cannot be separated, even in idea,

from debt, seems not properly incident to un-

certain and contingent damages. The dis-

tinction is admitted to be one of form, de-

pending on the form and cause of action. It

is necessary and obligatory by law. to main-

tain the forms of action, with the distinctive

rules which govern them. If this argument

is not allowed to be decisive, there is no rea-

son why assumpsit should not be brought on

a sealed instrument, or one form of action

serve alike for all contracts as well as torts.

Besides, in actions sounding in damage, the

liability, amount, and time, necessary inci-

dents for the allowance of interest, are not

ascertained and determined until the verdict

is rendered. Interest being stated damages

on pecuniary liabilities, to ﬁnd a sum with

interest in an action sounding in damages is

to allow damages on damages, which is an

'ncongruity." The pith of the argument here

is that the distinction grows out of and de-

pends upon the “form" of action, and that it

is necessary to maintain the “forms of ac-

tion," with the distinctive rules which gov-

ern them. We cannot give our consent that

matters of substance founded upon right shall

be thus made subservient to the maintenance

of the mere forms of action; or that money

which rightfully belongs to a party shall be

,'.:iveit when called by the name “damages,"

and withheld if chanced to be called “inter-

est." In Parrott v. Ice Co., 46 N. Y. 361, the

,-ourt says: “In cases of trover, replevin,

and trespass, interest on the value of prop-

erty unlawfully taken or converted is allowed

by way of damages, for the purpose of com-

plete indemnity of the party injured, and it

is diﬂicult to see why, on the same principle,

Interest on the value of property lost or de-

stroyed by the wrongful or negligent act of

another may not be included in the damages."
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stead of being destroyed, had been wrongful- In the case of Ancrum v. Slone, supra, the
ly takim by the defendant. and had been car- court says: "It ls nec·essary to the allowried away and disposed of at once by gift ance and· estimate of Interest to ascertain the·
to other parties, or had been destroyed by sum due, and the time when payable." At
fire or otherwise after the taking, so that it what time does the llablllcy for the negligent
really derived no benefit therefrom, in an destruction of property attach to the wrongaction for the recovery of its value interest doer if It shall be found that all things concur
under the modern authorities would be re- to set such liability In motion? It has been
co,·ernble as matter of legal right; but in sometimes contended that such llablllty atsuch cnse, would the subsequent gift or de- taches only upon the 11.ndlng of the jury. We
i;tructlon the.reof, and absence of bene.llcial do not think so. The verdict of the jury simuse to the defendaut, have any effect upon ply declares the Jlablllcy and 11.xes th!>
the right to the recovery of Interest? The amount. The law attaches the llablllty at
answer ·in the negative Is self-evident.
the time of the destruction, if all the circumIn Ancrum v. Slone, 2 Speer, 594, In which stances attendant thereon concur in stamping
this question of interest ls discussed at great- the case with the legal elements of llablllty.
er length than in any case we have exam- As before seen, the measure of the loser's
ined holding this view, Frost, J., says: "To damage ls the value of his property destroyed
the argument, tr Interest may be allowed In at the time of Its destruction. \Vhy at the
the aggregate damages found by a verdict, ·time of destruction? Because It Is at that
why may it not be allowed eo nomlne ?-the time that the destroyer becomes liable for
reply Is: The law does not inquire into the such value. The loser, before and at the time
particulars of a verdict for damages, and of such destruction, was entitled to his propIn some cases interest furnishes a just and erty, and the benefl.cial use of It; and inconvenient measure for the jury. But It Is stantly, upon such destruction, becomes, una stated compensation for the use of money, der the law, entitled to its value in money at
and, ae it cannot be separated, even in Idea, the hands of the wrong-doer, and can sue lnfrom debt, seems not properly Incident to u11- stnntly for such value. Because, through the
certaln and contingent damages. The dis- law's delays, no opportunity Is atrorded to
tinction Is admitted to be one of form, de- have the amount of thllt value declared by a
pending on the form and cause of action. It jury for a year, perhaps several years, Is it
Is necessary and obligatory by law. to main- right that the loser shall, during all that time. ,
tain the forms of action, with the distinctive be kept out of both his property, Its use, and '
rules which govern them. If this argument Its value, without some remuneration for the
ls not allowed to be decisive, there Is no rea- retention by the wrong-doer of such Yalue?
son why assumpslt should not be brought on Upon every principle of right we cannot think
a sealed instrument, or one form of action so. The theory of the measure of liability
serve alike for all contracts ru1 well as torts. In such cases Is just compensation. \Ve canBesides, in actions sounding in damages, the not see either justice or completeness of the
llabllity, amount, and time, necessary lncl- compensation dispensed under a rule that declents for the allowance of interest, are not clares a party who wrongfully destroys anascertained and determined until the verdict other's property to be liable at the time of
ls rendered. Interest being stated damagee such destruction for the value• thereof, but
on pecuniary liabilities, to find a sum with that permits the wrong-doer to withhold such
Interest in an action sounding in damages Is value for years, without some compensation
~o allow damages on damages, whlch Is an
for such retention. We cannot appreciate th1•
I.incongruity." The pith of the argume.qt here force of the argument of the learned judgt~
Is that the distinction grows out of and de- In Ancrum v. Slone, supra, "that to allow Inpends upon the "form" of action, and that It terest in an action for damages would be to
Is necessary to maintnln the "forms of ac- allow damages on damages." It is true that \
tion," with the distinctive rules which gov- In a ce1·taln sense It ls au allowance of damt•rn them. We cannot give our consent that ages on damages, (Interest being a specie~
matters of substance founded upon right shall of damage,) but it is not on allowance of
ht• thus made subservient to the maintenance damage on damage, for the same cause or·
of the mere forms of action; or that money damage. In the one case the principal sum
which rightfully belongs to a party shall be -the value of the property destroyed-ls
f.!'IYl'll when cnllt>d by the name "damages," awarded as the damage for the wrongful dearnl withheld If chanced to be called "lnter- strnction; In the other, interest Is allowed as
1·,..t." In Parrott v. Ice Co., 46 N. Y. 361, the the domage for the wrongful detention of
.-.mrt says: "In cases of trover, replevln, such value. Ju Chapman v. Railway Co., 26
and tn•!<pasi;i, Interest on the value of prop. Wis. 304, Chief Justice Dixon says: "In tres-r
l'rty unlawfully taken 01· conYertcd ls allowe<l pass, trover, or replevln for the same prophy way of damages, for the purpose of com·
erty taken or converted by the defendants.
pll'te Indemnity of the party Injured, and It such would have been the legal rule of damis difficult to see why, on the same prineiple, ages; or, rather, the value, with Interest
Interest on the value of p1·ope1·ty lost or de· from the time ot the faking or conversion. .
stroyed by the wrongful or negllgf'nt act of Why sho11l1l not the 1mme rule prevail in till«
nnother may not h<> inl'lmled in the damages." action"/ We nre at o lo"" to assign any good
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mason for the distinction. if it can be said-

that it exists, or if it can he said to be in the

discretion of the jury to give interest by way

of damages in this case, whilst in the others

they must give it as a matter of strict legal

right. We say we can see no good reason

for the discrimination. The object of the

rule, or of any rule of damages in any of the

cases, is to give just and full compensation

for losses actually sustained. It is obvious,

regard being had to such compensation,

which constitutes the foundation of the rule,

that the giving of interest is as essential in

this case as in any of the others. It is im-

material to the party who has lost his prop-

erty, whether it has been taken and convert-

ed, hr negligently destroyed by the other.

His loss is the same in either case, and in

either case he should be entitled to the same
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compensation." This view of the law ac-

cords fully with ours. and seems to be sus-

tained also by the following authorities: 1

Suth. Dam. 174; Railroad Co. v. Marley, 25

Neb. 138, 40 N. W. 948; Mote v. Railroad Co.,

27 Iowa. 22; Sayre v. Hewes, 32 N. J. Eq.

652; Derby v. Gallup, 5 Minn. 119 (Gil. 85).

In the case of Milton v. Blackshear, 8 Fla.

161 (decided in 1859). relied upon to establish

a contrary view, the question under discus-

sion was not involved. The action in that

case was upon an account for lumber sold and

delivered; and there is nothing in the deci-

sion that conﬂicts with the views here ex-

pressed. Neither do we ﬁnd anything in our

statute that is inconsistent therewith. Our

statute (page 585, § 1, McClel. Dig.; chapter

1483, Laws 1866) provides as follows: "The

legal rate of interest to be charged on all

notes, money, or liability of whatsoever char-

acter, and upon all judgments, shall be eight

per centum per annum." In view of the

charges given, we must assume that they

were heeded by the jury, and that they in-

cluded interest in their verdict from the date

of the ﬁre to the day of their ﬁnding upon

the amount found by them to be the value of

the property destroyed, which value, by arith-

metical rules, we ﬁnd to be, in round num-

bers, forty-ﬁve thousand and some hundred

dollars. The remainder of the verdict of

$52,900.03 represents interest found by the

jury for the period of 2 years and 17 days

intervening between the ﬁre and the verdict.

The established measure of damage in such

cases being complete compensation. we feel

that it would be doing a positive wrong to

the plaintiff were we, because of these in-

structions on the question. to order either a

new trial, or a remittitur of this sum, to

which, upon every principle of right, the

plaintiff is justly entitled. The errors as-

signed for giving the above-quoted 21st and

8th instructions on the subject of interest

and measure of damage, and for the refusal

to give the above-quoted 28th. 29th, and 30th,

instructions asked for, cannot be sustained.

OO0OIIO

The member of the court whose name ap-

r.1msox.u~

tor the distinction, If It cnn be eald
that It exists, or If It can be said to be In the
discretion of the jury to J[IVe intPrl')!t by wny
of damagl's In this case, whilst In the other11
they must give It ae a matter of strict legal
right. We say we can see no good reason
for the discrimination. The object of the
J"\tle, or of any rule of damages In any of the
(.'&Ses, ls to give just and full compensation
for loRSes actually sustained. It Is obvious,
regard being bad tO such compensation,
which constitutes the foundation of the rule,
that the giving of Interest Is as essential In
this case as In any of the others. It Is Immaterial to the party who has lost his property, whether It has been taken and convert·ed, or negligently destroyed by the other.
His loss Is the same In either case, and In
either case he should be entitled to the same
<"ompensatlon." Thla view of the law aceords fully wlth ours, nnd seems to be sustained also by the following nuthorltlt>s: 1
~uth. Dam. 174; Railroad C'o. v. ~Iarley, 25
~eb. 138, 40 N. W. 948; l\Iote v. Hullroad Co.,
Zi Iowa. 22; Sayre v. Hi>wes, 32 N. J. Eq.
4l52; Derby v. Gallup, 5 :Minn. 119 (Gil. 85).
In the cnse of l\Illton v. Blackshear, 8 Fla.
161 (deelded In 1&..'l), rellC'd upon to establish
a contrary view, the question under dlscus~lon was not Involved.
The action In that
<>ase was upon an account for lumber sold and
delivered; and there Is nothing In the declRlon that conflicts with the views here expressed. Neither do wr find anything In our
statute that Is lnconslRtent thE>r1•wlth. Our
~tatute (page 585, I 1, McClel. Dig.; chapter
1483, Laws 1866) provides as follows: "The
1·1 :ison
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lt>gal rate of Interest to be charged on all
notes, money, or llablllty of whatsoever charact(•r, ~nd upon all judgments, shall be eight
per centum per annum." In view of the
charges given, we must assume that they
were heeded by the jury, and that they Included Interest In their verdict from the date
of the fl.re to the day of their finding upon
the amount found by them to be the value of
the property destroyed, which value, by arithmetical rules, we 11.nd to be, In round numbers, forty-11.ve thousand and some hundred
dollars. The remainder of the verdict of
$52,009.03 represents Interest found by the
jury for the period of 2 years and 17 days
Intervening between the fire and the verdlrt.
The established measure of damage In such
cases being comi>lete compensation, we feel
that It would be doing a positive wrong to
the plaintiff were we, becuuse of these Instructions on the question, to order either a
new trial, or a remlttltur of this sum, to
which, upon every principle of right, the
plaintiff Is justly entitled. The errors ussigned for giving the above-quoted 21st and
8th Instructions on the subjt>ct of Interest
and measure of damage, and for the refusal
to give the above-quoted 28th. 29th, and :10th,
Instructions asked for, cunnot be sustained.

•

•

•

•

•

•

•

The member of the court whose name np·
pears at the hE>ad of this opinion feels It Is
due to his associate, Mr. Justice TAYLOR, to
say that he prepa1·ed about the same numbe1·
of the subdivisions of this opinion aa were
prepared by: such member.
·
The judgment Is amrmed.

4:.'.2
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LINSLEY v. BUSHNELLJ

(15 Conn. 225.)

Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut.

1842.

A. left his cart, ﬁlled with wood, by the

side of the fence within the highway, before

his homestead, in the evening; and the next

morning, the cart was found in the travelled

path. about ﬁve rods distant from the place

where it was left. upset, lying on one side,

and the wood by it, constituting together a

dangerous obstruction in the road. By whom,

or by what agency, this was done, did not ap-

pear; but A., knowing the situation of his

property, and having a reasonable opportuni-

ty to remove it, suffered it to remain there

two or three days, when B., travelling along

the highway in the night, in a one-horse

wagon, drove accidentally upon the cart and
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wood, without previously discovering them,

by reason of which he was violently thrown

from his wagon, and severely and dangerous-

Supreme Court ot Errors of Connecticut. July,
1842.
A. left his cart, filled with wood, by the
side of the fence within the highway, before
his homestead, In the e\·enlng; and the next
morning, the cart WllS found in the travelled
path, about five rods dist.mt from the place
where It was left. upset, lying on one side,
and the wood by It, constituting together a
dangerous obstruction lo the road. By whom,
or by what sgency, this was done, did not aPpear; but A., knowing the situation of his
property, and having a reasonable opportunity to remove It, sulfered It to remain there
two or three days, when B., travelling along
the highway In the night, In a one-horse
wagon, drove accidentally upon the cart and
"l'l'ood, without previously discovering them,
by reason of which he was Tlolently thrown
from his wagon, and severely and dangerously Injured.
Baldwin & Kimberly, for the motion. R. I.
Ingersoll and C. A. Ingersoll, opposed.

ly injured.

Baldwin & Kimberly, for the motion. R. I.

Ingersoll and C. A. Ingersoll, opposed.

July,

CHURCH, J . 1. Questions of minor impor-

tance have been discussed upon this motion,

which it may be well to dispose of, before

considering the leading principle of the case.

First, it has been objected, that the testi-

mony of Collins was iniproperly admitted.

Collins testiﬁed, that, immediately after the

plaintiff received the injury. the defendant

said, “I did not mean to remove the cart and

wood, until somebody got injured, and then

make known who put them into the trav-

elled road." And afterwards, he said, “What

would you do? I am provoked every day. I

won't touch the wood, if half Branford runs

into it, and gets killed, &c." This testimony

was admissible, for several reasons. It con-

duced to prove, that the defendant knew the

situation of the cart and wood; that he rec-

ognized them as his own, and had not aban-

doned them, or resigned his claim to any tres-

passer; that he had a reasonable time to re-

move them, but purposely permitted them to

remain; and also, it furnished strong evi-

dence of the recklessness of the defendant;

and if it did not prove any special malice

towards this plaintiff. it might legitimately

affect the question of damages in the case.

'2Iall v. Steamboat Co.. 13 Conn. 319: Sears

.'. Lyons, 2 Starkle. 317; Treat v. Barber, 7

Conn. 274; Churchill v. Watson, 5 Day, 140;

Bracegirdle v. Orford, 2 \Iaule & S. 77; Mer-

est v. Harvey, 5 Taunt. -H2.

CHURCH, J. 1. Questions of minor Importance have been discussed upon this motion,
which it may be well to dispose of, before
considering the leading principle of the case.
First, It has been objected, that the testimony of Golllns was !~properly admitted.
C-Olllns testified, that, Immediately after the
plaintiff recek'ed the Injury, the defendant
said, "I did not mean to remo'\"e 'the cart and
wood, until somebody got Injured, and then
make known who put them Into the travelled rood." And afterwards, he said, "What
would you do? I am provoked every day. I
won't touch the wood, If half Branford runs
Into It, and gets killed, &c." 'l'hls testimony
was admissible, for several reasons. It conduced to prove, that the defendant knew the
situation of the cart and wood; thllt he recognized them as bis own, and had not abandoned them, or resigned bis claim to any trespasser; that he had a reasonable time to remove them, but p1Jrposely permitted them to
remain; and also, It furnished strong evidence of the recklessness or the defendant;
and If It did not prove any special malice
towards this plalntltr, It might legitimately
atl'ect the question of du mnges In the case.
·:Iau v. Steamboat Co., 13 Conn. 319: Sellrs
~. Lyons, 2 Starkie. 317; Treat v. Barber, 7
8onn. 2i4; Churchill v. Watson, 5 Day, 140;
Braceglrdle v. Orford, 2 )faule & S. 77: Merest v. Hnrvey, 5 Taunt. 442.
Secondly, It was ohjected that the facts
claimed by the plalntllf do not sustain either
count In his declaration. In the first count,
It Is alleged, thllt the defendant "wrongfully
and unjustly put and placed, and caused to
be put and placed, divers, to wit, ten logs of

Secondly, it was objected that the facts

claimed by the plaintiff do not sustain either

count in his declaration. In the ﬁrst count,

it is alleged, that the defendant “wrongfully

and unjustly put and placed, and caused to

be put and placed, divers, to wit, ten logs of

t- Dissenting opinion of White, J., omitted.

wood, and a large ox cart, in the said high-

way; and wrongfully and injuriously kept

and continued, and negligently and wrong-

1.

Dissl'nting opinion of Wnite, J., omitted.

wood, and a large ox cart, In the said highway; and wrongfully and Injuriously kept
and continued, and negligently and wrongfully permitted the same to remain therein,"
&c. In the second count, It Is alleged, that
the defendant, "wrongfully and Injuriously.
kept and continued, and then and there negligently, knowingly and wrongfully permitted
to be there kept and continued, and wrongfully and Injuriously left In and upon said
usually travelled patlt, &c., the said cart and
logs," &c. The allegations In both counts
substantially charge, not only that the defendant placed the cart and logs upon the
travelled road, but also, that he wrongfully
and negligently permitted them to remain
and be kept there. We are strongly lnellned
to the opinion, that, in the .absence of all
proof that these lncumbrances were placed
upon the public highway, by any other person, the facts claimed by the plalntUr, would
conduce, In some plausible degree, to prove.
that they were placed there, by the defendant ·himself. At any rate, they prove conclusively the other charges. that the defendant wrongfully and negligently permitted
them to remain and be kept there. Leslie v.
Pounds, 4 Taunt. 649.
Thirdly, au objection Is made to the charge
of the judge In relation to the principle which
might have Influence In the IUlsessment of
damages. And cases from llassachusett8
and New York, are relied upon In support of
this objection. Whatever may have been formerly, or may be now the practice of the
courts of other states upon this subject. we
are certain our own practice bas been uniformly and Immemorially such as the judge
recognized In his charge In this case. Xolumus leges mutare. We lut'\"e no disposition
to discard our own usages In this respect.
We believe them to be founded In the highest equity, and sanctioned by the clearest
principles. T_h e judge Informed the jury.
that In estimating the damages, they had o
right to take Into conslderstlon the nect.>sSllry
trouble and expenses of the plalntuf, In the
prosecution of this action.
In actions of this chsracter, there ls no rule
of damages fixed by law, aa In cases of contract, trover, &c. The object Is the satisfaction and remuneration for a personal Injury.
which Is not capable of an exact cash Yaluatlon. The clrcumstanees of aggravation or
mltigation,-the bodily paln,-tbe mental angulsll,-the Injury to the pla.lntltl''s buslnes...
and means of llvellhood, past or prospective;
all these and many other circumstances Dl1lY
be taken Into consideration, by the jury, In
guiding their discretion In asses!llng damages
for a wanton persoml Injury. But these are
not all that go to make up the amount o(
damage sustained. The hill of the surgeon.
and othet· pecuniary charges to which the
plalntltl' has been necesi;arlly subjected. b)·
the mlsconrluct of the dPfendant, are equallr
proper suhjects of c•o11,.:i\IPr11 tlou. And sh:1ll
a deft.>mlant, who has n•fu,.:pd redress fo1· an
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unprovoked and severe personal injury, and

thus driven the plaintiff to seek redress in

the courts of law, be permitted to say, that

the trouble and expense of the remedy was

unnecessary, and was not the necessary re-

sult of his own acts, connected with his re-

fusal to do justice?

There is no principle better established, and

no practice more universal, than that vin-

dictive damages, or smart money, may be,

and is. awarded, by the verdicts of juries, ,

in cases of wanton or malicious injuries. and

whether the form of the action be trespass ,

or case. We refer to the authorities before

cited, and also to Dennison v. Hyde, 6 Conn.

508; Wort v. Jenkins, 14 Johns. 352; Mer-

riils v. Manufacturing Co., 10 Conn. 384; Ed-

wards v. Beach, 3 Day, 447.

court have given damages to indemnify the
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party for the expense of establishing it."

The argument in opposition to the doctrine of

the charge, is substantially founded upon the

assumed principle, that the defendant can-

not be subjected in a greater sum in dam-

ages than the plaintiff has actually sustained.

But every case in which the recovery of vin-

dictive damages has been justiﬁed, stands

opposed to this argument. And we cannot

comprehend the force of the reasoning, which

will admit the right of a plaintiff to recover,

as vindictive damages, beyond the amount

of an act and injury equally wanton and

willfully committed or permitted, will deny

to him a right to recover an actual indemnity

for the expense to which the defendant's

misconduct has subjected him. In the cases

to which we have been referred, in other

states, as deciding a different principle, the

courts seem to have assumed, that the tax-

able costs of the plaintiff are his only legiti-

mate compensation for the expense incurred.

If taxable costs are presumed to be equiv-

alent to actual, necessary charges, as a mat-

ter of law; every client knows, as a matter

of fact, they are not. And legal ﬁctions

should never be permitted to work injustice.

This court has repudiated this notion. It

was formerly holden in England, and per-

haps is so considered now, that no action

would lie for the injury sustained by the

prosecution of a vexatious civil action, when

there has been no arrest or imprisonment;

because the costs recovered, compensated for ‘

that injury. But this court, in the case of

Whipple v, Fuller, 11 Conn. 582, hold a con-

trary doctrine, and say: “We cannot, at this

day, shut our eyes to the fact known by

every body, that taxable costs afford a very

partial and inadequate remuneration for the

necessary expenses of defending an unfound-

ed suit."

2. But the question intended by the parties

more particularly to be discussed and con-

sidered, arises from that part of the charge

In this last ,

case, Daggett, in argument for the defend- 1

ant, admits, that where an important right is 1

in question, in an action of trespass. “the '
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unprovoked and severe personal Injury, and of the judge which relates to the liability of
thus drlveJl tbe platntur to seek redre88 In the defendant for the Injury sustained by tlll;i
the courts of law, be permitted to say, that plalntltr.
the trouble and expense of tbe remedy was
Conceding that this obstruction wae not
unnecessary, and was not tbe neces!!ary re- placed In tbe public highway by the ngpm·~·
sult of b.l.s own acts, connected with bis re- ot the defendant; tbe question ls, whetht-1·
fusal to do justice?
upon the facts appearing on thle motion and
Tbere Is no principle better established, and found by the jury, the defendant Is llabll'
no practice more universal, than that vin- at all? It Is perhaps material, that It does
dictive damages, or smart money, may be, not appear how, nor by what agency, the c11n
and 18. awarded, by the verdicts ot juries, and wood of the defendant were removed
ID caaes ot wanton or malicious Injuries. and from the road-side, where be left tbem; nor
whether the form of tbe action be trespass by what Instrumentality they were placed
or case. We refer to tbe authorities before i upon the travelled part of the highway,
cited, and also to Dennison v. Hyde, 6 Conn. ' where they occasioned the Injury to the plaln508; Wort v. Jenkins, 14 Johns. 362; Mer- tltr; because much of the argument tor the
rills T. Manufacturing Co., 10 Conn. 384; Ed- defence has proceeded upon the tact, as If It
wards v. Beach, 3 Day, 447. In this last had been conceded, that some trespasser,
case, Daggett, In argument tor the defend- without the defendant's knowledge, had done
ut, admits, that wbere an Important right 18 the act. Let this be conceded, and still we
ID question, In an action of tre11pae11, ..the are not persuaded that It Is material, becourt have given damage8 to Indemnity the cause the question, after all, will recur,party for the expense of establlehlng tt." what was the defendant's legal duty, after
The argument In oppoeltlon to the doctrine of he had knowledge of the situation of bis
the charge, ls substantially founded upon the property, and after he had reasonable opporassumed principle, that tbe defendant can- tunity to remove It?
We do not think that any special property
not be subjected In a greater enm In damages tban tbe plalntl1r bas actually sustained. In the defendant's cart and wood, beca·me
But every case In which the recovery ot vln- vested In any trespasser, In any such sense as
dlctln damages has been justified, stands to exonerate this defendant from his obrtga·
opposed to this argnment. And we cannot tlon so to use his own property as that It
comprehend the force ot the reasoning, wblch should not Injure another. Indeed, we canwill admit the right of a plalntUr to recover, not comprehend the principle which bas been
as vindictive damages, beyond the amount urged upon us In argument, that any right
of Injury confeuedly Incurred, and In caee of property Is acquired, by a mere act of WllD·
ef an act and Injury equally wanton and ton trespass, unaccompanied by a continued
wlllfully committed or permitted, wW deny possession, and not followed by a judgment
to him a right to recover an actual Indemnity against the trespasser for Its value. This
for the expense to which the defendant'e property, for all legal purpoecs, was In the
misconduct has subjected him. In the cases posseRslon of the defendant; and he alone
to which we have been referred, In other could maintain an action for It, foundetl upon
states, as de~ldlng a dlft'erent principle, the a property right. Com. Dig. tit. "Blens;
<..'Ourts seem to have assumed, tbat the tax- E."; Ros. Ev. 398.
able costs of tbe plalntlft' are his only legitiNor would It make any dltrerence In the remate compeneatlon for the expense Incurred. sult, although the trespasser, by whom the
If taxable costs are presnmed to be equiv- property was unlawfully placed upon the
alent to actual, necessary charges, as a mat- travelled road, could be discovered, and alter of law; every client knows, as a matter though the plalntl1r could sustain an action
ot tact, they are not. And legal fictions against blm. The defendant's duties and ohshould never be permitted to work lnjusUce. ligations could not be varied, nor his responThis court has repudiated this notion. It sibilities discharged, by this clrcumstanct'.
was formerly holden In England, and per- An action will as well lie against him who
haps Is so considered now, that no action continues a nuisance, as against him who
would lie for the Injury sustained by the erected it And the cases are numerous, In
prosecution o( a vexatious civil action, when which a plalntlft' ls permitted to make hlR
there has been no arrest or Imprisonment; election to proceed against one of several
because the costs recovered, compensated for who may be liable. Of course, It cannot he
that Injury. But this court, In the cnse of material to the plalntltr's right of recovery,
Whipple v. Fuller, 11 Conn. 582, hold a con- nor can It modify or change the defendtrary doctrine, and say: "We cannot, at this ant's liability, whether these obstructions
day, shut our eyes to the tact known by were placed upon the highway, by the force
every body, that taxable costs atrord a very of the elements, or by buman agency. The
partial and Inadequate remuneration for the question will still recur, what was the denecessary expenses of defending an unfound- fendant's duty, after the situation of his proped f!lllt."
erty was made known to blm ?
2. But the question Intended by tbe parties
"Sic utere tuo ut alleuum non lnedas," Is
more particularly to lie discussed and con- a maxim expressive of an Important and salusidered, arises from thn t part of the charge tary principle, which we think appllc·:Lhlc

I
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to this case, and to the legal obligations of

this defendant. Nor is it less applicable, if

it be conceded, that the defendant has done

nothing more than knowingly and willingly

to permit his property so to remain as to en-

danger others. He thus made and selected

the public highway as its place of deposit,

and is equally responsible, as if he had placed

it there, by his own direct agency.

It has been very properly admitted, by the

defendant, in argument, that the owner of

beasts, who knows their dangerous propensi-

ties, is liable for the injurious consequences

of such propensities, unless he uses reason-

able efforts to restrain them. Thus, the own-

ers of horses and cattle accustomed to wan-

der, and of dogs accustomed to bite, are lia-

ble; and we perceive no essential distinction

between such cases and the present. Here,
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the defendant as well knew, that his prop-

crty, placed in the centre of the public trav-

elled road, would endanger the safety of trav-

ellers, as the owner of a ravenous dog knows,

that the animal let loose, will do the same

thing. There is nogood sense ‘in the distinc-

tion, which has been attempted to be made,

between animate and inanimate property, in

this respect. Nor can it make an essential

difference, whether the injury be occasioned

by the peculiar condition or situation of real

or personal estate. ‘If the owner of a weak

and tottering wall, permits it to overhang a

public street, without suﬂlcient shores; if the

owner of a gate permits it to stand open

across the side-walk, at night, even if thrown

open by a trespasser; if the owner of land,

upon which a nuisance has been erected, by

a stranger, permits it to remain; these are all

cases, in which it is admitted, there would

remain a legal responsibility upon such own-

ers. But it is said, it is by reason of their

possession of the premises. In the present

case, as we have seen, the possession of this

defendant was equally certain, and his con

trol over the property equally absolute. as in

the cases stated.

The burden of the defendant's claim has

been, that, as he did not place the property in

the public highway, he was under no legal

obligation to remove it. Let this position be

tested, by a few more cases, in addition to

those already stated. A stranger, without

the knowledge of the owner, unlooses a fu-

rious dog from his chain, or a tiger from his

cage;—are no efforts necessary, on the part

of the owner, to restrain them, after he is in-

formed of their situation? A wrong-doer un-

fastens the stage-horses in a public street; is

the owner justiﬁed in permitting them to re-

main loose, and thereby endanger the lives

of the passengers within, and the travellerl1

without?

This is not a case, where property has been

taken wrongfully from the owner, and placed

beyond his control; nor a case where he can

be considered as having abandoned it, and as

having no longer any possession of it. This

defendant at all times asserted his owner-

DA.MAGES FOR PEHSONAL INJURIES.

to this case, nnd to the legal obligations or
this defendant. Nor Is it less applicable, It
it be conceded, that the defendant bas done
nothing more than knowingly and willingly
to permit his property BO to remain as to endanger others. He thus made and selected
the public highway as Its pince ot dPpo11lt,
and Is equally responsible, as If he had pli1ced
It there, by his own direct agency.
It has been very pro1wrly adwltlt>d, by the
defendant, In argument, that the owner or
beasts, who knows their dangerous propensities, ls llable for the Injurious consequences
of such propensities, unless he uses reasonable efforts to restrain them. Thus, the owners or horses and cattle accustomed to wander, and of doge accustomed to bite, are liable; and we perceive no essential distinction
between such cases and the present. Here,
the defendant as well knew, that his propt•rty, placed in the centl'e of the public tl'avelled road, would endanger the safety of trnv{·llcrs, as the owner of a ravenous dog knows,
that the animal let loose, will do the snme
thing. There Is no· good sense ln the distinction, which has been attempted to be made,
hctween animate and Inanimate property, In
this respect. Nor can It make an essential
dltrerence, whether the Injury be occasioned
by the pe<>ullnr condition or situation of real
or personal estate. ·u the owner of a weak
and tottering wall, permits It to overhang a
1111hllc street, without suff\clent shores; It the
owner of a gate permits It to stand open
across the side-walk, at night, even If thrown
open by a trespasser; It the owner of land,
upon which a nuisance !ms bePn erected, by
a stranger, permits It to remain; these are all
cases, In which It Is admitted, there would
remain a legal responsibility upon such owners. But it ls said, It Is by reason of their
possession ot the premises. In the present
case, as we have seen, the possession of this

defendant was equally certain, and hill con
trol over the property equally absolute, as In
the eases stated.
The burden of the defendanfs e111lm has
been, that, as he did not place the property in
the public highway, he was unller no legal
obllgutlon to remoTe It. Let this position be
teHted, by a tew more cases, In addition to
those already stated. A stranger, without
the knowledge of the owner, unlooses a fu.
rlous dog trom his chain, or a tiger from big
cage;-are no efforts necessary, on the part
or the owner, to restrain them, after he Is Informed of their situation? A wrong-doer unfastens the stage-horses In a public street; ls
the owner justified In permitting them to remain loose, and thereby endanger the lives
of the passengers within, and the travelleni
without?
This Is not a case, where property hne been
taken wrongfully from the owner, and placed
beyond his control; nor a case where he can
be considered as having abandoned It, and as
having no longer any posSf'ssion ot It. This
defendant at all times asserted his ownership of the property; and arter the Injury
was sustained, removed It Into his enclosure
and reclaimed It to hie use. It ls therefore
essentially unlike the case of Rex v. Watts, 2
ERp. urn. In that case, the defendant's vessel was a complete wreck, and not worth raising. It wru1 considered 9.8 abandoned, by the
defenllnnt, and therefore, be was under no
obligation to remove It.
If the foregoing principles be correct, It follows, that the notice given by the defendant
to the select-men of Branford to remove the
obstruction, was lmmaterlaL
No new trial Is advised.
WILLIA.MS, 0. J'., and STORRS and HINMAN, JJ., concurred. WAITE, J'., dissented as to recovery ot counsel fees.
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and employed methods and teets that were
cruel, and such as the judgment of the med(36 Atl. 191, 177 Pa. St. 1.)
ical profearion doea not appron, and thereby
}'upreme Court of Pennsylvania. July 15, 1896. lllillcted Injury on the plalatttr, they are lla.ble
for their own treepus, whether committed
Appeal trom court of common pleas, MiftllD with malice Ot' throqb lporanee. But rudeDMS and lnclvlllty ID the manner In which the
-county.
Action by James M. Goodhart against the eumlnatlon was conducted, If rudeness or
Pennsylvania Rallro&d Company. There waa Incivility can be afllrmed of anything that was
.a judgment for plalntUr, and defendant ap- said or done In that connection, could throw
no light on the extent of the Injury actually
peals. Reversed.
sutrered by the plaintiff, and the evidence reRurus C. Elder and George W. Elder, for ap- ferred to In the ft1'8t and second R88lgnments
pellant. D. W. Woods & Son, for appellee.
of error should have been rejected.
The remaining sixteen assignments of error
WILLIAMS, ;J, The plaintiff fec.'('lved the relate, more or le81! directly, to the single
l.Djury complained of while a passenger on one question the case preeented, viz. the measure of
-0f the trains of the defendant C"ompany. The damages, and can be moet conveniently considtrain was being moved In two sections. The ered togethE'r. Damages tor a personal Injury
1ln1t section, on which the plalntUr W118 ridlni, coDSlat of three principal ltem11: First, the
had stopped to repair a break In one of Its air I expenses to whi«h the lnj1m•d per!lOn ls subpipes, and had sent Its ftagman bnck to warn , jected by l'ea.'IOD of the injury complained of;
approaching trains. The second section, hav- second, the lnconvl'nlence and sull'erlng nating been misled by the slglllll displayed by an nrally resulting from It; third, the loss of
operator at a signal tower, came along at full earning power, If any, and whether tempora•peed; and, Its E'nglneer failing to notice the ry or permanent, cousequent upon the chartlagman and bis etrorts to warn him of the po- acter ot the Injury. Owens v. nanway Co.,
sition of the drat section, the accident result- 155 Pa. St. 334, 26 Atl. 748. The expenses
ed, and the plaintltr wa.'I thrown from his seat, for which a plalntltr may recover must l>e
and Injured. At the trial but two questions such as have been actually paid, or such as,
were raised: First. Was the accident and In the judgmeni of the jury, are reasonably
the consequent Injury to the plalntllr due to necessary to be Incurred. The plalntl!T canthe negligence of the employ~ of the defend- not recover for the nursing and attendance of
ant? If so, then, second, what was the prop. the members ot his own household, unlPHf!
« measure of damages to be applied by the they are hired servants. The care of his wife
jury? It does not appear that any contest and minor children In ministering to bis needs
was made over the ftrst of these questions. Involves the performance of the ordinary ofThe only real ground for controversy was fices ot atrectlon, which Is their duty; but It
-0ver the measure of damages, and the evi- Involves no legal liability on his part, and
dence should haTe been confined to the Issues therefore atrords no basis tor a claim against
-0f fact that related to this controversy. The a defendant for expenses Incurred. A manl'
.evidence In regard to the examination made may hire bis own adult children to work for
b1 Dr. Morton was not directed to the extent him In the same manner and with same ef-0f the plalntur•s Injuries, but to the severH1 fect that he may hire other persons, but, In
of the examination. Its evident object was the absence of an express contract, the law
to pel'Buade the jury that the character of the will not presume one, so long as the famllJ
-examination and the conduct of Dr. Morton relation continues. Pain and su!Terlng are
and his assistants was unnecessarll1 harsh not capable of being exactly measured by an
and annoying, and was a proper subject to be equivalent In money, and we have repeatedl1
~nsldered In assessing the plalntltr's damsaid that they have no market price. The
ages. But It must be borne In mind that a question In any given case la not what It
<!!aim was being made against the railroad would cost to hire some one to undergo the
~mpany for damages baaed upon an alleged
measure ot pain alleged to have been sulrered
Injury received In consequence of the accident by the plaintltr, but what, under all the cirjllready referred to. In order to determine In- cumstances, should be allowed the plalnt!IT
telligently the extent of Its liability, it was Im- In addition to the other Items of damage to
portant for the defendant to know the nature which he Is tntltled, In consideration of sufo0f the Injury, and the extent to which the plaln- fering necessarily endured. Baker v. PenntUrwas affected bylt. This couldonlybeknown sylvania Co., 142 Pa. St. 503, 21 Atl. 9i0.
as the result of a medical examination made This should not be estimated by a sentimental
tiy competent and experienced physicians. or fanciful standard, but In a reasonable manDr. Morton and bis a88istants were selected ner, as It ls wholly additional to a pecuniary
as proper persons to make the examination, compensation a!Torded by the first and third
and advise the defendant company of their Items that enter Into the amount of the verestimate of the plalntlfr's condition, and Its dict ln such cases. By way of Illustration,
(!()DSeqUent liability. It, In the discharge of let us assume that a plalntl!T has been wholly
their professional duty to their employer, they disabled from labor for a period of 20 d.iys
went beyond what was reasonably necessary 1n consequent-e of an lnJucy resulting from lbe
GOODHART v. P&'\')\SYLVANIA R. CO.

DAMAGES FOR PEllSO.\'.~\L i.\'JUltlEb‘.

425

GOODHART v. PE.\.\'SYLVANIA R. CO.

(35 Atl. 191, 177 Pa. St. 1.)

July 15, 1&6.

Appeal from court of common pleas, Miiiiin

county.

Action by James M. Goodhart against the

Pennsylvania Railroad Company. There was

a judgment for plaintiff, and defendant ap-

peals. Reversed.

Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.

Rufus C. Elder and George W. Elder, for ap-

Err"! to in the ﬁrst and second assignmvms

pellant. D. W. Woods & Son, for appellee.

WILLIAMS, J. The plaintiff received the

injury complained of while a passenger on one I

of the trains of the defendant company. The

train was being moved in two sections. The

ﬁrst section, on which the plaintiff was riding,

had stopped to repair a break in one of its air
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pipes, and had sent its ﬂagman back to warn

approaching trains. The second section, hav-

ing been misled by the signal displayed by an

operator at a signal tower, came along at full 3

speed; and, its engineer failing to notice the

ﬂagman and his efforts to warn him of the po-

sition of the ﬁrst section, the accident result-

ed, and the plaintiff was thrown from his seat,

and injured. At the trial but two questions

were raised: First. Was the accident and

the co1isequent injury to the plaintiff due to

the negligence of the employes of the defend-

ant? If so, then, second, what was the prop-

er measure of damages to be applied by the

jury? It does not appear that any contest

was made over the ﬁrst of these questions.

The only real ground for controversy was

over the measure of damages, and the evi-

dence should have been conﬁned to the issues

of fact that related to this controversy. The

evidence in regard to the examination made

by Dr. Morton was not directed to the extent

of the plaintiffs injuries, but to the severity

of the examination. Its evident object was

to persuade the jury that the character of the

examination and the conduct of Dr. Morton

and his assistants was unnecessarily harsh

and annoying, and was a proper subject to be

considered in assessing the plaintiff's dam-

ages. But it must be borne in mind that a

claim was being made against the railroad

company for damages based upon an alleged

injury received in consequence of the accident

already referred to. In order to determine in-

teliigently the extent of its liability, it was im-

portant for the defendant to know the nature

of the injury,and the extent to which the plain-

tlf f was affected byit. This could onlybeknown

as the result of a medical examination made

by competent and experienced physicians.

Dr. Morton and his assitants were selected

as proper persons to make the examination,

and advise the defendant company of their

estimate of the plaintiff's condition, and its

consequent liability. If, in the discharge of

their professional duty to their employer, they

went beyond what was reasonably necessary

and employed methods and tests that were

cruel, and such as the judgment of the med-
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negligence of another. This lost time is ca-

pablc of exact compensation. It will require

so,much money as the injured man might

have reasonably earned in the same time by

the pursuit of his ordinary calling. But let

us further assume that these days of enforced

idleness have been days of severe bodily suf-

fering. The question then presented for the

consideration of the jury would be:

ﬁlled with pain, instead of being devoted to

labor? Some allowance has been held to be

proper; but, in answer to the question, “How

much?" the only reply yet made is that it

should be reasonable in amount. Pain can-

not be measured in money. It is a circum-

stance, however, that may be taken into the

account in ﬁxing the allowance that should i

' ty, as judged of by the expert witness, but the

be made to an injured party by way of dam
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ages. An instruction that leaves the jury in

regard it as an independent item ,of damages, ‘

to be compensated by a sum of money that

may be regarled as a pecuniary equivalent,

is not only inexact, but it is erroneous.

word “compensntion." in the phrase “com-

pensation for pain and suffermg," is not to be

understood as meanmg price or value, but as

describing an allowance looking towards ree-

ompense for or made because of the suffering

consequent upon the injury. in computing the

damages sustained by an injured person,

therefore, the calculation may include not on- ‘

ly loss of time and loss of earning power, but,

in a proper case, an allowance because of

suffering. The third item, the loss of earn-

ing power, is not always easy of calculation.

It involves an inquiry into the value of the

labor, physical or mtellectual, of the person

injured, before the accident happened to him,

and the ability of the same person to earn

money by labor, physical or intellectual, after

the injury was received. Proﬁts derived from

an investment or the management of a busi-

ness enterprise are not earnings. The deduc-

tion from such proﬁts of the legal rate of in-

terest on the money employed does not give .

to the balance of the proﬁts the character of

earnings. The word “earnings" means the

fruit or reward of labor; the price of services

performed. And. Law Dlct. 390. Proﬁts rep- .

resent the net gain made from an investment,

or from the prosecution of some business, aft-

er the payment of all expenses incurred. The

net gain depends largely on other circumstan-

ces than the earning capacity of the persons

managing the business. The size and loca-

tion of the town selected, the character of the ,

commodities dealt in, the degree of competi-

tion encountered. the measure of prosperity

enjoyed by the community, may make an en- 1

terprise a decided success, which under less

favorable circumstances. in the hands of the '

same persons, might turn out a failure. The

proﬁts of a business with which one is con-

nected cannot tlzcrefore be made use of as a

measure of his earning power. Such evidence

may tend to show the possession of business

qualities, but it does not ﬁx their value.

PEUSO~AL

negligence of another. This lost time ls eapa ble of exact compensation. It will require
ao much money as the lnjnred man might
have reasonably &arned in the same time by
the pursuit of his ordinary calling. Bat let
us further assume that these days Qf enforced
Idleness have been days ot severe bodily BUf.
ferlng. The question then presented for the
consideration of the jury would be: What ls
It reasonable to add to the value of the lokt
time In view of the fact that the days were
filled with pain, Instead of being devoted to
labor? Some allowance bas been held to be
proper; but, in answer to the question, "How
mud1 ?" the only reply yet made ls that It
should be reasor1able In amount. Pain cannot be measured ln money. It ls a clreumstnnce, however, that may be taken Into the
account In fixing the allowance that should
be made to an !njured party by wa,y of dam
ai:-ee. An Instruction that leaves the jury to
regard it as as.:' independent Item .of damages,
to be compensnted by a sum of money that
may be regarled u a pecuniary equivalent,
ls not only Inexact. but It Is erroneous. The
11•ord •·compen!lll tlon." In the phrase "compensation tor pnin and suffering," Is not to be
understood as rueaumg price or value, Lat L\
describing an 'lllowance looking towards recompense tor 01' madt- because of the suffering
consequent upon the Injury. In computing the
damages sustalnea by an Injured person,
therefore, the calculation may include not only loss of time and loss of earning power, but,
In a proper case, an allowance because of
sufl'erlng. The lhlrd Item, the loss of earn·
Ing power. Is not always easy of calculation.
It Involves an Inquiry into the value of the
labor, physical or intellectual, of the pert!Ol1
lnjured, beforE: the accident happened to him,
and the ability of the same penion to earn
money by labor, physical or Intellectual, after
the injury WH .received. Profits derived from
an Investment or the management ot a bUBlness enterprise are not earnings. The deductlon from such profits of the legal rate of Interest on the monfy employed does not 1lve
to the balance of the profits the character of
earnings. The word "earnings" means the
fruit or reward of labor; the price of service&
performed. And. Law Diet. 300. Profits represent the net gain made from an Investment,
or from the prosecution of some business, aft.
er the payment of all expenses Incurred. The
net gain depends largely on other circumstances than the earning capacity of the persons
managing the bu.~lness. The size and location or the town selected, the character of the
commodities dealt ln, the degree of competition encountered. the measure of prospel'lty
enjoyed by the community, n1ay make an en·
terprlse a decided success, which under less
tavornble circumstances, In the hands of the
same persons, mtght turn out a failure. The
profits of a business with which one Is conneC'ted cannot ttcrefore be made use of ae a
measure of his .,arning power. Such evidence
may tend to sh;iw the poBSesslon ot l.lutllnes11

INJURIES.

qualities, but It does not ftx their value. Its
admission for that purpose wn11 error. It was
also error to treat this subject of the value
of earning power as one to be settled by expert testimony. An expert In banking or merchandlzlng might form an opinion about what
a man posses11lng given business qualifications
ought to be able to earn, but this Is not the
question the jury ls to determine. They are
Interested only in knowing what he did a~
tually earn, or what his services were reasonably worth, prior to the time of his Injury.
In se1tling this question, they should consider
not only hls past earnings, or the fair value
of services such as be was able to render, but
his age, statE• 'lf h,.alth, bUl!lness habits, and
manner of living. M.cHugh v. Schloeser, 15!>
Pa. St. •SO, 28 Atl. 291. The basis on which
this calculation must rest Is not the poSBiblU·
ty, as judged of by the expert witness, but the
cold, commonplace facts as proved by those
who knew them. Jt doee not follow, as a
necessary conclusion, that the services of the
plaintiff were worth no more at tbe time ot
his Injury than the SSO per month be_ was
receh·lng from the _-ompany In whose service
he was; but the tact that be accepted service
at that price was an Important one, and was
pel"lluaslve, though not conclusive. evidence.
that the price was considered by himself a
fair one.
We think the twelfth a881gnment al~ points
out a substantial error. The plalntltr was
hurt on the 20th tlay of September, 1893..
In May, lSS.. he was appointed postmaster at
Lewistown, Pa.. at a salary which leaves blm
a net balance of $54-0 per year after the pay·
ment of all expt>n~ He la still holding the •
ofllce and in receipt of the salary. Notwlth·
standing this fact, the leamed judge said t<>
the jury: "It aeems to the court-and we do
not understand that It ls denied by the defendant-that, sln<:e the accident, he hall been
totally dlaabled and utterly unable to do anything." For 18 months before this lostructJou was given, th~ plalntlfl' had been receiving the salary attached to the omm of postmaster at Lewistown, and had been giving
IUfficlent attention to the duttes of tbe omce
to see that they were properly performed by
his clerka and deputies. In other words, he
had been earning $540 per ' year, and was still
earning it at the time tbe trial took place.
Another subject requires consideration. T~
verdict rendered by the jury gives the calculation upon which the enormowi eum awarded to the plalntlfl' was based. From this It
appears that the sum of $19,526.50 was given
as the cost ot an annuity of $1,700 per annum
for 19 years. This calculatlon assumes (1)
that the pllllntlfl''s earning power was nearly
twice as great as he had himself offered it
tor to the company whose president and manager he was. It usumes (2) that be had a
rea:wnal.lle expectation of Ute for 10 years.
being at the time of the trial about 5.'l years
old. It assumes (3) that his earning power.
liistead ot steadlli decreasing with lucn•asiuic
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would bold up at lta mu.lmum to the
veey end of lite. It ll.88UIDe&, In the fourth
place, that be Is entitled to re<.'Over, not only
the present worth of bis future earnings, as
the jUI')" bu estimated them, but a llUftlcleut
BUm to enable him to go out Into the market,
and purchase an annuity oow,equal to bis estimated earnings. The first, second, and thJrd
of these are aaaumptioDB of tact. The fourth
is an a88umptlon of. law, and la clearly wro~

~ears.
DAMAGBS FOR PERSO.\AL L\'.H'i{IES. 427

years, would hold up at its maximum to the | When future payments are to be anticipated

very end oi. hfe. It assumes, in the fourth

place, that he is entitled to recover, not only

the present worth of his future earnings, as

the jury has estimated them, but a sufﬁcient

sum to enable him to go out into the market,

and purchase an annuity now,equai to his esti-

mated earnings. The ﬁrst, second, and third

of these are assumptions of fact. The fourth

is an assumption of law, and is clearly wrong-

and capitalized in a verdict, the plaintiff is

entitled only to their present worth. This is

the exact equivalent of the anticipated sums.

From what has been now said, it follows

that substantially all of the assignments of

error are sustained. The judgment is revers-

ed, and a venire tacias de novo awarded.
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Sl‘ERi{ET'1‘, O. J., dissenti-

427

When tutu.re payments are to be anticipated
and capitalized In a verdict, the plaintiff Is
entitled only to their present worth. 'fble le
the exact equlv'llent of the anticipated BUme.
From what baa been now said, It follows
that sublltantlall.v all of the assignments of
error are BWJtalned. The judgment le revenr
ed, and a venlre facla8 de novo awarded.

BTlllRRETT, 0. J .. dla&ent9.
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(50

LARSON T. CHASE.
N. w. 238, 47 Minn. 007.)

LARSON v. CHASE.

(50 N. W. 238, 47 Minn. 307.)

Supreme Court of Minnesota. Nov. 10, 1891.

Appeal from district court, Hennepin coun-

ty; Hooker, Judge.

Action by Lena Larson against Charles A.

Chase for the unlawful mutilation and dis-

section of the body of plaintiffs husband.

Demurrer to complaint overruled. Defend-

ant appeals. Aﬂirmed.

Bradish & Dunn and Babcock & Garrigues,

Suprerne Court of Minnesota. Nov. 10, 1891.
Appeal from district court, Hennepin county; Hooker, Judge.
Action by Lena Larson against Charles A.
Chase for the unlawful mutilation and dissection of the body of plalntift''s husband.
Demurrer to romplalnt overruled. Defendnot nppeals. A.filrmed.
Brndlsb & Dunn and Babcock & Garrlgues,
for appellant. Arctander & Arctander, for
rl'spondent.

for appellant. Arctander & Arctander, for

respondent.

MITCHELL, J. This was an action for

damages for the unlawful mutilation and dis-

section of the body of plaintiff's deceased

husband. The complaint alleges that she was

the person charged with the burial of the

body, and entitled to the exclusive charge

and control of the same. The only damages
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alleged are mental suffering and nervous

shock. A demurrer to the complaint, as

not stating a cause of action, was overruled,

and the defendant appealed.

The contentions of defendant may be re-

solved into two propositions: First. That

the widow has no legal interest in or right

to the body of her deceased husband, so as

_to enable her to maintain an action for dam-

ages for its mutilation or disturbance; that,

if any one can maintain such an action, it is

the personal representative. Second. That a

dead body is not property, and that mental

anguish and injury to the feelings, independ-

ent of any actual tangible injury to person

or property, constitute no ground of action.

Time will not permit, and the occasion does

not require, us to enter into any extended

discussion of the history of the law, civil,

common, or ecclesiastical, of burial and the

disposition of the body after death. A quite

full and interesting discussion of the sub-

ject will be found in the report of the referee

(Hon. S. B. Ruggles) in Re Beekman Street,

4 Bradf. Sur. 503. See, also, Peirce v. Pro-

prietors, 10 R. I. 227. 19 Am. Law Rev. 251,

10 Alb. Law J. 71. Upon the questions who

has the right to the custody of a dead body

for the purpose of burial, and what remedies

such person has to protect that right, the

English common-law authorities are not very

helpful or particularly in point, for the rea-

son that from a very early date in that coun-

try the ecclesiastical courts assumed exclu-

sive jurisdiction of such matters. It is easy

to see, therefore, why the common law in its

early stages refused to recognize the idea of

property in a corpse, and treated it as be-

longing to no one unless it was the church.

The repudiation of the ecclesiastical law

and of ecclesiastical courts by the Ameri-

can colonies left the temporal courts the

sole protector of the dead and of the liv-

ing in their dead. Inclined to follow the

precedents of the English common law, these

courts were at ﬁrst slow to realize the

changed condition of things, and the conse- ,

quent necessity that they should take cogni-

zance of these matters and administer reme-

:.\HTCHELL, 1. This was an action for
tlnmages for the unlawful mutllntlon and dissection of the body of plaintiff's deceased
husband. The complaint alleges that she was
the person charged with the burial of the
body, and entitled to the exclusive charge
und control of the 11ame. The only damages
nl!Pged are mental suO'erlng and nervous
shock. A demurrer to the complalnt, ns
not stating a cause of action, wa.~ overruled,
and the defendant appealed.
The contentions of defendant m11y be resolved Into two propositions: J!'lrst. That
the widow has no legal Interest In or right
to the body of her deceased husband, so as
to ena hie her to maintain an action for damages for Its mutilation or disturbance; that,
If any one can maintain such an action, It Is
the personal representative. Second. That a
dead body Is not property, and that mental
anguish and Injury to the feellngs, Independent of any actual tangible Injury to person
or property, constitute no ground of action.
Time will not permit, and the occasion does
not require, us to enter Into any extended
dlseusston of the history of the law, clvll,
· common, or ecclesiastical, of burial and the
disposition of the body after death. A quite
full and Interesting discussion of the subject will be found In the report of the referee
(Hon. S. B. Ruggles) In Re Beekman Street,
4 Bradt. Sur. 503. See, also, Peirce v. Proprietors, 10 R. I. 227, 19 Am. Law Rev. 251,
10 Alb. Law J. 71. Upon the questions who
has the right to the custody of a dead body
for the purpose of burial, and what remedies
such person has to protect that right, the
English common-law authorities are not very
helpful or particularly In point, for the reason that from a very early date In that country the ecclesiastical courts assumed exclusive jurisdiction ot such matters. It Is easy
to see, therefore, why the common law In Its
early stages refused to recognize the Idea ot
property In a corpse, and treated. It as belonging to no one unless It was the church.
The repudiation of the eccleslastlcal law
and of eceleslnstlcal courts by the Amerlran colonies left the temporal courta the
sole protector of the dead and of the living In their dead. Incllned to follow the
11rec<'dents or the Eni:llsh common law, these
<'onrts were at first slow to realize the

I

changed condition of things, arid the con11equent necessity that they should t~ke cognlza.nce of these matters and admlnlster remedies as In other analogous ca.see. Thia baa
been accomplished by a process of gradual
development, and all courts now concur In
holding that the right to the possession of a
dead body for the purposes of decent burial
belongs to those most Intimately and closely
connected with the deceased by domestic ties,
and that this Is a right which the law will
recognize and protect. The general, If not un1versa!, doctrine ls that this rlght belongs to
the surviving husband or wife or to the next
of kin; and, wblle there are few direct authorities upon the subject, yet we think the
general tendency of the courts ls to hold that,
In the absence of any testamentary disposition, the right of the surviving wife (If living with her husband at the time of his
death) Is paramount to that of the next of
kin. This Is In accordance, not only with
common custom and genl'ral sentiment, but
also, as we think, with reason. The wife ls
certainly neare1· In point of relationship and
aft'.ectlon than any other person. She Is
the constant companion of her husband during life, bound to him by the closest ties of
love, and should have the paramount right
to render the last sac1-ed services to his remains after death. But this right Is In the
nature of a. sacred trust, In the performance
of which all are Interested who were all1ed
to the deceased by the ties of family. or
friendship, and, It she should neglect or misuse It, of course the courts would have the
power to regulate and control Its exercise.
We have no doubt, therefore, that the plalntlft' had the legal right to the custody of
the body of her husband for the purposes of
preservation, preparation, and burial, and
can maintain this action If maintainable at
all.
The doctrine that a corpse Is not property
seems to have bad Its origin In the dictum
ot Lord Coke, (3 Co. Inst. 203,) where, In
serting the authority of the church, he says:
"It Is to be observed that In every sepulchre that ha.th a monument two things are
to be considered, viz., the monument, and
the sepulture or burial of the dead. The
burial of the cadaver that ls caro data vermlbus [ftesh given to worms] Is nulllus In
bonis, and belongs to ecclesiastical cognizance; but as to the menument action ls given, as hath been said, at the common law, for
the defacing thereof." If the proposition that
a dead body ls not property rests on no better foundation than this etymology of the
word "cadaver," Its correctness would be
more than doubtful But while R portion of
this dictum, severed from Its context. has
been repeatedly quoted as authority for the
proposition, yet It wlll be observed that It Is
not asserted that no Individual can have any
legal Interest In a corpse, but merely that th<'
burial Is nu111us In bonls, which was leg11Jly
true nt common law at that time, as the

as-
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whole matter of sepulture and custody of the

body after burial was within the exclusive

cognizance of the church and the ecclesias-

tical courts. But whatever may have been

the rule in England under the ecclesiastical

law, and while it may be true still that a

dead body is not property in the common

commerical sense of that term, yet in this

country it is, so far as we know, universally

held that those who are entitled to the pos-

session and custody of it for purposes of de

cent burial have certain legal rights to and

in it which the law recognizes and will pro-

tect. Indeed, the mere fact that a person has

exclusive rights over a body for the purposes

of burial leads necessarily to the conclusion ‘

‘ fringement on a legal right, mental suffe1ing

that it is his property in the broadest and

most general sense of that term, viz.. some-
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thing over which the law accords him ex-

clusive control. But this whole subject is

only obscured and confused by discussing the ,

question whether a corpse is property in the

ordinary commercial sense, or whether it has

any value as an article of trafﬁc.

portant fact is that the custodian of it has

a legal right to its possession for the purposes

of preservation and burial, and that any in-

terference with that right by mutilating or

otherwise disturbing the body is an actionable

wrong. And we think it may be safely laid

down as a general rule that an injury to any

right recognized and protected by the com-

mon law will, if the direct and proximate

consequence of an actionable wrong, be a

subject for compensation.

It is also elementary that while the law

as a general rule only gives compensation for

actual injury, yet, whenever the breach of

a contract or the invasion of a legal right is

established, the law infers some damage;

‘and, if no evidence is given of any particular

amount of loss, it declares the right by

awarding nominal damages. Every injury

imports a damage. Hence the complaint stat-

ed a cause of action for at least nominal dam-

ages. We think it states more. There has

been a great deal of misconception and con-

fusion as to when, if ever, mental suffering,

as a distinct element of damage, is a subject

for compensation. This has frequently re-

sulted from courts giving a wrong reason for

a correct conclusion that in a given case no

recoverycould be had for mental suffering,

placing it on the ground that mental suffer-

ing, as a distinct element of damage, is nev-

er a proper subject of compensation, when

the correct ground was that the act complain-

ed of was not an infraction of any legal

right, and hence not an actionable wrong at

all, or else that the mental suffering was not

the direct and proximate effect of the wrong-

ful act. Counsel cites the leading case of

Lynch v. Knight, 9 H. L. Cas. 577-598. We

think he is laboring under the same miscon-

ception of the meaning of the language used

in that case into which courts have not infre-

The im- ‘
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whole matter ot sepulture and coatody ot the
body after burial was within the exclusive
cogn!Jlance ot the church and the eecleslas·
tlcal courts. But whatever may have been
the rule In EnKland under the ecclesiastical
law, and while it may be true still that a
deud l>ody ls not property In the common
commerleal Sl'nse ot that term, yet In this
country It Is, so tar as we know, universally
held that those who are entitled to the pos·
session and custody ot It tor purposes ot decent burlal have Ct'rtaln leJo!nl rights to and
In It which the law ~ognlzes amJ will protect. Indeed, the mere tact that a pel'>lon bas
exclusive rights over a body tor the pmposes
ot burial leads necessarily to the conclusion
that It Is his property In the broadest and
most general sense ot that term, vl.z., something over which the law accords him exclusive control. But this whole subject Is
only obscured and contused by discussing the
question whether a corpse Is property In the
ordinary commercial sense, or whether It bas
any value as an article ot traffic. Thi' Im·
i>ortant fact Is that the custodian ot It bas
a legal right to Its possession tor the purposes
of preservation and burial, and that any In·
te1·fe1·ence with that right by mutilating or
otherwise disturbing the body Is an actionable
wrong. And we think It may be sately laid
down as a general rule that an Injury to any
right recognized and protected by the com·
mon law wlll, It the direct and proximate
consequence ot an actionable wrong, be a
subject tor compensation.
It Is also elementary that while the law
as a general rule only gives compensation tor
actual Injury, yet, wh::-never the breRch ot
a contraet or the Invasion of a IPgnl right Is
establlshe<l, the law Infers som!' damage,
and, It no evidence ls given of any p1trtlcular
amount ot loss, It declares the right by
awarding nominal damages. E'\"ery Injury
Imports a damage. Hence the complaint stated a cause of action for at least nominal dam·
ages. We think It stateii1 more. There has
been a i:reat deal of misconception and con·
fusion as to when, It ever, mental suffering,
as a distinct element of damage. ls a subject
for compemmtlon. This hns trequently resulted from courts gl'\"lng a wrong reason for
a correct conclnslon that In a given case no
recovery. could he had for mental sulferlng,
placing It on the ground that mental surrer·
Ing, as a distinct element of damage, le nev·
er a proper subject of compensation, when
the correct ground was thut the act com)linln·
ed ot was not an Infraction of any i<'gal
right, anrl hence not an actlonahle wrong at
nil, or else tliat the mental suffering was not
the dln•l't und proxlmatP rlTect of the wrong.
ful net. Counsel cltPs the leading case ot
Lynch v. Knlght, 9 H. L. Cas. 577-598. We
think he Is laboring under the same mlsconeept lon ot the meaning of the language used
in that ease Into which courts have not lnfre·

quently fallen. Taking the language In counectlon wlth the question actually before the
court, that case Is not authority tor detendant's position. It ls unquestionably the law,
as claimed by appellant, that "for the law to
tarnish redress there must be an act which.
under the circumstances, ls wrongful; and It
must take eft'ect upon the person, the property, or some other legal Interest, ot the par·
ty complaJnlng. Neither one without the oth·
er Is su111.clent." This Is but another way ot
saying that no action for damages wlll lie
tor an act which, though wrongful, Infringed
no legal right ot the plalntltT, although It
may have caused him mental suffering. But,
where the wrongful act constitutes an In·
, frlngement on a legal right, mental suffering
may be recovered tor, It 1t Is the direct,
proximate, and natural result ot the wrong·
ful act. It was early settled that substnn·
tlal damages might be recovered In a class ot
torts where the only Injury su!fered Is men·
tal,-as tor example, an assault without phys·
!cal contact. So, too, In actions tor talse Imprisonment, where the plaintiff was not
touched by the detendant, substantial damages hove been recovered, though physlcnlly
the plalntlfl'. did not sutler any actual detrl·
ment In an action tor seduction substantlnl
damages are allowed for mental sufferlng1<,
although there be no proot ot actual pecu·
nlary damages other than the nominal dnm·
ages which the law presumes. The same Is
true In actions for breach ot promise .of mar·
rlage. Wherever the act complained of con·
stltutes a Ylolatlon ot some legal rlght of tbe
plnlntltr, whlrh always, In contemplation of
law, causes Injury, he Is entitled to recover
all damages which are the proximate and
natural consequence or thr. wrongful act.
That mental sufl'Prlng and Injury to the feel·
lngs would be ordinarily the natural and
proximate result ot knowledge that the re·
mains ot a deceased husband had been nm·
tllated ls too plaJn to admit of argument.
In Meagher v. Driscoll, 09 Mass. 281, wlwrr.
the defendant entered upon plaintlfl"s land,
and dug up and removed the dead body of
his child, It was held that plaintiff might recover compensation for t.he mental angulRh
r.ansed thereby. It Is true that In Umt c·11s<'
the court takes occasion to repeat the ohl
saying that a dead body Is not property, and
makes the gist ot the action the trespass llll·
on plalntltr's lnn<l; but It would be n reproach to the law It a plaintllT's right to rPcover f01• mental anguish resulting from the
mutilation or other disturbance of tht' remaJns ot his dead shoul<l be made to dl'llt'IHI
upon whether In committing the act the <lt>fendnnt nlso committed a technical trl's)m~~
upon plnintllT's premises, while e'\"erybocl~··s
common sense would tell him thnt thP rPal
and substantial wrong was not the tres)lass
on the land. but the Indignity to the deud.
Order affirmed.
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SLOANE et al. v. SOUTHERN CAL. RY.
00. (L. A. 48..)t

SLOANE et al. v. SOUTHERN CAL. RY.

CO. (L. A. 48.)I

(44 Pac. 320, 111 Cal. 668.)

Supreme Court of California. March 23, 1896.

Department 1. Appeal from superior court,

Riverside county.

Action by Annie L. Sloane and another

against the Southern California Railway.

Company. From a judgment for plaintiff,

and from an order denying a new trial, de-

fendant appeals. On condition that plaintiff

remit a part of the amount recovered, the

order and judgment are aﬂlrmed.

W. J. I-Iunsaker, for appellant. Sweet,

Sloane & Kirby and Works & Works, 10!‘ t1* 1 tering into such contract. Jones v. The Cor-

(44 Pac. 320, 111 Cal. 668.)
~upreme Court of Calitornla.
March 23, 1896.
Department 1. Appeal from superior court,
Rlw•rside county.
Action by Annie L. Sloane and another
against the Southern California Railway
Company. From n judgment for plaintiff,
and from an order denying a new trial, defendant appeals. On condition that plalntltr
remit n part of the amount recovered, the
order and judgment are aftlrmed.
W. J. Hunsaker, for appellant. Sweet,
81oane & Kirby and Works & Works, tor respondents.

‘‘ tez, 17 Cal. 487; Head v. Railroad Co., 79

spondents.

HARRISON, J. The plaintlf f Annie L.

Sloane purchased a ticket, April 8, 1894, from

the agent of the defendant, at North Pomona,
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for passage from that place to San Diego,

and on the same day took passage upon the

regular passenger train of the defendant.

Before reaching San Bernardino the conduct-

or of the train took up her ticket, without

giving her any check or other evidence of her

right to be carried to San Diego, and on ar-

rlving at San Bernardino she was required

to change cars, and enter another train of

cars of the defendant. After entering this

train of cars the conductor in charge thereof

demanded of her her ticket, and upon her

stating to him that she had given it to the

conductorof the other train, and the circum-

stances therewith, she was informed by him

that she must either pay her fare or leave

the train. She had no money with her, and

when the train reached East Riverside she

left the car. After getting oﬂ the train, she

started to walk back as far as Colton upon

the rail1oad track, a distance of about three

miles, but, after walking a portion of the

way. secured a seat in-a passing vehicle, and

was carried to Colton, where she spent the

night with her sister-in-law. On the next

day. having borrowed some money with

which to purchase another ticket, she re-

sumed her passage, and was carried to San

Diego. The present action was brought to

recover damages sustained by reason of the

wrongful acts of the defendant's agents. The

cause was tried by a jury, and a verdict ren-

dered in favor of the plaintiffs for the sum

of $1.400. From the judgment entered there-

on, and an order denying a new trial, the

defendant has appealed.

it is contended by the appellant that, as the

plaintiff lei.t the car at East Riverside in ac-

cordance with the previous directions of the

HARRISON, J. The plaintiff Annie L.
Sloane purchased a ticket, April 8, 1894, from
the agent of the defendant, at North Pomona,
for passage from that place to San Diego,
and on the same day took passage UPon the
regular passenger train of the defendant.
Before reaching San Bernardino the conductor ''f the train took up her ticket, without
giving her any check or other evidence of her
right to be carried to San Diego, and on arriving at San Bernardino she was required
to change cars, and enter another train of
cars of the defendant. After entering thia
train of cars the conductor In charge thereof
demanded of her her ticket, and UPon her
stating to him tl'At she had given it to the
conductor·of the other train, and ·the circumstances therewith, ahe was Informed by blm
that she must either pay her fare or leave
the train. She had no money with her, and
when the train reached East Riverside she
left the car. After getting off the train, she
started to walk back as far as Colton UPon
the railroad track, a distance of about three
miles, but, after walking a Portion of the
way, secured a seat In -a pnsslng vehicle, and
was carried to Colton, where she spent the
night with ber sister-In-law. On the next
day. having borrowed some money with
which to purchase another ticket, she resumed her pasgage, nnd was carried to San
Die>~o. 'fhe prc11ent action wn.s brought to
rl•co,·er damages sustained by reason of the
wrongful acts or the defendant's agents. The
cnu!;c was tried by a jury, and a verdict rendered In favor of the plaintiffs for tbe sum
or U.-llJU. I<'rom the judgment entered thereon, aud an order denying a new trial, the
dcfendnnt bas appealed.
It is contended by the appellant that, as the
plai11t1lf left the car at East Hlvcrsi<le In accordnuee with the previous dire>ctlone cf the
conductor, and no personal violem·e was used
or di~1,Jayed towards her, her only right of
action Is for a breach of the defendant's contract to carry her to San Diego, nud that the
t>Xtl'nt of her recovery therefor Is the price

conductor, and no personal violence was used

or displayed towards her, her only right of

action is for a breach of the defendant's con-

tract to carry her to San Diego, and that the

extent of her recovery therefor is the price

t Rehearing denied.

paid for the second ticket, and a reasonable

compensation for the loss of time sustained

by her. The plaintiffs right of action against

the defendant is not, however, limited to the

t

Rehearing dl'uied.

paid for the lleCODd ticket, and a reeeonable
compenatton for the loa of ttme BUStalned
by her. The plalntttr"s right of action against
the defendant le not, howeTer, llmlted to the
breach of Its contraet to C?al'J'1 her to San
Diaco, but Includes full redre88 for the
wrongs sustained by her by reason of the
defendant's violation of the obligations which
, It assumed In entering Into such contract.
I If she was wrongfully preTented by the dei fendant from completing the passage to San
j Diego for which It had contracted with her.
! she could either bring an action simply for
the breach of this contract, or she could sue
It In tort, for Its violation of the duty, as a
common carrier, which It assumed UPon enterlng Into &U<'h contract. Jones v. The Cor1 tez, 17 f'..al. 487;
Head v. llallroad Co., 79
Ga. 358, 7 S. E. 217; Carsten v. Railroad Co..
44 Minn. 454, 47 N. W. 49. 'fhe complaint 111
the present case Is not merely for the breach
of the contract, nor 111 It merely for the wron~
committed In excluding her from the car, but
It Is to recoTer the damages sustained by her
by reason of the wrongful acts of the defendant committed in the violation of Its contract. It Is In the nature of an action on
the case, arising out of the conduct of the
defendant lo ""1'0ngtully depriving her of her
ticket, and thereafter, by reason of such
wrongful act, excluding her from Its car, and
refusing to carry out ·Its contract. Althougb
her action ls for tht tort re8Ultlng from thl•
defendant's conduct, the wrong whlcb produced that result wu twofold,-deprlvlng
her of the evidence of lta contract to carry
her to San Diego, and atterwams excluding
her from lt11 car for failure to produce the
evidence of which It had wrongfully deprived
her. For the purpose of giving her this right
of actlon, It le Immaterial that these different acts were by different agents of the defendant. If the conductor who took up the
ticket had himself, at a subsequent point In
the trip, excluded her for failure to exhibit
It, the liability of the defendant would not
be questioned. Its liability Is the S11me, notwithstanding, for Its own convenience, It has
lntrusted the manag.,ment of lta train to different conductors. Muckle v. Railroad Co.,
79 Hun, 32, 29 N. Y. Bupp. 732. The plalntift'
was not called upon to quPstlon the right
of the fi'-st conductor In takln~ up her ticket,
and It was the duty of the defendant to see
that she was not thereby deprived of her
right to a pa888ge upon Its cars.
In her testimony rPgardlng her exclusion
from the cars, the plaintiff recounted the lnten·iew between he1· and the conductor, and
the manner In which she was directed to
leave the car, and It was claimed at the trial
that she bad beeu thereby subjected to bumlllntlon and Indignity, for which she was
entitled to redress. Counsel for the appellant does not question, as a proposition of
law, that, It the conductor was insulting and
vloll'nt In removing her, such treatment forms
an elemeDt of dawaie to be re<.-overed by

I
1
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her; but he maintains that the evidence fails

to show such conduct. The evidence was,

however, before the jury, and they were

properly instructed in reference thereto; and,

although it might be urged upon them that

this evidence was insutiiclent to establish

such conduct, we cannot say, as a matter of

law, that it was not proper to submit the

question to their judgment.

Evidence was given at the trial tending to

show that Mrs. Sloane had been previously

subject to insomnia. and also to nervous

shocks and paroxysms. and that, owing to her

physical condition, she was subject to a recur-

rence of these shocks or nervous disorder if

placed under any great mental excitement;

and that, by reason of the excitement caused

by her exclusion from the car, there had been -

a recurrence of insomnia and of these parox-
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ysms. The court instructed the jury that, if

they found for the plaintiffs, “in assessing

damages, if it appears from the evidence that

the plaintiff Annie L. Sloane was wrongfully

deprived of her right Yo ride on defendant‘s

cars, and expelled therefrom in a manner and

under circumstances calculated to inﬂict, and

which did inﬂict, feelings of indignity and in-

sult, the jury is authorized to consider, under

the evidence, the injured feelings of the plain-

tiff, the indignity endured, her mental suffer-

ing, the humiliation and wounded pride which

one in her condition of life and standing in

the community would experience, together

with any bodily harm or suffering occasioned,

and to award such an amount for damages as

will compensate her for such humiliation, suf-

fering, and other detriment." The jury were

not specially instructed with reference to any

damages that might have been sustained by

reason of the recurrence of this disturbance of

the nervous system, but it is reasonable to

suppose that the above evidence was offered

by the plaintiffs for the purpose of recovering

damages for the injury that might be thus es-

tablished, and that, under that portion of the

above instruction in which the jury were au-

thorized in assessing damages to consider

"any bodily harm or suffering occasioned" by

the expulsion of Mrs. Sloane from the cars, it

was intended that they should consider this

evidence, and the injury which it established.

The defendant objected to the introduction of

the evidence, and excepted to the instruction,

and insists that under no circumstances could

the jury consider this effect upon the plaintiff

as an element of damage for which the defend-

ant is liabie; that the court should not have

directed the jury to consider any mental suf-

fering experienced by her. '

Counsel for the appellant has discussed, in

his brief, the want of liability on the part of

the defendant for any damages for mental suf-

- fering, and has cited many authorities in sup-

port of the proposition that mere mental anx-

iety, unaccompanied with bodily injury or ap-

prchended peril, does not afford a right of ac-

tion.

her; bat he malntalm tbat the mdence falls

to show such conduct. The eTidence wu,
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To the extent that the term “mental ‘

howeTer, before the Joey, and they were
properly Instructed In reference thereto; and,
although It might be urged upon them that
this evidence was IDSU1flclent to establish
web conduet, we cannot say, a11 a matter ot
law, that It was not proper to submit the
question to their Judgment.
Evidence was S'iven at the trial tending to
show that lln. Sloane had been previously
subject to Insomnia, and also to nervous
shocks and paroxysnu1, and that, owing to her
physical condition, she was subject to a recurrence ot these shocks or nervous disorder If
plaeed under any great mental excitement;
and that, by reason ot the excitement caused
by her exclusion trom the car, there bad been
a recurrence ot Insomnia and ot these paroxysms. The court Instructed the jury that, It
they found for the plalntltrs. "In assessing
damages, lt It appean from the evidence that
the plalntUr Annie L. Sloane was wrongfully
deprived of her right '6 ride on defendant's
cars, and expelled therefrom ln a manner and
under circumstances calculated to Inflict, and
which did Inflict, feelings or Indignity and ln11ult, the jury 111 authorized to consider, under
the evidence, the Injured teellngs of the plalntUr, the lndlgnlty endured, her mental sutrerlng, the humlllatloo and wounded pride which
oae In her condition of life and standing In
the community would experience, together
with any bodily harm or sutrering occasioned,
and to award such an amount for damages aa
wUI rompeoaate her tor such humlllatlon, suffering, and other detriment." The jury were
not specially Instructed with reference to an1
damages that might have been sustained b7
reason of the recurrence of this disturbance of
the nenous 11ystem, but It Is reasonable to
1uppose that the above evidence was offered
by the plalntltrs tor the purpose ot recovering
damages for the Injury that might be thus eatabllshed, and that, under that portion of the
above ll\8tructlon In which the jury were authorized In aSBeBBlng damages to consider
"any bodily harm or eutrerlng occasioned" by
the expulsion of Mrs. Sloane trom the care, It
was Intended that they should consider this
evidence, and tfle Injury which It established.
The defendant objected to the lutroductlon of
the evidence, and excepted to the lnstructl<>n,
and Insists that under no circumstances could
the jury consider thls etrect upon the plniutit'f
as an element ot damage tor whieh the defendant ls liable; that the court should not have
directed the jury to consider any mental suffering experienced by her.
Counsel for the appellant has discussed, In
bls brief, the want of JialJility on the part vf
the defendant tor nny damages for wental suf. fering, and has cited many auth<>ritles ln support of the proposition that mere mental anxiety, unaccompanied with bodily injury or apprehended peril, does not nl'ford a right ot action. To the extent tllat the term "mental
sutreri~" IB 1ncluded In the abuve lnstructlou,
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this proposition ls Inapplicable. The term, a11
there used, la to be construed with reference
to the context lo which It occurs. The "wen·
tal sutrerlng," there named, le not the mental anguish or pain referred to In the above
proposition cited by the appellant, but ls the
mental experience which Is concomitant with
the Insult,, Indignity, and l!mnlllatlon named
In the Instruction. It would be a contradiction ot terms to hold that the Individual who11e
pride had been humiliated, or whose dignity
had been Insulted, had no mental sutrerlng In
connection therewith, or that this humiliation
and Insult did not of themselves coustitute
mental sutrerlng; that be could have redress
tol:' the lnjured·prlde, but not tor the mental
Although mental sut1 sutrerlng It produced.
ferlng alone will not support an action, yet lt
constitutes an aggravation of damages when
It naturally ensues from the act complained
ot. 8 Buth. Dam. t 1245.
The real question presented by the objections and exception ot the appellant ls whether the subsequent nerV'Ous disturbance of the
plalntltr was a surrering ot the body or of the
mind. The Interdependence of the mind and
body ls ln many respects so close that It Is lmpo881ble to distinguish their respective lnftuence upon each other. It must be conceded
that a nervous shock or paroxysm, or a disturbance of -the nervous system, Is distinct
from mental anguish, and falls wlthtn tile
physlologlcal, rather than the psychological,
branch of the human organism. It le a matter
ot general knowledge that an attack of sudden fright, or an exposure to Imminent perll,
has produced lo lndlvlduala a complete change
In their nervous system, and rendered one who
was physically strong and vigorous .lWeak and
tlmld. Such a result must be regarded as an
Injury to the body rather than to the mind,
even thouirh the mind be at the 11ame time Injuriously atl'ected~ Whatever may be the Influence by which the nervous system Is affected, lts action under that Influence ls entirely distinct from the mental process which Is
set ln motion by the brain. The nerves and
nerve centei:a ot the body are a part of the
physical system, and are not only l!Useeptible
of lesion from external causes, but nre also
UablE' to be weakE>ned and deRtrnyed from
causes primarily acting upon the mind. If
these nerves, or the entire nervous system. a1·e
thus atrected, there ls a physical Injury thereby prod need; and, If the primal euuse of this
Injury ls tortlous, It Is imm1llt>ri11l whether it
blow, or Indirect, through
1 Is direct, as by a
some action upon the mind.
Tllis sul>Ject 1·e<:eived a very careful and
elnl>orate consideration In the case or Bell v.
Hali way Co., L. R. 26 Ir. 4:!8. Mrs. Bell wus
a passenger upon one of the defendant's trains,
aud by rea1;:on or tbe defendant's ne;:lli;ene\:
In the management of Its train sutrered great
frlgllt, In consequence ot wlllch her hrulth
"°as seriously Impaired. She bad previous.y
beeu a strong, henlthy woman, but It wns
lhown that, alter tWs occurrence, she sultered
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from fright and nervous shock, and was trou-

bled with insomnia, and that her health was

seriously impaired. The jury were instructed

that if, in their opinion, great fright was a ;

reasonable and natural consequence of the cir-

cumstances in which the defendant by its

negligence had placed her, and that she was

actually put in fright by those circumstances.

and if the injury to her health was, in their

opinion. the reasonable and natural consequence

of such great fright, and was actually occa-

sioned thereby, the plaintiff was entitled to re-

cover damages for such injury. It was object- ‘

ed to this instruction that, unless the fright

was accompanied by physical injury, even

though there might be a nervous shock occa-

sion'ed by the fright, such damages would be i

too remote. In holding that this objection was

not well founded, and that the nervous shock ‘
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was to be considered as a bodily injury, the

court held that, if such bodily injury might be

a natural consequence of fright, it was an ele-

ment of damage for which a recovery might

be had, and, referring to the contention of the

defendant, said: “It is admitted that, as the

negligence caused fright, if the fright contem-

poraneously caused physical injury, the dam-

age would not be too remote. The distinction

insisted upon is one of time only. The propo-

sition is that, although. if an act of negligence 1

produces such an effect upon particular struc-

tures of the body as at the moment to afford

palpable evidence of physical injury, the rela-

tion of proximate cause and effect exists be-

tween such negligence and the injury, yet such

relation cannot in law exist in the case of a

similar act producing upon the same struc-

' tures an effect which at a subsequent time-

say a week, a fortnight. or a month—must re-

sult without any intervening cause in the same

physical injury. As well might it be said that

a death caused by poison is not to be attribut-

ed to the person who administered it, because

the mortal effect is not produced contempora-

neously with its administration." At the close

of its opinion, Lord Chief Baron Palles says:

“In conclusion, I am of the opinion that, as the

relation between fright and injury to the nerve

and brain structures of the body is a matter

which depends entirely upon scientilic and

medical testimony. it is impossible for any

court to lay down as a matter of law that, if

negligence cause fright, and such fright in its

turn so affect such structures as to cause in-‘

jury to health, such injury cannot be a conse

quonce which, in the ordinary course of things,

would ﬂow from the negligence, unless such

injury accompanied such negligence in point

of time." This case is quoted at great length

and with approval in the eighth edition of Mr.

Sedgwick's treatise on Damages, at section

,86t). Mr. Beven, in the recent edition of his

work on Negligence (volume 1, pp. 77-81), also

comments upon it with great approval. In

Purcell v. Railroad Co., 48 Minn. 134, 50 N. W.

1034, the defendant so negligently managed

one of its cars that a collision with an ap-

proaching cable car seemed imminent, and
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from fright and nervous shock, and was trou- was ao nearly cauaed that the attendant corr
bled with insomnia, and that her health wu fusion of ringing alarm bells and of passenger,;
seriously Impaired. The jury were lnlltructed rushing out produced in the plaintiff, who waw
that lt1 In their opinion, great -fright was a a p11118enger on the car, a sudden fright, which
reasonable and natural consequence of the cir- threw her Into convulsions, and, she belni;
cumstances In which the defendant by Its then pregnant, caused In her a miscarriage.
negllKence had placed her, and that she wu and subsequent illness. The court held that
actually put In fright by those circumstancel5. the defendant's negligence was the proximateand If the Injury to her health was, IJJ. their cause of the plalntllr's Injury, and that It wa~
opinion, the reasonable and natural consequence liable therefor, even though the immediate reor su<'h great fright, and was actually occa- sult of the negligence was only fright, saysioned thereby, the plalntlll' was entitled to re- ing: "A mental shock or dlsturbonce aomt•es causes injury or illness of body, l'l'cover damages for such Injury. It was objected to this Instruction that, unless the fright
•lally of the nervous system." 8ee, also.
was accompanied by physical Injury, even
nulng v. Inhabitants of Williamstown, l
though there might be a nervous shock occa· Cush. 451; Seger v. Town of Barkhamsted~
sioned by the fright, such damages would be 22 Ooun. 290; Car Co. v. Dupre, 4 C. C. A
too remote. In holding that this objectlou was 540, 54 Fed. 646; Stutz v. Railroad Co., 7~
not well founded, and that the nervous 11hock Wis. 147, 40 N. W. 653; Razzo v. Varnl, 81
was to be considered as a bodily Injury, the Cal. 2SU, 22 Pa<'. 848. "It ls a physical in court held that, If such bodily Injury might be jury to the perBOu to be thrown out or
a natural consequence of fright, It was an ele- wagon, or to be compelled to jump out, even
ment of damage for which a recovery might though the harm done conslstll mainly - or
be had, and, referring to the contention of the nervous shock." Warfen v. Railroad Co., 16:~
defendant, said: "It ls admitted that, as the MllSl!. -1~. 40 N. E. 895.
negligence caused fright, lf the fright contemThe tn('lltal condition which superlndueetl
poraneously caused physical Injury, the dam- the bodily hnrrn lu the foregoing c11Bes Wilt'
age would not be too remote. The distinction fright, but the character of the mental ex1•i Insisted upon ls one of Ume only. The propo- tatlon by which the Injury to the body ls pro
sition ls that, although. If an act of negligence duced Is immaterial. It It can be establlshei.I
produces such an etr.ect upon partlculur struc- that the bodily harm Is the direct result of th1•
tures of the body as at the moment to atrord condition, without any Intervening cause, it
palpable evidence of physical Injury, the rela- must be held that the act which caused th1•
tion of proximate cause and effect exists b<!- condition set In motion the agencies by wWclt
tween such negligence and the injury, yet such the Injury was produced, and ls the proximat1•
relation cannot lo law exist in the case of a cause of such Injury. Whether the Indignity
11lmllar act producing upon the same struc- and bumlllatlon suffered by Mrs. Sloane caugtures an etJect wu1ch at a subsequent time- ed the nervous paroxysm, and the Injury to
B.'lY a week, a fortnight, or a month-must reher health from which she subsequently sufsult without any lnten·enlug cause In the same fered, was a question of fact, to be determluerl
physi<'al Injury. As well might lt be said that by the jury. There was evidence before then•
a death caused by poison Is not to be attribut- tending to establish such fact, and If they wer1•
ed to the person who administered It, because satisfted, from that evidence, that these resulti>.
the mortal etrect Is not produced contemporn- were directly traceable to that cause, and that
neously with its administration." At the elo11e her expuhiion from the car bad prorluced In
of lt'I opinion, Lord Chief Baron Palles says: her such a dlshirbance of her nervous system
"lo condusion, I am of the opinion that, as the as resulted In tl1e11e paroxysms, they were aurelation between fright and injury to the nerve thorized to Include In their verdict \Vhatever
and hrnin structures of the body Is n matter damage she bad thus sustained. Whethf>r
which (lcpends entirely upon scientific and the defemfaut or its nJ:ents knew of her S\J!';llJe(llcal testimony, It Is Impossible for any ceptlblllty to nervous disturbance wllB Immacourt to lay down as a matter of law th.'lt, If terial. She had the same rights as any othc>r
m•;.rlh:"ence cause frlJ:"ht, and such fright In ltll person who might be<'ome a passebger on I~
turn so afTi>ct such structures as to cause In-· road, and was entltled to as high degree or
jury to lwnlth, such Injury canuot be a const>- care ou Its part. It was not necessary that this
•!ll<'llCe which, ln the ordinary course ot thlngi1, Injury should have l.Jeen anticipated In orde!"
woul<l flow from the negligenee. unless such to entitle hc>r to a recovery therefor. Clv.
Injury neeompanled such negligence In point Code, t aa.'13. If the facts under which she
of time." This case ls quoted at great length was cxdud<>d from th1~ car would be an art of
aml with npproval lo the eighth edition of Mr. negli~l'llCe on the part. of the defPndaut as to
Rl'<lgwiek's treatise on Damages, at section any and all persons, whoever might sust11i11
,8130. Mr. Beven, ln the 1·ecent edition or his Injury by such act would be entitled to recoY<'•"
work ou Negligence (volume 1, pp. 77-81), also to the full extent of hls Injury, irrespecti'l"e of
comments upon It with great appro~·aI. Jn his previous physical condition or susceptlhll!Purcell v. Railroad Co., 4S :\Iilm. UH, 50 N. W. ty to harm. In Railroad Co. v. l(emp, 61 Mil.
1034, the dt>fenuant so negligently managed 74, 619, the plaintiff was Injured UllOD a ('fir
one of Its mr11 that a c.'Ollislou with an ap- ot the defendant. and thereafter a cancer de·
prna<'hlng cable car seemed Imminent, and veloped Itself upon her breast &t the pl:ice
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where she had been hurt. Testimony was giv- 1 the humiliation, injuries to her health, etc.,-—

en to the effect that such hurt was sutiicient 1

to cause the development of the cancer, and

that, in the opinion of the experts, they would

attribute it to that muse. It was shown that,

previous to the accident she had been in ap-

parently good health and condition. The court

held that it was for the jury to determine,

from the evidence, whether the cancer did re-

sult from the injury, and, if so, that the de-

fendant was liable, even though it had no rea-

son to anticipate such a result. “It is not for

the defendants to say that, because they did

not or could not in fact anticipate such a re-

sult of their negligent act, they must there-

fore be exonerated from liability for such con-

sequences as ensued. They must be taken

to know and to contemplate all the natural

and proximate consequences, not only that
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certainly would, but that probably might, ﬂow

from their wrongful act." See, also, Fell v.

Railroad Co., 44 Fed. 253.

The court properly left to the jury to de-

termine whether Mrs. Sloane exercised rea- ‘

sonable prudence in undertaking the walk

from East Riverside to Colton, and, if so, that "

the injury sustained by her was a proper ele-

ment of damage to be recovered. It could not

say, as matter of law, or instruct the jury,

that under the evidence before them, such

walk was or was not necessary, or whether

the route selected by her was the most feasi- 1

ble; nor would it have been justiﬁed in direct-

ing them not to allow compensation for any

injury sustained by the walk, upon the

ground that, if she had waited a few hours,

she could have gone upon the cars. Malone v.

Railroad Co., 152 Pa. St. 390, % Atl. (B8.

The refusal of the court to strike out cer-

tain portions of the complaint as irrelevant is

not a ground for reversal of the judgment.

The matter embraced therein was relevant

to the plaintiffs‘ right of recovery, and they

were justiﬁed in setting forth in their com-

plaint the several acts of the defendant which

constituted the wrong for which they sought

' redress. The defendant does not claim to have

been prejudiced by any of the probative mat-

ters contained in these allegations, and, even

if this matter might have been properly struck .

out by the court. after the cause has been

tried upon its merits the judgment will not

be reversed for such technical error.

The demurrer to the complaint was proper-

ly overruled. The cause of action set forth

therein is neither ambiguous nor uncertain.

It clearly states a single ground of recovery,

viz. the unlawful violation by the defendant

of the obligation it had assumed to .carry

Mrs. Sloane to San Diego; and, although

the damages caused to her by this violation of

its obligation were made up of the injuries

to her person, as well as the money paid by

her as the consideration of this obligation,

they all resulted from the wrong committed

by the defendant. It was necessary that she

should point out the particulars in which she

had sustained injuries from the defendant,-

where she had been hurt. Testimony wrui gtvPn to the effect that such hurt was sufficient
to <·au111.• the development of the cancer, and
that, in the opinion ot the experts, they would
attribute It to that cawie. It was shown that,
preYlous to the accident she had been in apparl'ntly good health and condition. The court
held that It was tor the jury to dt>t1>rn1i11e.
from the evidence, whether the can('er did resuit from the lnjnry, and, it so, that the detemlant was liable, even though It had no rea·
son to anticipate 1111Ch a result. "It 18 not tor
the defendants to say that, because they did
not or could not In fact anticipate such a re.
sult of their negligent act, they must therefOl"e be exonerated from liability tor such consequences as ensued. They must be taken
to know and to contemplate all the natural
and proximate consequences, not only that
certalnly would, but that probably might, flow
from their wrongtul act." See, also, Fell .,,
Railroad Co., 44 Fed. 253.
The court properly left to the jury to determlne whether Mrs. Sloane exercised reallOIUlble prudence In undertaking the walk
from Eut Riverside to Colton, and, 1t so, that
the Injury sustained by her was a proper
ment ot damage to be recovered. It could not
say, as matter of law, or Instruct the jury,
that under the evidence before them, 11ucb
walk was or waa not neceBSary, or whether
the route selected by her was the most fea.slble: nor would It have been justified In directIng them not to allow compensatlon tor any
Injury 11UBtalned by the walk, upon the
ground that, lf she had waited a few houn,
11he could have irone upon the cars. Malone v.
Railroad Co., ir.2 Pa. St. 390, ~ Atl. 6.18.
The reCullBI of the court to strike out certaln portions of the complaint as Irrelevant ls
not a ground for reversal ot the judgment.
The matter embraced therein was relevant
to the plalntllfs' right ot recovery, and they
were justllied In setting forth In their eomplaint the several acts of the defendant which
constituted the wrong for which they sought
- redress. The defendant does not claim to have
been prejudiced by any of the probative matters contained In these allegations, and, even
If this matter might have heen pro1wrly struck
out by the court, after the cause has been
tried upon Its merits the judgment will not
be reversed for 11uch technlcnl error.
The demurrer to the complaint was properly overruled. The csui1e of action set rorth
therein ls neither ambiguous nor uncertain.
It clearly states a single ground of recovery,
viz. the unlawful violation by the dt->fendant
of the obligation It had assumed to -carry
Mrs. Sloane to San Djego; and, although
the damages cauSPd to her by thh~ vlolution of
tts obligation were made up of the injuries
to her person, as well as the monl'y paid by
her as the consideration of this obllgatlon,
they all resulted from the wrong committed
by the defendant. It was uece888ry that she
should point out the particulars In which she
bad sustained lnjurlt>s from the defendant,-

: the humiliation, injuries to her health, ete.,--

i In order that evidence thereof might be

gh·pu

' at the trial, and also that the deft-uunut mi;.:-ht
: be prepart>d to meet such evidenee; hut it w:u
not necessary that she should designate tile
particular amount of damage whkh shl' hud
flUstained by reason of the indignity that !!he
bad been compelled to undergo, distinct" frolll
the amount i<ustalned from the Injury to
her health. These elements ot damage were
not capable or computation, nor would evl·
dence of such amount have been admissible.
'!'his amount was to be determined by the
jury, In the exercise of an intelligent dlscretlon.
Neither does the action of the court In
striking out a portion of the defendant's auswer justify a reversal of the jmlgment.
I T.he denial Qf ag allegation In the complaint tor wapt of suftlclent Information and
bellef to enable the defendant to answer
the same justifies tlieCOiirt In disregarding_
' or striking out such denial If
m tter Is
presmn t
knowled
of the
defendant;,. and, although a corporation does
1 not itself have any knowledge of the matters
allt>ged, but ls compelled to act through Its
oftlcers, whoee Information may be derived
from others, yet It cannot place Its denials
upon Its want or Information and belief, if
the matters alleged were presumptively with·
tn the knowledge of any of Its officers, even
though the oftlcer verifying the answer was
himself without any Information or belief upon the subject. In the present case It, moreover, clearly appears that the defendant was
not prejudiced by the action of the court. In
a separate defense to the action, the defendant directly alleged many of the facts which,
, In the portion or the answer thus struck out,
It bad denied tor want of Information and
belief; and, although an admission In one
defense Is not available as against a denlnl
i In another, It Is competent for the court to
, consider such admission for the purpose of
: determining whether the answer containing
1 the denial Is sham or evasive. After the rulj Ing of the court, the defendant amended Its
' answer by directly denying the matters alleged In one of the paragmpbs which the
court held had been lnsuftlclently denied, and
at the trial It stipulated to the truth of the
matters that had been denied by It In another of the paragraphs which waa stricken out.
The defendant was, therefore, not precluded
from defending the action in any partkular
upon which It relied. After a cause ha"
1 been tried upon Its merits. a ruling of thl•
· court either In strlklni; out, or In refusln1:
1 to strike out, a portion ot a pleading, will not
; justify a 1·eversal of the judgment, If it ap! pears that the party against whom the ruling
I was ms de has not been prejudiced thereby.
and has been able to present to the court his
1 entire cause of action or defense. Mere techj' nlcal error, unaccompanied by injury, will
be disregarded. C.Ode Clv. Proc. t 475.
The court did not err In Its instructions to

ele- 1
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the jury respecting the measure of care

which a railroad company must exercise to-

wards its passengers. Rorer, P». R. p. 951; ‘

Railroad Co. v. Homer, 73 Ga. 251. The pas-

senger is not required to question the action

of the conductor in taking up his ticket,

but has to assume that his conduct in tak-

ing or withholding the ticket is in accord-

ance with the rules of the company. It is

therefore incumbent upon the conductor to

exercise more than ordinary care in seeing

that. after he has taken the ticket from the 3

passenger, the latter shall be provided with

the means of continuing his journey. It is

not error to hold that this requires extreme

care and diligence. We are of the opin-

ion, however, that the damages allowed by

the jury were excessive, and not justiﬁed

by the evidence. They were properly told
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that they could not award the plaintif f ex- ‘

emplary damages, but only such as would

be a full and fair compensation to her for

the injury and detriment she had suffered

as the proximate results of the defendant's

wrongful acts.

show that the conductor was rude and in-

sulting in directing her to leave the train at

East Riverside is quite meager, and consists

more of her statement of its character than

of the language used by him. The jury were

instructed that, in estimating the amount of

damages she could recover by reason of the

humiliation in being excluded from the car,

they were not at liberty to consider her ‘

peculiar nervous temperament, but to allow

only such damages as would have resulted

to a person of ordinary or usual tempera-

ment. So, too, the evidence concerning the

effect of this expulsion from the car upon

her nervous condition consists more of gen-

eral statements than of details, and it does

not appear that this effect was of more than

The testimony tending to ‘

I brief duration. She does not claim to have

1 sustained any direct physical injury by rea-

son of the walk to Colton. She testiﬁes, as

do also her husband and Dr. Averill, that,

‘ except for her nervous condition, she was

‘ in fair health, and that she was abundantly

able to take a walk of two or three miles-,

and it is not suggested that the walk had

any effect upon her nervous condition, or

that she suffered any direct inconvenience

therefrom after her return to San Diego. The

walk itself was not attended with any un-

usual inconvenience. It was upon the rail-

1 road track, in a level country, on an after-

noon in April. The distance is not given,

but, after going about a mile, or as far as

l the railroad bridge, she was taken into a

‘ passing vehicle, and carried to Colton.

1 While the amount of damages that may be

i awarded in a case like the present is in the

‘ discretion of the jury, it must be a reasonable

| and not an unlimited. discretion, and must

be exercised intelligently and in harmony

, with the testimony before them. We think

l that the jury in the present case must have
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the jury respecting the measure of care
whid1 n railroad company must exercise towards its passengers. Rorer, ~. R. p. 951;
Rallroau Co. v. Homer, 73 Ga. 251. The passen;::et· ls not ret1uired to question the action
of the conductor in tnking up hi!' ticket,
but has to assume that bio conduct in takln~- or withholding the ticket Is in accortlanee with the n1Ies of the company. It ls
thC'refore incumbent upon the conductor to
exerdse more than ordinary care In seeing
that. after be has taken the ticket from the
pass<'nger, the latter shall be provided with
the means of continuing bis journey. It Is
not error to hold that this requires extreme
C':tre and diligence. We are of the opinion, howcYer, that the damages allowed by
the jury were excessive, and not jt•stified
by the evidence. They were properly told
thnt they could not award the plalntltl' exemplary damages, but only such as would
be a full and fair compensation to her for
the Injury and detriment she had suft'ered
as the proximate results of the defendant's
wrongful acts. The testimony tending to
show that the conductor was rude and insulting in directing her to leave the train at
Eest Riverside Is quite meager, and consists
more of her statement of its character than
of the language used by him. The jury were
instructed that, in estimating the amount of
damages she could recover by reason of the
humiliation ln be1ng excluded from the car,
they were not at liberty to consider her
pe<'nllar nervous temperament, but to allow
only such damages as would have resulted
to a person of ordinary or usual temperament. So, too, the evidence concerning the
effect of this expulsion from the car upon
her nervous condition consists more ot general statements than of details, and It doea
not appear that this effect was of more than
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brief duration. She does not claim to have
sustained any dlreet physical injury by reason ot the walk to Colton. She testifies, as
do also her husband and Dr. Averill, that,
eX<'<'IJt for her nervou11 condition, she was
In fair ht>alth, nnd that she was abundantly
ahle to tak•• a walk of two or three miles;
and It ls not suggested that the walk had
any en:'ect upon her nervous condition, or
thn t she 8uft"ered any direct inconvenience
therefrom after her return t-0 San Diego. The
walk Itself was not attended with any unusual inconvenience. It was upon the railroad track, In a level country, on an afternoon in April. The distance ls not ~lven,
but, after going about a mile, or as far a.'I
tqe railroad bridge, she was taken into a
pa8!'lng vehicle, and carried to Colton.
While the amount of damages that may be
awarded In a case like the present ls In the
discretion of the jury, It must be a reasonable
and not an unlimited. discretion, and must
be exercised Intelligently and In harmony
with the testimony before them. We think
that the jury In the present case must ban
been influenced by other considerations than
the testimony before them 1D arriving at the
am•;iunt of their verdict.
The judgment and order denying a new
trial are reversed, unless the plalntltl's shall,
within 30 days after the filing of the remit ·
tltur in the superior court, file with the clerk
and give to the defendant a stipulation remitting from the judgment the sum of $1,000.
It such stipulation be so filed and delivered,
the superior court ls directed to amend the
judgment In conformity therewith, and thereupon the judgment and order shall stand affirmed.
We concur. VAN FLBIOT, 1.; GAROUTTE,
1.
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MITCHELL v. ROFHE§.‘TER RY. CO.

YITCHF.LL T. ROC'Hm!TER RY. CO.
(45 N. E. 354, 151 N. Y. 107.)
Court ot Appeals of New York. D~. 1, lsnG.

(45 N. E. 354, 151 N. Y. 107.)

Court of Appeals of New York. Dec. 1. 1R96.

Appeal from supreme court, general term,

Fifth department.

Action by Annie lilitchell against the Roen-

ester Railway Company. From an order (28

N. Y. Supp. 1136) aﬂirming an order (25 N.

Y. Supp. 744) setting aside a nonsult, defend-

ant appeals. Reversed.

Appeal rrom supreme court, general term,
Firth department.
Action by Annie Mitchell against the RO<'n<'Rter Jfailway Cumpnny. From an ordPr (~
X. Y. ~upp. 1136) affirming an ordPr (:?ri N.
Y. Supp. 744) setting nside a nonsuit, dl'femlnut nppenls. Hel"ersed.
Chnrle!I J. Bis.~ell, for appellanL Norrh1
Bull, for respondent.

Charles J. Bissell, for appellant. Norris

Bull, for respondent.

MARTIN, .1'. The facts in this case are

few, and may be brieﬂy stated. On the 1st

day of April, 1891, the plaintlff was standing

upon a crosswalk on .\iain street, in the city

of Rochester, awaiting an opportunity to

board one of the defendant's cars which had

stopped upon the street at that place. While
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standing there, and just as she was about to

step upon the car, a horse car of the defend-

ant came down the street. As the team at-

tached to the car drew near, it turned to the

right, and came close to the plaintiff, so that

she stood between the horses‘ heads when

they were stopped. She testiﬁed that from

fright and excitement caused by the approach

and proximity of the team she became un-

conscious, and also that the result was a mis-

carriage, and consequent iliness. Medical

testimony was given to the effect that the

mental shock which she then received was

suﬂicient to produce that result. Assuming

that the evidence tended to show that the de-

fendant's servant was negligent in the man-

agement of the car and horses, and that the

plaintiff was free from contributory negli-

gence, the single question presented is wheth-

er the plaintiff is entitled to recover for the

defendant's negligence which occasioned her

fright and alarm, and resulted in the injuries

already mentioned. While the authorities are

not harmonious upon this question, we think

the most reliable and better-considered cases,

as well as public policy, fully justify us in

holding that the plaintiff cannot recover for

injuries occasioned by fright, as there was

no immediate personal injury. Lehman v.

Railroad Co., 47 Hun, 355; Commissioners v.

Coultas, 18 App. Cas. 222; Ewing v. Railway

Co., 147 Pa. St. 40, 23 AtL 340. The learned

counsel for the respondent in his brief very

properly stated that “the consensus of opin-

ion would seem to be that no recovery can be

had for mere fright," as will be readily seen

by an examination of the following additional

authorities: Haile v. Railroad Co., 60 Fed.

557; Joch v. Dankwardt, 85 Ill. 331'; Can-

ning v. Inhabitants of Williamstown, 1 Cush.

451; Telegraph Co. v. Wood, 6 C. C. A. 432,

57 Fed. 471; Renner v. Canﬁeld, 36 Minn. 90,

30 N. W. 435; Allsop v. Allsop, 5 HurL & N.

534; Johnson v. Wells, Fargo & Co., 6 Nev.

22-i; Wyman v. Leavitt, 71 Me. 227. If it be

admitted that no recovery can be had for

fright occasioned’ by the negligence of an-

other, it is somewiiat diﬂlcult to understand

how a deli'ndant would be liable for its con-

MARTIX, J. The fact8 In this CllRe are
few, and mny he brlefty stated. On the 1st
day of April, 18'Jl, the plnlntlfl' was standing
upon a crosswalk on Main street, In the city
of Rochester, awaiting an opportunity to
board one of the defendant's rors which hnd
stopp<>d upon the street at that place. While
standing there, and just as she was about to
step upon the car, a horse car of the defendant came down the atrcet. As the team attached to the car drew near, It turned to the
right, and came close to the plalntlfl', so that
she stood between the horses' beads when
they were stopped. She testified that from
frbrht and excltPment cauRed by the approach
and proximity of the team she became unconscious, and also that the result was a miscarriage, and consequent Illness. Medical
testimony was given to the efl'ect that the
mental sh0ck which she then received was
sutHclent to produce that result. ABBumlng
that the evidence tended to show that the defendant's servant was negligent ln the mau.ai:tement of the car and hor11es, and that the
plalntltr was free from contributory negligence, the single question presented Is whether the plalntlfl' la entitled to recover for tl1P.
dC>fendant's negligence which occasioned her
fright and alarm, and resulted In the lnjurles
already mentioned. "'hlle the authorities are
not harmonious upon this question, we think
the most rellable and better-considered cases,
as well aa public policy, fully justify us In
lioldlng that the plalntltr cannot recover tor
Injuries occasioned by fright, as there WWI
no Immediate personal Injury. Lehman v.
Railroad Co., 47 Hun, &ii>; Commissioners T.
Coultas, 13 App. Cas. 222; Ewing v. Railway
C'o., 147 Pa. St. 40, 23 Atl 340. The learned
counsel for the respondent In his brief very
properly stated thnt "the consensus of opinion would seem to be that no recovery can be
had for mere fright," as will be readily seen
by an examination of the following additional
authorities: Halle v. Railroad Co., 60 l~ed.
557; Joch v. Dankwardt, 85 Ill. 331"; Canning v. Inhabitants of Williamstown, 1 Cush.
451; Telegraph Co. T. Wood, 6 C. C. A. 432,
57 Fed. 471; !tenner v. Canfield, 3G Minn. 90,
30 N. W. 435; Allsop T. Allsop, I> Hurl & N.
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534; Johnson T. 'Wells, Fargo & Co., 6 Ne,·.
2"..!-1; Wyman v. Leavitt, 71 Me. 2".!7. If It be
admitted that no recovery can be hnd for
fright ocensioned'" by the neglige>nce of another, It Is somewhat diffieult to undel'!!tand
how a tlt•fPndant wouhl be llnble for Its consequen<·l'!!. Assuming that fright cannot
form the basis of an aetion, It Is obvious that
no recol"ery can be hml for Injuries resnlling
ther<>from. That the result may be nervous
dl!<mse, blindness, Insanity, or even a misran·inge, In no way changes the prlnelp!e.
TheRe results merely show the dPgree of'
fright, or the exteut ot the damages. Tb<?
right of action must still depend upon the
queRtlon whether a recovery may be had for
fright. It It con, then an action may be maintained, however slight the Injury. It not,
then 'there can he no reco,·ery, no matter how
grnve or serious the consequences. Therefore
the logleal result of the respondent's concei1slon would seem to be, not only that no recovery can be bad for mere fright, but also
that none can be bad for Injuries which arP
the direct coni<eq uences of It. If' the right of
recovery In this cla11s ot cases should be once
establlshC>d, It would naturally result In a
tlood of litigation 1n Cll8es where the lnJury complalned of may be easlly feigned without
dete<·tlon, and where the damages must rest
upon mere conjt"Cture or speculation. 'fbe
dlmculty which often exists ln cases of alleged physical Injury, In determining whether
they exist, and, If' so, whether they were
caused by the negllgent act of the defend:rnt,
would not only be greatly Increased, but 11
wide fleld would be opened for flctlllous or
speculative claims. To estnbll11b such a doctl'lne would be contrary to principles of pub·
Uc policy. Moreover, It cannot be properly
said that the plalntltr's miscarriage was the
proximate result of the defendant's negllgence. . Proximate damages are such As are
the ordinary and natural results of' the negligence charged, and those that are usual,
and may, therefore, be expected. It Is quite
obvious that the plaintiff's Injuries do not
fall within the rule as to proximate damages.
The Injuries to the plalntlfl' were plainly the
result of an accidental or unusual combination of circumstances, which could not haYe
heen reasonably anticipated, and over whkh
the defendant had no control, and hence her
damages were too remote to justify a recovery In this action. These considerations
le.ad to the conclusion that no recovery can
be had for Injuries sustained by fright occasioned by the negligence of another. where
there Is no Immediate personal Injury. 'fhc
orders of' the general and special terms should
be reversed, and the orde.r of the trial term
granting a nonsuit amrmed, with costs. All
concur, except HAIGHT, J., not sitting, and
VANN, J., not voting. Ordered accordiugl;y.
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ductor's division; that, owing to serious damage to that rond, caused by high water, plalnmr could proceed no further, and wa.s compelled to remain In Missoula from the 2d to
the 20th clay of June; that on said last-mentloned day plaintiff paid the fare demanded
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TURNER v. GREAT NORTHERN RY. CO.

(46 Pac. 243, 15. Wash. 213.)
Supreme Court of Wnshingtop. Aug. 31, 1896.

(46 Pac. 243, 15. Wash. 213.)

Supreme Court of Washingtop. Aug. 31, 1896.

Appeal from superior court, Spokane coun-

ty; Jesse Arthur, Judge.

Action by W. W. D. Turner against the

Great Northern Railway Company. There

was a judgment for plaintiff, and defendant

appeals. Reversed. '

Appeul from superior court, Spokane county; Jesse Arthur, .Judge.
Action by w. w. D. Tumer against the
Gi·eat Northern Hallway Company. There
was a judgment for plaintiff, and defentlant
appeals. Reversed.
•
C. Wellington, Jay H. Adams, and M. D.
Grm·er, for appellant. Graves & Woll, tor
respondent.
.
1

(3. Wellington, Jay H. Adams, and M. D.

Grover, for appellant. Graves & Wolf, for

respondent.

ages for the failure on the part of the defend-

ant to transport the plaintiff and his wife

over its line of railway from St. Paul, Minn.,

to the city of Spokane, in accordance with its

agreement and duty. The material facts set

forth in the complaint are, brieﬂy, that the

defendant is, and at all the times mentioned in

Generated for facpubupdates (University of Michigan) on 2014-06-12 19:24 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/mdp.35112105421491
Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd-google

the complaint was, a corporation operating a

line of raiiwayfrom St . Paul to Seattle by way

of the city of Spokane; that on May 30, 1894,

the plaintiff purchased from the agent of de-

fendant at St. Paul tickets for himself and

wife, and procured checks for their baggage,

over defendant's railway from St. Paul to

Spokane, and was induced so to do by the

representation of said agent that defendant's

passenger train which would leave St. Paul

on the said day would reach the city of.

Spokane on the morning of the 2d day of J uue

ductor's division; that, owing to serious dam-

age to that road, caused by high water, plain-

tiff could proceed no further, and was com-

pelied to remain in Missoula from the 2d to

the 20th day of June; that on said last-men-

tioned day plaintiff paid the fare demanded

‘ for transportation to his home at Spokane,

‘ which place he reached on the 21st day of

June, having been delayed over night at Hope,

Idaho; and that the expense necessarily in-

curred for extra railroad fare and for board

and lodging during the delays at Helena, Mis-

soula, and Hope was $80.20. It is averred in

the complaint that: “During their detention

' and delay plaintiff's said wife, in consequence

ANDERS, J. This was an action for dam- ‘

following, and that the tickets purchased .

from the defendant's agent were limited to

that time and train; that defendant then well

knew that it had not been able to run a

through train from St. Paul to Spokane for

several days prior to that time, and that, ow-

ing to a serious break in its roadbed west of

Havre, it would not be able to i‘un .<iu'ii

through train for a long time thereafter,

which fact it negligently and fraudulently

concealed from the piaintiff; that plaintiff

and his wife took passage on defendant's pas-

senger train which left St. Paul on the even-

ing of May 30, 1894, and when said train

reached Havre the conductor thereof inform-

ed the plaintif! that, because of some damage

to defendant's road further west, in the state

of Idaho, the train would proceed no further,

but that the plaintiff and his wife would be

taken on defendant's line of railway to

Helena, Mout., from which place they would

1

ANDERS, J. This was an actton for damages for the failure on the part of the defendant to transport the plnlntltr and his wife
over Its line of railway from St. Paul, Minn.,
to the city of Spokane, in accordance with Its
agreement and duty. The material facts set
forth In the complaint are, briefly, that the
defendant ls, and at all the times mentioned In
the complaint wns, a corporntlon operntlng a
line of railway from St. Paul to Seattle by way
ot the city of Spokane; that on May 30, 1894,
the pl11lntUr purchased from the agent or de·
fendant at St. Paul tickets tor himself and
wife, and procured checks tor their baggage,
over defendant's railway from St. Paul to
Spokane, and was Induced so to do by the
representation of said agent that defendant's
passenger train which would leave St. Paul
on the said day would reach the city or.
Spokane on the morning of the 2d day of June
following, and that the tickets purchased
from the defendant's agent were limited to ,
that time and train; that defendant then well
knew that it bad not been able to run a 1
through train from St. Paul to Spokane tor
several days 11rlor to that time, and that, owing to a serious break In its roadbed west of
Havre, it would not be able to run l'<lleh
through train for a long time then•aftPr,
which fact it negligently and traud11leutly
concealed from the plalntltr; that plaintiff
and his wife took pas!lllge on defendant's llRSsenger train which left St. Paul on the evening or May 30, 1894, and when said trnln
reached Havre the conductor thereof Informed the plaintiff that, because of ROme damage
to defendant's road further west, In the state
of Idaho, the train would proceed no further,
but that the plalntltr and his wife would be
mken on defendant's line or railway to
HPlenn, :\lout., from which place th!'y woul1l
II{' carried to thE>lr destination ove1· the line '
ot the Xort!wm Pacltk Hnilroad Company,
and thnt the tickets thl'n held by plnlntltr
wl're i.;ood, and would be honored for trans·
11ortatlon oYer that roncl; that plaintiff arrived at Helena on June let, and on the following day boarded the first west-bo11nd
Northern Pacific train, and presented his ticki>ti! to the conductor, who refusl'd to ae<•ppt
them for trnn~portntlon, and required the
11l11lntltr to pn~· tlw fnre for hh11KPlf and wife
to '.\llssouln,- th11t helng the end of the con-

for transportation to bis home at Spokane,
which place he reached on the 21st day or
June, having been delayed over night at Hope,
Idaho; and that the expense necessnrlly Incurred tor extra railroad tare and for board
and lodging during the delays at Helena, Mlssoula, and Hope was $86.20. It Is averred In
the complaint that: "During their detention
and delay plaintiQ"s said wife. In consequence
of said delay and her anxiety of mind as to
their situation, became sick at said city ot
Missoula, and was confined to her bed for
several days, and plalntltr was much worried, vexed, and annoyed because of his Inability to make hie wife comfortable, situated,
as they were, at an hotel, among stra n~ers, far
from home, and without access to their baggage; that because of said detention and delay, and of his Inability to reach his said
home, plalntltr was greatly harassed, troubled,
and perplexed about bis business, and it otherwise caused him great annoyance, vexation,
and anxiety of mind because or his embar·
rassed situation, the uncertainty when they
would reach their home, and the great dangers
Incident to traYellng at that time; • • •
that, In addltlon to said extra expense made
necessary, as aforesaid, because of defendant's negligent and fraudulent conduct In the
premises, and of plaintiff's delay and detention, as aforeMld, aml consequent loss of
time, worriment, troullle, annoyance, aml
anxiety of mind, as aforesaid, he has been
damaged In the further sum of $1,000." The
plaintiff accordingly demanded judgment
against the defendant for $1,086.20. The defendant moved the court to require the plaln·
tltr to furnish a bill of particulars showing
the respective amounts claimed for loss or
time, trouble, annoyance, disappointment, and
anxiety of mind, which motion was denied.
The defendant then answered, denying all lhl'
allt>gatlons of the complaint except that r•·latlng to the incorporation and business or
the defendant, and that the plaintiff purchase() the tickets mentioned In the complaint.
From a judgment In favor of the plaintiff for
the sum of $i50, this appeal is prosecuted.
It Is claimed by defrndant that It had a
right, under section 200 of the Code ot Proce•lm:e, to be advised, In advance, of how
much plaintiff sought to recover for loss or
tln1e, how much for anxiety of mln1l, etc.,
that lt inlght be prepared with Its pl'oofs to
meet the allegations of the complaint, and
that, If the allegations as to loss of time,
trouble, annoyance, and disappointment or
mind authorized the rntroductlon of any proof,
the damages were Rpeclal, and the def<'mlnnt
wn11 entitled to a Ktntenwnt of the partlcuL'lr
ltt'llll!. It has hl'Pll repeatedly held In !\cw
York, und1•r a statute like ours, and seems to
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be the settled rule, that the granting or re-

fusing of a motion for a bill of particulars is

within the sound discretion of the trial court,

and its ruling in that regard will not be re-

viewed on appeal, except in cases where there

has been a palpable abuse of such discretion.

4 Tilton v. Beecher, 59 N. Y. 176; People v.

Tweed, 63 N. Y. 194; Dwight v. Insurance

Co., 84 Y. 493. No such case, we appre-

hend, is presented here. The object of the

statute is to enable a party reasonably to

protect himself against surprise on the trial

(Butler v. Mann, 9 Abb. N. C. 49); but we are

unable to see how the defendant could have

been surprised by the testimony adduced by .

the plaintiff corroborative of the averments of

the complaint, to which defendant's motion

for a bill of particulars was especially ad-

dressed. So far as the complaint is concern-
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ed, its allegations were suﬂicient to let in the

evidence admitted. The damages claimed, or

at least those claimed for loss of time, were

general, and therefore were not required to

be speciﬁcally alleged. Thomp. Carr. Pass. p.

550.

It appears from the testimony of plaintiff

of showing that the plaintif f himself was not

in fault in taking the particular train on

which he started home. It was also compe-

tent as tending to prove the contract be-

tween the parties; but, for that purpose, it

was comparatively unimportant, in view of

the fact that the tickets themselves, which

were prima facie evidence of the defendant's

contract, represented upon their face that

plaintiff would be carried to his destination

within the time mentioned by the ticket

seller.

Objection is made by the defendant to the

action of the court in permitting the re-

dent to state to the jury the amount he

s compelled to pay for board and lodgi-1:

and other necessary expenses for himself

and wife while at lliissoula, and it is urged

‘th much earnestness that the expense in-

that he purchased his tickets for transporta- '

tion at the otiice of the Union Depot at St. '

Paul, and not at the ofﬁce of the defendant

company, and that the person from whom

he purchased them was engaged in selling ‘

tickets over various other lines of railway

whose trains entered and departed from that

depot. Upon the trial the court permitted

the plaintiff, over the objection of defendant,

to detail a conversation between himself and

the ticket seller, which occurred at the time

the plaintiff purchased his tickets, in which

the ticket seller stated, among other things,

that defendant's trains were running

through to Spokane on schedule time, and,

if there were no accidents, plaintiff would

arrive at his destination on the morning of

June 2, 1894. It is contended that this was

error, for the reason that it was not shown

that the person who made these statements

was an agent of the defendant, and author-

ized to bind it by such declarations. But the

fact that the tickets so sold were furnished

1.Je the settled rule, that the granting or re-
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of showing that the plalntltr himself was not
fusing of a motion for a bill of pnrtlculnrs Is In fault In taking the particular train on
within the sound discretion of thE> trial court, whleh be started home. It wae also compeand Its ruling In that regard will not be re- tPnt as tending to prove the contract bevlewcd on appeal, except In cases where the>re tween the parties; but, for that purpose, lt
has been a palpnlJle abuse of such discretion. was comparatively unimportant, In view of
../ Tilton v. Beecher, ri9 N. Y. li6; People v. the fnet th!lt the tickets themselves, whlC'l1
Tweed, 63 N. Y. 104; Dwight v. Insurance were prima facle evidence of the defendant's
Co., 84 N. Y. 493. No such cafle, we nppre- contract, represented upon their face that
1Je111l, ls presented here. The ohJ<>ct of the plnlntltf would be carrJed to his de!<tlnntlo:i.
statute Is to en::ihle a pn1·ty reasonably to within tl1e time' mentioned by the ti<•kl't
protect himself ai:ulnst surprise on the trial seller.
(Butler v. ?tlann, 0 AIJb. N. C. 49); but we are
Objection Is made by the defendant to the
1111:1.lile to see how the defPmlunt could have action of the court In permitting the reht>Pn surprised by the testimony adduced by~dcnt to state to the jury the nmount be
the plaintiff C'Ol'l'OUOffitlVl' ot the a\'erinents Of .
8 compelled to pay for lJonnl and )Oll'.~; .1 · :
the co111pl:1lnt, to whieh defl•Jlllnnt's motion and other necessnr.'' exi)('rn~cs for himsl'lf
for a lJlll of particulars was rspeclally ad- and wite while at l\ll~i<onln, and It Is urgt><l
dl"P!lst•d. So fnr as the co111pl11lnt Is concPrn- A.th much earnestness that the expense lnt>d, Its allegations were sufficiPnt to let In the .rred at that plaC'e was not the rt>sult of the
e\'ldcnce admitted. The dmnagrs clnlnwd, or ! b~ch or dPrendant's contract, but of an
at least tho!!e claimed fo1• lol!s or time, were lnd.ndent, lntervenini: cause, viz. the In·
geueral, and therefore were not required to ability of the Northern Pacific Uallroa<l Combe spN·lllcnlly alleged. 'l'homp. Carr. Pa11>!. p.
pnny, upon whose line the plolntlll' bad be·
UGO.
comP 11 pns11eni:er, seasonably to C'arry him
It appears from the testimony of plaint!!! to his destination. The fnct Is, however,
that be purchased his tickets for transporta- that the plalntltr and bis wife, while at Mlstlon at the otllce or the Union- Depot at St. soula, were not passPngers on the Northern
l'aul, and not at the office of the defendant ! Pnl•lftc Railroad, and the company operating
eompany, and that the persop. from whom that road had vlolntl'd no c1mtrnct with
he purchased them was engaged In selling them, or duty or oblii,.""lltlon concern!ng them.
tickets over various other lines of railway It can·led them safely and promptly to that
whose tmlns enterC'd and departed from that place, and thereby discharged Its whole
depot. Upon the trial the court permitted duty. lf plnlntltr had. on arriving there,
the plnlntllT, over the objection of dt>ft>ndunt, requested It lmmrolately to com·ey him to
to detail a conversation between hlwselr anti Spokane, the fact that Its road had been so
the ticket seller, which occurred at the ttme damaged by ftoods and high water that It
the plaintlft' purchased his tickets, In which could not move Its trains would have been
the ticket seller stated, among other things, a legal excuse for a failure to comply with
that defendant's trains were running such request. The plalntltr bad no right of
throu:;:h to Spokane on schedule time, and, action against the Northern Pacific Hallroad
tf there were no accldenta, plalntUr would Company for damai'es sutrered by reason of
ar11,·e at his cl<>Rtlnatlon on the morning of the delay at Missoula, and It therefore fol.Jnue ::!, 1894. It Is contended that thlB was lows that, It the defendant Is not llnble thereerror, fOT the reason that It was not shown for, the plalntltr ls without remedy, and
that the person who made these statements must sntrer a loss occasioned by no fault on
was an agent of the defendant, and author- his part. But we do not think that the plalnl:r.t>d to bind It by such declarations. But the tltr Is thus remediless. It wae his privilege,
fact that the tickets so sold were furnished If not hie duty, on being Informed that the
by the rnilway company, and were accepted defend11nt was unable to transport him In
as Its tlekets by the conductors of Its traJne, accordance with the terms of Its undertaking,
~ould seem to be sutllclent proof that the
to procure some other reasonable means of
seller was a tl<.>ket agent of the company, conveyance, and proceed on his journey.
and therefore clothed with the usual powers He chose what seemed to him, and appnr()f such agl'nts. It ls generally the fact that ently to the conductor of the !lefendant'tl
there Is no other person than the tlck~t train, to be the most direct and expediUous
agent at a railroad station who can give trav- route, and which, so far as we are advised,
~lers the ne<"essary Information as to the arwns the only one practicable. The omlsslo11
rhal, departure, and running time of trains, of the defendant to fulfill Its enimgement
and the rule, as fornmlatea by a learned text caused the plalntltr to seek transportation
writer, Is that passen1rers have a right, until over the No1·thern Pacific Railroad, and It Is
<>therwlse Informed, to rely on Information therefore justly liable for the expense therereceived by them from ticket agents, In an· by Incurred, Including that Incident to unswer to Inquiries concerning those matters, avoidable delay. 3 Suth. Dam. (2d Ed.) I
provided they do not disregard other reason- 936; 2 Sedg. Dam. (8th 1-;d.) I Sill.
ahle means of Information. 3 \Vood, R. R.
In answer to the question, "Now, Colonel,
(Minor's F.d.) 16.54. The testimony objectet\ I wish you would go on and state to the
to was certainly competent for the purpose jury what, 1t any, anxiety, worriment, etc.,
1
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you suffered on account of your delay, being

separated from your baggage, and all of

those things that are proper under the ruling

of the court, in consequence of this delay,"

the plaintiff was allowed, notwithstanding

the defendant's objection. to testify that he

was greatly worried, troubled, and annoyed

by the combination of circumstances sur-

roundin,:I; him at that time, among which

v.-cre that he had to pay out more money

than he had contemplated paying out; that

the Northern Pacilic Railroad Company‘

would not board him at Missoula, as they

did their passengers; his means were limit-

ed. and he did not know how long he had to

stay there; that he could not hear from

home, the telegraph line being broken down;

that his wife was taken sick, and lay in bed

three days, in consequence of her worriment,
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and that he could not make her comfortable

under the circumstances. Damages for

“worriment" and disappointment resulting

from such circumstances are too remote to be

recovered in this action. The mental anxi-

ety of the plaintiff induced by the sickness

of his wife and his inability to make her

comfortable, or his limited means, or his in-

ability to hear from home owing to the in(er-

ruption of telegraphic communication, can-

not be regarded as the proximate result of

the alleged'wrongful acts, or omissions of

the defendant, and the court therefore erred

in permitting this testimony to be submitted

to the consideration of the jury.

The court also erred, and for the same rea-

son, in instructing the jury generally that the

plaintiff was entitled to recover, for worry and

mental excitement, such sum as would fairly

and reasonably compensate him therefor.

"Damages will not be given for mere incon-

Yenience and annoyance such‘ as are felt at

every disappointment of one's expectations, if

there is no actual physical or mental injury."

1 Sedg. Dam. (8th Ed.) § 42. And hence

damages cannot be recovered for anxiety and

suspense of mind in consequence of delay

caused by the fault of a common carrier.

Trigg v. Railway Co., 74 Mo. 147; Hobbs v.

Railway Co., L. R. 10 Q. B. 111; Hamlin v.

Railway Co., 1 Hurl. & N. 408; Walsh v. Rail-

way Co., 42 Wis. 23. Nor, in an action against

I. railroad company for a refuml to carry,

can the plaintiff recover damages for fatigue

suffered by him in walking to his place of des-

tination, or for mental and physical suffering

caused by sickness contracted in such walk.

Railway Co. v. Thomas (Tex. Civ. App.) 27 S.

W. 411). But it is urged by the learned coun-

sel for pluintiff that this court, in the case of

Willson v. Railroad Co., 5 Wash. 621, 32 Pac.

468, and 34 Pac. 146. repudiated the doctrine

that damages cannot be recovered for mental

suffering which is not connected with physical

injury, and that the testimony and the instruc-

tion as to mental anxiety and excitement above

mentioned were in accordance with the prin-

ciple there announced. That was an action

for damages for an unlawful expulsion of a
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you s11ll'1'red on account of your delay, being
s1:pnrated from your ba~gage, and all of
those thin~s that are proper under the ruling
of tile C'ourt, in consequence of this d1>lny,"
the plaintiff was allowed, notwithstanding
the dPfendant's ohjPetion. to testify that he
was ~reatly worril•d, troullled, and annoyed
by the comhinutio11 of circumstances surro111111in~ him at that time, among which
v·cre that he hall to pay out more money
than he hnd cont1>111platell pa~·ing out; that
tlw North~·rn Pacitic Hallroad Company
wonhl ·not bo:1rd him nt ~lissoula, as they
did their passen~Prs; his menus were limited. uml he dill not know how long he hud to
stuy there; that he could not hear from
home, the telegraph line being broken down;
that his wife was taken sick, and lay In bed
three days, In consequence of her worriment,
and that be could not make her comfortable
under the circumstances. Damages for
"worriment" and disappointment resulting
from such circumstances are too remote to be
recovered In this action. The mental anxiety of the plaintltT lnduc<'d by the sickness
of his wite and his Inability to mnke her
('cmfortahle, or his limited means, or his Inability to hear from home owing to the Interruption or tele~raphlc communleation, cannot be regarded as the proximate l"C'sult of
the alle~ed" wrongful acts, or omissions of
the d!'fenrtant, and the court therefore errert
In pt>nnlttlng this testimony to be submitted
to the conslcleratlon of the jury.
The court also erred, and tor the same reaIKlU, In Instructing the jury generally that the
plnlnti!f was entitled to recover, for worry and
mental excitement, such sum as would fairly
and reasonably compen11ate him . therefor.
"Damages will not be given for mere lncon1'enlence and annoyance such' as are felt at
every disappointment of one's expectations, If
there ls no actual physical or mental Injury."
1 Sedg. Dam. (8th Ed.) I 42. And hence
damages cannot be recovered for anxiety and
1usperuie of mind In consequence of dl'lay
caused by the fault of a common carrier.
Trigg v. Railway Co., 74 Mo. 147; Hobbs v.
Railway Co., L. R. 10 Q. B. 111; Hamlin v.
Railway Co., 1 Hurl. & N. 408; Walsh v. Railway Co., 42 Wis. 23. Nor, 1n an action against
a railroad company tor a refusal to carry,
can the plaintiff recover damages for fatigue
1u1Tered by him ln walking to bis place of destlna tion, or for mel'tal and physical sutrerlng
caused by sickness contracted 1n 1uch walk.
Railway Co. v. Thomas (Tex. Clv. App.) 27 S.
W. 410. But lt is urged by the learned counsel tor plalntltr that this court, in the case of
Wlilson v. Railroad Co., 5 Wash. 621, 32 Pac.
468, and 34 Pac. 146, repudiated the doctrine
that damages cannot be recovered for mental
1uft'ering which 111 not connected with physical
Injury, and that the testimony and the Instruction as to mental anxiety and excitement above
mentioned were In accordance with the priilclple there announred. That was an action
tor damage!! for an unlawful expulsion of a

passenger from a railway train, and, while It
Is true that we held, in accordun<>e witll what
was deemed to be the weight o! a11tho1·ity.
that Ille plninti.IT was entitled to compensation
for the sense of wrong suffered and the feeling of hmuiliutlon and disgrace occnsioned by
the wrongful act, we did not undertake or Intend to announce any rule with respect to the
measure of damuges in a case like the one at
bnr. That case is clearly distinguislmhle on
principle from this, and the decision therein,
in our judgment, In no wise m!lltates against
the views we have here expre!!sed. ln the
\Vlll!!on Case the court proceelled upon the
theory that humiliation and mental distress
were the natural and proximate, If 11ot in fact
the necessary, result of the wrongful act of
the defendant; but In the present ease the
necessary element of proximity 111 wholly wanting: Tlle case of nallway Co. v. Berry ('.l'ex.
App.) 15 S. W. 48, clte<l by plnintil'f, aml
wlllch supports his contention, seems to us to
be contrary to sound policy, and opposed to
the general current of authority. In fact, the
trial court, In one portion of its charge to the
jury, recognized and announced what we bold
to be the correct doctrine, when It stated to
the jury that the plaintiff could not re<'<>Yer
damnges for any mental suffering experienc'('d
by l't'at1on of the refusal of the conductor or
the Northern Pacific Railroad Company to accept the tickets tendered to him by plalntilf
for transportation; and for what reason, then,
it told the jury that the plalntitl was entitled
to damages for mental anxiety and suft'.erlng
endured in consequenee of his delay, we are
unable to perceive. Surely no court could BBf
that, In contemplation of law, the mental agitation or excitement caused by being delayed
on a journey is of a different character from
that produced by unexpectedly having to pay
extra fare for transportation. The mental sensntlon 1n each case, whether it be called excitement, anxiety, annoyance, or worry, la
manifestly the result of disappointed hope or
expectation merely, for whlcb, as we have
seen, no damages can be awarded.
It appears from the evidence that the plaintitr is an attorney at law, and well known as
such at Spokane, but that he had not been
engaged 1n the practice of his profession for
two years prior to the time when his alleged
cause of action arose; and upon the trial he
testltled that he estimated the time lost by k1s
bl'ing delayed to be reasonably worth tl1e sum
of $2a per day. Two other attorneys were al80 called as wltnessses tor plainti!T, one of
whom stated that the services of attorneys of
the ability and learning of the plalntitr, who
were engaged in active practice in Spokane
during the month of June, 189-l, were worth
from $25 to $30 per day, and the other that
they were worth from $30 to $40 per day. All
of this evidence was objected to on the alleged ground that It was Lncompetent, irrelevant, and immaterial, and It ls here insisted
that the court erred In overruling the objection. Now, it la evident that, if the pla1ntltr
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was delayed in reaching his destination by the

fault of the defendant, he was damaged, on

account of lost time, to an amount exactly

equal to that which he would have earned by

the practice of his profession (for it is as a

lawyer only that he claims damages for loss

of time) had he been at home during such de-

lay; but to entitle him to a reco\ery it was

incumbent upon him to prove such amount by

competent and legal evidence. As to the proof

of damages for time lost by professional men.

Mr. Sedgwlck says: “In the case of most pro-

fessional men, there can be no way of ﬁxing

a general scale of vemuucratibn. The exclu-

sive services of such men cannot be measured -

by any pecuniary scale common to a whole

class. The most trustworthy basis of dam-

ages in such a case is the amount which the .

injured party has earned in the past. This is,
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nowever, only evidence from which the jury

will be enabled to say what the services of

such a man as the plaintiff are worth, and the

jury should distinctly understand that it is

not to be taken as the necessary and legal

measure of damages." 1 Sedg. Dam. (8th Ed.)

5 180. And this statement of law seems to

be amply supported by the authorities. It is

apparent, therefore, that the “most trustwor-

thy basis of damages" was not adopted in the

trial of this cause. There was no proof what-

ever of what the plaintiff actually earned as

an attorney, either before or after the particu-

lar time in question. Of course, he earned

nothing immediately before that time, because ,

he had not beﬁl engaged in the practice of the

law for the preceding two years; but, as he

resumed the practice of his profession imme-

upon the subject, and the question involved

was not one of science or skill, such as could

not be determined by a jury of ordinary intel-

ligence, without the aid of the opinions of oth-

ers. If facts only had been stated, the jury

could have drawn their own conclusions. Up-

on this issue the jury were instructed that for

_loss of time plaintiff was entitled to recover

such sum as his time at home, for the period

he was delayed by reason of defendant's fail-

ure to transport him, was reasonably and fair-

ly worth in his profe<sion or business; and as

an abstract proposition of law the instruction

was correct, but as‘ applied to the proofs it was

misleading. because it virtually authorized the

jury to adopt the amount stated by the plain-

tiff himself, or that which they might infer

from the testimony of either of the other wit-

nesses, to be the reasonable value of plaintiffs

time, as the absolute and certain measure of

damages. Even if it were conceded that the

evidence was admissible, and that it showed a

"general scale of remuneration" common to

all attorneys such as the plaintiff, the instruc-

tion would still be open to the same objection,

for it left out of consideration entirely the

probability that plaintlﬂ! would have had pro-

fessional empioyment had he been at home

during the period of his detention. Yonge v.

Stmmship Co., 1 Cal. 333; 3 Suth. Dam. (2d

Ed.) § 93"‘; 2 Sedg. Dam. (8th Ed.) § 863.
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was delayed In re&<'hlng his destination by the upon the 1mbject, and the question Involved
fault of the defendant, he was damag1>d, on was not one of science or skill, such as could
a(-count of lost tin1e, to an amount euc•tly not be determined by a Jury of Ol'dlnary lntrl('(JU:tl to that which he would have earned by llgence, without the aid of the opinions of oththe pntcll<'c of bis profl'si>lon (for It Is as a
trs. It facts only bud been stated, the jury
lawyn only that be clalws dumage!I for loss could bave tlrawn their own conclusions. l'po! tluw) bnd he been at borne during such deon this Issue the jury were lnstruch'Cl that tor
lay; but to entitle him to a reeovery It was .loss of time plnlntlff wns entitled to reeovPr
lncumb!'nt upon blw to prove such amount by sueh SUlll M his time at home, for the J•Prlod
comfl<'h'nt and lf'gal el'ldence. As to the proof he was del:i~·Nl by re:tl'!On of defrnilaut's failof 1l:u11:t1t€'S for time loi;t by prof«:>si;louul uwn.
ure to tnu1sport him, wns l'E'8SOMl>ly nn<l fulr~Ir. St>dgwlck says: "Io the case of wost pro- 1 1y worth In hh1 prufe~slon or bu,..ini>s."; nml us
frssional men, there cnn be no way of fixing an al1istrn<"t projlosition of lnw the lustmC"llon
a J!:l'l1€'ntl scale of remuueratlbn. The exduwa11 correct, but ns appllt>d to the proofs It w11s
slve services of sueb rn€'n <'annot be mensured mlslenrlluJ!', ht'<'lluse It \'irtnnJly authorized the
by any pecuniary &·ale common to a whole , jury to adopt the amount stated by the plnlnl'ltt:l..'I. The most trm•twortby basis of damtilr himself, or that which they might Infer
ages In such a rose Is t!J.e amount whkh the trom the testlmooy of either ot the other witInjured party has earned In the past. This Is, 1 nc8!14.'I!, to be the reasonable value of plalntltr's
.L1owf'ver, only evldt>nce from which the jury time, a8 the absolute and certaln measure of
will be enabll'd to say what the services of damages. Even lf It were conceded that the
such a man as the plalntllr are worth, and the evidence was admlsslble, and that It showed a
;Jury should distinctly understand that lt la
"general scale of remuneration" common to
not to be taken as the nCl'essary and legal all attorneys such as the plaintitr, the instrucmeasure of dnmnget1." 1 Sedg. Dam. (8th Ed.)
tion would etlll be open to the s:ime ohjeetlon,
I 180. And this statement of law IWems to for It left out of comdderntlon entlr1•ly the
be amply supported by the authorities. It II probRblllty that plalntll't would have bad proapparent, therefore, that the "most trustwor- fessional employment bad he been at home
thy basis of damagee" was not adopted In the during the period of his detention. Yonge v.
Rteamshlp Co., 1 Cal. 3.13; 3 Suth. Dam. (211
trial or this eaUBe. There was no proof whateTer of what ~be plnlntUr actually earned as F.d.) I 936; 2 Bedg. Dam. (8th Ed.) I Stl.~.
an attorney, elthf>r before or after the particu- The jury should have been cll11tlnctly charged
lar time In question. Of course, he earned to weigh that probllblllty, for the manifest reanothing Immediately before that time, because IOD that the plalntllr'1 right to damnget1 for
be had not be4!b enga~ In the practice ot the Jou ot time depended upon the fact whether
Jaw for tbe preceding two years; but, u he ' tbe time during whJch be wu delayed :woulil
resumed the practice ot hie profession Imme- bave been of pecuniary value to him It he had
diately after hie arrival at Spokane, we think arrived at bla delttlnat1011 without lfetentlon.
tt would have been proper to have 8hown
Under the Instruction as given the jury were
what be earned thereafter, not as eetablt11hln1 left to determine, 811 beet ttiey could, the
In Itself the value ot hJe time, but &8 evidence amount ot damages, without being Informed 8.1
to aid the jol'J' ln 4htlng It. It would even t.o the mle by which BUeb clamagee 8hould be
bave been penn!Mlltle to wbmlt to the con- meuured. It ls dUllcult, at beet, to determine
81deratlon of the jury, under proper ln8truc- the value of time ID a ca11e like this, where
tiona, proof of the earnings ot the plaintiff 1nch value Is not governed by any established
whe11 prevtou8ly enga~ In practicing law In rate of wages; and It ts therefore highly Imthe city ot Spokane; but we are Inclined to portant that the jul'J' should be fully Informed
the opinion that It was hardly proper to prove u to the rulell and prlnclples by which they
what the time ot practlclng attorneys wu should be guided.
What we have already uld rendel'B It un11wworth, u that would coDBtltute DO fair bula
ot d&magea, wbere the value of a penon'1 tlme eesary tor us to specially eonslder the rem11lndepeada BO much upon hla IDdivldual exer- 1ng points made by the defendant. The judgtiona. Neither WU It proper to permit the ment most be revel'l!led, and the cause rem1u1dplnlDtur hlmllelt to etate hJI own opinion or ed tor a new trial.
"estimate" of t:be value ot hl8 time, without
HOYT, C. J., and UORDON, J., eoDC!lll'.
aaatlng the facta upon which such oplnlon waa
balled. Indeed, the teetimony of each ol. the
DUNBAR, J. I dissent. I think no tmbwitnesses who teetlfted as to the value at u
attorney'• time wu subetantlally nothing mor. ltutial error wu committed bJ tbe eourt, and
than u expremlon at 1118 IDdlvldual oplnloa the Judcmeot !Would be aalrmed.
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SUMMERFIELD v. WESTERN UNION

TEL. CO.

(57 N. W. 973, 87 Wis. 1.)

Supreme Court of Wisconsin. Jan. 30, 1894.

Appeal from superior court, Douglas coun-

ty; Charles Smith, Judge.

Action by Fred G. Summeriield against

the Western Union Telegraph Company for

damages for delay in transmitting a mes-

sage. Judgment for plaintiff. Defendant

appeals. Reversed.

The other facts fully appear in the follow-

ing statement by WINSLOW, J.:

Action for damages for delay in the deliv-

ery of a telegram. Plaintiff resided on a

t‘-arm about 10 miles from the village of Iron

liiver, Wis.

D., with plaintiff's brother J. W. Summer-

ﬁeid. Defendant had an oﬂice at each of
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these places. October 23, 1892, J. W. Sum-

merﬁeld left at defendant's oﬂice at Lisbon

a message addressed to plaintiff, care of Burt

Clark, Iron River, reading as follows:

“Mother is dying. Come immediately. J.

W. Summerﬁeld." The fees for the transmis-

sion of the message were paid, but the evi-

dence tended to show that the message was

negligently delayed, and was not delivered

to Clark until October 28, 1892, and plaintiff

did not receive it until after noon of that day.

Plaintiffs mother died on the 26th day of

October. Plaintif f claimed that he would

have gone to his mother's bedside bad he re

ceived the telegram in due time, and that,

by reason of his failing to receive the mes-

sage until after his mother's death, he was

deeply “mortiﬁed, grieved, hurt, and shock-

ed, and suffered intense anguish of body and

mind, and was thereby thrown into a state

of nervous excitement and tremor, which ren-

dered him sick, and impaired his health and

strength, and that he still suffers from the

effect of the same." Upon the trial, objection

was made to the reception of any evidence

under the complaint, because it did not state

facts sufﬁcient to constitute a cause of ac-

tion, which objection was overruled, and ex-

ception was taken.

The court charged the jury, among other

things, as follows: “If you ﬁnd that the

message, in the exercise of ordinary dili-

gence, considering all the circumstances of

the case, was unreasonably delayed, and

that, if it had been delivered with reasonable

promptness, the plaintiff could and would

have responded thereto, and reached his

mother before her death, and that plaintiff

suffered mental pain from a sense of disap-

pointment, sorrow, chagrin, or grief at being

deprived of being at his mother's deathbed,

your verdict should be for the plaintiff in

such sum as will fairly compensate him for

his mental suffering and damages, if any, to

his nervous system, caused by the shock of

such mental suffering." A verdict for the

plaintiff for $652.50 was rendered, and, from

judgment thereon, defendant appealed.

His mother lived at Lisbon, N. '

..
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SUMMERFIELD v. WESTERN UNION
TEL. CO.
(57 N. W. 973, 87 Wis. 1.)
Supreme Court of Wisconsin. Jan. SO, 1894.
Appeal from superior court, Douglas county; Charles Smith, Judge.
Action by .Fred G. Rummerfield against
the Western Union Tel<-graph Company :tor
damages for delay In transmitting- a message. Judgment for plalntlJf. Defendant
appeals. Reversed.
The other facts fully appear In the following statement by WINSLOW, J.:
Action for damages for delay in tbe dellvery of a telegram. Plalntifr resided on a
farm about 10 miles trom the vlllage ot Iron
River, Wis. His mother lived at Lisbon, N.
D., with plaintiff's brother J. W. Summer·
field. Defendant had an office at ench of
these places. October 23, 181>2, J. W. Summerfield left at defendant's office at Lisbon
a message addressed to plulntul', cure of Burt
Clark, Iron River, reading as follows:
"Mother Is dying. Come Immediately. J.
W. Summerfield." The fees for the trunsmls·
slon ot the message were paid, but the evidence tended to show that the message was
negligently delayed, and was not delivered
to Clark until October 28, 1892, and plaintiff
did not receive lt until after noon or that day.
Plaintiff's mother died on the 26th day of
October. Plaintiff claimed that be would
have gone to his mother's bedside had he recel ved the telegram In due time, and that,
by reason of his tnlllng to receive the message until after his mother's death, he was
deeply "mortified, grieved, hurt, and shock·
ed, and suffered intense anguish of body and
mind, and was thereby thrown Into a state
of nervous excitement and tremor, which rendered him sick, and Impaired his health and
strength, and that he still suiters f1·om the
effect of the same." Upon the trial, objection
was made to the reception of any evidence
under the complaint, because 1t did not state
facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action, which objection was overruled, and exception was taken.
The court charged the jury, among other
things, as follows: "It you find that the
message, In the exercise of ordinary diligence, considering all the circumstances of
the case, was unreasonably delayed, and
thnt, If It had been delivered with reasonable
promptness, the plnlntlff could and would
have responded thereto, and reached his
mother before her denth, and that plaintiff
sufl't~red mental pain from a sense of disappointment, sorrow, chagrin, or grief at being
deprived of being at his mother's deathbed,
your verdict should be for the plaintiff in
such sum as wlll fairly compensnte him for
his mentn.l suffering and dumnges, If any, to
his ner>ous system, caused by the shock of
such mentnl suffering." A verdict for the
plaintiff for $t)!j!!.50 wns rendered, and, from
judgment th<>reon, dcfenlinnt appealed.

Catlin & Butler, Carl C. Pope, and La Follette, Harper, Roe & Zimmerman (Geo. H.
Fearons, ot counsel), for appellant.
Mental anguish alone, caused by the negllgent failure of a telegraph company to
promptly transmit and deliver a mesS11.ge,
will not sustain an action for damages by the
addressee. Wyman v. Leavitt, 71 Me. 22i,
230; Bovee v. Danville, 53 Vt. 183, 190;
Canning v. Wllll:unstown, 1 Cush. 451, 452;
Paine v. Railway Co., 45 Iowa, 569, 5i3, ti74;
City of Sallna v. Trosper, 27 Kan. 544, 564;
Keyes v. Railway Co., 36 l\Ilnn. 200, 293, 30
N. W. 888; Clinton v. Laning, 61 l\lich. 355,
361, 28 N. W. 125; Kennon v. Gilmer, 131 U.
S. 22, 26, 9 Sup. Ct. 696; Ewing v. Railway
Co., (Pa. Sup. 18U2,) 23 Atl. :~o; Railway
Co. v. McGinnis, 46 Kan. 109, 113, 26 Pac.
453; Commissioners v. Coultas, 13 App. Cas.
222, 225.

!\IcHugh, Lyons & Mcintosh, for respond·
ent.
"Mental anguish nnd sutrerlng occasioned
by the failure to dellver a telegraph message
are proper elements of damage In an action
against the telegraph company by the person
injured, and constitute grounds for recovery,
though no pecuniary loss Is shown." Telegraph Co. v. Newhouse, (Ind. App.) 33 N. E.
800; ft Suth. Dam. 260, 645; 37 Cent. Law
J. 61; Womack v. Telegraph Co., (TeL Civ.
App.) 22 S. W. 417; Bell v. Railway Co., L.
R. 26 Ir. 428; Railroad Co. v.tGritfin, (Tenn.)
22 S. W. 737; Beasley v. Telegraph Co., 39
Fed. 181; Telegraph Co. v. Stratemeier, (Ind.
App.) 32 N. E. 871; So Relle v. Telegraph Co.,
55 TeL 310; Young v. Telegraph Co., 107 N.
C. 370, 11 S. E. 1044; Reese v. Telegrnph Co.,
123 Ind. 294, 24: N. E. 163; Telegraph Co. v.
Henderson, 89 Ala. 510, 7 South. 410; Wndswortb v. Telegraph Co., 86 Tenn. 005, 8 S.
W. 574; Chapman v. Telegraph Co., (Ky.) 13
B. W. 880; Stuart v. Telegraph Co., 66 Tex.
580, 18 S. W. 351; Wlllson v. Railroad Co.,
(Wash.) 32 Pac. 468.
WINSLOW, J'., (after stntfng the facts.)
The exact question presented by the Instruction of the court to the jury ls whether mental anguish alone, resulting from the negllgent nondelivery of a telegram, constitutes
an independent basis for damages. At common law it was well settled that mere injury to the feellngs or aft'ectlons did not constitute an Independent basis for the recovery of damages. Cooley, Torts, 271; Wood's
Mayne, Dam. (1st Amer. Ed.) § 54, note L
It ls true that damages for mental suffering
have been generally allowed by the courts In
certain classes of cases. These classes are
well stated by Cooper, J., in his learned
opinion in the case of Tele1,'1-uph Co. v. Rogers, (Miss.) 9 South. 823, as follows: "(1)
Where, by the merely negllgent act of the
defendant, physical Injury has been sustained; and In tills clnss of c:1ses tht>y are com-

D.\:'11.\(: i..:.-.; FOH l'EH:-\0:\' .\ L l:\'.ll_;lHJ~.

D-\\i.\(ll&S FOR Pl-:ll.\‘()N.\L h\'.lURliu‘S.

pt-nsatory, and the reason given for their

allowance is that the one cannot be separat-

ed from the other. (2) In actions for breach

of the contract of marriage. (3) In cases of

willful wrong, especially those affecting the

liberty, character, reputation, personal se-

curity, or domestic relations of the injured

party." To this latter class belong the ac-

tlons of malicious prosecution, slander and

libel, and seduction, and they contain an ele-

ment of malice. Subject to the possible ex-

ceptions contained in the second and third

of the above classes, it is not believed that

there was any case,—certainly no we1l-con-

sidered case.—prior to the year 1881, which

held that mental anguish alone constituted

a suﬂicient basis for the recovery of dam-

ages. In that year, however, the supreme

court of Texas, in So Relle v. Telegraph Co.,

55 -Tex. 308, decided that mental sufforing
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alone, caused by failure to deliver such a

telegram as the one in the present case, was

suilicient basis for damages. The principle

of this case has been followed with some va-

riations, by the same court, in many cases

since that decision, and its reasoning has

been substantially adopted by the courts of

last resort in the states of Indiana, Ken-

tucky, Tennessee, North Carolina, and Ala-

bama, in cases which are cited in the briefs

of counsel. On the other hand, the doctrine

has been vigorously denied by the highest

courts in the states of Georgia, Florida, Mis-

sissippi, Missouri, Kansas, and Dakota, and

by practically the unanimous current of au-

thority in the federal courts. All of these

cases will be preserved in the report of this

case, and the citations need not be repeated

here. The question is substantially a new

one in this state, and we are at liberty to

adopt that rule which best commends itself

to reason and justice. It is true that it has

been held by this court, in Walsh v. Railway

Co., 42 Wis. 32, that, in an action upon

breach of a contract of carriage, damages

were not recoverable for mere mental dis-

tress; but, as we regard this action as being

in the nature of a tort action, founded upon

a neglect of the duty which the telegraph

company owed to the plaintiff to deliver the

telegram seasonably, that decision is not con-

trolling in this case. The reasoning in favor

of the recovery of such damages is, in brief,

that a wrong has been committed by defend-

ant which has resulted in injury to the plain-

tif! as grievous as any bodily injury could be,

and that the plaintiff should have a remedy

therefor. On the other hand, the argument

is that such a doctrine is an innovation upon

long-established and well-understood princi-

ples of law; that the diﬂiculty of estimating

the proper pecuniary compensation for men-

tal distress ls so great, its elements so vague,

shadowy, and easily simulated, and the new

ﬁeld of litigation thus opened up so vast,

that the courts should not establish such a

rule. Regarding. as we do, the Texas rule

as a clear innovation upon the law as it

-

p('n!"a.tory, and t11e reruion given for their
allowance ls that the one cannot be separated trom the other. (2) In actions tor breach
-0f the contract of marriage. (3) In cases of
wlll!ul wrong, especially those affecting the
liberty, chnracter, reputation, personal se...:urity, or domestic relations of the Injured
party." To this latter class belong the actions of ma liclons prosecution, slander and
libel, and seduction, and they conta.ln an elemmt of maliel'. Subject to the possible ex·
~<'ptions contained In the second and third
ot the above classes, It Is not believed thnt
there was nny cnse,-c<>rtainly no well-considered case.-prlor to the year 1881, which
hcltl thn.t mental anguish alone constituted
a sufficient basis tor the recovery of damages. In that year, however, the supreme
court ot Texas, In So Relle v. Telegraph Co.,
55 Tex. 300, decided that mc>ntnl sutfc>ring
alone, caused by failure to deliver such a
telegram as the one In the present case, was
sufficient basis tor damng-es. The principle
of this case has bc>en followed with some variations, by the same court, In many cases
81.nce that decision, and Its reasoning has
been substantially adopted by the courts ot
last resort ln the states of Indiana, Kentucky, Tennessee, North Carolina, nnd Alabama. In cases which are cited In the briers
-0! counsel. On the other hand, the doctrine
has been vigorously denied by the highest
-courts in the states of Georgia, Florida, :r.!lsslsslppl, Missouri, Kansas, and Dakota, and
by practlcn.lly the unanimous current ot authority In the federal courts. All of these
cases will be preserved In the report ot this
case, and the citations need not be repeated
here. 'l'he question Is substantially a new
one In this state, and we are at liberty to
adopt that rule which best commends Itself
to renson and justice. It ls true thnt lt has
been held by this court, In Walsh v. Railway
Co., 42 Wis. 32, that, In an action upon
breach of a contract of c.1rrlage, damages
were not recoverable tor mere mental dJstress; but, 118 we regard this action as being
tn the nature or a tort action, founded upon
a neglect ot the duty which the telegraph
company owed to the plnintll'f to deliver the
telegram seasonably, that decision Is not controlling In this case. The reasoning In favor
-0t the recovery or such damages ls, in brief,
that a wrong has been committed by defendant which has resulted ln Injury to the plaintiff as grievous as any bodily injury could be,
and that the plalntllr should have a remedy
theret'or. On the other hand, the ari;ument
ts that such a doctrine Is an Innovation upon
long-established and well-understood principles or law; that the difficulty of estlmatlng
the proper pecuniary compensation tor mental distress Is so great, Its elements so vague,
shadowy, and easily simulated, and the new
field of litigation thus opened up so vast,
that the courts should not <'Stablish such a
rule. Regarding. as we do, the Texas rule
as a clear Innovation upon the law as It
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previously erlsted, we shall decline to folio~
lt, and shall adopt the other view, namely,
that for mental distress alone, In such a case
as the present, damages are not recoverable.
The subject bas been so fully and ably discussed in opinions very recently delivered
that no very extended discussion will be attempted here. We refer specially to the
opinions In Telegraph Co. v. Rogers, (Miss.)
9 South. 823; Connell v. Telegraph Co., (l\Io.
Sup.) 22 S. W. 345; TelC'g-rapb Co. v. Wood,
57 l<'ed. 471. See, also, Judge Lurton's dissenting opinion In Wadsworth v. Teleg-rnph
Co., 86 Tenn. 695, 8 S. W. 574. In the lastnumed opinion the following very apt remarks are made: '"l'he reason why nn Independent action for such damai;:-es cannot and
ought not to be sustained ls found In the remoteness or such damages, and ln the metaphy:slcal character ot such an injury, considered apart from physical pain. Such Injuries
are generally more sentimental than substantial. Depending largely on physical and
nervous conditions, the suffering of one under precisely the same circumstances would
be no test ot the suffering of another. Vague
nnd shadowy, there Is no possible standard
by which such an Injury can be Justly compensated, or even approximately measured.
Easily simulated and Impossible to disprove,
It falls within all of the objections to speculative damages, which are universally excluded because or their uncertain character."
Another consideration which is, perhaps, or
equal Importance, consists In the great tidd
for lltlgntlon which would be opened by the
logical appllcatlon ot such a rule ot damages. If a jury must mensure the mental
sul:Ierlng occasioned by the failure to deliver this telegram, must they not also measure
the vexation and grief arising from a !allure to receive an lnvltntlon to a ball or a
Thanksgiving dinner? Must not the mortlflcatlon and chagrin caused by the public use
of opprobrious language be assuaged by money damages? Must not every wrongful act
wWch causes pain or grief or vexation to another be measured In dollars and cents?
Surely, a court should be slow to open so
vast a field as this without cogent and overpowering reasons. For ourselves we see no
such reasons. We adopt the language of
Gantt, P. J., In Connell v. Telegraph Co., supra: "We prefer to travel yet awhile super
antlquas vlas. It, ln the evolution of society
and the law, this innovation should be deemed necessary, the legislature can be safely
trusted to Introduce It, with those llmitatlons
and safeguards which wlll be absolutely necessary, judging from the variety or cases that
have sprung up since the promulgation or the
Texas case."
It was argued that under chapter 171,
Laws 1885, (Sunb. & B. Ann. St. § 1770b,)
damages tor Injuries to feelings alone might
be recovered. This law proYides that telegraph companies shall be llable tor all damages occasioned by failure or negligence or
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their operators, servants, or employee in re

celving, copying, transmitting, or delivering

dispatches or messages. We cannot regard

this statute as creating, or intended to create,

in any way, new elements of damage.

Whether its purpose was to obviate the dlﬂ:l-

culties which were held fatal to a recovery

in the case of Candee v. Telegraph Co., 34

Wis. 471, or to effect some other object, is

not a question which now arises; but it

seems clear to us that, had a radical change

in the law relating to the kinds of suffering

which should furnish a ground of damages

been contemplated, the act would have ex-

pressed that intention in some unmistakable

way. We see nothing in the law to indicate

such intention.

Finally, it is said that verdicts for injuries

to the feelings alone have been sustained in
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this court, and the muowmg cases are cnt*(l.

Wightman v. Railway Co., 73 Wis. 169, 40

N. W. 689; Craker v. Railway Co., 36 Wis.

657; Draper v. Baker, 61 Wis. 450, 21 N. W.

527. Without reviewing these cases in de-

tail, it is suﬂicient to say that there was in

all of them the element of injury or discom-

fort to the person, resulting either from actu-

al or threatened force, and they cannot be

relied upon as precedents for the allowance

of damages for mental sufferings alone.

It follows from these views that the instruc-

tion excepted to was erroneous. Judgment

reversed, and action remanded for a new

trial.

CASSODAY, J ., dissents.

DAMAGES FOR PERSONAL INJURIES.

•

their operators, BerVanta, or employes In receiving, copying, transmitting, or delivering
dispatches or messages. We cannot regard
this statute ns creating, or Intended to create,
lo any way, new elements ot damage.
Whether Its purpose was to obviate the dUllcultles which were held fatal to a recovery
in the case of Candee v. Telegraph Co., 34
"Wis. 471, or to eft'ect some other object, ls
not n question which now arises; but It
seems clear to us that, had a radical change
ln the law relating to the kinds of sutrerlng
which should furnish n ground of damages
been contemplated, the act would have U•
pressed that Intention In some unmistakable
way. We see nothing in the law to Indicate
such tntentlon.
Finally, lt ls said that verdict.& tor Injuries

to the feelings alone have been sustained 1D
Ulls l.'OUTt, UllU lilt! lOilOWlllg CUSt."ll ure Clll'U .
Wightman v. Railway Co., 73 Wis. 169, 40
N. W. 689; Craker v. Railway Co., 36 Wis.
657; Draper v. Baker, 61 Wis. 450, 21 N. W.
527. Without reviewing these cases lo detail, It ls sufficient to say that there was In
all of them the element of Injury or discomfort to the person, resulting either from actual or threatened force, and they cannot be
relied upon as precedents for the allowance
of dnmages for mental sutrerlngs alone.
It follows from these views that the Instruction excepted to w11s erroneous. Judgment
reversed, and action remanded for & new
trial

CASSODAY, J., dissent&

---- -- -

- -- - -- - - - - -

D.A)L.\.GES FOit l'EHSONAJ, INJUHlES.
DAMAGES FOR PE RS()NAL I.\J U R IES.

llAHO~EY

v. BELFORD.

(132 ~lass. afl3.)

443

MAHONEY v. BELFORD.

(132 Mass. 393.)

Supreme Judicial Court of ~lnss11chu11etts.
Suffolk. .llarch 3, 1882.

Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts.

Suffoik. March 3, 1882.

Exceptions from superior court, Suffolk

county; Staples, Judge.

Action by Dennis Mahoney against Charles

A. Belford for slander. Verdict for piaintil'f.

Exceptions by defendant. Exceptions over-

ruled.

Exceptions from superior court, Sntfolk
count)'; Staples, Jmlgi>.
A<·liou by Dennis )Jahmwy against CllarlPs
A. llt•lfonl for slnntle1·. \"l'r1\id for plai11tilf.
J~xeeptions by defendant.
Bxel~ptiuus o\·crrulP<I.
C. (;. KPycs, for plaintilf. H. Ill. Swa><ey,
for uefl'llllunt.

U. G. Keycs, for piaintiff. H. E. Swasey,

for defendant.

DEVENS, J. The defendant had charged

the plaintif f with stealing from his employer,

F. M. Weld. He had pleaded a justitication,

but at the trial did not seek to establish the

truth of the words alleged to have been ut-

tered. He did endeavor, in mitigation of

damages, and to show that the slander did
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not originate with himself. to offer testimony

as to the general reputation as to the plain-

tiff's having. during the time he lived with

Weld, and also at the time of the alleged

slander, stolen from him. In such an action,

evidence may be given of the general repu-

tation of the plaintiff in those respects in

which it has been assailed by alleged slander.

“'here one has been charged with theft, it

may be shown that he was generally reputed

a thief, in order thus to show that no serious

injury can have been inﬂicted on him. Clark

v. Brown, 116 Mass. 504. But what the de-

fendant sought to prove was not the plain-

tlffs general reputation, which was the gen-

eral character he had gained in the com-

munity by his course of life. but what was

the common rumor as to a particular transac-

tion, namely. his having stolen from Weld.

The defendant sought to show. not that the

plaintiffs general reputation was bad, but

that in a single instance he was generally re-

puted to have behaved badly. This would

have been to have proved the common talk

as to an individual subject of scandal. A

general report that the piaintit‘f is guilty of

the particular crime with which he was char-

ged cannot be received in evidence in mitiga-

tion of damages. Aidt-rman v. French, 1

Pick. 1; Bodwell v. Swan. 3 Pick. 876: Clark

v. Muusell, 6 \Ictc. t\Iass.) 373; Stone v.

\'arney. 7 \Iete. (\Iass.) 86: Peterson v. Mor-

gan. 116 Mass. 350.

Upon the qucrilltin of damages the court

instructed the jury "that they might consider

the injury, if any shown, to the mental feel-

ings of the plaintiff, which was the natural

and necessary result of the words used, if in

fact they were used as alleged, and were

slanderous; that mental suffering was an

element of damage." This was correct. The

words, if uttered at all, were uttered, as ap-

pears by the bill of exceptions, in an angry

dispute at an election, in the presence of

from twenty to sixty persons. While the evi-

dence was circumstantial. and not direct,

that the plaintlff had been actually damniﬁed

and had endured mental suffering in conse-

quence, “the occasion, circumstances, manner

UJo:\"J<;NS, J. Tlle tlefrmlaut llad charged
the plaiutlJ'I' with sh·aling frow his em11loyer,
I<'. M. Weld. He had pleatled a justification,
but at the trial d1d not seek to establish tile
truth of the words alleged to hnw been uttered. He did entlea vor, in mlt igatlon of
llumnges, and to show that thl' i;Jnntll'r did
not originate with himself, to otl'Pr 11•stimony
as to the g(•ueral reputation as to the plaintil'l''s ha'l'lng, during the time he llvetl with
Weld, Rlld also at the time of the alleged
slandei:. stolen from him. In such an action,
evidence may be gl¥en of the general reputation of the plalntllT In those t'PS!lects In
which It bas been assailed by alleged slan4ler.
Where one has been charged with theft, It
may be shown that be was gene1·ally reputed
a thief, In order thus to show that no serious
Injury can have been Inflicted on him. Clark
v. Brown, 116 Mau. 504. But wbat tbe defen<lant sought to prove was not the plalntllf's general reputation, which was the general character he bad gained In the community by his COUl'lle of life, but what was
the common rumor as to a particular transaction, namely, bll having stolen from ·weld.
The defendant sought to show, not that the
plalntllr's general reputation wa!I bad, but
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that ln a single Instance he was generally reputed to have behaved hadly. This would
ha'l'e been to have proved the common tnlk
as to an lnlllvldual subject of scandal. A
general report that the plaintllT is guilt~· <•!
tile particular crime witll which he was charged cannot Le rPet>i\·cd in evidence lu mi!igatiun of damagl's. Al1h·rrnau v. Frnncb, 1
Piek. 1; Ro1lwdl v. Swait. :l Pick. 3ill: Clark
v. :\hws..11. U :\Ie1e. (:\lass.) :r1:~; !'tone ,..
Yt1rth·~·. 7 )!Pk. 1 '.\l:1ss.) 84i: P1•ter,;11u ,., Morgan. 116 .!'llass. ;~:;o.
l'pon the qu1·~lion of damngcs thl' court
instructed the jury "th11t thPy miglll 1·011sitl1·r
the injury, If any shown, to the mentnl feelings of the plaintiff, which was the natural
an<l necessary result of the words used, If In
fact they wne used as alleged, and were
slanrlerous; that ment11l sul'l'erlni:r was an
element of damnge." This was correct. The
wor<ls, If uttered at all, were uttered, as appears by the bill of exceptions, In an angry
dispute at an election, In the presence of
from twenty to sixty persons. While the evidence was circumstantial, and not dlrPct,
that the plaint!IT had been actually damnlfted
and bad endured mental ilul'l'erlng In consequence, "the occasion, circumstances. manner
arnl nature" of the alleged slander werP s11d1
as warranted tbe plalntltr In contemling that
they had occasioned actual Injury arul mental
sul'l'erlng, and In seeking substnntinl damai:rPs
therefor. "Undoubtedly,'.' said Chief .TuRtlN•
Bigelow In Markham v. Russell, 12 Allt>11.
573, "the material element of damage In au
action tor slander ls the Injury done to chnracter. But it Is not the 10le element. A
jury may have a rigbt al8o to consider the
mental sul'l'erlng which may have been occasioned to a llarty by the publication of the
slanlleroue words." See, also, Marble v ..
Chapin, 132 Mll88. 225.
Excepttoni overrule4.
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(30 Pac. 195, 94 Cal 29.)

CAHILL v. MURPHY. (No. 14,047.)

(30 Pac. 195, 94 Cal. 29.)

Supreme Court of California. March 26, 1892.

Commissioners' decision. Department 2.

Appeal from superior court, Humboldt coun-

ty; G. W. Hunter, Judge.

Action by Mary Cahill against Daniel Mur-

phy for slander. From a judgment for plain-

tiff, and from an order denying his motion

for a new trial, defendant appeals Afﬁrm-

ed.

Frank McGowan, for appellant.

Supreme Court of California. March 26, 1892.

Commissioners' decision. Department 2.
Appeal fl'om superior court, Humboldt county; G. W. Hunter, Judge.
Action by l\Iary Cahlll against Daniel Murphy for slander. From a judgment tor plaintirf, and from an order denying bis motion
for a new trial, defendant appeals. Atll.rmed.
Frank McGowan, for appellant. J. H. G.
"'envcr, for respondent.

Weaver, for respondent.

J. H. G.

FITZGERALD, O. This is an action for

slander. The complaint alleges, in sub-

stance, that oil or about the 21st day of Sep- ‘

tember, 1889, and for a long time prior

thereto, plaintiff, with her children, occupied
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certain rooms in an hotel of which the de-

fendant was owner and proprietor; that one

of these rooms was situated on the ground

ﬂoor of the hotel, and used by her for the

purpose of carrying on and conducting a gen-

eral merchandising business; that on said

last-mentioned date, the soot in the chimney

leading from the room used as a store be-

came ignited, causing an alarm of ﬁre to be

given; and it is further alleged, upon in-

formation and belief, that the ﬁre was com-

municated to the soot in the chimney from a

ﬁre in the stove situated in said store. The

slanderous words, out of which this action

arose, are alleged to have been falsely and

maliciously spoken by the defendant of and

concerning the plaintiff, and are laid as fol-

lows: “This is twice you [the plaintiff mean-

ing] have tried to burn us [the said hotel

meaning] out to get your fourteen hundred

dollars insurance. But I will report you

[the said plaintiff meaning] to the insurance

company to-morrow morning, and have your

insurance taken away from you." It is fur-

ther alleged that the defendant, by the use

of these words, intended to convey the mean-

ing that the plaintif f willfully and malicious-

ly communicated the ﬁre to the soot in said

chimney, and that by so doing she was

guilty of an attempt to commit the crime of

arson. and that they were so understood by

those in whose presence they were uttered,

to the damage of plaintiff's character and

business in the sum of $10,000. A demurrer

was interposed to the complaint, which, upon

the grounds stated, was properly overruled.

Defendant therenpon answered, speciﬁcally

denying the material allegations of the com-

plaint, and, upon the issues thus joined,

plaintiff had verdict and judgment for $1,200.

The only error complained of, which we

deem it necessary to consider, relates to the

ruling of the court upon defendant's objec-

tion to the following question propounded to

plaintiff on her examination in chief as a

witness, and after she had testiﬁed, without

objection, that she had “a family of four

children." “Question. How many of them

are dependent upon you for support?" (Ob-

FITZGEllALD, C. This ls an action tor
slander. 'l'he complaint alleges, ln substance, that on or about the 21st day of September, 1889, and for a long tlme p1ior
tLe1·eto, plaintiff, with her children, occupied
certain rooms In an hotel of which the defendant was owner and proprietor; that one
of these room;; was situated on the ground
floor of the hotel, and used by her for the
purpose of carrying on and conducting a general merchandising business; that on said
lase-mentioned date, the soot ln the chimney
·kadiug from the room used as a store became Ignited, causing an alarm ot fire to be
given; and It ls further alleged, upon Information and belief, that the fire was communicated to the soot in the chimney from a
fire in the stove situated In said. store. The
slanderous words, out of which this action
arose, are alleged to have been falsely and
maliciously spoken by the defendant of and
concerning the plalntit'f, and are laid a.s follows: "This le twice you [the plalntlt'f meaning] have tried to burn us [the said hotel
meaning] out to get your fourteen hundred
dollars Insurance. But I will report you
[the said plaintitr meaning] to the Insurance
company to-morrow morning, and have your
insurance taken away from you." It Is further alleged that the defendant, by the use
of these words, intended to convey the meaning that the plalntlt'f willfully and maliciously communicated the fire to the soot ln said
chimney, and that by so doing she was
guilty of an attempt to commit the crime ot
arson. and that they were so understood by
those In whose presence they were uttered,
to the damage of plaJntllT's character and
bui:iness in the sum of $10,000. A demurrer
was Interposed to the complaint, which, upon
the "rounds stated, was properly overruled.
Defendant thereupon answered, speclfica.lly
denying the material allegations of the complnlnt, and, upon the Issues thus joined,
plain tin' had verdict and judgment for $1,200.
The only error complained of, which we
de<'m It necessary to consider, relates to the
ruling of the court upon defendant's objection to the following question propounded to
plnintlfl' on her exnmlnntlon In chief as a
witness, and after she had testified, without

1

objection, that she had "a family of four
children." "Question. How many of them
are dependent upon you for support?" ~Ob
jected to on the ground that the question 'ls
incompetent and Immaterial.' The objection
was overruled by the court, and defendant
excepted.) Answer. Three are dependent upon me at present." It ls claimed that the
effect and purpose of this testimony W!lJ! to
arouse the sympathies and sentimental feelings of the jury, to the prejudice of def<:!ndant's case, by the introduction of an element
that did not belong to lt, and which the jury
could not properly consider ln the assessment of damages. In Rhodes v. Naglee, 06
Cal. 081, G Pae. 863, the ruling of the court
below permitting the plaintiff, against defenda n t's objection, to prove that he was a
married ma.n, and had a famlly, was held
not to be erroneous. And ln Dixon v. Allen,
G() Cal. 527, 11 Pac. 179, the mother of the
plnJntur was allowed to testify as to the
number of her chlldren, their ages, and the
death of her husband. The rule laid down
by this court In those cases rests upon the
principle (although not stated) that, as mental suffering entitled the plalntlt'f to compensation In cases of this character, such sutrerlng may be lncroosed, and the damages consequently enhanced, by the fact that the
members of the plalntlt'f'e famlly would suffer by reason of the disgrace visited upon
her by the slanderous charge. It was therefore competent In this case, on the question
ot damages, to prove the number and ages
ot plaintiff's cblldren; but that they were
dependent on her for support was Irrelevant,
and not within the issues raised by the
pleadings; therefore erroneous. But was lt
such a material error as would justify a reversal? Tbe rule ln this state le well settled that injury will be presumed from error unless the record affirmatively shows to
the contrnry. It wa.s competent, as we have
stated, for the plaintiff to prove the number
and ages of her children, and, If lt appeared
from the evidence that they were minors,
the presumption would be that they were
naturally and legally dependent on her tor
support. The effect, therefore, of such evidence would be the same as It proven by
direct testimony. The evidence upon which
the verdict was founded shows that the slanderous words charged were spoken wantonly
and maliciously. The plalntlt'f was therefore entitled to recover of the defendant exemplary or punitive damages, and the assessment ot such damages was almost entirely
ln the discretion of the jury. In view, therefore, of the enormity of the charge, and the
i;ltuatlon of the parties, the plaintifl' being 1t
defenseless woman, coupled with the amount
of damages awarded by the jury as compared with the sum sued for, we are satisfied
that the jury was not lnfiuenced by this evi·
dencc prejudicinlly to the defendant's case
'l'he verdict might well have been for a ruucl:
larger sum, und yet not obnoxious to the olJ.

DAMA.UES FOR PERSONAL INJURIES.
DAMAGES FOR PERSONAL INJURIES-
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jection that it was excessive. In this case

we think the evidence immaterial, and its ad-

mission by the court a mere technical error.

People v. Fick, 89 Cal. 144, 26 Pac. 759. The

judgment and order should be aﬂirmed, and

we so advise.

We concur: TEMPLE, C.; FOOTE, 0.

PER CURIAM. For the reasons given in

the foregoing opinion the judgment and or-

der are aﬂirmed.
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Hearing in bank denied.

jectlon that It was excessive. Io this case
we think the evidence immaterial, and its admission by the court a mere technical error.
People v. Fick, 89 Cal. 144, 26 Pac. 759. The
judgme11t and order should be atnrmed, and
we so advise.
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We concur: TEMPLE, C.; FOOTEJ, C.

PER CURIAM. For the reasons given In
the foregoing opinion the judcment and order are a11lrmed.
Hea.riog In bank denied.
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AGGRAVATION OF DA .\L\GES.

(27 Ohio St. 292.)

HAY.\'Elt v. COWDEN.

(27 O1l1o St. 292.)

Supreme Court of Ohio. Dec. Term, 1875.

Supreme Court of Ohio. Dec. Term, 1875.

Error to district court, Miami county.

Error to district court, Miami county.

James Murray, J. T. Janvier, and H. G.

Sellers, for plaintiff in error. Conover &

Craighead and Morris & Son, for defendant

James Murray, J. T. Janvier, and H. G.
Selle1-s, for plnlntil'r In error. Conover &
Craighead and Morris & Son, tor defendant
lu en-or.

in error.

WRIGIIT, J. The slander alleged in the ‘

petition consists in falsely charging plaintiff,

a minister of the gospel, with drunkenness.

It is also averred that the words were spok-

en of and concerning him in his ministerial

profession and pastoral oﬂice. The demurrer

admits all that is averred, and thus this

question is raised: ' ar e

a minister of the gospel with drunkenness,

w en spoken of him in hi$_DJ.‘.Q£eS8l01l.or_mlL-

ing, acdonablgpersg? We answer that they
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are. We understand the rule to be, that

woLdispol§e,!l_9La_p_ersnnc.tend1n,p10_JnJ11re

him 1n 1iT§_Qiﬂ$&._pmfessmnnnlmdaane_thns

WM. 1 Starkie, Sland. 9; Townsh.

and. & L. § 182; 2 Add. Torts, 957 (section

2, c. 17, Edition of 1876 of this book, has a

large collection of authorities on the sub-

ject); 1 Am. Lead. Cas. 102; Fouiger v. New-

comb, L. R. 2 Exch. 327; Demarest v. Har-

ing, 6 Cow. 76.

Calling a clergyman a drunkard was held

actionable in McMillan v. Birch, 1 Binney,

176; Chaddock v. Briggs, 13 Mass. 251.

Such words are actionable because they

tend to deprive him of the emoluments which

pertain to his profession, and may prevent

his obtaining employment. It is not, as

counsel seem to suppose, that giving a

clergyman this right of action is because his

oiiice is higher than that of his fellow men.

It is a right which belongs to all who have

professions or callings, and in this clergy-

men are not different from others.

This principle is entirely different from

that upon which proceeded the cases of Hol-

lingsworth v. Shaw, 19 Ohio St. 430; Dial v.

Holter, 6 Ohio St. 228; Alfele v. Wright, 17

Ohio St. 238. In all these, the words im-

puted a criminal offense, and did not relate

to profession or calling.

Upon the trial of the case, it was insisted

by defendant that the words were not spo-

ken of the plaintiff in his character as a min-

ister. The court fairly left this to the jury,

and said if they were not so spoken, they

would ﬁnd for defendant . The jury ﬁnd this

issue for the plaintiff, and in the face of

that ﬁnding, it is impossible for us, sitting

as a court of error, to say that they were not

spoken of the plaintiff in his character or

capacity as a clergyman. If they were as

we have seen, they are actionable.

In the cases cited by defendant—Lumly v.

Allday, 1 Tyrw. 217; Brayne v. Cooper, 5

Nit'es. & W. 249; Ayre v. Craven, 2 Adol. &

E. 2; Buck v. Henly, 31 Me. 558; Redway v.

Gray, 31 Vt. 292; Van Tapel v. Capron, 1

Denio, 250—it was held that the words spo-

ken did not touch the plaintiffs in their va-

WRIGHT, J. The slander alleged In "the
petition consists In falsely charging plalntil'r,
a minister ot the gospel, with drunkenness.
It Is also averred that the words were 8poken of and concerning him In his ministerial
p1·ofesslon and pastoral ottl.ce. The demurrer
admits all that Is averred, aud thus tllls
question Is raised: 6i:e words which chargg
a minister of the gospel with dr1lIJkenuess,
when sroken of him In his 12cotess!on or cplllni,r ac ona~le ~er se? We answer that they
are. We unClersfnnd the rule to be, that
~ords spoke_n 9t a ;person tending to Injure
hfi.lllD1ilSOttice. p!'Qfesslon or trade are tbns
actionable. 1 Starkie, Sland. 9; Townsh.
Sfaud. & L. § 182; 2 Add. Torts, 957 (section
2, c. 17, Edition ot 1876 ot this book, has n
large collection ot authorities on the subject); 1 Am. Lead. CnB. 102; Foulger v. Newcoinb, L. R. 2 Exch. 327; Demarest v. Haring, G Cow. 76.
Calling a clergyman a. drunkard WnB held
actionable ln McMlllan v. Birch, 1 Binney,
176; Chaddock v. Briggs, 13 Mass. 251.
Such words are actionable because they
tend to deprive him ot the emoluments which
pertain to his profession, and may prevent
his obtaining employment. It ls not, as
counsel seem to suppose, that giving a
clergyman this right ot action le because hie
omce le higher than that ot his fellow men.
It le a right which belongs to all who have
p1-ofesslone or callings, and In this clergymen are not dlfrerent from others.
This principle Is entirely different from
that upon which proceeded the cases of Hollingsworth v. Shaw, 19 Ohio St. 430; Dial v.
Holter, G Ohio St. 228; Altele v. Wright, 17
Ohio St. 238. In all these, the words Imputed a criminal ofreuse, and did not relate
to profession or calling.
Cpon the trial of the case, It was Insisted
by defendant that the words were not spoken or the plalntlfr In his character as a minister. The court fairly lett this to the jury,
nnd imld If they were not so spoken, they
would find for defendant. The jury find this
Issue for the plalntifr, and In the face of
that finding, it ls Impossible for us, sitting
ns a court of error. to say that they were not
F:poken of the plalntltr In his character or
cnpadty as a clergyman. It they were a.s
we ha,·e seen, they a.re actionable.
In the <>nRes cited by defendnnt-Lumly v.
All<lny, 1 Tyrw. 217; Brnyne v. Cooper, 5
:'lll'es. & W. :H!:l; Ayre v. Craven, 2 Adol. &

nA~L\(a;s.

E. 2; Buck v. Henly, 31 Me. 558; Redway v.
Gray, 31 Vt. 292; Van Tapel v. Capron, 1
Denio, 250-lt was held that the words spoken did not touch the plalntifrs In their various trades or employments. But to charge
a minister with drunkenness does have such
nu effect. Congregations would not employ
clergymen with Intemperate habits, and the
development of such a vice would be cause
for speedy removal from omce. When the
question ls reduced to a mere matter of dollars and cents, the purity, the Integrity, the
uprightness ot a minister's life ls his capital
in this world's business.
Against the objection made, plalntU'l ofrered evidence ot the ~Ith of the defendant,
and In the charge the court said this evidence might be considered In connection
with the question ot exemplary damages.
We see no error In the admission ot the evidence or the charge of the court upon the
subject. That punitive or exemplary damages In a proper case may be given is not an
open question In Ohio. In Roberts v. Mason, 10 Ohio St. 277; Smith v. Pittsburg, Ft.
W. & O. Ry. Co., 23 Ohio St. 10, the court
allowed the jury to consider the woolth of
defendant In connection with the question of
punitive damages. It, then, punishment be
an object of a verdict, a small sum would
not be felt by a defendant of large wealth.
The vengeance of the law would scarcely be
appreciated, and he could atrord to pay and
slander still. There are cases which put
the admission ot the evidence upon th1s
ground. Alpln v. Morten, 21 Ohio St. 536, Intimates that the reason ls to enable the jury
to determine how much plalntll'r has been
lnjured. This case collects the authorities
on both sides of the question, to which
might be added McBride v. Laughlln, 5
Watts, 375; Wagoner v. Richmond, Wright,
173; Sexton v. •.rodd, Id. 320; 2 Green!. Ev.
249; 1 Am. Lead. Cas. 199, note 6; Horsley
v. Brooks, 20 Iowa, 115; Buckley v. Knapp,
48 Mo. 153. We see no error In the admission of the evidence, or the charge of the
court on the subject.
-There are some other questions raised by
counsel, to which we briefly allude:
The defendant asked the court to charge
the jury: "It they find that the words
spoken by the defendant ot and concerning
the plaintiff were untrue, and that the defendant has not reasonable cause to believe
them to be true, yet, If they are satisfied
from the evidence that the defendant did believe them to be true, such state ot facts
would not warrant a verdict tor punitive or
exemplary damages, but for compensatory
damages only." With which request the
court refused to comply, but, on tbe contrary, charged the jury that such was not
the law, to which the defendant then and
there excepted.
We do not understand the lnw of slander
to be, that It ls a defense that the slanderer
believed his words to be true, when he had

AGGRAVATION OF DAMAGES.
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no grounds for so believing. Beliei‘ must

have a foundation in something. Take

away the foundation, and what can be left?

The charge seems to us a solecism. Belief

can only be claimed as a defense, or in mit-

igation, where it is based upon such facts or

reasons as wopld incline a reasonable per-

son so to believe. Inasmuch as this charge

was asked in reference to exemplary dam-

ages, and there was evidence tending to

show that the words had been spoken under

circumstances indicating wantonness and

recklessness, the charge was properly re

fused.

It appears to be seriously argued that in a

minister oi‘ the gospel a single act of intox-

ication is not a fault, and therefore a charge

of that kind cannot be injurious. We can

hardly assent to this proposition. In a re-
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ligious teacher one offense of the kind must

be considered a grave departure from pro-

priety and duty; and to say that the act has

been committed is calculated to impair use-

fuiness.

As to the question of excessive damages:

The verdict was large; still we do not think

defendant can complain, in view of all the

circumstances of the case.

Judgment aﬂirmed.

SCOTT, C. J., and WHITMAN and JOHN-

SON, JJ., concurred. DAY, J., dissented.

no grounds for so beHevlng. Belief must
have a foundation In something. Take
away the foundation, and what can be left?
The charge seems to us a solecism. Belief
e11u only be claimed as a defense, or In mitigation, where It Is based upon such facb1 or
reasons as wopld Incline a reasonable person so to believe. Inasmuch as this charge
was asked In reference to exemplary damages, and there was evidence tending to
show that the words had been spoken under
circumstances indicating wantonness and
n>eklessness, the charge was properly r&
fused.
It appears to be seriously argued that In a
minister of the gospel a single act of lntox-
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lcatlon ls not a fault, and therefore a charge
of tllat kind cannot be lnjurlou11. We can
hardly assent to this proposition. In a religious teacher one offense of the kind must
be considered a grave depa1"ture from propriety and duty; and to say that the act has
been committed Is calculated to impair usefulness.
As to the question of exceBBlve damages:
The verdict was large; still we do not think
defendant can complain, In view of all the
circumstances of the case.
Judgmeni affirmed.
SCO'I'T, C. ;J., and WHITMAN and JOHNSON, JJ., concurred. DAY, J., dissented.
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BENNET!' v. HYDE.
AGGRAVATION OF DAMAGES.

BENNETT v. HYDE.

(6 001111. 24.)

(6 Conn. 24.)

Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut.
Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut. July,

July,

1825.

1825.

Action for slander. Verdict for plaintiff.

Heard on motion for new trial. Motion de-

nied.

tileaveland & Frost, for the motion. God-

dard & Judson, opposed.

Action for slander. Verdict tor plalntltr.
Heard on motion tor new trial. Motion deuied.
{'.Jc:t v<>land & Frost, for the motion.
danl & Judson, opposed.

God-

HOSMER, C. J. The evidence in a cause

must be conﬁned to the points in issue; and

the character of either party cannot be en-

quired into, unless put in issue expressly, or

by the nature of the proceeding itself. 1

Phil. Ev. 139.

in this case, conformably to the established

doctrine of our courts, the character of the

plaintiff was in issue. It was the object of

the defendant's attack; the injury to it is

the gravamen complained of; and for the
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vindication of it, the present action was in-

stituted. It was said, by Chief Justice Kent,

in Foot v. Tracy, 1 Johns. 46, 52: “The char-

acter of the plaintiff must be considered as '

coming in, at least collaterally, upon the

trial;" and this court, in Stow v. Converse,

4 Conn. 42, which was an action for a libel,

declared that “the plaintiff's character may

in'_nmx_eil_Ll1ecanse_t is m issue," The plain-

tiff's character is not made the subject of

enquiry, at the defendant's option, and shut

out of view, or the subject of investigation,

as shall best subserve the defendant's pleas-

ure and interest. To a rule so inequitable,

for the want of mutuality, the courts in this

state have never acceded; but they have

recognized and acted on the principle, that

the ﬁnal object of the plaintiffs suit, is the

vindication of his character; and that his

reputation, of consequence, is put in issue,

by the nature of the proceeding itself. The

case of Rawson against Hungerford, in Mid-

dlesex county, is not merely analogous with

this, but goes beyond it. In an action for

the breach of a promise of marriage, the

character of the plaintiff was considered to be

so far in issue as to authorize the reception

objcction,—not to sustain it from attack, but

to prove its excellence.

It has been frequently adjudged, in this

state, and may be considered as established

law, that the plaintiff in an action of slander

may prove the amount of the defendant's

property to aggravate damages; and, on the

other hand, that the defendant may recur to

the same evidence for the purpose of miti-

gating them. The same rule is deducible

from the law of Massachusetts (Larned v-

Buﬂinton, 3 Mass. 546); admitting evidence

in proof of the plaintiff's rank and condition,

to increase the damages, or to lessen them,

according as the facts should be found. It

is not to be inferred, that the damages are.

of course, to be proportioned to the defend-

ant's property; but merely that property

forms an item, which, in the estimate, is

deserving of regard. Great wealth is gen-

erally attended with correspondent inﬂuence:

and little inﬂuence is the usual concomitant

HOSMEU, C. J. The evidence in a cause
must be confined to the points in issue; lllld
the character of either party cannot be en11ulrcd into, unless put In Issue exp1·essly, or
lJy the nature of the proceeding itself. 1
l'hll. E\•, 139.
ln this case, conformably to the estaullshed
doctrine of our courts, the character of the
11laintltr was in issue. It was the object of
the defendant's attack; the injury to it is
the gravamen complained of; and for the
vindication of It; the present action was Instituted. It was said, by Chief Justice Kent,
In Foot v. Tracy, 1 Johna. 46, 152: "The character of the plalntllf must be considered as
coming In, at least collaterally, upon the
trial;" and this court, in Stow v. Converse,
4 Conn. 42, which was an action for a libel,
declare1l that "the plaintiff's character may
he 11roveil. because It 1s In Issue." The plaintiff's character ls not made the subject of
cnquh'y, at the defendant's option, and shut
out of view, or the subject of investigation,
as shall best subserve the defendant's pleasure and interest. To a rule BO inequitable,
tor the want of mutuality, the courts in this
state have never acceded; but they have
recognized and acted on the principle, that
the final object of the plalntltrs suit; ls the
vindication of bis character; and that bis
reputation, of consequence, ls put in issue,
by the nature of the proceeding Itself. The
case of Rawson against Hungerford, in Middlesex county, ls not merely analogous with
this, but goes beyond lt. In an action for
the breach of a promise of marriage, the
character of the plalntltr was considered to be
so tar lo issue as to authorize the reception
of evidence, in opposition to the defendant's

objL<t:tlun,-uot to sustain it from attack, but
to prove its excellence.
It has been frequently adjudged, In thi~
stnte, aml may be considered as established
law, that the plaintlft'. In an action of slandet>
may prove the amount of the defendant's.
property to aggravate damages; and, on the
other hand, that the defendant may recur t<>
Utt> same evidence for the purpose of mitigating them. The same rule ls deducible
from the law of Massachusetts (Larned v.
Butllnton, 3 Mass. 546); admitting evidence
In proof of the plal11tlft''s rank and condition.
to Increase the damages, or to lessen them.
according as the facts should be found. It
ls not to be Inferred, that the damages are.
of course, to be proportioned to the defendant's property; but merely that property
forms an Jtem, which, 1n the estimate, Is
deserving of regard. Great wealth Is generally attended with correspondent intluence ~
and little lntluence Is the usual concomitant
of little property. The declarations of a man
of fortune concerning the character ot another, like a weapon thrown by a vigorous
band, will not fall to inti.let a deeper wound
than the same declarations made by a man of
small estate, and, as a consequence· not uncommon, of small lntl.uence. Property, therefore, may be, and often ls, attended with the
power of pemetratlng great d~, and, lo
the estimate of a Jury, becomesu terestlng
enquiry. I am not asserting what ought t<>
be, but what ls; and that the degree of Injury, necessarily, ls dependent, In some measure, on the considerations before mentionedWbether the rule that the amount of the defendant's property, in the action of slander.
may be enquired Into, originated solely from
those principles In combination with the Justice and propriety of admitting somewhat of
a penal sanction, In cases, in which the most
atrocious calumny ls not punishable In a criminal prosecution, I do not declare. But that
such rule does exist, and has uniformly been
recognized In our courts, Is unquestionable;
and It ls not the subject of regret; that the
reputations ot the l11Docent and estimable
thus have an addltlonal shield against the
malice ot the calumniator.
The other judges were of the same opinion.
1 New trial not to be granted.
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(tl4 Me. 5:>3.)
J()HXS().\' v. .\‘\IUl‘H.

(64 Me. 553.)

Supreme Judicial Court of Maine. 1875.

Trespass by George W. Johnson against

Mannsseh Smith for assault and battery.

\'erdict for plaintiff. Heard on defendant's

exceptions. Exceptions sustained.

The exceptions were as follows: “The de-

fendant offered evidence of his property and

means. as~'[Téa'ring upon te matter. of puni-

tive damages and in mitigation thereof. The

plaintiff introduced no evidence tending to

show that the defendant had any property

whatever, and did not claim that the dam-

ages should be increased by reason of wealth

or any pecuniary ability on the part of the

defendant. The court excluded this evidence

offered by the defendant, and he excepted.

“The defendant also requested the judge to
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instruct the jury, that, the assault and bat-

tery being acts for which the defendant was

subject to prosecution and punishment by a

criminal action or indictment, they would

not be authorized in this case to allow any-

thing as exemplary or punitive damages;

which instruction the judge refused to give.

but did afﬁrmatively instruct the jury that

the law says that, in a case of gross and

malicious assault. the jury may, in their dis-

cretion, if they deem proper, award exem-

plary damages, but there is no rule of law by

which the plaintiff can claim it as a legal

Supreme Judicial Court of :\Inine. 1875.
Tr..i;pass by George \Y. Johnson ugulnst
Mann:sst'h Smith for a><sault and hatt1•1·y.
Verdict for plaintiff. llt'ard on dPfrmlant"s
exceptions. Exeeptions sustainPtl.
'11ie excPptions were ns follows: .. The defendant otfi>red evldt•nce of his propert.r and
means. as....11Paring up<jn1li;;Jlia l ter or punltl\·e damngl'S and In miti1rntio11 tht'L'eof. The
plaintiff Introduced no t•\·idence tending to
11how thut the defendant had any property
whatever, and did not claim that the damages should be Increased by reason of wPaith
or any pPt'lmlary ability on the part of the
defendant. 'fhe court excluded this evidence
olft>red by the defN1dant. and he excl'ptt>d.
"The defendant also requested the judge to
Instruct the jury, that. the assault and battery being acts tor which the defendant was
1mhject to prosel·utlon anti puuii-ihment by a
criminal action or lndi..tment, tlwy woul<I
not be nuthurlzt>d In this case to 11llow an.\·thlng as exemplary 01· punitive danrnges;
whkh lnstruetlon the judge rt>fused to gin>.
but did atftrmntln•ly Instruct the jury that
the law says that, in a case of gross and
malicious as1<ault. the jury may, In their discretion, If tlwy deem proper, award exemplary damages, but there ls no rule of law by
which the plaintiff can claim It as a legal
right."
T. H. llnskcll, tor plaintiff. Nathan Webb,
tor d!'r1•11dant.

right."

T. H. Haskell, for plaintiff. Nathan Webb,

for defendant.

DANF()lt'll‘H, J. The exception to the in-

struction to the jury, that “the law says that

in a case of gross and malicious assault, or

of gross and aggravated injury, the jury

may, in their discretion, if they deem proper,

award exemplary damages, but there is no

rule of law by which the plaintif f can claim

it asalegal right," must be overruled. Such

law has become so well settled in this state,

even in cases where the defendant is also lia-

ble to criminal prosecution, not only by the

decided cases, but also by a uniform and in

point of time a somewhat extended practice

in our courts, that it is now too late to dis-

turb it, unless by legislative enactment. God-

dard v. Railway Co., 57 Me. 202. and cases

there cited. Besides, to allow the exception

contended for, and permit the plaintiff to re-

cover exemplary damages for injury to his

property. and refuse it_under similar circum-

stances for an injury to his person. would in-

troduce a greater inconsistency and render the

law more unsymmetrical than is now claim-

ed for it.

LAW DA\I.2d Ed.—29

The other exception must be sustained. It

does not clearly appear whether the testi-

mony offered would have tended to show de-

fendant's general reputation as to property

or his actual condition in that respect. In ei-

‘ ther event, it should have been received, as it

was 1mI1_Lllgl_lj_j£_o_ﬂ.l€_iS:illi:- So far as the

cause of action rests upon an injury to the

DA!l<'J.~Olt'l'H, .T.
The excPptlon to the Instruction to thl' jury, that "the law says that
In a ease of gross and malicious assault, or
of gross and aggravated Injury, the jury
may, In their dlscrt•tlon, If they deem proper,
award exemplary damngl's. but tht>re Is no
rnle of law by which thl' plaintiff enn claim
It as n legal right," must be ovprruled. Ruch
law has become so well settled In this state,
even In cases where the defendant is also lhtble to criminal prosecution, not only by the
ctE>elded ca!!f's, hut also h~· a uniform nud in
point ot time a somewhat extended praetlce
In our courts, that It I!! now too latl' to disturb It, unless by legislative t•naetment. Goddard v. Railway Co.. 57 :'lie. 202, anrl Pases
there eltrd. Rcsl<ll's. to allow the PX<'<'llllon
c·ontended for, and permit the plaintiff tu rt>cover <•xemplary dnmagl's tor Injury to his
pro1wrty. and refuse It .1111<.lt•r :;ilmllnr dn·uru"tances for an Injury to his person. would Introduce a grentl'r lntousi,.h•ncy nud rt>ndPr the
lnw n10rP unsynmwtrh-al thnn Is now dahned for It.
LAW D.Ul.2d Ed.-29
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The otlwr PXl'L'Jllion mnst lw sustnhwtl. 11
doPs not c!Parly ap11cnr whether the tel'Limony olTt-reci would have tended to show dPtendanf!< general reputation RS to pro1wrty
or hi~ a<:tunl condition in that respect. In eitht•r t>\'Pnt, It should 1111,·c bet•n l'Cl'Pivc<I, ns it
was uc.di!!~!!L!_o_!l.ie ist11w So far as tlw
caUH' of action rests upon nu Injury to thP
charuett'r, or an Insult to the person. comPl'USatory <lamnges may be increased liy proof
of the Wt·nlth of the dt'fPtHlnnt. This 18 upou
tht• i;:round thnt Wt>allb is au elenwnt. whll'h
gol's to make up his rnuk and inllllPllt'e In
soeil'ty. nml thereby n•ndPrs the Injury or insult rPsultlng from his wrongful acts tlw
greater. Humphries v. Parker, 52 Me. UOi,
508; 2 Gt·eenl. Ev. § 269. But In such cases.
as It Is rather the reputation for, than tht>
posst>sslon of, wealth, which Is tht> cause of
this Increased rRnk, tlw testimony must correspond, and only the general question as to
his circumstances can be asked, and not tht•
detail. Stanwood v. Whitmore, 63 Me. 20\l.
But when exemplary dnmnges are claimed.
a dltft>rent question Is presented. The defendant's pl•<·unlary ability Is then a matter for
the consideration of the jury, on the ground
that a given sum would be a much greatt>r
punishment to a man of small means than to
one of larger. McBride v. McLaughlin, 5
Wntts. 375. Upon this point actual wealth
could only be materlnl. As bearing upon this
point the testimony was offered and exelurled. This took from the jury an element prop·
er tor their consideration.
It Is true the plaintiff offered no proof upon this point and dnlmed no damages by
renson of defendant's "wealth or pecuniary
ability;" but If It was competent tor the plaintiff to prove defendnnt's wealth to lncrea&·
his damages, It was equally competent for
the <letendant to show a want of It to diminish them; and the wah'lng of the right by till'
one, Is no reason why It should be tnken from
the other. Nor does the mere non-claim of
damages 011 thn t grounrl, the right to punltlv"
damages being still insisted upon, take it
from the consideration of the jury. HencP
the exclusion ot the testimony left them In
d:trknPss where tht>y Wt>re E>ntltled to light.
If the plaintiff really Intended to admit that
the defendant was without means, the testimony could have done him no harm; but
such an admission was not distinctly madP.
and In the absence of It, the t>xcluslon of th,.
testimony would be injurious to the defernlant. It certainly deprived him of a legal
right.
Exceptions sustained.
APPLETOX. C. J., and WAT.TO'.'\. llAH ROW8. and PI<:TERS, .T.J.. eoncurred.
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AGGRAVATION OF DAMAGES.

(20 S. W. 209, 111 Mo. !506.)

. BECK v. DOWELL.

(20 S. W. 209, 111 Mo. 506.)

Supreme Court of Missouri, Division No. 2.

Sept. 20, 1892.

Appeal from circuit court, Lewis county;

Benjamin E. Turner, Judge.

Action by Jennie Beck, by her next friend,

Oliver Beck, Sr., against Elijah Dowell, ex-

ecutor. From a judgment for plaintiff, de-

fendant appeals. Ailirmed.

Blair & Marchand and M. McKeag, for ap-

pellant. Clay &. Ray, F. L. Schoﬁeld, and J.

C. Anderson, for respondent.

GANTT, P. J. This cause was appealed

from the circuit court of Lewis county to the

St. Louis court of appeals. That court, in

an opinion by Judge Rombauer, aﬂirmed the

judgment of the circuit court, (40 Mo. App.

71;) but Judge Biggs being of the opinion
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that the conclusion reached by the majority,

that evidence of the ﬁnancial condition of the

plaintiff, in an action when the evidence will

justify the jury in awarding exemplary or

punitive damages, was admissible, is in con-

ﬂict with and opposed to two decisions of this

court, to wit, Overholt v. Vieths, 93 Mo. 422,

6 S. W. 74, and Stephens v. Railroad Co., 96

Mo. 207, 9 S. W. 589, the cause was, under

the constitution, certiﬁed to this court.

1. When the cause was heard in the court

of appeals, the instructions were not in the

record. No efforts were made to supply them

in that court, and that court rightly proceed-

ed on the assumption that the trial court had

correctly declared the law to the jury. Since

the case has reached this court, a certiﬁed

copy of the instructions has been ﬁled with

the record. The propriety of considering

these declarations of law by this court, under

these circumstances, suggests itself at once.

While this court obtains jurisdiction to “re-

hear and determine a cause so certiﬁed to

us by either of the appellate courts, as in

cases of jurisdiction obtained by ordinary

appellate process," there is nothing in the

L'0nstitUtion that justiﬁes parties in assuming

that we will or can take cognizance of mat-

ters not in the record. When a record is de-

ﬁcient in any material respect, the practice

is uniform that the party desiring the absent

record should suggest the diminution, and

apply for a writ of certlorari, or ﬁle stipula-

lions in this court, supplying the record. In

this case nothing of the kind has been done,

but from the brief of the appellant, we take

it he assumes that.these instructions are

properly before us. There is no hardship in

requiring parties to govern themselves by

the rules of procedure, established for the

disposition of causes. For the purposes of

this appeal, these instructions are no part of

the record, and the cause will be determined

on the presumption that the trial court cor-

rectly instructed the jury. Parties must pur-

sue legal methods in perfecting their tran-

scripts, and in the proper courts, and in prop-

er seasons.

2. The point in this record, then, is that

l5npreme Court of Missonri, Division No. 2.
Sept. 20, 1892.
Appeal from circuit court, Lewis county;
Benjamin E. Turner, Judge.
Action by Jennie Beck, by her next friend,
Oliver Beck, Sr., against Elijah Dowell, executor. From a judgment for plalntllf, defendant appeals. Affirmed.
Blair & Marchand and M. McKeag, for appellant. Clay & Ray, F. I.. Schofield, and J.
C. Anderson, for respondent.

sue legal methods In perfecting their transcripts, and In the proper courts, and In proper seasons.
2. The point In this record, then, 1s that
upon which the court of appeals divided. 18
evidence of the financial condition of the
plaintltl' admissible In an action for damages,
when there are circumstances of oppression
or mallce? That exemplary damages may be
recove1·ed In actions for trespass or personal
torts accompanied by circumstances ot malice
or oppression Is no longer open to question
In this state. Buckley v. Knapp, 48 Mo. 152.
Nor Is It controverted that it Is perfectly
competent to show the financial ability ot the
defendant In such a case. The case ot Stephens v. Railroad Co., 96 Mo. 214, 9 S. W.
589, was an action for compensatory damages alone, and the learned judge who wrote
the opinion expressly says: "There Is nothing In the case to justify the giving of exemplaq dnmws, and the damqges should

GANTT, P. J. This cause was appealed
from the circuit court of Lewis county to the
St. Louis court of appeals. That court, In
an opinion by Judge Rombauer, amrmed the
judgment of the circuit court, (40 Mo. App.
71;) but Judge Biggs being of the opinion \&Jonfl.ped tu._C.!C!.~88Uon w iQe ia~es
that the conclusion reached by the majority, sustained." The case ot Overholt v. Vieths,
that evidence of the financial condition of the 93- Mo. 422, 6 S. W. 74, had no element In It
plalntllf, ln an action when the evidence will justifying exemplary damages, and this court
justify the jury In awarding exemplary or held that It was not improper to exclude evlpunitive damages, wns admissible, Is In con- de9ce of the mother's financial condition In
flict with and opposed to two decisions of this a suit tor the death ot her child which had
court, to wit, Overholt v. Vieths, 93 Mo. 422, been drowned In a pond, "In view of the fact
6 S. W. 74, and Stephens v. Railroad Co., 96 that she had been allowed to state her condi~Io. 207, 9 S. W. 589, the cause was, under
tion In life, and that she did her own housethe constitution, certified to this court.
work and had no servant." We do not think
1. When the cause was heard In the court either of these cases can be considered as deot appeals, the instructions were not in the cisive of the point in this case. Excwplary
record. No etrorts were made to supply them damages are allowed, not only to compensate
In that court, and that court rightly proceed- the sufferer,· but to punish the offender.
ed on the assumption that the trial court had Franz v. Hllterbrand, 45 Mo. 121; Callahan
correctly declared the law to the jury. Since v. Catl'arata, 39 Mo. 137. The evidence In
the case has reached this t.ourt, a cerUfied this case tended to show that the plalntill'
copy of the instructions has been filed with was a girl about 16 years old; that her fathe record. The propriety of considering ther was a tenant of defendant; that on the
these declarations of law by this court, under day she was shot by defendant her father
these circumstances, suggests Itself at once. and bis sons were trying to water a cow in a.
While this court obtains jurisdiction to "re- lot of the defendant; that a difficulty ensued,
hear nnd determine a cause so certified to -a general fight; that she was standing l&
us by either of the appellate courts, as in the lot looking on, unarmed, when the decases of jurisdiction obtained by ordinary fendant turned upon her, and shot her through
appellate process," there is nothing In the the thigh. In other words, the defendant,
constitution that justifies parties In assuming with a deadly weapon, shot an unarmed girl
that we will or can take cognlz:mce of mat- without lawful provocation. We think there
krs not In the record. When a record Is de- was ample evidence from which the jury
ficient In any material respect, the practice could find willful, wanton lnjw·y. In 1 Suth.
is uniform that the party desiring the absent Dam. p. 745, It Is said: "In actions for torts,
record should suggest the diminution, and the damages for which cannot be measured
npply for a writ of certiorari, or file stlpula- by a legal standard, all the facts constituting
t ions in this court, supplying the record. In and accompanying the wrong should be provthis case nothing of the kind has been done, ed; and though there be a legal stnndard
but from the brief of the appellant, we take for the principal wrong, It aggravations exist
It he assumes that. these Instructions are they may be proved to enhance damages; and
properly before us. There ls no hardship In every case of personal tort must necessarily
requiring parties to govern themselves by go to the jury on Its special tacts. These
the rules of procedure, established .for the embrace the res gestm and · the age, sex, and
11lsposition of causes. For the purposes of status of the parties; this, whether the case
this appeal, these instructions are no part of be one for compensatlon only, or also for
the re<:ord, and the cause will be determined exemplary damages, when they are allowed."
on tbe prNmmptlon that the trial court cor- In Bump v. Betts, 23 Wend. 85, the supreme
rectly ln~tructed the jury. Parties must pur- court of New York, on a question of excess-
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‘dlimsiances may be inquired into.

ive damages, pointed to the fact that the de-

fendant had the command of great wealth,

and that the plaintiff was a poor man. in

McNamara v. King, 7 Ill. 432, in an action

for assault and battery, the court permitted

the plaintiff to show he was a poor man with

a large family. The supreme court of lili-

nois, in aﬁirming that ruling, said: “We are

also of the opinion that the circuit court de-

cided correctly in admitting the evidence and

giving the instruction. In a.ctinns_o£-this

k.in.d,_the_condl-ties-in—llfe and circumstances

(g_tlte_parties are peculiarly the proper sub-

jects f9i:_i.he,,c_on,slderation of the jury in ei-

tlmating the damages. Their pecuniary cir-

It may

be readily supposed that the consequences of

a severe personal injury would be more dis-
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astrous to a person destitute of pecuniary

resources, and dependent wholly on his man-

ual exertions for the support of himself and

family, than to an individual differently situ-

ated in life. The effect of the injury might

be to deprive him and his family of the com-

forts and necessaries of life. It is proper

that the jury should be inﬂuenced by the pe-

cuniary resources of the defendant. The

more afﬂuent, the more able he is to remuner-

ate the party he has wantonly injured." In

Grable v. Margrave, 4 Ill. 372, in an action

for seduction, the trial court admitted evi-

dence to show plaintiff was a poor man. The

supreme court. on appeal, said: “The court

therefore decided correctly in admitting evi-

dence showing the pecuniary condition of the

plaintiff. This evidence does not go to the

jury for the purpose of exciting their preju-

dices in favor of the plaintiff because he is

a poor man. but to enable them to understand

fully the effect of the injury upon him, and to

give him such damages as his peculiar condi-

tion in life and circumstances entitle him to

receive." In Gnlther v. Blowers, 11 Md. 5315,

in an action for assault and battery, the trial

court having admitted evidence for the plain-

tiff, with a view of increasing his damages,

that he was a laboring man and had a wife

tve damages, pointed to the fact that the defendant had the command of great wealth,
and that the plalntur was a poor man. In
McNamara v. King, 7 Ill. 432, In an actlon
for anault and battery, the court permitted
the plalntltr to ebow be was a poor man with
a large family. The supreme court of llllnols, ln afll.rmlng that ruling, said: "We are
also of the opinion that the circuit court decided correctly In admitting the evidence and
giving the Instruction. la nctlnna of &We
kind, the CDDdltiee IB Ille and clrcnmetnncelJ
~e.s

are peculiarly the proper. Ab!gr the ~O!l!'!lderll!ion of_ tlle .Jllri .lll..estJ!IUltlng the damages. Their pecuniary cir' cumst:mces may be Inquired into. It may
be readily supposed that the consequences of
a severe personal Injury would be more dis·
astrous to a person destitute of pecunlal'y
resources, and dependent wholly on his manual exertions for the support of himself and
family, than to an Individual differently situated in llfe. The effect of the Injury might
be to deprive him and his family of the comforts and necessaries of life. It le proper
that the jury should be Influenced by the pecuniary resources of the defendant. The
more amuent, the more able he Is to remunerate the party be has wantonly Injured." In
Grable v. Margrave, 4 Ill. 372, In an action
for seduction, the trial court admitted evidence to show plalntltr was a poor man. The
supreme court, on appeal, said: "The court
therefore decided correctly In admitting evidence showing the pecuniary condition of the
plnlntltr. This evidence does not go to the
Jury for tbe 1mrpose or exciting their prejudices ln favor of the plalntur because be Is
a poor man, but to enable them to understand
fully the etrect of the Injury upon him, and to
give him such damages as his peculiar condl·
Uon In lite and circumstances entitle him to
receive." In Gaither v. Blowers, 11 Md. 536,
In an action tor as..'<llult and battery, the trial
court having admitted evidence for the plain·
tltt, with a view of Increasing his damages,
that he was a laboring man and had a wife
and children to support, the supreme court,
after quoting the language of McNamara v.
King, 7 Ill. 432, says: "This ls good sense,
and Is sustained by the decisions In most ot
the states. An Injury done to a person not
dependent on manual labor for the support
-0f himself and family Is In no wise as great
~

as one to a person so situated." In Reed v.
Davis, 4 Pick. 21~. the supreme court of
Massachusetts, In an action for trespass tn
forcibly evicting plaintitr from his home,
says: "One ot the defendants stated to a
witness, In answer to bis Inquiry whether be
thought the plaintiff could not make him suffer, that 'the plalntltr had been to jail, and
sworn out, and was not able to do anything.'
Now, that circumstance was to be taken into
consideration by the jury. There Is nothing
more abhorrent to the feelings of the subjects of a free government than oppressing
the poor and distressed under the forms and
color, but really In vlolatlon, of the law." "It
ls found that the dwelling house was small,
but the damages are not to be graduated by
the size of the building. The plalntlll also
was poor. He had seen better days, but bad
been reduced In his circumstances. He was
thought not to be able to do anything In vindlca tion of his rights at the law." In Dalley
v. Houston, 58 Mo. 361, this court said: "It is
next Insisted that the court Improperly told
the jury that, In the estimation of damages,
they might take Into consideration the '('ondltion ln lite of plnlntitrs, and their pursuits
and nature of their business.' There is no
doubt but that, ln estimating damages In
such cases, the jury may properly take Into
consideration the pecuniary condition of the
parties, their position In society, and all other
circumstances tending to show the vindictiveness, or atrocity or want of atrocity, In tlle
transaction, and which tend to characterize
the assault." This decision ot Judge Vt; rles
was concurred in by all the judgt>s. It has
never, to our knowledge and so far as we ran
ascertain, been questioned, denied, or c1·itlclsed. It ls In harmony, as we have seen,
with the decisions of other courts of grent
ability. It Is In harmony with the tendency
of the courts to place before the triers of
facts, whether court or jury, every f1u:t that
wlll aid them In arriving at a correct verdict.
It ls evident In this case Its effect was not to
create prejudice or passion. There Is nothing that smacks of either In the verdict. Accordingly we amrm the judgment of the
court of appeals, as Indicated by the opinion
of the majority of the judges of that court,
on this as well as all other points ruled In the
case, and It will be so ce•tlfl.ed to that court.
All concur.

and children to support, the supreme court,

after quoting the language of Mc.\'amara v.

King, 7 Ill. 432, says: “This is good sense,

and is sustained by the decisions in most of

the states. An injury done to a person not

dependent on manual labor for the support

of himself and family is in no wise as great

as one to a person so situated." In Reed v.

Davis, 4 Pick. 215, the upreme court of

Massachusetts, in an action for trespass in

forcibly evicting plaintiff from his home,

..

says: “One of the defendants stated to a

witness, in answer to his inquiry whether he

thought the plaintiff could not make him suf-

fer, that ‘the plaintif f had been to jail. and

sworn out, and was not able to do anything.'

Now, that circumstance was to be taken into

consideration by the jury. There is nothing

more abhorrent to the feelings of the sub-

jects of a free government than oppressing

/
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GOLDS\IITH'S ADM'I{ v. JOY.

(17 Atl. 1010, 61 Vt. 488.)

Supreme Court of Vermont.

June 13, 1889.

Exceptions from Bennington county court;

Powsus. Judge.

Trespass for an assault and battery, com-

I1‘ilu'.tP(i on one Goldsmith, brought by Gold-

smil,h‘s administrator against Moses Joy. Jr.

Defendant did not deny that he made the as-

sault. it appeared, however, that an the

time. and just before, hot words had passed

between the parties. and defendant claimed

that he committed the wrong under the in-

ﬂuence of the passion induced by the insult-

ing and unjustiiiable language of plaintiff's

intestate, and that this fact should be con-

sidered by the jury in reduction both of the

actual and exemplary damages. Defendant
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was the superintendent and general manager

of the construction of a system of water-

works in the city of Bennington. and in that

capacity had in his employ about 100 men,

mostly or all foreigners. It was in reference

to the treatment of these men by defendant

that the intestate used the alleged insuitin

language. He was-suffering from Bright's

disease at the time of the affrny, and subse-

quently died of it. It was claimed that his

death was materially hastened by the as-

sault.

The court instructed the jury to award

plaintiff actual damages at any rate, no mat-

ter what the provocation which led to the

assault might have been. Upon the subject

of exemplary damages the charge was as fol-

lows: “Now. then, as to the other question

of damages. In actions of this kind under

the laws of this state, the jury is permitted

(not compelled. but permitted) in their dis-

cretion to allow to the plaintiff, in addition

to the ordinary ColIl}l€in.\'i1ior)' damages. such

damages as in their judgment the charucler

of the assault requires, in order that their

verdict may serve as a terror to evil-doers.

This is called ‘exemplary damages,'—d:un-

Bennington.

ages that are awarded by way of example; a

verdict that the community can look upon as

the wise judgment of the jury, exercised in

a case where it will be calculated to restrain

attacks of this kind in the future. I have

said, gentlemen, that the allowance of the

damages is permitted to the jury. They are

not uwarded in any case unless the trespass

—unless the assault and battery—was of

such a wanton, malicious, or aggravated

character as leads the jury to think that an

example ought -to be made of the case.

Oftentimes an assault is committed by one

man upon another under such circumstances

that the jury can see honestly that there was

no malice; that there was no wantonness;

that there were no high-handed acts that

would justify the awarding of more than

compensatory damages. On the other hand,

many cases exist where the attack is of a

wanton character, where it is inexcu-mble,

MITIGATIO.N OF DAMAGES.

GOLDSMITH'S ADM'R v. JOY.
(17 Atl. 1010, 61 Vt. 488.)
Supreme Court of Vermont. Bennington.
June 13, 1889.

Exceptions from Bennington county court;
Judge.
Tre~pass for an :issault and battery, commktPd on one Goldsmith, brought by Goldsmith's admi11istrator against Most>s Joy, Jr.
Defendant did not deny that he made the as11ault. Jt appearoo, however, that at the
time. and just before, hot words had pa!!sed
betwem the parties, and defendant claimed
that he committed the wrong nnder the intlnence of the pas'iion indnced by the insulting and unjnstiliable langnage of plaintiff's
intestate, and thut this fact should be cousidered l>y the jury In retlnl'tion both of the
actual and exemplary damages. Defendant
was the superintt•ndent and general manager
of the construction or a system of waterworks in the city of Bennington, and in that
capacity had in his employ about 100 men,
mostly or all foreigners. It was in reference
to the treatment of these men by defendant
that the intestate used the alleged 1ns111t1ng
language. He was suffering from Bright's
disease at the time of the affray, and subsequently died of it. It wa., claimed that his
death was materially hastened by the assault.
'£he court instructed the jury to award
plaintiff actnal damasres at any rate, no matte1· what the provocation which led to the
assault might have been. Upon the subject
of e:itemplary damages the charge was as follows: "Now, then, as to the other question
of damages. In actions of this kind under
the laws or this state, the jury is permitted
(not compelled, but p(·rmitted) in their discretion to allow to the plaintiff, in addition
to the ordinar.v compen~atory damages, such
dnmages as in their judgment the characte1·
of the aBSault requires, in order that their
verdict may se1·ve as a terror to evil-doers.
'£his is called •exemplary damages,'-damages that are awarded by way of example; a
verdict that the community can look upon as
the wise judgment of the jury, exei·cised in
a case where it will be calenlated to restrain
attacks of this kind in the future. I have
said, gentlemen, that the allowance of the
damages is permitted to the jury. They are
not awarded in any case unless the tresp1tss
-unless the assault and batte1·y-was of
such a wanton, malicious, 01· aggravated
character as leads the jury to think that an
example ought ·to be made of the case.
Oftentimes an assault is committed by one
man upon another under sul'h circu mstanres
that the jury can see honestly that there was
no malice; that there was no wantonness;
that there were no high-handed acts that
would justify the awarding of more than
compensatory damages. On the other hand,
many ca.o;es exist where the attack Is of a
wanton character, where it is inexcu~al>le,
where it is of a high-hamle I nature, au I the
PoWEHS,

1

jury, looking at all the facts In the case,
wisely say that the public are entitled to have
an example made in the parLicuhn case, in
order that in the future not only the defendant himself;but that otht>r persons who get
into affrays, shall be restrained from making
these high-handed, inexcusable, and wanton
attacks upon anotlwr. So that, gentlemen,
this question, then, is one that addrl'sses itself to your wise discretion. Do you think,
in view or what is shown here, that this attack was of such a chararter as warrants you
in awarding exemplary damages? If yo;1 do,
then the amount of Lhl'se damages rests
wholly in yonr wise discretion. Wi1ether it
shall be a small sum or a large sum, you are
to judge of; but in any event, gentlemPn, H
you award damages of this nature, you are
to do it bl.'!rause you think that this assault
upon Mr. Gohlsm1th was, under the circumstances, wholly ini>xc11saule and wanton oo
the part of the defendant. Now, then, in
respect to that question, mere words made
use of by one person to anothe1· are no h•gal
excnse whatPver for the inlliction of personal
viuluncu. It makes no difference how violent the langua~e used may be, no man ha$
the right to use personal violence upon anothe1· when he Is induced to simply by the
U:Je of words. That is no defense to the action. But wht>n you come to the question of
whether a particular case isonethatdesenP.s
the awarding of exemplary damages, then
you nre to consider all the circumstances in
the case: the provocation, if any, that the
defendant had; and everything that is calculated on the one hand to aggravate his act,
an<l on the other· ham I to palliate his act, is.
to be considered. As I have al1·eady said on
the main question of eompematory darnagr.s,
there is no defense here whatever. No matter what was said, no matter how much
provocation the defPndant had, he is bound
to answer for the compensatory dama·~es. at
any event. As to exemplary dnmages, in
the exercise of a wise discretion you will .not
allow them unless you are satisfied that thl'
act of the defendant was high-handed, w11nton, and inexcusable, and in determining that
question you are to take into view all the
provocation that he had. Now, then, gentlemen, if the provocation was slight, it is quite
different, and it should have less Wt>ight.in
determining the question whether you shall
award e:itemplary damages than it would
have if the provocation was great. Then,
again, you may look at the parties themselves. If Goldsmith was a feeble old man.
in poor health, and physically unal.ile to compete with the defendant in a personal encounter, and the defendant without any
provocation that you in your judgment say
warrants an assault.-a violent assault,-if
he then makes an assault that is altogether
undue, uncalled for, in view of the special
circu111stanc1>s existing, why, then, it would
be a cnse that the jury might awm·J exemplary damal(es. The law takes notice of the
liot 17as.:1iuns that peopl ~ fall into when they

MITIGATIOX OF D.UL\GE'.3.
MITIGAl‘10_\' OF DAM AGES.

453

. are engaged in disputes. not by way of mak-

ing a complete defense to an action for dam-

ages, but by way of raising a doubi; in the

minds of the jury respectmg the awarding

of exemplary damages. And in determining

that question the jury are justiﬁed in looking

at the parties as they stand before them.

Take an ignorant class of men that we have

in every community,— men who have by

their education and bringing up had less op-

portunities to come within the circle of good

order and of good behavior,—the jury might

well say that as to that class of men. if they

fall into disputes and come to blows, there

would be less occasion for setting an ex-

ample than there would be if the parties oc-

cupied a higher and more prominent position

in society. The inﬂuence of an example in a

case of this kind oitentimcs depends quite
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largely upon the character of the parties in-

volved. You can cast about you in your

mind‘s eye. in the community, and pick out

men who, if they should fall into an affray

of this kind. would draw away very far from

the moorings of gooll citizenship and good

behavior, and then an exlunple would be de-

manded, if one inilicted an assault upon an-

other." Verdict anl judgment for plaintiff.

Excepti by defendant.

Ii/lai'ti~‘rchibiild, J. L. Martin, and J.

C. Baker, for plaintiff. Batchelder 86 Bates

and W.'B%5heldon, for defendant.

TYIER. J. The court instructed the jury

that there was no defense to the claim for

actual or compensatory damages; that words

were no legal excuse for the iniliction of per-

sonal violence; that. no matter how great the

provocation, the defendarit was bound in any

event to answer for these damages. It is a

gem-ral and wholesome rule of law that when-

ever by an act which he could have avoided,

and which cannot be justiﬁed in law, a per-

son inﬂicts an immediate injury by force, he

is legally answerable in damagi-s to the party

injured. The question whether provocative

words may be given in evidence under the

general issue to reduce actual damages in an

action of trespass for an assault and battery

has undergme wide discussion. The English

cases lay down the general rule that provoca-

tion may mitigate damages. The case of

Fraser v. Berkelcy, 7 Uar. 8: I'. 621, is often

referred to, in which I.ord Amsosn held that

evidence _might be given to show that the

plaintiff in some degree brought the thing up-

on himself; “that it would be an unwise law

if it did not make allowance for human in-

llrmities; and,i.f aperson commit.violexu'eat

agavvhen he is s_mal‘ti,ng underimmediate

p-ovocation, that j§_pIat].er of mitigation."

'l‘I.\'DA .,"CT LL, in Perkins v. Vaughan, 5

Scott, N. R. 881, said: "1 think it will be

' found that the result of the cases is that the

matter cannot be given in evidence where it

amounts to a defense, but that, where it does

not amount to a defense, it may be given in

mitigation of d;uuages." Linford v Lake, 3

Hurl. & N. 275; 2 Add. Torts, § 1393, recog-

4;j3

Hurl. & N. 2i5; 2 Add. 'forts.§ 1:.1~3. recognizes the same rule. In this country, 2
Oreenl. Ev.§ 9a, !ilfiles the rule that a pro\'ocation by the ~lainti.II .may l.ie thus.shown. if so
fP~ent as to induce a. prcalllllption tbat via:
lence was committed under the immedi.a.tii
_intlt.ll'nce oftlie-p;ission Thus wrongfully ex~
£il~d by ~h!l plainti1L The earlier cases commonly cited in support of this rule ar" Cushman v. Ryan, 1 8tory, 100; Avery v. Ray, 1
.Mass.12; Lee v. Woolsey, 19 .Johns. 319; and
.Maynard v. Beardsley, 7 Wend. 560. The supreme court of MassachusPtts has generally
recognized the doctrint! that immediate provocaUon may mitigate actual damages of this
kind. Mowry v. ~mith, 9 Allen, 67; Tyson
v. Booth, 100 Mass. 258; and Bonino v. Caledonio, 144 .Mass. 2\.U, 11 N. E. Hep. 98. It
is also said in 2 i':iedg. Dam. (7th Ed.) 521,
note: "If, making du" allowance for the infirmities of human temper, the.defendant has
reasonable excuse fo1· the violation or public order, then there is no foundativn for exemplary damages, arnl the plaintiff can claim
only com pensal ion. It is merely the corollary
of this that where there is a reasonable excuse fm· the dtfomhmt, at·ising froru the pl'Ov·
ocation or fault of the plaintilf, but not sufficient entirely to justify the act done, there
can be no PXemplary damages, and the circ11n1stances of mitigation must be applied to
the actual Jamagee. If it were not so, the
plaintiff would get full compensation for
daninges occasioned by himst!lf. The rule
TY~R. J. Thecotll't instructed the jury ought to be and ia practically mutual. .Malicn
that there waa no deft!nse tu the claim fo1· and provocation in the defendant are punactual or compensatory damage"; that wortls ished by intlicting damages exceedil1g the
were no legal excnst! for tbe inlliction of per- measure ofeompmsation, and in the plaintiff
ao1,11l violence; that, no matter how great the by giving him less than that measul"e." In
provo:·ation, th~ defendant was bound in any Blll"ke v. Melvin, 45 Coun. 243, PARK, C. J.,
e\"ent to answer for these damages. It is a held that the whole transaction should go to
gen .. ral and wholesome rule of law that when- the jury. "They could not uscertain what
~ver bv an act which he eould have avoided,
amount of damage the plaintiff w11s entitled
mid wiaich cannot be justilled in law, a per- to recdve by considering a part of the tram1son inflicts an immeiliat.e injury by force, he action. They must look at the whole of it.
is IPgally answerable in damag..s to the party They must ascertain how far the plaintiff
injured. The question whethl•r provo<.'ative w11s in f11ult, if in fault at all, and how far
words may be given in evidence unde1· the the 1lefendant, and give damages accor.lingly.
gtmeral issue to reduce actual damages in an The difference between a provoked and an
action of trespus.~ for an assault and battery unprovoked assault is obvious. 'l'he latte1·
has und .. rg. •De wide discussion. 'fhe English would deserve punishment beyond the actual
-Oases lay down the general rule that provoca- damage, while the damage in the other case
tion may mitigate damages. The .case of would be attributable, In R great measure, to
:t'raspr v. Herkel~y, 7 Car. & P. 621, is often the misconduct of the plaintiff himself." In
refPrred to, in which I.ord ABINOER held that Bartram v. Stone, 31 Conn. 159, it was held
-evid .. nce .might be given to show that the that in an action for assault and battery the
plai ntilf in some degree brought the thing up- defendant might prove, in mitigation of damon himself; "that it would be an unwise law ages, that the plaintiff, immediately before
if it did not make allowance for human in- the assault, chargP.d him with a cril11e, and
tlrmitit-s; arul, ifa person CQJUllli.t..dolec.ceat that his assault upon the plaintiff was octjiurn whe_'! I~ _i~ 11.llllll'tiug u11der immediat1,i casioned by "sudden heat," produced uy the
PQ!Vocat1011, tha.t j1. matJ.er uf mitigation."
plaintiff's false accusation. See, also, Rich·
TINDAL, C. J., in Perkins v. VauP'han, 5 Bl"dson v. Hine, 42 Conn. 206. In Kiff v.
&ott, N. R. 881, said: "I think it will be Youmans, 86 N. Y. 324, the plaintiff was
founJ that thl' J"esult of the case.~ is that the upon dP.fendant's f>remisPS for the purpose
mattn cannot be given in evidence where it of committing a trespass, 11nd the defendamounts to a dPfense, but that, where it does ant assaulted him to prevent the act, and
not 1111101111t to a defenst1, it may be given in the only question was whether he used unmiligatiun of damages." Linford v Lake, 8 nect!Ssary fore~. DAN FuUTJJ, J., said: "It

are engaged In disputes, not by wny of making a complett1 defense to an action for damages, l>Ut by way uf raising a doubt in the
minds of the jury respect.ug the awarding
<>f exemplary damages. And in deten11iui11g
that question the jury are justified in looking
at the parties as they stand before them.
Take an ignorant class of men that Wf' have
in every co111m11nity,-men who have by
their education and bringing up had less opportunities to come within the cil·cle of good
<mlei· and of good behavior,-the jury might
well say that as to that class of men, if they
fall into disputes ancl come to blows, there
would be le:>s occasion for s1·tting an example than there would be if the parties occnpit'<I a hil{her an•i more prominent po~it ion
in society. The influence of an example in a
case of this kind 01tentim 1•s clepenus quite
largely upon the charader of the partie:1 involved. Yon can cast abo11t yon in yonr
mind's eye, in the cu111m1111ity, and pick out
lllt!n who, if they should fall into an affray
of this kind, would draw away Vt>ry far from
the r~oorings of goo:l citizensJiip anJ good
beluwiur, and then an t!Xample would be demanded, if one inlli<'ted an a,-~ault upon another." Verdict an 1 judgment for plaint.ilf.
J<;xcepti~y defendant.
Martin~'l"chibald, J. L. Martin, and J.
C. Baker, tor plaintiff. Batchelder & llates
and w.~heldon, fardefendaut.

'~-

MITlGATlON OF
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MITIGATION OF DAM.\GI'l.\‘.'

still remains that the plaintiff provoked the

tn-spass; was himself guilty of the act which

led to the disturbance of the public peace. Al-

though this provocation fails to justify the de-

fendant, it may be relied upon by him in miti-

gation even of compensatory damages. This

doctrine is as old as the action of trespass,

* * * and is correlative to the rule which

permits circumstances of aggravation, such

as time and place of an assault, or insulting

words, or other circumstances of indignity

and contumely, to increase them." In Robi-

son v. Rupert, 23 Pa. St. 525, the same rule

is adopted. the court sayinr ' “Where there

is a reasonable excuse for th.. lefendant aris-

ing from the provocation or fault of the plain-

tiff, but not sufﬁcient entirely to justil'y the

act done, there can be no exemplary damages,

and the circumstances of mitigation must be
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applied to the actual damag1 s." In Ireland

v. Elliott, 5 Iowa, 478, the court said: “The

furthest that the law has gone, and the fur-

thest that it can go, while attempting to

maintain a rule, is to permit the high provoca-

tion of language to be shown as a palliation

for the acts and results of anger; that is. in

legal phrase. to be shown in m.tig-1tion of

damages." In Thrall v. Knapp, 17 Iowa,

468. the court said: “The clear distinction

is this: Conteniporaneous provocations of

words or acts are admissible, but previous

provucations are not. And the test is whether

‘the blood has had time to cool.' "‘ * *

The law affords a redress for every injury.

If the plaintiff slandered defendant's daugh-

ters, it would entirely accord with his natural

feeling to chastise him; but the policy of the

law is against his right to do so, especially

after time for reﬂection. It affords a peace-

ful remedy. On the other hand, the law so

com; I. tely disfavors violence, and so jealous-

ly guards alike individual rights and the pub-

lic peace, that, ‘if a man gives another a

cuff on the ear, though it costs him nothing,

no, not so much as a little riiachylon, yet he

shall have his action.‘ Per Lord HOLT,

Ashby v. White, 2 Ld. Raym. 955." The

reasoning of the court seems to make against

his rule that provocations such as happen

at the time of the assault may be received in

evidence to reduce the amount of the plain-

tiif's recovery.

In Morely v. Dunbar, 24 Wis. 183, DIXON,

C. J., held “that, notwithstanding what

was said in Birchard v. Booth, 4 Wis. 75.

circumstances of provocation attending the

transaction, or so recent as to constitute a

part of the res gestoe, though not sutiirient

entirely to justify the act done. may consti-

tute an excuse that may mitigate the actual

damages; and, where the provocation is

great and calculated to excite strong feelings

of resentment, may reduce them to a sum

which is merely nominal." But in Wilson

v. Young, 31 Wis. 574, it was held by a ma-

jority of the court that provocation could go

to reduce compensatory damages only so far

as these should be given for injury to the feel-

still remains that the plaintiff provoked the
trt>spa88; was himself guilty of the act which
led to the distul'bance of thepulilic peace. Although this provocation fails to justify the defendant, it may be reli<'d upon by him in mitigation even of compensatory damages. This
doctrine is as old as the action of trespass,
• * * and is correlative to the rulfl which
permits circumstances of nggravation, such
as timti and place of an assault, or insulting
worils, or othe1· circumstances of indignity
anti contumely, to incrern1e them." In Rol>ison v. Rupert, 23 Pa. St. 52:1, the same rule
is ado)ltetl, the court sayinj: • "Where there
is a reasonable excuse for th~ lefendant arising from the provocation or fault of the plaintiff, but not surflcient entirely to justit'y the
act done, the1·e can be no exempla1·y damages,
and the circumstances of mitigation must be
applied to the actual damag1 s." In Ireland
v. Elliott, 5 Iowa, 478, the court said: "The
furth1>st that the law has gone, and the fiirthe11t that it can go, while attt>mpti ng to
maintain a mle, is to permit the high provocation of language to be shown as a palliation
for the acts and res11lts of auger; that is, in
legal )Jhr.iSt!, to be shown ill m.tigation of
dama:rt>s." In Thrall v. Knapp. 17 Iowa,
46!:1. the court said: "Thti clear distinction
. is this: Contempormu•ous provocations of
wort.ls or acts are admissible, but previous
provocutions are not. And the test is whetht>r
•the blood has had time to cool.' "' "' "'
Thti law affords a redress for tivery injury.
If the plaintiff slandered defendant's daughters, it would entirely accord with his natural
fet.>ling to chastise him; but the policy of the
law is against his right to do so, especially
after time for reflection. It affords a peaceful remedy. On the other hand, the law so
com1 Ltely disfavors violence, and so jealously guards alike individual rights and the public peace, that, •if a man gives another a
cutl' on the ear, though it costs him nothing,
no, not so much as ~ little diachylon, yet he
ahall have his action.' Per Lord HOLT,
.Ashby v. White, 2 Ld. Raym. 955." The
reasoning of the court seems to make against
his rule that provocations such as happen
at the time of the assault may be received in
evirlence to reduce the amount of the plaintiff's recovery,
In Morely v. Dunbar, 24 Wis. 183, DIXON,
C. J., held "that, notwithstanding what
was saitl in Birchard v. Booth, 4 Wil.'. 75,
circumstances of provocation attending the
transaction, or so recent as to constitute a
part of the 1·es gestre, though not sutlkient
entirely lo justify the act clone, may constitute an excuse that may mitigate the actual
damages; and, where the provocation is
great and calculated to eJCcite strong feelings
of resentment, may reduce them to a sum
which is merely nominal." But in Wilson
v. Youug, 31 Wis. 574, it was held by a majodty of the court that provocation could go
to rt>duce compensato1·y damages only so far
as these should be given for injury to the reel·
iugs: D1xo:o<, C. J., however, adhering to

DAM.\.GE~.

the rule in .Mu rely v. Dun Lar t Ji:it it migl1l g<>
to retluce all compensatory damages. But.
in Fenelon v. Hutts, 53 Wis. 34!, ION. W.
Rep. 501, and in Corcoran v. Harran, 55
Wis. 120, 1~ N. W. Rep. 468, it was clearly
held that personal abuse of the assailant by
the party assaultt>d may be consideri·d in
mitigation of punilory, but not of actual
damages, which mclutle those allowed for
mental and bodily suffe1'ing; that a man commencing an assault and battery under such
circumstanees of p1·ovocation is liable for th&
actual damages which result from such assault. In Donnelly v. Harris, 41 Ill. 126.
the court instructed the jury that words
spoken might be consideroo in mitigation of
damages. WALKER, C. J., in delivering the
opinion •f the supreme court, remarked:
"Had this modification been limited to exemplary damages, it would have been correct,
but it may well have been unrlerstood by the
jury as applying to actual damages, and they
would thus have been misled. To allow them
the effel:t to mitigate actual damages would
be virtually to allow them to be ust·t.l as a defen11e. 'l'o say they constitute no defense,
and Lhen lo say they ruay moti..;ate all !.mt
nominal dnmal{es, wonld, we think, he doing by indirection what has been prohibited
from being done directly. To give to words
this effect would be to abrogate, in effect,
one of the most firmly established rules of
the law." See, also, Ogden v. Claycomb, 52
lll. 366. InGizln v. Witzel, 82 Ill. 324!, the
court said, in reference to the charge of the
court bl'low: "The third instrnction tt'Jls the
ju1·y, among other things, that the phdntitl'.
in order to recover., should have been guilty
of no provocation. This is error. Itls wholly immaterial what language he may have
used, so far as the right to maintain an action is con<·erned, and even if he went beyond words and committed a technical assault.
the acts of the defendant must still be limit-eel to a reasonable self-defense." In N onis
v. Casel, 90 Iud. 148, this precise question
was not raised, but the court said, in reference to the Instructions of the court below,
that the first part of the charge, that the
provocation by mere words, however gross
and abusive, cannot justify an assault, was
correct, and that a person who ~akes such
WOl'ds a pretext for committing an assault
commits thereby not only a mere wrong, but
a crime, and the pel'son so assaulted is not
deprived of the right of reasonable self defense, even though he used the insulting
language to pl'ovoke the assaull. against which
he defends himself; but, whatever may have
been his purpose in using the abusive language, it cannot be madti an excuse for the
assault. .Johnson v. McKee, 27 Mich. 471.
was a case very similar to the one at bar, and
was given to the jury under like instructions.
The supreme court said: "In regard to provocation, the court charges, in effect, that if
plaintiff provoked defendant, and the assault was the result of that provocation, he
could recover nothing beyoml his actual dam-
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ages and outlays, and would be precluded

from claiming any damages for injured feel-

ings or mental anxiety. In other words, he

would be cut of f from all the aggravated

damages allowed in cases of willful injury,

and sometimes loosely called ‘ exemplary

damages.‘ As there is no case in which a

party who is damaged, and is allowed to re-

cover anything substantial, cannot recover

his actual damages, the rule laid down by the

court was certainly quite hberal enough, and

if any one could complain it was not the de-

fendant." The court said in Prentiss v.

Shaw, 56 Me. 436: “We understand that

rule to be this: A party shall recover as a

pecuniary recompense the amount of money

which shall be a remuneration, as near as

may be, for the actual, tangible, and immedi-

ate result, injury, or consequence of the tres-
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pass to his person or property. * " * If

the assault was illegal and unjustiﬁed. why

is not the plaintiff in such case entitled to

the beneﬁt of the general rule, before stated.

that a party guilty of an illegal trespass on

another's person or property must pay all

the damages to such person or property, di-

rectly and actually resulting from the illegal

act? * * 1' Wherethe trespass orinjury

is upon personal or real property. it would

be a novelty to hear a claim for reduction of

the actual injury based on the ground of

provocation by words. If. instead of the

owner's arm, the assailant had broken his

horse's leg, "' " "' must not the defend-

ant be held to pay the full value of the horse

thus rendered useless?" The learned judge

admits that the law has sanctioned, by a

long series of decisions, the admission of evi-

dence tending to show, on one side, aggra-

vation, and on the other mitigation of the

damages claimed, but he holds the law to be

that mitigaut circumstances can only be set

against exemplary damages, and cannot be

used to reduce the actual damages directly

resulting from the defendant's unlawful act.

In a learned article on “Damages in Actions

ex Delicto," 3 Amer. Jur. 287, it is said: “If

the law awards damages for an injury, it

would seem absurd (even without resorting

to the deﬁnition of damages) to say that they

shall be for a part only of the injury." “It

is a reasonable and a legal principle that the

compensation should be equivalent to the in-

jury. There may be some occasional depart-

ures from this principle, but I think it will

be found safest to adhere to it in all cases

proper for a legal indemniﬁcation in the

shape of damages." Jacobs v. Hoover, 9

Minn. 20-1. (Gil. 189;) Cushman v. Waddell,

Baldw. 57;t and McBride v. McLaughlin, 5

Watts. 375,—are strong authorities in sup-

port of the rule that provocative language

used by the plaintiff at the time of the bat-

tery should be given in evidenceonlyin miti-

gation of exemplary damages, and that un-

tiFv-il. F‘.-1s, No. 3,516’?

less the plaintiff has given the defendant s.

provocation amounting in law to a justiﬁca-

11gAS and outlays, and. would be precludL'<i
from claiming any damages for Injured feelings or mental anxiety. In other words, he
woulrl be cut otr from all the aggravated
damages allowed in cases of willful injury,
and sometimes loosely called •exemplary
damages.' As there is no case In which a
party who ls damaged, and is allowed to recover anything substantial, cannot recover
his actual damages, the rule laid down by the
court was certainly quite liberal enough, nnd
if any one could complain it was not the defendant." 'fhe court said in Prentiss v.
8haw, 56 Me. 436: "We understand that
rule to be this: .A party shall recover as a
pecuniary recompense the amount of money
which shall be a remuneration, as near as
may be, for the actual, tangible, and immediate result, injury, or consequence of the trespass lo his pe1·son or propt'rty. • • • If
the assault was illegal and unjustified, why
ls not the plaintiff in such case entitled to
the benefit of the general rule, before stated,
that a party guilty of an illegal trespass on
another's person or property must pay nil
the clamnges to such IM'r:mn 01· propnty, clirtclly aud ilctunlly re:iu!ti11g froru th..: rn ..gul
act? • • • Where the trt>spass or injury
is upon per!!onal or real propt'rty, It would
be a novalty to hear a claim for reduction of
the actual injul'y based on the ground of
prornc11tion by words. It, instead of the
owner's arm, the assailant hacl broken his
horse's leg, • • • must not the defendant be held to pay the full vulue of the horse
thus rendered u11eless?" The learned judge
admits that the law has sanctioned, by a
long series or decisions, the admission of evidence tending to show, on one side, aggravation, and on the other mitig1ttion of the
damages claimed, but be holds the law to be
that mitigant circumstances can only be set
agaimt exemplary damages, and cannot be
used to reduce the actual dam11ges directly
resulting from thedl'fendant's unlawful act.
In a learned lll'ticle on "Damages in Actions
ex Dt>licto," 3 Amer••Jur. 287, it issald: "It
the law awards damages for an injury, it
would seem absurd (even without reso1·ting
to the definition of damages) to say that they
shall be for a part only of the injury." "It
is a reasonable and a legal principle that the
compensation should ba equivalent to thl' in·
jul'y. There may be some occasional departures from this principle, but I think it will
be found safest to adhel'e to it in all cases
proper for a legal indemniHcation in the
shape of clamagt's." Jat:obs v. Hoover, 9
Minn. 204, (Gil. 189;) Cushman v. Waddell,
Baldw. 57; 1 and .McBride v. Mc:Laughlin, 5
Watts, 375,-are strong authorities in support of the rule that provocative language
used by the plaintiff at the time of the battel'y should be given in evidence only in mitigation of exemplary damag~s, and that un· - - -- --- --1
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less the plaintiff has given the defendant a
provocation amounting in law to a j ustification hd is entitled to receive compensation
for the actual injury sustained.
If provocative words may mitigate, it follows that they may reduce the damaires to a
mere nominal sum, and thus practic11lly justiry an assault and battery. But why, under
this rule, may they not fully justify? If, in
one case, the provocation is so gre11t that the
jury may award only nominal damages, why,
in another, In which the provocation is far
greater, should th Py not be perm ittt>d to a<'quit thedef1mdant, and thus overturn the WPll·
settled rule of law that words cannot justify
an assault. On the other hand, tr words cannot
justify they should not mitigate. A defendant shoul<l not be heard to say that the plaintiff was first in the wrong by abusing him
with insulting words, and therefore, though
he struck and injured the plaintilT, he was
only partly in the wro11g, and should p:•y
only part uf the actual damagr>s, If Lhe right
of the plaintiff to recover actual damages
were in any dPgree dependent on the 1h•lend1rnt's inle11t, then the plaintiff's pru\'ocalion
to thll defendant to cu111111it the as~nult upun
him would IJe legitimate evidence beal'ing
upon that que~tion; but It is not. Even
lunatics nnd id1ul~ are liable for actual damag&i clone by tllem to tile p1·overty or person
of another, nnd certainly a person In the full
possess.on of his faculties sho11ld ba held
liable for his actual inju1·ies to another, unless done in self-defense, or under reasonable
apprehen~ion that the plaintiff was alJout to
do him bodily harm. The law is that a person is liable in an action of trespass for an
assault and LatLery, although the plaintift'
made the firRt assault, if the defendant used
more fo1ce than was necessary for his prot1:ct10n, and the symmetry of tl:e Jaw is l>e•tet·
preservl'd by holding that the defendant's
liability for nctunl damages bf'gins with the
b ..ginning of his own wrongful act. It is
certainly in accordance with what this court
held in Howland v. Day, 56 Vt. 318, that
"the law abhors the use of force either fur
attack or defense, and never permits its use
unnecessarily." Exemplary damages al'e not
recoverable as matter of right, but as was
stated l.iy WHEELER, J., in Earl v. Tupper,
45 Vt. 275, they are given to stamp the condemnation of the jury upon the acts of the
defendant on account of Lheir ID<\licious or
oppr..ssive character. Boardman v. Goldsmith. 48 Vt. 403, and cases cited; Mayne,
Dam. 58-65; Voltz v. Blackmar, 64 N. Y.440.
The instructions to the jury upon this branch
of the case were in substantial accordance
with the law us al.Jove stated. .As exemplary
damag..s wne awardahle in the discretion of
the jury, the charge was also conect that the
intluence of an example in a case oft.his kind
dept>nded on the character nnd standing of
the parties involved. We fiml no error in tbe
charge, and the judgmtnt is nffinned.
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WARD v. BLACKWOOD.1

(41 Ark. 295.)

Supreme Court of Arkansas. Nov. Term. 1883.

Appeal from circuit court. Faulkner county;

J. W. Martin. Judge.

Massey sued Ward in an action ex delicto.

His complaint contained two paragraphs—

one for assault and battery. and the other for

malicious prosecution in having him arrested.

After the issues had been made up. the plain-

tiff died. \Ir. Blackwood qualiﬁed as his

administrator, and the action was revived in

his name and proceeded to a trial, which re-

sulted in a verdict against Ward for two

thous.-1nd dollars damages. Ward excepted

to the revivor in the name of the personal

representative. and afterwards moved the

court to arrest the judgment and to grant

him a new trial for this alleged error. Re-

(41 Ark. 21Ki.)
l"npreme Court of Arkansas. Nov. Term, 1883.
AppPal from circuit court. l•'nulkner county;
J. W. )Jartln, .Tmlge.
)la!,:;;<'y sued Ward in an action ex dellcto.
His complaint eontainetl two parngrnpbsnne for assault and hattery. arnl the otlwr for
malidous prosecution in Im \"Ing him :nrc•stPcl.
After the issues had been matlc up. the plnintiff !llt>tl. :\Ir. Blackwood qualified as his
tHlminii;tmtor, nml the action was revh·C'tl in
his name and proceeded to a trial, which resulted In a verdict ag:tlnst \Yard for two
thous:rntl tlollars dnmagPs. "'nrd exet>ptetl
to the r!"vivor in the 1mme of th!" pPrs011al
l"l'lll'PsPntnti\·e, and aft1•rwartls lllO\"Pd the
<·ourt to arrest the judgmrnt and to gornnt
him a new trial for this alleged error. ReYPrsed.
R. C. Xewton and Henderson & Caruth. for
UJ>Jll'lhtnt. \V. L . Terry and Blal'kwood &
Williams, for ap11ellee.
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versed. ,

R. C. Newton and Henderson & Caruth, for

appellant. W. L. Terry and Blackwood &

Williams, for appellee.

J. i l l i i l l i O

'l‘he court gave the following direction to

the jury: “If the assault was committed

without fault on the part of the plaintiff in

a wanton and willful manner. and under cir-

enmstances of outrage. cruelty and oppres-

sion, or with malice, they will be warranted

in ﬁnding vindictive or exemplary damages

by way of punishment and for public ex-

ample."

And it refused to give this: “If you ﬁnd

from the evidence that Massey was employed

by or for Ward, for the purpose of guarding

t-onvicts, and that some of them escaped

through the carelessness or negligence of said

.\iassey, or through his connivance, and that

Ward believed he had so acted, although said

belief or opinion will not justify the assault.

it may be considered in mitigation of dam-

ages."

The action of the court in these particulars

was excepted to. and was urged in support

of the motion for a new trial. And it was

also claimed that the damages were excess-

ive. The defendant was the lessee of the

penitentiary. The plaintif f was employed as

a guard, and was especially instructed to be

vigilant and never permit a convict to come

nearer him than twenty-ﬁve yards. He was

S)CITH. J. • • • • • • • • •
Th<' court gave the following direction to
the jury: "If the assault was committed
without fault on the part ol' th<' plaintiff In
11 wantnn and willful manner, and under circumstances of outrage, cruelty ruul oppression. or with malice, they will be warranted
in fln!ling vindictive or exemplary damages
hy way of punishment and for public ex:unple."
And It i·efused to give this: "It you find
from the evidence that -;'.fassey was employed
toy or fo1· \Vard, for the purpo11e of guarding
1·onvl<'ts, and that somr of tlwm c!'lcaped
through the carelessness or negligence of said
)fa,..sry, or through his connlrnnee, and that
\Vard believed he had so acted, although said
belief or opinion wlll not justify the assault,
It may be considered In mitigation of damages.''
The action of the court In the8e pnrti<'ulars
was exe!epted to. and was urged In support
of the motion for a new trinl. And It was
also claimed that the damages were excesslve. The defendant was the lessee of the
penitentiary. The plalntlft' was employed as
a guard, and wllS especially Instructed to he
vi){ilant aud never permit a convict to come
11P11rer him than twenty-five yards. He wail
110! 11 man of strong constitution and was In
ra thl'r ft>eble he:tlth. He seems to have fallt•n :islt:>ep on his post 1tbout ten o'cloek in the
111ornlng, nutl thr1•c convict~. taking 111lvantage
of his con!litlon, disarmed him and made
J.:"ond thl'it· escape. They were tired upon by

not a man of strong constitution and was in

rather feeble health. He seems to have fall-

en asleep on his post about ten o'clock in the

morning. and three convicts, taking advantage

of his condition, disarmed him and made

good their escape.

l Portion of opinion omitted.

They were ﬁred upon by,

the other guards. and in the midst of the com-

motion the defendant came into the yard,

and being enraged at the escape of the con-

victs. seized a clapboard, and struck the plain-

tif f three or four times over the shoulders and

back.

This does not impress us as a proper case

for the inﬂiction of exemplary damages or

1

Port ion or opinion omitted.

the othPr gunrcls. and In the midst of the c:ommotion the rlefendant came Into thP ~·:nil,
and lJping- enrag-£>d at the escnpe of thP eonvicts. sdzl'd a elnpboartl, an1l stnwk tht! plaintiff three or four times over the shonltlt•rs an<I
back.
This does not Impress us ae a propE>r case
for the Infliction of exemplary damagPs or
smart money. An employer who, In a fit of
passion. assaults his servant for n. neglect of
duty, thereh~· commits n hrt>•H'h of the pea<'e
and an n<'lionable wrong. But If, making
due allowance for the Infirmities of human
temrwr, the defendant has a reasonable excnsP. nrlsiug from the 11rovoc·ation or f,rnlt
of th!' plaintilT. but not i:uftkient to justify
eutirply the aC't dun!', then damagpi; ought
not to be nssPs!letl by way of punishment and
the dn.:umsrauces of mitigation should be
consi<lt·retl.
For the public oll'ense. Jllas11ey swore out a
warrant, upon which Ward was arrested. arraignNI. plPacletl guilty, and fined $10 and
t'ost;; nnd 1mld the same. For the private lnjur~· this al'lion Is prosecuted_
And the ele. ments of damages are, the personal Indignity
lnvoh·Pd In the assault, the plaintiff's hodlly
pain, and suffering. loss of time and labor,
and diminished capacity to work from the
date of the assault to Massey's death, and
the expenses of metlical and surgical attendance during his Illness consequent upon the
Injuries received.
Cushman v. \Vaddell, 1 Baldw. 59, Fed. Cas.
No. 3,5Hl, was an action by a schoolmaster
against a parent for a severe beating. The
plalntlft' had punished one of bis pupils tor
some offense. The father went to the plalntltf's bom·dlng-bouse, attacked and beat him
savagely, accompanied by very intemperate
and vindictive language and other clrcumstnnces of aggravation. The court held th.1t
no provocation could excuse the dPfendant
from making c•ompen!latlon for all the Injury
the plalntlft' hnd suft'eret.l hy the unlawful attack. Rut It the jury were satisfied that,
without any previous malice towards the
plalntltr, or any deliberate design to Injure
him in llPrson or In the estimation of the puhlie, the tlefendant acted In the heat of passlon. caused by the appearance and acconn'
of his son. It was a circumstance which ou1.wt
to operate powerfully to reduce the damage~
to such as were l'Olllpt>nAA tory.
In the l'88e under coni<i<leratlon. there was
no evidence of previous malice, nor of deliberate cruelty, only of hot blood and a certaln recklessness. \V81'd had never seen
Massey before. And Massey WllS very far
from being free from fault.
For the errors above Indicated, the judgment Is reversed, and a new trial Is awarded.

~llTIGAflON

Slf'KHA v. S:\IALL et nl.

\IlTIGAl‘ION OF DAMAGES.

4-')?

SIFKRA v. S.\IAl'.L ct al.

(33 Atl. 9. 87 Me. 493.)

Supreme Judicial Court of Mnine. May 4,

ll\U5.

Exceptions from supreme judicial court,

York county.

Action on the case for libel by Raymond

Sickra against Josephine W. Small and an-

other. Plaintiff had judgment for nominal

damages only. and brings exceptions. Excep-

tions sustained.

G. F. Haley, for plaintiff. E. J. Cram, for

defendants.

W1-II'I‘EIIOUSE, J. This was an action of

libel for defamatory matter, publi hed in a

newspaper, representing that the plaintiff

and Mrs. Blake had “eloped," and were liv-

ing together in adultery.

At the trial, evidence was offered by the
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defendant, and admitted by the court, sub-

ject to the plaintiffs right of exception. that

the plaintiff's “general character" was bad

in the community in which he lived.

that, in actions for libel or slander, the char-

acter of the plaintiff may be in issue upon the

question of damages; but it is contended that

the inquiry should be restricted to the plain-

tiff's general reputation in respect to that ‘

trait of character involved in the defamatory

charge.

While there has been some contrariety of

opinion, or at least of expression, upon this

question, it must now be regarded as settled,

both upon principle and the great weight of

authority, that, in this class of cases, the

defendant may introduce evidence, in mitiga-

tion of damages, that the plaintiff's general

reputation, as a man of moral worth, is bad,

and may also show that his general reputa-

tion is bad with respect to that feature of

character covered by the defamation in ques-

tion; and, as to the admission of such evi-

dence, it is immaterial whether the defendant

has simply pleaded the general issue, or has

pleaded a justiﬁcation as well as the general

issue. Stone v. Varney, 7 Metc. (Mass.) 86;

Leonard v. Allen, 11 Cush. 241; Bodwell v.

Swan, 3 Pick. 376; Clark v. Brown, 116

Mass. 5053; Root v. King, 7 Cow. 613; Lamos

v. Snell, 6 N. H. 413; Bridgman v. Hopkins,

34 Vt. 533; Eastland v. Caldwell, 2 Bibb, 21;

Powers v. Cary, 6-1 Me. 1; Odgers, Sland.

& L. 34)4; Ruth. Dam. 679; Best, Ev. 256; 1

Whart. Ev. 53; 2 Starkie, Sland. 87; 1 Greenl.

Ev. § 55; 2 Greenl. Ev. § 275.

In Stone v. Varney, supra, the libel imputed

to the plaintif f “heartless cruelty toward his

child," and it was held competent for- the de-

fendant to introduce evidence, in mitigation

of damages, that “the general reputation of

the plaintiff in the community, as a man of

moral worth," was bad. After a careful ex-

amination of the authorities touching the

question, the court say, in the opinion: "Thi;‘

‘

review of the adjudicated cases, and particu-

larly the decisions in this commonwealth and

in the state of New York, seems necessarily to

01" DAl.IAGES.

qupstlon, the court say, tn the opinion: "Thi::
re\'ll'W of the adjudicated cuses, and pnrtku(33 Atl. 9. Si MP. 493.)
larly the decisions In this commonwealth nnll
In the state of 1'ew York, eeems necessarily to
Supremt> .Tudieinl Court of :\!nine. May 4,
lead to the conelmllon that evidence of gen1~u:;.
eral bad character Is admissible In m!ligatlon
Exceptions from su11reme judicial ('{)Urt, of dumnges. • • • It cnnnot be jm1t that
a man of Infamous cbarn<"ter sb1111ltl, for the
York county.
Action on the case tor libel by Raymond 11nme libelous matter, be entitled to equal.
lAi<'kra l\gninst Jost•phine "'· Small aud an- tlnmnge!' with the man of unblernl::1hed repu~•ther.
Plaintiff had jmlirnwnt for nominnl tation; yet 11urh lllU!!t be the result. unless
tlnnm,;:Ps only, and bring11 excl'ptlons. l<~Xl't'p rlmraeter be a proper l'lllhject of evldenee lwfore a jury. Lord Ellenhorougb, In 1 :\Inulc
tions suHtnined.
& S. 2S(j, says, 'Certainly a peri<on of dh;G. F . Hnley, tor plaintitr. E. J. Cram, for paraged fame Is not entitled . to the same
<ll'fendnnte.
nwa~i.1re of damages with one wh"s1• l'l1aract<'r h1 unhll•111IRllt'd, and it Is eompPtcnt to
WHI'.rEHOl'~E. J. Thi!'! wns nn action of
i<how thnt b~· evidence.'"
llllf'I for 1~rnmatory mnttP•'. puhli hP'i in a
Ju Lt•onaril v. Allen. supra, the plalntltr
news11uper, n•pn•;euting thnt the iilniutllf Will:! chui;,;(·tl with lllullclously Lu.-ning a
and !Ill'!!. Blnke had "elopPd," nm\ Wt>rt' llv- sehoolhouse, and It wnR held thnt, In the lnlni: toi;:Pther in ndnltet'y.
troduetlon of evidence to l1111wach the charAt the trial, evidt>nce was otrered by the acter of the plnintilT, In mllil'ation of dnmdeft>ndnnt, and ndmlttrtl hy the conrt, sub- ai;:es, the Inquiries should relute t'ither to the
ject to the plalntUl"s right of exception, that general charactPr or the plalntltr fo1• Integrity
the plalntlfl"s "general charneter" was bad nnd moral worth, or to his re1mtntlon In reIn the community In wbJcb be lived.
gard to conduct similar In cbnral'ter to the
1. It was not qut>~tloned by the plnintllf olfense wltb which the detendnnt had charthat, In actions for libel or slander, the char- &'ed him.
act~ ot the plalntU'C may be In Issue upon the
In the recent cnRe of Clurk v. Brown, 116
question of damages; but It Is contended that Maas. r;or;, the plalntltr was charged with
the Inquiry should be restricted to the plnln- larceny. The trial court admitted evlden<'e
tll't's gt>neral reputation In respect to tbnt i that the plnlntlll''s reputntlon tor honesty and
trait of cbarn_cter Involved In the defamatory I Integrity was bad, and excluded evidence that
e!harge.
his reputation In resped to thieving was bad.
While there has been BOme contrariety of But the full court held the exclusion of the
opinion, or at least of expression, upon this latter evldenc~ to be error, and rcatHrmed the
queHtlon, It must now be regarded as settletl, ruk, laid down In Stone v. Ynrney and Leonboth upon principle and the great weight or nard v. Allen, supra, that It woe compPtent
authority, that, In tbLB class of cases, the tor the defendant to prove, In mitigation of
defendant may Introduce evidence, In mitiga- damages, that the plalntltr's general reputation ot damages, that the plalntlll"s general tion was bad, and that It was also bud In
reputation, as a man of moral worth, la bad, respect to the charges Involved In the aland may also show that his general reputa- leged alander.
tion la bad with respect to thnt feature of
In Lamos v. Snell, 6 N. H . 413, the defendcharacter covered by the defamation In quet1- ant's right to Inquire Into the plnlntltr's "gentlon; and, as to the admission of such evi- eral character 11.8 a virtuous and honest man,
dence, It Is Immaterial whether the defendant or otherwise," was brought directly In queshns elmply pleaded the general Issue, or baa tion; and It was determined that the defendpleaded a justification as well as the general ant was "not confined to evidence of characIssue. Stone v. Varney, 7 lletc. (!\laB11.) 86; ter founded upon matters ot the same nature
Leonard v. Allen, 11 Cush. 241; Bodwell v. aa that specified In the charge, but mny give
l'lwan, 3 Pick. 376; Clark v. Brown, 116 In evidence the general bad character of the
l\lase. !105; Root v. King, 7 Cow. 613; Lamos plalntlll' • • • In mitigation ot damages,
v. Snell, 6 N. H. 413; Bridgman v. Hopkins, and for this Inquiry the plalntlll' must stand
34 Vt. 533; Eastland v. Caldwell, 2 Bibb, 21; prepared."
Powers v. Cary, 61 Me. 1; Odgers, Sl:md.
In Eastland v. Caldwell, wpra, the court
& J,, 304; Ruth. Dam. 679; Best, Ev. 2i'1!>; 1
say, In the opinion: "In the estimation of
Whnrt. Ev. 5.'3; 2 Starkie, Slend. 87; 1 Greenl. damages the jury must take Into consldrraEv. f r.:>; 2 Green!. Ev. f 2i5.
tlon the general character of the plaintiff.
In Stone v. Varney, supra, the libel Imputed • • • In this case, the detendanl''s coun::;el
to the plalntltr "heartless cruelty toward his was permitted by the court to Inquire Into the
<·hlld," and It was held competent for· the de- plaintll'C's general character In relation to the
fendant to Introduce evidence, In mitigation tacts In Issue; but we are of opinion be ou ~ht
of damages, that "the general reputation of to have been pennltteil to Inquire Into bis
the plnlntltr In the community, as a man of general moral character, without re·atlon to
moral worth," was bad. After a careful ex- any particular species of Immorality; for a
amlnatloD of the author1Uea toucldu1 the man who la habitually addicted to every v.ce,
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except the one with which he is charged, is

not entitled to as heavy damages as one pos-

sessing a fair moral character. The jury,

who possess a large and almost unbounded

discretion upon subjects of this kind, could

have but very inadequate data for the quan-

tum of damages if they are permitted only to

know the plaintiffs general character in re-

lation to the facts put in imue."

With respect to the form of the inquiry,

it is said to he an inﬂexible rule of law that

tile only admissible evidence of a man's char-

acter. or actual nature and disposition, is his

general reputation in the community where

he resides. Chamb. Best, Ev. 236, note. It

would seem, therefore. that, in order to avoid

eliciting an expression of the witness' opin-

ion respecting the plaintiff's character, the

appropriate form of interrogatory would be
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an inquiry calling directly for his knowledge

of the plaintiff's general reputation in the

community, either as a man of moral worth,

without restriction, or in the particular rela-

tion covered by the libel or slander.

2. But the plaintiff also has exceptions to

the following instruction in the charge of the

presiding justice: “I am requested by the

counsel for the defendant to instruct you

that, if the plaintiffs conduct was such as to

excite the defendant's suspicions, it should be

considered in mitigation of damages, the

plaintiiff alleging that he had never been sus-

pected of the crime alleged. I give you that

instruction."

This request was doubtless suggested by

the note to section 275, 2 Greenl. Ev., which

appears to be based on the old case of Earl of

Leicester v. Walter, 2 Camp. 251. But that

case has long ceased to be recognized as au-

thority for anything more than the admission

of evidence of the plaintiffs general reputa-

tion. A similar intimation is found in Lar-

ned v. Buﬂinton, 3 Mass. 353, but in Alder-

men v. French, 1 Pick. 18, this dictum is de-

clared to be unsupported by any authority.

Again, in the later case of Watson v. Moore,

2 Cush. 134, it was held incompetent for the

defendant, in an action of slander, to prove, in

mitigation of damages, “circumstances which

excited his suspicion,and furnished reasonable

cause for belief on his part, that the words

spoken were true." The obvious objection to it

is that the damages in an action of slander are

to be “measured by the injury caused by the

words spoken, and not by the moral culpa-

bility of the speaker." We have seen that

the defendant is permitted to prove that the

plaintiffs general reputation is bad, because

this evidence has a legitimate tendency to

show that the injury is small; but the evi-

dence of general report that the plaintiff is

guilty of the imputed offense is inadmissible

for the purpose of reducing damages. Powers

v. Cary. supra; Mapes v. Weeks, 4 Wend.

659; Stone v. Varney, supra. A fortiori,

evidence of the defendant's suspicions, how-

ever excited, cannot be received for such

a purpose. Watson v. Moore, supra.

lUTlGATlON Ob' DA..\IAUES.

except the one with which he Is charged, 18
not entitled to ae heavy damages as one possessing a fair moral cheracter. The jury,
who possess a large and almost unbounded
cllsc1·etion upon subjects of thle kind, could
hnve but very Inadequate data tor the quantum of damngee If they are permitted only to
know the plalntllI'e genernl character ID relation to the fncts put In Issue."
Wlth respect to the form of the Inquiry,
It le snltl to be an ln1lexlble rule of law that
the only actmlsslble evidence of a man's char·
acter, or actual nature and disposition, ls his
general reputation ID the community wbere
he resides. Chamb. Best, Ev. 256, note. It
would seem, therefore, that, In order to avoid
eliciting an expression of the witness' opin·
Ion respecting tbe plaintltr'e character, the
appropriate form of Interrogatory would be
au Inquiry calling directly for his knowledge
of the plalntllI's general reputation In the
community, either as a man of moral worth,
without restriction, or In the particular relation covered by the libel or slander.
2. But the plaintltr also has exceptions to
the following instruction In the charge of the
presiding justice: "I am requcsted by the
counsel tor the defendant to Instruct you
that, It the plaintiff's conduct was such as to
excite the defendant's suspicions, It should be
considered In mitigation of damages, the
plaintiff alleging that he had never been suspected of the crime alleged, I give you that
instruction."
'!'his request was doubtless suggested by
the note to section 275, 2 Greenl. Ev., which
appears to be based on the old case of Earl of

Leicester v. Walter, 2 Camp. 231. But that
case has long ceased to be recognized as authority tor anything more than the admission
of evidence of the plaintiff's general reputation. A similar Intimation ls found ID Larned v. Bumnton, 3 Mass. 353, but ID Aldermen v. French, 1 Pick. 18, this dictum Is declared to be unsupported by any authority.
Again, ID the later case of Watson v. Moore,
2 Cush. 134, lt was held Incompetent tor the
defendant, In an action ot slander, to prove, In
mitigation of damages, "circumstances which
excltetl his suspicion, and furnished reasonnble
cause tor belief on his part, tbat the words
spoken were true." The obvious objection to It
ls that the dnmages ID an action ot slander are
to be "measured by the Injury caused by the
words spoken, and not by the moral culpablllty ot the speaker." We have seen that
the defendant ls permitted to prove that the
plaintlt!'s general reputation ls bad, because
this evidence has a legitimate tendency to
show that the Injury ls small; but the evidence of general report that the plaintiff le
guilty of the Imputed offense Is inadmissible
for the purpose of i·educlng damages. Powers
v. C'ary, supra; Mapes v. Weeks, 4 Wend.
059; 8tone v. Varney, supra. A fortiori.
evidence of the defendant's suspicions, however excited, cannot be received tor su.11
a p1111lose. Watson v. Moore, supra.
This lns.tructlon to the jury must, therefore, be held erroneous; and for thla reason
the entry must be:
Exceptions sustained.
HA.SKELL, J., C<i...icurred In the result.

MITlGA.TlO:-i 01•' DA:\LV:ES.
MITIGATION OF 1)A\l.\(iES.

Ing this discussion the defendant, In the diischarge of his duty as a member of said common council, In dlscm1slug the offtclal conSupreme Court of Missouri, Division No. 1.. , duct of plalntlfr, stated that the resolutiou
:'tiny 28, 1804.
previously Introduced by him to lnv<'stlgat•'
App1'ul t1·om circuit court, Jackson county; the city omclals was aimed at Superintendent Callahan; that said Callahan, In his
B. H. Field, Judge.
Action by Thomas F. Callahan against D. official position, as inspector of curbing, had
curbing that was being put In
n. lngTam tor slander. Judgment for pluln- condemned
by one party, and permitted another mau, n
tltr, and defendant appeals. Reversed.
favorite of said superintendent, to put In
Thu111pson & Wilcox, for appellant. Har- · the same stone, entailing loss on the first
mon Bell und Wash Adums, for responden1.
man, nnd bestowing official favors on tht'
second; thut he had also given acceptances
MAr.l~ARLANE, J.
Action for slander. for curbing put In by one man to another,
The petition charged that on the 4th ot N<>- knowing at the time he gave the acceptances
veml>er, 1889, plalntltl' was appointed su- that the person to whom he gave them had
perintendent of streets of Kansas City, which not done the work, and was not entitled to
was un omce of honor and trust, under the them, thus enabling the second man to colcharter and ordinances of aaid city; that lect pny for work done by the first, and
on said date, at a meeting ot the common defrauding one man to put money Into the
council of said city, In the presence of divers pocket of a favorite of said Callahan. Dcpersons (naming other members of said i fendant, In stigmatizing such conduct as
council, and the clerk thereof, and other dishonorable and dlshont'st, applied the
persons), then present, defendant "falsely ' term 'downright thief,' to said superintendand mullclously spoke and published of and ent. Defendant says that this statement was
concerning the plalntltr the false and mali- made In the discharge of his offtclal duty, as
cious words following, to wit: 'Now, I want above set forth, and without malice or ill
to s11y something, and I want the reporters will to plalntltl', and that he had good reason
to "'get It. The superintendent of streets- ' to believe, and did belJeve, that the stnt<'this Callahan-ls a downright thief, and I ments he made were true, and that the opean prove It.' " The petition further charged , probrious epithet he used was a just nnd fair
that at the time the words were spoken there characterlzntlon of such omctal mlscondul"t.
was not then pendln~ before said council Defendant further states that the circumany ordinance, motion, resolution, or report stances above referred to are as follows: In
referring to plalntltl', or the omce so held June, 1887, John Henry had a private conby him; "that defendant meant and Intend- · tract to put In about 82 feet or curbing for
ed, by the use of said words so spoken and F. J. Baird on Twentieth street, l.Jetween
published by defendant as aforesaid, to Southwest boulevard and Broadway; that
charge plalntltl' with being guilty of willful, said Henry did said work, and put In said ·
con-upt, and mallclo\18 oppre11slon, partial- curbing, and said Callahan, though knowing
ity, mlSt.•onduct, or abuse of authority In that said Henry had done said work, Issued
his omclal capacity, as such superintendent acceptances to one Bashford; thnt, In the
of streets, or under color ot his said omce. tall of 1887, Johnson and Tompkins were
Plalntltl' further states that at the time putting In curbing on Sixteenth sh·eet, besaid words were so spoken by defendant tween Penn and BroadwaJ·, and that they
the defendant well knew the same to be got the cnrbmg of Richard Cummins; that
false, and said words were 8o spoken by de- said Callahan condemned some of said stone,
fendant wantonly and maliciously, and with and said Cummins sold It to one Bashford,
the Intention of Injuring plalntltr; that the and Callnh:m nllowcd him to use It for cu1·bwords spoken were false, and plnlntltr waR lng on another street." The reply was a
greatly Injured In said offtce, and In 11111 feel- genc>ral denlnl.
ings, good name, and reputation." The anThe evidPnre showed thnt plnlntllT was on
swer was a general denial, and a speclnl the 4th day of November, 1889, superintendplea as follows: "For a second and further ent of streets, and defendant was a membPr
answer to plalntltr's amen•led petition, de- of the city council; that defendant had prefendant says that, at the time the supposed viously held the omce of Inspector of curbing
defamatory words were spoken by defend- and sidewalk construction; that, some time
ant, the lower house ot the common council previously, defendant had Introduced In Uw
of Kansas City, being regulnl'ly In session. lower house of the council, of whlcll he wns
were dlscnR11lng the otflcc of superintendent a member, a resolution ben1·lng on plalntltr's
of streets, nod the actions and methods of omclal conduct, which had passed that house,
Supe1·intendent Cnllahan, the plalntitr. It and gone to the upper house, where It then
had been stated by dltrerent membe.rs of the remained uncllsposed of. On this occasion a
council that he was an Inefficient and In- member raised a question of privilege; nnd n
competent officer, and had been guilty of general discussion and criticism or plalnurr·s
misconduct, oppression, partiality, and abuse official conduct followed, In whlrh defendant
of nuthority, In his oft:kinl capacity. Dnr- i spoke the words attrlbutt'<l to him, making
CALLAHAN v. INGRAM.
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CALLAHAN v. INGRAM.

(26 S. W. 1020, 122 Mo. 355.)

Supreme Court of Missouri, Division No. 1.,

May 28, 189-1.

Appeal from circuit court, Jackson county;

R. H. Field, Judge.

Action by Thomas F. Callahan against D.

R. Ingram for slander. Judgment for plain-

tiff, and defendant appeals. Reversed.

Thompson & Wilcox, for appellant.

mon Bell and Wash Adams, for respondent.

MACl‘‘.\RLANE, J. Action for slander.

The petition charged that on the 4th of No-

vember, 1889, plaintiff was appointed su-

perintendent of streets of Kansas City, which

was an ofﬁce of honor and trust, under the

charter and ordinances of said city; that

on said date, at a meeting of the common

council of said city, in the presence of divers
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persons (naming other members of said

council, and the clerk thereof, and other

persons), then present, defendant "falsely

and maliciously spoke and published of and

concerning the plaintiff the false and mail-

cious words following, to wit: ‘Now, I want

to say something, and I want the reporters

tosget it. The superintendent of streets-

Har- '

ing this discussion the defendant, in the dis-

charge of his duty as a member of said com-

mon council, in discussing the oﬂicial con-

duct of plaintiff, stated that the resolution

previously introduced by him to investigate

the city ofﬁcials was aimed at Superintend-

ent Callahan; that said Callahan, in his

ofﬂcial position, as inspector of curbing, had

condemned curbing that was being put in

by one party, and permitted another man, a

favorite of said superintendent, to put in

the same stone, entailing loss on the ﬁrst

man, and bestowing oﬂicial favors on the

second; that he had also given acceptances

for curbing put in by one man to another,

knowing at the time he gave the acceptances

that the person to whom he gave them had

not done the work, and was not entitled to

them, thus enabling the second man to col-

lect pay for work done by the ﬁrst, and

defrauding one man to put money into the

pocket of a favorite of said Callahan. De-

fendant, in stigmatizing such conduct as

dishonorable and dishonest, applied the

1 term ‘downright thief,' to said superintend-

this (Jaliahan—is a downright thief, and I ‘

can prove it.' " The petition further charged

that at the time the words were spoken there

was not then pending before said council

any ordinance, motion, resolution, or report

referring to plaintiff, or the oﬂlce so held

by him; "that defendant meant and intend-

ed, by the use of said words so spoken and -

published by defendant as aforesaid, to -

charge plaintif f with being guilty of willful,

corrupt. and malicious oppression, partial-

ity, misconduct, or abuse of authority in

his ofilcial capacity, as such superintendent

of streets, or under color of his said ofﬁce.

Plaintif f further states that at the time

i
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MITIGATION OF DAMAGES.

special reference in what he said to the al- I such act, and serve as a warning to prevent

leged misconduct set up in his special plea.

At the time no resolution, ordinance, motion.

or report was before that house. re'<peeting

plaintiff, or his ofﬁcial conduct. On the trial,

defendant offered to prove that those pres-

ent, who heard defendant's language, under-

stood it to refer to oilicial misconduct of

plaintiff in the matters referred to. lie also

oﬂered to prove the reasons and motives

which induced him to speak of plaintiff as he

did. These offers were refused by the court.

I).-fondant, in support of his special plea, un-

dertook to prove that. while plaintiff was in-

specter of curbing, he issued to one party a

certiiieate for curbing put in by another. V

Under the ordinances, the engmeer was re-

quired, after completion of work by the own-

er of the property charged therewith, to V
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grant a certiiicate of the fact, which, when

iiled, exonerated the owner from liability to ‘

pay for the improvement. Defendant of-

fered in evidence a certiﬁcate of that charac-

ter, which showed that the measurement had

been made by plaintiff as inspector, but with-

out designating who had done the work.

The court refused to permit this certiﬁcate

to be read in evidence.

At request of plaintiff, the court gave the ‘

jury the followinginstructions: “(1) Thejury

are instructed that if they believe from the

evidence that on November 4, 1889, the plain-

tiff was acting as superintendent of streets

of Kansas City, and that defendant, Ingram,

was a member of the common council of

Kansas City, and at a meeting of the lower

house of the common council, and in the

presence of various people, the defendant

maliciously used the following language of

and concerning the plaintiff in his character

of superintendent of streets, namely: ‘Now,

I want to say something, and I want the re-

porters to get it. This superintendent of

strcets—this Callahan—is a downright thief,

and I can prove it,'—and if the jury further

believes that said language was false and

untrue, then the said jury should ﬁnd for the

plaintiff. (2) Malice does not consist alone

in personal spite or ill will, but it exists, in

law, wherever a wrongful act is ‘intentionally

done without just cause or excuse. (3) The

court instructs the jury that the defendant is

not protected in this action from liability for

the words used by him against plaintiff by

reason of having uttered them in the cham-

ber of the lower house of the common council

of Kansas City. (4) The jnry_are instructed

that, in making their verdict, they may take

into consideration all the facts and circum-

stances as detailed by the witnesses; and if

the jury ﬁnd for plaintiff, in estimating the

damages which they may think plaintif f has

sustained, the jury may take into considera-

tion, and allow the plaintiff for, the mortiﬁca.-

tion to his feelings, suffered from the act of

defendant complained of, and may add

thereto, as punitive damages, such amount as

will adequately punish the defendant for

Ml'l'IG.\TIO:X OF

i;ipN•l:il rl'fPrPnce In wlrnt he said to the nllq.:ed mlseornluct set up In his special plea.
At the tinll' no i·psolntion, 01·1Uua11l'<', motion,
01· n·1>0rt was before thnt house. rl';.;pl't'tlng
plaintill', or llls official conduct. On the trial,
tlcfrmlant offerl'd to prove that those present, wi10 hl'urd dl'fendant's languagP, understood It to rt>fm· to official miscon<lnct of
pl:ilntlff in the mattl'rs reft>rred to. Ile also
olkrcd to prove the reasons and moth·es
whkb lnrlucctl him to speak of plaintiff ns he
did. ThPSl' oft'ers were rl'fmwfl by tilt' court.
H('f(•mlant, in support of his s1wl'ial plea, un1..krtook to prove that. whi!P t>!ni11tllT was Inspector of curbing, he Issued to one party a
cfi·tillt-ate for curbing put In by nuother.
Und1·r thl' ortllnnncPs, the eu;.:tncl'r was req11ir1·1l, nfter compll'tion of work by the owner of the property charged therewith, to
grant a ce1·tilicate of the fact, which, when
fil<'tl, pxonerated the owner from liability to
puy for the lmprovenwnt. Dl'fl'ndnnt offl're<l in evidence a certificate of that character, which showed that the measurement had
bc!rn runtle by plalntllf ns inspector, but without designating who had done the work.
The court refusetl to permit this certificate
to be read In evidence.
At rc>quest of plaintiff, the court gave the
Jury the followlnglnstrut>tlons: "(l) Thejury
are lm~tructed that If they believe from the
eyltll'nce that on NovembC'r 4, 1889, the plalntltr was acting as superlntendt•nt of streets
of Knnsas City, and that defendant, Ingram,
was a member of the common council of
Kansns City, and at a meeting of the lower
house of the common council, and in the
presence of various people, the defendant
maliciously used the following language of
and concerning the plalntllf in hls character
of superintendent of streets, namely: 'Now,
I wnnt to say something, and I want the repo1·h·1·s to get it. This superintendent of
streets- this Callahan-ls a downright thief,
and I can. prove lt,'-flnd It the jury further
believes that snld language was false and
untrue, then the said jury should find for the
plaintiff. (2) Malice does not consist alone
in personal spite or lll will, but it exists, ln
law, wherever a wrongful act is "Intentionally
done without just cause or excuse. (3) The
rourt Instructs the jury thnt the defendant Is
not protl'cted ln this action from liability for
the words used by hlm against plalntllf by
rPason of having uttered them In the chamber of the lower house of the common council
ot Kansas City. (4) The jury_are instructed
that, ln making their vt•rdlct, they may tnke
Into eonsldt>ratlon all the facts and clrcum·
stances as detailed by the witnesses; and If
the jury find for plaintiff, In estimating th1!
dnmnges which they may think plalntllf has
sustained, the jury may take Into consideration, and allow the plaintiff for, the mortification to bis feelings, suffered from the act of
defendant complained of, and may add
thl'rcto, ns punitive damages, such amount as
will adequately punish the defendant tor

DA~IAGES.

such net, and sl'r,·e as a warning to pren•nt
otlwrs from lwlug guilty o.f a like act." Thf!
court gave one lni>tl'Uctlon tor the tlcfcntlaut,
as follows: "(11) The jury are lnstrueted that
if they believe from the evidence thut tlw
remarks of dl'fl'ntlant at the connell mel'tlng on the 4th of Novl'mbcr, 18''ID, in reft>rence to plaintil'I', tukt>n us a whole, in tll('ir
import. referred to him as inspeetor of curbing, nnd not as sn1ll'rintPndPnt of stn•:·t><. tlwn
your venllct should be for the defP111l:1nt."
The judi;:-ment wos for plaintiff, fur :;;:;,ouo,
and dPfendant appenle<l
1. Defendant ndmitt<.'ll speaking the wor<ls
lm1mtt'<I. to hlw, but umll'rtook to justify
what he snld on the ~'Tound that he wus at
the tlme a. member of th<' city council of
Knmms City, which was In regular session.
and hnd untlcr di11c11s1:1lon tltl' ottlce of supl'r·
intrndent of strPrts, nnd the ofttciul action
autl methods of plainUtr, who was then such
supl'rlntendl'nt; that, In. the disl•harge of his.
otliclal duty, he hud the right ond prlvilegt•
to discuss :md eharactl'J'IZ<> the offielal misconduct of 11Ini11tllf. There cnn be no doubt,
on proper occ:1slon, members of the city council would be 1>rotected from "res11onslblllty
tor whntever Is sold by them, which Is pertinent- to any inquiry pending or proposl'd bt>fore them," but no further. They would become "accowitable when th<'y wandrr from
the subject in band to a!ll!llll others." Cooley, Torts, 214; Neeb v. Hope, 111 Pa. St. rn2.
2 Atl. 568. Members of the city council, In
particular, and all citizens, In general, are
Interested In the proper, honest, and efficient
administration of the public service, and
have the right. In the public Interest, to criticize public officers, and to prefer charges tor
malfeasunce or neglect of duty, If done In
good faith, upon probable and reasonable
grounds; but the law does not permit any
pef&on to slander another, on any occasion or
under any circumstances, when. he Is not
protected by nbeolute privilege. It Is charged
In the petition, and conclusively shown by
the evidence, that when the objectlonabl<words were spoken there was no Inquiry
pending or proposed before that house of the
council, which would mnke th~ ()(.'CaHion out•
ot privilege, beyond that which ls aceorded
to every citizen. Defendant .was not privileged to falsely characterize the platntllf &ll
a "thief," though the term was intended to
apply to bis official conduct Whether the
occasion ls such as to make the communication one of privilege is always a question of
law for the court. where there ls no dispute
as to the circumstances under wmcn It wa11
made, and the court dltl uot err In holdl.ng
that the language applied to defendant was
not privileged. Newell, Defam. p. 391, I 9;
Odger, Sland. & L. 183; Am. & Eng. Enl'.
Law, 406. ·The words spoken were actionable In themselves, and, being admitted by
the answer, the court properly instructed the
jury that If they were false the defcndaut
was liable.

MITIGATIO~
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2. Complaint is made of the ﬁrst instruction

given for plaintiff, in that it is an abandon-

ment of the meaning plaintiff, in his peti-

tion, by innuendo, placed upon the words

spoken. The innuendo charges that defend-

ant intended and meant. by the language

used, to charge plaintiff with oppression and

partiality in the discharge of his ofﬁcial du-

ties as superintendent of streets; and the

claim is that he should be held to the in-

terpretation he himself placed upon them,

while the instruction authori'/.ed a recovery

on proof of the falsity of the words admit-

tedly spoken. The innuendo is intended to

deﬁne the defamatory meaning which the

plaintiff places upon the words used. In ‘

case the defamatory meaning is apparent

from the language charged, there is no ne

cessity for an innuendo at all. The pur-
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pose of the innuendo, and its effect upon the

party pleading it, is thus expressed by Town-

.send in his work on Slander (section 338):

"Where language is ambiguous, and is as

susceptible of a harmless as of an inju-

rious meaning, it is the function of an innu-

endo to point out the meaning which the

plaintiff claims to be the true meaning, and

the meaning upon which he relies to sustain

his action. This applies whether the am-

biguity be patent or latent, and whether or

not there are any facts alleged as induce-

ment. By this means the defendant is in-

formed of the precise charge he has to meet,

and to deny or justify. But the plaintiff is

subjected to the risk that if he claims for

the language a meaning which is not the

true one, or one which he is unable to make

out satisfactorily, he may be defeated on

the ground of variance or failure of proof;

for when the plaintiff, by his innuendo, puts

a meaning on the language published, he is

bound by it, although that course may de-

stroy his right to maintain the action." To

the same effect, see Starkle, Sland. & L. §

446; Newell, Defam. p. 629, § 39; Odger,

Sland. & L. 100. It will be seen that the

oﬂice of the innuendo is to set a meaning

upon words or language which are of doubt-

ful or ambiguous import, and, taken alone,

are not actionable;

case the defamatory meaning is apparent

from the words used, an innuendo is unnec-

essary. Its use is only necessary in order

to bring out the latent, injurious meaning of

the words employed. When used for this

legitimate and necessary purpose, the plain-

tiff will be bound to abide by his own con-

struction of the words used. The innuendo

thus becomes a part of the cause of action

stated. The rule, as given by all the text

writers. is different when the words charged

are actionable in themselves. In such case

the defendant can put in issue the truth of

the words spoken, either with or without the

alleged meaning-. “It will then be for the

jury to say, from the proofs, whether the

plaintiff's innuendo was sustained. If not,

the plaintiff may fall back upon the words

2. Complaint is made of the first instl'Uctiou
given for plniutilT, In that It Is nn nbnudon·
Il!Nlt of the m<>nning plnlntilT, In his petl·
tion. by lnnuenllo, placed upon the wc.ir<ls
spoken. The innuendo char;;es that <lt>ft•utlant Intended and mt'aot, by the lnnguagr
nsNI. to churgP plaintilT with OJIJll"l'i<sion and
partiality in the dli<<'harge of his official duti<'s ns su1wrlntP11tlP11t or i;trt>Pts; and thr
claim Is that he shonl<l he hPlll to tht' interpl'\•tntiou hE' himst'lf 11l11cl'tl upon tlwm,
while the lu1<tr11..tion 111Hhoriz1·<l a 1·t•<·<11"l'l'r
on proof of tin.. fulslt.v of the words admittedly spoken. 'l'he Innuendo ls lntewlcd to
define the defamatory meaning whil'h the
plnlntltr places upon the words used. In
ease the llefamatury mt•1rnlng Is n11p11rt•nt
from the lani,.ruagt' charged, there ls no necessity tor an Innuendo at nil. Tlw pur·
110~ of the> Innuendo, :111tl lh1 effl'ct upon the
party plea1Jing it, Is thm1 expressed by Town.send In his work on Slandl'l' (sPctiou a:~'>):
"'Vlwre lnngunge Is nmhlguous, and Is as
SU11<..>t>ptlble of a harmless us of an Injurious meaning, It Is the function of an lmmendo to point out th<' meaning which the
plaintUr cll\lms to be the truP ml'anlug, and
the mel\nlng upon which be relll's to sustain
his action. This applies whl'ther the ambiguity be patent or latent, nnd whethe1· or
· not ther1• are any facts alll'ged as lmlucement. By this means the defendant Is In·
formed or the l)rl'clse charge be has to mf'et,
and to deny or jm1tlfy. But the plaintiff Is
1mhJt>ctc>d to the risk that If be claims for
the language a meaning which Is not the
true on<', or one which be Is unable to make
out sati!lfnetorlly, he may bl' dl'f(•ated on
the ground of variance or failure of proof;
tor wlwn the plalntllT, by his lnnuf'rnlo, puts
a meaning on the l!mi:"nai.:e puhlished. h<' Is
bound by It, although that course may de11troy his right to maintain the action." To
the same f'tfect, see StarklP, S!and. & J,. I
446; Newell, Defam. p. u:m, § 39; Odger,
Sland. & L. 100. It will be seen that the
office of the Innuendo Is to set a meaning
upon words or language which are of doubtful or amhiguous Import, ancl. taken alone,
are not actlonahl<>; and It follows that, In
<'nse the defamatory meaning Is npp111·1•nt
from the words Ull('d, an !uml!'nclo Is nnneees,;ary. Its use is only nect>.~snry In order
to hrlng out the latent, lnjuriom1 lll(•anlng or
the words employed. When used for this
legitimate and nPcl'ssary purpose, the plnlntilT will be bound to nhl!le by his own con.
struction of the words used. The lnnurndo
thus lx•comes a part of the cause> of action
statPd. The rulr, as given by all th<> t<•xt
wrltl'rs. Is dilTerent when the words d1111·ged
are actionable In themselves. In sul'11 em10
the defenilnnt can put In lssur the truth of
the words spoken, either with or without the
alleged lllP:Ullng. "It will then be tor the
jury to say, from the proofs, wh<'ther the
plalnt!IT's Innuendo was susuilned. It not,
the plnlntltr may full buck upon the wonJ;1
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thenu;elves, and urge that. taken In thl•ir
naturnl and o!JYlous slgnificu tlon. tlwy are
actionnble in themsPlves. without the nll<'l!l'll
meaning, and that, the1·efure, his UllJll'OYc•l
Innuendo may be rejected us surplu><ugP.°'
Newl'il, Defnm. p. ti28, § 38; Ocli.,:cr, Hlaml.
& L. 101, and Clll'll'S citt-11. "An lnmwndo
will not vitiate the procl'edlngs, though new
matt .. r he lt11t·otl11c1•1l; and whPre the 11H1tt•·r
Is 111111Prfluous, 111111 the cause of action h~
com)llete without It, th!' lnuuen<lo mny be
rl'j(•1·ted." Starkie, Slnnd. & L. 482; G:1g1!
v. Shelton, 3 Hich. Law, 242. "If a complulnt ls sufficient wltlluut the lnnul'nllo, the
i11m1Mulo mny be rf'jected as surplusage.
'rlw innuendo may always be rejected when
it nwrl'ly lntrodnt'!'S matter not lll'cPssary
to support the aetlon." '!'owns. Slnncl. & L.
§ :~. and cases cltrd; 13 Am. & Eng. Enc.
Law, 4(j8. The prluciple am10unc1.•d by t11e11e
nuthors is supported by nunwrous casl's cited
by tlwm,-11 case from this court being one.
In that case, defendant charged plnintilf
with bl'lng a whore, meaning thereby that
plaintiff "had been guilty of the crime of
adultery." The proof disclosed that plaintllT
was an unmarried woman. Upon an appeal from a judgment In favor of plalntilT,
defendant Insisted thnt as plalntllf, by Innuendo, had declared that defendant's wife lnt1•ndc1l, by speaking the words, to Impute
adultery, plaintiff was bound to prove they
we1·e uttered In the st•nse thus ascribed to
them; but the court held that the innuendo
coul<I be r<•J<'etrd, nlhl sustained the judgnwnt. Hud!!On v. Garn<'r, 22 Mo. 424.
Tlwre ean be no doubt that the words
"downrh.:ht thlrr," nppllNl to plaintiff, lmput<'d to him thr <'riinP of lurce ny, and were
In th<'mselves actlom1hll'. The Innuendo.
<'harglng that drfen1lant mrnnt tberc>hy to
charge plalntllT with offtcial corruption, oppre'!11lon, and partiality also imptttl'tl n.
crime, and was actionable. Rev. St. 188!l.
H 3732, 3i83. DPfenclnut, by answer, admitted that he applied to dc>f1•111lant the tC'rm
"downright thief," as charged. Upon th!"
state of the pleading, we do not think thert'
was c>rror In ln'!trnctlng th!' jury that plalntilT could reco,-er If defendant !<poke thP
worc111 as l'imrgt>d, ancl they were fnlsr, unlE>'!s plaintiff was justified In so speaking.
3. The tlrst Instruction rt•qulrecl the jury. In
order to flnd for plnlntllT, to also find thnt
the (}f'fnmatory words WPrP spok<'n with malke. The second Instruction told the jury
that malice existrd in law "whenevrr 11
wrongful a ct ls intentionally done without
just eause or excuse." The ltfth lnstrudim1
authorized the jury, In mnklng tbrlr verdll't.
to add therPto, as punitive damnges, "sud1
amount as will adPquatdy punish tlw tlPflornlant for such act, and srrve as a w111·ning to
prevent others from being guilty of a like act.'"
Exrmplary demagl'S W<'l'e thus authorized
l\'ithout proof of express malice. Defendant
insists that punitive rlaru11ge!'(, In suits tor
slmulC'r, are only reconmble wheu the w1·ung-
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- lcging or proving special damages.

doer was actuated by actual or express mal-

ice, as distinguished from malice implied by

law. No one is excused for the libel or slan-

der of another for the reason that the wrong-

doer was without malice. The actual in-

jury suffered does not depend upon the mo-

tive of the wrongdoer. The object, then, in

giving evidence in proof of malice, is to in-

crease the damages beyond what was actual-

ly sustained. Odger, Sland. & L. 269; Towns.

Sland. & L. § 91; Suth. Dam. § 1225, and

cases cited. In slander the words are always

intentionally spoken, whatever meaning may

be imputed to them. Hence, it is said. when

slanderous words are spoken, or a libelous ar-

ticle is published falsely, the law will aﬂix

malice to them. There is no necessity of

proving express malice. Buckley v. Knapp,
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48 Mo. 161. So it is uniformly held that

when the words spoken are actionable in

themselves, and are proven to be false, the

law will imply malice. Hall v. Adkins, 59

Mo. 144; Price v. Whitely, 50 Mo. 439;

Noeninger v. Vogt, 88 Mo. 589; Mitchell v.

Bradstreet Co., 116 Mo. 226, 22 S. W. 358,

724. So it will appear that malice, such as

the law implies, is the very gist of the ac-

tion for slander. It is held in some of the

cases last cited that, when the words spoken

are actionable in themselves, the person in-

jured will be entitled to recover without al-

It is

also held that a repetition of the defamatory

words may be given in evidence for the pur-

pose of proving express malice (Nocuinger v.

Vogt, 88 Mo. 593), and thereby increasing the

damage, though malice was implied from

the words spoken. It is said that “malice,

in legal understanding, implies no more than

willfuiness." Buckley v. Knapp, supra.

Again, malice in law is deﬁned as “the

malice which is inferred from doing a wrong-

ful act without lawful justiﬁcation or ex-

cuse." 1 Starkie, Sland. & L. 213. Townsend

says: “The distinction between malice in law

and malice in fact has been supposed to con-

sist in this: that the one is inferred, and the

other is proved. The supposed distinction is

unreal and unsound; for, ﬁrst, there is no dis-

tinction between what is inferred and what

is proved,—what is, or is supposed to be,

rightly inferred is proved." Towns. Sland.

& L. p. 68, § 87. We may say, then, that

malice, whether expressed or implied, means

the same, the only difference being in the

establishment of it. When malice is implied

from the words spoken or published, the bur-

den is on the defendant to prove lawful jus-

tiﬁcatlon or excuse, or the absence of a mall-

cious intent. On the other hand, if the words

themselves do not imply malice, the burden

rests upon the plaintiff to establish it. When

malice exists, punitive damages may be

given; and it cannot be seen why a distinc-

tion should be made when the evil intent ex-

isted, whether implied or proved. It is true

a distinction is made by some courts, and it
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doer was nctunted by nctual or express malice, ns distinguished from malice Implied by
lnw. No one Is excused for the libel or slander of another for the reason that the wrongdoer was without mnlice. The nctunl In·
jury suffered does not depend upon the motive of the wrongdoer. The object, !hen, In
giving evl<lence In proof of malice, ls to ln1'rease the dnmages beyond what was actually sustained. Odger, Sland. & L. 269; Towns.
Slnml. & L. § 91; Suth. Dam. § 1225, nnd
cn::<PS dted. In slander the words are always
Intentionally spoken, whatever meaning may
be imputed to them. Hence, it is said. when
sland~rous words are spoken, or a libelous nrticle is published falsely, the law will affix
malice to them. The1·e ls no necessity ot
proving express malice. Buckley v. Knapp,
48 Mo. 16L So it Is uniformly held thnt
when the words spoken are actionable In
themselves, and are proven to be false, the
law will Imply malice. Hall v. Adkins, 59
Mo. 144; Price v. Whitely, 60 Mo. 439;
Noeninger v. Vogt, 88 Mo. 589; Mitchell v.
Bradstreet Co., 116 Mo. 226, 22 S. W. 358,
724. So It will appear that malice, such as
the law Implies, ls the very gist of the action for slander. It Is held In some of the
cases last cited that, when the words spoken
are actionable In themselves, the person injured will be entitled to recover without al·
leging or proving special damages. It ls
also held that a repetition of the defamatory
words may be given In evidence for the purpose of proving express malice (Noenlnger v.
Vogt, SS Mo. 593), and thereby Increasing the
damage, though malice was Implied from
the words spoken. It ls said that "malice,
In legal understanding, implies no more than
willfulness."
Buckley v. Knapp, supm.
Agnln, malice In law ls defined as "the
malice which Is inferred from doing a wrongful act without lawful justification or excuse." 1 Starkie, Slall(I. & L. 213. Townsend
says: "The distinction between malice In law
and malice In fact has been supposed to consist In this: that the one Is Inferred, and the
other Is proved. The supposed distinction ls
unreal and unsound; for, first, there Is no dis·
tinctlon between what ls Inferred and what
ls proved,-what ls, or Is supposed to be,
i·lghtly Inferred ls proved." Towns. Sland.
& L. p. 68, § 87. We may say, then, that
malice, whr>ther expressed or Implied, means
the same, the only difference being In the
e:o;tablishment of lt. When malice ls Implied
from the words spoken or published, the burden Is on the defendant to prove la'\'\>ful justification or excuse, or the absence of a malicious Intent. On the other hand, If the words
themselves do not Imply malice, the burden
r£>sts upon the plaintiff to establish lt. When
malice exists, punitive damui;es may be
l!lven; and It cannot be seen why a dlstlnc·
lion should be made when the evil Intent existed, whether Implied or proved. It Is true
a dli;tlnctlon ls ma<le by some courts, and It
is hdd that, unless ex1iress mnlice ls proved,

exemplary damages should not be allowed.
This line of decision was followed by the
St. Louis court of appeals in Nelson v. Wallace, 48 l\lo. App. 193, and Fulkerson v. Murdock, 53 Mo. App. 156. It Is argued tlmt
punitive damages are only allowed in trd' PllSS
and other actions for torts, when the offense
ls committed In a wanton, rude, and ai;grnvated manner, Indicating oppre;;sion, or a desire to injure, and that no rcnson can be seen
for the npplicntion of a dltTereut rule In cases
for slander or libel. We think the distinction
does not In fact exist. :Malice Is im1Jlied in
the willful doing of any wrongful act, with·
out justlticatlon or excuse, whereby Injury
Is done to another, whether It be to his charneter, his person, or his property. 'Where
such act ls done malicious!)-, therefore, the
Injured person shoulu be entitled to exemplary damages; and It would be Immaterial
whether malice was Implied from the nature
of the net Itself, or Inferred as a fnct from
all the clrcmnstances under which It was
committed. The question ls whether the
wrong was done willfully, and without lawful justification or excuse. Whatever the
decisions of the other states may be, there
.seems no just ground for distinguishing between malice In fact and mallce In law, In
respect to the right to exemplary damages,
In action for libel and slander; and the decisions of this state make no such distlnc·
tlon. In Buckley v. Knapp, supra, an In·
structlon was approved which authorized the
recovery of punltlve damages upon Implied
malice nlone; and that decision was followed
In the subsequent case of Clements v. Maloney, 55 ~Io. 359, and the doctrine has since
these decisions been regarded as settled. It ls
said in Bergmann v. Jones, 94 N. Y. 6'2: "The
falsity of the libel Is sufficient proof of malice to uphold exemplnry d:1mnges, and plalnt11r's right to recover them ls In the discretion of the jury. When the falseness of the
libel Is proved, as a general rule, lt is sufftelent to wa1·rant the jury In gh·lng exemplary damages." This ruling was approved by
the same court In Warner v. Publishing Co.,
132 N. Y. 183, 30 N. E. 393, and expressly
followed In Hintz v. Graupner, 138 Ill. 158,
27 N. E. 935. To the same effect ls the case
of Blocker v. Scho1r, 83 Iowa, 269, 48 N. W.
1079.
.
4. Exemplary damages may always be
given, In suits for slander, when the words
are mallclously spoken; but whether such
damages should be given, In any case, Is a
matter within the discretion of the jury. In
order to show good faith, and want of malice, the defendant has the right to put In
evidence all the clrcwnstnnces under which
the words were uttered; and, It such clrcum·
stances tend to rebut malice, snch damages
could only be n warded in case the words
were maliciously spoken, but may, In themselves, be sufficient proof, lf mnllce ls Implied ther efrom. l'lalntll!', by Innuendo,
chm·ged that defl'nd:rnt, by the slanderous
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words used, intended to impute to him cor-

ruption in otiice. Defendant, by answer,

and in mitigation of damages, admitted that

the words spoken had respect solely to plain-

tiff's oﬂiclal conduct. Defendant offered, as

was his right to do, evidence tending to

prove the circumstances under which the

objectionable words were used, in order to

prove good faith, and want of malicious in-

tent. As has been said, defendant, as an

interested citizen, had the right to make rea-

sonable comment and fair criticism upon

plaintiff's oﬁicial conduct, but he had no

right to go beyond that, and slander him.

It was, in view of all the circumstances, for

the jury to say how far the evidence miti-

gated the malice, if at all, and to award the

damages accordingly. We think the effect

of the instruction on the measure of dam-
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ages was to ignore this defense, and, as the

question of exemplary damages was a mat-

ter independent of the right to recover, the

error was not cured by the ﬁrst instruction,

which required a ﬁnding that the words were

maliciously spoken in order to a recovery for

any amount. Exemplary damages are given

by way of punishment, and the jury should

be so instructed thereon as to leave no doubt

on the subject.

5. There was no error in refusing to per-

i

mit defendant to testify as to the motives .

which actuated him in speaking the defama-

tory words, so far as the testimony affected

the right to recover compensatory damages. ‘

The effect would be the same though he .

meant to say one thing, and said another. '

He is answerable for so inadequately ex-

pressing his meaning. Nowell, Defam. p. 1

301; McGinnis v. George Knapp & Co., 109

Mo. 148, 18 S. W. 1134. But the motives or

purposes with which the words were spoken

lie at the very foundation of malice. They

are the very conditions upon which exem-

plary or punitive damages are predicated,

and no good reason appears why defendant

should not be permitted to prove what his

motives were. Odger says: “In all cases,

the absence of malice, though it may not be

a bar to the action, may yet have a material

effect in reducing the damages. The plain-

tiff is still entitled to reasonable compensa-

tion for the injury he has suffered; but if -

the injury was unintentional, or was com-

mitted under a sense of duty, or through

some honest mistake, clearly, no vindictive

damages could be given. In every case,

therefore, the defendant may, in mitigation

of damages, give evidence to show that he

acted in good faith, and with honesty of par-

pose, and not maliciously." Odger, Sland.

& L. 317. "Upon principle, the spirit and

intention of the party publishing a libel are

ﬁt to be considered by the jury, in estimat-

ing the injury done to the piaintiff, and e\i-

dence tending to prove it cannot be excluded

simply because it may disclose another and

different cause of action." Starkie, Sland.

words used, lnt<'rn1Pil to Impute to h1m cor- :
ruptlon in omre. Drfl'111lnnt, by ·answer, '
and In mitigation of da1u:igt>s, admitted that
the words spoken had respt.>ct soll•ly to 11lnlntlff's official conduct. Derendant offered, as
was his right to do, evidence tending to
prove the circumstances under which the
objectionable words were used, In order to
prove good faith, and want of mnlklous intent. As bas been said, defendnnt, aa an
interN;ted cltlzt'n, had the right to make reasonable comnwnt and rnJr criticism upon
pin lntllf's oftklal conduct, but he had no
right to go beyond that, and slamler him.
It was, In vlew of all the circumstances, tor
the jury to say how far the evidence mitigated the malice, If at all, and to award the
damages accordingly. We think the effect
of the Instruction on the measure of dnm·
ages was to Ignore this defense, and, as the
qut•stlon of exemplary damages was a matter Independent of the right to recover, the
01'ror wns not cured by the first Instruction,
which required a finding that the words were
maliciously spoken In order to a recovery for
any amount. Exemplary damages arc given
by way of punishment, and the jury should
be 80 Instructed thereon as to leave no doubt
on the subject.
6. There was no error in refusing to perml t defendant to testify as to the motives ,
which actuated him in speaking the defamatory words, 80 far as the testimony affected '
the right to recover compensatory damages.
The e.lrect would be the same though be
meant to say one thing, and said anO'ther.
He Is answerable for so lnndequately expr<'sslng his meaning. Newell, Defam. p.
301; McGinnis v. George Knapp & Co., 109
Mo. 148, 18 S. W. 1134. But the motives or
purpt.1ses with which the words were spoken
lie at the very foundation of malice. They
are the very conditions upon which exemplary or punitive damages are predicated,
nnd no good reason appears why \lefendant
should not be permitted to prove what his
motives were. Odger says: "In all cases,
the absence of malice, though It may not be i
a hnr to the action, may yet have a material
etl'1><·t In reiluclng the dnmngps. 'fhe plain·
111'1' Is still entitled to rcnsonnble comperumtlou for the Injury be has sutrcrro; but 1t
the Injury was unlntl'ntlonnl, or was committed under a s<'nse of duty, or through
some 11onest mistake, cl<'arly, no vindictive
damages could be given. In every case,
th<'rPfore, the defendant may, In mitigation
of damages, give evidence to show thn.t he
acted in good faith, and with honesty of pur-
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pose, and not maliciously." Odger, Slnn<l.
r,. 317. "Upon principle, the spirit and
lntmtlon ot thl' pa.rtr publishing a libel nre
flt to be consldp1·C'<l by tho jury, In estlmfi>tlng the Injury done to the plnlntlff, and eYI·
dl'll<'<' tl'ndlng to prove It cannot be exclud<'<l
simply because It mny disclose another and
dllTerent cause of action." Starkie, Stand.
& L. § 039. "Tl1e lntent-mt•nnlng the lnt('llt
to etrect certnln conscquenc1·s-wlth wh"ch
nn act Is done Is material on the question of
the amount of damages. 'l'he absence of a
bnd Intent will mitigate the damages. 'fhe
presence of a bnd Intent will aggravate
them." Townsh. Sland. & L. § 01. 'Ye
think l'vldenee of the lntl'ntlon n.nd motive
of dl'fendant was admissible for the purpose
of mitigating the punishment, by way of exemplary damagl's; but the jury shouM have
been cautioned not to nllow such evidence
to operate na a defense to the action, or to
mitigate the actual damages sustalnul.
6. It does not appear upon the face of the
acceptance offered in evidence that It au.
tho11zed any particular person to collect the
amount due tor putting In the curbing, yet
delivery to, an<l possession by, one who bad
only done a small portion of the work, was
a clt·cumstance which mny have given the
holder an advantage; and we think the certificate should have been admitted for what
lt was worth. The transaction In which the
certificate was issued by plalntl.lr was commented upon by defendant In the dlscus1:1lon
In which the slanderous words were usl'<l,
and defendant had the right to place the
whole matter before the jury, for the purpose of showing good faith, and want of
actual ma.lice. For the same reason, de·
fendant should have been permitted to show
what he hnd been told by others In reference
to this ncceptnnce. Blocker v. ScholT. ~
Iowa, 2G5, 48 N. W. 1079; 01·tb v. Fentherly, 87 ~Ilch. 320, 49 N. W. 64-0.
7. There was 'lO error In refusing to per·
mlt witness Lane to testify as to his un<ll'rsta.ndlng of the slanderous words used by
defendant. A witness may testify to the
speaking of the slanderous words. "together
with all the attendant clrcnmst:rnc<'s and
connections, the eir.lstlng facts; and, aft<>r
having done 80, It Is tor the jury to dC'll•rmlne from the evidence whnt was nwnnt."
Newell, Defam. p. 308, and cns<'s cit('\l In
note. For the errors noted the judgment Is
reversed, and the cause remanded.

&

BARCLAY, J., absent.
concur.

The other judges
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LOUISVILLE, N. A. & C. RY. CO. v. SNY-

DER.

(20 N. E. 284, 117 Ind. 435.)

Supreme Court of Indiana. February 21, 1889.

Appeal from circuit court, Clinton county;

Joseph C. Suit, Special Judge.

Action by James B. Snyder against the

Louisville, New Albany & Chicago Railway

Company, for personal injuries. Judgment

for plaintiff, and defendant appeals.

S. O. Bayless and W. H. Russell, for ap-

(20 N. E. 284, 117 Ind. 435.)
:Supreme Court of Indiana. February 21, 1889.

Appeal from circuit <.'Ourt, Cllnton county;
Joseph C. Suit, Special Judge.
Act:on by James B. Snyder against the
Louis\·ille, New Albany & Chicago Railway
Uomvany, for personal injuries. Judgment
for l>l:tintl!T, and defendant appeals.
S. 0. Bayless and W. H. Russell, tor appellant. 'l'. H. Palmer, W. F. Palmer, B. K.
Higinbotham, and M. Bristow, tor appeliee.

pellant. T. H. Palmer, W. F. Palmer, B. K.

Higinbotham, and M. Bristow, for appellee.

ELLIOTT, C. J. The appeilee was a pas-

senger on one of the appellant's trains,

which, by the falling of a bridge, was pre-

cipitated into White river, and the appeilee

severely injured.

Dr. Bowles, an expert witness called by
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the appellant, gave an opinion as to the na-

ture and extent of the injury sustained by

the appellee, and on cross-examination it was

developed that his testimony was in part

based on statements made to him by the ap-

peilee. Waiving all questions of practice,

and deciding the appellant's motion to strike

out as if it were properly restricted to the

alleged incompetent part of the testimony,

we have no hesitation in deciding that the

trial court did right in overruling the motion.

As we have often decided, the physical or-

gans of a human being cannot be inspected

by the eyes of a surgeon, and the statements

of the sufferer must, of necessity, be taken

by the surgeon. It is not possible for any

surgeon, by a mere external examination, to

always discover the character of an injury,

and properly describe or treat an injured

man; ‘and for this reason, if for no other,

the statements of the injured person descrip-

tive of present pains or symptons are always

competent, although narratives of past oc-

currences are inadmissible. On this point

our own decisions are harmonious, and they

are right upon principle, and are well sup-

ported by authority. Railroad Co. v. New-

ell, 104 Ind. 264, 3 N. E. 836; Railway Co. v.

Falvey, 104. Ind. 409, 3 N. E. 389, and 4 N.

E. 908; Railway Co. v. Wood, 113 Ind. 544,

14 N. E. 572, and 16 N. E. 197; Board v. Leg-

gett. 115 Ind. 544, 18 N. E. 53; Hatch v. Ful-

ler, 131 Mass. 574; Railroad Co. v. Johns, 36

Kan. 769, 14 Pac. 237; Qualfe v. Railroad

Co., 48 Wis. 513, 4 N. W. 658. From these

decisions we shall not depart.

The fact that the appellee was suffering

from Bright's disease at the time he was in-

jured does not impair his right of recovery.

The rule is this: “Where a disease caused

by the injury supervenes, as well as where

the disease exists at the time of the injury,

and is aggravated by it, the plaintiii is enti-

tled to full compensatory damages." Rail-

road Co. v. Hecht, 115 Ind. 443, 17 N. E. 297;

Railway Co. v. Wood, supra; Railroad Co.

v. Pitzer, 109 Ind. 179, 6 N. E. 310. and 10

N. E. 70; Railroad Co. v. Buck, 96 Ind. 346;

Ehrgott v. Mayor, 96 N. Y. 26-i; Jucker v.

ELLIOTT, C. J. The appellee was a pasJ:Jenger on one of the appellant's trains,
which, by the falling or a bridge, was precipitated into White river, aud the appellee
severely Injured.
Dr. Bowles, an expert witness called by
the appellant, gave an opinion as to the nature and extent of the Injury sustained by
the appellee, and on cross-examination it was
developed tbnt his testimony was in part
based on statements made to him by the appellee. Waiving all questions of practice,
and deciding the appellant's motion to strike
out as If it were properly restricted to the
alleged Incompetent part of the testimony,
we have no hesitation In deciding that the
trial court did right In overrullng the motion.
As we have often decided, the physical organs of a human being cannot be Inspected
by the eyes of a surgeon, and the statements
of the sulferer must, of necessity, be taken
by the surgeon. It is not possible tor any
surgeon, by a mere external examination, to
always discover the character of an injury,
nod properly describe or treat an Injured
11111'0; and for this reason, if for no other,
the statements of the Injured person descriptive of present pains or symptons are always
competent, although narratives of past occurrences are Inadmissible. On this point
our own decisions are harmonious, and they
are right upon principle, and are well sur1ported by authority. Railroad Co. v. Newell, 104 Ind. 264, 3 N. E. 836; Railway Co. v.
Falvey, 104. Ind. 400, 3 N. E. 389, and 4 N.
E. 908; Railway Co. v. Wood, 113 Ind. 544,
14 N. l<J. 572, and 16 N. E. 197; Hoard v. Legi:ett. 115 Ind. 544, 18 N. E. 53; Hatch v. Fuller. 131 Mass. 574; Railroad Co. v. Johns, 36
Kan. 7Gn, 14 Pac. 237; Quaife v. Railroad
Co., 48 Wis. 513, 4 N. W. 658. From these
decisions we shall not depart.
'l'he fact that the appellee was suffering
from Bright's disease at the time he was Injured clocs not Impair bis right of recovery.
The rule ls this: "Where a. disease caused
by the injury supervenes, as well as where
the disease exists at the time of the Injury,
and ls aggravated by it, the plaintiff ls entitled to full compensatory damages." Railroad Co. v. Hecht, 115 Ind. 443, I i N. E. 297;
Hnllwny Co. v. Woo<l, supra; Hullrond Co.

v. Pitzer, 109 Ind. 179, 6 N. E. 310, and 10
N. E. 70; Railroad Co. v. Buck, 96 Ind. 34U;
Ehrgott v. Mayor, 96 N. Y. 2<H; Jucker v.
Railroad Co., 52 Wis. 150, 8 N. W. 862; Railway Co. v. Harris, 122 U. S. 597, 7 Sup. Ct.
128U; Railway Co. v. Rosenzweig, 113 Pn.
St. 519, 6 Atl. 546; Railway Co. v. Leslie, 57
Tex. 83.
'l'be rule we have stated ls thus expressed
In cme ot our best text-books: "Though the
plalntllI be aftlicted with a disease or weakness which has a tendency to aggravate tbe
Injury, the defendant's negligence will still
be held to be the proximate cause." 2 Shear.
& R. Neg. (4th Ed.) § 742.
The Instructions clearly and properly state
the law on this subject.
The court did not err In Instructing the
jury as to the degree of care required of the
appellant; at least, not as agalll8t the appellant. The rule Is well settled that carriers are bound to use the hlgbeet practicable
degree of care to secure the safety of passengers.
There was no evidence of contributory negligence on the part of the appellee, and the
court might well have refueed any Instruction at all upon that point. Where a passenger Is In his proper place In the car, and
makes no exposure of bis person to danger.
there can be no question of contributory negligence. Decisions like that of Railway Co.
v. Greene, 106 Ind. 279, 6 N. E. 603, In caseR
of persons Injured at a railroad crossing,
are not applicable to such a case as the one
at our bar. The law ls, as the jury were
told, that carriers of pa88engers. are liable
for the slightest negligence. Any negligence
on their part ls actionable. Railroad Co. v.
Rainbolt, 99 Ind. 551.
The law wm not tolerate any negligence on
the part of carrleri;i, although they are not
Insurers of the safety of their passengers.
The burden of overcoming the presumption
of negligence arising from evidence of the
occurrence of an accident and Injury to a
passenger ls upon the carrier. Packet Co.
v. :McCool, 83 Ind. 302; Railroad Co. v. Buck.
96 Ind. 346; Railroad Co. v. Newell, supra;
Railroad Co. v. Ilninbolt, supra; Anderson v.
&holey, 114 Ind. i>53. 17 N. E . 12.5.
Io Railroad Co. v. Pedigo, 108 Ind. 481, 8
N. E. 627, the rule was applied In a case
growing out of the same occurrence ns that
In which the appellee was Injured. The
twenty-second Instruction asked by the appellant, and refused, reads thus: "The court
further Instructs you that by 'negligence.'
when used In these Instructions, ls meant
either the failure to do what a ree.sonable
person would ordloarlly have done under the
circumstances of the situation, oc doing what
such person would not have done under the
existing circumstances." This Instruction
was properly refused. It Is not proper In
such a case as this to define negligence as It
Is defined In this Instruction. In a case ot
this cha111(•ter, the omission to exercise the
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highest degree of practicable care constitutes

negligence, but in other cases the failure to

exercise ordinary care constitutes negligence.

Counsel are greatly in error in asserting, as

they do, that the instruction correctly fur-

nishes the standard for the government of

the jury. The appellant was, as we have

substantially said, bound to do more than

prudent men would ordinarily do, since it

was bound to use a very high degree of care.

The duty of a railroad company engaged in

carrying passengers is not always discharged

by purchasing from reputable manufacturers

the iron rods or other iron-work used in the

construction of its bridges. The duty of the

company is not discharged by trusting, with-

out inspecting and testing, to the reputation

of the manufacturers, and the external ap-

pearance of such materials. The law re-
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quires that before the lives of passengers

are trusted to the safety of its bridges, the

company shall carefully and skillfully test

LAW DAM.2d Ed.—30

and inspect the materials it uses in such

structures. This duty of inspection does not

end when the materials are put in place, but

continues during their use; for the company

is bound to test them, from time to time, to

ascertain whether they are being impaired

by use or exposure to the elements. Mauser

v. Railway Co., 3 Law T. (N. S.) 585; Rail-

road Co. v. Suggs, 62 Tex. 323; Stokes v.

Railway Co., 2 Fost. & F. 691; Robinson

v. Railroad Co., 9 Fed. 877; Richardson v.

Railroad Co., L. R. 10 C. P. 486, L. R. 1 C.

P. Div. 342; Ingalls v. Bills, 9 Metc. 1; Frink

v. Potter, 17 Ill. 406; Bremnor v. Williams,

1 Car. & P. 414; Hegeman v. Railroad Corp.,

13 N. Y. 9; Alden v. Railway Co., 26 N. Y.

102.

The decision in the case of Railroad Co. v.

Boyd, 65 Ind. 527, is not in conﬂict with this

doctrine, for in that case an inspection was

made.

Judgment aﬂlrmed.

l1ighest degree of practicable care constitutes
negligence, but in other cases the failure to
exercise ordinary care constitutes negligence.
Counsel are greatly in error in asserting, as
they do, that the. Instruction correctly fur.dishes the standard for the government of
tde jury. The appellant was, as we have
substantially said, bound to do more than
prudent men would ordhu~rlly do, since It
was bound to use a very high degree of care.
The duty of a railroad company engaged In
carrying passengers Is not always discharged
by purchasing from reputable manufacturers
the Iron rods or other Iron-work used in the
construction of Its bridges. The duty of the
company ls not discharged by trusting, without Inspecting and testing, to the reputation
of the manufacturers, and the external appearance of such materials. The law requires that before the lives of passengers
are trusted to the safety of Its bridges, the
company shall carefully and skillfully test
LAW DAM.2d Ed.-30
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and Inspect the materials it uses In such
structures. This duty of Inspection does not
end when the materials are put In place, but
continues during their use; tor the company
ls bound to test them, from time to time, to
ascertain whether they are being Impaired
by use or exposure to the elements. Manser
v. Railway Co., 3 Law T. (N. S.) 585; Railroad Co. v. Suggs, 62 Tex. 323; Stokes v.
Railway Co., 2 Fost. & F. 6!H; Robinson
v. Raih-oad Co., 9 Jt,ed. 877; Richardson v.
Hailroad Co., L. R. 10 C. P. 486, L. R. 1 C.
P. Div. 342; Ingalls v. Bills, 9 Mete. 1; Frlul;:
v. Potter, 17 Ill. 406; Bremner v. Williams,
1 Car. & P. 414; Hegeman v. Railroad Corp.,
13 N. Y. 9; Alden v. Railway Co., 26 N. Y.
102.
The decision In the case of Railroad Co. v.
Boyd, 65 Ind. 527, Is not In conftlct with this
doctrine, tor In that case an ln.&pect1on was
made.
Judgment amrmed.
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(21 A.ti. 33, 129 Pa. St 363.)

BUNTING v. HOGSETT

(21 Atl. 33, 139 Pa. St. 363.)

Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.
1891.

Jan. 12,

Supreme Court of Pennsylvania. Jan. 12,

1891.

Appeal from court of common pleas, Alle-

gheny county.

Action by Henry C. Bunting against Robert

Hogsett for personal injuries. Plaintiff, Hen-

ry C. Bunting, excepted to the following por-

tion of the charge to the jury: “He [plaintiff]

is also entitled to compensation for the loss

of earning power during the expectancy of his

life. That is one of the most difﬁcult things

to determine, but you have to use simply your

good judgment, for the reason that you can-

not tell how long a man may live. You can-

not tell whether he will live the full expect-

ancy of his life. No one can tell that. While

he was injured by the accident he still might
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have had a disease that would shorten his

life anyhow, and if there is proof of that. as

there is proof in this case that he had Bright's

disease. and that was not occasioned, or hard-

ly could be occasioned, by this accident, you

will take that into consideration, and consider

whether, by reason of that, his expectancy of

life is not shortened very much from what the

tables that have been given in evidence show.

It is alleged that his expectancy of life could

not be as shown in the tables, because phy-

sicians certify he has Bright's disease. Your

experience in life will tell you that that is a

very dangerous disease, and it it was not

caused by this accident—and it is not pretend-

ed it was—you will take thatlnto considera-

tion in determining the loss of his earning

power during the time which he may be ex-

pected to live." The jury returned a verdict

of $1,733 in favor of Henry C. Bunting, and

of $500 for Phoebe J. Bunting. Plaintiff,

Henry Bunting, now prosecutes this appeal,

assigning the above charge as error.

Edw. Campbell and Thos. Patterson, for ap-

pellant. A. D. Boyd and Lazear & Orr, for

appellee. _

CLARK, J . There was evidence in this case

that the plaintiil‘. Henry C. Bunting, at the

time of the trial, was suffering from what

is known as “Bright's disease of the kidneys."

Upon a chemical analysis, albumen was found

in his urine. He suffered from dizziness, fail-

ure of sight, and double vision. He was fee-

ble, had shortness of breath, and a stagger-

ing gait, and exhibited other symptoms of this

malady. The testimony of some of the med-

ical experts was that they believed him to

be suffering from Bright's disease. and there

was little, if any, evidence to the contrary.

The court very properly, therefore, instructed

the jury that there was proof of this fact in

the case; that it was a dangerous disease;

and that they should take this into considera-

tion in determining Mr. Bunting's expectancy

of life and the loss of his earning power. Nor

was there any evidence to justify the jury in

ﬁnding that this disease was caused by the

personal injuries received in the collision.

The judgment is therefore aiﬂrmed.

Appeal from court of common pleas, Allegheny county.
Action by Henry C. Bunting against Robert
Hogsett tor personal Injuries. Plalntltr, Henry C. Bunting, excepted to the following portion of the charge to the jury: "He [plalutlff]
Is also entitled to compensation tor the loss
ot earning power during the expectancy of his
life. That Is one of the most dim.cult things
to determine, but you have to use simply your
good judgment, for the reason that you cannot tell how long a man may live. You cannot tell whether be will live the full expectancy of his life. No one can tell that. While
he was Injured by the accident he still might
have had a disease that would shorten his
life anyhow, and It there ls proof of that, as
there Is proof In this case that he had Bright's
disease, and that was not occasioned, or hardly could be occasioned, by this accident. you
wlll take that Into consideration, and consider
whether, by reason of that, his expectancy of
llfe Is not shortened very much trom what the
tables that have been given In evidence show.
It Is alleged that his expectancy of lite could
not be as shown In the tables, because physicians certify he has Bright's disease. Your
experience In lite will tell you that that Is a
very dangerous disease, and If It was not
caused by this accident-and It ls not pretend-

ed It was-yon will take that ·Into consideration In determining the toss of his earning
power during the time which he may be expected to llve." The jury returned a verdict
ot $1,733 In favor of Henry C. Bunting, and
of $W0 for Phoebe J. Bunting. Plalntll!',
Henry Iluuting, now prosecutes this appeal,
assigning the above charge ll.8 error.
Edw. Campbell and Thos. Patterson, tor appellant. A.. D. Boyd and Lazear & Orr, for
appellee.

CLARK, J. There was evidence In this case
that the plaintllr, Henry C. Bunting, at the
time of the trial, was suffering from what
is known as "Bright's disease of the kidneys."
Upon a chemical analysis, albumen was found
In his urine. He sutrered from dizziness, failure of sight, and double vision. He was feeble, had shortneSB of breath, and a staggering gait, and exhibited other symptoms ot this
malady. The testimony of some of the medical experts was that they believed him to
be sutrerlng from Bright's disease, and there
was little, lf any, evidence to the contrary.
The court very properly, therefore. lnstruct<"d
the jury that there was proof of this fact In
tne case; that It was a dangerous disease;
and that they should take this Into consideration In determining Mr. Bunting's expectancy
of life and the loss of his earning power. Nor
was there any evidence to justify the jury In
finding that this disease was caused by the
personal Injuries received In the colllslon.
The Judgment la therefore alDrmed.
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(“ARPEN'l‘iCR ct ai. v. AMERICAN BLDG.

& LOAN ASSN.

(56 N. W. 95, 54 Minn. 403.)

Supreme Court of Minnesota. Aug. 17, 1898.

Appeal from dist1ict court, Hennepin coun-

ty; Lochren, Judge.

Action by Charles W. Carpenter and oth-

ers against the American Building & Loan

Association. Plaintiffs had judgment, and

defendant appeals. Afﬁrmed.

Hart & Brewer, Rea & Hubachek, and 0. .

M. Cooley, for appellant. Dodd & Bowman

and Norman Fetter, (Lusk, Bunn 8; Had-

ley, of connsel,) for respondents.

COLLINS, J. In substance, the complaint

herein is identical with that involved in

Allen v. This Defendant, 49 Minn. 544, 52

N. W. Rep. 144. The conspicuous difference

in the answers in the two actions is that in
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the case just mentioned the defendant as-

sociation justiﬁed the transactions of which

the plaintiff complained, aﬂlrmed the regu-

larity and validity of the alleged sales, and

relied upon them as a perfect defense to the

cause of action, while here the answer dis-

aﬂirmed and repudiated the sales, expressly

averred their invalidity, and alleged that in

the month of May, 1892, the various stock-

holders had been notiﬁed by mail that such

pretended sales were null, and had no effect

upon their rights, and that they were en-

titled to reinstatement, upon payment of ac-

tual dues and ﬁnes; and the stockholders

were further notiﬁed that, unless their stock

was reinstated upon the terms proposed, a

sale of the same would be made on June 28, ‘

1892, pursuant to the by-laws of the associn- -

tion. The court below found that nearly all

of the pretended sales had been made in

the years 1889 and 1890.

that the notice just referred to was issued in

the month of May, 1802, by means of a cir- .

cular letter, in which it was stated that said '

sales had been declared void by the courts

of the state. It is a fair inference that

until this circular was promuigated the de-

fendant had persisted in its assertion that 3.

the sales were regular and valid; and as the

-opinion in the Allen Case was ﬁled on May

16, 1892, it may also be inferred that the

drcular was prepared after that date, and

was induced by the result of that action.

The trial court also found that the present

case was commenced June 22d, and that the

assignments under which the plaintiffs

claim were executed and delivered prior

thereto.

stock shares had been sold to defendant, in

pursuance of the circular notice. and that. in

form, the sale was regular.

We regard this cause as wholly controlled .

It 1

by that of Allen v. Association, supra.

was said in the opinion therein—and our ‘

views remain ‘the same—thnt the right of

action there recognized and upheld was

founded upon the fact that there had been

a distinct act of dominion wt-ougfuily ex-

0~'

~ARPE:\TER

et al. T. AMERICAN BLDG.
& LOAN ASS'N.
(56 N. W. 95, M Minn. 400.)
:Supreme Court of Miooesota. Ang. 17, 18tlC3.
Appenl from district court, Hennepin coun·
ty; Lochren, Judge.
Action by Charles W. Carpentpr and othi'l'fl against the American Building & Loan
Association. Platntitrs had judgment, and
defl:'ndant appe&ls. A1ftrmed.
Hart & Brewer, Rea & Hubachek, and 0.
?ti. Coolt>y, for appellant. Dodd & Bowman
and Norman Fetter, (Lusk, Bunn & Hadley, of. counsel,) for respondent&.

COLJ.Il'<OS, J. In substance, the complaint
hPrPln Is ltlPntlcal with that ln'\"olved In
Allen v. This Defendant, 49 Minn. 5-14. l'i2
N. W. Rep. 144. The conspicuous dltrerl'nce
tn the nmnvPrs In the two actions ls that In
the cnse just mentioned the defendant nssocla tJon justified the trnnsnctlons of which
the plnlntUr complalnro, affirmed the regularity and '\"t1lldlty of the alleged sales, and
relied upon them a8 a perfect defense to the
cnuse of action, while here the 8D8Wer dlsaftlrmed and repudiated the sales, E>xpressly
averred their Invalidity, and alleged that In
ibe month of May, 1892, the various stockholders had been notified by mall that such
pretended sales were null, and had no E>ffect
upon their rights, and that thPy were entitled to relnstntemrot, upon payment of actual dues and flues; and the stockholders
were further notified that, unless their stock
wa.a reinstated upon the terms proposed, a
sale of the same would be ma.cle on June 23,
1892, pursuant to the by-laws of the association. The court below found that nearly all
of the pretende<l sales had been m:ule In
the yefll'S 1889 and 1800. It further fotmd
that the notice just referred to was issued In
the month of l\lny, 180'.l, by ftleans of a circular letter, In whkh It was stated that said
sales had been declared void by the courts
of the state. It Is a fair Inference that
until this circular was promulgated the defendant had persisted In Its assertion that
the sales were regular and valid; and as the
·opinion In the Allen Case was tlled on May
16, 1892, It may also be inferred that the
circular was prepared after that date, and
wna induced by the result of that action.
The trinl court also found that the present
case was commenced June 22d, and that the
:aS11lgnments under which the plnlntU'fs
-claim were executed and dellvered prior
thereto. It was found thnt on June 23d the
stock shares had be<>n sold to defendant, in
pursuance of the circular notice, and that. ln
fom1, the anle wns r!'gular.
·
We regurd this cause as wholly controlle:l
by that of Allen v. AMOClatlon, supra. It
waa said In the opinion therein-and onr
views remain "the same-that the right of
:action there recoimlzed and uphE>ld was
founded upon the fact that th<'re hnd been
.a distinct act of. dominion w1'0ngfuJy ex-
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ercteed O'\"er the shareholders' property, Inconsistent with their rights, and In denial
of them. The defendant corporation, by assuming to sell, and wrongfully selling, the
shares, deprived the ownt>rs of their stock,
and the advantages accruing from It, as
much when bidding It In tor Itself as when
It accepted the bid of a stranger, and then
transferred the title on its books. This. It
was said, waa an act of 1Dterterence, aubverslve of the rights of the stockholders to
enjoy and control the stock, and mny lJe
treo.ted by tht>m a.a & conversion of thl'ir
property. That any distinct act of dominion wrongfully exerted over one's property,
In dmlal of his right, or tncon!';lstent with
It, amounts to, and may be tree.ted as, a
con'fendon, wns recognbo.:ed long 11go In this
court, In Hossfl'ldt v. Dll1, 28 Minn. 41J9,
10 N. W . Rep. 781. The right, then, or the
original shareholders, or of these plnlntltrs,
as their llllt!limees, to malnmln this action,
was perfect from the day It accrued up to
the time that detendnnt assoclntlori abandoned Its former line of defense, and olTerl'd
to relnstate,-a period of from two to three
years. This was settled In the Allen C.lsl';
so that the present Inquiry ls solely as to
the etrect of the olTer to reinstate upon an
existing and perfect right of action then
held by the shareholdt•rs or by the pla·ntitl's, and the offer was nothing more than
an olTt>r to return to the rightful owner
property alrefl.dy converted to the dPfendant's use. It was an attempt on the put
of the 8Jl80clatlon, atter lt had actually converted the stock shares to its own use, and
had for the term of from one to three ye:1rs
denied that the former ownl'rs bnd nny Interest In the same, to compel them to receive back the converted propel1y, 11g·1lnst
their wlll. The palpable purp:>se of the
otrer to reinstate was to df'prive the shareholders of a clear right possessed by ench
to elect as between remedles,-to dl'tf'nnlne
whether their actions should be brought to
recover the stock shares In specie, or to recover for the value of the . snme. It the
offer could be given the full elTect dl'~ln•d,
the defendant would be allowed to perpetrate & wrong; to persist that It bad nuthorlty so to do; and flnally, when defl'ated In
the courts, to take away from the injure J
party his right to pursue his choice of concurrent remedies. It la safe to say that the
option 1\8 to remedy ls not with tlw party
who has lnftlcted the Injury, for If It Wf're
he would be permitted to take advantage
of his own wrong.
It ls well settled, as a general proposition,
that when an actual conversion of chattf'ls
has taken pince the owner ls undt•r no obllgntlon to receive them b:tek, when temlPred
by the wrongdoer. 6 Bnc. Abr. 677: 9 Bae.
Abr. 559; 4 Amer. & Eng. Enc. Law, 123,
and cases cited. The right of action ls
comp.,:-te and perfect when the convt>rslon
takes pince, und the object of the act k n
la to recover damngea, not to regain poi:;ses-
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sion of the thing itself. Even if the goods

be returned by the wrongdoer, and are ac-

cepted by the owner, after the action is

brought, damages, nominal or actual, may

be recovered. There is a class of cases

when, in trespass or trover, the defendant

may mitigate the damages by a. timely and

proper return of the property. The rules

which govern in such cases seem to be that

where the wrong lacks the element of will-

fuiness—has been committed in good faith—-

the court, in its discretion, may order a re-

turn, upon timely application by the defend-

ant, accompanied by an offer to pay all

costs, and a showing that no real injury will

have been suffered by the plaintif f when

possession is restored. The right of action

is not defeated by the order of the court,

but damages are mitigated. The subject
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and the authorities are fully reviewed in

Hart v. Skinner, 16 Vt. 138. See, also, Rey-

nolds v. Shnler, 5 Cow. 323. and Churchill

v. We1sh, 47 Wis. 39, 1 N. W. Rep. 398. We

have no such cam now before us.

The point is made upon this appeal that

it was incumbent upon the piaintiffs to pro-

duce and surrender up the stock or share

certiﬁcates before they could recover; Jos-

lyn v. Distilling Co., 44 Minn. 183, 46 N. W.

Rep. 337, being the principal authority relied

on. But plaintiffs are not asking, as was

demanded there, for the cancellation of

stock certiﬁcates, the transfer of such stock

upon the books of the association, and the

issuance of new certiﬁcates. Nor were the

conclusions reached in the Joslyn Case

adopted on any view of the negotiability of

stock certiﬁcates, but on general principles

appertaining to the doctrine of estoppel.

The transfer or assignment of the certiﬁ-

cates here involved could give the purchaser

no greater rights, as against the_ associa-

tion, than the assiguees had. Hammond v.

Hastings, 134 U. S. 401, 10 Sup. Ct. Rep.

727.

The remaining points made by counsel for

appellant need not be speciﬁcally referred

to. Judgment aﬂirmed.

MlTIGA'flON 01'' DAMAGES.

slon of the thing Itself. Even If the· goods
be returned by the wrongdoer, and are accepted by the owner, after the action Is
brought, damages, nominal or actual, may
be recovered. There ls a class of wsee
when, in trespass or trover, the defendant
mny mitigate the damages by a timely and
proper return of the property. The rules
wWch govern In such cases seem to be that
where the wrong lacks the element of wlllfuln<."88-has been committed in good fnlththe court, in Its· discretion, may order a return, upon timely application by the defendant, accompanied by an otrer to pay all
.. costs, and a showing that no real injury will
have been sutrered by the plalntltr when
possession Is restored. The right of action
Is not defeated by the order of the court,
but damages are mitigated. The subject
and the authorities are fully reviewed in
Hart v. Skinner, 16 Vt. 138. See, also, Reynolds v. Shuler, 5 Cow. 323, and Churchill
v. Welsh, 47 Wis. 39, 1 N. W. Rep. 398. We
have no such case now before us.

The point ls made upon this appeal that
It was incumbent upon the plaintltrs to produce and surrender up the stQCk or share
certificates before they could recover; Joslyn v. Dlstllllng Co., 44 Minn. 183, 46 N. W.
Rep. 337, being the pl'inclpal authority relk."IJ
on. But plaintitrs are not asking, as was
demanded there, for the cancellation of
stock certlftcates, the transfer of such stock
upon the books of the a.ssoclatlon, and the
Issuance of new certificates. Nor were the
conclusions reached In the Joslyn Case
adopted on any vie w of the negotiability ot
stock certlftcates, but on general principles
appertaining to the doctrine of estoppel.
The transfer or assignment of the certificates here Involved could give the purchaser
no greater rights, as against the. association, than the asslgnel'S had. Hammond v.
Hastings, 134 U. S. 401, 10 Sup. Ct. Rep.
727.
The rema1nlng points made by counsel for
appellant need not be speclficall¥ referred
to. Judgment a.111.rmed.
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WRIGHT "· BANK OF THiil METROP-

OLIS.
469

WRIGHT V. BANK OF THE METROP-

OLIS.

(18 N. E. 79, 110 N. Y. 237.)

Court of Appeals of New York. October 2.

1888.

Appeal from supreme court, general term,

Fourth department.

About the 7th of January, 1878. one Henry

0. Elliott received from his correspondent in

Rome, N. Y., (B. Huntington Wright,) his

check for $2,000, payable to the order of El-

liott, with a request from Wright that he

(Elliott) would meet some drafts Wright

would draw on him. and obtain payment

from the check. He accordingly honored the

drafts, and, having indorsed the check, pro-

cured its discount by the defendant. It was

not paid when presented, and Elliott being

unable to learn the reason, went to Rome to
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see the drawer of the check. He then learn-

ed that the drawer had made a general as-

signment for the beneﬁt of his creditors, and

stated his inability to do anything for Elli-

ott. Finally, Elliott succeeded in obtaining

a number of shares of stock in different rail-

road companies, as collateral security to the

check then lying protested in the hands of

the defendant. The history of the interview

resulting in the procuring of the stock by

Elliott as given on the trial is contradictory,

but the verdict of the jury shows that they

believed that which was given on the part

of the plaintiff. From the evidence thus

given it appears that the stock was in reality

the stock of Benjamin E. Wright, the fa-

ther of B. Huntington Wright, and that it was

delivered by him to Elliott voluntarily, and

for the purpose of being used as a collateral

to his own note at six months, which was

to be used to take up the check; but the

stock was not to be sold for six months. as

it was then selling in market much below

what the father thought the stock was really

worth. The stock was owned by Mr. Wright,

as he said, for an investment, and he had no

idea of selling it; but he allowed Elliott to

take it because he felt sorry for his situa-

tion, and wanted to help him, as far as be

reasonably could, out of the diﬂiculty he

was in. Elliott took the stock and went to

New York. and had a talk with the cashier

and vicepresident of the defendant, who re-

served their decision as to whether they

would take the note and the stock. Subse-

quently, and on the 17th of January, the

cashier wrote that the stock being non-divi-

dend paying, and the note six months paper,

it would be impossible to get it through the

board; and he suggested it would be much

better to obtain Mr. Wright's consent to sell

the stock. and to make his (Elliott's) account

good in that way. Elliott inclosed this note

to Mr. Wright in a letter addressed to "B.

H. Wright;" and in response, and on the 22d

day of January, Benjamin H. Wright, the

mvner of the stock, wrote Mr. Rogers, the

cashier of defendant, refusing to sell the

stock. or to permit of its being sold. Mr.

(18 N. E. 79, 110 N. Y. 237.)
Court of Appeals of New York. October 2,
1888.
Appenl from supreme court, general term,
Fourth department.
About the 7th of January, 1878, one Henry
O. Elliott received from hJs correspondent ln
Rome, N. Y., (B. Huntington Wright,) his
check for $2,000, payable to the order of Elliott, with a request from Wright that he
(Elliott) would meet some drufts Wright
would draw on him, and obtain payment
trom the check. He accordingly honored the
dratta. and, having lndoreed the check, procured Its discount by the defendant. It was
not paid when p1·esented. and Elliott being
unable to learn the re!UIOO, went to Rome to
see the drawer ot the check. He then learned that the drawer had made a general assignment tor the benefit of his creditors, and
stated hie lnablllty to do anything for Elliott. Finally, Elliott succeeded In obtaining
a number of shares of stock In different railroad companies, as collateral security to the
check then lying protested In the hands of
the defendant. The history of the Interview
resulting In the procuring of the stock by
Elliott as given on the trial ls contradictory,
but the verdict of the jury shows that they
believed that which was given on the part
ot the plaintiff. From the evidence thus
given It appears that the stock was In reality
the stock of Benjamin H. Wright, the father of B. Huntington Wright, and thnt It was
delivered by him to Elliott voluntarily, and
tor the purpose of being used as a collateral
to his own note at six months, which was
to be used to take up the check; but the
stock WllB not to be sold tor six months, as
It was then sellln~ In market much below
what the father thought the stock was really
worth. The stock was owned by Mr. Wright,
as he said, for an Investment, and he had no
Idea of selling It; but he allowed Elliott to
take It because he felt sorry tor his situation, and wanted to help him, as far as he
reasonably could, out of the dlfHculty he
was In. Elliott took the stock and went to
New York, and had a talk with the ca.shier
and vice-president of the defendant, who reserved their decision as to whether they
would take the note and the stock. Subsequently, and on the 17th of .January, the
cashier wrote that the stock being non-dividend paying, and the note slx months paper,
It would be Impossible to get It through the
board; and he suggested It would be much
better to obtain Mr. Wright's consent to sell
the st()('k, and to make his (Elliott's) account
good la that way. Elllott lnclosed this note
to l\Ir. Wright In a letter addressed to "B.
H. Wright;" and In response, and on the 22d
clay of January, Benjamin H. Wright, the
.. wner of the sto<:k, wrote Mr. Rogers, the
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cashier of defendant, refusing to sell the
stock, or to permit of Its being sold. Mr.
Rogers had never seen either of the Mess1·s.
Wl"ight, and did not know there were two;
and subsequenUy, and about the 29th of January, Elliott told him that Mr. Wright authori?.ed the sale of the stocks, and they
were Immediately sold, less commission for
$2,201.50. On the part of the plalntur It was
claimed that Mr. Wright, the true owner of
the stocks, never gave any such authority to
sell them, and that he was unaware that
they had been sold until May 9, 1878. FeiJruary 14, 18Sl, the stock reached the highest price, down to the day of trial, selling on
that day for $18,003. '!'his action was commenced October 7, 1879. Mr. Wright, the
owner of the stock, was a.bout seventy-six
years of age in May, 1878, and In the latter
part of that ;year went south, and l·eturncd
early In the year 1879. On the 9th or May,
1878, he made a demand upon the defendant
for the stocks, and tendered to it the amount
of the check and Interest, being something
over $2,000. The cashier stated the stocks
had been sold by the authority of the owner
thereof, a11 he supposed, given through Mr.
Elliott, and refused to deliver them or their
value. The original plaintiff died since the
first trial of the case, and the present one
was duly substituted. The court charged the
jury that If they found for the plalntll! he
was entitled to recover the highest price at
which the stocks could have been sold In the
market between the date of their actual con·
version and a reasonable time thereafter, and
that the jury should tlx the reasonable time,
not arbitrarily or through sympathy or prejudice; but they were to say what, under all
the circumstances, would be a reasonable
time within which to commence this action,
and also, It may be, reasonable diligence In
prosecuting It; because if the action were
commenced In fact within a reasonable time
after the conversion of the stock, and had
been prosecuted with reasonable diligence
since, then the plalntll! was entitled to recover the highest market price that the stock
reached between the date of the conversion
and the time of the trial, less the amount of
the check and Interest, and with Interest on
the balance. This charge was duly excepted
to. The jury found a verdict for $3,391.25.
There ls no evidence which shows when the
stock reached that value. Upon the rendition of the verdict both parties moved to t1et
It aside, the plalntll'f on the ground that he
was entitled, under the charge, to the highest value of the stock down to the trial, and
the defendant on the ground that the damages were excessive and contrary to evidence. The court granted the motion of the
plaintiff, and set the verdict aside on the
ground stated, ancl denied the motion of the
defendant. The defendant appealed to the
general term t1·om both of such orders. Thnt
court reversed the order setting aside the
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verdict, and ordered judgment thereon, and

aﬂirmed the order made on defendant's mo-

tion, refusing to set aside the verdict. Judg-

ment was then entered upon the verdict of

the jury, and from that judgment both sides

appeal to this court, and they also appeal

from the orders of the general term upon

.Ml'rIGATIO:N OF

verdict, and ordered jmlgment the1·eon, and
n.fllrmed the order made on dei'endant'e m~
tion, refusing to set aside the verdict. Judgment wns then entered upon the verdict of
the jury, and from that judgment both sides
appeal to this court, and they also appeal
from the orders of the general term upon
which the judgment was entered.
W. E. Scripture, for plaJntiff. Joseph H.
Choate and John Delahunty, for defendant.

which the judgment was entered.

W. E. Scripture, for plaintiff. Joseph H.

Choate and John Delahunty, for defendant.

PECKHAM, J ., (after stating the facts as

above.) This case comes before us in a

somewhat peculiar condition. As both par-

ties appeal from the same judgment, which

is for a sum of money only, it would seem

as if there ought not to ‘be much diﬂlculty in

obtaining its reversal. It is obvious, how-

ever, that a mere reversal would do neither

party any good, as the case would then go
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down for a new trial, leaving the important

legal question in the case not passed upon

by this court. This, we think, would be an

injustice to both sides. The case is here, and

the main question is in regard to the rule

of damages, and we think it ought to be de-

cided. By this charge the case was left to

the jury to give the highest price the stock

could have been sold for, intermediate its

conversion and the day of trial, provided the

jury thought, under all the circumstances,

that the action had been commenced within

a reasonable time after the conversion, and

had -been prosecuted with reasonable dili-

gence since. Authority for this rule is claim-

ed under Romaine v. Van Allen, 26 N. Y. 309,

and several other cases of a somewhat sim-

ilar nature, referred to therein. Markham v.

Jaudon, 41 N. Y. 235, followed the rule laid

down in Romaine v. Van Allen. In these

two cases a recovery was permitted which

gave the plaintiff the highest price of. the

stock between the conversion and the trial.

In the Markham Case the plaintiff had not

paid for the stocks, but was having them

carried for him by his broker (the defend-

ant) on a margin. Yet this fact was not re-

garded as making any difference in the rule

of damages, and the case was thought to be

controlled by that of Romaine. In this state

of ~the rule the case of Matthews v. Uoe, 49

N. Y. 57-62, came before the court. The pre-

cise question was not therein involved; but

the court, per Church, O. J., took occasion to

intimate that it was not entirely satisﬁed

with the correctness of the rule in any case

not special and exceptional in its circum-

stances; and the learned judge added that

they did not regard the rule as so ﬁrmly set-

tled by authority as to be beyond the reach

of review whenever an occasion should ren-

der it necessary. One phase of the question

again came before this court, and in proper

form, in Baker v. Drake, 53 N. Y. 211, where

the plaintiff had paid but a small percentage

on the value of the stock, and his broker,

the defendant, was carrying the same on a

margin, and the plaintiff had recovered in

the court below, as damages for the unau-

PECKHAM, J., (after stating the facts as
above.) This case comes before us in a
somewhat peculiar condition. As both parties appeal from the same judgment, which
ls tor a sum of money only, it would seem
as If there ought not to 'T>e much dltH.culty in
obtaining its reversal. It ls obvious, however, that a mere reversal would do neither
pa1·ty any good, as the case would then go
down tor o. new trial, leaving the important
legal question In the case not passed upon
by this court. This, we think, would be an
II~justlce to both sides. The case Is here, and
the main question Is In rega1·d to the rule
of damages, nnd we think It ought to be decided. By this . charge the case was left to
the_jury to give the highest prl~e the stock
could have been sold for, intermediate its
conversion and the day of trial, provided the
jury thought, under all the circumstances,
that the action had been commenced within
a reasonable time after the conversion, and
had .been prosecuted with reasonable dillgence since. Authority for this rule ls claimed under Romaine v. Van Allen, 26 N. Y. 309,
and several other cases of a somewhat similar nature, referred to therein. Markham v.
Jaudon, 41 N. Y. 235, followed the rule laid
down in Romaine v. Van Allen. In these
two cases a recovery was permitted which
gave the plaintll'l the highest price of. the
stock between the conversion and the tiial.
In the Markham Cnse the plaintiff had not
paid for the stocks, but was hnving them
carried for him by his broker (the defendant) on a margin. Yet this fact was not regal."ded as making any difference in the rule
of damages, and the case was thought to he
controlled by that of Romaine. In this state
of .the rule the case of Matthews v. Coe, 49
N. Y. 57--62, came before the court. The precise question was not therein involved; but
the court, per Church, C. J., took occasion to
intimate that it was not entirely satisfied
with the correctness of the rule in any case
not special and exceptional In its circumstances; and the learned judge added that
they dld not regard the rule as so firmly settled by authority as to be beyond the reach
of review whenever an occasion should render It necet1sary. One phase of the question
again came before this court, and in proper
form, in Bake-r v. Drake, 53 N. Y. 211, where
the plaintur had paid but a small percentage
on the value ot the stock, and hie broker,
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the defendant, was carrying the same on a.
margin, and the plaintiff had recovered ln
the court below, ae damages for the unau·
thorized sale of the stock, the highest price
between the time of conversion and the time
of trial. The rule wns applied to substantially the same facts as in Markham v. Jaudon, supra, and that case was cited as authority for- the decision of the court below.
'.fhls court, however, reversed the judgment
and disapproved the rule of damages which
had been applied. The opinion was written
by that very able and learned judge, Rapallo, and nil the cases pertaining to the subject
were reviewed by him, and In such a masterly manner ns to leave nothing further for
us to do In that direction. We think the reasoning of the opinion calls for a reversal of
this judgment. In the course of his opinion
the judge said that the rule of damages, as
laid down by the trial court, following the
case of Markham v. Jaudon, had "been recognized and adopted in several late adjudications in this state in actions for the conversion of property of fluctuating value; but
its soundness as a general rule, applicable
to all cases of conversion of such property,
has been seriously questioned, and Is denied
in various adjudications in this and other
states." 'l'he rule was not regarded as one
of those settled principles in the law as to
the measure of damages, to which the maxim stare declsls should be applied. '.fhe
principle upon which the case was declde<l
rested upon the fundamental theory that ln
all cases of the conversion of property (except where punitive damages are allowed)
the rule to be adopted should he one which
affords the plamtll'l a just Indemnity for the
loss he has sustained by the sale of the
stock; and, In <'ases where a loss of profits
ls claimed, It should be, when a warded at
all, an amount sufficient to indemnity the
party Injured for the loss which is the natural, reasonable, and pl"oximate result of the
wrongful act complained of, and which a
proper degree of prudence on the part of the
complainant would not have averted. The
rule thus stated, in the language of Judge
Rapallo, he proceeds to apply to the facts
of the case before him. In stating what in
his view would be a proper Indemnity to the
injured party in such a case, the learned
judge commenced his statement with the
fact that the plaintil'l did not hold the stocks
for investment; and he added that, if they
had been paid for and owned by the plalntil'l, dUferent considerations would arise, but
it must be borne in mind that we are treat•
Ing of a speculation carried on with the capital of the broker. and not of the customer.
If the broker has violated his contract or(
disposed of the stock without authority, the
customer ls entitled to recover such damages as would naturally be sustained In restoring himself to the position of which he
has been deprived. He certainly has no
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right to be placed in a better position than

he would be in if the wrong had not been

done. The whole reasoning of the opinion

is still based upon the question as to what

damages would naturally be sustained by

the plaintif f in restoring himself to the posi-

tion he had been in; or in other words, in re-

purchasing the stock. It is assumed in the

opinion that the sale by the defendant was

illegal and a conversion, and that plaintiff

had a right to disaﬂlrm the sale, and to re-

quire defendants to replace the stock. If

they failed, then the learned judge says the

plaintiff's remedy was to do it himself, and

to charge the defendants with the loss nec-

essarily sustained by him in doing so.

Is not this equally the duty of a plaintiff

who owns the whole of the stock that has

been wrongfully sold? I mean, of course, to
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exclude all question of punitive damages

resting on bad faith. In the one case the

plaintiff has afalid contract with the broker

to hold the stock. and the broker violates it

and sells the stock. The duty of the broker

is to replace it at once, upon the demand of

the plaintiff. in case he does not, it is the

duty of the plaintiff to repurchase it. Why

should not the same duty rest upon a plain-

tiff who has paid in full for his stock, and

has deposited it with another conditionally?

The broker who purchased it on a margin

for the plaintiff violates his contract and his

duty when he wrongfully sells the stock,

just as much as if the whole purchase price

had been paid by the plaintiff. His duty is

in each case to replace the stock upon de-

mand, and, in case he fall so to do, then the

duty of the plaintiff springs up, and he

should repurchase the stock himself. This

duty it seems to me is founded upon the

general duty which one owes to another who

converts his property under an honest mis-

take, to render the resulting damage as

light as it may be reasonably within his

power to do. It is well said by Earl, J., in

Parsons v. Sutton, 66 N. Y. 92, that "the

party who suffers from a breach of contract

must so act as to make his damages as

small as he reasonably can. He must not

by inattention, want of care, or inexcusable

negligence permit his damage to grow, and

then charge it all to the other party. The

law gives him all the redress he should have

by indemnlfying him for the damage which

he necessarily sustains." See. also, Dillon

v. Anderson, 43 N. Y. 231; Hogle v. Railroad

Co., 28 Hun, 363,—the latter case being an

action of tort. In such a case as this, wheth-

er the action sounds in tort or is based al-

together upon contract, the rule of damages

is the same. Per Denio, C. J., in Scott v.

Rogers, 31 N. Y. 676; and per Rapallo, J.,

in Baker v. Drake, supra. The rule of dam-

ages as laid down in Baker v. Drake, in

cases where the stock was purchased by the

broker on a margin for plaintiff, and where

the matter was evidently aspeculation, has

been aﬂirmed in the later cases in this court.

right to be placed In a better poaltlon than
he would be In If the wrong had not been
done. The whole reasoning of the opinion
1a st111 baaed upon the question as to what
damages would naturally be sustained by
the plaintiff In restoring himself to the position be bad been in; or lo other words, lo repurchasing the stock. It 1a aeeumed lo the
opinion that the sale by the defendant was
1llegal and a conversion, and that plaintiff
bad a right to dlsatlinn the sale, and to require defendants to replace the stock. It
they failed, then the learned judge says the
plalntllf's remedy was to do it himselr, and
to charge the defendants with the loss nee·
ei188.rlly sustained by him In doing so.
Is not this equally the duty of a plaintiff
who owns the whole of the stock that has
been wrongfully sold? I mean, ot course, to
exclude all question of punitive damages
resting on bad faith. In the one case the
plaintiff bas &j'alld contract with the broker
to hold the stock, and the broker violates lt
and sells the stock. The duty of the broker
ls to replace It at once, upon the demand of
the plaintiff. In case he does not, lt ls the
duty of the plalntllf to repurchase It. Why
should not the same duty rest upon a plalnmr who bas paid lo full for hts sto<'K, and
has deposited It with another conditionally?
'.rhe broker who purchased It on a m111·gin
for the plaintiff violates his contract and his
duty wbeo be wrongfully sells the stock,
Just as much as If the whole purchase price
bad been paid by the plaintiff. His duty Is
In each case to replace the stock upon demand, and, lo case he fall so to do, then the
duty of the plaintiff springs up, and he
should repurchase the stock himself. This
duty It seems to me 1a founded upon the
general duty which one owes to another who
converts hls property under an honest mistake, to render the resulting damage as
light as It may be reasonably within bis
power to do. It Is well said by Earl, J., In
Parsons v. Sutton, 66 N. Y. 92, that "the
party who sutrers from a breach of contract
must so act as to make his damages as
small as he reasonably can. He must not
by Inattention, want ot care, or Inexcusable
negligence permit bis damage to grow, and
then charge It all to the other party. The
law gives him all the redress he should have
by Indemnifying him !or the damage which
he necessarily sustains." See, also, Dillon
v. Anllerson, 43 N. Y. 231; Hogle v. Railroad
Co., 28 Hun, 363,-the latter case being an
action of tort. In 11uch a case as this, whether the action sounds In tort or ls based altogether upon contract, the rule of damages
ls the same. Per Denio, C. J., lo Scott v.
Rogers, 31 °N. Y. 676; nnd per Rapallo, J.,
In Baker v. Drake, supra. The rule of damages as laid down In Baker v. Drake, In
cases where the stock was purchased by the
broker on a margin tor plaintiff, and where
the matter was evidently a · speculation, has
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been a11lnned In the later cases In this court.
See Gruman v. Smith, 81 N. Y. 25; Colt v.
Owens, 00 N. Y. 368. lo both cases the duty
ot the plalntUr to repurchase the stock within a reasonable time ls stated. I think the
duty exists In the same degree where the
plalntllf had paid in full tor the stock, and
was the absolute owner thereof. In Baker
v. Drake the learned judge did not assume
to declare In a case where the pled~or was
the absolute owner ot the stock, and It was
wrongfully sold, the measure of damages
must be as laid down lµ the Romaine Case.
He was endeavoring to distinguish the cases,
and to show that there was a difference between the case of one who Is engaged in a
speculation with what Is substantially the
money of another and the case of an absolute owner of stock which Is sold wrongfully by the pledgee. And he said that at least
the former ought not to be allowed such a
rule ot damages. It can be seen, however,
that the judge was not satisfied with the
rule in the Romaine Case, even as applied to
the facts therein stated. In his opinion he
makes use o! this language: "In a case
where the 1088 of probable profits Is claimed as an element of damage, lf It be ever
allowable to mulct a defendant f<>r such a
conjectural loss, Its amount ls a question
of tact, and a finding lo regard to It should
be based upon some evidence." In orde1· to
refuse to the plaintilf In that case, however,
the damages claimed, It was necessary to
overrule the Markham Case, which was
done. Now, so !ar as the duty to repurchase
the stock ls concerned, I see no dltl'erence In
the two cases. There Is no material distinction In the fact ot ownership of the whole
stock, which should place the plaintiff outside or any llnblllty to repurchase after notice ot sale, nnd should render the defendant continuously liable for any higher price
to which the stock wight rise after conversion and before trlal. As the same liability on the part of defendant exists ln
each case to replace the stock, and as he ls
technically a wrong-doer in both cases, but
In one no more than ln the other, he should
respond in the same measure of damages
in both cases; and that measure ls the
amount which, In the language of Rapallo, J.,
Is the natural, rensonahle, and proximate re- \
suit of the wrongful act complained ot, and
which a proper degree of prudence on the
part of the plaintiff would not have averted. The loss ot a sale of the stock at the
highest price down to trial would seem to
be a less natural and proximate result ot
the wrongful act of the defendant In selllng
lt when plaintiff had the stock for an fnvestment, than when be had It tor a speculation;
tor the Intent to keep it as an Investment is
at war with any intent to sell It at any
price, even the highest. But In both cases
the qualification attaches that the loss shall
only be such as a proper degree of prudence
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on the part of the complainant would not

have averted, and a proper degree of pru-

dence on the part of the complainant con-

sists in repurchasing the stock after notice

of its sale, and within a reasonable time.

If the stock then sells for less than the de-

fendant sold it for, of course the complain-

ant has not been injured, for the difference

in the two prices inures to his beneﬁt. If it

sells for more, that difference the defendant

should pay.

It is said that as he had already paid for

the stock once, it is unreasonable to ask the

owner to go in the market and repurchase it.

I do not see the force of this distinction. In

the case of the stock held on margin, the

plaintiff has paid his margin once to the

broker, and so it may be said that it is un-

reasonable to ask him to pay it over again

Generated for facpubupdates (University of Michigan) on 2014-06-12 19:24 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/mdp.35112105421491
Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd-google

in the purchase of the stock. Neither state-

ment, it seems to me, furnishes any reason

for holding a defendant liable to the rule

of damages stated in this record. The de-

fendant's liability rests upon the ground that

he has converted, though in good faith, and

under a mistake as to his rights, the prop-

erty of the plaintiff. The defendant is, there-

fore, liable to respond in damages for the

value. But the duty of the plaintiff to make

the damage as light as he reasonably may

rests upon him in both cases; for there is no

more legal wrong done by the defendant in

selling the stock which the plaintiff has fully

paid for than there is in selling the stock

which he has agreed to hold on a margin,

and which agreement he violates by selling

it. All that can be said is that there is a

difference in amount, as in one case the plain-

tiff's margin has gone, while in the other

the whole price of the stock has been sacri-

ﬁced. But there is no such difference in the

legal nature of the two transactions as

should leave the duty resting upon the plain-

tiff in the one case to repurchase the stock,

and in the other case should wholly absolve

him therefrom. A rule which requires a re-

purchase ot the stock in a reasonable time

does away with all questions as to the high-

est price before the commencement of the

suit, or whether it was commenced in a rea-

sonable time, or prosecuted with reasonable

diligence; and leaves out of view any ques-

tion as to the presumption that plaintiff

would have kept his stock down to the time

when it sold at the highest mark before the

day of trial and would then have sold it,

even though he had owned it for an invest-

ment. Such a presumption is not only of

quite a shadowy and vague nature, but is

also, as it would seem, entirely inconsistent

with the fact that he was holding the stock

as an investment. If kept for an invest-

ment, it would have been kept down to the

day of trial; and the price at that time there

might be some degree of propriety in award-

ing. under certain circumstances. if it were

higher than when it was converted. But to

presume in favor of an investor that he
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on the part of the complainant would not
have averted, and a proper degree of pru·
dence on the part of the complainant consists in repurchasing the stock after notice
of Its sale, and within a reasonable time.
If the stock then sells for lees than the defendant sold It for, of course the complainant has not been Injured, for the difference
In the two prices Inures to his benefit. It It
sells for more, that difference the defendant
should pay.
It Is said that as he had already paid for
the stock once, It Is unrE>asonable to ask the
owner to go In the mnrket and repurchase It.
I do not see the force of this distinction. In
the case of the stock held on margin, the
plaintiff has paid his margin once to the
broker, and so It may be said that It ls unreasonable to ask him to pay It over again
In the purchase of the stock. Neither statement, It seems to me, furnishes . any reason
for holding a defendant liable to the rule
of damages stated In this record. The defendant's liability rests upon the ground that
he has converted, though In good faith, and
under a mistake as to his rights, the property of the plaintiff. The defendant ls, therefore, liable to respond in damages for the
value. But the duty of the plaintiff to make
the damage as light as he reasonably may
rests upon him In both cases; for there ls no
more legal wrong done by the defendant In
selling the stock which the plaintiff bas fully
pnld for than there Is In selling the stock
which he has agreed to bold on a margin,
and which agreement he violates by selling
It. All that can be said Is that there Is a
difference In amount, as in one case the plaintiff's margin bas gone, while In the other
the whole price of the stock has been sacrificed. But there Is no such difference In the
legal nature of the two transactions as
should leave the duty resting upon the plaintiff In the one case to repurchase the stock,
and In the other case should wholly absolve
him therefrom. A rule which requires a repurchase ot the stock In a rP.asonable time
does away with all questions as to the highest price before the commencement of the
suit, or whether It was commenced In a reasonable time, or prosecuted with reasonable
diligence; and leaves out of view any question as to the presumption that plalntlfr
would have kept his stock down to the time
when It sold at the highest mark before the
day of trial and would then have sold It,
even though he had owned It for an investment. Such a presumption Is not only of
quite a shadowy and vague nature, but Is
also, as It would seem, entirely Inconsistent
with the fact that he was holding tlle stock
as an investment. It kept for an investment, It would have been kept down to the
day of trial; and the price at that time there
might be some degree of propriety In awarding, under certain circumstances. if it. were
higher than when It was converted. But to

presume In favor of an Investor that he
would have held his stock during all of a
period of possible depression, and would
have realized upon It when It reached the
highest figure, ls to Indulge In a presumption which, it Is safe to say, would not be
based on fact once in a hundred times. To
formulate a. legal liability based upon such
presumption I think ls wholly unjust in such
a case as the present. Justice apd fair dealing are both more npt to be promoted by adhering to the rule which Imposes the duty
upon the plaintiff to make bis loss as light
as possible, notwithstanding the unauthorized act of the defendant, assuming, ot'
course, in all cases, that there was good faith
on the part of the appellant. It ls the natural and proximate loss which the plaintiff
ls to be Indemnified for, and that cannot be
said to extend to the highest price before
trial, but only to the highest price reached
within a reasonable time after the plaintiff
has learned of the conversion of his stock
within which he could go In the market and
repurchase It. What Is a reasonable time
when the facts are undisputed, nnd different
Inferences cannot rensouably be drawn from
the same facts, ls a Question ot' law. See
Colt v. Owens, 90 N. Y. 368; Hedges v. Railroad Co., 49 N. Y. 223.
We think that beyond all controversy In
this case, and taking all the facts Into consideration, this reasonable time had expired
by July 1, 1878, following the 9th of May of
the same year. The highest price which the
stock reached during that period was $2,795,
and, as it ls not certain on what day the
plaintiff might have purchased, we think It
fair to give him the highest price It reached
In that time. From this should be deducted
the amount of the check and Interest to the
day when the stock was sold, a8 then It is
p~sumed the defendant paid the check with
the proceeds of the sale. In all this discussion as to the rule of damages we have assumed that the defendant acted In good faith,
In an honest mistake as to Its right to sell
the stock. and that It was not a case for
punitive damages. A careful perusal of the
whole case leads us to this conclusion. It ls
not needful to state the evidence, but we cannot see any question In the case showing
bad faith, or Indeed any reason t'or Its existence. The fact ls uncontradlcted that the
defendant sold the stock upon whnt Its ofHoers supposed was the authority of the owner
thereof given to them by Elliott. The opinion delivered by the learned judge at general term, while agreeing with the principle
of this opinion as to the rule of damages In
this case, sustained the verdict of the jury
upon the theory that, If the plaintiff had gone
Into the market within a reasonable time,
and purchased an equivalent ot' the stocks
converted, he would have paid the price
which he recovered by the verdict. This left
the jury the right to fix what was a reason-
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able time, and then assume there was evi-

dence to support the verdict. In truth there

was no evidence which showed the value of

the stock to have been anything like the

amount of the verdict, for the evidence show-

ed it was generally very much less, and

sometimes very much more. But ﬁxing what

is 1 reasonable time ourselves, it is seen that

the stock within that time was never of any

such value. The judgment should be revers-

ed, and a new trial granted, with costs to

abide the event.

EARL, FINCH, and GRAY, JJ., concur.

RUGER, O. J., and ANDREWS and DAN-

Generated for facpubupdates (University of Michigan) on 2014-06-12 19:24 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/mdp.35112105421491
Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd-google

FORTH, JJ., dissent.

able tfme, and then assume there was evidence to support the venllct. In truth there
waa no evidence which showed the value of
the atock to have been anything like the
amount of the verdict, f1>r the evidence showed It was generally very much less, and
sometimes very much more. But fixing what
la a reasonable time ourselves, It le seen that
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the stock within that time was never of any
such value. Tile judgment should be reversed, and a new trial granted, with costs to
abide the event.
EARL, FINCH, and GRAY, JJ., concur.
RUGER, O. J., a.nd ANDREWS and DANFORTH, JJ., dissent.
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EXCESSIVE‘OR INSUFFICIENT DAMAGES.

BALTIMORE & O. R. CO. v. CARR.

(17 Atl. 1052, 71 Md. 135.)

Court of Appeals of Maryland. June 11, 1889.

Appeal from circuit court, Prince George's

county.

Aigned before ALVEY, C. J., and

MILLER, ROBINSON, IRVING. BRYAN, '

and l\lcSHEltRY, JJ.

John K. Oowen, F. Snowden Hill. Thos.

& 0. R. CO. v. CARR.

(17 Atl. 1052, 71 Md. 135.)
Court of AppC'ols of Mnrylnnd. June 11, 1889.
Appeal from circuit court, Prince George's
cuuuty.
A1g11f"d before ALVEY, C. J., and
:MILLEH, ROBINSO.N", UWI.NG, BHY.A.N,
and ~lcSHEHHY, JJ.

John K. Cowen, F. Snowden Hill, Thos.
Anilers11n, and IV. Viers Bouie, J1·., for app.. llant. (;}eorge Peter, Jas. B. Henderson,
anu William i:Statiley, for appellee.

Anderson, and W. Viers Bouic, Jr.,for ap-

pcll-ant. George Peter, Jas. B. Henderson,

and William stanley, for appellee.

ALVEY, C. J. This is an action on the

case, brought by the appell e against the ap-

prnant for the wronglul refusal of admission

of the former to the cars of the latter, and the

?\t-tl0P was tried upon the general issue and

plea of not guilty of the wrong alleged. The

declara(ion contains but a single count, in 1
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which it is alleged that the plaintiff pur-

chased a ticket for a passage on the road of

the defendant from the town of Ruckville to

the city of Washington, and rv[nrn; thatthe

pluinliff I'ecame a passenger on thedi-felnl-

ant's road. and was transported from Rock-

vilh- to the city of \\'ashington. and that on

his return within the time limited by his

t.ckct he presented himself at the gate in the

depot of the defendant in Washington city,

in proper time to take a return train to the

town of llockvdle, scheduled to leave the ‘

depot at 5:31 P. 11., and that he was refused

by the gatekeeper admission to such train.-

And it is then alleged that the plaintiff was

entitled by virtue of his ticket to pass through

the gale, for the pnrp.se of getting on the

train, to be conveyed from Washington city

to Ru;-kville. and that it “was the duty of the

(lef(.udant to provide competent and polite

servants and agents to attend and to have

char',;e of the gate through which passengers

were comprllcd to pass to get on the said

train of cars; yet the defendant, umnindful

of its duty in this regard, refused to permit

the plaintiff to pass through the said gate to

enter the cars so as to be c'onveyed from

Washington city to the town of ltockville,

and nt*;_[lectr'(l to provide competent and polite

scrianis and agents to have charge of the

gate by winch passengcrs obtained access to

the cars, but had a rude, impolite, and in-

comp lent servant in charge of said gate,

who then and th-re refused to permit the

plaintiff to pass through said gate to the

said train of cars, and with force pushed back

the plaintiﬂ, and was guilty of other rude,

impohte, and improper treatment of the

plaintiff. by reason whereof the plaintiff was

prevenle1l from attending to his business en-

gagements in the town of ltockville, and the

feelings of the plaintif f were greatly injured

and outraged, and he was subjected to great

vexation, indignity, and disgrace, and com-

pelled and forced to remain in the city of

Washington until slate hour in the night, to-

wit, the hour often minutes past ten o‘clock;

and the plantiff therefore brings suit," etc.

The proof shows that‘the plaintiff, with a

ALVEY, C. J. This is an action on the
case, brought by the appe:I e against the ap11.. 11a.11t for the wrong I ul 1·efllsal of admis:iion
of the funner tu the cars of the latter, and the
al'tiul"I was tried upon the general issue and
plea ot not guilty of the wrung alleged. The
dcdaradou cunLain:i but a single count, in
w11h:h it is 11llegell that the plaintiff purcha11•·d a tfrkt>t for a passage on the road of
th" d1•ft"nd11nt from the town of Rockville to
the <'itv of Washington, aud r1·t11rn; that the
plai111il1' l•ec:1me a pas!lenger on the ll!'ft>mlant's rn:ad. 11nd was trnnsportrd from Hock\'ilJ,.. to the city of \\'u:;hiu~ton, and that on
l1h1 rt>t11rn within the time limiled ltv h is
t.cht he prest>nted himself Kt the gate i'1 the
dt>pot or the defendant in Washington city,
in propt'r lime to take a return train lo the
town of Hock ville, scheduled to leave the
d1-pot at 5: iil P. 11., and that he was refused
by the Jtate-keeper a<lmiS!lion to such train.·
Awl it is then nllE>g•-ll that the plaintiff was
t'nti1l ...d by virtue or hill ticket to pass through
the ga1 e, for the purp•>Se of getting on the
tmin, to be conveyed from Washington city
to Ilo;·k ville, and that it "was the duty of the
def... 111lant to provide competent and polite
St'rvant:i Knd a!(ents to attend and to have
cl1ar~e of tlie gate through which passengers
were romp•·lled to pass to get 011 the said
train of cars; yet the defendant, unmindful
or ils tlutr in this reJ?ard, refused to permit
the pluintifl' to p11ss throngh the said gate to
ent1'r tile mrs BO 8.'i to be conveyed from
Washi11glon city to the town of U.ockville,
.and nt'glectt>1l to provide competent and polite
St>nan.s and agents to have charge of the
~ate lty wluch passeugns obtained access to
th" rars, but hat.I a rudP, impolite, and in·
comp ·lent servant in charge of said gate,
who then and th.•re refu:;ed to permit the
plaintiff to pass through said gate to the
saill train of cars, and with force pnshed back
the plaintiff, and Wl\11 guilty of other rude,
impolite, and improper treatment of the
plaintiff, hy reason whereof the plaintilf was
prevenle1l from attending to his business engagements in the t.own of Hock ville, and the
ft'cltn~s of the plaintiff were greatly injured
anti 0:1trag•·d, and he was subjected to great
vexation, indignity, and disgrace, and com·
pellec.I 1md forced to remain in the city of
Washington until a late hour in the night, towit, the hour often minutes past ten o'clock;
and the I>lanLiff therdore brings suit," etc.

The proof shows that.the plaintiff, with 11.
ticket entitling him to a return passage t<>
Rockville, presented himaelf at the gate in the
depot at Washington city giving a<lmissioo
to passengers to departing t1·ains, and sought;
admission to the train that left tbe depot, according to published t.ime-table, at 5:31 P . .H.
for Rockville and other points on the .Metropolitan 1oad. The plaintiff himself testifies
that he reached the g:1te some two or throominutes before the time for the train to start;
but whether the plaintiff presentell himself"
at the gate immediately before or immediately
after the signal by gong for excluding passengers at the gate for the particular train.
would seem to be left in doultt, the evidence
upon this point being in conflict. The plaintiff testifies that he did not hear the gong.the signal fur the train to start; but hesw1-ars that the train bad not left the depot..
aud that he had time witl1ln which he could
have 1·eached and ent1-rPd the train, if he had
heen allowed to pass the gate as he desired
to do. The proof on the part of the derendant is that thP gong had so11rnled, but th&train wa.~ delavell some two or thrt'tl minutes.
in 11tb1<'lti11g arlll taking Ollt SOlllt' t'Xlra C'lll'S;.
and that it is the tluty of th~ gat~keept>r to·
act on the signal given by the sound of the
gong, and that he knew nothing of the delay
that would be caused by the taking out theextra cars. The plaintiff swears tl111t he WllSnot only prevented from having access tu thetrain, hut that he was rudely resisted, andwas struck by the gate-keeper, thongh he says.
he was not ph~·sically injured.
Upon the whole evidence the defendantc
offered three prayers for instruction to th&
jury, all three of which were rejel'ted by
the court; and the conrt substituted its own
instructions, intended to cover the whole·
case, in the following terms: "If the jury
find th it the plaintiff had purchased n tickflt
from W.1shington to Rockville, and intended
to leave on the 5: 31 P • .111. train, but that by
the instructions given by defendant to its
gate-keeper p11ssengers were not idlowl'd t<>
pass through the gate after the last gong had
sonnded fur the departure of the train, in order to take such train, and that the last gonghad sounded for the departure of the 5: :n P.
)I. train before the plaintilf endeavored t<>
pass through the gate, then the plaintiff i&
not entitled to recover, unless the jury find
that the gate-keeper used unnecessary force
to prevent the plaintiff from passing through
the gate; and, if the jury find that such unnecessary force was used, then the plaintiir
is entitled to such damage as may compensat&
him for the Injury to his person and feeling•
that resulted from such unnecessa1y force.
(2) But it the jury find that the plaintiff had
arrived at the g11te before the last gong had
sounded, and had his ticket, which was duly
exhibited to the gate-keeper, but was refused
entrance to the train, then the plaintiff is.
entitled to such damages as the jury may
find would, under all the . circumstances ..
compensate llim for such refusal." It was.

EXCESSIVE OR
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under these instructions that the verdict was 2 Co. v. Blocher. 27 Md. 277. But, in respect

found for the plaintiff. Exception was

taken to the instructions given, and also to

the refusal to grant the prayers offered by

the defendant. The ﬁrst of the defendant's

prayers would seem to be based upon the

But this is in form an action of tort. The

contract, it is true, entitled the plaintiff to

admission to the cars, and gave rise to the

duty onlhe part of the defendant to allow

such admission under proper circumstances;

but in cases of the class to which this be-

longs the refusal or neglect to perform that ‘

duty, as well as the negligent performance

of it, furnishes a ground of action in tort.

In such case both the non-feasance and the

misfeasance constitute a wrongful act, for

which the remedy may be either by action on

the contract or in tort, at the option of the
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party injured. Boorman v. Brown, 3 Q. B.

526: and same case ai.ﬁrmed in the house of

lords. (H Clark St F. 1.)

ab-tract PI'0P0HtiOII, may be correct enough,

but it would hkely have a tendency to mis- '

lead in a case like the present. and therefore ‘

there was no error in rejecting it. Nor do

we think there was error in rejecting the

second prayer of the defendant. This prayer

has reference to the power of the defendant

.to make, and to require to be conformed

to, reasonable rules and regulations for the

admission of passengers to its trains while in

the depot. That the enforcement of reason-

able rules and regulations for the admission

to trains in a crowded depot, where trains

are constantly departing for different points

and directions, is an actual necessity, does

not admit of question or doubt. Such regu-

lations are not only necessary to prevent

confusion and for the preservation of order,

but are necessary for the guidance and pro-

tection of the traveling public. And, such

being the case, the railroad company must .

have power to make and require to be ob-

ser\ed such reasonable rules and regulations.

But such rules and regulations must always

be enforced with due regard to the rights of

the passenger. In the ﬁrst place, the rules

and regulations must not be of a nature to be

unreasonably obstructive of the rights and

convenience of the passenger; nor should

they be enforced in an arbitrary and unrea- ‘

sonable manner, to the unnecessary hindrance

and delay of the passenger, or in a man-

ner to subject him to indignity or unneces-

sary annoyancc. And in tlus case, though

the gate-keeper may have been mistaken as ‘

to the departure of the train in fact, or as to

his duty under the rules and regulations of

the depot, yet, if the circumstances were

such. at the time the plaintiff presented him-

self at the gate, as to entitle him to admis-

sion to the train then still being in the depot,

and before it had started, such mistake of the

gate-keeper could afford no defense to the

right of the plaintif f to recover. Railroad

, ask.

theory that this is. in substance at least, an ‘

INS~FJ:o'ICrnST

under these Instructions that the verdict was
found !or the plaintiff. Exception was
taken to the instr11ctions given, and also to
the refusal to grant the prayers offered by
the defendant. The first of thll defendant's
prayers wonld seem to be based upon the
theory that this is. in substance at least, an
action upon the contract of carriage of the
plaintiff over the road of the defendant.
Hut this is in form an action of tort. The
contract, it is true, entitled the plaintiff to
s<lmission to the cars, and g:LVe rise to the
duty on the part of the defendant to allow
11uch admission under proper circumstances;
but in cases of the class to which this belongs the rerusal or neglect to perform that
duty, as Wl'll 88 the negligent performance
of it, furnishes a ground of action in tort.
In such case both the non-feasance and the
misfeasance constitute a wrongful act, fiJr
which the remeJy may be either by action on
the contract or in tort, at the option of the
party injured. Boorman v. Brown, 8 Q. B.
526: and same case affirmed in the house of
Jords. (11 Clark & F. 1.) The prayer, as an
ab,traet propo-1ition, m:'y be correct enough,
but it would likely have a tem.lenc-y to mislead in a case like the present. and therefore
there was no error in rejecting it. Nor do
we think there WRll error in rejecting the
secoml prayer of the defendant. 'fhis prayer
has reference to the power of the defendant
. to make. and to require to be conformed
to, reasonable rules and regulations for the
a!lmission of passengers to its trains while In
thll depot. 'fhat the enforcement of reasonable rules and regulations for the admission
to trains in a crowded depot, where trains
are constantly departing for different points
and mrections, is an actual neces!lity, does
not admit of question or doubt. Such regulation1 are not only necessary to prevent
confusion and for the preservation of order,
but are necessary for the guirlance and protection of the traveling public. Aml, such
being the case, the railroad company must
have power to make and require to be obsene<I such r1·asonable rules and regulations.
But such rwles and regulations must always
be enforced with due regard to the rights of
the passf'nger. In the lirst place, the rules
and regulations must not be of a nature to be
unreasonably obstructive of the rights and
convenience of the passenger; nor should
they be enforced in an arbitrary and unrea11onable manner, to the unnecessary hlmlrance
and delay of the passenger, or in a manner to subject him to indignity or unneces.
sary annoyance. And in tins case, though
the gate-keeper may have been mistaken aa
to the departure of the train in fact, or as to
his duty under the rules and regulations of
the depot, yet, if the circumstances were
such, at the time the plaintiff presented himself at the gate, as to entitle him to admission to the train then still being in the tiepot,
and before it had started, such mistake of the
gate-keeper could afford no defense to the
right of the plaiutitl to recover. Railroad
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Co. v. Blocher, 27 Md. 277. But, In respect
to the right of the defen1lant to enforc•~ rules
and regulations forndmission to its trnins in
the depot, the instructions of the court were
as favorable as the defendant could po"'sibly
ask. The defendant obtained. in those instructions substantially everythiug that was
sought by its second and third prayns, and
therefore there was no error in refu::1ing
those prayers as presented by the defendant.
We think, however, there was error in the
second Instruction of the court, in re!!pe<:t to
' the question of damngi>s. The jury were instructed that, if they found for the plaintiff
for the rllfusal to pa.'ls him through the gate,
then he was entitled to such damages as thPy
might find would, under all the cirl'umstances, compensate him for such refusal.
This left thfl whole question of damag"s at
large, without de6nition by the rourt, to the
discretion of the jury, and without any cri' terion to guide them. What compensation
would embrace-whether actual and neces1ary expenRes incnrret.1 by reason of the refusal, or the mere delay, or disappointment
in pleasurt', or t.11e pos::iible losot in bu~ine:is
trr.nsactions, however ren>ote or indirect, or
for wounded feeling!'l-were matteu thrown
. open lo lhe jury, and tht>y were alloWt'd to
; speculate upon them without r1>straint. This
is not justitled by any well-estaulished rules
of law. In the case of Knight v. Egerton, 7
' Exch; 407, where, in effect, such an instrucI tion was given, the court of exchequer held
it to be wholly insufficient, "and that it was
the duty of the judge to inform the jury what
i was the true measure of damages on the is. sue, whether the point was taken or not;"
and the court directed a new trial because of
: the indefinite instruction as to the true measure of damnges. The rule by which damagt>s
are to be estimated is, as a general principle,
a question of law to be decided by thll court;
that ls to say, the court must decide and instrnct the jury in respect to what elements,
and within what limits, damages may be e3li·
I mated in the particular action. Harkn v.
Dement, 9 Gill, 7; Hadley v. Baxemlale, 9
Exch. 341, 354. The simple question whether
damages have been sustained by the breach
of duty or the violalion of right, and the extent of clamagP.s sustained as the direct consequences of such breach of duty or violation
of right, are matters within the province of
the jury. But beyond this juries, as a genera! rule, are not allowed to intrude, as by
such intrusion all certainty and fixedness of
legal rule would be overthrown and destroyed.
In a case like the present the rule for m11aslll'Ing the damages ls fixed and determinate, and
should be applied to all cases alike, except in
thoRe cases where there may be malice or circurm1tance8 of aggravation in the wrong
complained of, for which the damages may
be enhanced. Indeed, it is of the utmost importance that juries should be expliciLly iuatructed &:1 to the rules by which they are to
be governed in estimating damages; fol', as
it was justly observed by the court in Had1

1

1
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EXCFISSIVE OR INSUFFICIENT DAMAGES.

ley v. Baxendale, supra, “if the jury are left

without deﬁnite rule to guide them. it will,

in most cases, manifestly lead to the greatest

injustice." In cases of this character the

jury can only give such damages as were the

immediate consequences naturally resulting

from the act complained of. with the right

to allow exemplary damages for any malice,

or the use of unnecessary force. in the com-

mission of the wrong alleged. Railroad Co.

v. Blocher, supra. The expenses incurred

by the plaintiff, occasioned by the refusal

of the defemlant to admit him to the train,

such as the expense of a ticket to travel upon

another train, and hotel expenses incurred by

reason of the delay, may be allowed for; and

mere inconvenience may be ground for dam—

age. if it is such as is capable of being stated

in a tangible form, and assessed at a money
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value; and so for any actual loss sustained

in matters of business that can be shown to

have been occasioned as the direct and neces-

sary consequence of the wrongful act of the

defendant made the ground of action. Denton

v. Railway Co., 5 El. dz B1. 860; Hamlin v.

Railway Co., 1 Hurl. & N. 408; Hobbs v.

Railway Co., L. R. 10 Q. B. 111; Wood's

Mayne, Dam. 398, 399; 2 Greenl. Ev. § 254.

For the error in the second instruction of

the court, with respect to the measure of

damages. the judgment of the court below

must be reversed, and a new trial awarded.

EXCI<!SSIVE OR INSUFFICIENT DAMAGES.

ley v. Baxendale, supra, "if the jury are left
without definite rule to guide them, it will,
in most cases, manifestly lead to the greatest
injustice. " In cases of this character the
jury can only give such damagt>B as were the
lmn1eciiate consequences naturally resulting
from the act complained of, with the right
to allow exemplary damages for any malice,
or the use of unnecessary force. in the commission of the wrong alleged. Railroad Co.
v. Blocher, supra. The expenses incur1·ed
by the plaintitf, occasioned by the refusal
of the defendant to admit him to the train,
such as the expense of a ticket to travel upon
another t1·ain, and hotel expenses incurred by
reason of the delay, may be allowed for; and

mere inconvenience may lie ground tor damage, if it is such as is capable of being stated
in a tangible form, and assessed 1tt a money
value; and so for any actual loss sustained
in matters of business that can be shown to
have been occa.'iioned as the direct and neces11ary consequence of the wrongful act of the
defendant made the ground of action. Dentou
v. Railway Co., 5 El. & Bl. 860; Hamlin v.
Railway Co., 1 Hurl. & N. 408; Hobbs v.
Railway Co., L. R. 10 Q. B. 111; Wood'it
Mayne, Dam. 398, 399; 2 Greenl. Ev. § 254.
For the error In the second instr11ction ot
the court, with respect to the measure of
damages, the judgment of the court below
must be reversed, and a new trial awarded.
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LIMBURG v. GERMAN FIRE INS. CO. OF

PEORIA.l

(57 N. W. 626. 90 Iowa, 709.)

Supreme Court o! Iowa. Jan. 26, 1894.

Appeal from superior court of Keokuk; H.

Bank, Jr., Judge.

Action on a policy of insurance. Jury trial;

verdict and judgment for plaintiff. Defend-

I.IMBURG v. GERMAN FIRE INS. CO. OF
PEORI.A.t
(57 N. W. 626, 90 Iowa, 709.)
Supreme Court of Iowa. Jan. 26, 1894.
Appeal !rom superior court of Keokuk; H.
Bank, Jr., Judge.
Action on a policy of insurance. Jury trial;
,·erdlct and judgment for plainutr. Defendant appeals.
James C. Davia, for appellant. J. F. Smith,
for appellee.

ant appeals.

James C. Davis, for appellant.

for appeilee.

KINNE, J. ' ' ' ' ' '

5. The jury were told by the court in an

instruction that if they found that the bulld-

_I—I;orﬁon of opinion omitted.

J. F. Smith,

ing was not totally destroyed, and it could be

repaired at an expense of $200 to $250, then

piaintlffs damages would be limited to the
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amount it would have cost to repair said

building, and put the same in as good condi-

tion as before the ﬁre occurred, with 6 per

cent. interest per annum thereon. Under the

provisions of the policy this instruction was

proper, and, whether it was so or not, the

jury were bound to follow it. The undis-

puted evidence was that for $250 the build-

ing could have been made as good as it was

bei:‘ore the tire. The jury disregarded the

court's instruction, and found for plaintiff

for the full amount of the policy, with in-

terest. The court should have set the verdict

aside for the reasons given. Reversed.

KINNE, J. •
•
•
•
•
•
5. The jury were told by the court In an
Instruction that 1! the7 found that the bulld1 Portion of opinion omitted.
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lng was not totally destroyed, and It could be
repaired at an expense of $200 to $250, then
plalntltr's damages would be limited to the
amount 1t would have cost to repair said
building, and put the same lo as good condition as before the fire occurred, with G per
cent. interest per annum thereon. Un<ler the
provisions of the policy this instruction was
proper, and, whether It was so or not, the
jury were bound to follow it. The undisputed evidence was tliat for $200 the bulldlng could have been made as good as lt was
before the fire. The jury disregarded the
court's Instruction, and found for plalntltr
for the full amount of the pollcy, with Interest. The court should have set the verdict
aside for the reasons given. Reversed.
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compensate her for the lnjurle& she 11uetalned that ft was the duty of the circuit
(40 N. W. 809. 77 Wis. 544.)
court to set aside the verdict for that reason? That the court mRy, and In a proper
Suprl'me Court of 'WiR<'onsin. Oct. 14, 1890. case should, set aRlde a verdict for Inadequacy of damagt'e and awartl a new trial,
Appeal from circuit court, Waupaca iR nut questioned. '!'hie court so held In
county.
Emmons v. Sheldon, 26 WIA. 648, and
'l'hlR Is an action to recover damaites for Whitney v. City of Milwaukee. 65 Wte . .W9,
I· ..;onnl lnJurleH to the plain tlrr, alleged 27 N. W. Rep. 39. But, to justify the interto have been can Red by a. defect! VP. high- ference of the court with the verdict, It
WRY in the 1lefe111lant town. 9n Jnne I, must appear from the testimony that the
1886. the plalutln was riding.with her hus- damages awarded ure so gro88ly disprobuml on such hl11:hwny In a vehicle on portionate to the Injury that, lo a wardtwo wheels, called a "dog-cart," drawn ing them, the jury must have been lnftuby one horRe, then being drl\'en hy her encet'l by a perverted judirment. The
hm1hand. When the horse was walking conrt wns able thus to characterize the
bril1kly. one wheel of the cart struck a verdict In Emmons v. Sheltlon, for the
stone a few Inches high, firmly filled In the danrnges there awarded were but $5,
ground, and extending from the side of (which charged the plaintiff with the costs
the tra\•eled track to within three or four of the action,) although It was prO\·ed
fncheH of one of the wa&'on rnts In the thnt tho plaintiff eunered a most 11erfoue
tra<·k; and, by reaaun of the concussion, bodily lnjur.v. There seems to have been
plaintiff was thrown from the curt, nml no controversy ae to the ei:tent of such
received the Injuries complained of. On injury. And eo In Whitney v. City of Milthe trial or the cause, the court allowecl waukee the undisputed evidence proved
witnessrs for the defendant to testify, that the plalntln was so seriously Injured
agalnRt objection by the plalntln, that, that the damagp,e awarded by the jury
In their 011111!011, carts like the oue In which therefor were groRely Inadequate complaintiff was riding at the tlmP. she was pensation, and so Rmnll that the )llulntlft
Injured are unsuf<.• for the use of two per- wa11 charge.able \\Ith the coRta, which exson11 rilling over ordinary country roads. ceeded the damages awarded. This court
The trial reRultl'd In a ver1llct for the plaln- was able to R~ that the verdict was pertUf, a1111el4Rlng her damages Rt $167. 'l'he ver11e, and t.hat,'quotlng from the opinion
plaintiff moved for a new trial, mainly on delivered by Mr. Ju11tice 0RTo:-r, "sueb a
till' ground that the damages so aRIJ('flRed verdict Is trifling with a case In court and
are fnu•lequute to com1Jcnsate her for the public justlee, and unworthy of twelve
lnJurv she proved she suRtalned. The mo- good nncl lawful men, and le justly caleution wus denied, and J111lgment was there- lated to c11Rt otllum ou the jury system
upon eute1·ed for tho (>lalutlff, pur1Juunt to and jury trials." We adhere to the rule
the ver<lh!t. from which Judgment she ftP- e.stabllehed In those caRes. Hence the
peulR to this court.
question 111, does the testimony bring thte
C.:11te, .Jones & Sanborn, for appellant. case within the rule? In the consl<le1·aReeu, Gra,ce ct Rock, for respondent.
tio11 ef this question, we must assume
that the jury found every fact going to
LYON, J., (after st11tln11: the facts BB mitigate or reduce the damage111 which
ahov ... ) Conmwl for the plain •fff <'lnlnre a they could properly find from the proofs.
rPverRnl of the JudgPuent on two grounds. The testimony teucls to show that the
Tb08e are thut the court erred In allowing plalutlH was to 11ome extent an Invalid
before Rhe WHH Injured, and th Rt thP. puln
wltnt>HR~R ror the town tu testify that, In
tlrnlr opinion, the cart lo which the plalo- and db1ublllty she has sufteretl since the
tltr wa11 riding Wa.R unsafe for the use of Injury should, in part at leust, be attwo person!! riding together In lt on or- tributed to previous Ill health. Then the
dinary country ruadH, an1l that the dam- circumstances of the injury and her condiages awarded the plalntln are gro!!sly In- tion pretiPntly therenfter tend to show
adequate to compeo11ate her fur tbe Inju- that the Injury was not so AevP.re as
ries Rhe recelvt>J.
1>lalmed. 'l'here Is considerable teRthnony
J. U111Joubte11ly it was error to admit <>t the above eharncter, and we think It
testimony of the opinions of wltneRRes ~utttdent materially to mitigate her clalm
that the cart wuR thu11 unsafe. That wa11 for damages. Under the testimony, therea question for the Jury, upon all the fact11 fore. there Is a wide margin for the jury
In the r.aee. Thie l'Ourt R~ held In Kelley In aReee11lng damages. Probably a verv. Fond cfu Lac, :n \Vis. 179; ~leHull v. dletfora much larger sum could have been
Tulford, 37 Wis. 327; Griffin v. 'l'own of held not exl'esslve. Perhaps, if the plainWillow, 43 Wis. 509; and other cases. But tiff's tetitlmony as to the extent of her inthe Jnry found for the plaintiff, and, In or
jurle11 stooct alone, It ought to be held that
der to do Ho, tbt'y must nec~arlly have the damages are Inadequate. But In vle\v
found that the cart WRR a proper vehicle of ull the testimony, and of thP fact that
tu be use1l by the phtlntiff and her huH- the verdict has successfully paPsed the
bnnd at the place where she was Injured. scrutiny or the leamed clrcuJt juJge, we
Hem·e the testimony thus Prroneomdy ad- do not feel warranted In saying that It la
mitted did not prejudice or harm the plain- a perverse verdict. Hence, although we
tiff. nnd the error In ndmlttlng It Is nut might have been better satisfied had a
sufficient ground for reversing the judg- somewhat grettt<>r sum been awar1led, we
ment.
are not a.t llhertv to disturb the ver,llet.
II. Were the damages which the jury The judgment of the circuit court must be
awarded the plaintiff so lnudequate to allirmed.
ROBIXSON
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ROBINSON v. TOVVN OF WAUPACA.

(46 N. W. 809. 77 VVis. 544.)

Supreme Court of Wisconsin. Oct. 14, 1890.

Appeal from circuit court, Waupaca

county.

This is an action to recover damages for

l. sonal injuries to the plaintiff, alleged

to have been caused by a defective high-

way in the defendant town. On June 6,

1886. the plaintiff was riding.with her hus-

band on such highway in a vehicle on

two wheels, called a“dog-cart," drawn

by one horse, then being driven by her

husband. When the horse was walking

briskly. one wheel of the cart struck a

stone a few inches high. ﬁrmly ﬁxed in the

ground, and extending from the side of

the traveled track to within three or four

inches of one of the wagon rats in the
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track; and, by reason of the concussion,

plaintiff was thrown from the cart, and

received the injuries complained of. On

the trial of the cause. the court allowed

witnesses for the defendant to testify,

against objection by the plaintiff, that,

in their opinion,cartslike the one in which

plaintiff was riding at the time she was

injured are unsafe for the use of two per-

sons riding over ordinary country road.

The trial resulted in a verdict forthe plain-

tiff, assessing her damages at $167. The

plaintiff moved for a new trial, mainly on

the ground that the damages so assessed

are inadequate to compensate her for the

injury she proved she sustained. The mo-

tion was denied, and judgment was there-

upon entered for the plaintiff, pursuant to

the verdict. from which judgment she ap-

peals to this court.

Cute. Jones & Sanborn, for appellant.

Reed, Grace & Rock, for respondent.

LYON, J., (after stating the facts as

above.) Counsel for the plain'iff claims 8

reversal of thejudghmnt on two grounds.

These are that the court erred in allowing

witnesses for the town to testify that, in

their opinion. the cart in which the plain-

tiff was riding was unsafe for the use of

two persons riding together in it on or-

dinary country roads, and that the dam-

ages awarded the plaintiff are grossly in-

adequate to compensate her for the inju-

ries she received.

1. Undoubtedly it was error to admit

testimony of the opinions of witnesses

that the cart was thus unsafe. That was

a question for the jury. upon all the facts

in the case. This court so held in Kelley

v. Fond du Lac, 31 Wis. 179; Qieson v.

Tolford, 37 Wis. 327; Grifﬁn v. Town of

Willow. 43 Wis. 509; and other cases. But

the jury found for the plaintiff. and, in or

der to do so, they must necessarily have

found that the cart was a proper vehicle

to be used by the plaintiff and her hus-

band at the place where she was injured.

Hence the testimony thus erroneously ad-

mitted did not prejudice orharm the plain-

T,

TOWN OF WAUPACA.

EXCESSffE OR INSUFFICIENT DAMAGES.
EXCESSIVE OR INSUFFICIENT DAMAGES.

CARTh"R v.· WELLS, FARGO & CO.

part of the defl'ndant was controverted by
many witnesses for the plalntur. The exhibition, however, that was made of the plainCircuit Court, S. D. California. December 10, tiff's person In court, and the tests that were
1894.
th<'re made by Dr. Hughes, amounted, I
think, to ocular dPmonstratlon ot the fnct that
No. 561.
the plaintiff could not possibly bnve at that
Thia Wftl an action by James A. Carter time stood upon the plank and performed
against Wells, Forgo & Oo. tor damages for the work the eYldence without conflict showpersonal lnjurl<'S. The jury gave a verdict ed that he was doing at the time or the actor the plalntur for one dollar. Plalntur cident.
moves for a new trial;
Accepting, RB the court must for the purWellborn & Hutton, for plaintiff. Pills· posps ot this motion, the facts to be that the
bury, Blanding & Hayne and Graves, O'Mel- plaintiff, without fault of his own, was Inveny & Shankland, for defendant.
jured by the negligence ot the defendant, It
cannot permit a verdict to stand that awards
ROSS, District Judge. Thie action was him damages In name only. While the court
brought to recover damages In the amount of should and always will be careful not to
-$10,000 for personal Injuries alleged to have usurp the t'uncUons ot the jury, It Is, neverbeen sustained by the plalntltr by the negli- theless, Its duty to protect parties from Imgence of the defendant. The verdict of the proper verdicts, rendered through misconcepjury In favor of the plalntltr necessarily In- tion, prejudice, passion, or ether wrong Induded a finding that the defendant was neg- fluences. Lancaster v. Steamship Co., 2G
ligent, and that there was no contributory Fed. 233; Gaither v. Railroad Co., 27 Fed.
negligence on plalntltf's part, as set up In de- 545; Muskegon Nat Bank v. Northwestern
fense of the action. There wns much evi- Mut. Lite Ins. Co., 19 Fed. 405; Kirkpatdence In the case tending to show that there rick v. Adams, 20 Fed. 292. In Field on Damwas no negligence on the part of the de- ages (page 886) It Is said: "It Is less usual
fendant, and, further, that there was such tor the court to Interfere with the finding ot
eontributory negligence on plalntltr's part as the jury for Inadequate than for excessive
should prevent a recovery by him; and, had damages. though It has the power to do so.
the verdict been In favor of the defendant on • • • But a verdict may generally be set
~lther or both of those propositions, there aside for Inadequacy, upon the same grounds
would be no Interference with It by the that warrant the court In Interfering where
~urt, for the evidence In respect to those
they are excessive."
matters was substantially conflicting, and the
To the same effect Is Gaither '" Railroad
Issues in respect thereto were tor the deter- Co., 27 Fed. 545.
mination of the jury, under appropriate In·
And In Sedg. Meas. Dam. (volume 2, p. G56)
•tructlons from the court, which were given. It ls said: "The forbearance of the court to
But the verdict being, In etrect, that plaln· Interfere with the jury Is so great that, In actllf was Injured by the defendant's negli- tions ot tort, the general rule Is that a new
gence, without contributory negligence on trial will not be grauted for smallne11s or
his own part, he was manifestly entitled at damages. But It 11eems that It the jury so tar
the hands of the Jury to substantial dam- disregard the justice of the case as to give no
Bges. The evidence was without conflict that damages at ~ll where some redress Is clearly
the collision which caused the plaintiff's In- due, the court will Interpose. So where, In
jury threw him from a ecatrold eight or ten a case tor negligence tor defendant's servant
feet high (on which he was at the time work- driving against the plaintiff, It appeared that
ing, tor two dollars per day) to the ground, the plaintiff's thigh was broken, and considbis head and shoulder striking on a large rock, erable expense Incurred for surgical treatfrom which he was picked up In an uncon- ment; the plalntltr obtained a verdict, dam:SClous condition; and that, after regaining ages one farthing; a new trial was granted
~onsclousness, he was carried to the county
on payment ot costs; and Lord Denman said:
hospital, where he remained about five weeks, 'A new trial on a mere dltrerence ot opinion
two weeks of which time he was confined to as to amount, may not be grantable; but here
his bed. These facts ot tbemselves entitled are no damages at alL' "
the plaintiff, under the verdict, to substantial
In the present case the amount awarde<l
damages, and not to the merely nominal sum the plalntltr by the jury was practically no
.of one dollar. The head and neck ot the da•mages at all; yet the jury at the same
plalntltr were, at the Orne of the trial, much time found, In etrect, that the plalntlfr was
hent to one plde, nnd his walk was that of a Injured through the negligence of the defendparalytic. The defendant Introduced many ant, without any contributory negligence on
witnesses who testified that hftJ appearance his own part. The evidence, without conflict,
snd movements were about the same prior showed that bis Injuries by the fall were such
to the Injury complained of as they were at as, under those circumstances, entitled him
the time ot the trial, and that they could see to substantial damages. For these reasons
no difference In them. This testimony on the the mation for a new trial 18 granted.
(64 Fed. 100;).)

479

CARTER v.‘ WELLS, FARGO & CO.

(64 Fed. 1005.)

Circuit Court, 8. D. California.

1894.

No. 561.

This was an action by James A. Carter

against Weils, Fargo & 0o. for damages for

personal injuries. 'l‘he jury gave a verdict

for the plaintif f for one dollar. Plaintiff

moves for a new trial;

Weilhorn & Hutton, for plaintiff. Pills-

bury, Blanding & Hayne and Graves, O‘Mel-

veny & Shanklaud, for defendant.

December 10,

ROSS, District Judge. This action was

brought to recover damages in the amount of

$10,000 for personal injuries alleged to have

been sustained by the plaintiff by the negli-

gence of the defendant. The verdict of the
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jury in favor of the plaintiff necessarily in-

cluded a ﬁnding that the defendant was neg-

ligent, and that there was no contributory

negligence on plaintiff's part, as set up in de-

fense of the action. There was much evi-

dence in the case tending to show that there

was no negligence on the part of the de-

fendant, and, further, that there was such

contributory negligence on plaintiffs part as

should prevent a recovery by him; and, had

the verdict been in favor of the defendant on

either or both of those propositions, there

would be no interference with it by the

court, for the evidence in respect to those

matters was substantially conﬂicting, and the

issues in respect thereto were for the deter-

mination of the jury, under appropriate in-

structions from the court, which were given.

But the verdict being, in effect, that plain-

tiff was injured by the defendant's negli-

gence, without contributory negligence on

his own part, he was manifestly entitled at

the hands of the jury to substantial dam-

ages. The evidence was without conﬂict that

the collision which caused the plaintiffs in-

jury threw him from a scaffold eight or ten

feet high (on which he was at the time work-

ing, for two dollars per day) to the ground,

his head and shoulder striking on a large rock,

from which he was picked up in an uncon-

scious condition; and that, after regaining

consciousness, he was carried to the county

hospital. where he remained about ﬁve weeks.

two weeks of which time he was conﬁned to

his bed. These facts of themselves entitled

the plaintiff, under the verdict, to substantial

damages. and not to the merely nominal sum

'of one dollar. The head and neck of the

plaintiff were, at the time of the trial, much

bent to one side, and his walk was that of a

paralytic. The defendant introduced many

witnesses who testiﬁed that his appearance

and movements were about the same prior

to the injury complained of as they were at

the time of the trial. and that they could see

no difference in them. This testimony on the

part of the defendant was controverted by

many witnesses for the plaintiff. The exhibi-

tion, however, that was made of the plain-
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PETEI{SON v. WESTERN UNION TEL. 0O.

(67 N. W. 646, Ci') Minn. 18.)

June 4, 1896.

Appeal from district court, Brown coun-

ty; B. F. Wcbber, Judge.

Action by Samuel D. Peterson against the

Western Union Telegraph Company. There

was a verdict for plaintiff, and from an or-

der denying a new trial defendant appeals.

Reversed.

(67 N. W. 646, 65 Minn. 18.)

Supreme Court of Minnesota.

June 4, 1896.

Appeal from district court, Brown county; B. F. Webber, Judge.
Action by Samuel D. Peterson against the
Western Union Telegraph Company. There
was a verdict for pl&lntUl', and from an order denying a new trl&l defendant appeals.
Ht· versed.
Ferguson & Kneeland, for appellant. B. L.
Pie1·ce, tor respondent.

Ferguson & Knecland, for appellant. S. L

Pierce, for respondent

.

Supreme Court of Minnesota.

START, C. J. This is an action for libel,

in which the plaintif f recovered a verdict for

$5,200, and the defendant appealed from an

order denying its motion for a new trial.

The defendant on January 19, 1893, received
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at its oﬂlce in New Ulm, from Albert Blan-

chard, a message for transmission over its

telegraph line to St. Paul, which reads thus:

“New Ulm, Minn., 1-19, 1593. To S. D. Peter-

son, Care Windsor, St. Paul, Minn.: Slip-

pery Sam, your name is pants. [Signed]

Many Republicans." The New Ulm oper-

ator sent the message over the wires to St.

Paul, where it was taken from the wire by

the operator, and delivered to the plaintiff

in a sealed envelope bearing his address as

stated in the message.

The record presents three questions for

our consideration: (1) Was the message a

libel, or fairly susceptible, on its face, of a

libelous meaning? (2) Was the evidence suf-

ﬁcient to justify the jury in ﬁnding that the

defendant maliciously published the suppos-

ed libel? (3) Are the damages awarded so

excessive as. to justify the conclusion that

the verdict was the result of passion and

prejudice? We answer each of the questions

in the aﬂlrmative.

1. The message was, on its face, fairly

susceptible of a libelous meaning. The sting

is in the word “slippery." This word, when

used as descriptive of a person, has a well-

understood meaning. It means, when so

used, that the person to whom it is applied

cannot be depended on or trusted; that he

is dishonest, and apt to play one false. Cent.

Dict. If such is the meaning of the word

as used in this message,—and of this the

jury were the judges,—it was clearly libel-

ous, because, if a man is dishonest, and apt

to play one false, he merits the scorn and .

contempt of all honorable men. To falsely

publish of a man that he is slippery tends

to render him odious and contemptible. Such

a. publication is a libel. Wilkes v. Shields

(Minn) 64 N. W. 921.

2. The question whether or not the defend-

ant maliciously published the libel is one of

some doubt, but we are of the opinion that

it was a question for the jury, under the

evidence. Technically, the defendant publish-

ed the libel when it communicated it to its

operator at St. Paul, but whether such pub-

llcation was wrongful (that is, actionable)

ST ART, C. 1. This ls an action for libel,
In which the pl&lntltr recovered a verdict for
$5,200, and the defendant appealed from an
01·der ·denying Its motion for a new trl&l.
The dt>fendant on January 19, 1893, received
at Its office In New Ulm, from Albert Blanchard, a message tor transmission over Its
telegraph llne to St. Paul, which reads thus:
"New l!lm, Minn., 1-19, 1~93. To S. D. Peterson, Care Windsor, SL Paul, Minn.: Slippery Sam, your name ls pants. [Signed]
Many Republicans." The New Ulm operator sent the message over the wires to St.
Paul, where it was taken from the wire by
the operator, and delivered to the plalntllr
In a sealed envelope bearing his addre88 as
eta ted in the message.
The record presents three questions for
our consideration: (1) Was the message a
libel, or fairly susceptible, on Its face, ot a
libelous meaning? (2) Was the evidence suffieient to justify the jury In finding that the
defendant maliciously published the supposed libel? (3) Are the damages awarded so
excessive as . to justify the conclusion that
the verdict was the result of passion and
prejudice? We answer each of the questions
in the affirmative.
1. The message was, on Its face, fall'ly
susceptible of a libelous meaning. The sting
Is In the word "slippery." This word, when
used as descriptive of a person, has a wellunderstood meaning. It means, when so
used, that the person to whom It ls applied
cannot be depended on or trusted; that he
ls dishonest, and apt to play one false. Cent.
Diet. If such ls the meaning of the word
as used In this message,--and of this the
jury were the judges,-lt was clearly libelous, because, it a man le dishonest, and apt
to play one false, he merits the scorn and
contempt of all honorable men. To falsel1
publish of a man that he Is slippery tends
to render him odious and contemptible. Such
a publication ls a libel Wilkes Y. Shields
(Minn.) 64 N. W. 921.
2. The question whether or not the defendant maliciously published the libel ls one of
some doubt, but we are of the oplnlon that
It was a question for the jury, under the
evidence. Technically, the defendant published the libel when it communicated It to Its
operator at St. Paul, but whether such pub-

licatlon was wrongful (that i11, actionable)
depends on the further question whether or
not it was privileged. The derendant was a
common carrier, and was bound to transmit
all proper messages delivered to It for that
purpose, but It was not bound to send Indecent or libelous communications. \Yhere
a protl'ered message ·is not manifestly a libel,
or susceptible of a libelous meaning, on Its
face, and ls forwarded In good faith by the
operator, the defendant cannot be hel<l to
have maliciously published a libel, although
the message subsequently proves to be such
ln fact. In such a case the operator cannot
wait to consult a lawyer, or forward the
message to the principal office for instru~
Uons. He must decide promptly, and forward the message without delay, if lt is a
proper one, and for any honest error of judgment In the premises the telegraph company
cannot be held responsible. But where the
message, on its face, ls clearly susceptible
of a libelous meaning, ls not signed by any
responsible person, and there ls no reason
to believe that it Is a cipher message, and
It ls forwarded under such circumstances as
to warrant the jury In finding that the operator, In sending the message, was negligent
or wanting In good faith In the premises, the
company may be held to have maliciously
published the libel. A. publication under
such circumstances ls not privileged. Tbe
evidence In this case was such that a finding
either way on the question whether the defendant maliciously published this libel
would not be disturbed by the court. Whether this question was correctly submitted to
the jury on the trial of this case, we need
not Inquire; for the1·e must be a new trial
on another ground, and, It there was such
error, It 18 not likely to occur on the next
trial.
3. The damages In this case are so exces11lve as to conclusively show that the verdict was the result ot passion and prejudice_
Com·ts should Interfere with an assessment
of damages by a jury with great caution,
and sustain the verdict unless It appears
that it was the result of passion or prejudice. But the verdict In this case admits
of no defense. As correctly stated by the
trial court In Its Instructions to the jury, the
sole publication of the libel In this case by
the defendant was In making it known to
its own agent at St. Paul, and the damages
of the plalntltr were limited to such as be
sustained by reason of the publication to
such agent. In view of the fact that such
agent could not disclose the contents of the
libel without becoming a criminal and exposing himself to serious punishment, and
that there ls no evidence to justify the In·
ference that the contents of the message
ever reached the public, except through the
plalntltr, a verdict assessing his damages
at '5,200 ls simply farcical. It can only be
accounted for on the ground that It was the
result of passion or prejudice. The trial

- - -
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court seems to have regarded the damages

so excessive as to justify a new trial. ex-

cept for the fact that this is the second ver-

dict in the case, and that one reason for set-

ting aside the former verdict was that the

damages were excessive. As a rule, the

court will not set aside a second verdict on

st'count of excessive damages, but where,

LAVV DAM.2d Ed.—31

as in this case. the verdict is controlled by

no reason. supported by no justice, and is

manifestly the result of passion and preju-

dice, it is the duty of the court to set it

aside, no matter how many similar'verdicts

may have been previously returned in the

case. Order reversed, and a new trial grant-
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ed.

seems

court
to have regarded the damacea
so excesslTe u to justify a new trial, except tor the tact that this Is the second nrdlct lo the case, and that one reason for setting aside the former Terdlct was that the
damages were exce881ve. A.a a rule, the
~urt will not set aside a second Terdlct on
account ot exce881ve damasea, bat wJaere.
J,AW DA.M.2d Ed.-81

481

aa In this case, the verdict Is controlled by
no reason, supported by no justice, and Is
manifestly the result of passion and prejudice, It kl the duty of the court to set It
aside, no matter bow many similar ·verdicts
may baTe been previously returned In the
case. Onler renned, and a new trial granted.
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LOUISVILLE SOUTH. R. 00. v. MINOGUE.

(14 S.'W. 357, 90 Ky. 369.)

Sept. 13, 1890.

Appeal from circuit court, Shelby coun-

ty.

"‘ To be ofﬂcially reported. "

Court oi Appeals of Kentucky.

L. C. Willis, E. Frazier, and Thos. W -'

Bullitt. for appellant. Gilbert & Force,

Matt O'Uohert_y, and R. C. Davis, for ap-

peilee. ,

HOLT, (.7. J. A train of the appellant

was delayed by the air-brakes falling to

work. it was overtaken by a construc-

tion train of the company, which was

known to those in charge of the passen-

ger-train to be but a few minutes behind

it, and a collision occurred, the only dam-
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age to the passenger-train being the de-

struction of -the rear platform of its rear

car. The appeilee, Mary J. Minogue, who

was a passenger upon it, was by the jar

of the collision thrown from her seat to

the ﬂoor of the car in which she was rid-

ing; and for the injuries she thereby sus-

tained she brought this action for dam-

ages, averring that they resulted from the

gross neglect of the appellant's agents

who were operating the trains. It is

claimed this neglect consisted in failing to

exercise care in ﬂagging the coming train.

The evidence is somewhat conﬂicting as

to whetherthis was done in time to have

enabled it to stop beiore overtaking the

passenger train; but whether the fault

layin neglect in this respect, or in the rear

it to do so, failing to check up, need not

be considered, because, whether the one or

the other, the testimony is of such a char-

acter as authorized the question of the ex-

istence or non-existence of gross neglect

upon the part of the company's agents to

be submitted to the jury. They returned

a verdict for $10,000. It is urged that this

verdict is, in view of the evidence, so ex-

cessive that, conceding it em braces both

compensatory and punitive damages, yet

this court should reverse the judgment.

The existence of ordinary neglect in such a

case authorizes compensatory damages,

while gross neglect permits the jury to

award those which are both compensa-

tory and punitive. In this instance, the

jury, if they thought proper, were author-

ized by the instructions to ﬁnd both.

Whether they have gone beyond a reason-

able limit must be determined by the con- .

duct of the company's agents connected

with the accident, and the character of the

appeilee‘:-t injuries.

measurement of compensatory damages

leaves the matter largely to the discretion

of the jury. yet the ﬁnding must be within

the conﬁnes of reason. So, too, must ex-

emplary damages be reasonably adequate

to the degree of fault. The appeilee sus-

tained extcrnal bruises, and her nervous

db1tance of several miles. She waa confined to her bed for seven or eight weeka,
(14 S. W. 357, 90 Ky. 369.)
and suftered from nervo1J&net1s uud sleepleeenesa. Since she left her bed, 11he hm1
Court or Appeals ot Kentucky. Sept. lB., 1890.
walked about her room, and been to towu
Appeal from circuit court, Shelby t!oun- once or twlcP, but has been unable to do
any work. The accident uccurrecl In OctJ'.
t.ober; the case was tried In March follow... To be officially reported."
ing; and thla, briefly Rta ted, wu htt conL. C. Willis, E. l<'razier, and Thos. 1V
dition during that 1:.erilod. None of her
Bullitt, for appellant. Gilhert & Poree,
Mutt O'Voherty, and B. C. Dll.vls, for ap- bones were broken, hut at one time Hince
the accident, If not ever since, she haR been
pellee.
troubled with partial paralyeia, or an Insensibility, In one leg, from the knee down.
HOL'l', C. J. A train of the appellant The probalJle duration of her Injuries h1
waR delayed by the air-brakes falling tu not shown by the testimony. Whether
w01·k. It was overtaken by a conRtruc- thev are of a permanent character does
tlon train of the company, which was not appelir. The medical te11tlmony which
known to those In charge of the passen· was Introduced le utterly unHatlsfactory
ger-tratn to be but a few minutes behind In this l'('Spect. The burden rested upon
It, and a colllslon occurred, the only dnm- the appellee to show the extent of her inage to the passenger-train being the de- juriCM. If of a permanent character, she
structlon of the rear platform of lta rear should have shown It. A perus11I of the
car. The eppellee, Mary J. Minogue, who evidence creates no satisfactory opinion
was a passenger upon It, was by the jar upon this point, and leuves the matter In
of the collision thrown from her seat to entire rtoubt. The physicians who testithe floor of the car In which she was rid- fled say she may recovflr entirely and she
tag; ond for the lnjurieii she thereby sue- may not.
tained ebe brought this action for damIt 111 Impossible to measure with anyaa-es, averring that they resulted from the thing like absolute certainty the amount
gross neglect of the ttppellunt'e agents of pnnltive damageR proper in a cnse, or
who were operating the trains. It Is the extent of some of the elements of those
clahnell this neglect consisted In falling to which are compen11atory. The opinion of
exercise care In flagging the coming train. a jury has been. 1rnd properly, no rtoubt,
The evidence is somewhat conflicting a.s regarded as the best mettns of even a fair
to whether this wttit done In time to ha\"e approximation, and every verdict should
enabled It to stop before overtaking the be treated vrima f1Jcif.' as the result of honpa"4st>ngt-r train; but whether the fault est judgment upon their part. They are
h1y In neglect In this respect, or In the rear the couetltutlonal triers of the facts of a
train, If It bad sufficient notice to enable case, and courts should exercise greot cault to do so, falling to cheek up, need not tlon In Interfering with their verdicts.
be considered, because, whetht"r the one or Litigants muitt not bA left, however, to
the other, the tet1tlmony ls of such a char- their arbitrary will, and be without remacter as authorized the question of the ex- edy lo cases where verdicts can be &e·
lstence or non-exlstenr.e of gross ne~lect counted for only upon the theory that
upon the part of the company's agents to they ttrt' the result of an improper eymbe 11uhmitted to the jury. '!'hey returned I path\" or unreasonable prejudice. In such
a \"erdlct for fl0,000. It lit urged that this I case8 'tt le one of the highest dutleR of a
ver1llct le, In Tlew of the evidence, so ex- i court to Interfere; otherwise great wrongs
cet111i\"e that, conceding It embraces both ' will often result, and the party be remedl·
compensntory and punitive clamages, yet I Jess . Whether It should d<> so le moM
this court should reverse the jud~ment. ! easily determinable In B. case where com'l'he exh1tence of ordinary neglect In •m<'h a pensatory damages only are allowable.
cttse authorizes compenRatory damages, ., because they In part admit of exact measwhlle gross neglect permits the jury to urenrnnt. In such cases, this court httH
award tboeA which are both compen@a- oft.en reversed the jury's tlndlnJt. We see
tory anrt punitive. In thh1 Instance, the I no reason why It should not do 110 In a
Jur~·, If they thought proper, were author- case like this one, but with lncrenitecl caulzecl by the lnstructlonH to find both. tlon, perhaps.
Whether they have gone beyond a reason- , In the case now presented there was no
able limit must be dt-termlned by the con- ·1tntentlonal tnjury. An effort was made to
duct ef the company's agents connected ftnit the coming train, and those in charge
with the aecldent, ttnd the character nf the of It attemptecl. upon not.Ice or the danger,
apr1ellee'H Injuries. While the rule for the , to stop It. Whether theRe enorts were of
nw11Hur1•ment of compensatory damages . such a character as left the company open
len vc'H the matter largely to the dll!eretlon i to the charge of grosH negleet was a quesof the jury, yet the flnrtlng must be within tlon for the Jury. But no purpose to Inthe confines of reason. So, too, must e~- ! Jure 111 shown; and, while It was properly
cmplary damnge11 be reasonably adequate a que1<t.lon for the determination of the
tu the de~ree of fnult. The appellee 11utt- jurv whether the company's agents hacl
ta.Inell external brulRes, and her nervous not been KUllty of tmch neglect as merited
syRtem wa11 greatly shocked. There Is evl- punlRhment by way of punitive dttmnge11,
dence tending to show, ho\\e\"er, that It yet, In our opinion, e. case was not prel111d been somewhat Impaired by previous sented b:v the Pvldence for a vt.-rdlct of
e . 1•111 · . I 111111. diatdy 11fl.-r tht- accident, $10.000, either upon the score of pur1iHhHl1C wulkl'<J to u friend's house nenr by.
mentor compensation, ur both. It Is tru('
u11d soon after rude !tome In a vehicle, a
that railroad companit:H, as to their pat11

1

1

1
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sengers, should be held to the exercise of

the utmost care and skill which prudent

persons would be likely to exercise as to

themselves under the like circumstances,

and in the cond uct of abusiness so hazard-

ous as railroading; but in the absence of

bad motive or purpose of injurv, or a neg-

lect so wanton as to demand the severest

punishment, and where it is utterly uncer-

tain what the result of an injury will be, a

verdict ior such a sum as has been award-

ed to theappellee strikes one at ﬁrst blush

as the result of either prejudice towards

the offending party or an undue sympathy

for the one injured. While absolute cer-

tainty an to the result of an injury should

not be required, yet a mere conjecture, or

even a probability, does not warrant the -

sv_—__—‘_—_——-____—v-——_——__liiiﬁﬁii-____w—-—-—.‘ _ ' ‘T if’ f --—-q
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giving of damages for iuture disability,

which may never be realized. The inture

etiect of the injury should be shown with

reasonable certainty to authorize dam-

ages upon the score of permanent injury.

This wasnot done in this case. The evi-

dence nhows that the appellee is as likely

to entirely recover, and perhaps in a short

period of time, as she is to be permanently

affected by the injury. To sustain a ver-

dict likethis one under such circumstances

would often result in the grossest injus-

tice, and its existence can be accounted for

only upon the ground that the jury were

swayed by prejudice, or an improper con-

trolling sympathy. The judgment is

thereiore reversed, and cause remanded for

a new trial,consistent with this opinion.

ﬂy‘/.1/&;.;.‘ ,J$*%W/4/Q

11en~ra.

should be held to tbe exercise of
the utmost care and 11klll which prudent
personR would be likely to exercise as to
tbemsel \"ell uniter the like clrcumstn.ncet1,
and In the conduct of a buRlness 110 hasardoos as railroading; bot In the absence or
bad motive or purpOAe or lnjurvh, or a neglect so wanton u to demand t e severest
punJshment, and where It 111 utterly uncertain what the result of an Injury will Lie, a
verdict for such a aum a.ti has bt-en a warded to theappellee strikes one at first hluHb
as the result ur either prejudice towards
the oftendlng party or an undue sympathy
ror the one Injured. While absolute certalnt.l· a11 to the result of an Injury should
nut IJe ruqulred, yet a mere conjecture, or
neo a probability, dot!* not warrant the

488

giving of damages for future disability,
which may never be realized. The future
effect of the Injury should be shown with
reasonable certulnty to authorize damages upon the score of permanent Injury.
Thie was.not done in this case. The evidence Mhows that the appellee is as likely
to entirely recover, and perhaps In a short
period of time, al! she is to be permanently
affected by the Injury. To 1mstaln u verdict like this one under such circumstances
would often result In the grosaet1t Injustice, and It• existence can be aeuounted for
only upon the ground that tbe Jury were
swayed by prejudice, or an Improper controltlng sympathy. The judgment Is
therefore revenied, and-cau11e remantled for
a new trial, eon•lsteot with Ull• opinion.

EXCESSIVE OR INSUFFICIENT DAMAGES.
TIETAN v. LAKE SHORE & M. S. RY. CO.
4'84

(53 N. W. 1094, 94 :Mich. 146.)
EXCESSIVE OR INSUl‘‘FICIENT DAMAGES.

RETAN v. LAKE SHORE & M. S. RY. CO.

(53 N. W. 1094, 94 Mich. 146.)

Supreme Court of Michigan. Dec. 22, 1892.

Error to. circuit court, Lenawee county;

Victor H. Lane, Judge.

Action by Frank A. Retan against the Lake

Shore & Michigan Southern Railway Com-

pany to recover damages for personal in-

juries. Judgment was entered on a verdict

for $30,000 in favor of plaintiff, and defend-

ant brings error. Aﬂirmed.

O. E. Weaver (Geo. C. Greene and O. G.

(letzen-Danner, of counsel), for appellant.

Supreme Court of :Michigan. Dec. 22, 1892.
Error to circuit court, Lenawee county;
Victor H. Lane, Judge.
Action by Frank A. Retan against the Lake
Shore & !liehigan Southern Railway Com·
t>any to recover daniages for per110ual in·
juries. Judgment was entered on a verdict
for $30,000 in favor of plolntllT, and defendant brings error. Affirmed.
C. E. Weaver (Geo. C. Greene and 0. G.
<ktzen-Danner, of cou·nsel), for appellant.
Watts, Bean & Smith and L. R. Pierson, for
appellee.

“'-atts, Bean & Smith and L. R. Pierson, for

appellee.

LONG, J. Plaintiff recovered a judgment

against,the defendant for $30,000 damages

for negligent injuries. The negligence com-

plained of was in allowing a sidewalk which
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crosses defendant's main track, and extends

along the side of a public street in the vil-

lage of Hudson, to become out of repair, and

dangerous to public travel, and by means of

which the plaintiff's foot was caught and

fastened in said walk between one of the

planks and one of the rails of defendant‘s

track, and while being so held one of de-

fendant's trai.ns of cars ran over him, cutting

off both his feet. The main track of de-

fendant's road, extending easterly and west-

erly, crosses Main street in that village at a

very acute angle. A sidewalk 6 feet wide

has been maintained on the north side of

Main street for some distance for over 30

years by the owners of the abutting prop-

erty, and by the village at the street cross-

ings. The defendant company has main-

tained this walk over its right of way since

1868. In that year the village council, by

resolution, directed the building of a side-

walk on the north side of Main street be-

tween Tiﬂln and High streets, and notiﬁed

the defendant to build that portion across its

right of way, which it did, and has ever

since maintained it. The planks of the walk

inside the railroad tracks ran parallel with

the rails. Crossing the track at such an

acute angle, the extreme length of the plank

sidewalk is about 27 feet, though the walk

is only 6 feet wide. The planks are laid

away from either rail from 2 to 2I/; inches,

to allow the ﬂange of the car wheels to pass

la'tween them and the rails. The plank in

the walk next the south rail had become

split on the west end, so that a piece had

been torn out about 14 inches long, leaving

an open space between the rail and the

plank 3% inches wide at the end, extending

14 inches along the plank, and narrowing

down to 2 or 2% inches. On January 3, 1891,

the plaintiff, while passing along this walk,

dropped his mitten near the center of the

planking between the rails. He passed be-

yond the rails about 25 feet, when, missing

the mitten, he retraced his steps to get it,

and, arriving at the west end of the plank-

ing, he turned and saw the fast mail train

of defendant approaching from the west. As

LONG, J. Plaintiff recovered a judgment
against , the defendant for $30,000 damages
for negligent injuries. Tqe negligence complained of was ln allowing a sidewalk which
crosses defendant's main track, and extends
along the side of a public street ln the vlllage of Hudson, to become out of rPpalr, and
dangerous to public travel, and by means of
which the plalntltf's foot was caught and
fastened ln said walk between one of the
planks and one of the rails of defendant's
track, and while being so held one of defl>rnlnnt's trains of cars ran over him, cutting
ol'I.' hoth his feet. The main track of detcnd:rnt's road, extending easterly and westerly, crosses Main street In that village at a
v(:ry acute angle. A sidewalk 6 feet wide
hus been maintained on the north side of
::\lain street for some distance for over 30
years by the owners of the abutting property, and by the village at the l!treet crossings.
The defendant company has maintained this walk over its right of way since
181.iS. In th11.t year the vlllage council, by
resolution, dfrected the building of a sldcwnlk on the north side of Main street between Tiffin and High streets, and notified
the defendant to build that portion across Its
ril!ht of way, which It did, and has ever
since maintained it. The planks of the walk
Inside the railroad tracks ran parallel with
the rails. Crossing the trnek at such an
aeute angle, the <>xtreme length of the plank
sidewalk ls nhout 27 feet, though the walk
Is only 6 feet wide. The plunks are laid
away from Plther rall from 2 to 2%. inches,
ti> :illow tl:e f1nn~e of the car wheels to p:tss
hPh1·pen them and the rails. The plank in
the walk next the south rail had become
split on the west end, so that a piece had
b(•en torn out about 14 Inches long, leaving
an open space between the rail and the
1•l:rnk 3% inches wide at the end, extending
H: Inches along the plank, and narrowing
down to 2 or 2~/i Inches. On January 3, 18!H,
the plnlntltr, while passing along this walk,
dropped his mitten nenr the center of the
planking between the rails. He passed beyond the rails about 25 feet, when, missing
the mitten, be retraced his steps to get It,

lind, arriving at the west end of the planking, he turned and saw the fast mail trnin
ot defendant approaching from the west. .\M
he turned towards the west, his foot, which
was resting upon the south rail of the de~
fendant'll track, slipped otr, and was caught
ln this space left by the broken. pia,lJ.k. He
tried to extricate his foot, and, finding he
could not do so, he signaled the train to
stop. 'l'he trnln was then at or near what
ls called the "Stone Bridge," about 584 feet
away, and running, ns the engineer testifies.
about 12 mlles an hour, but gaining speed.
The engineer, as soon as he saw the pla!ntltf was ca-qght, made every possible effort
to stop the . train, but was unable to do so
until the engine and tender bad run over the
plaintltr, and cut otr the left foot above the
ankle and crushed the right one. Both feet
were su~sequently ·amputated; the left one
near the knee, and the right forward of th<heel. It appears that the plalntllT saw the
train coming before he crossed the track tht>
first time, and knew what train it was. lil'
was accustomed to see this train every day.
As he left High street on his route west and
reached the track, he could see west upon
the track several hundred feet distant; and
as he crossed over, the train was some 800
feet distant from the crossing. Plalntl1f was
born and brought up In the village, and had
lived there nearly all his life, and had been
accustomed to pass along this walk; but he
says he had never noticed Its condition or
this defect. When stopping and turning to
look at the appronchlng train, h e llid not notice whe1·e he put bis foot, but says It must
have been on the rail, and from there slipped
Into this hole. This walk between the rails
had been twice renewed, the Inst time about
seven years before the accident. The testl·
mony shows thn.t the hole in this plank had
been there from six to nine months, and that
several other persons, prior to plaintiff's Injury, had their feet caught In the same hole.
and some of them had con,;hlPrable difficulty
In extricating them.
The declaration charges the breach of duty
as follows: "But the defendant, dlSl'<'gnrd·
Ing Its said duty In that behalf, on the 111.At
dny aforesaid, and for a long time, to wit,
three months prior thereto, permitted a.ud
allowed said sidewalk where It crossed thl'
track of said defendant to become decayed.
broken. and out of repair, and one of the
plauks adjoining and next to the south rail
ot said trnck to bPcome split and broken.
so that there was a space between the said
rail and said plank large enough to receive a
man's shoe and foot, and Into which a person walking along said walk and across eald
track was liable to be thrown down, and the
foot fastened: and which said hole had been
left by defendant to remain and be unrepa.lred and ln a dangerou.s condltlon tor a space
of time, to wit, sixty days prior to the 3d of
January, 1891."
It ls' claimed that under the charter of the

EXCESSIVE OR INSUFFICIENT DAMAGES.
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defendant company and the general railroad

laws of the state no duty is cast upon the

defendant company to construct or maintain

a sidewalk across a public street. either in

a township, village, or city. While it is true

that the charter of the defendant company

or the general railroad laws of the state do

not provide in express terms for the build-

mg of a sidewalk, as such, across any pub-

lic street, yet it is provided by the defend-

ant's charter that whenever the company

shall construct its road across a public high-

way it shall restore it “to its former state,

or in a suﬂlcient manner not necessarily to_

impair its usefuiness." In the present case,

however, we need not discuss or. consider

that question. The defendant company, act- ‘

ing under the notiﬁcation of the common

council of the village, did construct the cross- t
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ing there, and for years has assumed the

duty of keeping it in repair. By this act

it invited people to pass over it, and it has

thus become its duty to keep it in a reason-

ably safe condition for public travel. As

was said in Stewart v. Railroad Co., 89 Mich.

315, o0 N. W. 852: .“It was a structure built

upon its own land, and by its nature and

use was a continual invitation to those law- ,

fully having a right to cross from one side

to another at that place to enter upon it and

cross there; and, so long as this invitation

thus impliedly given to such persons contin-

ued, it was the duty of the defendant, inde-

pendently of any contract, to see to it that

it was safe for the purposes implied by the

invitation." This principle is supported by

abundant authority. Nichols' Adm'r v. Rail-

road Co., 83 Va. 99, 5 S. E. 171. The same

principle was involved in the case of Cross

v. Railway Co., 69 Mich. 363, 37 N. W. 361,

and the cases there cited. In Spooner v.

Railroad Co., 115 N. Y. 22, 21 N. E. 696, the

court held the‘ defendant company liable for

the injury upon the ground that it had as-

sumed the duty of maintaining the crossing.

2. It is claimed that there was no such

defect in the planking between the rails as

to make the defendant liable- The action

is not based upon the faulty construction of

the crossing, but in permitting it to become

defective, in that a hole was permitted to

i'cnui..iIt for a long space of time unrepalred.

,In the construction a space was left for the

ﬂange of the car wheels to pass along the

side of the rail. No negligence is claimed

on that ground, but that, -when the plank

became broken and split off sufﬁcient to ad-

mit a person's foot, it was not reasonably

safe. It was admitted on the trial by the

track hands of the defendant company that,

if the plank had been examined, the defect

would readily have been seen.- No claim

was made that any such examination was

made for a long space of time, and, no par-

ticular examination for the last,six years

prior to the injury, except such ascould be

made by the track hands passing over the

crossing on a hand car. Some of defend-

defendant company and the general railroad ant's witnesses-and especially the road masl1tws of the state no duty Is cast upon the ter-testified that the planking next the rail
d<•ft•ndant company to construct or maintain would be n<>arly used up by the passing
n sidewalk across a puhllc str~t. either in trains In. about six months, and yet no Ina township, vlllage, or city. While it ls true spection or the walk ls claimed to hnrn been
thnt the chartn of the dPfe111!11nt company made, except thnt above stated by the truck
or the general railroad law11 of the state do hands. There was abundant evidence on the
not provide In express terms tor the bulld- trlnl that the detect existed, and that the
mg or a sidewalk, as such, across any pub- defendant company, by the least care, would
lic street, yet It ls provided by the dPfoncl- have discovered It.
nut's charter that whenevE>r the company
Error ls assigned upon the refusal of the
>ihall construct its road across a public high- court to glw set'eral requests to charge.
way It shall restor;e It "to Its former state, The questions so raised are fully disposed
or In a sufficient manner not necessarily to of .In what has already been said. The court
Impair Its usefulness." In the present case,· submitted the question or defendant's neghowever, we need not discuss or consider ligence to the jury as follows: "Before the
that question. The defE>ndant company, act- plalntHf ls entitled to a. verdict at your hands
ing under the notltlcatlon of the common here, he must convince you by a preponder<~ouncll ot the vtllage, did construct the cross- : ance or the evidence-you must be convinced
Ing tht>re, and tor years has assumed the by a preponderance ot the evlde&e~_.111.. .the
duty of keeping It In repair. By this act case-that the company were negligent In peI<It Invited people to pass over it, and It has mltting this walk to be In the condition which
thus become Its duty to keep It In a reason- Jt was In at the time the accident occurred;
~bly safe condition tor public travel.
As . that that negligence was the direct cause or
was snld In Stewart v. Railroad Co., 89 Mich. .the Injury which the plalntltl' claims to have
am, fJO N. W. 852: ."It was a structure built sutfE>red; and that he,. himself, the plaintlt'r,
upon Its own land, and by Its nature and was not negligent In such a way as to co1,1use wns a continual Invitation to those law- trlbute himself to the Injury which occurrf!\l.
fully having a right to cross from one side I say you must be satisfied, before a ve11to 11nother at that place to enter upon It and dlct can be rendered for the plnlntlft', of euch
cross there; and, so long as this Invitation and all of these propositions. Your first inthus lmpllt•tlly given to such per><ons contin- quiry will naturally be as to whether the
ued. It wns the duty ot the defendant, lnde- defendant was negligent In permitting this
pt>ndently of any contract, to Sl'e to It that walk to be Jn the condition in which It wns;
It was sate for the purposes l0111lled by the and upon that question you are lniltructed
Invitation." This principle ls 11upported by that the company are bound to exercise that
ahundant authority. Nichols' Adm'r v. Rail- clE>gree or care In . the construction and operroad Co., 83 Ya. .99, 5 S. E. 171. The same ation or this road as ls common to railway
prlndple Wll'il involved In the case or Cross companies; that degree ot care which, in
v. Railway Co., 6H Mich. 3tl3, 37 N. W. aUl, view of the circumstances, .would be req.ui,.and the cases there cited. In Spooner v. ed by prudent management. It this defect,
Hallroad Ca., 115 N. Y. 22, 21 N. E. OOG, the which Is charged In the 1il:tintlff'8 declaration,
court held the· defendant company liable tor -and which Is only that tht? company per;
the Injury upon the ground that It had ns- mittoo this .bole to. be there next to the mll,
8Umed the duty of maintaining the crossing. as has .been described,;-lf . this defect werr.
2. It ls claimed that there was no such such a one ns that ordinary. care .on the .part
defect In the planking between the rails as or tlle rallro!lll company. w.o uld .not discoYer
to make the defendant liable.. The action It, and they had no knowledge of It, then
ls not based upon the faully construction of there .would not .be, ln la"'., negllgencC' suc:.b
the cros!ilng, but In permitting It to become 11s tha.t the defendant woul<L be lll'ld 'l'MfJOn.·
dt·f~ctlve, In that a hole was permitted to
sible. l.n this actlo~. . On the other blind. If
i·cmuil1 for a long space of time unrepnlred. It was such a defect,. It the defect was the
In th'e construction a space was left for the c.1use of the Injury, and .was such a one a~
flange of the cur wheels to pass along the that by careful and prudent maungPment on
i:;ltle or the rail. No negligence Is claimed the part of the company It should have been
on that ground, but that, .when the plank discovered, then there was 'negligence Jn the
becamE> broken and split otr sufliclent to ad- company In permitting the place to be there,
mit a person's foot, It was not reasonably whether they bad actual knowledge 01'. .nqt~
safe. It was admitted on the trlnl by the The rallroad company are not lnsurei·>1: thl'
track hands of the defendant company that, law docs not require . that they be .lnsurt•rs
It the plank had been examined, the defect against accidents, or against lnjurh1s l>elug
would ri>adlly have been 11een. . No claim received by.persons and lndlv!duals w.b1,> m~y
wus made that any .such examln11tlon was come upon . thp.lr property. or µi the . vlclnlty
made for a long space of time, and ...nc;> par- ot It. .'l'here ls danp;er necessarily focldent tQ
ticular examination tor the last six years , the bus1nel8 of managing and, operatjr:ig. ll
prior to the injury, except such as. could be railroad·. company, which .all per,sons 1tre
made bf. the track hands pll.Sslng over the bound to. take cognlzRneP ot, such ·;lll. are llJ.ltT
("rosslng on a hand car. Some of defend- ur;11ly Incident to it; but the law ·. requires
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that. as I have said, the company shall have

in mind the nature of the business which

they are carrying on, and shall take such pre-

cautions as the nature of it and the perils

which are incident to it would seem to re-

quire. The ordinary care and prudence

which railway management and experience

has generally shown are proper. If. then,

the company were not negligent in permitting

this defect to be in this walk, under these in-

structions, they are not responsible. If they

were.—if they failed to perform the duty

which I have stated to you was put upon

them under the law,—and failed to exercise

that degree of care and prudence which is

common in prudent railway management,

thentherc would be negligence." This was

a fair submission of these questions to the ju-

ry under the evidence in the case.
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3. It is claimed that the defendant had no

notice of the defect. The testimony shows

that the defect had existed for several

months; that many persons had noticed it,

and several persons. prior to that time, had.

been caught in the same way at that place,

and in the same hole. This testimony was

all before the jury, and from which they may

well have found that, though the company

had no actual notice of the defect, it was

its duty to have known it, had it exercised

any care. It was competent to show that

others were caught in the same hole prior to

the time of piaintiff's injuries. Lombar v.

Village of East Tawas, 86 Mich. 14, 48' N.

W. 947.

4. It is claimed that the plaintiff was guilty

of contributory negligence in returning to the

crossing in face of the approaching train, and

especially as he testiﬁed that he did not look

where he stepped. Several requests to charge

were submitted to the court upon this claim.

and refused. The court, under the general

charge. left that as a question of fact for the

determination of the jury, and, as we think,

very properly. It appeared that at the time

he stepped upon the track the train was

nearly 600 feet away. He had seen the train

pass there every day for years, and knew the

rate of speed it was going. He would un-

doubtedly have had plenty of time to have

passed over and got his mitten. had it not

been for the defect, for which the defendant

was solely in fault. We cannot say as mat-

ter of law that his conduct was such as to

charge him with negligence. It is not like

the case of one who attempts to cross a rail-

road track with a team in the face of an ap-

proaching train. A very careful and prudent

person might have attempted the same thing.

it was not a peril voluntarily and unneces-

sarily assumed, within the meaning of the

cases cited by counsel, but an act which un-

der the testimony the jury had a right to

pass upon, and determine whether it was

negligent or not. It cannot be said either

that as matter of law the plaintiff was negli-

gent in not looking where he stepped. He

had a right to believe that the crossing was
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that, as I have said, the company shall llave safe. He had paMed ever It 11: sreat many
In mind the nature of the business which tlmea aad bad not had bis attention called
they are carrying on, and shall take· BUch pre- to this defect. It was a way provided by
cautions as the nature of lt and the perll1 the defendant for him and others of the pubwblcb are Incident to lt would seem to re- lic to pa88, and It cannot be said that a
quire. Tbe ordinary care and prudence ,Person traveling alon1 a way must at all
wblcb railway management and experience times look where he steps or be charged with
has generally )lbown 8l'e pl!oper. If, then, being nes{lgent. It waa a question tor the
the company were not negligent In permitting jury.
this defect to be ID thJs walk, under these ln5. It ls claimed further that the JOl"J' were
structJons, they are not responsible. If they ln1laenced ID awarding 80 large a. verdict by
were,-lf they failed t'o perform tbe duty the languare of plalntlft's counsel. used In·
which I have stated to you was put upon the closing &rlJWDeDt. TlJe following portion
them under the law,-and failed to exercise of such argument ls selected, and error uthat degree of caTe and· pradenee wbieb' Is slgned upon It: "If you tt.nd,. gentlemen of
common In prudent ra1lw&J' IDllnagement, the jury, tllat tbla defendant ought to pay
then. there would be negllcenae." Tbla wa this bey, I hope 700 will not quibble- over the
a fair submission of theae questlom- t.o· the :I-• amount. The· good Lord knows he cannot
ry- under the nldence In the case.
laave too much: and yet, gentlemen, as has
3. It. ls claimed tbat the defendant had no already been said befoN you, we do not want
notice of the defect. The testlmoDY allows you to gl>ve such an amount that It might
that the defect bad e%1sted for several shock the common aense of the community
months; that DULDY persons hacl noticed IC, and people generally; but we want enough.
and several penons, prior to tbat time, bad . and It ls tor your judgment, and yours only,
been caught In the same way at tbat place, as to how much It shall be. Nobody else has
and In the same bole. This testimony was a right to Interfere. Ah, gentlemen, nobody
all before tbe Jury, and from which they may else will Interfere." When taken in connecwell have fOUDd that, though the compan,- tion with the other portion of tbe argument.
bad no actual notice of tbe defect, It was which Is set out ID thl! record, we thlDk counlta duty to have known It, had It exercised sel cannot claim that anything lmproi)er wsa
any care. It was competent to show that said, even lf the portion of wblcb complaint
others were· caught kl the same hole prior to 18 made can be said to be Improper. Counthe time ot plalntUf's lnjnrles. Lombar v. sel, continuing his remarks to the Jury upVillage ot East Tawae; 86 lllch. 14,. 4& N. on that subject, said: "Disabuse youraelns
trow sympathv; disalnu1e yourselves from any
w. 941.
4. It Is claimed that the plalntur was guilty t!eellng that you want to do for hfln,-whethof contributory negligence In returning to the er It Is right or wrong,-lf It Is possible that
croeslng In face of tbe· approachlnir; train, and JOU have any 8UCb feellq. Come down to
especially- as he testified that be did not look the law and the facts as the court will give
where he stepped. Several requests to charge them to you. Let It strike where It wlU.
were submitted to the court upon this claim, If It will lea"f:e this poor boy where be Is,
and retuaed. Tbe court, ander the genetal under the evidence, then so be It. But don't
charge, left that as a question of fact for the Sll'e Rim a pittance. Don't give b1lD what,
determination of the jury, and, as we think, In proportloa to tM laj\lry he has suffered.
very properly. It appeared that at the time would be no compensatfoo. We want suchhe stepped upon the track the train was an amount u this brother right here wm recnearly 600 teet away. Be had seen the train 011n1ze as a fah and just Tenlict Give such
pau there every day for years, and knew the a verdict as you believe Clement E. Weaver
rate ot speed It was going. Jile would nn- himself would g1..,.e, were he one of you.''
doubted)7 have bad pleney of time to have It Is not claimed that there was any mtspassed oYer and got his mitten, had it not st.a temeet ol tact or law, and certainly the
been tor tbe defect, tor which the defendant language would net have a tendency to In·
was solely In fault. We cannot say at1 mat· dame the minds ot the Jurors against the corter of law that his conduct wu such aa to poration. They were told to dlso.buse their
charge him with negligence. It ls not Uke mind& from all sympathy, and to gl.ve such
the case of one who attempts to cron a rail- an amount as would not shock the common
road track wltb a team In the face of an ap- sen.se of men generally; and to this wu addproachJng train. A very careful and prudent ed the request to give 8Ut!b a verdict as thl'
person might have attempted the aame thing. attorney of the defendant co1npan7 would
It was not a peril voluntarily and unnece• ctve If he were on the jury. It Is trne tbar
sarlly- usumed, within the meaning of the there may lut;Ye been an appearance of frallkc:88e8 cited by counsel, but aa act which UD·
aeSB and fairness on the part of counsel, 118ecl
der the testimony the Jury bad a right to as a coYer while he wal!I attempting to arouRt•
pass upon, and determine whether It was · the sympathy ot the jury for the plalntlfr"K
negligent or not. It cannot be said either condition; but we are not prepared to a~·
that as matter of law the plaintiff was negli- that the language was IO tar prejudicial H
gent ID not looking where he stepped. He to call f01: a reversal of the judgment. Coun·
had a right to believe that '11e crossing was · llel muat have some latitude lo the argo-
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ment of cases: and. while we have reversed

cases for intemperate language of counsel.

where it plainly appeared that it was used

for the purpose of arousing the passions or

prejudices of the jury, which must neces-

.\‘i\ril)' prejudice the opposite partyJ we see

nothing in these remarks which should call

for any uch rule.

6. We have examined this record. and have

heen unable to ﬁnd any error in the proceed-

ings. We have not felt called upon to dis-

cuss all the assignments of error, but have

t‘X8IIIiDed them with that care which the

large amount involved demands. One other

point demands attention. It is claimed that

the amount of damages is excessive. Not

having found any error in the proceedings, or

anything improper upon the trial tending to

prejudice the defendant's rights or inﬂame
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the jury. and thereby prejudice them against

the defendant, we cannot disturb the verdict

on the ground solely that it is greater in

amount than we think should have been

given. Hunn v. Railroad Co., 78 Mich. 529.

44 N. W. 5%; Richmond v. Railway Co..

87 Mich. 392, 49 N. W. 621; Stuyvesant v.

Wilcox (Mich.) 52 N. W. 467. I am not pre-

pared to say, however, that cases might not

arise where, even under our iformer rulings.

we would not be justiﬁed in considering that

question. It the verdict was such as to

shock the common sense and judgment of

mankind, it might call for a different rule.

and the court might be justiﬁed in overturn-

ing it. But that is not so in this case.

The jury have taken into consideration the

pain and suffering this piaintiff.‘ has endured.

and the loss to him for the remainder of his

years of both feet. It may be large, but the

jury alone had the right to determine it. The

judgment must be afﬁrmed, with costs. The

other justices concurred.
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